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A Epistemologia Antisorte como resposta epistemológica ao problema de Gettier
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O problema de Gettier destaca-se por ser um dos problemas epistemológicos mais abordados e discutidos nos projetos de investigação pertinentes à área das teorias do conhecimento. Esta dissertação pretende, em primeiro lugar, expor e explicar alguns dos motivos principais pelos quais a fórmula relativamente simples da conclusão de Edmund Gettier “Uma crença verdadeira e justificada não é necessariamente uma forma de conhecimento” ainda desperta nos dias de hoje, e volvidos mais de 60 anos após a publicação do artigo original no qual o problema de Gettier foi apresentado, várias questões e debates acerca da natureza das componentes que são necessárias para uma crença ser considerada uma forma de conhecimento legítima. Em segundo lugar, esta dissertação pretende, de igual modo, analisar criticamente uma corrente epistemológica em específico, a epistemologia antisorte, e propô-la como a resposta mais sólida e bem fundamentada, senão como a candidata mais adequada como potencial solução, às implicações epistemológicas problematizadas por Gettier no seu artigo. Para essa finalidade, irei passar em revista e fazer os meus próprios comentários dos artigos principais de alguns dos autores que trataram da leitura dos momentos-chave mais críticos nas diferentes etapas da conceção e do desenvolvimento da epistemologia antisorte. Nesse sentido, irei realizar várias observações críticas dos contributos de Linda Zagzebski, Mark Heller, Duncan Pritchard e Nathan Ballantyne para a fundação e elaboração dos conceitos mais fundamentais integrados na corrente da epistemologia antisorte.
The Gettier problem stands out as being one of the most approached and discussed epistemological problems in the investigation projects pertinent to the area of the theories of knowledge. This dissertation intends, firstly, to expose and explain some of the main motives on account of which the relatively simple formula of Edmund Gettier’s conclusion “A justified true belief isn’t necessarily knowledge” still sparks nowadays, and more than 60 years after the publishing of the original article in which the Gettier problem was introduced, multiple questions and debates about the nature of the components that are necessary for a belief to be considered a legitimate form of knowledge. Secondly, this dissertation intends, in an equal manner, to critically analyze one specific epistemological movement, the anti-luck epistemology, and propose it as the most solid and well-founded response, if not the most adequate candidate as a potential solution, to the epistemological implications problematized by Gettier in his article. For that end, I will review and make my own comments on the main articles of some of the authors who took care of the reading of the most critical key-moments in the different stages of the conception and of the development of anti-luck epistemology. Following that direction, I will make several critical observations about the contributions of Linda Zagzebski, Mark Heller, Duncan Pritchard and Nathan Ballantyne concerning the foundation and elaboration of the most fundamental concepts included in the anti-luck epistemology movement.
The Gettier problem stands out as being one of the most approached and discussed epistemological problems in the investigation projects pertinent to the area of the theories of knowledge. This dissertation intends, firstly, to expose and explain some of the main motives on account of which the relatively simple formula of Edmund Gettier’s conclusion “A justified true belief isn’t necessarily knowledge” still sparks nowadays, and more than 60 years after the publishing of the original article in which the Gettier problem was introduced, multiple questions and debates about the nature of the components that are necessary for a belief to be considered a legitimate form of knowledge. Secondly, this dissertation intends, in an equal manner, to critically analyze one specific epistemological movement, the anti-luck epistemology, and propose it as the most solid and well-founded response, if not the most adequate candidate as a potential solution, to the epistemological implications problematized by Gettier in his article. For that end, I will review and make my own comments on the main articles of some of the authors who took care of the reading of the most critical key-moments in the different stages of the conception and of the development of anti-luck epistemology. Following that direction, I will make several critical observations about the contributions of Linda Zagzebski, Mark Heller, Duncan Pritchard and Nathan Ballantyne concerning the foundation and elaboration of the most fundamental concepts included in the anti-luck epistemology movement.
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Palavras-chave
Crença Verdadeira Justificada Epistemologia Antisorte Epistemologia das Virtudes Problema de Gettier Sorte Epistémica Sucesso Cognitivo Anti-Luck Epistemology Cognitive Success Epistemic Luck Gettier Problem Justified True Belief Virtue Epistemology