Ferreira, Miguel A.Matos, PedroPires, Pedro2018-12-072023-06-012018-10-010022-1082PURE: 6134106PURE UUID: b82f1bc6-04ce-4758-bbea-4bebe04e5859Scopus: 85055129429WOS: 000447674600006http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85055129429&partnerID=8YFLogxKFunfing agency: International Monetary Fund (IMF), University of Toronto, Villanova University, Fuel Cell Technologies Program, Texas A and M University, University of Hong Kong, Universiteit Maastricht, Georgia State University, McGill University, Howard University School of Business, Universiteit van Tilburg, European Research Council (ERC), Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT) and Richard A. Mayo Center for Asset Management at the Darden School of BusinessWe study the performance of equity mutual funds run by asset management divisions of commercial banking groups using a worldwide sample. We show that bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated funds by 92 basis points per year. Consistent with conflicts of interest, the underperformance is more pronounced among those affiliated funds that overweight the stock of the bank's lending clients to a great extent. Divestitures of asset management divisions by banking groups support a causal interpretation of the results. Our findings suggest that affiliated fund managers support their lending divisions’ operations to reduce career concerns at the expense of fund investors.47326406engAccountingFinanceEconomics and Econometricsjournal article10.1111/jofi.12702https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85055129429