Lewinski, Marcin2018-02-272018-02-2720170824-2577PURE: 3197382PURE UUID: f1b0c5af-d8fb-47df-aa5a-0f1308d3aa54Scopus: 85020393032WOS: 000404357600001ORCID: /0000-0002-7218-3948/work/55089632http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85020393032&partnerID=8YFLogxKUID/FIL/00183/2013The paper offers a theo retical investigation into the sources of normativity in practical argumen tation. The chief question is: Do we need objectively-minded, unbiased arguers or can we count on "good" argumentative processes in which individual biases cancel each other out? I address this question by ana lysing a detailed structure of practi cal argument and its varieties, and by discussing the tenets of a com parative approach to practical rea son. I argue that given the compara tive structure proposed, reasoned advocacy in argumentative activity upholds reasonableness whenever that activity is adequately designed. I propose some basic rules for such a design of practical argumentation.29594900engAdvocacyArgumentationComparativismDeliberationPolyloguePractical argumentPhilosophyjournal article10.22329/il.v37i2.4775https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85020393032