Armand, AlexCoutts, AlexanderVicente, Pedro C.Vilela, Ana Inês da Silva2023-12-112023-12-112023-020047-2727PURE: 50286864PURE UUID: 45bd9966-672a-4b54-a528-3ada0b0a0c3bORCID: /0000-0003-1326-7348/work/126416618Scopus: 85146127124http://hdl.handle.net/10362/161101Corruption is often harmful for economic development, yet it is difficult to measure due to its illicit nature. We propose a novel corruption game to characterize the interaction between actual political leaders and citizens, and implement it in Northern Mozambique. Contrary to the game-theoretic prediction, both leaders and citizens engage in corruption. Importantly, corruption in the game is correlated with real-world corruption by leaders: citizens send bribes to leaders whom we observe appropriating community money. In corrupt behavior, we identify an important trust dimension captured by a standard trust game.316275engCorruptionGameTrustLab-in-the-fieldElite captureCitizenPolitical leaderIncentivesBehaviorSDG 8 - Decent Work and Economic Growthjournal article10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104799http://www.pedrovicente.org/corruption.pdfhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272722002018?dgcid=author