Salas, Javier González de Prado2020-11-112020-11-1120180495-4548PURE: 13071469PURE UUID: 6122122a-a96e-44ad-9fd2-f02279eb2530Scopus: 85042802425WOS: 000426892700001http://hdl.handle.net/10362/106976UID/FIL/00183/2013Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay (Philos Stud 165(1): 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel (Frank Ramsey London: Routledge, 2003) have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn's.18213695engFrank RamseyMental representationNaturalistic theories of contentSuccess semanticsTeleosemanticsPhilosophyHistory and Philosophy of Sciencejournal article10.1387/theoria.17736https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85042802425http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/17736