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Fusões Conglomerais e o Direito Antitruste: Operações pro-competitivas ou Práticas Exclusionárias e Anticoncorrenciais?
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Dentre as formas de crescimento de uma sociedade empresarial, as fusões e aquisições de empresas apresentam-se como uma estratégia eficaz de crescimento dos negócios empresariais, seja sob o aspecto do progresso económico da empresa, seja como método de diversificação ou de expansão de
barreiras geográficas, permitindo o alcance de mercados cada vez maiores e o fortalecimento da posição da empresa a nível regional ou mundial.
Por meio deste tipo de operação, observou-se a formação de grandes conglomerados empresariais, consequentemente o aumento da concentração não só nos mercados relacionados (fusões horizontais e fusões verticais), como também em mercados não relacionados ou pouco relacionados (fusões
conglomerais).
Especificamente, nos anos sessenta e setenta, as autoridades antitruste norte-americanas (FTC) notaram o fenómeno do crescimento das fusões conglomerais, o que despertou o interesse dos agentes de regulação económica, bem como dos juristas e estudiosos do tema, especialmente sobre as vantagens e/ou os aspectos potencialmente anticompetitivos do crescimento orgânico das empresas voltadas para mercados não relacionados ou pouco relacionados, e os seus possíveis efeitos sobre a concorrência.
Notadamente, os efeitos conglomerados e as suas prováveis consequências anticompetitivas, ou não, decorrentes das fusões conglomerais são o objeto do presente estudo, mormente porque, em razão da formação dos grandes ecossistemas, entre eles os conglomerados digitais (big techs ou GAFAM) e, também dos ecossistemas não digitais de multiprodutos e multiserviços, notou-se um ressurgimento da preocupação das autoridades regulatórias, seja no âmbito do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Económica (CADE/BRASIL), seja no contexto da Comissão Europeia (CE) com a formação
e o controlo de tais estruturas.
Posto isso, o objeto deste trabalho é analisar como as fusões conglomerais estão a ser abordadas no âmbito da jurisprudência do CADE, sob a óptica das Teorias do Dano, bem como, para além disso, a abordagem das mencionadas teorias devidamente revisitadas. Ampliando a análise, no presente
estudo far-se-á um breve paralelo com os conceitos adoptados na jurisprudência no âmbito das autoridades antitruste a nível europeu (Comissão Europeia).
Among the various forms of growth available to a business corporation, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) stand out as an effective strategy for business expansion—whether from the perspective of economic progress, as a method of diversification, or as a way of overcoming geographical barriers. These operations enable access to increasingly larger markets and help strengthen a company’s position at the regional or global level. Through this type of transaction, the formation of large business conglomerates has been observed, resulting in an increase in market concentration not only in related markets (horizontal and vertical mergers) but also in unrelated or loosely related markets (conglomerate mergers). Specifically, during the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. antitrust authorities (FTC) took note of the phenomenon of the rise of conglomerate mergers, which drew the attention of economic regulators, legal scholars, and practitioners—especially concerning the advantages and/or potentially anticompetitive aspects of organic business growth into unrelated or loosely related markets, and its possible effects on competition. Notably, the conglomerate effects and their potential anticompetitive consequences—if any—resulting from conglomerate mergers are the subject of the present study. This focus is particularly relevant given the formation of large ecosystems, including digital conglomerates (Big Tech or GAFAM) and nondigital multi-product and multi-service ecosystems, which have rekindled regulatory concerns. These concerns are evident both within Brazil’s Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) and the European Commission (EC) regarding the formation and control of such structures. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to analyze how conglomerate mergers are being addressed within the jurisprudence of CADE, from the perspective of Theories of Harm, and to revisit and examine those theories in depth. Furthermore, this study includes a brief comparison with the concepts adopted in the jurisprudence of European antitrust authorities (European Commission).
Among the various forms of growth available to a business corporation, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) stand out as an effective strategy for business expansion—whether from the perspective of economic progress, as a method of diversification, or as a way of overcoming geographical barriers. These operations enable access to increasingly larger markets and help strengthen a company’s position at the regional or global level. Through this type of transaction, the formation of large business conglomerates has been observed, resulting in an increase in market concentration not only in related markets (horizontal and vertical mergers) but also in unrelated or loosely related markets (conglomerate mergers). Specifically, during the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. antitrust authorities (FTC) took note of the phenomenon of the rise of conglomerate mergers, which drew the attention of economic regulators, legal scholars, and practitioners—especially concerning the advantages and/or potentially anticompetitive aspects of organic business growth into unrelated or loosely related markets, and its possible effects on competition. Notably, the conglomerate effects and their potential anticompetitive consequences—if any—resulting from conglomerate mergers are the subject of the present study. This focus is particularly relevant given the formation of large ecosystems, including digital conglomerates (Big Tech or GAFAM) and nondigital multi-product and multi-service ecosystems, which have rekindled regulatory concerns. These concerns are evident both within Brazil’s Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) and the European Commission (EC) regarding the formation and control of such structures. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to analyze how conglomerate mergers are being addressed within the jurisprudence of CADE, from the perspective of Theories of Harm, and to revisit and examine those theories in depth. Furthermore, this study includes a brief comparison with the concepts adopted in the jurisprudence of European antitrust authorities (European Commission).
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Efeitos conglomerados fusões e aquisições fusões conglomeradas teorias do dano empresas maverick jurisprudência Conglomerate effects mergers and acquisitions conglomerate mergers theories of harm maverick firms jurisprudence