Luciano, Simone Antonio2025-05-162025-05-162023-02-171571-8123PURE: 72092870PURE UUID: d1f49607-532e-491f-ba14-fbb520688eddScopus: 85148957782WOS: 000994560400003http://hdl.handle.net/10362/183088This article investigates whether crimes of starvation not committed as a method of warfare could be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. It assesses whether it is possible to use crimes already typified in the articles of the Rome Statute to prosecute all those cases of starvation that cannot be prosecuted as war crimes because they were committed neither during an armed conflict nor in association with an armed conflict. More specifically, it addresses the question of whether nowadays peacetime starvation could be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court as an act of genocide, an act of persecution, an act of extermination or as an “inhumane act”.37580389engRome Statutecrimes against humanityStarvationInternational Criminal CourtSDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutionsjournal article10.1163/15718123-bja10149https://brill.com/view/journals/icla/23/2/article-p284_003.xml?ebody=article%20detailshttps://brill.com/view/journals/icla/23/2/article-p284_003.xml?ebody=article%20details