When Different Democracies Collide: India and United States, Competing Visions of the International Order?

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Abstract
This article argues that commonality of regime type is not a sufficient condition for peaceful power transition. Other elements that have deserved very little attention can be much more determinant of the outcome, especially if we cross levels of analysis. This article advances a model that is going to apply to the cases of the United States (as a declining power) and India (as a rising power). The model and the empirical analysis uncover those factors, articulate them and explain why New Delhi contests important aspects of the American-led liberal order.

Resumo
Quando Duas Democracias Colidem: Índia e Estados Unidos, Vistas Competitivas da Ordem Internacional?

Este artigo argumenta que a similaridade do tipo de regime não é o único fator que influencia a confiabilidade dos estados em contexto de transição de poder. Pelo contrário, existe um número de elementos pouco estudados até hoje que podem ter uma grande influência em divergências entre estados democráticos, especialmente se as avaliamos sob o ponto de vista de diversos níveis de análise (normalmente avaliados separadamente). Para isso, o artigo desenvolve um modelo de análise que vai aplicar aos casos dos Estados Unidos e da Índia, explicando, assim, porque é que Nova Deli tem vindo a contestar aspectos fundamentais da ordem internacional norte-americana.
Introduction

In his famous book “Diplomacy”, Henry Kissinger affirmed that there was no known country who would not achieve a higher degree of power without trying to influence the course of events in international affairs (Kissinger, 1994: 37). However, as neoclassical realists have proved since the 1990’s (in this topic Fareed Zakaria is particularly relevant) the real question is not about if a state is going to try to imprint their unique mark in the system, but when, how, and in the name of what (Zakaria, 1998: 37).

We know, from classical realism and neoclassical realism that the international system is a permissive condition, i.e., the system “gives states considerable latitude in defending their security interests, and the distribution of power merely set parameters for grand strategy” (Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, 2009: 7). In other words, the international system provides constraints and opportunities for states to act in behalf of their national interest (Morgenthau, 1961: 8) which is, in part, defined not only by threat assessment but by states’ own collective ideas (Legro, 2005: 13).

Therefore, the international system does not determine the quality or kind of policy choices each state is going to make. If we want to have a realistic framework that defines foreign policy making choices we should blend four elements: the structure of the international system, threat assessment (which state is my an enemy and to what degree), collective ideas (how each state self-image is going to influence the way it is exercise power), and endogenous and exogenous shocks (negative and positive) that lead the elites to reconsider their foreign policy and worldview positions towards the international order (Owen, 2010: 4).

India is an exemplary state in this matter: its most important rivalries, Pakistan and China were defined in the 1950’s and the 1960’s respectively. However, recent changes in policy – namely towards the United States and international order – were not determined by these enmities, but by shocks. There have been three since the 1990’s: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the almost simultaneous crises of the balance of payments at the beginning of the 1990’s (Ganguly and Mukherji, 2011: 23, 84) that led to a lost decade in India’s foreign policy. Too centered on solving its economic problems (and in economic reforms determined by the IMF loans) New Delhi was consumed by domestic affairs.¹

¹ However two things must be noted: the first is that the way towards a more open economy was already underway before the shocks mentioned above. Rajiv Gandhi, the tragically assassinated Prime Minister was, according to several authors, the major architect of the elites’ pact between the Congress Party and the businessmen towards a wider openness to the markets, back in the mid 1980’s (see for example Ganguly and Mukherji, 2011: 84; Kholi, 2012: 11). The other thing is that Gandhi’s measures were accelerated and broadened by the loans (and attached guarantees) granted to India by the IMF. However, it is also true that the economic reform in India were also not as ambitious as it is usually believed, and the state is still very present in much of the states’ economic affairs (Kholi, 2012: 17)
The apathy was broken by the victory of the BJP\(^2\) and the first nuclear test performed in 1998. Two consequences arose. The international community condemned India’s initiative, imposing sanctions and criticizing New Delhi openly, but it also triggered a new sort of attention over India: after all, the state was a democracy in a neighborhood of autocratic regimes, was one of the most populous countries in the world, was opening its economy to foreign markets, and now possessed nuclear power. These events prompt a last minute visit by Bill Clinton in March 2000 that created mixed feelings among the India elites. Some welcomed the President and perceived it as the American recognition that India was an important player, others saw it with mistrust: after all Clinton always emphasized the integration of China over India and the President’s visit came a little too late in his tenure. The BJP considered by most analysis more pragmatic and national interest oriented was in power, and according to some authors, determined to open a new era in Indian foreign policy (Mohan, 2015: 116; Muni, 2009: 20).\(^3\)

However, the third shock was positive, albeit also very demanding. By the mid-2000’s India stop been perceived internationally as a “suppliant” state and started to be seen as a “competitor” (Smith, 2007: 6). That came with a price: New Delhi’s elites had to start looking for the type of international actor they wanted their country to be, and how, as a responsible stakeholder, it would give its contribution to the world order. By this time the United Progressive Alliance (UPA1) coalition, led by the Congress Party, was back in the government.

This emergence has implications especially given the context within which it started to happen. On the one hand, India’s rise has been shadowed by the rise of one of its major rivals, China (which has grown so far politically and economically faster than India), along with the rising prominence of other states like Russia and Brazil with very different political strategies, along with the United States strategic restraint (Sestanovich, 2014: 9). This scenario prompted what Robert Gilpin calls “the first phase of power transition”. This first phase is characterized by a period where states already perceive that the distribution of power is shifting but it did not change enough yet to propel confrontation (either form the status quo powers who will tend to challenge the most prominent rival to keep it from rising or the most prominent rising power trying to challenge the status quo power) (Gilpin, 1981: 14).

But, more importantly, and still following Gilpin, the first phase is also the moment when states, both declining and rising, start to define their allegiances and possible

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\(^2\) As we will see later the BJP is a more ambitious party in terms of foreign policy and India’s insertion in market economy.

\(^3\) We do not refer to the nuclearization of India as a shock (at least for New Delhi). It was an internal decision that was the consequence of a long debate that started during Indira Gandhi’s tenure.
future partnerships and alliances, as well as their positions about important matters in the international system. To put it simply, in the first phase of power transition states start or intensify their domestic debates about the international strategy they want to follow and what sort of role they want to play in world affairs. This is the phase India is currently facing. Internal debates are about what role India should play in the international system, now that it is recognized by its peers as an emerging power.

So far, and according to a number of field interviews, as well as publications released in the last few years, New Delhi is inclined to follow its traditional “autonomy” strategy (Ollapally and Rajagopalan, 2012: 79), both for strategic reasons, to diversify friendships without antagonizing its possible neighboring rivals (Mohan 2015: 201), and for value based reasons, materialized in the emergence of what could be called Neo-Nehruvianism narrative, i.e., India’s positions are based on some of the fundamental values and strategic culture inspired in India’s founding father and adapted to the needs of the twenty first century (Soller, 2014: 19).

Therefore, on the one hand, we are witnessing a more pragmatic power driven foreign policy since the end of the 1990’s, accompanied by a defensive moral based narrative that became more evident in the 2000’s. The former justifies what Mohan calls Modi’s “embrace to America” (Mohan, 2015: 113), and the later prescribes caution in world affairs, especially in what regards the values of the international order built mainly by the United States – that, in an overall perspective, India does not subscribe (Hurrell, 2006). This is an instance, perhaps the most important one, of how often New Delhi separates the multilateral order policies from the bilateral relations approaches (Chaudhuri, 2014: 27).

Therefore, in what concerns multilateral relations, India has been acting politically –often siding with China – against the liberal international order and the unipolar world dominated by the United States that New Delhi seems to perceive as dangerous and against its interests (Acharya, 2014: 4). New Delhi is not necessarily acting against the United States bilaterally (remember Modi’s embrace) with whom it jointly works in particular policies where there is mutual understanding and/or interest such as combating terrorism, joint policies on nuclear proliferation, and more recently, in a number of joint military exercises (see MOD 2012 Report). However, since power is not only absolute but also relative and international relations are not only multilateral but also bilateral, while undermining Washington’s led-liberal order, India is also helping empowering its rival, China, endangering its own security. This behavior is puzzling both strategically (why would New Delhi empower Beijing?) and in what concerns the international order (why would India endanger a liberal order that tends to defend and enhance its regime type?).

Taking this short introduction into account, this paper asks the following question: why is India taking security risks to weaken the American liberal order?
The answer might be in two connected elements identified recently by the *Oxford Handbook of India Foreign Policy*. First, there is very little or almost no theorization on the role of India in international relations (Malone, Mohan and Raghavan, 2015: 8). There are plenty of books and articles about India’s foreign policy, but very little has been written on India’s worldview and how it relates to the ongoing liberal order. The second reason rests in a more empirical fact: despite being a democracy since its independence, India has little taste for some of the norms and rules advanced and enhanced by a Western-value based international order.

The most common example is New Delhi’s rejection of the idea of spreading democracy (Muni, 2009: 4, 18). As it was recently written by a number of influential authors among the Indian elites “we are committed to democratic practices and are convinced that robust democracies are a surer guarantee of reciprocity in our neighborhood and beyond. *Yet we do not promote democracy* or see it as an ideological concept that serves as a polarizing axes in world politics” (Khilnani et al., 2014: 77) (emphasis added). Human rights protection by force and the denial of international legitimacy to states that are not democracies are just two of the ordering principles where India is in disagreement with the United States. As we shall see later, other overarching issues are at stake.

Taking this gap into account (lack of scientific production on India’s role in the world) and the idea that India wants to take advantage of its image as a “non-aggressive power” (Khilnani et al., 2014: 12) this paper advances the hypothesis that New Delhi is a more “introverted” democracy if compared with the more “extroverted” character of Washington’s foreign policy and international order, which precludes a closer relationship among the two states. As such, this paper makes two arguments: the first is that there is a history of tense relations between Washington and New Delhi that is a strong constraint to a deeper understanding between the two states. It is not necessarily (or at least not only) a matter of resentment, or of what Bruce Jones calls an “impulse of rivalry” (Jones, 2014: 4); it is a matter of reciprocity, a fundamental value in the Indian strategic culture.

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4 The terms “introverted” and “extroverted” used here to classify the different character of India and the United States democracy have been adapted from the terminology recently introduced by Madalena Meyer Resende to qualify types of nationalism. “Introverted nationalism” refers to sorts of that are skeptical about supra-national institutions and their beneficial effects on state-building institutions while “extroverted nationalism” refers to those who believe that supra-national institutions are beneficial and positively transformative (see Resende, 2015: 7, 10, 86). Adapted to democracy, these terms should read as the difference between a more contained democracy that excludes a number of interventionist policies from its strategy thinking (introverted) and a democracy that has a more expansionist and interventionist policy in the name of democracy (extroverted). Along the paper, these differences will become clearer.
Even Ashley Tellis, one of the major defenders of a rapprochement between India and America affirms that “any effort to assess the future of U.S.-Indian relations must begin with an attempt to understand weather the fundamental constraints that prevailed the development of close bilateral ties in the past have disappeared irrevocably” (Tellis, 2015: 488). This is telling about an ongoing mistrust that has been fading but is yet to be completely overcome (Ollapally and Rajagopalan, 2012: 83). Conversely, Indian elites tend to see the liberal international order as harmful to their interests and values as well as for other states that, for one reason or another, have been so far completely or partially excluded from it. If the order was built by the United States and its allies – and India, despite being a democracy did not belong to it – there is a possibility that New Delhi will tend to see the order through the lenses of this non-declared but existent estrangement.

The second argument is that there are different worldviews in Washington and New Delhi, and both are rooted in the history and identity of those countries. Therefore we should expect some problems to arise in India’s relationship with the international order. The abundant literature about the relationship between New Delhi and the U.S scarcely covers that fact and the reasons why this problem goes beyond the bilateral relationship and relates to the comprehensive way India sees the liberal international order through the lenses of its own identity. To prove this argument it is necessary to fill, at least partly, the theory gap Malone, Mohan, and Raghavan mentioned, and to focus in trying to understand the relationship of India with the world and, more specifically, with the norms and rules that are accepted by the international community.

These arguments are going to be displayed in four sections. The first is a brief clarification of a number of concepts, indispensable to understand both the international order in its different dimensions, as well as India’s role in the international system, especially in the upcoming power transition. The second section presents a model of analysis that will theoretically sum up the components of the problem addressed by this article. As we will see, part of the model regards the relationship between the hegemonic power and other states and the way other states perceive and relate to the international order. The model asks for an empirical analysis that will be the subject of the last two sections, one (the third part of the article) regard-

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5 According to interviews conducted by the author in New Delhi in 2014, there is still a large mistrust among the public opinion over the United States, especially during Democrat administrations. There is a general belief that the integrationist positions of the Democrats lead them to pay more attention to China than to India. The same can be said about the elites. Although there is a younger generation who is more open to the United States, elite interviews showed that the Cold War grievances are still very much present among several academics and policy makers.
ing the American liberal international order and what the United States expects of its international liberal allies, and the other (the forth section of this article) will approach India’s “response”. This last section looks at India’s historical relationship with the United States, its worldview, and consequent evaluation of American international standards.

The paper concludes that the two elements – the bilateral relationship and the perception of the international order – are both causes of India’s commitment to contribute to the enhancement of a multipolar international system. However, it will also highlight the security dilemma that India has so far ignored but sooner or later will have face: the fact that its political actions have the collateral effect of empowering China, the most important threat to India’s security.

**Conceptualizing International Order and Emerging States in Phase One of Power Transition**

The international order is usually conceptualized as the set of norms and rules that regulate the relations among states at a giving moment in time. Usually the international organizations of the new international order are built right after deep crisis or wars. The winners negotiate mechanisms that simultaneously perpetuate their power and interest, including the creation of conditions for lasting peace (Ikenberry, 2011: 36). Most authors point out that the attempts to creating such arrangements were the Peace of Westphalia (1648), followed by the Congress of Vienna that generated the Concert of Europe (1815), the very short-lived Treaty of Versailles (signed in 1919), the institutionalized order after World War II (1942-1989), and the post-Cold War American global hegemonic order (1991-ongoing) (see Clark, 2011 and Kissinger, 2014).

In all cases but the last, the states that negotiated the order had win a war, which gave them legitimacy to start a new institutional arrangement, but also made them sit around the table and negotiate, make concessions, adapt to one another, and accommodate. The last case was different: there was a sole superpower that after some indecision opted for a Wilsonian order that it believed was good not only to extend its primacy across time, but also to the humanity in general, once liberalism, the ideology of progress represented by the United States no longer had rivals (Smith 1994: 151) and have proved to be the most conductive to prosperity and happiness.

We will get back to this issue on section three. Now, suffice to say that despite the legitimacy borrowed by winning the bipolar conflict, the fact that there was no negotiation opened a new era for the definitions and contours of international order.

Furthermore, the upcoming power transition comes with three novelities. First, there is reason to believe that the United States will not lose its position as a great power (Buzan, 2004: 87). Despite the spectacular economic rise of states like China and India and the fact that Russia’s assertiveness has grown recently without much

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resistance from other states, Washington is still the most powerful state in a number of aspects, especially in what concerns military power (Nye, 2015: 8).
Second, what is likely to happen is the rise of a few poles of power, none of them a clear winner or loser, with very different visions of what a fair and peaceful order means and with fundamental differences of collective identities. On one hand, “hegemonic war” (Aron, 1966: 70) is much less likely as most of the states possess nuclear weapons, tending to natural deterrence (Waltz, 2009: 87-88); but on the other hand, due to the blurry hierarchy among the states and differences on their ends, order will also be more difficult to negotiate. When should negotiations start? What are the central issues to be discussed besides “hierarchy of prestige”? Which states will sit around the negotiations table? Which conceptions are they willing to make?
This leads us to the third point that will also deserve further discussion along the article: the ongoing liberal international order is highly institutionalized (Ikenberry, 2011: 28). This can have one of two consequences: either accommodation, as the upcoming powers will accept the ongoing order with due accommodation and few changes; or a more difficult power transformation, if the newcomers do not accept the rules of the game and are willing to change them at a very high degree. Destroying and building new institutions is a herculean job. As theory tells us, institutions are hard to change gradually, let alone to transform (Owen, 2010: 57). Therefore, it is likely that a highly institutionalized international order will be harder to negotiate. So far, rising states have actually been using the order’s institutions in two ways: to promote themselves (Brazil and India have been claiming for a seat in the United Nations Security Council) or to denounce the American-led order itself (as the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization or the last two Climate Summits in Copenhagen and Paris illustrate).
These new characteristics require more sophisticated definitions of order. Besides distribution of power, institutions and the rules of the game, there are other five elements worth evaluating, as they are to be expected to generate more tension among the superpower and the rising powers of the international system.
The first is legitimacy, i.e., “the authority contract” between the hegemonic power and the states that are going to be ruled (Lake, 2009: 93). As we will see there are different sources of legitimacy according to the United States and the emergent powers.
The second concept is justice, or, in other words, “the principles of right and justice [that] are selected and agreed upon” by the parts and that are going to constitute the core of the hierarchy of states.

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6 This is an expression borrowed from Gilpin (1981: 31).
The third element is states’ “worldviews”. In the past, this factor was easier to overcome; both in Westphalia and Vienna, international powerful actors would stick to a minimal base of principles that would allow them diversity and pluralism in a number of matters – especially internal (Kissinger, 2014: 12). The ideological problem would only come in World War II and the end result was the division of the world in two – a Western democratic sphere and a socialist centralized one. There was no further negotiation after the beginning of the bipolar conflict. The end of the Cold War removed ideational issues from the global debate again due to the collapse of one of the competitors. However, the problem of different worldviews is likely to return again due to the differences among the contestants.

Forth is the sense of belonging. As theory tells us, when there is an international order, especially a hegemonic one, some states abide by consent and others are coerced into it (Keohane, 1984: 63; Buzan 2014: 18). States that feel they belong to the order tend to be more cooperative and less unsatisfied once they become great powers.

Finally, the international order has a dimension an author calls “normative approbation” (Clark, 2011: 104), which basically sums the previous elements. A state may strongly disagree with the principles of the order but it might not be able to change the rules of the game for a long time (being a colony the classical example). As such, the order, both during its formation period and its lifetime, has a dynamic nature. It incorporates every states relationship with the hegemonic power, as well as the judgment of the order’s norms and rules (that are also not static). But we only tend to remember this dynamics component – that is arguably the most important aspect of the international order – when power starts to shift.

This more comprehensive definition of international order – that entails not only distribution of power, norms, rules and international institutions, but also legitimacy, justice, worldviews, belonging and approbation – is particularly important as we face the rise of what Sean Burges calls “emergent states”. An emerging state is one that “does not seem to realize that [it should] be happily (and quietly) joining the liberal ‘West’ club constructed by the United States. The emerging state does not seem to want to use the current framework of global governance rules

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7 This was the case both of the peace of Westphalia, that had the goal of allowing each state to choose the religious tendency inside their border and Vienna, where states were allowed to have completely different regimes types. In both cases the ordering principle was balance of power. In Westphalia, equal sovereignty allowed these free internal choices. In Vienna, there was a difference between great powers and other states, but internal choices were also respected as long as they did not interfere in states relations.

8 Coercion does not necessarily mean military conflict: it means that some states are not comfortable with the rules of the game but they are not strong enough to change them.
and institutions” (Burges, 2014: 286). However, it does not mean that it wants to tear it apart.

In previous power transitions, the literature used to categorize states in two groups. The status quo powers, the ones that wanted to maintain the ongoing order because they were satisfied with it (satisfaction might require accommodation, i.e., the recognition of new great power status, but not the change of the rules of the game). The other category were the revisionist powers, the ones that seek to change the order, as it did not serve their interests and purposes (Hurrell, 2007: 3). Those states would not only be willing to change their position in the distribution of power, they would also want to redefine the social rules of the community of states (Gilpin, 1981: 11).

Today, these classifications are more blurred. For example Randall Schweller sees a finer degree of dissatisfaction, arguing that emerging states can be “spoilers, supporters or shirkers” (Schweller, 2011: 287), or, in an opposite way, Miles Kahler classifies all rising powers as “moderate reformers” (Kahler, 2013: 279). Others authors prefer to study the different roles each rising state would like to play in a changing world (see for example Burges, 2013; Narlikar, 2013). India, despite its repeated rhetoric on democracy has been displaying the will to correct injustices that, in its perspective, the American order brought to its region (but without exaggerated claims of U.S. lack of legitimacy). It believes in sovereignty as the central value of the international system and rejects intromission and intervention of the most powerful states in the system (Baipai, 2003: 258-259) It also contests liberalism as a necessary condition for belonging to the international society (Hurrell, 2003: 2, 44), and believes, inequality is not only a result of bad internal policies, but of the Western exploitation of developing countries (Gallagher, 2013: 2) among other examples.

In sum, all these authors and their sometimes confusing definitions lead us to another problem: states that are rising might very well be something in between – not revisionist, nor status quo. They desire to reform the order to fit in, not only in the power politics sense (to be recognized as great powers), but also with what they think is their unique form of contribution to the international order (that they believe they can improve by advancing their particular ideas) helping to create setting that is more fair, just, and encompassing of the desires of other states. India and Brazil fit that model (probably Russia and China are more revisionists): they see the international order as too rigid as only liberal democracies similar to America seen to fit in (Grey, 2000: 1). Therefore they are looking to disrupt it through soft balancing (see Paul, 2005) without completely destroying it. They are willing to introducing their own values that better reflect their interests and “foreign policy traditions” (Crandall, 2011: 10).

They are also aware that they are “global swing states” (Fontaine and Kilman, 2013: 93), meaning that the way they (will) choose to conduct their foreign policy (through “taking new responsibilities, free-riding or obstructing”) and develop their rela-
tionships with other states is going to have impact in the current liberal international order. Of course, power emphasizes dilemmas that were already underlying states’ internal debates. The difference is that currently these “emerging states” start to be pressured by the community of states to make decisions that they were able to postpone when their international status was less prominent. India is one of those states.

Conceptualizing Decision Making Towards the International Order

Both realists and liberals would advise India to join the international liberal order. Among the community of liberal scholars is almost unanimous the claim that the United States would be willing to share power with their fellow democracies (Ikenberry, 2011: 6), especially with India because of its economic and latent power (i.e. size and population), and its geographical position (proximity with China) that would make New Delhi the ideal ally to contain Beijing. Actually it is fair to acknowledge that George W. Bush’s initiative to bring India into the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2005, as well as Condoleezza Rice’s official trip to India, declaring the United States willingness to support India’s rise are part of those efforts carried out by the Washington in the previous administration to reinforce the relation between the two states⁹ (Baru, 2014: 199; Tellis, 2015: 492).

Furthermore, in theoretical terms, there is a strong belief among American scholars and policymakers that the Democratic Peace Thesis will have an important role in the states relations in the future. According to that theory, applied to power transition, there is almost unanimity in pointing out that regime type is a smoothing factor in power transition, and will direct democratic rising states towards an approximation of one another to preserve the values of the international liberal order¹⁰. This has been reinforced rhetorically by New Delhi when the BJP was in power (Mohan, 2015: 15). A lead followed by Manmohan Singh (despite strong criticism along the lines of the Congress Party).

However, in practice, India seems reticent to do so, and there are two important reasons to justify New Delhi’s choice, which are usually absent from the debate. First is what we call India’s “collective identity” (from which regime type is just one of the characteristics). Constructivism develops its main theoretical points over the

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⁹ Some authors claimed that the rapprochement started right at the end of Bill Clinton’s administration, when the U.S. President made an official visit to the country in March 2000, while suspending the sanctions imposed after the Indian nuclear test. However, it was right at the end of his tenure, therefore it is fair to affirm that the President that really tried to build a solid relationship with India was George W. Bush.

¹⁰ For a detailed explanation of why the Democratic Peace Thesis might not work in the case of U.S.-India relations see Soller (2014: 12-17).
assumption of states’ socialization. Following Alexander Wendt’s lead, most authors focus either on mutual co-constitution or on one of the vectors of the “structure-agency” interaction (i.e. how the structure influences the state or the state influences the structure) (Mercer, 1995: 230; Wendt, 1999: 26).

However, we believe that there is a privileged role for states’ self-image in the creation of their worldviews. Self-identity, “one’s conception of who one is and who one is not” (Anderson, 2010: 46), is usually disregarded, but it is critical in debates among elites specially during shocks, as they look for internal references (i.e. historical experiences, learning processes, traditions, values, exceptionalism, the founding fathers’ views) to make decisions, including to debate a vision of how the international order should look like.

Therefore, and this is the second reason, states strongly use first level of analysis’ elements (self-images emerging from internal debates and decisions) to evaluate, on the one hand, the behavior of the hegemonic state(s) (second level of analysis), and, on the other hand, the values that underlie the international order (third level of analysis) they have been subjected to. This evaluation (the dynamic part of the international order) is going to determine the degree of contestation (if any) of the international order. In sum, we can only evaluate satisfaction (and compliance with the order) or dissatisfaction (which entails some degree of revisionism) if we understand how the three levels of analysis interact. To do so, we developed the following model.

India through, its historical experiences, traditions and internal debates (Waltz, 1967: 3) developed a set of collective ideas that by interaction with exogenous factors – chiefly the configuration of regional and international distribution of power – are expressed in its national interests. These experiences also lead to an
understanding of what an international order that is fair and protective of their interests should look like.

Simultaneously those collective ideas are fundamental to evaluate both the hegemonic states’ behavior and the international order that together constitute the way India is going to evaluate the international order as a whole. This detail is important inasmuch as one of the most common criticisms that come from New Delhi is the lack of reciprocity of the United States towards India and Washington’s use of double standards\(^\text{11}\) (depending on the political proximity of the state and/or their own fulfillment of the rules they themselves created). Consequently, there is an overall judgment of the international order \textit{de facto}, (that includes a composite of the perception of the behavior of the hegemonic power and an evaluation of the values, and how they impact India’s interests) against the “imagined” order that India finds both more suitable to its interests and more just for the world (according to its internal values). The more approximate the \textit{de facto} order and the “imagined” order are, the most likely is the probability of alignment in context of power transition. The opposite is also true.

What follows is an empirical test of the proposed model. We start by looking at the American-led international order and the expectations developed by Washington concerning other democratic states. Then, we will proceed with an analysis of how India is responding to these expectations.

\textbf{America’s Extroverted Democracy}

When it comes to classify the United States as an international power terms as democracy and liberalism come to mind. “Liberalism” is the set of “ideas [the United States] holds about how power should be used” (Legro, 2005: 3). Therefore, despite deviations related to securing vital interests, liberalism provides the ideological framework, the set of “collective ideas” that guides American order building and foreign policy\(^\text{12}\).

In what concerns the third level of analysis, (and as a consequence of the first level), the United States created a liberal international order – sometimes referred as American-led international order – that reflects its internal values. Order is always a project with a purpose (Hurrell, 2007: 2) and in the present case, the American

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\footnote{11 This was a very usual criticism heard during field interviews. Even more pro-American scholars/policy makers in India, identified this as one of the most prominent problems concerning Washington behavior (along with forceful regime change due to imperialist interests).

12 Other authors use other terms such as “foreign policy tradition” or “political culture” to designate the same phenomenon (Crandall, 2011: 8; Ambrosius, 2012: 7). However, we consider the term “collective ideas” more accurate as it brings us back to the first level of analysis and its expansion to the other levels.}
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order is based on the “idea of a liberal solidarist society of states” (Hurrell, 2007: 5) (emphasis added) that will in turn, through progress and time become, in its most ambitious view a “world order of democratic states” (Ambrosius, 2002: 7). Specifically, when Woodrow Wilson proposed a new world order, he was deliberately rejecting the classical European model of balance of power, while organization and advancing a new one inspired on American internal ideological principles (Cooper, 1983: 270). Since Wilson’s Fourteen Points, most elements of the United States corollary were maintained, some reinforced and some added, contributing to a certain definition of what it means to be a liberal international actor and how the liberal international order should be organized (Mandelbaum, 2002: 34).

Woodrow Wilson’s view of the world can be summed in four main principles: national self-determination – that required sovereignty and democratic self-government; liberalization of the world economy; collective security; and progressive history. These four main principles, according to Wilson and most of his followers are universal, i.e., they fit the peoples of every nation of the world independently of their history, cultural, or religious heritage (Ambrosius, 2002: 2).

The logic was the following: an international order based on balance of power had proved inefficient in preventing war; therefore the international system should be reorganized according to the United States constitutional principles that enabled its peaceful prosperity since the Civil War. Those principles were to be reflected in an international organization – the League of Nations – that would create a framework for peaceful exchange and favor states’ path towards self-determination and democracy (Soller, 2009: 23). That would lead to the growth of the number of democracies and consequently the occurrence of war would decline. Wilson was a firm believer in Kant’s vision that democracies do not go to war with one another and tend to get together in a federation for perpetual peace, due to a number of similarities that would lead them to defend the same values against putative enemies (Ikenberry, 2008: 10; Mandelbaum, 2002: 67).

These were the principles behind Wilson’s plan to “make the world safe for democracy” and the ideational foundations of what later came to know as Pax Americana (Lind, 2006: 25). The logic was the following: sovereignty (and self-determination) was dependent on self-government; self-government would lead to the natural choice of democracy as regime type, once history was moving towards universal liberalism; and the United States role was to provide the necessary structures to facilitate this march towards progress (Ikenberry, 2008: 15).

It was implied that the League of Nations was to be based in American values due to its “unique nature, distinct from European great powers” (Legro, 2005: 61); that, guided by the U.S. leadership of collective security, it would become “a system in which all nations in the world, powerful and weak, automatically would unite to punish any aggression by any country anywhere” as the only way to restore
enduring peace in the international system after World War I (Lind, 2006: 97), while contributing to “end tyranny” when it was on the way of democratic development (Gaddis, 2008: 13). Implicit was the rejection of legitimacy of states that did not share the United States regime type.

After World War II, the United States became the “Liberal Leviathan”, to use Ikenberry’s (2011) famous and accurate expression. The decline of the European powers after the war brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the top of power politics and soon their rivalry began. This transition and posterior bipolar conflict had two major consequences.

First, the U.S. Western hegemony became highly institutionalized. Franklyn Delano Roosevelt had already developed universal political and economic institutions (the United Nations and its associated agencies, Bretton Woods), continuing Wilson legacy while giving it a pragmatic shift: FDR’s order was negotiated with his war allies (Great Britain and the Soviet Union) and China, to make sure that there was a possibility of introducing power politics (the UN Security Council) into an all-American framework of market economy, human rights, and collective security. However, the beginning of the Cold War led President Henry Truman to make an addition to his predecessor’s agenda: it was necessary to build a separated peace among democracies (NATO and the permanent security alliance with Japan) and to reinforce the idea of democratic legitimacy (Ruggie, 1996: 38, 40) to face an ideological enemy. The second consequence was a change in the relationships with states outside the permanent alliances spectrum. Since the beginning the of Cold War, the rivals of democracy were no longer states yet to transition to democracy – as in Wilson’s time – but Communist states, or states that sympathized with Communism. As we will see in the next section, the Cold War opened a wound in the U.S.-Indian relations that is yet to be completely overcome (Kapur, 2010: 265).

As goes without saying, the United States won the Cold War and the major consequence of the victory was the reinforcement of the liberal international order. Wilsonian principles were further institutionalized in international organizations (Paris, 2004: 3); market economy became the official tool for pushing for democratization around the world; there was a reinforcement of long term commitments among democracies – materialized first and foremost in the enlargement of NATO to the former Warsaw Pact countries (Golgeier, 1999: 57); and the individual became the center of international law, allowing forceful interventions, robust arbitrations, and a considerable number of state-building operations planned under the twin values of democracy and market economy (Paris, 2004: 19). After the end of the Cold War, the United States were a fully “extroverted democracy”: the American hegemony was globalized and consolidated along with a radicalization of the liberal values, and the crystallization of democracy as the only legitimate regime type in the world (Collier, 2009: 3).
This was manifested in several ways: one was the development of the “End of History” narrative. Its argument was that the U.S. had defeated all forms of progressive approaches to political affairs and it was a matter of time until democracy and market economy would spread around the globe (Fukuyama, 1992: xi). The liberal version of the theory of modernity (see Lipset, 1960) was rescued, and there was a consensus in Washington that the U.S. should pursue policies to stimulate market openness that would lead to the creation of a middle class ready to progressively demand more freedom (Bacevich, 2002: 101). As the “End of History” became the dominant doctrine, it introduced the possibility for the United States to act openly in the name of those values. Debates on “promoting democracy”, “aiding democracy” and “supporting democracy” became widespread (Carothers, 1999; Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000). This narrative also consolidated the idea that America was the model that all democracies should follow (Oren, 1999: 267).

As such, it is not surprising that liberal internationalists became a very preeminent group among decision makers in Washington, introducing a number of changes in the international order. The most important was a normative revolution: state sovereignty was removed from its central place at the heart of international law and replaced by the individual (Badescu, 2011: 20; Paris, 2004: 11). The “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) rule was instituted by the United Nations in 2005, creating a legal framework that allowed interference and even intervention on other states’ affairs in case of incapacity (or impossibility) of fulfillment of the social contract.

Convinced that these rules would be generally accepted by any democratic power, welcome to join the “opened” and “flexible” liberal order (Ikenberry, 2011: 20) – a bipartisan commission summed up the necessary attributes to be accepted in a hypothetical league of democracies (yet another incarnation of Wilson’s project) for the twenty first century:

“Membership would be predicated not on an abstract definition of liberal democracy or on the labels attached by states to other states, but rather by the obligations that members are willing to take on themselves. Members would have to: pledge not to use force or plan to use force against one another; commit to holding multiparty, free-and-fair elections at regular intervals; guarantee civil and political rights for their citizens enforceable by an independent judiciary; and accept that states have a “responsibility to protect” their citizens from avoidable catastrophe and that the international community has a right to act if they fail to uphold it” (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006: 26).

This excerpt sums up the ongoing rigidity of what is the expected behavior of a democracy in the international system according to the declining but still hegemonic power. Democratic international actors are expected to maintain and enhance their democratic internal practices while being an example to their neighbors; to
comply with the liberal international order; to open their economies to globalization; to participate in collective security; to accept and participate in the R2P; and to agree with the idea that autocracies are less legitimate actors in the international system (Doyle, 2012: 25).

Two things must be added before we turn to India’s reaction. First, the liberal international order had, so far, positive results. It kept the Western democracies cohesive, allowing economic prosperity and a degree of stability (the provision of public goods that Hegemonic Stability Theory mentions widely)\(^{13}\), and was key to the Western victory in the Cold War. Second, Barack Obama’s administration was a lot less enthusiastic about this surge of liberal internationalism. It does not mean it totally disappeared, as the war in Libya and the Obama Doctrine are evidences of, but the war fatigue, the strategic restraint\(^{14}\), Obama’s penchant for more dialogue and less interventionism are reasons to believe on a less interventionist pattern that might or might not be followed by his successor.

However, this more recent period before Barack Obama, along with tensions during the Cold War, deeply influenced India’s current perceptions towards the United States, both in what concerns its overall behavior and the values it imprinted on the liberal international order – in relation to which, India “never fully felt part of” (Stuenkel, 2001: 179). As Hurrell (2006) also describes despite years oscillating between tensions and some sort of neglect, the U.S. seems to expect at least cooperation from India as the regional Asian power. But India’s answer to Washington demands has been mixed, to say the least. Many may have benefited with this American Wilsonianism and the United States distribution of public international goods (including India that received international aid in a few moments of its history). But that did come with a price.

India Introverted Democracy

*The Bilateral Relations with the United States*

The problems started in 1917-1919 when the Indian Liberation Movement realized that President Wilson was not referring to their claims of independence when he pledged for self-determination (Manela, 2007: xxi). That promise was only directed to the Western European states from the dismantled Austro-Hungary Empire. Hopes fell again on the ground when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared more than once his abomination for colonialism, but decided to do nothing about

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\(^{13}\) See for example Keohane (1984) and Gilpin (2001).

\(^{14}\) In the last State of the Union Address in January 2016, the President acknowledged that the world was already multipolar.

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it, as he did not want to be hostile to its major allied – Great Britain (Khilnani, 1999: x) – and he believed colonialism was a condemned institution that would fade by itself. It was just a matter of time.

During the Cold War, India started to be seen, almost since the beginning, as one of the frontline sympathizers of the Soviet Union. Nehru claimed repeatedly that the Non-Aligned Movement was a third way for developing countries who did not want to take any side on the bipolar conflict. They could “keep away from power politics of groups align against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may lead again to disasters at an even larger scale” (Nehru, 1946 quoted by Raghavan, 2010: 20). India’s choice and leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement as well as its unequivocal preference for a centralized economy (Tharoor, 2002: 77) were perceived as moves against the United States, only to be confirmed by Indira Gandhi’s signing of a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1971 (Mansingh, 2015: 106).

From an Indian perspective, the United States struggle against Communism deeply jeopardized India’s position both internationally and regionally. Washington did not support India in the United Nations dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, and made an agreement with Islamabad in 1954 that empowered India’s neighbor and enemy (Kapur, 2010: 265). Finally, in 1971, Kissinger and Nixon started the détente policy with China, leaving India, then the only democracy in the region, and a non-aggressive power, isolated (Tharoor, 2012: 9) and in the verge of a war with Pakistan over Bangladesh.

As such, Indian tends to see the agreement with the Soviet Union in 1971 as the only possible way out of the third Indo-Pakistani War and only possible line of defense from Washington’s quasi-alliance with China (Raghavan, 2014: 237). On top of this, the nuclear proliferation problem also caused a number of tensions, especially due to the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Act (NNPA), a bill passed during Jimmy Carter’s administration (Chaudari, 2014: 220) and the sanctions imposed by the U.S. after the first Indian nuclear trials in May 1998. As suggested before, tensions alleviated with Bill Clinton’s official visit in 2000, which was meant to create the opportunity for a fresh start in the relationship between the “two world largest democracies”. George W. Bush followed the lead – due to reasons already explained – but the enthusiasm lowered again in the Barack Obama tenure and the UPA2 administration.

This also explains India’s negative reaction when Obama announced the “pivot to Asia” policy – that brought back old fears of intromission and imperialism. Even today, New Delhi tends to see Washington as “the primary imperial power after the Second World War” (Bajpai, 2015: 21) which directly shocks with India’s strong notion of “post-colonial sovereignty” (Bajpai, 2015: 24) still very influenced to this day by “a deeply rooted aversion to both colonialism and imperialism” (Ganguly, 2013: 6). Some authors’ say that this resentment is fading away, or at least it should
be (Tharoor, 2012: 15) but many still believe that “even 60 years after the end of the British colonial rule, post-colonial rationalizations (...) remain alive” (Ganguly, 2013: 6). This makes India’s cooperation with the United States hegemony difficult in many ways.

**An Introverted Democracy**

Its own comparison with the United States led New Delhi to look for a place in the world where it could still be a democracy (despite its difficult neighborhood and estrangement with the United States) without being forced to follow Washington’s footsteps, especially in what concerns promotion of democracy. In other words, as the model predicts, India resorted to its own collective ideas to come up with its renewed worldview.

This led to an internal debate (still ongoing). However, it is already possible to identify a raising narrative around concepts from the past that boasts the endorsement of many among elites around and public opinion (Soller, 2014: 17). First and foremost, India believes on its ability to become a great power (Khilnani et al., 2014: xxix), with size, structure and political positions to represent many other southern countries’ interests through a “mediatory” role, gained by being one of the most heterogeneous nations in the world (Bajpai, 2015: 42). Being a non-aggressive power, India is willing to be regionally predominant (without creating fear and resistance in other states) while using the same concept as a way of legitimizing its more global aspirations. Its peacefulness is also a way of reassuring other great powers that New Delhi will not generate unnecessary conflict and will try to solve any problem that arises through peaceful means.

Second, there is the tradition that started with Nehru’s of the almost sacred concept of “autonomy” in Indian foreign policy (sometimes the terms used are “freedom” or “independence”), that dictates that India can never lose its independency of decision making (Tharoor, 2012: 9). As recently reinforced by an author “India maintains a serious preoccupation with autonomy” (Narlikar, 2013: 598). Together, New Delhi’s almost pacifist way of relating with other states (Pardesi, 2007: 211) and carefulness of being “not too interventive in the region” (Xavier, 2013: 252), does not preclude the existence of an authoritative role. On the contrary: it gives India a specificity related to off-shore balancing (in a continent of aggressive states) and leadership by example, which creates a relationship with the value of democracy that can be translated by an “isolationist stance [that] is often associated with a ‘prudent’ realist India, a democratic city upon the hill that refuses to impose its democratic regime as an ‘advantage’ and a ‘model’” (Xavier, 2013: 252).

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15 Besides this relative consensus, it is important to remember that India in a *de facto* democracy. Therefore there is dissent and it is impossible to determine if the dissent is going to grow or not.
Therefore, it is not fair to say that India does totally disregard democracy as an international value. It is just a different sort of democratic foreign policy. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once wrote “any meaningful solution must be based on principles of democratic pluralism and inclusivism, the respect for law and of diversity of states” (Singh quoted by Muni, 2009: 16) (emphasis added). Someone familiar with India’s history could easily hear the echoes of Nehru’s conception of India as a democratic actor: non-entanglement, and the ideas of “freedom” and “self-respect” (Chauduri, 2014: 68). As such, it is central to acknowledge that when Indian leaders refer to a “democratic order” they mean two things: that each state is free to have the regime type, religion, or culture of its choosing (as long as they do respect other states rights and integrity), and to an international order where all great powers are recognized as such, independently from their regime type. Unlike the United States, it does not mean that democracy is the only legitimate regime type.

Third, India is not demoting itself from its democratic role in the world. But it prefers to lead by example. This is why New Delhi has been developing stronger relationships with other democracies in Asia (such Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Japan) while betting on institutionalizing some democratic values (ASEAN and the Bali Initiative are good examples). At a global level India is founding member of IBSA (with Brazil and South Africa), a consulting mechanism to curtail problems that are common to southern democracies. But New Delhi always acts democratically within the limits of its introversion, imposed, in the past, by the regional and the international systems (for most its history India was surrounded by autocracies, and until recently it was a relatively weak state) and now self imposed.

This behavior has disadvantages. On the one hand, a state that puts so many limits on the use of force (as a normative imperative) might be seen a “passive” (Khilnani et al., 2014: 12); on the other, India’s conception of international democracy, expressed in Singh’s words, differs considerably from the U.S. conception, precluding the possibility of a strong partnership based on values, between the two states. However, it also has had, so far, a few advantages: despite Indian de facto very powerful position in South East Asia, other states, even non-democracies, tend to see it as trustable state, essential to the traditional multi-vector foreign policy in a troubling neighborhood (Xavier, 2007: 5). It can also help multilaterally: instead of allying in a group against another, India found a “distinct break from the motivations of multilateralism in the twentieth century” (Saran, 2015: 624). In other words, one

16 So far, we believe it became evident that India perceives itself as a southern democracy, with responsibilities of leadership over southern countries. It does not mean automatic confrontation with the West, but the representation of a number of people who had a different history from the United States and its allies.
of the other sides of the coin of autonomy is what an author calls “plurilateral engagements [that] essentially serve to position India firmly within the established order and in some instances at the global high table of governance” (Saran, 2015: 624). These are also “groupings that act as bridge between India’s old avatars of NAM and G77 and its new role as an emerging power” (Saran, 2015: 624), which shows again some attachment with its own roots. Therefore, its democratic but non-discriminatory foreign policy gave India the possibility of being engaged, multilaterally in the world but not entangled to to anyone in particular. India is a democratic international actor, but not in sense of de-legitimizing non-democratic states. Not only for the reasons already suggested – its geographical location in a troubling neighborhood, the advantageous cordial relations with non-democratic states, a particular definition of democracy (different from the United States), and a scrupulous and introverted use of democracy as an international value – but also, and maybe more importantly, the political will of securing autonomy, that is still, and it will likely continue to be – a more important internal/external value than democracy.

An Unfair International Order
Stephen Cohen makes a persuasive link between the first and third problems, related to the perception of the U.S. behavior and the perception of fairness or lack of it in what concerns the international order (expressed in our model): “The United States and India have clearly grown distinct over the years, not only because of the abundant misperceptions on both sides but also because of fundamental differences on the best way of peacefully organize the international system, the nature of the Soviet Union, the virtue (or sins) of alliances, and above all, the degree to each in Indian eyes, the United States resisted India’s emergence as a major power” (Cohen, 2001: 287, 288).

A few of the problems are partly solved. In the last State of the Union Address, President Obama declared that the world is already multipolar. The Soviet Union is no longer the U.S. rival. However, other problems, especially in what concerns justice in the international order and the virtue of permanent alliances, are not. As mentioned before, three values (again, inherited from Nehru) underlie India’s identity: autonomy, democracy, and pluralism. Those values were learned through the experience of colonialism. Independence generated autonomy, and the leaders of the newborn country chose democracy (as well as secularism and the rule of law) as the basis to create a common framework of equality for the future of the Indian people, immersed, since inmemorial times, in religious, cultural and linguistic diversity (Guha, 2007: 103) – hence pluralism is almost natural in the subcontinent. As the model presupposes these internal values have international order equivalents – which India will tend to try to project in the international system, as Kiss-
inger and other classical and neoclassical realists quoted right at the beginning of this article assert. Five values emanate from “autonomy”. One of them is international pluralism. Democracy is the best regime for India, and the most desirable one for every country in the world, but all states are entitled to their own model of development and society. Two other values are equality, as every state is entitled to the same rights under international law (therefore, there is a rejection of the America idea that democracy is the basis of legitimacy), which is attached to reciprocity. States are perceived by India in equality of circumstances; the dichotomy New Delhi prefers, to distinguish friends from foes is reciprocity, or, in other words, the way a state behave towards New Delhi, independently of regime type, is going to define their relationship.

Thus, the most important international organization is the United Nations, universal (any state is welcome) but not universalist (in the sense that it does not exclude in terms of regime type), as the UN is the guardian sovereignty (the fourth value emanating from autonomy), which, for reasons already explained, is seen as a central and inalienable right. This also closes the circle of democracy: it is expandable, perhaps, but only to the point it does not interfere with sovereignty. And that, from an Indian perspective, seems that is not up for negotiation.

The last value is pluralism. Being India a heterogeneous nation and subscribing values of negative freedom (see note 15) India believes that exclusionism is not only unfair, but dangerous. It created international institutions that are against Indian interests. It prefers an international environmental regime where great powers do not jeopardize the development of industrializing countries, and it believes that human rights are more secure through sovereignty than through the will of a discretionary power that due to its position in the international system cannot be truly tamed.

As such, the Indian “imaginary” order is multipolar, pluralist, equalitarian (in the Vattelian sense), based on reciprocity and sovereignty. Its introversion and taste for autonomy will tend to make it try to correct the perceived liabilities of the American order, especially its more extroverted incarnation.

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17 My research makes me believe that this sort of international pluralism has two origins: one was already mentioned – the inherent pluralism of the Indian society. The other origin is western pluralist liberalism. The Indian Liberation Movement took many its ideas of India from Western Europe where philosophers like Adam Smith, David Hume and Voltaire accepted and enhanced the concept that there was no single way of organizing societies, relaying heavily in the idea of context. These two origins were harmonized into a single concept of pluralism very present in the Indian discourse, policy making, and “imagined” order.

18 For reasons of space it is not possible to discuss the questions related to other international regimes that India dislikes.
Final Notes: Bond to Disagree?

Independently on how the debate is going to turn out, if we look at the model developed in this article and the description of India’s response to the U.S. challenges, it is fair to acknowledge that New Delhi is uncomfortable both in its relationship with its the United States (except for a few positive moments described above) and the liberal international order Washington created during and after World War II.

Therefore, it is natural that India will look for its own role in a new world order that allows it at least two things: to try to retain, as a long as possible its profile as an “introverted democracy” (based on its own self-image) that helps its regional relationships and its global multi-vector policy; and to keep on making use of its international influence to stop the United States from being an “extroverted democracy”; that, according to many among Indian elites, jeopardizes Indian interests and specially goes against its most cherished values.

Due to its relative weakness compared to the Washington, New Delhi has actively tried to mitigate the U.S. power in three ways: by aligning with other states, namely the BRICS, to build alternatives to the liberal international order; by using the existing international institutions to contest the United States power (especially norms related to human rights, economic ordering, climate change regimes, or even to stand by states over which the U.S. has reservations, such as Iran); and by claiming India’s right of a greater intervention in international policy and norms making, that could be achieved if the international organizations would accept further leadership from the emerging states. The classical example of this position is India’s claim of a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

New Delhi’s overall goal seems clear: it does not wish to overthrow the United States from the status of a great power in the international system, (the rhetoric of the “two largest democracies” serves India well) but it wishes an international multipolar order where great power can tame one another: New Delhi sees unipolarity as dangerous, as it tends to unleash the hubris of the United States). Furthermore, it is looking for way to influence the values of the international order toward a more pluralist and sovereignist framework.

Putting it simply, the de facto order and India’s “imaginary” order are not completely divergent. But they are also far from being convergent.

However, if Robert Gilpin is right, this is only the first phase of an upcoming power transition. Therefore, there is much still to decide (including in what concerns India’s internal debates, where a new generation of more pro-American scholars is gaining terrain). Furthermore, China’s rise will also create and/or deepen a number of questions in New Delhi. As power is relative, weakening the United States-led international order empowers China (India’s most dangerous rival) as some analysts have been pointing out, and this is the true downside of
India’s policy towards the multilateral dimension of world affairs. It seems to ignore that China is being rewarded by India’s behavior. This indicates that the debate about Indian positions in the world is far from being finished, and that shocks, as defined by John Owen quoted earlier in this article, can lead to a rapid change of plans.

References


Diana Soller


