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OS COMPORTAMENTOS DE COLUSÃO NÃO INTEGRADOS EM ACORDOS: CONTRIBUTO PARA ANÁLISE DO SEU ENQUADRAMENTO JUSCONCORRENCIAL À LUZ DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO
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O presente estudo aprofunda a análise do conceito de cartel no Brasil, com foco nas formas de colusão não integradas em acordos propriamente ditos entre concorrentes, que desafiam os paradigmas tradicionais de investigação e repressão a condutas colusivas nessa jurisdição. A pesquisa demonstra que o conceito tradicional de cartel consolidou-se em torno a acordos explícitos entre concorrentes para fixar preços de produtos e serviços, restringir produção, dividir mercados e ajustar resultados de contratações públicas, consideradas as mais graves restrições à livre concorrência. Em termos de elementos probatórios para a responsabilização concorrencial, constatou-se a centralidade das provas diretas que evidenciam os ajustes e a comunicação entre os agentes econômicos, tidas como relevantes para caracterizar a conduta. Contudo, nos últimos anos, esse conceito de cartel tem demonstrado limitações frente a formas de colusão mais sutis, complexas, e que não envolvam um acordo claro e propriamente dito entre concorrentes. Assim, a presente investigação analisou criticamente o sistema brasileiro de repressão a cartéis, com foco na dicotomia entre colusões integradas e as não integradas em acordos propriamente ditos entre concorrentes. Utilizou-se, para tanto, o conceito de práticas concertadas, em sua visão europeia, como ponto de interesse relevante, por se referir a essas condutas colusivas cujo tratamento merece ser debatido e aprofundado na doutrina e jurisprudência brasileira. Adotou-se, ainda, a conduta autônoma de trocas de informações como exemplo concreto de prática concertada a ser debatida e analisada, a fim de sanar confusões conceituais e propor um tratamento para o tema consistente com os parâmetros já sedimentados para a caracterização de condutas colusivas no Brasil. Para tanto, na Parte I, apresentamos o sistema de repressão a colusões no Brasil, apresentando as diferenças entre os acordos integrados em acordos entre concorrentes e aqueles não integrados nesses acordos, em suas perspectivas normativa, jurisprudencial, doutrinária, probatória e sancionatória. Tais análises são fundamentadas em ampla pesquisa empírica na jurisprudência do Tribunal Administrativo da autoridade concorrencial brasileira nos dez primeiros anos da entrada em vigor da Lei nº 12.529/2011. A partir disso, foram identificados os perfis de tratamento e consequências jurídicas, bem como outros elementos relevantes em termos conceituais, probatórios e sancionatórios entre essas categorias.
Na Parte II, a abordagem recai sobre a experiência europeia de repressão a colusões, nas mesmas perspectivas acima, a fim de permitir uma melhor base de visualização entre as semelhanças e diferenças, especialmente com vistas a perceber o caminho interpretativo mais equivalente entre as categorias de acordos entre empresas e práticas concertadas, o que se mostrará útil para avaliar e adaptar-se à realidade brasileira.
Por fim, a Parte III apresentou propostas de aprimoramento na análise de condutas colusivas não integradas em acordos entre empresas propriamente ditos, notadamente as condutas autônomas de trocas de informações sensíveis entre concorrentes, para as quais ainda se apresenta um fluxo de análise de risco útil para a atividade de triagem da autoridade concorrencial e também para os agentes econômicos, de forma a contribuir para uma efetiva política de repressão a cartéis do Brasil.
This study delves into the analysis of the cartel concept in Brazil, focusing on forms of collusion not integrated into formal agreements between competitors, which challenge the traditional paradigms of investigation and repression of collusive conduct in this jurisdiction. The research demonstrates that the traditional concept of a cartel has consolidated around explicit agreements between competiros to fix prices of goods and services, restrict production, divide markets, and rig bids, considered the most serious anticompetitive infringements. In terms of evidentiary elements for antitrust liability, the centrality of direct evidence demonstrating agreements and communication between economic agents has been observed as relevant to characterize the conduct. However, in recent years, this concept of cartel has shown limitations in the face of more subtle and complex forms of collusion that do not involve a clear and explicit agreement between competitors. Thus, this research critically analyzed the Brazilian system of cartel repression, focusing on the dichotomy between integrated collusion and collusion not integrated into explicit agreements between competitors. To this end, the concept of concerted practices, in its European perspective, was used as a relevant point of interest, as it refers to these collusive conducts whose treatment deserves to be debated and deepened in Brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence. Furthermore, the autonomous conduct of information exchange was adopted as a concrete example of a concerted practice to be debated and analyzed, in order to resolve conceptual confusions and propose a treatment for the topic consistent with the parameters already established for the characterization of collusive conduct in Brazil. The study is divided into three parts: Part I presents the anti-cartel system in Brazil, presenting the differences between agreements integrated into agreements between competitors and those not integrated into these agreements, from their normative, jurisprudential, doctrinal, evidentiary and sanctioning perspectives. These analyses are based on extensive empirical research in the jurisprudence of the Administrative Tribunal of the Brazilian antitrust authority in the first ten years of the entry into force of Law No. 12,529/2011. From this, the treatment profiles and legal consequences were identified, as well as other relevant elements in conceptual, evidentiary, and sanctioning terms between these categories. Part II focuses on the European experience of collusion repression, in the same perspectives above, in order to allow a better basis for visualizing similarities and differences, especially with a view to perceiving the most equivalent interpretative path between the categories of agreements between companies and concerted practices. Part III presents proposals for improving the analysis of collusive conduct not integrated into formal agreements between companies, particularly the autonomous exchange of sensitive information between competitors, for which there is still a useful risk analysis flow for the screening activity of the antitrust authority and also for economic agents, in order to contribute to an effective cartel repression policy in Brazil.
This study delves into the analysis of the cartel concept in Brazil, focusing on forms of collusion not integrated into formal agreements between competitors, which challenge the traditional paradigms of investigation and repression of collusive conduct in this jurisdiction. The research demonstrates that the traditional concept of a cartel has consolidated around explicit agreements between competiros to fix prices of goods and services, restrict production, divide markets, and rig bids, considered the most serious anticompetitive infringements. In terms of evidentiary elements for antitrust liability, the centrality of direct evidence demonstrating agreements and communication between economic agents has been observed as relevant to characterize the conduct. However, in recent years, this concept of cartel has shown limitations in the face of more subtle and complex forms of collusion that do not involve a clear and explicit agreement between competitors. Thus, this research critically analyzed the Brazilian system of cartel repression, focusing on the dichotomy between integrated collusion and collusion not integrated into explicit agreements between competitors. To this end, the concept of concerted practices, in its European perspective, was used as a relevant point of interest, as it refers to these collusive conducts whose treatment deserves to be debated and deepened in Brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence. Furthermore, the autonomous conduct of information exchange was adopted as a concrete example of a concerted practice to be debated and analyzed, in order to resolve conceptual confusions and propose a treatment for the topic consistent with the parameters already established for the characterization of collusive conduct in Brazil. The study is divided into three parts: Part I presents the anti-cartel system in Brazil, presenting the differences between agreements integrated into agreements between competitors and those not integrated into these agreements, from their normative, jurisprudential, doctrinal, evidentiary and sanctioning perspectives. These analyses are based on extensive empirical research in the jurisprudence of the Administrative Tribunal of the Brazilian antitrust authority in the first ten years of the entry into force of Law No. 12,529/2011. From this, the treatment profiles and legal consequences were identified, as well as other relevant elements in conceptual, evidentiary, and sanctioning terms between these categories. Part II focuses on the European experience of collusion repression, in the same perspectives above, in order to allow a better basis for visualizing similarities and differences, especially with a view to perceiving the most equivalent interpretative path between the categories of agreements between companies and concerted practices. Part III presents proposals for improving the analysis of collusive conduct not integrated into formal agreements between companies, particularly the autonomous exchange of sensitive information between competitors, for which there is still a useful risk analysis flow for the screening activity of the antitrust authority and also for economic agents, in order to contribute to an effective cartel repression policy in Brazil.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Cartel Acordo entre empresas Prática concertada Troca de informações sensíveis Agreement between companies Concerted practice Exchange of sensitive information