Arvan, LannyCabral, Luís M. B.Santos, Vasco2019-11-212019-11-211995-03Arvan, Lanny, Cabral, Luís and Santos, Vasco, Meaningful Cheap Talk Must Improve Equilibrium Payoffs (March, 1995). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 255http://hdl.handle.net/10362/87939We generalize Farrell's (1987) idea of coordination by means of cheap talk. We show that if cheap talk is meaningful (in a specific sense) and if there is room for cooperation (namely if there exists at least one pure-strategy equilibrium Pareto superior to the default equilibrium), then cheap talk must increase the equilibrium expected payoff relative to the play of the game without pre-play communication.engMeaningful Cheap Talk Must Improve Equilibrium Payoffsworking paper