Soria-Ruiz, Andrés2024-04-302024-04-302023-090167-7411PURE: 87856179PURE UUID: f4fdd6c1-0583-4eb4-9a11-ece016dd78edScopus: 85167338518WOS: 001044833200001http://hdl.handle.net/10362/166761UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020I argue against the view that metalinguistic usage is a form of conversational implicature. That view, suggested by Thomasson (Anal Philos 57(4):1-28, 2016) and Belleri (Philos Stud 174(9):2211–2226, 2017), has been most recently fleshed out by Mankowitz (Synthese 199:5603–5622, 2021). I provide two types of criticism to the implicature view. From an empirical point of view, metalinguistic usage differs in key respects from standard cases of conversational implicature. From a conceptual standpoint, I argue that the calculation algorithm provided by the implicature view makes undesirable predictions. Although my main objective is negative, I end the paper by sketching an alternative neo-Stalnakerian view of metalinguistic usage, that can be gathered from work by Barker (Linguist Philos 25(1):1–36, 2002; Inquiry 56(2–3):240–257, 2013) and others.12401625engConversational implicatureMetalinguistic negotiationMetalinguistic usageSemantic–pragmatic dividePhilosophyjournal article10.1007/s11245-023-09944-zhttps://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85167338518