The Unexamined Life on Trial. A Crucial Problem in Plato’s Writings

Abstract

The goal of this dissertation is to discuss the assertion that “the unexamined life is not worth living” (Apology, 38a). We will start by considering how, according to the Apology, such a life is marked by false knowledge claims, self-neglect, drowsiness and a merely apparent happiness. Then, we will extent this analysis to the whole Platonic corpus, in order to better understand the implications of this perspective. This extension will include four moments. First, we will analyze Plato‟s conception of philosophical examination. Although it may seem there is no unitary conception of examination in the corpus (especially because of the difference between a negative and a positive kind of examination), we will see that philosophical examination is always directed at views or beliefs. We all possess a complex system of beliefs, and these beliefs may contain many errors and distortions, which are bound to vitiate any positive examination. Consequently, we must first verify the beliefs we already have, and only then can we search for new views. Second, we must consider the inner constitution of our being (i.e., of our ροπή) and see how it determines the general structure of each particular life (αίμξ). The ροπή has a complex cognitive structure, and it is essentially marked by the pursuit of a superlative good. A αίμξ is thus a system of practical tensions, directed at the superlative good, and based on our views of the good and of how to attain it. Moreover, the ροπή is marked by three constitutive drives (love of gain, love of honor, and love of knowledge – θζθμζμθία), and these drives try to control the pursuit of the good, are always in a particular relation of forces, and also contaminate or transform each other – which means, among other things, that our entire ροπή and our entire life are deeply marked by love of knowledge. Third, we will describe the constitution of the unexamined life on the basis of the structures previously identified. We will see that although there are many modalities of unexamined life, they all have a similar constitution. They are characterized by the rule of a non-philosophical drive and by a weak love of knowledge, and this in turn constitutes a practical system and a cognitive system that are marked by many defects. Fourth, we will reconsider Plato‟s assertion in light of all that was seen. We will show that the unexamined life is constitutively defective or bad because it is ruled by a drive that is unfit to rule and its way of seeing things is severely distorted. This prevents the ροπή from attaining the knowledge and the superlative good it desires. Hence, the unexamined life should be rejected and we should devote ourselves to philosophical examination, in order to attain truth and the superlative good. However, philosophical examination can have different outcomes and it faces several risks. Thus, we will close with the discussion of whether or not these variables may affect the imperative of philosophical examination and the rejection of the unexamined life.