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Projeto de investigação
Stochastic Dynamics of Cooperation
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AI Modelling of Counterfactual Thinking for Judicial Reasoning and Governance of Law
Publication . Pereira, Luís Moniz; Santos, Francisco C.; Lopes, António Barata; DI - Departamento de Informática
When speaking of moral judgment, we refer to a function of recognizing appropriate or condemnable actions and the possibility of choice between them by agents. Their ability to construct possible causal sequences enables them to devise alternatives in which choosing one implies setting aside others. This internal deliberation requires a cognitive ability, namely that of constructing counterfactual arguments. These serve not just to analyse possible futures, being prospective, but also to analyse past situations, by imagining the gains or losses resulting from alternatives to the actions actually carried out, given evaluative information subsequently known. Counterfactual thinking is in thus a prerequisite for AI agents concerned with Law cases, in order to pass judgement and, additionally, for evaluation of the ongoing governance of such AI agents. Moreover, given the wide cognitive empowerment of counterfactual reasoning in the human individual, namely in making judgments, the question arises of how the presence of individuals with this ability can improve cooperation and consensus in populations of otherwise self-regarding individuals. Our results, using Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), suggest that counterfactual thinking fosters coordination in collective action problems occurring in large populations and has limited impact on cooperation dilemmas in which such coordination is not required.
Artificial intelligence development races in heterogeneous settings
Publication . Cimpeanu, Theodor; Santos, Francisco C.; Pereira, Luís Moniz; Lenaerts, Tom; Han, The Anh; NOVALincs; Nature Publishing Group
Regulation of advanced technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become increasingly important, given the associated risks and apparent ethical issues. With the great benefits promised from being able to first supply such technologies, safety precautions and societal consequences might be ignored or shortchanged in exchange for speeding up the development, therefore engendering a racing narrative among the developers. Starting from a game-theoretical model describing an idealised technology race in a fully connected world of players, here we investigate how different interaction structures among race participants can alter collective choices and requirements for regulatory actions. Our findings indicate that, when participants portray a strong diversity in terms of connections and peer-influence (e.g., when scale-free networks shape interactions among parties), the conflicts that exist in homogeneous settings are significantly reduced, thereby lessening the need for regulatory actions. Furthermore, our results suggest that technology governance and regulation may profit from the world’s patent heterogeneity and inequality among firms and nations, so as to enable the design and implementation of meticulous interventions on a minority of participants, which is capable of influencing an entire population towards an ethical and sustainable use of advanced technologies.
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Entidade financiadora
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
Programa de financiamento
3599-PPCDT
Número da atribuição
PTDC/MAT-APL/6804/2020