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How to do Things with Emotions

Dina Mendonça

In *Experience and Nature* (1925)¹ Dewey presents a thought-provoking suggestion about emotion clearly stated in chapter 9. ‘On Experience, Nature and Art’ when he writes:

For emotion in its ordinary sense is something called out by objects, physical and personal; it is response to an objective situation. It is not something existing somewhere by itself which then employs material through which to express itself. Emotion is an indication of intimate participation, in a more or less excited way in some scene of nature or life; it is, so to speak, an attitude or disposition which is a function of objective things.²

The present chapter unpacks the quotation in light of *Experience and Nature* and indicates how the reference to an objective situation is decisive to interpret Dewey’s take on emotion. Though there has been different elaborations on how to best understand Dewey’s conception of emotions within his philosophical work and how to integrate his insights into the contemporary research on philosophy of emotions³, it will be shown that the outcome of taking this specific interpretative stand will result in highlighting how the different ways to qualify situations are crucial for the education of thinking.

After a general description of Dewey’s comments on emotions, the chapter is divided into three follow up sections: 1) will put forward how Dewey understood the distinction between subjective and objective and, more specifically how that changes the

¹ John Dewey, 1925/1988. *Experience and Nature*, In Jo Ann Boydston (ed.) *The Later Works of John Dewey*, vol. 1. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

² Ibid. 292.

³ Cunningham, S. 1995. Dewey on Emotion: Recent Experimental Evidence. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 21 (4): 865–874; Garrison, J. 2003. Dewey’s Theory of Emotions: The Unity of Thought and Emotion in Naturalistic Functional ‘Co-ordination’ of Behavior. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 39 (3): 40–443; Morse, D. 2010. Dewey on the Emotions. *Human Affairs* 20 (3): 224–231; Dreon, R. 2022. *Human Landscapes: Contributions to a Pragmatist Anthropology*. Albany: SUNY Press; Candiotto, L., and R. Dreon. 2021. Affective Scaffoldings as Habits: A Pragmatist Approach. *Frontiers in Psychology* 12: 629046; Petit, E., and J. Ballet. 2021. Habit and Emotion: John Dewey’s Contribution to the Theory of Change. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 45 (4): 655–674; Mendonça 2012. Pattern of Sentiment: Following a Deweyan Suggestion. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 48 (2): 209–22; Mendonça, D. 2017. Situating Moods. *Philosophia* 45: 1453–1467; Mendonça, D. 2024. *A Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions: A Layered Theory*. New York: Palgrave.

way in which emotions are generally considered to be subjective; 2) will show that taking emotions as responses to objective situation helps to identify different types of information carried out by emotional processes and how all are crucial for communication; and 3) explains that emotional education in light of Dewey's insights reveals that meta-emotions are a crucial element of emotional literacy. Finally, the chapter ends with some concluding remarks on how this understanding of emotions as responses to objective situations can contribute to the education of thinking.

1. Dewey's take on emotions⁴

In a paper entitled “Dewey on the Emotions” Donald Morse argues that, for Dewey, emotions are the way humans have to be responsive to nature and that his theory of emotion can be seen as a concern for the environment and that “Dewey is something of a green thinker”⁵. Independently of one's agreement or not with this interpretation, what matters mostly, for the purposes of this chapter, is that while some of Dewey's scholars think he had a complete theory of emotions, others do not⁶, and from these last group some have elaborated new theoretical proposals for Emotion Theory grounded on Dewey's insights⁷.

⁴ In this section, I use my previous published work on Philosophy of Emotions (see all bibliographic references for Mendonça).

⁵ Morse, D. 2010. Dewey on the Emotions. *Human Affairs* 20 (3): 224–231: 230

⁶ Petit, E., and J. Ballet. 2021. Habit and Emotion: John Dewey's Contribution to the Theory of Change. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 45 (4): 655–674, p.660.

⁷ Pappas, G. 1993. Dewey and Feminism: The Affective and Relationships in Dewey's Ethics. *Hypatia* 8 (2): 78–95; Alexander, T. M. 1999. John Dewey and the Aesthetics of Human Experience. In S. Rosenthal, C. R. Hausman, and D. R. Anderson (Eds.). *Classical American Pragmatism: Its Contemporary Vitality*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, pp.160–173; Garrison, J. 2003. Dewey's Theory of Emotions: The Unity of Thought and Emotion in Naturalistic Functional 'Co-ordination' of Behavior. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 39 (3): 40–443; Tiles, J.E. 2003. Dewey. London & New York: Routledge; Hohr, H. 2010. 'Aesthetic Emotion': An Ambiguous Concept in John Dewey's Aesthetics. *Ethics and Education* 5 (3): 247–261; Hohr, H.. 2013. The Concept of Experience by John Dewey Revisited: Conceiving, Feeling and “Enlivening”. *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 32 (1): 25–38; Morse, D. 2010. Dewey on the Emotions. *Human Affairs* 20 (3): 224–231; Mendonça 2012. Pattern of Sentiment: Following a Deweyan Suggestion. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 48 (2): 209–22; Crippen, M. 2018. Pragmatism and the Valuable Mind. *Transactions of the Charles Peirce Society* 54 (3): 341–360; Quéré, L. 2018. L'émotion comme facteur de complétude et d'unité dans l'expérience. La théorie de l'émotion de John Dewey, *Pragmata* 1: 10–59; Dreon, R. 2022. *Human Landscapes: Contributions to a Pragmatist Anthropology*. Albany: SUNY Press; Mendonça, D. 2024. *A Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions: A Layered Theory*. New York: Palgrave.

Whatever side a scholar may take up, there is no doubt that when one looks close at Dewey's writings, his comments about emotions align with the way he described ideas⁸ and a group of common traits between ideas and emotions appear. First, emotions belong to situations, similarly to the way ideas also connect to situational wholes. Second, both emotions and ideas change and develop according to the change and development of the situations to which they belong. Third, although they both come to us involuntarily (for Dewey, the suggestions that appear in the face of problematic situations are involuntary, just as emotions assault us), they nevertheless have the power to direct and guide the further development of the situation at hand. The ability to use emotions and ideas to guide future situational developments is not a given, and can be promoted and educated with and within experience. The conclusion can feel somewhat striking, even if it makes even more visibly "clear that feelings and thoughts are deeply intertwined."⁹ In sum, it is because of the way in which emotions in Dewey's work can be seen as behaving very similarly to ideas that "Dewey's account of the emotions exists primarily in order to straighten out our conception of reasoning"¹⁰.

To understand Dewey's quotation and the description above, one needs to acknowledge how *an* emotion is a response to an objective situation. One possible way to best capture the suggestion is by linking them to situations through a pattern, just as Dewey designed the pattern of inquiry to show the role of ideas within problematic situations. If one accepts this possibility, one can take up the notion of a pattern of emotional experience—pattern of sentiment—to further follow up the insight of the similarity between ideas and emotions and use Dewey's pattern of inquiry to unfold the complex nature of emotional activity.

This stresses once again that one important consequence of this philosophical move is to reinforce how "Dewey has clearly broken with any attempts to define reason as separate from emotion."¹¹ for the notion of pattern avoids taking up a cognitive-emotional split and is meant to overcome unhelpful dichotomies. As Dewey has made

⁸ Mendonça, D. 2003. When Heads Happen—Exploring the Deweyan Conception of Mind. Unpublished, presented at SIFA; Mendonça 2012. Pattern of Sentiment: Following a Deweyan Suggestion. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 48 (2): 209–22.

⁹ Morse, Dewey on the Emotions, 225.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid. 226

extensively clear, taking such separations ontologically forces us to a poor understanding of what is being inquired and of inquiry itself, and makes us miss how affective states matter. As Dewey writes in *Logic, the theory of inquiry* (1938)¹²:

Those, who are especially addicted to thinking as an occupation, are aware when they observe the process of thought, instead of determining by dialectic what they must be, that immediate feeling is not limited in its scope. Different ideas have their different “feels,” their immediate qualitative aspects, just as much as anything else. One who is thinking his way through a complicated problem finds direction on his way by means of this property of ideas. Their qualities stop him when he enters the wrong path and send him ahead when he hits the right tone. They are signs of an intellectual “Stop and Go.” If a thinker had to work out the meaning of each idea discursively, he would be lost in a labyrinth that had no end and no centre. Whenever an idea loses its immediate felt quality, it ceases to be an idea and becomes, like an algebraic symbol, a mere stimulus to execute an operation without the need of thinking.¹³

Thus, inquiry can be analyzed, in itself, as an emotional experience in which a specific problem is solved, and it can also be analyzed in terms of an inquiry highlighting the function of emotions in solving problems. Similarly, an emotional situation can be interpreted in terms of a problematic situation and analyzed accordingly, or it can be interpreted in terms of an aesthetic experience or be simply enjoyed. Overall, this means that taking up Dewey’s reconstruction of experience seriously means accepting that there are no separate and distinct experiences as such (e.g., cognitive experience, aesthetic experience, emotional experience).

Dewey’s general procedure is to begin with the whole emotional experience instead of asking about the nature of this or that emotion label for, as he writes, “[e]xperience is emotional, but there are no separate things called emotions in it”¹⁴. This places him in a different direction than the one put forward by William James in his famous piece “What is an emotion?”¹⁵, even if details of both approaches would reveal their similar pragmatist take on the subject. For instance, Dewey would have been

¹² John Dewey, 1934/1989 *Art as Experience*, in *The Later Works of John Dewey*, vol. 10. Ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

¹³ Ibid. 125

¹⁴ Ibid. 48

¹⁵ James, W. 1884. What is an Emotion? *Mind* 19: 188–204.

sympathetic to James' "Sentiment of Rationality"¹⁶ even if he asked challenging questions to James' theory of emotions¹⁷.

The different point of departure taken up enables Dewey to explain that stating that an experience is implicated in a situation¹⁸ does not mean that it is implicated in the overall context and that the term situation stands for something different than just the mere background scenario. This means that the same situation can appear in different contexts and that the same context can be the overall environment for two different situations, and also means that a situation can change its quality (for example, from puzzling to clear, or from dangerous to empowering), even if some situations may tragically be immune to change¹⁹.

In philosophical discourse as well as everyday usage, situation and context are often used interchangeably and frequently there is no distinction made between them²⁰, except perhaps to appeal to the social and cultural atmosphere, in which the term context is favored over situation. However, Dewey's description of a situation as a 'contextual whole' suggests that we can highlight the distinction making it clearer that a situation is a unity that occurs within a certain context, and that a situation is embedded in a context which inevitably also influences the situation and must, to a certain extent, also be considered.

To fully capture the impact of Dewey's insights about emotional processes one can put forward a Layered Theory of Emotions²¹ and in this way better account for how emotions and moods are pertinently linked to situations and contexts. When this is taken up, one is in a better position to capture how emotional information can be transferred between different emotional layers and how different layers can help individuals regulate and act upon their own emotional states²² by changing the situations by transforming the

¹⁶ James, W. 1879. The sentiment of rationality. *Mind* 4 (15):317-346.

¹⁷ John Dewey, 1994/1971. The Theory of Emotion, In Ed. Jo Ann Boydston (ed.) *The Early Works of John Dewey*, vol. 4: 152-188. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, p. 172. See also Mendonça 2012. Pattern of sentiment.

¹⁸ Dewey, Art as Experience, 72.

¹⁹ Mendonça, A *Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions*, p 10-11.

²⁰ Rohlfing, K., M. Rehm, and K.U. Goecke. 2003. Situatedness: The Interplay Between Context(s) and Situation. *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 3 (2): 132–157, p.3.

²¹ Mendonça, A *Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions*, p. 13.

²² See for more detailed description: Mendonça, D. 2017. Situating Moods. *Philosophia* 45: 1453–1467; Mendonça, A *Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions*.

relationships between different layers. The recognition of these layers provides a better understanding of how someone cannot simply change one's emotional state by simply wishing it to be different. For example, when someone wakes up sad, one cannot simply decide not to be in that state, and if one wishes to not feel this way one must address and target a specific layer (or layers) to promote emotional processing while simultaneously respecting the emotional landscape one finds themselves in.

When emotional experience is interpreted through these layers it is possible to overcome the common philosophical conclusion that emotions have an object while moods do not²³, and it also helps better understand that emotions are not part of the mere subjective element of experience but are the outcome of subjective and objective elements that constitute what is *an* experience. According to Dewey, it is only the totality of the conditions of experience given by the subjective factor—the operations of an acculturated organism—and the objective factor—physical subject matter—that can offer the means to properly explain the richness of experience. This is especially visible in descriptions of emotions under Dewey's philosophical work and difficult to fully capture without the immense contemporary research on emotions recently undergone. Nevertheless, to fully capture Dewey's insight upon emotional experience one needs to recover what he himself said about the distinction between subjective and objective and how that has a direct implication on how we understand emotions and our experience of them.

2. Objective and Subjective on Dewey's take on emotion

In general emotional processes are taken to be part of the subjective element of human life, and there is an underlying divide of the world into objective elements, which stands in contrast with the subjective. However, Dewey's philosophical work is always aiming to overcome rigid divisions within the philosophical tradition showing that our terminology is not a mirror of the world, but a way to best handle what we are living. Once it is accepted that language and the linguistic categories are not a direct description

²³ Mendonça, *Situating Moods*.

of the world as it is, the relation of language with the world, and also to emotions, is inevitably differently understood. In fact, Dewey's terminology allows us to escape the type of subjectivism that invalidates any exchange of information about personal experience and makes criticism of tastes and dispositions impossible²⁴.

Dewey often provides an historical description of the development of philosophical distinctions to show why previous philosophical traditions lead to misguided philosophical conceptions. This genealogical method is different from those ones more generally referred to in the literature²⁵, and can be interpreted under the denotative method of Dewey²⁶ undertaking both a genealogical deconstruction followed by a pragmatic reconstruction²⁷ such that it brings about a more adequate understanding of the role of language in thinking about issues, as well as its connection to future experience. That is, the genealogy method used by Dewey is carried out along with philosophical transformations aligned with the reconceptualization of the concept of experience.

In what concerns the distinction between objective and subjective labels, Dewey shows that the separation only appears with the British Empiricism perspective, and that the closest one found in Greek thought is the identification of things being given by nature versus things being given by convention but that, "[i]f we consider Greek thought in an analytical way, we shall be persuaded, in any event, that from its own standpoint it cannot be called objective"²⁸ because the distinction between physical and psychological had not been consciously made. It is only when it is shown that a subject interferes with what is being known, that there is the need to identify these subjective elements and separate them from the objective ones. And this only is philosophically recognized when the outcomes of experiences are treated as the means for the realization of future experiences, and the method of science shows it can take objects that are perceived,

²⁴ Mendonça, A *Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions*, 37.

²⁵ Ratcliffe, Julian 2024. Genealogy: A Conceptual Map. *European Journal of Philosophy* 32 (4):1255-1276; Lightbody, B. (2025) Philosophical Genealogy. *Encyclopedia* 5, 126. <https://doi.org/10.3390/encyclopedia5030126>

²⁶ Leonov, Andrii, 2022, Dewey's Denotative Method, *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* [Online], XIV-1 | 2022, Online since 13 May 2022, connection on 15 May 2022. URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2735>

²⁷ Leonov, Dewey's Denotative Method, 3.

²⁸ John Dewey, 1934/1989, Art as Experience, In Jo Ann Boydston (ed.) *The Later Works of John Dewey*, vol. 10. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, p. 192.

enjoyed and suffered as signs for what can be experienced in the future. Thus, it is the recognition of the interaction of these two factors — 1. the techniques of observation and of calculation and techniques of controlling our perception, and 2. the organizing of what has been perceived in light of future experience — that properly makes the distinction between subjective and objective. This was not available to Ancient Greek thinkers because “Greek thought failed to recognize the existence of this “subjective” factor as a condition of positive control”²⁹ and only made the difference between what was apparent in contrast with what was really the case.

This means that, for Dewey, the indication that something is best considered under the label of objective versus another thing being best captured by the label of subjective is useful and yet it does not translate to assuming that all emotional processes are subjective by the very fact of being emotional. And in what concerns the description of emotions, it is especially important for it is the difference between these two factors that enables separating and identifying when something makes us feel in a certain way from when it should make us feel in a certain way and yet it doesn’t. Often in philosophy of emotions this is captured by pointing out that something is emotionally adequate or not-adequate for the subject of experience. Unfortunately this also often means having a standard which is normal to be able to judge when something is adequate or not. However, for Dewey there is no need to have a general statistical norm for all it matters is to have a description of the situation in terms of possible future experience. This means one can recognize a specific situation and yet not be touched accordingly, which reveals something about the person who is living that specific situation or something about the situation itself. The remark is not limited to this or that person and, instead, means that any person who goes through a similar situation and feels similarly will also identify the discrepancy.

One common complaint about Dewey’s description of experience is that it leaves unanswered the question “who is the subject of experience?”. However, this question misses out Dewey’s proposal and his insights. That is, when commentators complain that Dewey’s notion of a problematic situation requires that a problematic character be

²⁹ John Dewey, 1941/1991 *The Objectivism-Subjectivism of Modern Philosophy*, In Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), *The Later Works of John Dewey*, vol. 14: 189-200. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, p.199.

identified by a concrete and determinate subject who has the experience³⁰, they are confusing the role of subjective and objective conditions because they ask if the situation would still be problematic if there were no subject to disclose it. To be fair to these commentators, what is really happening is that they are using the distinction ontologically and keeping up philosophical terminology without integrating development of our understanding of experience. When these commentators conclude that it is pointless to use the notion of situations because it either requires a subject that identifies the situation as problematic or that the subjective problematic character of a situation is determined by a subject, they are failing to understand Dewey's novel proposal. The problem lies in a confusion of the importance of the subject in experience and on a general bias toward objectivity. To clarify this Dewey writes:

Experience shows that as a matter of fact objective reference precedes subjective reference. Reference to a subject instead of an object is extrinsic and reflective. It is indeed only another mode of objective reference; that is, some tediousness of the object is accounted for in terms of unusual state of the object. Otherwise to say "I am bored" and "it is tedious" are merely two phrases to express exactly the same fact.³¹

That is, our vocabulary of emotions allows us to make distinctions between how a situation is from how it makes us feel, and this is why it is so important to integrate the notion of situation in emotional description. Besides enabling people to distinguish situations from how they live them, it also helps everyone to translate experience in ways that one can imagine, for instance, both a scenario where one is bored without facing a tedious situation and one where someone is not bored within a tedious situation. This helps, for example, to foresee that people may sometimes fail to see a problematic situation when they are living it, which can intensify its problematic character even more because it is invisible for the subject who is experiencing it.

³⁰ Mackay, D. 1942/1991. What does Mr. Dewey Mean by an Indeterminate Situation? In Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925–1953*, 15:393–401. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, p. 394.

³¹ John Dewey, Value, Objective Reference and Criticism, In Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), *The Later Works of John Dewey*, vol. 2: 78-97. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1925/1984, p. 91.

The dominant mode of referring to emotions and moods detached from situational contexts makes it is close to impossible to capture the interconnections between different emotional layers and, more importantly, more difficult for people to regulate emotional experiences³². In an ironic twist it is by acknowledging situations and being able to name the difference between being bored by a situation and identifying if it is tedious that one also recognizes that this would be the case even if no vocabulary would enable showing it. Of course, being able to insert the notion of situation in the description of emotional experience is not sufficient for transforming the emotional landscape. Yet, it promotes emotional expression, communication and processing of emotional experiences because it helps to view them as dynamic occurrences that can be transformed.

Dewey's notion of situations changes our understanding of emotional experiences because the subject can be observed, named and described. Accordingly, experience is no longer something private, only accessible to the subject who has the experience³³ and language can help to express the meaning of emotional experience beyond mere labeling by describing situations and aiming, as much as is possible, to capture its dynamic nature recognizing all its different layers.

It is the notion of a situation that can provide the interpretative tool to best describe the dynamic life of the emotional landscape because a situation can be rephrased and transformed into different situations. For example, a situation can be diluted into a larger situational whole, or integrated as to quickly react to help future similar situations. Situation can be reinterpreted and made more complex by adding details which better reflect the overall experience, and in this way the focus of attention can be shifted by narrative schemes, and consequently it makes more sense to identify that emotions form an always changing and mutable class³⁴. That is, as Amélie Rorty writes, “[e]motions do not form a natural class”³⁵ and that is why “[h]istorically, the list of emotions has expanded as a result of these controversies. (...) [and a]s the class grew, its members

³² Mendonça, D. & Sàágua, J. 2019. Emotional Reflexivity in Reasoning; The function of describing the environment in emotion Regulation, Laura Candiott (ed.) *The Value of Emotions for Knowledge*, Gewerbestrasse, Switerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019, pp. 121- 144.

³³ Mendonça, A *Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions*, p.37.

³⁴ Mendonça, A *Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions* p.13.

³⁵ Rorty, A.O. 1982. From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments. *Philosophy* 57 (220): 159–172, p. 105.

became more heterogeneous; the analysis became more ambiguous”³⁶ not because they are part of an irrational section of human nature, but because human nature is creative in inventing how to be in the world.

It is because the word situation implies a range and “[i]t stands for something inclusive of a larger number of diverse periods of time but which, nevertheless, have their own unity”³⁷ that the situation is a contextual whole of experience which belongs to an overall context in which organisms and the environment are not understood as independent entities and can only be seen in relation to each other³⁸. One way to best reproduce the layers that underlie emotional experience is by describing the emotional episode in a narrative structure to grasp specific aspects and details of the situation and identify how it may format future emotional experiences. When a person describes an emotional experience using narratives it promotes communication in ways that were previously opaque, sometimes for the very people who have lived the situation.

3. Crucial role of Communication on Dewey’s take on emotion

It can not be overstated how communication is key. Dewey writes:

Of all affairs, communication is the most wonderful. That things should be able to pass from the plane of external pushing and pulling to that of revealing themselves to man, and thereby to themselves; and that the fruit of communication should be participation, sharing, is a wonder by the side of which transubstantiation pales.³⁹

That is, communication transforms lives. If words and language were a simple description of the world, then all that was needed was to correct the odd mistaken word here and there. In such a world rewriting, for instance, would merely be making even more clear what is already given in language. However, language is more than a mere tool of description because it is how humans use and respond to meaning and “social participation affected by communication”⁴⁰ is what gives rise to “agency for elevating

³⁶ Rorty, *From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments*, p. 105.

³⁷ Geiger, G. 1958. *John Dewey in Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press, 31.

³⁸ Mendonça, *A Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions*, 25.

³⁹ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 132.

⁴⁰ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 7.

man into the realm of what is usually called the ideal and spiritual”⁴¹. To use the reference to writing once again: rewriting often means transforming the text and finding new ideas to better describe events. Similarly, sharing situations by way of narratives transforms the subjective conditions of experience because humans live collaboratively and solve and overcome problematic situations with others and this amplifies possible future experience in ways that are not reachable individually.

This amazing ability to communicate is not just attained through the so-called cognitive elements. Here a caveat must be made: the mere use of the term cognitive can put us in trouble for it can mistakenly mean that some things are cognitive while others are not, and thus divide human interaction into cognitive and non-cognitive. Dewey was very much aware of this problem and spent more than half of his life trying to show that experience is not merely cognitive while simultaneously trying to avoid the epistemological divide between cognitive and non-cognitive. Though most Dewey scholars are attentive to this issue and continue to contribute to Dewey’s legacy moving away and beyond unhelpful dichotomies, it is nevertheless difficult to have dialogues with philosophers from other schools of thought without inadvertently fall prey of using cognitive in a way that is quickly taken to be opposed to non-cognitive. The distinction, when it appears in Dewey, is meant to show, at least in part, that language does not capture the so-called ultimate reality as it is, but is a way — a tool — to deal with reality and life.

Dewey’s redefinition of experience as an interaction shifts the focus of attention from the functioning of our sense apparatus to the focus on the complex structure of actions of living creatures. And given that experience is no longer primarily cognitive, the terms used to describe it are also changed: the concept of situation becomes a technical name such that “[w]e should add the important point that the situation should be defined as inclusive of the inquirer.”⁴² And under this new light of experience as an interaction, philosophical reflection can establish different distinctions to better understand what happens in experience. Among the new distinctions we can find the

⁴¹ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 7.

⁴² Gallagher, S. 2009. Philosophical antecedents of situated cognition. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (Eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of situated cognition* (pp. 35–51). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 47.

difference between primary and secondary experience, and that between experience at large and *an* experience⁴³. These new distinctions help to better explain that certain experiences are demarcated from the general flow of experience because “[i]n contrast with such experience, we have *an* experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment”. One of the important consequences of this new vocabulary is that learning from experience does not refer simply to the acquisition of knowledge in terms of deliberate inquiry but “to make backward and forward connection between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence”⁴⁴ and communication is vital for these connections.

Dewey thinks that when there is communication there can be transformation because “[e]vents turn into objects, things with a meaning”⁴⁵ and events can be revised and reconsidered and “they are re-adapted to meet the requirements of conversation, whether it be public discourse or that preliminary discourse termed thinking.”⁴⁶ In what concerns the nature of emotions this means that while communication includes verbalizing feelings, emotions, moods and sentiments it also includes how emotions can be contagious⁴⁷ and how emotions can be shared either by joint experience or by art⁴⁸.

In sum, at the heart of communication one finds how things are made common for two or more people, and this turns out to be more difficult than its statement because there is not just someone talking and another person taking it in: there is joint understanding of meaning. Unfortunately, oftentimes communication is taken to be a type of propositional exchange of information (which can be recorded either by writing, taping speech or another medium of registration). One only needs to recognize that pointing and placing, which is considered under the label of depiction, is also a basic method of communication that works by a different theoretical model⁴⁹ to recognize that communication is wider than exchange of propositional information.

⁴³ Mendonça, *A Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions*, 26.

⁴⁴ John Dewey 1916/1985. *Democracy and Education*. In Jo Ann Boydston (ed.) *The Middle Works*, vol. 9. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, p. 147.

⁴⁵ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 132.

⁴⁶ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 132.

⁴⁷ Fischer, A.H., and A.S.R. Manstead. 2010. Social Functions of Emotion. In *Handbook of Emotion*, ed. M. Lewis, J. Haviland, and L. Feldman Barrett, 3rd ed., 456–468. New York: Guilford Press, p. 461.

⁴⁸ Mendonça, *A Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions*, 130.

⁴⁹ Clark, H.H. 2016. *Depicting as a Method of Communication*. *Psychological Review* 123 (3): 324–347.
Clark HH. 1996. *Using Language*. Cambridge University Press.

Regarding emotions, depiction must be taken into account because emotions themselves can depict, and people communicate their emotional experiences often not in a deliberate fashion. Among the many important consequences of this aspect of emotional communication, we know that it is crucial for the moral and political sphere⁵⁰ for understanding what others communicate requires interpreting their intentions and their motivations. It is also because of this that the social interaction and the communication that occurs within emotional experiences can promote insightful reflexivity and self-reflexivity⁵¹. As Dewey explains:

Such is the essence and import of communication, signs and meaning. Something is literally made common in at least two different centres of behavior. To understand is to anticipate together, it is to make a cross-reference which, when acted upon, brings about a partaking in a common, inclusive, undertaking.⁵²

This can explain why human emotions can be set apart from the emotions of other species. Even if many of the emotional processes are shared with other species, the density of possible layers of meaning at stake for humans (personal narratives, culture, historical accumulations, etc.) reveals that feeling can always be more complex than what first appears. One way to recognize this complexity in feeling is to acknowledge that qualities can encapsulate culture through feeling. Dewey borrows Santayana's reference to tertiary qualities to better explain this human ability as we shall see further on.

The role of language in communication itself is always two folded: if on the one hand, as Dewey says, "we become capable of perceiving things instead of merely feeling and having them"⁵³ because language enables ways of preserving the meaning and traits of situations such that it can be used to seek and establish cooperation with others; on the other hand, it means something in itself and creates enjoyable experience by itself.

Dewey explains this well when he writes,

Discourse itself is both instrumental and consummatory. Communication is an exchange which procures something wanted; it involves a claim, appeal, order,

⁵⁰ Strawson, Peter (1963). Freedom and Resentment. *Proceedings of the British Academy* 48:187-211.

⁵¹ Rosenberg, M. 1990. Reflexivity and Emotions. *Social Psychological Quarterly* 53: 2-12, p. 11.

⁵² Dewey, Experience and Nature, 141.

⁵³ Ibid. 143.

direction or request, which realizes want at less cost than personal labor exacts, since it procures the cooperative assistance of others. Communication is also an immediate enhancement of life, enjoyed for its own sake. The dance is accompanied by song and becomes the drama; scenes of danger and victory are most fully savored when they are told. Greeting becomes a ceremonial with its prescribed rites. Language is always a form of action and in its instrumental use is always a means of concerted action for an end, while at the same time it finds in itself all the goods of its possible consequences⁵⁴.

This is why language can clarify emotional events either by helping to process past experience or transforming the meaning of past experience, even if, unfortunately, it can also increase the mess inside when used detached from previous experience and possible future experience. This means that language can both reinforce dysfunctional emotional patterns, as well as reorganize and transform emotional experiences. This apparent conflict of directions of the use of language happens because communication is a way to overcome the immediacy and intensity of events - like when people name their feelings in order to prevent simply being taken by them in a relationship - and it also stands on its own - because naming feelings is emotional in itself. This is possible because “[c]ommunication is uniquely instrumental and uniquely final”⁵⁵ and when both are united in experience “there exists an intelligence which is the method and reward of the common life, and a society worthy to command affection, admiration and loyalty”⁵⁶. In other words, when we use communication the overall motivation should be to amplify meaning and make it enjoyable for its own sake.

In other words, because there is communication the immediate qualities and feelings of experience can be preserved and shared and also reflected upon, and this means communication is a means for cooperative action. In addition, because communication is instrumental it is also an experience in itself, and provides feelings and immediate qualities in itself, these two sides of communication can be in harmony. This is most visibly attained in art for it is with artistic objects that one more clearly recognizes that emotion is called out by objects⁵⁷. In fact, what is happening is that there

⁵⁴ Ibid. 145.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 159.

⁵⁶ Ibid. 160.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 292.

is a funded and general embodiment of ordinary experience at large given in *an* experience.

The best way to understand the suggestion is to introduce the notion of tertiary qualities, which are best visible in creative processes because “they exemplify in accentuated and purified form the control of selection of detail and of mode of relation, or integration, by a qualitative whole.”⁵⁸ It is important to understand emotions because emotions are a response to an objective situation and “[a] situation is a whole in virtue of its immediately pervasive quality”⁵⁹ These qualities are present in other human activities for we can think that *an* encounter was uncanny, or that *a* landscape strikes us as divine, or that *an* event was transformative. Often, the way people make reference to aesthetic experience is a way of pointing to the undeniable nature of tertiary qualities and their impact. Perhaps the easiest way to grasp them is to appeal to how they can be identified in art because it is easier to see how they are then integrated into future discourse. Take the example of a Kafkaesque situation. The quality does not capture a specific detail, or a unique plot or description, and just as Dewey describes a quality that colors a situation: “it is not anything that can be expressed in words for it is something that must be had.”⁶⁰ If one person comments “it was really kafkaesque” and someone else does not see it as such, it would be impossible to argue for it by pointing to a specific item of the occurrence. One would probably have to tell some sort of narrative and align it with one or more of Kafka’s works, and somehow prompt the recognition for the other person to have it after the event. Ultimately, one might have to suggest that without reading at least one of Kafka’s novels or short stories it might be impossible to understand the named quality. According to Dewey, it is this qualitative element that stands in the background of every experience is what controls and identifies the meaning of a situation. And even if in aesthetic experiences this is easier to see, other types of experience when they are *an* experience, they partake of the effect of this aesthetic quality⁶¹.

⁵⁸ John Dewey, 1930/1988, *Qualitative Thought*. In Jo Ann Boydston (ed.) *The Later Works of John Dewey*, vol. 5:243-262, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 251.

⁵⁹ John Dewey, 1938/1988 *Logic: The theory of Inquiry*, In Jo Ann Boydston (ed.) *The Later Works of John Dewey*, vol. 12. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 73.

⁶⁰ John Dewey, 1920/1988. *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. In Jo Ann Boydston (ed.) *The Middle Works of John Dewey*, vol. 12. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 75.

⁶¹ Ibid. 75-76.

Though the notion of quality already appears in *Experience in Nature*, it is in subsequent philosophical texts that Dewey better describes their fundamental role. Dewey knew that the terminological proposal was difficult because the term quality was (and still is) associated with specific items which normally stand for distinctions of properties of things located in *an* experience, and not items that can qualify the whole of *an* experience and modify every other quality within it⁶². In *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Dewey explains,

The phrase “tertiary qualities,” happily introduced by Santayana, does not refer to a third quality like in kind to the “primary” and “secondary” qualities of Locke and merely happening to differ in content. For tertiary quality qualifies *all* the constituents to which it applies in thoroughgoing fashion⁶³

And this means that when these qualities are named in addition to the way they often adopt an emotional designation such as describing a situation as distressing, perplexing, cheerful, tragic, etc; they also “permeate and color *all* the objects and events that are involved in an experience”⁶⁴. And when, for example, there is a quality of indeterminateness which is a condition for inquiry, it also “unifies and guides the various proposals, experiments, the complications and failures, and the resolution which transforms that quality itself onto one of order and determinateness”⁶⁵ as to enable the modification of indeterminate to determinate to indicate that the end of inquiry has been reached.

In another important text to understand the proposed notion of tertiary qualities, “Qualitative Thought”, Dewey explains how these qualities are not as “a property possessed in addition to its other properties”⁶⁶ for they unify, guide and organize all other types of properties and qualities one may identify in the situation. To illustrate this point, Dewey gives an example of how specific propositions can promote a total reinterpretation of something (a thing, a person or an event). Dewey writes,

⁶² Dewey, *Logic: The theory of Inquiry*, 75.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Stuhr, J. 1979. Dewey’s Notion of Qualitative Experience. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 15 (1): 68-82, 80.

⁶⁶ Dewey, *Qualitative Thought*, 245.

Take the proposition: “The red Indian is stoical.” This is interpreted either as signifying that the Indian in question is characterized by the property of stoicism in addition to that of redness, or that he belongs to the class of stoical objects. The ordinary sense of the proposition escapes recognition in either case. For this sense expresses the fact that the indigenous American was permeated throughout by a certain quality, instead of being an object possessing a certain quality along with others. He lived, acted, endured stoically.”⁶⁷

So one can label the pervasive quality of tertiary qualities as the crucial element to understand emotions because the objective situation is given with them. In *Experience and Nature* Dewey point this out clearly when he writes: “Emotional conditions do not occur as emotions, intrinsically defined as such; they occur as ‘tertiary’ qualities of objects”⁶⁸. And this is why in retrospect some of these tertiary qualities are designated with names of emotions which represent an organized system of meanings used for educating children to identify specific sets of perceptual situations with emotion names (fear, anger, love, etc.)⁶⁹

4. Education of Emotions

It is clear that both emotions and tertiary qualities are crucial for a good understanding of Dewey’s philosophical proposal. Nevertheless, to offer a deep understand of Dewey’s proposal one must explain how it makes a difference in education because it is “[t]he educational point of view that enables one to envisage the philosophical problems where they arise and thrive, where they are at home, and where acceptance or rejection makes a difference in practice”⁷⁰. One important consequence for education is to be able to show that emotional literacy is concerned with more than just emotional regulation and management because it is concerned with thinking and how “thought is definitely regulated by qualitative considerations”⁷¹.

⁶⁷ Ibid. 244.

⁶⁸ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 230.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 230-231.

⁷⁰ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 338.

⁷¹ Dewey, *Qualitative Thought*, 243.

Traditionally, because of the way emotions were set in opposition to reason and rationality, the education of emotion meant mostly education of control over emotional expression. Fortunately the recent decades of research on emotions have shown that the picture is different and more complex. Affectivity and rationality are intertwined such that education of emotion needs to be updated. One of the changes that has already been seen is that educators have started to include emotional literacy, at home and in schools, as part of their educational efforts⁷². This often includes teaching children naming emotions similarly to the way colors are taught, and also ways to identify them in others and cope and regulate their emotional expression such that peace and cooperation with others is cultivated. Nevertheless, as Dewey has reminded us, the notion of experience underlies our educational structures such that the philosophical notion of experience is always lurking behind the scenes and when the concept appears incomplete or used in a misguided fashion, it risks undermining the efforts and good intentions of educators. In general, the trend for emotional learning incorporates emotional intelligence and an Aristotelian posture which means that appropriate emotions are indispensable for moral education and for the good life⁷³.

One way to best illustrate how emotions are not as simple and compact as their names we have for them⁷⁴, is to recognize the role of meta-emotions: being sad about losing a friend, or sad about being sad or sad about feeling joy at someone else misfortunes are different qualities of sadness which are poorly captured by the label sad and impossible to differentiate at the phenomenological level unless it is further explained that they are a meta-emotion about different emotions. An emotion is a meta-emotion is it is about an emotion, and are especially hard to detect because they can reinforce the first order emotion (as when one is sad about being sad) or they can be missed because they work often at sub personal levels⁷⁵. Kristjánsson has shown that without a deeper understanding of Aristotle the efforts based on Emotional Intelligence

⁷² Elbertson, Nicole A. Patricia A. Jennings, Marc A. Brackett, 2025, The role of educators in school-based social and emotional learning, *Social and Emotional Learning: Research, Practice, and Policy*, 6, 100134.

⁷³ Kristjánsson, Kristján. "'Emotional Intelligence' in the Classroom? An Aristotelian Critique" *Educational Theory*, Vol. 56, No.1, 2006, 39-56.

⁷⁴ John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 48.

⁷⁵ Jones, T., and A. Bodtker. 2001. Mediating with Heart in Mind: Addressing Emotion in Mediation Practice. *Negotiation Journal* 17: 217-244.

fall short⁷⁶ and that without incorporating the notion of meta-emotions educators can see their efforts break down or backfire regarding the education of character they aim at⁷⁷. Even though meta-emotions have long been recognized fundamental in parenting and educational practice⁷⁸, it has not reached programs of emotional literacy. Dewey's take on emotions can highlight their importance and show they can promote emotional literacy by the way in which thought, in general, is "definitely regulated by qualitative considerations"⁷⁹.

Meta-emotions cannot be handled as a special case of emotion because reflexivity modifies the nature of our emotional world given the way meta-emotions color first order emotions. That is, the way in which meta-emotions make up a specific layer can modify the overall sequence of emotional layers altogether⁸⁰. For instance, when people are sad about their anger, the first-order emotion becomes different than if someone were to feel righteously happy about their anger. However, it is often when people are looking back at what happened that they are capable of identifying the meta-emotional level and its impact. It is by looking at emotional occurrences as situations that accommodate the description of a meta-emotional levels that one may be surprised by aspects⁸¹ of the event one had missed in experience. Once this is recognized, future experience is more able to consider the meta-emotional level at stake, even if it continues to be more opaque than desirable.

One very important element of meta-emotions is that they do not constitute simplistically more emotional information about the experienced situation, the extra layer of emotion may change and transform the experience altogether. This can be crucially important for imagined situations for it gives individuals a way to foresee the emotional impact of possibilities beyond the immediate feelings of the imagined scenario.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Kristjánsson, K. (2023). Phrónesis, metaemociones y educación del carácter. *Revista Española de Pedagogía*, 81(286). <https://doi.org/10.22550/REP81-3-2023-01>

⁷⁸ Gottman, J. M., Katz, L. F., & Hooven, C. (1996). Parental meta-emotion philosophy and the emotional life of families: theoretical models and preliminary data. *Journal of Family Psychology*, 10(3), 243–268. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0893-3200.10.3.243>

⁷⁹ Dewey, Qualitative Thought, 243.

⁸⁰ Mendonça, A *Deweyan Philosophical Take on Emotions* p.54 ff.

⁸¹ Goldie, P. 2005. Imagination and the distorting power of emotion. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 12: 130–142.

The connection to imagination helps to show how emotional literacy is a complex endeavor and can be compared to aesthetic development because it requires an ability to compare and an ability for analogy so specialized that can best be similarly found in aesthetic judgments. Thus it has been previously suggested in Philosophy of emotions that perhaps we learn to experience the emotional landscape similarly to the way we learn about Art⁸². Also, this pedagogical journey is never complete for emotional literacy does not end when mandatory school finishes. This means that emotional literacy needs, ideally, to provide children with awareness of their emotional states and those of other people, including meta-emotional layers, and also increase their knowledge of how qualities can transform other qualities. That is, emotional literacy somehow needs to teach how to identify different layers and their interaction, and how specific qualities can transform situations.

In other words, meta-emotion provides a way to better contribute to model and transform the relations between first-order and second-order emotional processes. The connection between the first order and second order is not given nor settled, and educators often inadvertently direct or guide the coloring done by second-order emotions. However, because often they are not doing it deliberately and can miss out on an adequate concept of experience⁸³, they may also inadvertently create emotional loops which are damaging for growth. Take for example variations in how to deal with jealous feelings: while some families may encourage people to feel embarrassed about being jealous by punishing or verbally condemning children, other families where jealousy stands as a symbol of the intensity of their affection, may regard it with tenderness, and other families may combine these two without realizing it. These variations in educational practices may format the way in which adults regulate and control their own emotional lives, and reinforce the stagnant and tragic mode of being caught in an emotional loop. The Shakespeare play of *Othello* is a great example of how jealousy can be tragic. Yet, had Othello been aware of his meta-emotional processes, and

⁸² de Sousa, R. 1990. Emotions, Education and Time. *Metaphilosophy* 21: 434–446, 436.

⁸³ John Dewey, 1938/1991. Experience and education. In Jo Ann Boydston (ed.) *The Later Works of John Dewey*, vol. 13: 1-62. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 20.

communicated with Ofelia his tragic situation, he might have been able to rewrite their destiny.

Similarly, because children receive feedback from peers and parents the cultural impact of emotions may be tragically frozen. It may be for instance at the root of men's fear and avoidance of their own emotions⁸⁴, and preventing them from working with the dynamic nature of emotional processes to find their way of processing events which have an intense emotional impact. Though there is nothing in the concept of meta-emotion itself that makes them necessarily good, nor is it the case that they are not generally or necessarily veridical⁸⁵, the mere acquaintance with being able to name them and label them will be insufficient. The explosion of research on emotion in the last decades (Dukes et. al. 2021) has highlighted many issues that can be dealt with by developing a novel theory of emotions in light of Dewey's insightful suggestion (Mendonça 2024), and the recognition of meta-emotional layers requires that those processing emotional experiences explore the layer needed for processing and integrating situations both in traumatic experiences as well as ordinary daily life.

5. Concluding remarks on a philosophical contribution for the education of thinking.

It is because meta-emotion can be an important clue to explain some of the mysteries of emotional world⁸⁶ that education of thinking in connection with emotional literacy may be decisive for human flourishing⁸⁷. Under Dewey's concept of experience, the recommendation of introducing meta-emotions in emotional literacy is incomplete without also incorporating pedagogical moments for the education of thinking for the sake of thinking. In part because "feelings and thoughts are deeply intertwined."⁸⁸ and also because reasoning is needed for working out situations and thinking through them,

⁸⁴ Jakupcak, M. 2003. Masculine Gender Role Stress and Men's Fear of Emotions as Predictors of self-reported Aggression and Violence. *Violence and Victims* 18: 533–541, 534.

⁸⁵ Jäger, C., and A. Bartsch. 2006. Meta-emotions. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 73: 179–204. p.186

⁸⁶ Morton, A. 2020. Cousins of Regret. In *The Moral Psychology of Regret*, ed. Anna Gottlieb, 29–44. London and New York: Rowan and Littlefield.

⁸⁷ Kristjánsson, K. 2023. Phrónesis, metaemociones y educación del carácter. *Revista Española de Pedagogía*, 81(286). <https://doi.org/10.22550/REP81-3-2023-01>

⁸⁸ Morse, Dewey on the Emotions, 225.

recognizing when it is crucial to look and consider meta-emotional processes from when it is not. Dewey thought that the inability to see how an underlying pervasive quality of a situation was a principle of thought itself was “the source of a larger part of the artificial problems and fallacies that infect our theory of knowledge and our metaphysical, or theories of existence”⁸⁹. Given that previous work on education has shown that philosophy has a unique contribution for the education of thinking⁹⁰, I want to conclude by suggesting that a logic of quality is needed to show more clearly how feeling and thinking are intertwined. This suggestion requires a book of its own to be fully explored, and for the time being, these last words are meant to point us into that general direction.

To be able to educate thinking as to promote people’s ability to recognize underlying pervasive qualities of a situation it is fundamental to work out how to best teach people that communication inevitably includes depiction, and that depiction is based on a fundamentally different mode of thinking”⁹¹. Herbert Clark has explained the complexity demanded by depiction when he writes that it needs be able to deal with “symbol strings, layered as well as non-layered actions, proximal and distal viewpoints as well as discourse viewpoints, and percept-bound as well as concept bound imagination”⁹², in which people have to rely on proprioceptive knowledge, sensibility and imagination⁹³.

There is no doubt humans do things with emotions, though the description of this might not be as simplistic as explaining action by pointing out emotions. An understanding of emotion regulation and how the education of emotions can help to guide mental life is needed. When in 1930 Dewey writes that “thought is definitely regulated by qualitative considerations”⁹⁴ and that the existence of pervasive qualities are simultaneously the background and the point of departure which work as a regulative principle of thinking,⁹⁵ he provided the direction to revise our understanding of how

⁸⁹ Dewey, *Qualitative Thought*, 262.

⁹⁰ Mendonça, D. 2022. Foundations of Philosophy for Children, Reasonableness and the Education of Thinking, In Núria Sara Miras Boronat and Michela Bella (eds.) *Women in Pragmatism: Past and Future*, Springer, pp. 147-158.

⁹¹ Clark, *Depicting as a Method of Communication*, 324.

⁹² *Ibid.* 343.

⁹³ *Ibid.* 324.

⁹⁴ Dewey, *Qualitative Thought*, 243.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* 261.

emotions can transform situations. Developing a Logic of Quality grounded on his philosophical work⁹⁶ would show why and how specific qualities are different from those that are possessed by people and objects and permeated them throughout⁹⁷, as well as show why they can transform a situation. As Dewey writes these pervasive qualities sometimes appear to express an immature mode response and other times appear to reveal a unified focus which can only be brought about by prolonged and intense training or rigorous reflection⁹⁸ without any insight about the variation. Similarly to emotional information which can sometimes mislead us while other times provide the ground for certainty.

Finding a didactics for the logic of quality might provide insight into logic itself and how we do things with emotions more generally by showing how these qualities, which are present in a great variety of human activity (aesthetic, morals, politics, education, scientific research, etc.), have so far either been denied logical status or reduced to quasi-mathematical items. A logic of quality would overcome the lack of ability identified by Dewey and overcome the way “neglect of qualitative objects and considerations leaves thought in certain subjects without any logical status and control”⁹⁹.

⁹⁶ Pappas, G. F 2016. John Dewey’s Radical Logic: The function of the qualitative in Thinking. *Transactions of the Charles Peirce Society*. Vol. 52, No.3, pp.435-468.

⁹⁷ Ibid. 244.

⁹⁸ Ibid. 250.

⁹⁹ Ibid. 245.

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