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From Crisis to Opportunity? Causes and Consequences of the Politicization of the CFSP on the Example of the Refugee Crisis (2015-2017)

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ABSTRACT

FROM CRISIS TO OPPORTUNITY? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLITICIZATION OF THE CFSP ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS (2015-2017)

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The outbreak of the refugee crisis in 2015 has thrown the European Union off-balance, not only when it comes to Asylum and Migration policy, but also in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The massive influx of refugees has put a spotlight on the link between internal and external security as well as on the protection of the EU's external borders and thus also gave high political relevance to the CFSP. In response to these security challenges, the EU adopted a new EU Global Strategy in 2016 realigning the priorities and objectives of the CFSP and calling for reform and deeper integration. All these processes introduced a new political dynamic and public attention, culminating in the Politicization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.

This dissertation gives an overview of the current theories on the European Union's Politicization by analyzing its characteristics, mechanisms, and consequences. Subsequently, this theoretical framework of politicization literature will be applied to the Common Foreign and Policy. The case of the refugee crisis is used to elaborate its contribution to the Politicization of CFSP. Against the background of the growing ties between internal and external security, this dissertation argues that the migration crisis has led to polarizing conflicts between the member states and the political actors in foreign policy. However, other than what might be expected, it shows that this politicization has not hindered but supported further integration of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.

KEYWORDS: European Union, Politicization, CFSP, CSDP, EUGS, refugee crisis, migration

RESUMO

DA CRISE À OPORTUNIDADE? CAUSAS E CONSEQUÊNCIAS DA POLITIZAÇÃO DA PESC NO EXEMPLO DA CRISE DOS REFUGIADOS (2015-2017)

DERYA KIZILKAYA

Com o início da crise dos refugiados em 2015, a União Europeia perdeu o equilíbrio, não só no que respeita à política de Asilo e Migração, mas também à Política Externa e de Segurança Comum (PESC). A afluência massiva de refugiados demonstrou a interligação entre a segurança interna e externa, bem como a protecção das fronteiras externas da UE, dando assim também grande relevância política à PESC. Em resposta a estes desafios de segurança, a UE adoptou uma nova Estratégia Global da UE em 2017, que realinha as prioridades e objectivos da PESC e apela a uma reforma com vista a uma integração mais profunda. Todos estes processos introduziram uma nova dinâmica política e atenção pública, que culminou na Politização da Política Externa e de Segurança Comum da UE.
Esta dissertação dá uma visão geral das actuais teorias sobre a politização da União Europeia, através da análise das suas características, mecanismos, e consequências. Posteriormente, este quadro teórico de literatura de politização será aplicado à Política Externa e de Segurança Comum. O caso da crise dos refugiados é utilizado para elaborar a sua contribuição à politização da PESC. No contexto dos crescentes laços entre a segurança interna e externa, esta dissertação argumenta que a crise migratória levou à polarização de conflitos entre os Estados-Membros e os actores políticos na política externa. Contudo, para além do que seria de esperar, mostra que esta Politização não travou, antes pelo contrário, contribuiu para uma maior integração da Política Externa e de Segurança Comum da União Europeia

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: União Europeia, politização, PESC, PESD, EUGS, crise dos refugiados, migração

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP-Common Foreign and Security Policy

COREPER-Committee of Permanent Representatives

CSDP-Common Security and Defence Policy

EEAS-European External Action Service

ECJ-European Court of Justice

EUNAVFORMED-European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean

EDC-European Defence Community

EPC-European Political Cooperation

EP-European Parliament

ESDP-European Security and Defence Policy

ESS-European Security Strategy

EU-European Union

EUGS-EU Global Strategy

EUMC-EU Military Committee

EUMS-Directorate-General for External Relations and the Military Staff

GAC-General Affairs Council

HR-High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR),

NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OECD-Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PSC-Political and Security Committee

SEA-Single European Act

TEU-Treaty on the European Union

WEU-Western European Union

Chapter 1 – Introduction

"*We believe the EU can and needs to develop common answers to today's challenges abroad and at home. In a context of rising global challenges and opportunities, we see the European Union as more necessary than ever and as the only framework capable of providing appropriate collective answers to the changing international environment*." (Ayrault and Steinmeier, 2016).

In their joint contribution of 2016, "*A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties*" the French and German foreign ministers see the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy in a position to respond to the security challenges of today's world. Both advocate for joint and intensified action by the member states of the European Union within the framework of a "*Security Union*". These demands overlap with those of the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker: "*The time for action has come. In the area of security, as in many other areas in Europe, fragmentation is what makes us vulnerable. Europe needs a genuine Security Union*" (European Commission 2016a).

For a long time, the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy was characterized by a limited willingness on behalf of the member states to give up their sovereignty and transfer national competences to the European institutions, especially in the area of security policy. Thus, it was characterized by a significant discrepancy between ambition and reality. However, the security policy environment has changed considerably in recent years. World politics is increasingly characterized by military conflicts, international terrorism, environmental disasters and social upheavals. In 2015, with the outbreak of the so-called refugee crisis, these transformations, in an increasingly globalized world, were also most strongly felt by the European Union.

The enormous influx of refugees in the European Union, mainly with its roots in conflicts, war, and political instability in the Middle East and North Africa, has had a significant impact on the European Union's member states. In 2015, 1.32 million asylum applications were registered in the EU; in 2016, this number reached 1.26 million (Eurostat, 2020). This wave of refugees has confronted the EU with significant challenges

and vulnerabilities in its Foreign and Security Policy but also dominated the media and public agenda in 2015 and 2016 (Chouliaraki and Zaborowski, 2017). According to Eurobarometer 2015, migration was the most important issue and urgent problem for the EU population, followed by the fear of terrorism (European Commission, 2015). As EU citizens' trust in the EU to overcome the challenges decreased, their demand for more protection of the external borders and more action on migration increased (European Parliament, 2019, 3-4).

In response to the refugee crisis, new processes were triggered to adapt the EU's Foreign and Security Policy to the new challenges. As a result, European policy has been increasingly focusing on the concept of "*security*," with references to a "*Security Union*" and a "*Europe that protects*" (European Commission, 2017, 2; Juncker, 2016). With the publication of the new Global Strategy of the EU in June 2016, by the High Representative, the debate on greater EU security and strategic autonomy has received recent attention. The Strategy identifies the new core global interests and principles of the Union's external engagement and redefines its strategic objectives, thus adapting the EU's external policy to new challenges. (Reiterer, 2017, 12-13). To this end, new priorities for the Common Foreign and Security Policy were created, such as *"the Security of the Union", "Resilience to the East and South", "Integrated Approach to Conflicts", "Cooperative Regional Orders", and "Global Governance"* (European Union, 2016, 9-10).

These political processes in the Common Foreign and Security Policy have been accompanied by unprecedented public attention (Reiterer, 2017, 13). In the wake of the refugee crisis, border security within the European Union and particularly on the EU's external borders has become increasingly high on the political and public agenda. Not only was its political relevance clearly visible to the media, parties, and journalists, but it also became increasingly important to EU citizens.

The focus of the present Master's thesis is to show how the refugee crisis has contributed to the politicization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The term politicization shall be understood as the "*demand for, or the act of, transporting an issue or an institution into the sphere of politics - making*

previously unpolitical matters political" (Zürn, 2019, 977-978). In the course of this, it will be examined in more detail, on the one hand, which measures and political actors have promoted this process and, on the other hand, what consequences the politicization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy has entailed.

1.1 Research Interest and Research Questions

Considering the process of European integration over the past decade, it is clear that the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union has not been at the forefront of public debate. This phenomenon is mainly due to the fact that security is still regarded as a core area of national sovereignty and is regulated at an intergovernmental level between the individual states (Costa, 2018). While in other policy areas, particularly the EU's economic and financial policy, there was always a great deal of public attention and deeper integration (Peters, 2014), European Foreign and Security Policy was subject to the "*permissive consensus*" (Hooghe/Marks, 2009; Lindberg/ Scheingold, 1970). This refers to a quiet agreement and a positive general attitude towards the European Union with a simultaneous lack of knowledge of the integration process among the European population, which does not intervene in the shaping and decision-making of the political elites.

Since the refugee crisis, which reached its peak in 2015, a political debate and public debates on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union have been emerging. Since then, the Union has been under constant public and political pressure to address its Foreign and Security Policy's sustainability. Some scholars even speak of a "*renaissance of the Common Foreign and Security Policy*" (Bendiek, 2017, 5).

Moreover, it is clear that in the wake of the refugee crisis, competences that were traditionally assigned to European domestic policy, especially migration policy and the fight against terrorism, are increasingly being dealt with by the Union's foreign policy, especially such as "*border protection and maritime security*" (European Union, 2016, 20).

The research interest is, therefore, mainly focused on these two aspects. On the one hand, it is of particular interest to examine which factors and mechanisms have contributed to the fact that this generally very distant policy area has become the subject of public and political debate. On the other hand, it will elaborate the political and institutional consequences of this politicization on the Common Foreign and Security Policy's framework.

The following work will be established based on selected research questions and hypotheses. The starring two questions will give a general overview of the concept of politicization and the history and the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, followed by the more specific questions, to be elaborated for and in the case study:

- How did the Common Foreign and Security was established, and how can it be integrated into the European Union's security policy architecture?
- What can be understood by the concept of politicization? What are the characteristics and causes of politicization?
- What are the characteristics and mechanisms of politicization in European policy, especially in the refugee crisis context? Which instruments of the CFSP became the subject of public political debate in the refugee crisis?
- Which political actors and mechanisms favored the politicization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the context of the refugee crisis?
- What were the consequences and effects of the politicization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union?

To answer these research questions, concrete hypotheses are formulated which will be analyzed and tested in more detail in the further course of the thesis.

Hypothesis 1: The politicization of the CFSP can be recognized from an increased political and public attention to migration and asylum that has not only led to elevated

awareness and public visibility for the CFSP, but also to an actor expansion in the field of the CFSP and further polarization.

Since in the context of the refugee crisis, the issues of (illegal) migration and asylum and the internal dimension of EU security have revealed a direct link to external security, increased attention to migration and asylum has, in turn, led to increased awareness and public visibility for the CFSP. These interconnections also resulted in an actor expansion of the actors involved in the CFSP. As a consequence, the CFSP was opened up to non-CFSP actors through the Global Strategy, which can be seen in many points as a response to the refugee crisis. There is also no denying that the CFSP was in the middle of a polarized conflict during the refugee crisis, which is most visible in the different positions of the member states on the joint naval mission, the EU NAVFORMED/Operation Sophia.

Hypothesis 2: The politicization of the CFSP in the course of the refugee crisis was driven by media and populist political influence which have contributed to polarized political conflicts, and have led to a broader public perception of the CFSP.

During the refugee crisis, the politicization of the CFSP was stimulated by the contestation of populist political influence that has taken advantage of the issue of migration and questioned the status quo of the CFSP. This process was amplified by the mass media, which has not only served as an area of contestation for polarized conflict and for populists; it also has made frames of security and borders prominent, measurable even in the broader public perception. These factors have put additional pressure on the EU actors, which have remained incapable of cooperating on the issue of migration and refugees and presenting a solution, which has ultimately resulted in attempts to reform the approaches in the CFSP.

Hypothesis 3: The politicization of the CFSP has not only initiated a series of debates on further integration steps in the CFSP, it has also resulted in institutional integration efforts in this area.

The migration crisis and the accompanying security risks which have led to the politicization of the CFSP have also triggered integration dynamics and reform efforts in

the CFSP area inter alia by bringing new attention to the debate on enhancing the strategic autonomy of the EU. This dynamic was not only institutionalized by the launch of PESCO. The emergence of PESCO was driven by a unique integration dynamic, which is based on forms of flexible integration. Alongside these flexible forms of integration, the call for eliminating the unanimity principle has also gained great relevance.

1.2. State of Art: Politicization of the Common Foreign Security Policy of the European Union

Given the dynamic of both, the refugee crisis and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the associated short lead time for complex research processes, the current state of research on the politicization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy during the refugee crisis still looks very sparse.

The situation is different when it comes to the politicization of European integration. The development of European integration, which has undergone several phases of politicization and crises, has been accompanied by an intense and relevant scientific debate from its early days. Regarding politicization, especially the publications of Zürn and DeWilde (2012), Hooghe and Marks (2009), and Statham and Trenz (2015) provide the basis for my research, as well as Grande and Kriesi (2015). Research agrees that there has been an apparent increase in the politicization of world politics in the past two decades and that a pro-active politicization of political leadership is a necessary prerequisite for successful European politics. Equally, the concept of politicization is a process by which European policy is subject to political controversy and debate. Michael Zürn's publications make him one of the most distinguished scholars in this field. His fundamental thesis links the politicization of European politics with an increasing transfer of national competences to supranational institutions. In his publications with DeWilde (2012, 2014), the authors specialize more closely on the processes in the "*political space*" that lead to politicization, as well as the emergence of so-called "*opportunity structures*" and the emerging political legitimacy. Hooghe and Marks (2015), on the other hand, see politicization as a response to too far-reaching European integration beyond the economic sphere and as a departure from "*permissive*

consensus" into a "*constraining dissensus*". A further relevant contribution was made by the researchers Statham and Trenz (2015), whose studies on politicization focused more on the growing public sphere and the mass media, arguing that the politicization of the EU could be measured by the increased public attention and the polarization of the debate on European issues.

In general, European research offers a good overview of theories on European policy's politicization and its consequences. Nevertheless, there is a lack of research, especially in the field of politicization of EU foreign policy, as it has become increasingly important in recent years. Over the past few years, current research on Europe has dealt with politicization in crises, but in a much more differentiated way with the Euro crisis, for example, by Hutter and Kriesi (2019). In their study, the authors examine how crises promote politicization, especially by fueling conflicts and putting political actors under pressure. Therefore, this publication offers some starting points for a politicization of EU foreign policy, which unfortunately have not been sufficient. The scientific essay by Barbé and Morillas (2016) also offers initial research approaches to European foreign policy's politicization. Both authors use politicization theories to analyze developments in EU foreign policy using the example of the EU Global Strategy of the EU (EUGS) and examine the effects of the emerging politicization on the political integration of the EU. Their work concludes that EU foreign policy has been the subject of politicization, and that this process has been leading to deeper integration.

Costa (2018) also recognizes the research deficit regarding politicization of EU foreign relations. In this context, he points out that current conflicts in an increasingly globalized world have also changed the dynamics of European external action. He pleads for an agenda that addresses the issue and even provides an analytical framework, mainly based on Zürn's research.

In the following, my work will attempt to contribute to this deficit and illustrate the European Foreign and Security Policy's politicization between 2015 and 2017, in the context of the refugee crisis.

1.3. Methodology

For this research, a qualitative research approach has proven useful for investigating the politicization of European Foreign and Security Policy and answering the research questions. Besides, this thesis will focus on the developments in the Common Foreign and Security Policy on the example of the refugee crisis, therefore, a case study will be conducted.

Case studies have been a frequently used and usually beneficial analytical tool in European studies for many years. Data obtained in a case study will be analyzed within the theoretical framework developed previously (Yin, 2009, 18). The aim is to record as much data as possible and then analyze and interpret problem-relevant topics, resulting ultimately in an analytical generalization, expansion, or complementation of existing theories (Yin, 2009, 15).

There have been various documents consulted by type and scope to answer the research question of this thesis. For the theoretical framework primary and secondary literature, referred to in the bibliography (books, articles, journals, legal texts, statements, publications of institutions and organizations), were consulted. For this purpose, both German and English resources were used.

To obtain necessary data and information to answer the research questions, a qualitative content analysis was used in order to collect the data. For the theoretical basis of this work on concepts of politicization, different texts and works of different authors were analyzed. The traditional definitions and theories of politicization in the context of the European Union, among others by Zürn (2009, 2012, 2014) and Hooghe and Marks (2009), served to some extent as a guideline for this thesis. Therefore these references were mainly used as a scientific starting point and basis. But, as these were limited to concepts predominantly related to issues of transfer of sovereignty and authority and institutional change within the European Union, further references were necessary in the further course of the work.

As the European refugee crisis was subject to a great deal of public attention, and has raised questions and conflicts related to identity politics, it was not sufficient to

draw on these traditional concepts. Therefore, it was necessary to consult approaches that also include the public sphere and media processes. For this reason, recent research on politicization was consulted, which examines politicization in the context of similar processes. The euro crisis, as an equally political and public development, therefore served as a comparable development. Thus, publications on politicization in the context of the euro crisis were also intensively analyzed. The publication of Statham and Trenz (2015) and Grande and Kriesi (2015) were particularly helpful in this regard.

For the present scientific research, it was furthermore necessary to intensively search the World Wide Web for relevant texts, since especially on the recent developments in European migration and asylum policy, hardly any scientifically well-founded print media were available.

In the course of the research and investigation process, the collected data were reduced to the relevant information, analyzed and interpreted according to the subject matter. The results obtained through content analysis were then recorded and presented in form of results responding to the research questions.

1.4. Structure

The present thesis is structured into four chapters, along with an introduction and conclusion: In the first two chapters, the theoretical basis for the case analysis is elaborated. The first chapter defines the concept of politicization and the relevant theories for the research questions. To this end, the characteristics, mechanisms, and consequences of politicization are examined in more detail.

The following chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy's historical developments, objectives, and structure. It begins with the beginnings and continues with the ongoing integration of Foreign and Security Policy into the EU's legal framework. Thus, the main treaties and strategies and their effects on the Foreign and Security Policy will be examined.

The core of the work is the third part, in which the previously developed theories on the politicization of European policy are applied to developments in the Common Foreign and Security Policy during the refugee crisis. This chapter aims to examine and evaluate whether and how the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been politicized in the context of the refugee crisis.

In the concluding chapter, all results are presented in a comprehensive overview, and a critical perspective of the research process is formulated. Finally, current developments in the Common Foreign and Security Policy will be discussed, and an outlook will be given.

Chapter 2 - The Politicization of Political Processes

The concept of politicization is addressed in various areas of political science. Especially in international relations and European studies, the term politicization is of particular importance. In the following chapter, the concept of politicization will first be defined in general terms. Subsequently, we will take a closer look at politicization in the context of the European Union and highlight and specify dimensions, core characteristics, and consequences of politicization.

2.1. Definition

Generally, one can speak of politicization either when matters are moved from the realm of necessity or the private sphere to the public sphere or if issues are moved "*from the public sphere to the governmental sphere*" (Hay, 2007, 79). A differentiated definition is also offered by Michael Zürn, who defines the term "*politicization*" as the "*demand for, or the act of, transporting an issue or an institution into the sphere of politics - making previously unpolitical matters political*" (Zürn, 2019, 977-978). The sphere of politics can be explored from two different perspectives: If one differentiates from a system theory standpoint, it refers to the political subsystem that is responsible for the elaboration of collectively binding decisions (Zürn, 2014, 50). In this context, politicization means, for example, that issue matters, for which the decision-making mechanisms of another, i.e., economic or moral subsystem have initially been responsible, are brought into the political subsystem. Therefore, they are negotiated according to the political majority and decision-making rules and converted into binding law (Anders et al., 2018, 4). The second perspective is a discourse-theoretical consideration. Here, the area of the political does not refer to another (sub)system, but

to the public space, where factual questions, problems, and conflicts are introduced and discussed (Anders et al., 2018, 4; Zürn, 2014, 50). According to discourse theory, politicization can thus be defined as the process by which decision-making competencies and the related authoritative interpretations of facts are brought into the political space or public space. In other words, a political problem is made the "*subject of public discussion*" (Rauh and Zürn 2014, 4).

In studies on politicization in the context of the European Union, the discourse-theoretical perspective is often decisive, which is why I will also refer to this in my research.

2.2. Politicization of the European Union

Considering the history of the EU, its politicization can be seen, on the one hand, as a long-term and dynamic process in which, as a result of the increasing transfer of sovereignty to the EU and its institutions, the public attention is increasingly focused on European issues. Thus European policies become the subject of public controversy. On the other hand, however, far-reaching events, so-called "*critical events*" can also contribute to politicization. All these processes and factors create different opportunity structures for politicization processes and mean that the extent of politicization can be different (Anders et al., 2018, 11).

These public debates can be conducted not only about the institutional design of the European Union (polity) but also about specific decisions (policy) or the decision-making processes themselves (politics) (Anders et al., 2018, 5). Furthermore, it is also essential to analyze in which "*areas*" the debates are held. The following arenas can be listed: "*(a) institutional arenas at the core of the political system, which are populated by politicians (e.g., the European Parliament or national parliaments); (b) intermediary arenas linking political decision-making processes to the broader citizenry, which are dominated by participants with a professional interest in politics (political parties,*

interest groups, the media, etc.); and (c) citizen arenas in which lay people communicate about politics (at the workplace, in discussions with friends, etc.)" (Hurrelmann et al., 2015, 45). It is assumed that the politicization of an issue does not occur to the same extent in all arenas. Not only individuals can act as "*subjects*'' or "*agents of politicization*", but also groups participating in the political process, "*such as politicians, experts, interest groups, mass media and those in a position to organize political protest*" (DeWilde/Zürn, 2012, 140).

When considering the process of politicization in the European Union context, according to Zürn (2006), it is essential to emphasize that politicization is linked to the transfer of sovereignty of the member states and the resulting increase in the authority of the European Union. Michael Zürn defines politicization in his approach as an automatic, unintended consequence of the transfer of sovereignty of the member states and the increase in the authority of the EU institutions. Through the EU's multi-level system and the associated shift of national decision-making powers to the European level, the supranational structure of the EU is no longer understood by society and the various political actors as an economic system disconnected from the public. As a result of the EU's supranationalisation and the relevance of decision-making at the European level, society and political actors begin to "understand" the EU and its significance. In consequence, the public perception of the EU and the demands and standards of good political order is changing (Zürn, 2006, 244): *"(...) the more influential the EU and its institutions become, the more they attract public attention and provoke both utilization and support, on the one hand, and counter reactions to the EU policies and the polity, on the other''* (DeWilde/Zürn, 2012, 140).

Frank Schimmelpfenning further complements this perspective by emphasizing that the more important a policy area is for an existing community, the more politicized is the transfer of sovereignty to a supranational institution. Accordingly, policy areas that are particularly important for the identity and solidarity of the Community (i.e., migration policy or security) are therefore more likely to be politicized than technical and marginalized policy areas (i.e., environment and development policy) (Schimmelpfenning, 2020, 17).

Alternatively, Hooghe and Marks (2009) define politicization, considering the model of Scheingold and Lindberg (1970, 62), as a transition from a so-called "*permissive consensus*" to a "*constraining dissensus*". Until the mid-1980s, there was an agreement in academic discourses on the predominance of a "*permissive consensus*" in European affairs: the population faces European integration with a silent agreement and acceptance of the European population and trusts the representation of its majority interests to the respective government. On the other hand, recent research, particularly with the ongoing communitarization which followed the Maastricht Treaty, speaks of a "*constraining dissensus*". "*As more issues shifted to the European level, elite decision making would eventually give way to a process of politicization in which European issues would engage mass publics*". (Hooghe and Marks, 2009, 6) According to this view, with the increasing surrender of national sovereignty, public opinion is increasingly shaped by a critical assessment of European politics. Thus, the European Union's political decisions are no longer based entirely on political interests, political elites, or the prospects of economic advantage, but are determined by the now critical attitudes and opinions of the EU's population.

In conclusion, politicization can be defined neither as a linear nor an EU-wide process. Instead, its development depends on several favorable or restrictive influences and factors.

2.2.1. Characteristics of Politicization

At what point can one speak of politicization? In practice, politicization, therefore, can be defined as "*an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards policy formulation within the EU*" (DeWilde/Zürn, 2012, 140). There are three main aspects of politicization: public visibility, the scope of actors, and the intensity of the debate between actors (DeWilde/Zürn, 2012, 140; Grande/Kriesi 2015, 5).

The first dimension, public visibility or awareness, describes the extent of public attention to European issues. The public sphere is, therefore, an indispensable condition

for political conflict. Issues that are not publicly discussed can only be politicized to a limited extent (Grande and Kriesi 2015, 5-6.). If political decisions are not publicly communicated, e.g., by government representatives at a press conference, they are not considered politicized. Thus, one could speak of "*silent politicization*" if decisions are carried out in "*back rooms*" (Zürn 2014, 20). The politicization of policy areas whose measures are not classically discussed in public, such as security, is thus all the more prominent the further it goes beyond the scope of classical "*backroom politics*" and the more public criticism, contestation, or demands for change by the political actors such as political parties or the population arise. Thus, security governance only becomes the subject of more fundamental politicization when social or political actors participate and intervene in these processes.

In the context of the European Union, a European public sphere also plays a significant role: The more Europeanized a debate is, the greater its salience should be. This is all the truer as modern democracies have developed into "*media democracie*s" (Pfetsch/ Marcinkowski 2009), in which the media presence of actors and topics is a decisive precondition for their political relevance (Voessing 2018).

The dimension of actor expansion (second dimension) refers to the growing number and complexity of actors involved in a conflict actively engaged in discourse. This includes both individual and collective actors like parties, experts, NGOs, think tanks, or interest groups, that articulate their positions in a publicly perceivable way. Actor expansion describes the fact that not only the public debate deals with a specific topic but also the circle of actors that, under normal circumstances deal with the issue, is widened by politicization: More people with different backgrounds participate in the political process and invest time and resources to mobilize for or against an institution or decision. Conflicts that do not extend beyond a small circle of political elites or specific interest groups can only be politicized to a limited extent (de Wilde/Zürn 2012, 139-40, Grande/Kriesi 2015. 5-6).

The third dimension of politicization, polarization, refers to the intensity of the conflict between the actors. A political conflict is all the more intense, the more it polarizes between actors. Heavily politicized conflicts are characterized by the fact that

the actors involved hold different positions and form opposing political camps (de Wilde, 2011). Consequently, political conflicts are most polarized when two political groups with opposing positions take up positions in public debates on a topic to which they both attach great importance. (Grande/Kriesi, 2015, 6).

2.2.2. Mechanisms of Politicization

The increase in authority and sovereignty does not automatically lead to politicization, nor in every area. In more general terms, "*political opportunity structures*" play a decisive role in politicization (DeWilde/Zürn, 2012, 143): *"(...) political opportunity structure provides the basic infrastructure enabling EU issues to move from isolated elites' decision-making to mass politics*" (DeWilde/Zürn, 2012, 139).

To find an explanatory approach to the mechanisms of politicization of specific processes, Statham and Trenz (2015) propose to analyze how collective actors are polarized in the public sphere and thus attract public attention, which then allows them to shape the legitimacy of the political system and ultimately lead to politicization: "*Politicization of European integration unfolds through a combination of a sequence of mechanisms that emerge from interacting changes in three interdependent sets of social relations; the mechanisms are:(i) structured cleavages and polarizations about the principle, scope or future of European integration, (ii) public contestation and resonance, (iii) legitimation*" (Statham/Trenz, 2015,7- 8).

Polarized actors' relations in the EU context can be summarized as oppositional attitudes towards EU policies, within specific political camps, based on their values, interests, and identities. These camps have different views on the European Union's future construction, the extent to which European integration and cooperation should be deepened, and how much national sovereignty should be delegated to EU institutions. The resulting conflicts, which are increasingly being carried out on a national and European level, influence national political systems in the EU and thus favor politicization.

Therefore, it is indispensable to investigate in what form and size, as well as at what levels, various pro- and anti-European social and political movements or groups position themselves and act on a particular issue. These debates in political systems, as well as in public discourse, have an important influence on the extent to which politicization occurs. The more polarized the different actors face each other on a topic, the more conducive it is that the conflict which is carried out leads to politicization (Statham/Trenz, 2015,7- 8).

In addition to the polarized actors, it is essential to note that the political conflict that arises from this contradictory debate is carried out publicly, i.e., gets a resonance in the media. Here, too, the existence of a public sphere is essential: "*[A] public sphere includes not only those who take an active part in the debate, but it presupposes that communication resonates among others, a public, for whom it is also relevant. This resonance of public communication between institutional actors and the public is carried primarily by mass-mediated political debates. This effectively brings the public back in to European politics*" (Statham /Trenz, 2015, 6). In modern democracies (mass) media, therefore, play a crucial role in the politicization process, since they generate public visibility for issues and conflicts, as well as for the actors and groups involved, as it allows them to make informed decisions about the European Union. That media instead is interested in depicting conflicts rather than displaying consensus is proved in various communication research studies (Hug 1997).

Therefore, it can be assumed that for a political debate to receive a great deal of public attention, the media must report on it. Thus, the degree of politicization of a topic in a modern democracy is strongly dependent on how much public and media attention it receives. Media coverage has an increasing influence on how strongly certain groups (have to) position themselves in the political debate or actively participate in it. Besides, the media can initiate new visual debates and thus stimulate further discussions. Therefore, journalists and media organizations also play an essential role in the politicization process, especially by giving political conflicts in the EU a voice in the media, that in turn creates publicity (Statham/Trenz 2014).

Another critical aspect of a public-based concept of politicization is legitimacy. "*All political systems need legitimacy to sustain dominance."* (Abels, 2018, 2). The same applies to the EU as *"(...) a supranational body (...) in which government takes place, i.e., legally binding decisions of a depth and scope that were previously reserved for sovereign nation-states*" (Abels, 2018, 2), that requires democratic legitimation.

In the context of the European integration process and the transfer of sovereignty of national competences to the EU level, the publicly expressed claims to participate in shaping the democratic order of the EU, by pro-Europeans as well as by anti-Europeans, exert a pressure of legitimacy on the EU (Zürn, 2006). The exercised political authority of European institutions and actors is thus opposed by political actors' social and political interests. However, where Europe intervenes deeply in its citizens' everyday lives, technocratic legitimation is often no longer sufficient to generate public approval. The result is a political controversy that reaches beyond the narrower circle of the "*political elite*" and finds no or only limited support among the broader European public. Zürn speaks of politicization as the process of confronting EU governance with the normative requirements of a legitimate political order (Statham/Trenz, 2014). This process has two consequences: first, it turns the EU public; and second, it puts EU institutions and actors under legitimacy pressure that cannot be dealt with within the existing system, but calls for deep reform of the institutional and constitutional EU framework (Zürn 2006, 244). According to Statham and Trenz, the public sphere serves here as an "*arena for contesting legitimacy*" in which political conflicts are carried out. The conduct of a public debate and the associated political rivalries over political legitimacy is essential for politicization. These developments bring the question of democratic legitimacy and thus a profound problem of the EU to the fore. This is followed by demands for alternative approaches to regulation and new bases of legitimacy, resulting in politicization. The successive growth of EU competences and supranational institutionalization makes it more likely that EU governance is politicized and becomes subject to legitimation debates.

2.2.3. Consequences of Politicization

As has been pointed out throughout this chapter, politicization in the European Union context is linked to a wide range of conditions and mechanisms. Therefore, literature is also divided on the consequences of politicization in the EU. However, I would like to focus on two possible implications of politicization. Whereas one group of EU researchers consider politicization to be a problem and an obstacle to further integration and deepening of cooperation between the European Member States, the second group sees politicization as an opportunity to eliminate the EU's often-held democratic deficit.

Examining the arguments that see the Politicization of the EU as an obstacle and problem for the future of European cooperation, scholars argue that breaking the permissive consensus to a constraining dissensus "*puts shackles on the executive decision-makers, thus preventing compromises on the European level*" (Zürn, 2010, 982). This puts additional pressure "*on a consensus-based political system that is in general not well equipped to absorb and channel political conflicts*" (Hutter/Kriesi, 2019, 1014). As a result, this leads to a regression in problem-solving at the European level, combined with a lower willingness to compromise and lack of support, and decreasing effectiveness (Zürn, 2010, 982; Hooghe/Marks, 2009). Some scientists go even further and even describe politicization as "*an anti-systemic force*" (Zürn, 2010, 984), which is destructive to the European project; for some scholars, the rise of parties critical of Europe and a controversial public debate about the EU serves as an example (Balfour et al., 2016).

On the other hand, politicization is seen as a political opportunity that enables more democracy and promotes and strengthens political competition between the EU's institutions and decision-making mechanisms. In this sense, politicization is seen as an indispensable condition and prerequisite for developing new institutional procedures. This view is also supported empirically; Rauch (2016) shows that a high degree of politicization of EU decision-making can improve supranational institutions' responsiveness.

Overall, politicization as a process is seen by European Studies as a response to too far-reaching European integration, beyond the economic sphere (Hooghe and Marks 2009) or a growing transfer of sovereignty from national states to EU institutions (de Wilde Zürn 2012). Furthermore, opportunity structures play an essential role, which favor and allow politicization, including polarized actors' relations, public contestation, and resonance, as well as legitimacy conflicts. Whether politicization has occurred can be measured by public visibility, the scope of actors, and the debate's intensity between actors. However, the consequences are controversial; while one group sees politicization as an opportunity to overcome the democratic deficit, the other group considers it problematic and an obstacle to cooperation within the Union.

2.3. The Politicization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

In the history of the European Union, various common policies of the European Union, such as the European Union's trade, economic and financial policies, have been the subject of public debate and controversy at the European level, which has led to a politicization of these areas. In contrast to these areas, however, Foreign and Security Policy belongs to an area of national sovereignty, in which the national interests of the Member States dominate the political field. Therefore, it was part of the "*permissive consensus*" for a long time and remained mostly unaffected by politicization tendencies within European integration (Barbé/Morillas, 2019, 754).

However, significant changes in the international and security policy environment, in particular crisis-related events inside and outside the Union, not only led to a public debate on Europe's future role in world politics but also a changed narrative in European Foreign and Security Policy (Barbé/Morillas, 2019, 754).

The EU Global Strategy, adopted in 2016, illustrates these structural changes in security with the words: "*We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity, and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the*

European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself". (European Union, 2016, 7).

The changed security policy circumstances brought the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the European Union more and more into the public debate and confrontation. Crises such as the refugee crisis mentioned above are "*critical events*" in European Foreign and Security Policy's integration process, contributing to its politicization.

The politicization of the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy has unfolded along three dimensions: (1) the Union and its policies have become more visible and salient; (2) European policies in the area of Foreign and Security Policy has triggered increased contestation and polarization, and (3) engagement with the EU has broadened beyond elite actors.

The following chapter will analyze in more detail and show to which extent the so-called refugee crisis has contributed to the politicization of the European Foreign and Security Policy. For this purpose, mechanisms that have fostered this process and consequences of this development will be elaborated more in detail

Chapter 3 - General Approach to the Common Foreign Security of the EU

This chapter discusses in detail the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union. Firstly, before giving a summary of the Common Foreign and Security Policy's historical developments, various terms related to the subject matter will be defined and explained more precisely. Furthermore, Foreign and Security Policy interests and objectives of the EU will be determined. Finally, the legal basis of the CFSP and its central institutions, actors, and instruments will be discussed.

3.1. Definitions

European Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is, in general, understood to be "*the totality of actions that a state undertakes to realize its essential interests in areas such as power politics, security, economy and culture concerning its international environment*" (Gareis 2006, 15). The fundamental principle of European foreign policy is its multidimensionality: the CFSP and CSDP are the main components of the intergovernmental dimension, which is based on cooperation and the unanimous decisions among the members of the Union. In this area, the sovereignty of the nation-states is thus preserved. (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet/ Rüger, Carolin, 2015, 10). Besides the intergovernmental dimension, there is also a communitized dimension of foreign policy, which takes decisions through a qualified majority of the supranational institutions (Council, European Commission, European Parliament). For example, this includes EU trade policy, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid in which member states are willing to transfer sovereignty. (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet/ Rüger, Carolin, 2015, 15-21).

The beginnings of a common European foreign policy can be traced back to the European Coal and Steel Community as economic cooperation, founded in 1952. The positive development of the European Coal and Steel Community, with the ever-increasing integration of the member states, up to the present European Union, led not

only to increased economic influence but also to the claim to political power with global ambitions.

Security policy

Security policy refers to the institutional, procedural, and decision-making aspects of social action aimed at regulating the security of a community and its citizens. In particular, the social aspirations aim to establish, maintain, or increase the Community's internal and external security. (Schmidt 2010, 639). From a foreign policy perspective, the security policy can be understood as the sum of all actions of a state aimed to create a state of security for its citizens. Security in this context is the absence of danger to citizens' lives, freedom, and welfare, as well as threats to the political order of a state (Gareis 2006, 20). In its implementation, the security policy is reflected in creating and maintaining safe external (state) borders through military measures, establishing collective security systems, mutual confidence-building measures, and international cooperation.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The Common Foreign and Security Policy is founded on the principles which guided the very beginnings of the European Union: "*democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law*" (Article 21(1), TEU). In this regard, the Member States of the EU are formally obliged to support the Common Foreign and Security Policy "*in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity*" and to "*refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations*. "(Article 24(3), TEU).

The CFSP represents a unique form of cooperation between the European Union (EU) member states within the broad field of EU external action. As described in the previous section, the CFSP is based on intergovernmental cooperation. Furthermore, the principle of subsidiarity is also relevant in this context. Decision-making processes under the CFSP will only be carried out if they fall within the competence of the

European Union under the terms of Article 24 (1), if action, as opposed to national measures, is justified and if the actions were taken are in their intensity proportionate to the aims pursued (Fink-Hooijer, 1994, 178).

According to Title V Article 24 (1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU*)," [T]he Union's competence in matters of common Foreign and Security Policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence*."

The general objective of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is expressed in the TEU as:

"The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its creation, development, and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries and international, regional or global organizations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations "(Article 21 (1), TEU).

In contrast to a political and diplomatic security policy within the CFSP framework, the CSDP, as an integral part of the CFSP, "*ensures the Union an operational capability drawing on civil and military assets*" (Articles 42-46, TEU) by mobilizing civil and military instruments in peace-keeping, conflict prevention and international security missions outside the Union.

The success of external action depends overall on the efficient coordination of diplomatic, economic, development policy, police, and military measures, which must be coordinated institutionally, across sectors, and at all levels of action.

3.2. History and Development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy

This brief introduction to the terminology is followed by a historical overview of the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy from World War II to the European Union's foundation in 1992.

There have been many ideas and ambitions for the political unification of Europe over the past centuries, nevertheless European integration has taken place following the Second World War. In addition to the foundation of global and European organizations, such as NATO, the OECD, or the Council of Europe, the EU became an increasingly important economic and political player on the world stage in the second half of the 20th century. But, in terms of a common security policy, the European Community of states had not sufficiently succeeded in becoming a significant military and diplomatic power up until the end of the 20th century.

The first attempts at harmonization took place in the 1950s to create a European Defence Community (EDC), whose ratification failed because of France's veto. (Schwarz, 2004, 53-54) This was followed in 1954 by creating the Western European Union (WEU), a regional system of collective security. The European Communities' (EC) efforts to coordinate national foreign policies initially culminated in 1970 in the European Political Cooperation (EPC), based on intergovernmental cooperation procedures, consisting of regular meetings of ministers and the work of a Political Committee composed of staff from the respective foreign ministries. Thus, the EPC provided the first forum for regular consultations on foreign policy; however, it did not have a binding effect (Kermer, 2016, 55).

Thus, although foreign policy cooperation between the member states subsequently was deepened, it was not organized supranationally but was based exclusively on the political concept of intergovernmental cooperation.

In 1986 the Single European Act (SEA) gave this intergovernmental cooperation a formal basis and institutionalized it in the form of the EPC Secretariat in Brussels. Until the Single European Act (SEA) implementation, the EPC was a purely informal or non-institutionalized form of cooperation, i.e., not incorporated into the Community

Treaties. Overall, the Single European Act legally integrated the EPC, but ultimately it did not fundamentally enhance EPC, as the structural character of cooperation, which was merely intergovernmental, remained unchanged (Algiers, 2010, 42).

However, with its 12-member states, the EPC reached its limits during international crises in the 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, German unification, the Yugoslavian and Gulf crises, a separate European position, independent of NATO, was required. The new challenges for European foreign policy, which had so far been exclusively intergovernmental, required a different and coordinated stance for cases of crisis and conflict in order to be able to use and represent the Community and its political weight. The apparent lack of an effective institutional framework for defining and implementing a joint position of the EC Member States increasingly proved to be a significant weakness of European Development Cooperation (Algiers 2010, 45).

3.2.1. EU Treaties and further regulations

To respond effectively to these security challenges, the European Council signed the Maastricht Treaty on 7 February 1992. The EU Treaty created the European Union and achieved the highest level of integration in European history. Based on the Treaty, the Union consisted of three pillars: the European Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA) (Figure 1). The first pillars had a supranational character, while the other two were limited to intergovernmental cooperation. This Treaty can therefore be seen as the birth of the CFSP:

"*RESOLVED to implement a common Foreign and Security Policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence in accordance with the provisions of Article J.7, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security, and progress in Europe and in the world*,

RESOLVED to facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of their peoples, by establishing an area of freedom, security, and justice, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty". (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1992).

As a result, by replacing the EPC with the CFSP, the EU's responsibility in defence matters was for the first time established in a Treaty. Furthermore, the European Political Cooperation was given a new name: Common Foreign and Security Policy.



Figure 1: Maastricht Treaty- Treaty on the European Union-TEU Source: EC Project – Single Economic Space, 2007, 5

Thus, the intergovernmental second pillar created a new framework for the Union's external action with a wide range of possibilities at its disposal. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force on 1 May 1999, introduced the position of the High Representative for the CFSP, who is also Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. The external presentation of the EU was carried out by the so-called "*Troika*", which consisted of the Presidency of the Council, the Commissioner

responsible for foreign policy, and the High Representative for the CFSP. Besides, under the High Representative responsibility, a policy planning and early warning unit was established (Kermer, 2016, 58).

The previously used principle of absolute unanimity for CFSP decisions has also been revised in two areas: for decisions on the implementation of a common strategy which has already been adopted by the European Council (unanimously) and for decisions on the implementation of joint actions or positions which also had been decided by the Council (unanimously). A qualified majority may take these decisions, but each Member State still had the option of either opposing the vote for reasons of national importance and referring the matter back to the European Council or of allowing the decision to pass but not having to support it by using a so-called "*constructive abstention*" (EUR-LEX, 2021). Besides, the European Council agreed on the Treaty establishing a common defence policy: "*The Common Foreign and Security Policy shall include all questions relating to the protection of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy* "(Article J.7, Treaty of Amsterdam).

As a result, the EU's responsibility in defence matters was for the first time established in the Treaty by replacing the EPC through the CFSP. The European Political Cooperation was given a new name: Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Following a decision by the European Council at the EU summit in Cologne in June 1999, the so-called Petersberg tasks, defined in 1992 by the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union (WEU), were transferred to the CFSP tasks. These include "*humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, combat operations in crisis management, including peace-making*" (Article 17, TEU)

The December 1999 Helsinki Summit adopted the guidelines and institutions for a European security and defence policy (ESDP) as part of the CFSP. On that occasion, the European Council decided to establish a military intervention force with the headline goal of deploying by 2003 some 60 000 soldiers mobilizable within 60 days to carry out all Petersberg tasks for a period of up to one year (Pagani, 1998, 738, EUR-LEX, 2021).

The Nice Summit in February 2001 gave the CFSP its current structure with several new permanent political and military bodies. It is headed by the European Council, the highest decision-making body, and at the second level by the EU General Affairs Council, which is composed of the Secretary-General and High Representative for the CFSP; the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, an EU Military Committee (EUMC), the Directorate-General for External Relations and the Military Staff (EUMS) and a Police Staff and a Joint Situation Centre. The third level is made up of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), the Political and Security Committee (PSC, formerly the Political Committee), and the respective Special Representatives (Ondarza, 2008, 8).

The Treaty of Nice, which entered into force on 1 February 2003, enabled for the first time in the CFSP the possibility of so-called *"enhanced cooperation"*, which requires only a minimum of eight participating Member States to cooperate and act in the field of defence, security, and armaments in the framework of joint actions or positions and crisis management initiatives (Regelsberger, 2008, 272-273).

In December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) entitled "*A Secure Europe in a Better World*". This Strategy closed an apparent gap between the CFSP and ESDP structures and its intervention instruments, which have been vigorously developed in recent years, as well as between the CFSP and ESDP objectives, which have been kept very general in the Treaty on European Union. After the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe failed due to negative referenda in France and the Netherlands in early summer 2005, the European Union (EU) entered a temporary crisis. After a period of reflection, the Heads of State and Government at the European Council of 21-22 June 2007 decided to amend the EU Treaties rather than replacing them with a Constitution as planned. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 brought far-reaching changes within the Common Foreign and Security Policy: A European External Action Service was created as well as the office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This brought together the competencies of the High Representative of the CFSP with those of the Commissioner for External Relations. The European Council, acting by a qualified majority and with the President of the Commission's agreement, appoints the High

Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), which is entrusted with responsibility for implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The HR also chaired the Council of Foreign Ministers and was one of the Commission's vice-presidents. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was renamed into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, even after the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP continues to be intergovernmental (Bindi, 2010, 35-38).

The CFSP was recently reoriented in 2016 by the EU's" *Global Strategy (EUGS)- Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*". The EU thus succeeded in refocusing its priorities under the heading of "*real politics*". The strategic priorities will be the EU's response to external crises and conflicts, the resilience of partner countries, and the protection of the EU and its civilian population. For the first time, the EU's interests and the security of its territory and civilians have been highlighted and prioritized. Furthermore, the democratization of regions outside the EU is no longer defined as an obligatory priority, but instead, democratization processes are to be supported. The EU's new strategic autonomy also implies the ability to cooperate and collaborate with international and regional partners or to act autonomously if necessary (Biscop, 2016, 91-93).

3.2.2. The legal status of the CFSP

The Treaty of Lisbon considers the CFSP as part of the EU's external action and lists it in Title V of the TEU "*General Provisions on The Union's External Action and Specific Provisions on The Common Foreign and Security Policy*". The CFSP is defined in Articles 23-41 TEU and the CSDP, as an integral part, in Articles 42-46 TEU.

Article 24 (1) TEU contains the gradual establishment of a common security and defence policy, the CSDP, which is again explicitly described in Article 42 TEU. In contrast to the CFSP, the scope of the CSDP extends to the areas defined in Article 43 TEU: "*joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks*

may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories."

Although the pillar structure of the EU was abandoned under the Treaty of Lisbon, the CFSP continues to enjoy a special status due to its still very intergovernmental structure (Diedrichs, 2012, 43). This character of the CFSP is underlined by the still limited scope for involvement of the European Parliament in Article 36 TEU and the almost non-existent possibilities for control by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in CFSP matters (Beck 2012, 31).

3.3.3. Actors of the CFSP



Figure 2: Institutional Division of Policy Areas in EU External Action

Source: HM Government, 2013, 19

The Common Foreign and Security Policy covers all actors involved in Member States government's external action. The Council of the European Union, the European Council, the European Commission, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy represent the center of the executive within the EU's Foreign and Security Policy.

At the head of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are the Heads of State or Government as the "*European Council*". The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy attends the meetings in an advisory role. This Council lays down the political foundations on which the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy is built. Under Article 22 (1) TEU, the European Council defines the strategic interests and foreign policy objectives referred to in Article 26 TEU, which are subsequently specified by the Council of the European Union. The European Council meetings take place twice a year, also known as EU summits (Regelsberger 2011, 242). Under the principle of unanimity, the European Council, as the hierarchically highest decision-making body for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, takes political decisions which are the guiding principle and which set the central objectives and strategies for further action for the Council of the European Union, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the associated institutions such as the Political Security Committee. If no unanimous agreement can be reached within the lower levels of decision-making on a particular issue, the European Council nevertheless tries to find a consensual solution or compromise on the subject to be represented outside the European Union. For all decisions requiring unanimity, a Member State may abstain, but it cannot prevent decisions from being taken. This is known as "constructive abstention". The member state that abstained is not obliged to implement the decision. However, it accepts that it is binding on all other States (Algiers, 2010, 53).

The Council of Ministers in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, composed of representatives of all Member States at the ministerial level, is the central advisory and decision-making body of the CFSP. The so-called "*General Affairs Council*", chaired by the Presidency and the High Representative, ensures the coherence of the Council's work in its different configurations, under Article 16 (6) TEU and comes

together once a month on this occasion. All decisions and debates concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy are discussed in the General Affairs Council (GAC). In doing so, the GAC follows guidelines or strategies laid down by the European Council straightforwardly and serves as the decision-making center for CFSP issues (Regelsberger 2011, 242). The Member States of the EU, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission may submit proposals to the General Affairs Council, which will examine them based on guidelines drawn up by the European Council. (Algiers, 2010, 55-57). The Council, therefore, takes the necessary decisions on the exercise of the CFSP, the formulation of its content, and in particular the implementation of common positions or actions. With a few exceptions, such as the appointment of a special representative in the field of the CFSP, it acts unanimously (Rehrl/Weisserth 2010, 40).

The Council's work is mainly assisted by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of officials from the Member States' permanent representations in Brussels. The PSC follows the international situation and monitors the implementation of agreed policies. In the event of a crisis, it adopts the necessary decisions on the performance of the CFSP as well as the preparation and implementation of common positions or actions (Rehrl/Weisserth 2010, 39). The coordination within the EU member states on Common Foreign and Security Policy measures before a Council decision is conducted in the so-called CFSP Council working groups, subordinate to the Political and Security Committee (Algiers 2010, 61).

The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) is also Vice-President of the Commission. Article 27 (2) TEU sets out the functions of the High Representative. He/she is elected by the European Council by a qualified majority and must be confirmed by the President of the European Commission. The High Representative's term of office lasts five years. Under Article 18(3) of the TEU, the High Representative conducts the CFSP and contributes to the definition of its policy by making proposals and is responsible for its implementation on behalf of the Council. He/she acts in the field of the CFSP in the same way as he acts in the field of CSDP. Within the Commission, he/she is responsible for the Commission's external relations and for coordinating the other aspects of the Union's external action. The High Representative

thus combines the functions of High Representative for the CFSP, Commissioner for External Relations, and President of the Foreign Affairs Council (Regelsberger, 2011, 243). Accordingly, he/she shall represent the Union in areas relating to the CFSP, conduct political dialogue with third parties on behalf of the Union and express the Union's position in international organizations and at international conferences. He/she also participates in the Council of Europe's work following Article 15 (2) TEU. The Lisbon Treaty grants the High Representative a right of initiative in the field of CFSP. Under Article 30 (1) TEU, he/she may refer a matter relating to the CFSP to the Council and submit initiatives and proposals to it (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet/ Rüger, Carolin, 2015, 153-159; Rehrl/Weisserth 2010, 36). The High Representative is also assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS), the diplomatic institution of the Union, based in Brussels, with the task of ensuring more coordination and coherence in the Union's external policy and relations with third countries (Rehrl/Weisserth 2010, 37).

After the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament (EP) is more embedded in the CFSP and CSDP, in particular, since the High Representative of the Union is also a Commissioner. Therefore, the EP is involved from the very beginning in the Commission's composition and thus in the choice of the High Representative by the mandatory consultation of each Commissioner on his/her prospective portfolio and the subsequent approval of the Commission (Article 17 TEU). Since the CFSP is not a communitarian policy area, the European Parliament does not have any decisive functions. However, Article 36 of the TEU requires the High Representative of the Union to keep the EP regularly involved and informed in the main aspects and developments in the area of the CFSP and CSDP (Rehrl/Weisserth, 2010, 41-42). The European Parliament is given twice a year the opportunity to hold debates on the CFSP annual reports and to address its questions and recommendations to the European Council or the High Representative. Nevertheless, the EP has a significant influence on the CFSP budget, as the financing of the CFSP requires Parliament's consent (Rehrl/Weisserth 2010,41-43).

Since the HR is Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, the European Commission is also involved in CFSP and CSDP. The Commission is associated with the work of the CFSP but does not formally participate in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, Article

22 (2) TEU allows the Commission and the High Representative to submit joint proposals to the Council. The Commission's activities mainly concern the civilian aspects of the CFSP, such as development policy and humanitarian aid (Rehrl/Weisserth, 2010, 40). The Commission also has instruments in those areas of the CFSP that affect Community policies (sanctions policy, human rights, democracy, terrorism). Besides, their role in the administration of the Union's budget offers the possibility of influencing the decisions in the CFSP. The President of the Commission as a member of the European Council and the Commission also participates in meetings of the General Affairs Council as well as in the political dialogue with third countries (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet/ Rüger, Carolin, 2015, 147-153; Rehrl/Weisserth 2010, 40).

3.3.4. Instruments of the CFSP

The main actors of the Common Foreign and Security Policy have various instruments at their disposal to achieve their policy objectives while remaining within the framework of the general guidelines defined by the European Council under Article 26 TEU. The General Affairs Council is authorized under Article 25 TEU to adopt legal acts in the form of decisions. These decisions represent either actions or positions. Actions (Article 28 TEU) are those by which the EU itself operates in a specific field of external action, while positions of the Union (Article 29 TEU) are those by which the GAC expresses its attitude to "*a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature*". These positions are binding for all Member States, which are held responsible for ensuring that their national policies are compatible with the common positions. Under Article 21 TEU, the CFSP may also decide on sanctions against third countries in order to achieve its policy objectives under Article 24 TEU. Other policy instruments include Foreign Affairs Council declarations by which the EU expresses its views on current political events, démarches, and the political dialogue with third countries. As already mentioned, the European Council and the Council for Foreign Action in the framework of the CFSP take decisions by unanimity (Article 31 (1) TEU). However, Member States have the option of abstaining from voting ("*constructive abstention*"). The decisions then do not apply to these Member States (Article 31 (1) TEU). The responsibility for

implementing decisions belongs to the High Representative and the EU Member States (Art. 26 (3) TEU) (BMEIA, 2020).

In this chapter, it can be concluded that, although the Treaty of Lisbon has removed the pillar structure of the EU, the intergovernmental character of the CFSP has been maintained mainly in the field of Foreign and Security Policy. The role and influence of supranational bodies such as the Commission and Parliament are therefore significantly weaker in the area of CFSP as in other areas. According to Title V Article 24 (1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)," *[T]he Union's competence in matters of common Foreign and Security Policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence*". The Union's external action ranges from external economic policy, security policy, sanctions, institution building, and humanitarian aid to civil and military missions. The CFSP is defined and implemented unanimously by the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council, both not supranational bodies of the EU, limiting the Union's capacity to act. Although the Commission may make proposals to the Council concerning the CFSP, decision-making competences are limited. Likewise, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy acts mainly in an advisory role and is responsible for implementing the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council.

Chapter 4 - Case Study

The theoretical part of this Master's thesis gave a detailed overview of the processes of politicization as well as the structure, objectives, and actors of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.

This conceptual framework thus serves as the basis for the following empirical part of this paper, which will accordingly examine based on theory more in detail the refugee crisis's role in the politicization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy from a practical point of view.

To this end, following hypotheses, outlined also in the introduction, will be examined and tested based on the interplay of theory and empirical research and data:

Hypothesis 1: The politicization of the CFSP can be recognized from an increased political and public attention to migration and asylum that has not only led to elevated awareness and public visibility for the CFSP, but also to an actor expansion in the field of the CFSP and further polarization.

Hypothesis 2: The politicization of the CFSP in the course of the refugee crisis was driven by media and populist political influence which have contributed to polarized political conflicts, and have led to a broader public perception of the CFSP.

Hypothesis 3: The politicization of the CFSP has not only initiated a series of debates on further integration steps in the CFSP, it has also resulted in institutional integration efforts in this area.

First, a historical overview of the refugee crisis is given to provide a better historical context. This is followed by an analysis of the characteristics by which the politicization of the CFSP in the context of the refugee crisis can be measured. The next section provides an overview of the mechanisms that have fostered politicization, and finally, the consequences of this process are discussed in more detail.

4.1. Historical background: Outbreak of the refugee crisis

Over the past decades, conflicts and wars and hence flight and displacement have increased in many regions of the world. According to data collected by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 65.3 million people were displaced in 2015 and 67.7 million in 2016 (UNHCR 2016; UNHCR 2015).

Although asylum applications in the European Union already increased in 2014, a significant increase in refugee numbers was recorded in the first half of 2015 (Eurostat, 2020). Especially after the shipping accident in the Mediterranean Sea on 19 April 2015, in which up to 800 refugees and migrants lost their lives, the issue of asylum in the EU has received greater attention. In response to this catastrophe, debates on sea rescue, safeguarding external borders, and cooperation with countries of origin and transit were intensified to a greater extent, and a European Agenda for Migration was adopted in May 2015 (European Commission, 2019).

In the second half of the year, the number of refugees again rose dramatically (Eurostat, 2020) and placed Europe's internal and external borders into a state of emergency. With the Balkan wars, where the EU received about 700 000 refugees between 1992 and 1995 (UNHCR, 2000, 218), the summer of 2015 thus became the symbol of the so-called refugee crisis, and not only represented one of the greatest waves of immigration in Europe since the Second World War (Cardoso/Garrido, 2015) but also turned into one of the most outstanding humanitarian and political challenges of the European Union.



Figure 3: Number of first time asylum applicants registered in the EU Member States

Source: Eurostat, 2017

Figure 3 shows that already in 2014, about 562 690 asylum applicants were registered in the EU Member states. In 2015 the number rose to approximately 1.26 million, but also in 2016, the number of asylum seekers remained with about 1.20 million asylum applications at a high level (Eurostat, 2020). Despite common external borders, the attitude and willingness to receive, support, and care for asylum seekers in the EU have remained highly variable. Consequently, the refugees were spread very unevenly across the EU countries: 75% of all applications were mainly located in five Member States: Germany, Hungary, Sweden, Austria, and Italy (EU) (European Commission, 2015). The large influx of refugees posed a major challenge to these member states. After the construction of border fences at the Schengen area's external border, as in Bulgaria and Hungary; also, other member states as Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, and France decided to reintroduce border controls, even within the Schengen area, temporarily. However, the situation became particularly acute in the Mediterranean countries and concerning maritime border security, especially in Greece and Italy, but also in Spain (Benedicto, Brunet, 2018, 6).

In 2015, around 1 million people seeking protection crossed the Mediterranean to reach Europe, over 850 000 refugees via Greece, over 150 000 via Italy, and over 15 000 via Spain (UNHCR, 2015).



Figure 4: Detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU's external borders, 2015

Source: Frontex, 2016, 17

Despite increased border security measures, including on the EU's maritime external borders, approximately 1.822 million illegal border crossings were documented by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX) in 2015 (Frontex, 2016, 17[1]). In the following years, illegal border crossings decreased sharply but remained high (Figure 5), with 511,050 in 2016 and 204,720 in 2017.

[1] "Illegal border crossings" is the official term used by the EU institutions and does not refer to the number of persons who have crossed the borders illegally, but to the attempts of illegal border crossings detected by the member states (a person can cross the external border several times). It is impossible to provide information about the exact number of illegal border crossings. However, the data are a good indicator of the migratory pressure at the borders and the workload of the EU border authorities. (Frontex, 2020)



Figure 5: Number of illegal entries between border-crossing points (BCPs) detected in the European Union (EU) from 2014 to 2017

Source: Frontex, 2017

Along with the so-called refugee crisis, the issue of border security within the European Union (EU), and especially at the EU's external borders, thus shifted increasingly into the focus of the political agenda. At the beginning of the crisis, the Commission approved the European Security Agenda in April 2015 and the European Migration Agenda in May 2015 (European Parliament, 2019). In the following year, Commission President Juncker announced his intention to build a security union (Bendiek, 2017, 18).

However, this also provided windows of opportunity for new legislative projects and operational measures at European and Member State levels, such as the reinforcement of Frontex (Bossong, 2019, 2), the adoption of the EU Global Strategy, the cooperation with third countries and transit countries such as the EU-Turkey deal and the CFSP Mission Sophia (Bendiek, Bossong, 2019, 8).

4.2. Politicization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the wake of the refugee crisis

Since the previous chapter focused on illegal border crossings and asylum applications in the context of the refugee crisis, the following chapter is dedicated to the first hypothesis of this thesis: The politicization of the CFSP can be recognized from an increased political and public attention to migration and asylum that has not only led to elevated awareness and public visibility for the CFSP, but also to an actor expansion in the field of the CFSP and further polarization.

A Common Foreign Policy and a Common Security and Defence Policy, as an integral part of the CFSP, has always been supported and approved by the majority of the European population. Figure 6 shows very clearly that the Common Foreign and Security Policy, since its implementation in the Treaty of Amsterdam, has always been supported by more than 61% of the EU population.



Figure 6: A common foreign policy of the 28 Member States of the EU.
Source: Eurobarometer 89, 2018

Much greater support is given to a Common Security and Defence Policy as an important CFSP tool, with higher approval ratings of more than 71% since 2004, as shown in Figure 7.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the European Council has already made the issues of foreign security and defence one of its priorities in 2013. However, in this connection, the EU initially focused on increased cooperation with international organizations such as NATO (European Council, 2013).



Figure 7: A common defence and security policy among EU Member States.
Source: European Commission 89, 2019

However, with the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has gained great political and public attention. Since then, the CFSP has found a prominent place on the political agenda of the European Union. In May 2015, the EU Commission presented a European Agenda for Migration, which, in addition to the strategic guidelines for migration policy, also declared more decisive action in the CFSP (European Council, 2015). In the same year, through the Council Decision CFSP-2015/972 of 22 June 2015, the European Union military operation in the southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) was launched to combat human smuggling and smuggling activities in the southern and central Mediterranean. The

political attention reached its climax with the adoption of the European Global Strategy in June 2016, redefining the strategic objectives and approaches of the CFSP.

Nevertheless, it would be insufficient to claim the public support in Figures 6 and 7 for a Common Foreign Policy and a Common Security and Defence Policy as the leading narrative for political developments in the CFSP. A far more meaningful contribution in the public and political perception of the CFSP was made by the refugee crisis, which can probably be called a leading narrative, both politically and publicly, for developments in the CFSP.

Considering the developments in the EU population's public perception during the refugee crisis, apparent shifts can be identified. The public impact of the high number of refugees entering the EU (Figure 3) is also reflected in the Eurobarometer surveys. Figure 8 shows that, according to a Eurobarometer study on the two most important issues for the EU, a gradual increase in importance on the subject of migration has been observed since autumn 2012. While immigration was at 24% in autumn 2014, a sharp increase to 38% was recorded in spring 2015, which marked the beginning of the refugee crisis, by making immigration the most important issue for the EU population and leaving behind the subject of the economic situation and unemployment. This position was maintained in autumn 2015 when a further rapid increase of 20% compared to spring had been observed. For 58% of the EU population, immigration was the most important problem of the EU at that time, followed by the issue of terrorism with 25%, which has again played an increased role since the terrorist attack in Paris in November 2015. The fact that the attackers had come from Syria disguised as refugees also substantially impacted refugees' public perception in Europe (Wagner, 2016, 38). In 2016, the value of the issue of migration rose to 48% in spring and 45% in autumn, but still remained the EU's most important problem for the population. At the beginning of 2017, immigration, with a percentage of 38%, was overtaken for the first time by the problem of terrorism with 44%. The increased fear of terrorist attacks can again serve as an explanation for this development. At the end of 2017, however, the issue of immigration is again in first place with 39%, closely followed by terrorism with 38%.



Figure 8: What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?
Source: European Commission, 2017

It is therefore clear that since the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015, issues such as economic situation and unemployment have been pushed back by the issue of migration and terrorism and have become more present in public awareness.

While at the peak of the refugee crisis, 58% of the EU population identified immigration as the most important issue for the EU, a much larger proportion of 81% saw the EU's external borders as an important security challenge (Figure 9). In comparison, a further 87% saw the EU as having a common duty to protect its external borders (DeVries/Hoffmann, 2016, 3). In contrast to migration, which was still perceived as the most important problem in the following years, in 2017, with an increase of 5%, 86% saw the EU's external borders as an important security challenge, of which 51% saw this as a very important problem and 35% as a fairly important problem. These perceptions appear justified, looking at the number of illegal border crossings with approximately 1,822 in 2015, with 511,050 in 2016 and 204,720 in 2017 (Figure 5).



Figure 9: In your opinion, how important are the following challenges to the internal security of the EU?
Source: European Commission, 2017

The public awareness of the issue of protection of the external borders can be underlined by another Eurobarometer 2016 survey (Figure 10), which shows that 71% of respondents would like the EU to intervene more than at present; a larger proportion of 74% would like the same in terms of migration as 66% in security and defence and 50% in terms of foreign policy.



Figure 10: Percentage of respondents who would like the EU to intervene more than at present.
Source: European Commission, 2016

Figure 10 summarizes very well that public support for the CFSP combined with the issue of migration delivered a clear signal in the direction of policymakers to enhance cooperation regarding foreign, security, and defence policies. This is mainly due to the fact that in the context of the refugee crisis, the external dimension of the internal security of the EU has been increasingly linked to the CFSP.

This development gained momentum for the first time with Frederica Mogherini, High Representative of the CFSP (HR), and her intention to organize a joint session between foreign and interior ministers in early 2015 as a response to the tragedies in the Mediterranean: "*I will convene an extraordinary meeting of the Commissioners' Group on External Action in the coming days to discuss with the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, a review of our policies. I've also decided to put a discussion on migration on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council soon. The fight against smuggling and trafficking, the rescue of migrants at sea, the protection of asylum seekers are shared challenges; they require a stronger exercise of shared responsibility* "(Blockmans/Russack, 2015, 10).

The Interior and Foreign Ministers met on 20 April 2015 and discussed the issue of migration in the Foreign Affairs Council. The outcome of this meeting was integrated into the European Agenda on Migration, whose adoption on 13 May 2015 combined for the first-time competences of the external dimension of the internal security of the Union, which normally falls under the area of justice and home affairs, with common foreign security by stating that: „*It is clear that we need a new, more European approach. This requires using all policies and tools at our disposal - combining internal and external policies to best effect*" (European Commission, 2015,2). The Council furthermore mandated HR to align the CFSP with this approach effectively.

One mission, in particular, gained great relevance and attention during the refugee crisis. At the external borders, the internal and external dimensions of EU border surveillance operations have become increasingly intertwined: In June 2015, the CFSP Council Decision 2015/972 established the CSDP mission EUNAVFOR (Operation Sophie) to replace the Italian rescue mission "*Mare Nostrum*" and to relieve Italy's coast guard and combat trafficking networks in the southern and central Mediterranean (Nováky,

2018, 203). Although migration control is not part of the missions' responsibilities but covered by Justice and Home Affairs, however, increasing attention to the problem of illegal migration has shifted migration control into the scope of the EU's Operation Sophia. While the original mandate of this operation was to combat smugglers, tasks such as surveillance activities, search and rescue operations at sea and the exchange of information with the authorities of the Member States as well as FRONTEX and Europol have been added, combining internal and external security for the first time in such a strong operational framework (Bendiek, Bossong, 2019, 10-12).

Finally, the growing interdependence of the internal and external dimensions of the Union's security was also recognized in the European Union's Global Strategy, and the strategic orientation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy was adapted to these challenges. On 28 June 2016, the CFSP High Representative, Frederica Mogherini, published the 54-page Global Strategy document entitled "*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* ". While the strategy is, on the one hand, a response to the changing security environment in Europe, on the other hand, it also has a strong focus on migration and can be seen as a response to the refugee crisis of 2015. In contrast to its predecessor, the ESS, which does not refer to migration, the issue of migration occupies a large place in the EUGS in a multi-layered form, i.e., through references *to "mobility", "border management", "origin and transit countries", "migrants", "refugees", "legal migration", "readmission", "return", "displacement", "displaced", "reception", "asylum", "irregular flow", "legal and circular channels", "demography", "visa facilitation"* and "*visa liberalization*" (Ceccorulli, Lucarelli, 2017, 86-87.).

As "*a Strategy that made the internal-external nexus the silver thread running across the document*" (Nocci, 2016, 469), migration and the EU's Foreign and Security Policy were brought into a direct connection: *"We must become more joined up across our external policies, between Member States and EU institutions, and between the internal and external dimensions of our policies. This is particularly relevant to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, migration, and security, notably counter-terrorism.* (European Union, 2016, 11).

The Strategy "*suggests that addressing the root causes of conflict, sharpening EU tools in the internal-external security nexus, and addressing immediate humanitarian crises are necessary in order to cope with challenges in North Africa and the Middle East*" (European Parliament, 2016, 4). This includes the necessity to establish the space for cooperation and diplomacy, especially with countries of the North and sub-Saharan Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East (European Union, 2016, 35).

Special attention is also paid to cooperation in EU migration and asylum policy: "*Together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. We will work with our international partners to ensure shared global responsibilities and solidarity*" (European Union, 2016, 11). In practical terms, the EUGS acts as a basis of legitimacy for the cooperation between the CSDP (via CFSP Council Decisions) and the European Coast Guard in matters relevant to the protection of the Union's external border (European Union, 2016, 20).

Another core piece of this internal-external security nexus is the EU Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016. At its core, the EU-Turkey Agreement aimed to reduce irregular migration at the EU's external borders, smuggling and human rights abuses, and migrant deaths. In return, EU member states promised to increase resettlement of Syrian refugees in Turkey, accelerate visa liberalization for Turkish nationals, and increase existing financial support for the Turkish refugee population (Council of the European Union, 2016). Thus, securing and controlling the borders of EU member states has been moved to the external borders. This inclusion of the EU borders in the Common Foreign and Security Policy shows that migration is no longer primarily understood as a domestic issue but is increasingly perceived as a foreign policy matter. The agreement was publicly heavily criticized as immoral or even illegal, not only between Human Rights Organizations. The UNHCR criticized the return of migrants to Turkey as a *"mass expulsion*" (Barnes, 2016; Bruegel, 2016), Amnesty has labeled the Deal as "*A shameful stain on the collective conscience of Europe*" (Amnesty International, 2017).

Against this background, it is evident that the CFSP, mainly through its contribution to protecting the external borders during the refugee crisis, revealed a

significant public awareness. This shift in migration policy from the JHA to the CFSP, which was mainly driven by the refugee crisis, has in turn also expanded the spectrum of actors involved in the CFSP.

From an institutional perspective, the refugee crisis has led to closer institutional cooperation between the JHA agencies and the CFSP and one of its most relevant instruments, the CSDP. In the past, cooperation between CFSP missions and the JHA agencies such as Frontex or Europol was not usual or even avoided. An example of this is the EU NAVFOR Somalia mission, where cooperation with Interpol was established, but Europol was not involved (Trauner, 2016, 2-4).

The mission adopted in the context of the refugee crisis „*EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia is not representative of the majority of CSDP missions/operations, notably in that its mandate allows collection of personal data and cooperation with JHA agencies*" (Council of the European Union, 2017, 3). In the mandate (CFSP 2015/778 of 18 May 2015) of the European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) a direct cooperation between the JHA agencies and the CFSP was also established for the first time: "*EUNAVFOR MED shall cooperate with the relevant Member State authorities and shall establish a coordination mechanism, and as appropriate, conclude arrangements with other Union agencies and bodies, in particular FRONTEX, EUROPOL, EUROJUST, European Asylum Support Office and relevant CSDP missions* "(Article 8 (3)).

Moreover, a Working Arrangement between EUNAVFOR MED and Europol was also concluded in December of the same year, which „*aims at the effective countering of the humanitarian crisis as well as the identification and analysis of the organized crime groups, in particular operating in the field of immigrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and illegal trafficking including in arms, ammunition, explosives and on crude oil and other illegal exports that are contrary to UNSCR 2146 (2014) and UNSCR 2362 (2017), as well as crimes relevant to the security of EUNAVFOR MED*"(Article 1 (2))

This arrangement also provided that: „*High-level meetings between Europol and EUNAVFOR MED will take place regularly to discuss issues relating to this Arrangement and the cooperation in general*," as well as "*EUNAVFOR MED and Europol will consult*

each other regularly on policy issues and matters of common interest for the purpose of realizing their objectives and coordinating their respective activities" (Article 6 (a & b)) (EUROPOL, 2019).

Consequently, EUNAVFOR MED, launched in the context of the refugee crisis, enabled JHA agencies and the CFSP instruments to work together for the first time and, by doing so, has increased the number of actors involved in the CFSP at the institutional level.

However, the range of actors involved has been widened at the institutional level and the political level. The ESS of 2003 and 2008 was designed by a limited circle of political experts and elites. Although the Member States were also involved, the then-High Representative Javier Solana was mainly involved in the drafting of this strategy: *"[T]he 'pen' was kept firmly in the hands of Solana's cabinet, the Policy Unit led by Christoph Heusgen, and the Director-General for Security and Defence Policy in the Council General Secretariat, Robert Cooper*" (EUISS, 2015,14).

Frederica Mogherini presented with the European Global Strategy a much more inclusive approach. Although the EU Member States still have a "*traditionally dominant role"* in the CFSP (Moravcsik 1999, 295), and the EU Global Strategy has not enabled any actor expansion in active decision-making progress, a broader spectrum of actors can be observed in the development of the Global Strategy as a guideline for the CFSP.

At the Munich Security Conference in 2015, HR Mogherini already assured that the Global Strategy would not be a strategy "*that is not drawn up in a closet by a select few, but a broad process that involves the Member States and EU institutions, as well as the foreign policy community spanning across academic and think tanks, the media and civil society*" (EUISS, 2015, 118). Consequently, she succeeded in opening up the CFSP also to other non-CFSP actors. In addition to the member states (including the Foreign Affairs Council), the EU Parliament (through the AFET Committee) and the EU Commission, as Vice President and Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, she also mobilized the scientific community, among others through more than 50 scientific contributions that have been integrated into the strategy. During a so-called "*consultation semester*", numerous workshops, seminars, roadshows and events were organized in and outside

the EU between October 2015 and April, not only for the scientific community, but also for "*engaging civil society, students and the wider public through student conferences, town hall meetings, opinion polls, as well as virtually through social media, and an interactive website featuring written opinions, videos and infographics*" (Sus, 2016, 7; Mogherini, 2015, 120), through which an *"open and consultative method a nucleus of a European public sphere in security has developed*"(Sus, 2016, 8).

Moreover, the refugee crisis has contributed to a greater polarization between the member states, accompanied by blockages in negotiations at the European level. Several states initially reacted to the high influxes from summer 2015 with renationalization tendencies by introducing national border controls as in Germany and France and border closures as by Hungary. In May 2015, in response to this massive migration flow, the EU Commission presented a European Agenda for Migration, which contained the strategic guidelines for migration policy for the following years, including action against smugglers, combating the causes of flight, and the creation of legal migration from third countries. However, the Commission's proposal to redistribute refugees among the EU member states using a specific distribution key led to significant conflicts and disputes among the member states (Bendiek/Neyer, 2016, 2-3).

Despite the dispute, the heads of state and government agreed at the EU summit in June 2015 to resettle 40,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy and accept a further 20,000 refugees from third countries via the UNHCR's Resettlement Program. After the large increase in the number of refugees during the summer months, the Commission presented another proposal to distribute 120,000 refugees. Although this proposal raised significant conflicts, it was implemented despite the veto and resistance of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania (Engler, 2019). This political polarization and the internal conflicts coupled with the security concerns of the member states and the population (Figure 8) have led to a greater focus on protecting external borders. In this context, Frontex's competencies were planned to be expanded in 2015 and implemented in 2016 (Bossong, 2019, 2-3). Being aware of these positions, referring to article 43 TEU and the fact that the CSDP "'*may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories*", the mission EUNAVFOR MED was established. While CFSP military missions

have so far been mainly deployed to operate outside the EU, this mission was the first operation to be launched to guarantee the internal security of the Union by controlling the external borders of the Union (Tardy, 2015, 2), also referred to as an "*externalization of EU migration and border controls to third countries*" (Bendiek, Bossong, 2019, 14).

While this mission was intended to represent a united response to illegal migration, it led to further conflict and polarization within the member states. Although the Mission's mandate was primarily responsible for identifying and combating illegal migrant smuggling, it was obliged under international law to carry out sea rescue operations and became increasingly focused on this task (Bendiek, Bossong, 2019, 12). Thus, between June 2015 and July 2017, the operation saved over 41,000 migrants from drowning (German Foreign Office, 2017) and brought them to the Italian port. However, 153,842 migrants were brought to Italian ports by European military ships in 2015, 181,436 in 2016, and 119,369 in 2017 (Bettati, 2018). This high number of arriving refugees further aggravated the situation between the member states, especially countries like Italy, Greece, and Germany insisted on a distribution key that was increasingly rejected by the eastern member states (Engler, 2019). The internal disputes and the increasing polarization in the distribution issue also manifested themselves in the re-orientation of the CFSP. Where in 2015 the official publications of the EU NAVFOR MED focused on "*rescue*" and "*save*", in the following years, this rhetoric shifted to "*border control*" (Cusumano, 2016, 13; Figure 11), serving also as a reflection of the shift of the missions focus.



Figure 11: EUNAVFOR's rhetoric until June 2017.
Source: Cusumano, 2016,

This includes, in particular, the additional extension of the operation's mandate in 2016, through which the Mission, by supporting the establishment of a Libyan coast guard, should increasingly ensure that fewer migrants cross the Mediterranean to the EU (Bendiek, Bossong, 2019, 12). Still, internal disputes within the member states continued and became the focus of political conflict (Cusumano, 2016, 15). While one camp, i.e., Germany, Sweden, and Luxemburg, called for more protection for and more European solidarity with refugees (Bendiek/Neyer, 2016,3), the other camp, including the eastern Member states and Austria, expressed obvious criticism of the mission, calling it a "*shuttle service*" between Italy and the Libyan coast, which makes it easier for smugglers to do their business rather than curbing it (Welt, 2017; Bakker et al. 2017, Bendiek/Neyer, 2016,3). Similarly, the House of Lords (2016) concludes in a report that "*The mission does not, however, in any meaningful way deter the flow of migrants, disrupt the smugglers' networks, or impede the business of people smuggling on the central Mediterranean route*" and can therefore be described as "*has failed to achieve its objective*" (House of Lords, 2017). The conflict reached a climax with Italy's announcement in 2017 that it would vote against the mission due to the high number of refugees and the lack of burden-sharing among the European member states. Following the Commission's commitment to providing further funding and support to Italy, the member state withdrew its veto, and the mandate was further extended (Nuspliger, 2017). Still, the disagreement among the member states regarding refugees' fair distribution and a consensus among the CFSP on the Sophia mission remained unchanged (Mantini, 2019, 2-3).

In retrospect, the first hypothesis of this work can thus be considered confirmed: During the migration crisis, a politicization of the CFSP can be identified through several indicators: An increased political and public attention of CFSP issues, an expansion of actors involved in the CFSP, and polarized conflicts. As the issues of (illegal) migration, asylum, and the internal dimension of EU security in the refugee crisis showed a direct link to external security, the increased attention to migration and asylum, in turn, led to increased awareness and public visibility of the CFSP. These correlations also led to an expansion of the actors involved in the CFSP, with the Global Strategy opening the CFSP to non-CFSP actors, which in many ways can be traced back to the refugee crisis. It is

also non-neglectable that the CFSP found itself in a polarized conflict during the refugee crisis, which was most evident in member states' different positions on the joint naval mission to combat illegal immigration towards the central Mediterranean the EU NAVFORMED/Operation Sophia.

Although the refugee crisis can be considered a "*critical event*" that favored politicization, it is not sufficient to explain the politicization of the CFSP. There are far more complex political and institutional opportunity structures that have enabled the process of politicization. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze more in detail which structures have contributed to the politicization process. These will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

4.3. Mechanisms of the Politicization of the CFSP

In the next chapter, the second hypothesis forms the starting point: The politicization of the CFSP in the course of the refugee crisis was driven by media and populist political influence which have contributed to polarized political conflicts, and have led to a broader public perception of the CFSP.

In the Lisbon Treaty (Article 2), the European Union is clearly defined as a union of values: "*The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between women and men prevail*."

But it can be observed that, even before the refugee crisis outbreak, populist and nationalist parties, which are in apparent contradiction to the European understanding of values, were on the rise. If one compares the election results of the European Parliament in 2014 with the elections in 2009, one can witness not only an increase in the share of the vote for right-wing parties (Figure 12), but also a decrease in support for pro-European currents, but instead an increase in Euroscepticism (Figure 13).



Figure 12: Share of members of the European Parliament belonging to parties or political groups
Source: Pew Research Center, 2016



Figure 13: Share of members of the European Parliament belonging to parties or political groups
Source: Pew Research Center, 2016

Populist parties were not only involved in the European Parliament but also in national governments. In 2015, the national conservative parties in Hungary, Greece, and Poland, which can be assigned to the populist camp, were the largest governing party with strong support ratings (Figure 14).

Country/Party	EP election result in 2009	EP election result in 2014	Popularity among likely voters at the end of 2015	Popularity among likely voters at the end of 2016
Greece/ Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	4.70%	26.5%.	29%	22%
Poland/ Law and Justice (PiS)	27.40%	32.3%	38%	41%
Hungary/ Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fizdez)	56.36%	51.4%	51%	46%

Figure 14: List of populist parties in the European Union
Source: FEPS; 2016

Besides, in 2016 in six other member states, populist parties were involved in the government as smaller allies (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Finland, Latvia, Czech Republic, and Lithuania). In two other member states (Denmark and Portugal), the government was supported from outside by populist parties. (FEPS, 2016, 7; Figure 14)



Figure 14: Governing populist parties in Europe,2016 Source: FEPS, 2016, 19

Alongside these populist and partly national conservative parties, the refugee crisis triggered a rise in right-wing populists to radical right-wing parties in the EU, which openly adopted anti-Semitic, anti-Islamic, and racist positions (Pisou/Ahmed, 2016, 165). Figure 15 shows how right-wing parties' approval ratings visibly increased in 2015

compared to their election results in 2014. Although approval ratings decrease in some cases at the end of 2016, they remain at a higher level than in the pre-crisis year 2014.

Country/Party	EP election result in 2009	EP election result in 2014	Popularity among likely voters at the end of 2015	Popularity among likely voters at the end of 2016
Austria/Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	12.%	19.5%	32%	35%
The Netherlands/ Party for Freedom (PVV)	16.9 %	13.2%	19%	16%
Poland/ Law and Justice (PiS)	27.4 %	32.3%	38%	41%
Hungary/The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)	14.%	14.6%	21%	21%
Germany/ Alternative for Germany (AfD)		7.10%	8%	12%
Sweden/ Sweden Democrats (SD)	3.2%	9.70%	19%	18%
Slovakia/ Slovak Natonal Party (SNS)	5.5%	3.61%	7%	14%
France/ National Front (FN)	6.30 %	24.95 %	29%	28%
Italy/Northern League (LN)	10.%	6.15%	14%	13%

Figure 15: List of populist parties in the European Union
Source: FEPS; 2016

The parties may differ in positions among themselves, but they overlap significantly on the issue of migration and refugees (Schellenberg, 2018). Therefore, the refugee crisis can be seen as a momentum for the (right-wing) populist parties, as they have seen the crisis as an opportunity for contestation. Whereas right-wing parties have traditionally not been involved in foreign-policy debates, they have used the link

between internal and external security to stir up sentiment also in foreign-policy discussions as well (Barbé/Morillas, 2019, 758). They not only reject European integration „*because they believe that it weakens national sovereignty, diffuses self-rule, and introduces foreign ideas. They oppose European integration for the same reasons that they oppose immigration: it undermines national community*" (Hooghe/Marks, 2009, 17)

These actors have similar restrictive migration policy ideas, especially regarding immigration from outside the European Union. These are based on discriminatory and racist concepts, in which a common European Christian identity is manifested, especially in distinction to the immigration of Muslims. The influx of refugees, who were predominantly Muslims, was presented not only as an economic threat but also as a cultural one (Caiani/Weisskircher 2020).

Thus, in October 2015, the FPÖ leader Strache demanded a border fence between Austria and Hungary to stop refugees from entering the country and warned against "*Islamization*" with statements such as: "*We have a Christian culture, and we want to keep a Christian culture for our children''*(Deutsche Welle, 2015). In his populism, Le Pen also followed him as leader of the Front National and in the same year called for *"immediate halt of all intake of migrants in France''*. Wilders, the leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom, called in a parliamentary debate 2015 the refugee crisis an "*Islamic asylum tsunami*" and labeled the male refugees as „*testosterone bombs*" who "*threaten our girls*." (Tharoor, 2015) The PiS party leader, Kaczynski, also warned during the 2015 election campaign that Muslims were setting up "*Sharia zones*'' and using churches as toilets. At the same time, he claimed they were bringing dangerous diseases and parasites into the country (Cienski, 2016). The PiS won the elections at the end of 2015 as the strongest party and moved into parliament. In power with his Fizdez party during the refugee crisis, Orban described his border fence as protection against a "*Muslim invasion*" to "*keep Europe Christian*" and clearly stated that refugees were not welcome in Hungary due to their religion and culture (The Guardian, 2015).

The growing influence of (right-wing) populists triggered a shift in the political landscape and created a political cleavage. On the one hand, there is the value-based

and treaty-based model of an open European policy, represented by the EU Commission as the "*guardian of the treaties*" and striving for a solidarity-based and value-oriented domestic and foreign policy. On the other hand, there have been (right-wing) populist parties in opposition to this understanding of values, which demand a domestic and foreign policy prioritizing national interests (Balfour et al., 2016).

Remarkably, the „*mainstream parties*" have come under increasing pressure from populist parties. While populist parties have been able to exert the most significant influence where they participate in governments, such as in Hungary or Poland, also *"mainstream parties (...) are increasingly being 'outbid' by populist challengers*" (Balfour et al., 2016) as political populist currents have managed to shape the political debate not only at the national but also at the European level. Moreover, they acted as a so-called *"fig leaf behind which governments can hide, claiming that any new proposal for a common solution to a difficult issue would be blocked by the populists*" (Balfour et al., 2016, 51). Especially during the refugee crisis, populist radical right parties' rising popularity has enabled mainstream parties to become stricter on migration (Bale, 2003).

Although primarily the eastern member states, such as Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, demonstrated their opposition to an EU relocation scheme for refugees or asylum seekers, also member states from the "*coalition of the willing*," a loose group of member states consisting of Germany as the driving force and Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Slovenia, Portugal, France, and Greece, which rely on solidarity and close cooperation with Turkey in refugee policy, gradually suspended their support due to populist pressure. France turned away politically from Berlin after the terrorist attacks; due to the increasing popularity of populist tendencies, also Austria introduced refugee ceilings. Even Sweden, which took in the most refugees per capita in 2015, introduced border controls at the Danish border in 2016 (Weber, 2016, 136-138; FEPS, 2016).

These disputes have not only nourished polarized conflict between the member states in the area of the Migration and Asylum Policy but also when it comes to the CFSP. The refugee crisis has been "*used by populist parties to provide a radical rethink of the*

EU's foreign and security agendas'' (Barbé/Morillas, 2019, 758). The nationalistic and populist discourses and conflicts have resulted in a shift of a CFSP based on values and principles to a policy aimed at curbing migration and focusing on border security. The unwillingness of the member states to agree on a common and solidary solution in the relocation of refugees has led to a securitization of the CFSP, which can be most clearly observed in the Mediterranean (Rivera, 2020, 4; Figure 11): By the externalization of border security is to third countries (Bendiek, Bossong, 2019, 14) by the expansion of The Operation Sophia's mandate to the Libyan coastguard, humanitarian responsibility was compromised in the name of border security.

But also, in terms of the internal perspective of the CFSP regarding migration, the influence of the populists, especially from the eastern member states, is clearly visible. Natalia Tocci, the "penholder" of the EUGS, described the process of the agreement for the Global Strategy as follows: *"Some Member States, notably from the east, were sceptical about making references to the internal dimensions of migration, notably asylum. Yet for a Strategy that made the internal–external nexus the silver thread running across the document, neglecting the internal dimension of the policy area—migration—where the internal–external nexus is most evident would have been paradoxical at best. By covering only the external dimension of migration, the Strategy would have given the impression that the EU's approach to migration is exclusively centred on keeping migrants outside EU borders*" (Tocci, 2016,469). No secret was made about the existing securitization of the CFSP and the emerging conflicts: *"By covering only the external dimension of migration, the Strategy would have given the impression that the EU's approach to migration is exclusively centred on keeping migrants outside EU borders. While, unfortunately, this is close to practice, the HRVP did not want to legitimise such an approach in the EUGS*" (Tocci, 2016,469).

Against this background, (right-wing) populist parties, in particular, acted as primary drivers of polarization, especially by publicly fomenting and mobilizing internal and polarizing conflicts in the member states and negatively influencing the public awareness of the refugee debate, which was ultimately reflected in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy. Consideration must also be given to the fact that populist statements

and polarizing statements were reproduced significantly more often in the media, especially in tabloid newspapers, which is why populist arguments found a high place in the public debate (Balfour et al., 2016, 19-20).

However, it is also essential to give an integrated approach to the mass media's role in the context of the refugee crisis, which succeeded in influencing political and public attitudes toward migration and refugees and thus actively shaping debates.

A general overview of the refugee crisis media coverage is difficult, as the different member states were affected differently by the refugee crisis, and thus the media coverage also differs. Therefore, it is useful to refer to a study that examines the coverage of 24 media outlets from five EU countries with different geographical locations (East, South, West, North) about the refugee crisis in more detail.



Figure 16: Dynamics of Refugee Coverage in Europe[2].
Source: Heidenreich et. al, 2019

[2] Horizontal reference line indicates average weekly coverage per country over the whole period of analysis. Lines are centered on their countries' respective average, indicating the deviation of the coverage in a given week from this average. Lines are smoothed using a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression. N of articles = 130,042.

Figure 16 states that there has been increased coverage of refugees in all member states. In Germany, Sweden, Spain, and the United Kingdom, overall coverage peaked during the most intense phase of the crisis, at the end of summer 2017 (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017). In Germany, due to the New Year's Eve sexual assaults, there has been a resurgence in coverage after a leveling off. In the United Kingdom, the content remained at a high level almost simultaneously until the Brexit referendum. A closer analysis of the Spanish press shows that the second peak is based on a strong focus on the EU-Turkey deal and Brexit. The relatively flatter curve in the Hungarian press analysis compared to the other countries can be explained by the fact that Hungary had already experienced the first large influx of refugees and media attention in winter 2014.



Figure 17: Dynamics of Refugee Coverage in Europe.
Source: Heidenreich et. al, 2019



Figure 18: Dynamics of Refugee Coverage in Europe.
Source: Heidenreich et. al, 2019

Although in the Hungarian press, the aspect of humanitarian aid is pronounced at the beginning of 2015, it decreases with the increasing number of refugees arriving and is, however, overtaken by the framing of "*crime and terrorism*." The "*Border*" aspect is also particularly pronounced during the climax of the EU-refugee crisis and the construction of a fence along the national border in October 2015, after which framing shifted from the national level to the EU level, and media coverage focused on EU policies in the refugee crisis (Figure 17).

In the German press, framing is very diverse and varies, which is partly related to the country's size. However, the framing "*Border*" also plays an important role here and remains at a high level despite a decrease after Chancellor Merkel's famous sentence, "*We can do it*." Parallel to Merkel's statement, however, the importance of the framing "*National Refugee Policy*" is increasing, which deals with how to deal with refugees in the country, especially the problem of accommodation (Figure 18).



Figure 19: Dynamics of Refugee Coverage in Europe.
Source: Heidenreich et. al, 2019



Figure 20: Dynamics of Refugee Coverage in Europe.
Source: Heidenreich et. al, 2019

Compared to the other countries, the framing "human interest" is particularly prominent in the Swedish press but decreases with the refugee crisis's peak and increases again with the decreasing number of arriving refugees. The interest in framing *"EU Refugee Policy* " became increasingly prominent from summer 2015 along with the frame "*Refugee Movement*" and remained constant, in contrast to the latter (Figure 19).

Two dominant framings can be identified in the United Kingdom press: "*refugee camp*" is particularly prominent, registering its peak at the height of the crisis. Also, in the context of the Brexit referendum in June 2016, the refugee issue is discussed more frequently. Beyond this, the "*Culture & Value*" frame also played an important role up to and after the Brexit referendum (Figure 20).



Figure 21: Dynamics of Refugee Coverage in Europe.
Source: Heidenreich et. al, 2019

In the Spanish press, the "*EU Refugee Policy*" frame plays the most prominent role and only flattens out after the EU-Turkey deal's ratification. While the "*Human Interest*" frame was in the foreground at the beginning of 2015, it is overtaken by the "*Border*" frame as of July 2015 (Figure 21).

While similarities between the individual countries can be identified, there are also differences. Considering the frame "*Border*" which also plays a vital role for the public awareness of the CFSP, we can conclude that the geography of the countries plays a decisive role in the topic of the border problem, as in the case of Germany and Hungary and their proximity to the Balkan route and Spain with its maritime border to the Mediterranean Sea.

A study commissioned by the Council of Europe on media coverage in EU countries (Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Serbia, and the United Kingdom) comes to a similar conclusion (Chouliaraki and Zaborowski, 2017). In summary, the media focused on "*careful tolerance*" in the first wave, the peak of the refugee crisis (July 2015). This period was dynamic and, on the one hand, characterized by humanitarian efforts, also by the EU, which, however, expressed itself somewhat

cautiously, due to fears about the negative consequences for the security of the EU. This phase was followed by "*ecstatic humanitarianism*": The image of the dead body of three-year-old Alan Kurdi, which also appeared in numerous headlines in the European press, caused a turnaround in media coverage. The media narrative about the plight of asylum seekers and humanitarian measures and solidarity for refugees outweighed the content of measures to protect their own country. Moreover, there was more frequent coverage of immigration's positive consequences in this period than in the others.

In the third phase, "*Fear and securitization*," the media's perception and reporting changed drastically after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015. Security and defence measures for protecting national and European external borders dominated over humanitarian actions for refugees. Among the articles examined in the study, over 60% of the articles from November onwards contained a defence and military frame, predominating in countries such as (Germany, Hungary, France, UK, and the Czech Republic)

The media coverage, especially the frame like "*Border*", is also reflected in the perception of the population. Mass media has accompanied the refugee issue as a transnational information medium and has played an essential role in influencing public awareness, including border security and protection, and giving a platform for polarizing conflicts.

Although populist parties and the media discussion around the refugee crisis and the EU's security experienced a great deal of attention, this mostly decreased in parallel with the decrease in refugee numbers. However, what remained was the question of legitimacy, both in domestic politics and in foreign policy, raised at the very beginning of the refugee crisis.

The divisive disagreement on fundamental issues of migration and European solidarity, the uncoordinated national unilateral actions of individual member states have weakened the Union's political capacity to act and called into question the status quo in domestic and foreign policy. This inability to perform was also reflected in the perception of a broad section of the population Between 63% and up to 94% of the people in the member states most affected by the refugee crisis are dissatisfied with EU

refugee policy (Figure 22), between 35% and up to 68% even favor a return of sovereignty from the EU to the member states (Figure 23).



Figure 22: Overwhelming majorities unhappy with EU´s handling of refugees
Source: Pew Research Center, 2016



Figure 23: Disagreement on ´ever closer´ union
Source: Pew Research Center, 2016

Not only the dissatisfaction of the EU population but also the existing cleavages between the member states, especially when it comes to populist parties, regarding handling the refugee crisis increased the pressure on EU institutions and actors to realign the existing system and prove their legitimacy, also in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy.

Since immigration and terrorism issues have been very present to the Europeans and have been a source of contestation, it became more and more relevant to the EU actors to present action in this field. As these issues, which have impacted the Europeans daily lives, had external origins (Tocci, 2016, 463), the crisis has strengthened EU political actors' focus on Foreign and Security Policy and its importance for the EU's internal security. Presented in the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015, pointing out that

"*a robust fight against irregular migration (...) and securing Europe's external borders must be paired with a strong common asylum policy as well as a new European policy on legal migration. Clearly, this requires an enhanced coherence between different policy sectors, such as (...), foreign and home affairs policies*." (European Commission, 2015,6); this approach opened for the first time a political discussion about a stronger coherence between the EU's domestic policy and the CFSP and paved the way for a new political approach and order, which ultimately was implemented in the Global Strategy.

To conclude, the outcome of this chapter confirms the second hypothesis: The politicization of the CFSP was driven by the contestation of populist political influence that has exploited the topic of migration and challenged the status quo of the CFSP. This process was driven and amplified by the mass media, which has not only served as a platform of contestation of polarized conflict and populists; it also has made frames of security and borders popular, observable also in the wider public perception. These factors have increased pressure on the EU actors, which have proven incapable of cooperating on the issue of migration and refugees and presenting a solution, which has ultimately resulted in attempts to reform and change the approaches in the CFSP.

4.4. Consequences of the Politicization of the CFSP

The previous sections have shown that the refugee crisis has acted as a catalyst for the politicization of the CFSP. Thus, it remains to consider the consequences of the politicization of the CFSP for the CFSP as a political structure itself in the context of the refugee crisis. As described in the previous theory chapter the result of the politicization process is open and can therefore lead to more integration and cooperation, but also to rejection and renationalization.

The basis for this last chapter of the case study forms the third hypothesis: The politicization of the CFSP has not only initiated a series of debates on further integration steps in the CFSP, it has also resulted in institutional integration efforts in this area.

With the Global Strategy's adoption, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was gradually strengthened and has since been the subject of wide-ranging reform efforts. Thus, the EUGS has developed an unexpected dynamic in security and defence policy, a field that has so far been excluded mainly from integration steps and "*traditionally falling within the rhetoric of the permissive consensus*'" (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Some even speak of a "*renaissance of the Common Foreign and Security Policy*'' (Bendiek, 2017, 5).

Along with the shifting Foreign and Security Policy environment, such as Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the Ukraine crisis, the migration and refugee flows in particular also put pressure on the EU to realign its internal and external security policy. This resulted, as described in the previous chapters, in the Global Strategy and a clear paradigm shift in the CFSP: The focus of the European Foreign and Security Policy was now no longer based on the idea of democratic transformation of the European neighborhood and the goal of ever further integration of all member states, as described in the ESS, but on a Europe that "*protects, strengthens and defends*." (Perring, 2017; Bendiek, 2017) With the EUGS, the resilience approach was introduced, focusing on protecting the Union's own security, its borders, and its citizens. As stated in the EUGS, the protection and security of Europe "*starts at home*" (European Union, 2016, 9). This is also perceived as a *"bottom-up approach to security*" (Barbé/Morillas, 2019, 760): The internal security of the Union and especially of its citizens occupies a higher place in the agenda of the EUGS compared to the ESS, replacing the approach that holds the EU in responsibility as "*as an entity projecting values and providing security internationally*" (Barbé/Morillas, 2019, 760).

The Global Strategy defines resilience as "*the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises*" (European Union, 2016, 23). This key strategic concept is thus generally understood as the ability of the CFSP to withstand and resist to, and regenerate from disasters and other challenging exigencies by fostering active, long-term action. Resilience is intended to confront fears and uncertainties and provide stability, thus meeting European citizens' key demands and expectations. Ultimately it should enable the EU to preserve its values in an increasingly complex environment while pursuing its interests (Bendiek, 2017, 15).

Furthermore, the Global Strategy has brought new attention to the debate on enhancing the strategic autonomy of the EU. This is associated with the question of the extent to which the EU should develop into a security guarantor for its citizens independent of individual member states or international allies. More specifically, strategic autonomy in the case of the CFSP is defined as the ability to make its own Foreign and Security Policy decisions, to set its own priorities, and to implement them in cooperation with third countries or international organizations, rather than having to adapt to or even submit to foreign orders and rules (Lippert et al., 2019).

Already four months after the publication of the strategy, the European Council has started to implement the Strategy and has set its priorities for 2016 and 2017 as follows:

- "*Resilience building and integrated approach to conflicts and crises;*
- *Security and defence;*
- *Strengthening the nexus between internal and external policies;*
- *Updating existing or preparing new regional and thematic strategies;*
- *Stepping up public diplomacy efforts*."

Particular emphasis was also given to "*the urgent need to focus on migration as well as counter-terrorism and hybrid threats and the need to support Member States in this regard*" (Council of the European Union, 2016a).

Beyond this, the Global Strategy calls, besides civil instruments also for greater engagement of military means in the processes of peacebuilding and conflict resolution: *"In this fragile world, soft power is not enough: we must enhance our credibility in security and defence. To respond to external crises, build our partners capacities and protect Europe, Member States must channel a sufficient level of expenditure to defence, make the most efficient use of resources, and meet the collective commitment of 20% of defence budget spending devoted to the procurement of equipment and Research & Technology"* (European Union, 2016, 44) and provides clear instructions by calling for greater cooperation between the member states: *"To acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm. Member States remain sovereign in their defence decisions: nevertheless,*

nationally-oriented defence programmes are insufficient to address capability shortfalls. (...) The voluntary approach to defence cooperation must translate into real commitment. (…) Defence cooperation between Member States will be systematically encouraged" (European Union, 2016, 45-46).

This aspect experienced a lot of attention and dynamics: In the aftermath of the EUGS, Germany and Italy published their own White Paper on security policy in 2016, and also dealt with reform proposals in European Foreign and Security Policy. While the German government described, among other things, the challenges, strategic priorities, and areas for shaping the CFSP, the Italian document calls for greater political use of Articles 42 (6)[3] and 46[4] TEU, which deal in particular with Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). In the Lisbon Treaty, Articles 42(6) and 46 introduced the PESCO as an instrument for flexible integration in the EU's security and defense policy area. This instrument was introduced to enable member states with higher military ambitions to establish a Permanent Structured Cooperation and cooperate more closely in this area. Furthermore, Germany and France have published a paper that ties in with the Italian document and calls for implementing a PESCO: *"The new EUGS calls on Member States to enhance their cooperation" and* to make full use of the Lisbon Treaty's potential. "*Now, we believe it is time to start an inclusive initiative based on EU Treaties at best at 27 to enhance CSDP, including the use of PESCO (*Von der Leyen/Le Drian, 2016, 6)".

Subsequently, PESCO was the subject of discussion in various Minister and Council meetings; the European Parliament also joined the debate and adopted a resolution on the European Defense Union on November 22 in 2016. In this document, the Parliament refers to the EU's Global Strategy and an existing "*window of*

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[3] 42(6) Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.

[4] 46 (1): Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

opportunity." By also acknowledging the efforts of Italy, Germany, and France; the EP clearly called for the establishment of PESCO:

"*9. Takes the view that the Union should dedicate own means to fostering greater and more systematic European defence cooperation among its Member States, including permanent structured cooperation (PESCO); is convinced that the use of EU funds would be a clear expression of cohesion and solidarity, and that this would allow all Member States to improve their military capabilities in a more common effort" and*

11. Encourages all Member States to make more binding commitments to one another by establishing permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework; encourages Member States to establish multinational forces within the PESCO framework (European Parliament, 2016). This caused not only the entry of another important political actor into the debate but also has strengthened the legitimacy of the demands." (European Parliament, 2016a)

Finally, in cooperation with the High Representative for the CFSP and the EU institutions, the member states agreed on provisions regarding the principles, structure, and content of PESCO. Thus, on December 11, 2017, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 to establish Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), in which 25 member states participated (Figure 24).

PESCO provides, for the first time, a legally binding institutional framework, based on the EU Treaty, for all areas related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and in particular to the Common Security and Defense Policy, including planning, financing, investment, operational capabilities, and, finally, the implementation of significant armament projects. The HR called this step a " *big achievement, a historic achievement*" and that "*this was impossible, and we proved it to be possible*" (Mogherini, 2017).

Figure 42: PESCO, EU and NATO members
Source: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2020

The emergence of PESCO is driven by a unique integration dynamic, which is based on forms of flexible integration. These include, besides the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the enhanced cooperation (based on Article 20 TEU), and the constructive abstentions (based on Article 31). Specified in the Lisbon Treaty, these instruments are intended to break the deadlock in the Foreign and Security Policy integration process and to enable a greater capacity to act in the field of CFSP. In June 2017, the European Council announced using flexible integration forms increasingly and thus, with the launch of PESCO, gave new momentum to integration in the CFSP (Bendiek, 2017, 31).

Alongside the flexible forms of integration, the call for eliminating the unanimity principle has also gained great relevance. In the State of Union address in 2017, Commission President Juncker stated: *"[I] want our Union to become a stronger global actor. In order to have more weight in the world, we must be able to take foreign policy decisions quicker. This is why I want Member States to look at which foreign policy decisions could be moved from unanimity to qualified majority voting. The Treaty already provides for this, if all Member States agree to do it. We need qualified majority decisions in foreign policy if we are to work efficiently*".

In doing so, he referred to the Passarelle clause (Article 31 TEU), which provides for a future extension of majority voting, provided that the European Council so decides unanimously. Furthermore, he has highlighted the importance of further integration in defence matters: *"And I want us to dedicate further efforts to defence matters. (…) By 2025 we need a fully-fledged European Defence Union. We need it. And NATO wants it" (*European Commission, 2017c).

This view was also supported by the EP in its Annual Report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 2017, by stressing *"that the current decision-making process for the CFSP, based on unanimity in the Council of the EU, is the main obstacle to effective and timely external EU action; is of the opinion that qualified majority voting should also be applied for the CFSP"*(European Parliament, 2017).

At first glance, it may seem that integration efforts in the area of CFSP are in contradiction with the growing nationalism and the demand for greater national autonomy that can be observed in many European member states. However, due to the refugee crisis and an increasingly complex security environment, national governments are confronted with significant security risks that threaten the internal and external security of the European Union, and in which unilateral national action no longer provides an effective solution. In this regard, the EU Global Strategy states: *"[I]n an increasingly complex world, we must stand together".*

The study results of this chapter have confirmed the starting hypothesis. With the Global Strategy the Common Foreign and Security Policy was gradually strengthened and has since been the subject of wide-ranging reform efforts. Alongside it has brought new attention to the debate on enhancing the strategic autonomy of the EU. But especially, in the institutional dynamics of the EUGS politicization process, the introduction of PESCO succeeded in strengthening political integration in the areas of Foreign and Security Policy, and especially in defense, two incredibly divisive areas of European integration among member states. Moreover, this has triggered new debates, especially regarding the reform of decision-making processes that may lead to further integration processes.

Chapter 5 - Conclusion

In the final consideration of this research work, the results of the empirical part will be summarized in the light of the research questions and hypothesis formulated at the beginning.

This dissertation had the objective of analyzing the politicization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and was intended to address the question of whether and to what extent the refugee crisis has contributed to its politicization. In order to be able to conceptualize this process and its complexity, the analysis was carried out on two levels, theoretically and empirically. First, the characteristics, mechanisms, and consequences of politicization in the context of Europe were elaborated theoretically in order to apply them empirically to the CFSP in the context of the refugee crisis between 2015 and 2017.

The analysis has shown that the CFSP, despite its importance in the European integration process, still constitutes an essential component of national sovereignty compared to other policy areas. Thus the member states are fundamentally skeptical and reserved about advancing integration in this area. As a result, although there has been some progress in the supranationalization of this area, it is still strongly characterized by an intergovernmental nature and remains mostly under the direct influence and decision-making of the individual member states. Consequently, the intergovernmental character is a decisive factor for efficiency, but also mainly for its inefficiency. Although the Common Foreign Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy have always been supported and approved by most of the European population, due to the few noticeable interventions in ordinary citizens' everyday lives, it remained subject to the permissive consensus.

Nevertheless, the growing threats to the European Union in the wake of the refugee crisis posed new challenges for cooperation in security and defense policy, leading to increased activity and engagement in this area. Subsequently, as assumed and analyzed throughout the paper, a politicization of the CFSP can be observed. Since the massive influx of refugees to the European Union, the issues of illegal migration, asylum, and protecting external borders have moved to the center of public and political

attention. As the internal security of the EU overlaps on these issues and competencies with the CFSP, the salience of these topics also led to increased attention for the CFSP. Mainly through its contribution to protecting the external border, among other things, Operation EUNAVFORMED has revealed a significant public awareness. This interlinkage also led to an expansion of the actors responsible in the CFSP, which was also reflected in the EU Global Strategy. Not only has it led to closer cooperation between agencies and actors of the JHA and CFSP. Not surprisingly, the refugee crisis has contributed to a greater polarization between the member states, accompanied by blockages in negotiations at the European level, especially when it comes to illegal migration. These disputes have also led to further conflict and polarization within the member states in the area of CFSP. Thus my first hypothesis can be considered verified.

Furthermore, as assumed in my second hypothesis, the Politicization was driven by populist actors, as the crisis has triggered a rise in right-wing populists to radical right-wing parties in the EU. These populist actors have taken advantage of the refugee crisis to nourish polarized conflicts between the member states and in the public. Consequently, these tendencies have resulted in an observable shift of the CFSP, focusing rather on a policy aimed at curbing migration and focusing on border security than a value-based action. Furthermore, the influence of the media and its framing also had a great influence. Besides, general reporting on the refugee crisis, especially military and border frames, have had an impact on the public and political perception and awareness of the CFSP. With immigration and terrorism issues being a source of contestation for various political actors, as well as being present more than ever to the EU population, pressure on the EU actors and institutions was exerted to realign the existing system and prove its legitimacy. This resulted in a coherent approach between the EU's domestic and foreign policy and paved new forms of cooperation and collaboration also legitimized in the EUGS. Therefore, hypothesis two can also be considered verified over the course of the study.

Consequently, as assumed in my third hypothesis, this politicization in the context of the refugee crisis led to an integration dynamic and new reform debates in the CFSP, but also especially in the CSDP. With protection and defence being an

uttermost urgent problem to address during the crisis, the launch of PESCO, an important step towards a community in the field of security, was taken. After CFSP had repeatedly proven to be one of the most static policy fields within the EU, the chance for more European integration seemed closer than it had been for a long time with the establishment of PESCO. Its launch serves as a symbol for the political momentum in foreign and security policy triggered by the migration crisis.

All in all, the recent migration crisis can be seen as a catalyst for the politicization of the CFSP. However, it is not a linear process that can be clearly identified, but rather a dynamic process consisting of an interplay of many different factors. My research has focused particularly on the competence area of border protection and maritime security of the CFSP, as a global approach would go beyond the scope of this paper. However, it can be assumed that political conflicts and actors in other areas of CFSP, such as the fight against the causes of flight, civilian missions, and humanitarian aid, have also contributed to its politicization. Moreover, this thesis has only dealt with the refugee crisis, but at the same time, it is likely that the prominence of other historical events such as Brexit has also played an important role in this process. In terms of further research, it would be of interest to examine the politicization of the CFSP from these perspectives.

Especially the politicization of security policy is a field with great research potential due to the increasingly globalized world. In this context, research should also be devoted to new and differentiated theories that tie in with current realities. From the point of view of my research, it would be of great interest to investigate how the politicization of security policy and the emergence of new media forms, especially social media and fake news, are linked.

Further research is all the more important as it is only a matter of time that new forms of cooperation in the CFSP will emerge, and thus further integration will take place. The continuing difficult situation in Ukraine, Syria, and other trouble spots in the world are pushing the question of a strategic autonomy of the European Union in security matters more and more into the center of attention. Therefore, despite the challenges, the CFSP must increasingly become more coherent, especially in relation to

new threats and challenges in the areas of external borders. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that it is also necessary to initiate discussions and exchanges among the political public and parliaments on how this new security architecture should be shaped. Debates on the future direction of the CFSP should not only address existing concerns about a supposed threat to national traditions and cultures as well as fears, but also the question of which values the CFSP should continue to be based on in the future, and at what cost? The external borders of the European Union are, in a global comparison, the most dangerous in terms of numbers of dead refugees and migrants. The International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Missing Migrants Project cites 12,336 deaths in the Mediterranean Sea for the period of my dissertation alone, from the beginning of 2015 to the end of 2017, with another 298 deaths recorded in Europe over the same period (International Organization for Migration, 2020).

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