



Review article

Emerging business models in local energy markets: A systematic review of peer-to-peer, community self-consumption, and transactive energy models

J.M. Schwidtal ^{a,*}, P. Piccini ^{b,*}, M. Troncia ^c, R. Chitchyan ^d, M. Montakhabi ^e, C. Francis ^f,
A. Gorbacheva ^g, T. Capper ^h, M.A. Mustafa ^{i,j}, M. Andoni ^k, V. Robu ^l, M. Bahloul ^m, I.J. Scott ⁿ,
T. Mbavarira ^o, J.M. España ^p, L. Kiesling ^q

^a Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Padua, Via Giovanni Gradengio 6/a, Padova, 35131, Italy

^b Centre for Environment and Sustainability, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom

^c Institute for Research in Technology (ITT), Comillas Pontifical University, Madrid, 28015, Spain

^d Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TH, United Kingdom

^e Imec-SMIT, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 9, Brussels, 1050, Belgium

^f School of Engineering, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH9 3FB, United Kingdom

^g Energy Institute, University College London, 14 Upper Woburn Place, London, WC1H 0NN, United Kingdom

^h Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of Engineering, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, United Kingdom

ⁱ Department of Computer Science, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, United Kingdom

^j imec-COSIC, KU Leuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, bus 2452, Leuven-Heverlee, B-3001, Belgium

^k Smart Systems Group, School of Engineer and Physical Sciences, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, United Kingdom

^l CWI, National Research Institute for Mathematics and Computer Science, Amsterdam, 1098XG, Netherlands

^m International Energy Research Centre, Tyndall National Institute, Cork, Ireland

ⁿ NOVA Information Management School, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de Campolide, Lisbon, 1070-312, Portugal

^o Institute for Innovation and Technology Management, Lucerne University of Applied Sciences & Arts, Horw, 6048, Switzerland

^p Universidad ELA, Vda. El Penasco, Envigado, Antioquia, Colombia

^q Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, United States

ARTICLE INFO

Dataset link: <https://doi.org/10.48420/16930768>

Keywords:

Peer-to-peer
Self-consumption
Transactive energy
Local energy market
Business model canvas
Electricity trading
Flexibility provision
Prosumer
Consumer
Aggregator
Smart local energy

ABSTRACT

The emergence of peer-to-peer, collective or community self-consumption, and transactive energy concepts gives rise to new configurations of business models for local energy trading among a variety of actors. Much attention has been paid in the academic literature to the transition of the underlying energy system with its macroeconomic market framework. However, fewer contributions focus on the microeconomic aspects of the broad set of involved actors. Even though specific case studies highlight single business models, a comprehensive analysis of emerging business models for the entire set of actors is missing. Following this research gap, this paper conducts a systematic literature review of 135 peer-reviewed journal articles to examine business models of actors operating in local energy markets. From 221 businesses in the reviewed literature, nine macro-actor categories are identified. For each type of market actor, a business model archetype is determined and characterised using the business model canvas. The key elements of each business model archetype are discussed, and areas are highlighted where further research is needed. Finally, this paper outlines the differences of business models for their presence in the three local energy market models. Focusing on the identified customers and partner relationships, this study highlights the key actors per market model and the character of the interactions between market participants.

1. Introduction

The electricity industry is experiencing an unprecedented, rapid change driven by the urgent need to tackle climate change, the proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs), and advances in

information and communication technologies. The wave of the 5D global energy megatrends, namely decarbonisation, decentralisation, digitisation, democratisation, and disruption-as-usual, has accelerated the shift from the conventional electricity paradigm to the next era of

* Corresponding authors.

E-mail addresses: janmarc.schwidtal@phd.unipd.it (J.M. Schwidtal), p.piccini@surrey.ac.uk (P. Piccini).

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2023.113273>

Received 6 January 2022; Received in revised form 13 January 2023; Accepted 20 March 2023

Available online 3 April 2023

1364-0321/© 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

List of abbreviations

BESS	Battery energy storage system
BM	Business model
BMC	Business model canvas
CAPEX	Capital expenditures
CSC	Community (or collective) self-consumption
DER	Distributed energy resource
DR	Demand response
EMS	Energy management system
HRM	Harmonised electricity market role model
LEM	Local energy market
OPEX	Operational expenditures
P2P	Peer-to-peer
PV	Photovoltaic
TE	Transactive energy

the decentralised, distributed, clean, and smart energy system [1–3]. Viewed from the power industry perspective, the ongoing transformation takes place at both sector and actor levels.

At the sector level, the transformation is largely influenced by the interplay between digitisation and the prevalence of DERs, providing power from smaller assets at lower investment costs [4]. This could foster new local energy market (LEM) models for the power sector [5]. Amid this quest for innovation, the most widely discussed models in industry and academic literature are peer-to-peer (P2P), community (or collective) self-consumption (CSC), and transactive energy (TE) [6–8].

At the actor (i.e., the energy market participant) level, these new models have agitated a similar urge for transformation, allowing a number of new digital technology businesses to enter the energy markets. The emergence of, and the competition threat from, such new business models (BMs) forces the current market incumbents to re-evaluate their place in the market and to readjust their business practices [4,9].

Despite the lively and ongoing research into P2P, CSC, and TE models, to date, there has been no consolidation in the knowledge of the current structure of the BMs populating such markets, nor of the key actors that drive these models. The novel contribution of this paper is in addressing this research gap by tackling the following research question: How are the new P2P, CSC, and TE energy trading businesses structured and what key actors drive them?

A comprehensive structured literature review based on academic literature published at peer-reviewed journals is undertaken here. The review analyses the structure of BMs ascribed to P2P, CSC, and TE market models using the business model canvas (BMC) [10]. The BMC is commonly used by academics and practitioners in the energy sector to analyse, describe, and compare existing BMs [9,11–13]. The key novel contributions of this work are, it:

1. Identifies the key actors that drive P2P, CSC and TE markets;
2. Undertakes a systematic literature review that aggregates and systematises the types of P2P, CSC and TE BMs envisioned and/or trialled by the academics into common archetypes;
3. Details the structure of each of these BM archetypes;
4. Considers the specificities and peculiarities of the identified BM archetypes.

In short, this paper presents a novel set of business model categories for the LEMs, based on the key actors that drive each category and their engagement with the BMC elements. Nine macro-actor business categories are identified across the P2P, CSC, and TE markets. For each business model category the key elements, peculiarities and gaps are discussed. Thus, this paper demonstrates both the areas where

the current research provides strong grounding for a practicable local energy BM, and points out the gaps where further research is needed to demonstrate the actual practicability, profitability and applicability of the local energy BMs.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the relevant background work and elucidates the terms P2P, TE, and CSC. Section 3 details the systematic methodology used in this study. Section 4 presents the analysis results from the study of 135 reviewed papers and defines BM archetypes. Section 5 discusses the common aspects relevant to all of the identified BM archetypes and how they differ for the three market models. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.

2. Background and related work to literature review of BMs for LEMs

To lay the groundwork for the following BM analyses, this section introduces the concepts of emerging P2P, CSC, and TE market models, as well as the main features of the BMC as an analysis tool. Related literature reviews are outlined and compared to the presented work.

2.1. Emerging market models: P2P, CSC, and TE

The concepts of P2P, CSC, and TE have been discussed with various meanings in existing literature. While all three concepts share common characteristics, they differ in terms of size, operational scale, and the primary purpose of their market activities [14].

P2P refers to a concept of direct electricity exchange among market participants without the need for a middleman [6]. The main driver behind this market model is to empower energy end-users and to provide them with an incentive to actively engage with the energy market [15,16]. While academic descriptions of the P2P concept usually focus on the interaction of end-users [9,11], practical implementations instead, such as through the ‘European Renewable Energy Directive 2018/2001’ [17], can also have a broader set of market participants such as suppliers and aggregators.

The concept of the TE market model is somewhat fuzzier [7]. It emerged from decentral coordination methodologies of supply and demand, especially for power systems with an increasing presence of DERs and smart devices [18]. The main scope is thereby often to enhance power system reliability through dynamic market mechanisms instead of passive and expensive grid reinforcements [19]. One of the most used definitions of TE, proposed by the GridWise Architecture Council, broadly defines TE as a “set of economic and control mechanisms that allow the dynamic balance of supply and demand across the entire electrical infrastructure using value as a key indicator” [20].

Finally, the term CSC originates in the European Renewable Energy Directive 2018/2001 [17] and is based on “jointly acting renewable self-consumers” [21]. A renewable self-consumer is defined in the directive as an energy end-user “who generates renewable electricity for its own consumption, and who may store or sell self-generated renewable electricity, provided that [...] those activities do not constitute its primary commercial or professional activity” [17]. A CSC market is therefore specified as a group of jointly acting renewables self-consumers who are located in physical proximity with the primary purpose to “provide environmental, economic or social community benefits [...] rather than financial profits” [17,22].

2.2. Business model canvas

The BMC is used as a tool to analyse, describe, and design BMs [10]. It consists of a visual template composed of nine elements that constitute the so-called building blocks for each BM. These elements are defined and presented in Table 1.

The BMC is used as an analytical framework for this paper to differentiate BM archetypes identified from the literature. Other academics

Table 1

Conceptualisation of the business model canvas. Elaboration based on the nine business model elements [23].

BM element	Description
Value proposition	Value that is created by the company's products and services for customers
Customer segments	Groups of individuals or organisations to which a company wants to deliver value
Customer relationships	Connections a company develops and maintains with customers
Channels	Modes whereby value propositions are communicated and delivered to customers
Key activities	The prime activities a company needs to execute its BM
Key resources	Key assets necessary for a company to execute its BM
Key partner	Cooperative agreements with other actors to make the BM work
Cost structure	Costs incurred as a result of operating a BM
Revenue streams	Income obtained from value propositions provided to customers

have previously used the BMC for BM analysis in the energy sector [9, 11,12], though none have undertaken a comprehensive review of LEM businesses using this framework. By applying the BMC to the analysis, the roles and business components of different actors in the emerging LEM models are scrutinised in a structured way, which reveals common and divergent features that shape the current energy sector.

2.3. Related work on literature review for LEMs

Several reviews and survey articles discuss LEMs from different perspectives. Khorasany et al. [24] studied the market frameworks for local energy trading concerning scalability, overheads, and grid constraints resolution approaches. The challenges that LEMs address are reviewed by Bjarghov et al. [25], and taxonomy of constructs and optimisation mechanisms (e.g., meta-heuristics, convex optimisation, etc.) for energy trading in smart grids is suggested by Aggarwal et al. [26]. More specifically, the challenges and opportunities of blockchain in the energy sector are researched by Andoni et al. [27]. On a similar note, Siano et al. [28] explore the different consensus mechanisms within distributed ledgers. Mengelkamp et al. [29] review LEM structures in literature and provide a high-level overview of market participants that might be present in such, namely aggregators, consumers, distribution companies, energy utilities, local governance, microgrid agents, market operators, local producers, prosumers, storage devices, and system operators. While these reviews discuss general frameworks of LEMs and their stakeholders, actual business models with their key elements within such markets are not analysed.

Another set of reviews focuses on specific aspects of individual LEM types, such as Tushar et al. [30] outlining challenges on virtual and physical layers of P2P mechanisms or Ahl et al. [31] describing the challenges in scaling P2P mechanisms. An overview of the current research and practice landscape of P2P trading is provided by Zhou et al. [6] and Soto et al. [32], while Zhang et al. [33] provide a list of commercial P2P projects. Along the same lines, Hu et al. [34] provide a list of TE demonstration projects, and Chen and Liu [18] describe the state-of-the-art of TE trading.

There are also a few reviews that reach across different LEM types. Sousa et al. [35] provide a comprehensive review of P2P and community-based markets, Siano et al. [28] on P2P and TE markets or Zia et al. [36], which present a structured 7-layer framework that potentially covers P2P, CSC, and TE models. They define a user layer as the foundation of their model architecture, followed by a network layer, a system operator layer, a market layer, a distributed ledger layer, a communication layer, and finally, a regulation layer on top.

Survey papers that address BMs of LEM participants address, for the most part, aspects of single participants such as Brown et al. [37] on emerging prosumer BMs, Müller and Welpé [8] on storage operators, Zhou et al. [38] on sharing coordinators and retailers, Montakhabi et al. [39] on broker and representatives or Pang et al. [40] on investment and consulting entities. Regarding the joint analysis of multiple BMs, Burger and Luke [41] represent an exception by reviewing the sum of emerging BMs for DERs based on empirical data.

This review differs from previous publications by focusing on reviewing the BMs that operate in the LEM and outlining their specific

composition mapped against the BMC. It details how each aspect of the BMC is fulfilled and where the models lack clarity. Furthermore, it does not limit its analysis to a single LEM type but compares BM appearances comprehensively across the three models of P2P, TE, and CSC. Reproducibility and benchmarking for future research on LEMs are encouraged by following a structured review methodology and making the extracted BM raw data available (see data availability section for more information). To the best of the authors' knowledge, the only structured literature review on LEMs so far is provided by Mengelkamp et al. [29], which focused on the broader concept of LEMs and their applications.

Along the line of these reviews, additional analyses have recently been published under the umbrella of the International Energy Agency's Global Observatory on Peer-to-Peer, Community Self-Consumption, and Transactive Energy Models, to which this work also belongs. Adams et al. [42] critically reviewing the social and economic value that these models provide while Capper et al. [43] review the archetypal market designs with underlying auction mechanisms. Dudjak et al. [44] provide a state-of-the-art review on system aspects that analyzes the impact of LEM integration on power systems, and O'Regan et al. [45] describe the technology implications on the technology layer concerning hardware, software, and data requirements. Finally, De Almeida et al. [46] outline the descriptive and normative legal aspects of LEM implementations in Europe and frame the regulatory challenges that lie ahead.

3. Systematic literature review methodology

This study followed a systematic literature review methodology [47] for literature search and selection (Section 3.1), data extraction (Section 3.2), and data analysis (Section 3.3). Limitations and threats to the validity of the study were considered and, where possible, mitigated (Section 5.4). Fig. 1 presents an overview of the methodological structure of the study.

3.1. Literature search and selection

The literature search strategy aimed to identify peer-reviewed journal articles which present peer-to-peer, self-consumption or transactive energy markets. Since all three terms are ill defined, papers which self-identified as concerning one of these market models were included. The Scopus and Web of Science databases were searched on 25 March 2020 using the following search term:

("peer to peer" OR "peer-to-peer" OR P2P) OR ("self consumption" OR "self-consumption" OR CSC) OR (transactive OR TE) AND electricity.

The initial search returned 892 results once duplicates were removed. The papers were reviewed against inclusion criteria to determine which were appropriate to be included in this study. An initial review of the paper title and abstract was completed, followed by a further full text review for papers which passed the initial review. The inclusion criteria used were:




Fig. 1. Flowchart of the applied methodology structure for the systematic literature review on emerging business models in P2P, TE, and CSC market models.

- The paper is in English;
- The paper is about electricity markets;
- The paper self-identifies as concerning peer-to-peer, self-consumption or transactive electricity markets;
- The paper discusses a market, or entities which participate in a market; and,
- The paper is published in a peer-reviewed journal.

One-hundred and forty-five papers were deemed relevant for inclusion in this study following review against the inclusion criteria. During data extract a further 10 papers were removed because they did not contain sufficient information for analysis. Therefore, a total of 135 papers are included in the study. The earliest paper included in the review was published in November 2015. No date range filters were applied to the search. The relatively short date range is reflective of the fact this is a new topic of research.

3.2. Data extraction

To ensure that data was extracted consistently from each paper included in the review, a data extraction table based on the BMC [23] was developed. The BMC is used to analyse, describe and design business models, and has previously been used to analyse business models in the energy sector [9,11,12]. The business model canvas was adapted for this study in the following ways:

- Business channels were subdivided into channels for evaluating, purchasing, and delivering the value proposition.
- Resources were further subdivided into tangible, non-tangible, and human resources.
- Revenue streams were differentiated between those based on static or dynamic variables.
- Cost structures were differentiated between capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operational expenditure (OPEX).

The full of data extraction criteria can be found in the codebook in [Appendix A](#). For data extraction, the 135 papers were randomly distributed between 14 researchers. Each researcher performed the data extraction independently. A cross-review process ensured data was extracted consistently by the different researchers.

3.3. Data analysis methodology

Thematic analysis [48] was used to create archetypal business models from the extracted data. The development of these archetypal business models was a two stage process. In the first stage the 221 individual business extracted from the literature were clustered into

nine business types. In the second stage, the business model canvas elements for each of the nine business type clusters were analysed to create nine archetypal business models.

The archetypal business models developed in this work are complementary to the harmonised electricity market role models (HRM) developed by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) [49]. Although the models developed in this paper are specific to P2P, CSC and TE markets, comparisons can be made between the two. As part of the analysis, the archetypal business models developed in this work have been compared to the harmonised role models. This comparison can be found in [Appendix B](#).

4. Analysis of business model categories emerging from systematic literature review

As per previously discussed methodology, the BM analysis has identified a set of actor categories. This section discusses these categories and their distribution across the three investigated LEM models, as well as presents a detailed analysis of the BM archetypes.

4.1. Identified actors' types

Based on the descriptions of 221 businesses elicited from the reviewed literature and the integrated techno-economic roles of the HRM, nine actor categories were identified. These can be organised into the following three sets:

1. A set of actors that are asset owners and are connected to the grid:
 - Prosumers;
 - Pure consumers;
 - Pure generators;
 - Storage operators.
2. A set of facilitators which can either act as platform providers for direct business transactions among actors, or as intermediaries for (groups of) actors to enable interactions with a wider market:
 - Platform operators;
 - Aggregators;
 - Representatives.
3. A set of actors that act as service providers and potential customers of asset owning actors:
 - Retailers;
 - Grid operators.

Table 2
Description of identified actor categories in P2P, CSC, and TE market models.

Actor	Description
Prosumer	An entity which is connected to the grid and that injects and withdraws energy at the same grid connection point. It is characterised by a bidirectional electricity flow based on generating, consuming, and storing assets at its grid connection point.
Pure consumer	An entity connected to the grid which possesses and potentially operates its own assets to consume electricity. Among such assets can be also storage assets, although they will only be utilised to shift consumption, and not for reinjecting electricity into the grid. A pure consumers is therefore characterised by a unidirectional, withdrawing electricity flow at its grid connection point.
Pure generator	An entity connected to the grid which possesses and potentially operates its own assets to generate electricity. It is thereby characterised by a predominately unidirectional, injecting electricity flow at its grid connection point.
Storage operator	An entity connected to the grid which possesses and operates its own assets to store electricity. Although it neither generates nor consumes energy (except minor process losses), it does however buy, keep for a time, and then sell energy to the local market at different instances of time. It is thereby characterised by a bidirectional electricity flow at its grid connection point.
Platform operator	An entity which operates a platform for energy trading or sharing. It is not connected to the grid and does not own any relevant generation or consumption assets, yet it facilitates the exchange among its customers.
Aggregator	A virtual entity, not physically connected to the grid, which acts on behalf of a variable group of parties connected to the grid (or their representatives). Aggregators manage the combination of their clients' individual assets as one virtually aggregated asset, with various levels of activity on a potential plurality of markets.
Representative	A virtual entity, not physically connected to the grid, which acts on behalf of a single party connected to the grid. Representatives manage the combination of their client's individual assets towards a potential plurality of trading agents or market platforms. Other than aggregators, representatives always represent only one single client.
Retailer	Usually a virtual entity, not physically connected to the grid, which does not own any physical assets. Retailers hence neither generate nor consume energy, yet they buy and sell energy on platform operators to then exchange it with individual clients.
Grid operator	An entity that manages, develops, and maintains the electricity or gas network for a specific territory.

A short description of each actor's main characteristics is presented in [Table 2](#). More detailed descriptions, a definition of each actor's category in terms of the set of HRM role combinations, as well as a selection of synonyms used in literature, are presented in [Appendix C](#).

Given that prosumers are by far the most common actors in the reviewed research, the amount of retrieved information provided the opportunity to study them in more detail (see [Section 4.3.1](#)). While all prosumers share fundamental key characteristics, four distinct types of prosumer BMs have been identified, depending on their interactions with other actors in their ecosystem. These four types of prosumer are: prosumers that interact directly with other prosumers (peer-peer), prosumers that interact with a group of other prosumers (peer-group), prosumers that interact with one or multiple markets (peer-market), and prosumers that interact through or with the support of a dedicated individual energy management system (EMS) (peer-EMS). More detailed characteristics of these four prosumer subcategories are described in [Section 4.3.1](#).

It should be noted that businesses can also cover multiple actor roles simultaneously. For example, a microgrid operating business might act as a platform operator for a set of microgrid participants to facilitate the energy exchange among them. Simultaneously, the same business might act as an aggregator to coordinate the ancillary service provision to a higher-level grid operator. Whether or not such combined roles might pose any legal and regulatory challenges is discussed in [Section 5](#). However, regulatory compliance has not been judged in the analysis of the BMs.

4.2. Presence of individual actors in different market models

[Fig. 2](#) shows how the 221 identified active businesses from the reviewed research is distributed among the nine actor categories. The majority (about 60%) of businesses belong to a group with grid connected assets, i.e., prosumers, pure consumers, pure generators, and storage operators (see [group 1](#), [Section 4.1](#)). Among these, prosumers clearly prevail as, overall, the mostly described businesses with the two subcategories peer-peer and peer-market making up the largest shares. The facilitators group also contains reasonably widespread actors, with aggregators and platform operators accounting for 13% and 12% of the active businesses, respectively. The group of service providing actors, on the other hand, is comparatively least represented, with grid operators and retailers accounting for 7% and 5%, respectively. However,

this only applies to their presence as businesses actively participating in the LEMs. Their presence as passive customers and supporting partners to other businesses is clearly more pronounced, as shown in [Section 5](#). [Fig. 3](#) reports the presence of actors in absolute numbers broken down by market model.

[Table 3](#) provides the actors' presence in the associated literature references. A single paper can contain multiple actors and some papers contain more than one energy model. Out of the 135 papers, 77 associated with P2P models, 58 with TE models, and 9 with CSC models.

4.3. Individual actors business model analysis

The following section presents the synthesised BMs for each actor of interest as reported in the reviewed research. First, it outlines how the individual BM is structured, how it operates, and what its main characteristics are. This is accompanied by a detailed BMC-based analysis of the BM across all three LEMs of interest. Finally, a brief discussion of peculiarities, missing elements, and contradictions is provided.

4.3.1. Prosumer

As previously noted, four subcategories of prosumer have been identified. [Table 4](#) provides an overview of the subset of overarching BM elements that characterise all subcategories. The table cites the source research papers, while the brightness of each cell's colour denotes the frequency with which the relevant feature was referenced. Further detail on the BM elements for each subcategory is provided in [Tables D.9](#), [D.10](#), [D.11](#), and [D.12](#).

The basis of prosumer's value proposition is consistent for all four subcategories and is dominated by the generation and delivery of electric energy at convenient prices. More than 75% of the prosumer businesses provide this value to their customers. The second most common value proposition consists of flexibility provision through demand response or dispatchable generation. However, the occurrence of this value proposition varies considerably between model subcategories: from only 10% for the peer-peer prosumers subcategory, to over than 50% for the peer-EMS subcategory. Concerning customer segments, prosumers serve as the most cited customer to other prosumers across all subcategories. The only other customer segment reported for all four prosumer subcategories is the pure consumer.

Distribution of identified macro-categories**Group 1: Grid connected asset owners**



- Prosumer
- Pure generator
- Pure consumer
- Storage operator

Group 2: Facilitators & multipliers

- Platform operator
- Representative
- Aggregator

Group 3: Service providers

- Retailer
- Grid operator

**Fig. 2.** The presence of identified actors in the reviewed literature.**Fig. 3.** The presence of identified actors in reviewed literature associated with P2P, CSC and TE models.**Table 3**

Presence of identified macro actors in the reviewed literature.

	P2P	CSC	TE
Prosumer	[28,37,38,50–108] ^a	[37,104–106,108–111] ^a	[28,107,112–146] ^a
Prosumer peer-peer	[28,37,50,53,54,59–61,63–65,67,72,74,75,77,78,80, 82,84–87,94,95,107] ^a	–	[28,107,113,114,116,126] ^a
Prosumer peer-group	[54,62,66,68,74,104,106,108] ^a	[37,104,106,108–111] ^a	[119,120,130,135]
Prosumer peer-EMS	[56,58,68,69,73,76,98–101]	–	[117,122,131,133,140–142]
Prosumer peer-market	[37,38,52,55,70,71,79,81,88,89,91–93,96,103,105] ^a	[105] ^a	[115,118,121,123,127,128,137,138]
Pure consumer	[61,76,79,83,93,94,104,108,132,147–151] ^a	[104,108] ^a	[152–154]
Pure generator	[78,147,150,155,156]	–	[132,154,157–159]
Storage operator	[51,55,91,104,105] ^a	[104,105,160] ^a	[158,159,161]
Platform operator	[37,54,70,85,90,104,105,108,162–165] ^a	[37,104,105,108–110] ^a	[119,129,130,132,134,136,141,153,154,166–168]
Aggregator	[37,80,81,101,104,108,169,170] ^a	[104,108] ^a	[119,120,123–127,129,132,140,145,152,154,158, 166,167,171–175]
Representative	[90]	–	[141,145,146,157,176,177]
Retailer	[37,59,78,92,148,151]	–	[130,167,168,171,178]
Grid operator	[55]	–	[112,119,120,124,125,129,145,154,161,166,168, 174,179–181]

^aEntry refers to a paper that contains more than one energy market model.

Platform operators are the only key partner that is equally relevant to all prosumer subcategories (cited around 25%–35%). Aggregators, retailers, and grid operators also serve as partners across all prosumer types, but with varying importance. Peer-EMS prosumers rely most significantly on aggregators, whereas the other three prosumer types interact with retailers and grid operators. Beyond these key elements, the four prosumer sub-types each develop their own distinct BM features.

Prosumer category I: peer-peer

This prosumer subcategory represents individual actors who produce and trade their surplus electricity and/or flexibility directly to other individual peers, mostly via platforms. Individual actors and peers refer to household prosumers, pure consumers, and juristic persons, e.g., microgrids, residential buildings, and small commercial entities.

The fundamental value proposition of these prosumers is to provide electricity to other peers at prices cheaper than those from the retail market. The customer segments consist exclusively of other prosumers and pure consumers. Irrespective of market models, relationships with customers are maintained through automated services, i.e., processes without human involvement. Peer-peer prosumers rely on the following key activities, resources and partners:

- Key activities are generally producing electricity, managing loads and generation, deciding selling prices, and trading their electricity on the online platform.
- Key resources consist of tangible assets, such as PVs for electricity generation, battery energy storage systems (BESSs) for temporary

Table 4
Comparison of selected business model elements for different prosumer types.

	Prosumer peer-peer	Prosumer peer-group	Prosumer peer-EMS	Prosumer peer-market
<i>Value proposition</i>				
Provide electricity	[28,37,50,53,64,98– 61,63,65,67,74,75,77,78,80,82,84– 87,94,95,107,113,116,126]	[37,54,62,66,74,104,106,108–110, 119,130,135]	[56,69,73,76,98–100,113,122,131, 140–142]	[37,38,53,56,70,79,81,86,89,91– 93,96,103,105,115,118,121,127, 128,137]
Provide flexibility	[64,72,114]	[62,66,109,119,120,130]	[56,68,98,99,101,117,122,133,140]	[71,79,96,123,137,138]
<i>Customer segments</i>				
Other prosumer	[28,37,50,54,59–61,63– 65,67,72,74,75,77,78,82,84–86,95, 107,113,114,116,126]	[37,54,62,66,74,104,106,109,110, 130,135]	[56,68,69,73,76,98–101,113,122, 131,140,142]	[38,55,70,71,79,81,88,89,92,93,96, 103,105,115,121,128,137]
Pure consumer	[53,80,84,85,87,94,95]	[68,104,106]	[76,113,140]	[79,91,93,118,121]
Pure generator			[140]	
Storage operator				[55,105]
Platform operator		[110]	[133,140,141]	[38,52,70,79,105,127]
Aggregator		[119,120]		[118,123,127]
Representative				
Retailer		[130]		[37,123]
Grid operator			[117,140,142]	[138]
<i>Key partners</i>				
Other prosumer		[54]		
Pure consumer				
Pure generator				
Storage operator				
Platform operator	[28,54,60,61,65,72,85,87,107]	[66,104,110,130]	[73,100,131,133,141]	[38,70,79,91,105,115,121,127,128]
Aggregator	[80]	[135]	[101,113,133,135]	[81,88]
Representative			[133]	[71]
Retailer	[53,59,78,85,86,95,113]	[37,68,109]	[122]	[92,96,103]
Grid operator	[64,65,75,84,86,87,107,113]	[68,106,119,130,135]	[68,73,122]	[37,52,55,71,81,91,103,115,123, 137]

storage and balancing, and to a lesser extent, technology infrastructure. Intangible assets are modestly present and consist of software for supply and demand forecasts, active market interaction through bidding, and the ability to interact with data stores (e.g., blockchain).

- Key partners include platform operators as central facilitators, grid operators as infrastructure and balancing providers, and retailers as the suppliers of last resort.

Online marketplaces or platforms are the main channels used by customers to purchase electricity from prosumers. The most important factor customers use to evaluate the value proposition and thus justify their purchase decision is its price. Delivery of electricity is done through a distribution network.

DER installations entail the only mentioned CAPEX for peer-peer prosumer, whereas OPEX comprises costs such as maintenance of generation units, and transaction and grid charges. Their primary revenue streams come from the sale of surplus electricity. Fig. 4 provides an overview of the peer-peer prosumer BMC (additional details and individual references in Table D.9).

Observations of note on peer-peer BMs relate to the fact that many papers under-specify the relevant resources and costs for business viability. For instance, since most of the peer-peer prosumers trade their electricity and/or flexibility on automated online platforms, the ICT and software that enables trading are vital parts of the peer-peer BM. However, only a minority of the reviewed papers identify ICT infrastructure as a tangible key resource [80,87,94] or the ability to actively interact with other peers or the market as a non-tangible key resource [59,60,74,86,107,113,114,116,126]. Similarly, although most reviewed papers name PV as a key resource for prosumers [28, 53,54,59–61,63,64,67,72,77,78,80,84–87,95,114,116,126], the investment cost of PV is noted in only one-fifth of the reviewed papers [53, 63,64,85,86,114]. Finally, discussion of OPEX, such as the maintenance costs of DERs, transaction costs, and grid fees for electricity export, is also limited to only a third of the reviewed papers [53,59,65,67,72,73, 75,84,85,113,116].

Prosumer category II: peer-group

The second prosumer category considers the actors for which supply and demand is submitted to a group or a cooperative platform operator. Unlike category I, the platform operator optimises solutions for the group as a whole.

Fig. 5 presents the BMC for the peer-group prosumer category. Value proposition, customer segments, and relationships are mainly in line with other prosumer categories' BMs. Differences occur concerning channels where community-based preferences appear as an evaluation criterion. Furthermore, instead of an active bidding process, a uniform passive assignment to all trade participants dominates with a respective commercial delivery through a specific community scheme. In revenue streams, reduced costs for consumed electricity are noted as the additional revenue stream from leveraging demand response (DR) at community level.

Key activities comprise fewer forecasts of own consumption and more exchange of information with other actors, and controllable resources are operated mainly based on centralised objectives and less for self-optimisation. Significantly, group-based prosumer BMs have a BESS as tangible assets compared to key resources of other prosumer BM types. Non-tangible resources are, on the contrary, less present. Key partners are dominated by grid operators, platform operators, and to a certain extent, retailers, whereas aggregators are generally less present. The reported cost structure consists mainly of the consumption costs for supplemental (i.e., not self-generated) electricity, and in very few cases, transaction costs (see further details and individual references in Table D.10).

Observations on peer-group BMs include the value proposition, which involves mainly DR used to shift individual consumption to times of surplus generation within the local community. This, in turn, leads to reduced consumption costs rather than direct payments for flexibility provision [54,66,120,130,135]. It is also interesting that less than half of the covered businesses have a central facilitator such as a platform operator or aggregator among their key partners [66,104,110, 130,135]. This might be interpreted as an indication of a prevalence of decentralised group management schemes. On the other hand, the




Fig. 4. The business model canvas of prosumers in the peer-peer version as reviewed in literature. A total of 30 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in [Table D.9](#).




Fig. 5. The business model canvas of prosumers in the peer-group version as reviewed in literature. A total of 14 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in [Table D.10](#).

cost structure does not mention payment for the platform operators or aggregators, which flags an existent gap in the published models. Similarly, no opportunity costs for the provision of individual assets such as BESSs for utilisation at community level are reported [120,130,135].

Prosumer category III: peer-EMS

The third prosumer category includes the actors whose energy market interaction is ruled via an EMS. The EMS optimises prosumers' generation and consumption, then submits supply or demand bids to a platform operator to buy and sell from other prosumers. The platform

operator optimises per peers' multi-device preferences first, then carries out peer-to-peer trading (as for prosumer category I).

As shown in [Fig. 6](#), the value proposition of peer-EMS prosumers includes both trading of electricity and flexibility at convenient rates, albeit with a more pronounced flexibility offering than other prosumer categories. This is complemented by the offering of additional ancillary services such as reactive power and spinning reserve. In value proposition evaluation, the main criterion of price is complemented by individual preferences such as comfort parameters or risk aversion. Besides prosumers and pure consumers, customer segments also notably contain grid operators and platform operators. Considering channels,




Fig. 6. The business model canvas of prosumers in the peer-EMS version as reviewed in literature. A total of 17 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in [Table D.11](#).

the purchase of the value proposition mainly happens for this subcategory increasingly through active interaction and specifically by using the EMS. Revenue streams are based more often on both sold electricity or on cost reductions for consumed electricity from flexibility activation. Additionally, direct revenue streams from ancillary services are reported.

The key resources include a significant number of BESSs, controllable loads, and ICT infrastructures. The non-tangible resources include a wide range of abilities associated with the EMS (e.g., load and generation forecasting, optimal scheduling, optimal bidding, and resources control). No key partners gains significance. Considering the cost structure, CAPEX and fixed OPEX are absent, as for most prosumer types. The variable OPEX is specified for electricity consumption, generation costs for non-renewable resources, and opportunity costs for providing flexibility (i.e., demand response and curtailed generation, see [Table D.11](#) for further detail and individual references).

Observations on peer-EMS BMs note that the value proposition of this category relies on flexibility service provision, predominantly delivered implicitly through price signal response [56,69,76,100,117,122,131,133,140]. Overall, the EMS appears to support prosumers at the individual bidding process by (i) forecasting [76,98,101,117,122,133,140,142], (ii) executing the actual sales of the value proposition through active market interaction [56,69,98,117,122,133,140], and (iii) optimising self-dispatch in case of rather passive market interactions [68,101,141,142]. In all cases, however, no costs are associated with EMSs, neither CAPEX nor OPEX, representing thus a significant gap in the reviewed literature models.

Prosumer category IV: peer-market

The fourth prosumer category is defined by actors primarily interacting with a market and, unlike the previous three categories of prosumers, not directly interacting with other peers. Actors' activities are driven by a personal preference optimisation under the constraints and goals of the market, whereas the market platform itself might integrate additional processing such as setting a fixed price, aggregating requests, or integrating central storage availability constraints.

The value proposition of peer-market prosumers is fully in line with that of other prosumers' in terms of cheaper electricity and

flexibility provision. However, the customers of this subcategory are the most diverse, including all actor categories except pure generators and representatives. In general, customers are not captive but can freely choose the provider in the market. Key partners are wide-ranging (as for other prosumers), though clearly dominated by grid operators. Last but not least, the reported revenue streams are mainly based on sold electricity times the local market-clearing price and the underlying cost structure concerns quasi exclusively variable OPEX, with purchase costs for supplementary electricity being the most referenced feature. The resulting BMC for peer-market prosumers is presented in Fig. 7 (see Table D.12 for further detail and individual references).

Observations on peer-market BMs include that here, while still being mentioned for only 17 out of 24 reviewed papers, variable OPEX is reported for a comparably broad spectrum. This links to more detailed market costs, including imbalance costs [127], transaction costs [115], or associated network constraints [91]. Note that CAPEX and fixed OPEX are absent, as for most other prosumer types.

It is also worth mentioning that a reasonable number of these prosumers do not rely on an external institution for the market platform provision. Instead, many integrate a decentralised market platform as part of their intangible resources [70,71,81,88], often with a blockchain implementation. Other members of the peer-market prosumers subcategory have a dedicated bidding agent [38,79,92,93,137], and do not outsource the bidding process to third-party representatives or aggregators.

4.3.2. Pure consumer

Fig. 8 presents the BMC elements of the pure consumers BMs for P2P, TE, and CSC markets. Pure consumers offer two major value propositions. These are flexibility from DR, and electricity demand, which remunerates generating parties in the LEM. This remuneration is usually higher than from other (off-market) sources, such as the feed-in tariff. The latter value proposition aims at the principal customer segment of prosumers, from which the pure consumers purchase electricity. Platform operators or retailers also appear in some cases as customers concerning the DR flexibility from pure consumers. The number one key partners for the pure consumer are platform operators. All pure consumers have loads as their key resources, most of which

KEY PARTNERS	KEY ACTIVITIES	VALUE PROPOSITION	CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS	CUSTOMER SEGMENTS
Grid operator (11)	I. information exchange (8)	providing electricity (22) at local market price, i.e., below wholesale market price (15) at general market conditions (6)	automated (20)	Prosumers (17)
Platform operator (9)	II. interaction with local market platform (21) with active bidding (14) with passive communication (3)	providing flexibility (6)		Platform operator (7) (wholesale market)
Aggregator (3)	III. electricity generation (14), operation of own controlla- ble assets (14)	providing reactive power (1)		Pure consumer (5)
Retailer (3)				Aggregator (3)
Representative (1)				Storage operator (2)
none or not specified (3)				Retailer (2)
				Grid operator (1)
	KEY RESOURCES		CHANNELS	
	tangible generation assets (17), i.e., PV (13), Wind (4), conventional (3); BESS (14), controllable loads (4)	evaluation	price (18), individual prefer- ences (5), technical feasi- bility (1), no evaluation (2)	
	non-tang. market platform (5), bidding agent (4), optimization abi- lity (3), forecast ability (2),	purchase	active interaction and continuous bidding (19), passive assignment (4)	
	human none or not specified (25)	delivery	commercial: energy platf. (9) physical: distribution grid (8)	
COST STRUCTURE		REVENUE STREAMS		
CAPEX	installation costs of proprietary assets (3), none or not specified (21)	fixed	not specified (24)	
OPEX	costs for supplementary electricity (9), generation costs for non- renewables (2), opportunity costs for DR (2), BESS operation & maintenance (1), imbalance costs (1), transaction costs (1), costs associated to network constraints (1), none or not specified (10)	variable	electricity sold (19): - times local market clearing price (18) - times bilateral contract price (1) - times fixed feed-in tariff (1) reduced costs for consumed electricity (4) flexibility sold times local clearing price (2)	

Fig. 7. The business model canvas of prosumers in the peer-market version as reviewed in literature. A total of 24 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in Table D.12.

are controllable to a considerable extent. BESSs constitute the second controllable asset and are fundamental for their flexibility offering. On the financial side, their cost structure is dominated by the costs for consumed electricity. The revenue streams that this BM generates are mainly of an indirect nature, manifesting as reduced costs for the consumed electricity (see further details and individual references in Table D.13).

Observations on pure consumer BM: A notable peculiarity here are the very limited customer segments. Besides the prosumers, only four out of thirteen papers mention platform operators [104,148,154] or retailer [153] as customers. Compared to other small-scale participants, pure consumers also appear to have comparably little forecasting ability (only four out of thirteen papers mentioning this activity [61, 150,154,163]). Further non-tangible resources such as EMS or other abilities for optimised bidding are barely present. Pure consumers appear, therefore, to be a somewhat more passive business.

Another peculiarity concerns the evaluation of the pure consumers' value proposition. Customers are reported to use both price and 'technical fit' [104,151,163]. In these cases, the value proposition comprises flexibility used to balance local imbalances from PV uncertainty [163] or to align with other local DR offers in terms of timely availability and capacity for aggregated flexibility offers to the grid operator [104]. Overall, flexibility offers are noted in seven papers, but only in two of them, the offer is explicitly remunerated [104,154]. In the remaining five cases, its utilisation is remunerated via reduced costs for electricity consumption [148,150,151,153,163].

Limited information was provided on the cost structure, noting only the cost for electricity provision and, in a few cases, opportunity costs for the DR provision [148,151], transaction costs [149,150], or potential imbalance costs [149]. As for other BMs, another missing element for this group is information on ICT infrastructure and how pure consumers interact with their customers or the other market participants.

4.3.3. Pure generator

Pure generators are electricity sellers who have generation capability, are able to sell electricity at lower prices than the market (retail) price, and can actively respond to the market demand by adjusting their

generation rate. These capabilities can not only be used to maximise the generator's profits but also to serve local communities. The value which Generators provide is delivered to various customer segments. Pure consumers and prosumers buy electricity from pure generators at a price below the retail price, whereas retailers or other pure generators rely on them to balance their portfolios for supply. The BMC elements of the pure generator BMs for the P2P, TE, and CSC markets are summarised in Fig. 9 (see more detail and individual references in Table D.14).

Pure generators' customers purchase partly through active bidding or simply by signing up to a local scheme. The channels for value delivery include local market platforms (to support bid submission), with the physical delivery occurring through the local distribution grid. Necessary key activities for value delivery include, amongst others, electricity generation, surplus supply prediction, offer pricing, evaluation and selection of offer propositions, and transactions recording. Their key partners are platform operators to operate and clear the local markets and aggregators that run virtual power plants. The primary tangible key resources they possess are generation assets (such as wind turbines, PVs, diesel generators and gas-fired micro-turbines). Intangible assets include software for generation and demand forecasting for a given timeslot, as well as price setting. Pure generator models mention no specific human resources. In this model, the revenue streams are generally based on variable rather than fixed components, which change based on market conditions. The generated revenue is calculated as the energy sold times the respective transaction or clearing prices. The BM is cost-driven, and variable cost structure elements include: (i) fuel costs for non-renewable electricity generation, (ii) imbalance costs, and (iii) transaction costs.

Observations on pure generator BM: The BM is strongly asset-based, with the presence of tangible resources in this BM being significantly increased compared to other BMs. This is because the generation assets are fundamental for the actor's value proposition.

Furthermore, this BM serves a wide range of customers, from pure consumers [147,150,155–158] and prosumers [156] to platform operators [147,150,155,157] and aggregators [158]. Here the customer relationships are almost exclusively automated [78,147,155–158] and anonymous [147,155,157]. However, the details on the ICT infrastructure to enable such automated communication with customers




Fig. 8. The business model canvas of pure consumers as reviewed in literature. A total of 13 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in Table D.13.




Fig. 9. The business model canvas of pure generators as reviewed in literature. A total of 8 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in Table D.14.

are missing. Also, this BM's cost structure reports neither related investment costs (CAPEX) nor fixed operating costs (OPEX) such as maintenance or repairs, resulting in a second gap of information from the research.

4.3.4. Storage operator

Fig. 10 presents the derived storage operator's BMCs for the P2P [51,91], CSC [104,105], and TE [158] models. The value proposition of storage operators' BM is based on energy trading with price arbitrage and the provision of flexibility services. In general, the storage operator acts as the entity that offers the capability of absorbing and

injecting power into the grid depending on price signals or technical requirements (see more details and individual references in Table D.15).

Here the key resources are storage devices (e.g., stationary or non-stationary BESS) that can provide multiple (simultaneous) services. Using these resources, storage operators exploit price differentials either directly by active trading or indirectly by providing energy flexibility to balance the local market. Therefore, price differentials on the local or wholesale market constitute the fundamental basis of their BMs financial structure. Additional revenue streams from system service provision related to frequency and voltage control (power flexibility) are marginal. In P2P and TE markets, the storage operator aims to




Fig. 10. The business model canvas of storage operators as reviewed in literature. A total of 6 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in Table D.15.

maximise its profits. Storage operators who participate in the CSC markets provide a service to the community allowing the achievement of community goals and own profit maximisation.

Observations on storage operator BM: Discussion on CAPEX sensitivity and possible economies of scale would be a crucial element here but is missing in the models of the reviewed research. Only one paper reports CAPEX and fixed OPEX (maintenance costs). Moreover, the ICT infrastructure and software requirements for local market interactions are poorly defined. A particular Storage Operator case is provided by Basnet and Zhong [51], with a BM built around hydrogen storage with electrolyser and fuel cell as key resources, instead of the otherwise prevailing BESSs.

4.3.5. Platform operator

Platform operators are agents who run a platform for energy trading, sharing, or dispatch at a local level. Moreover, the platform may also deal with ancillary services and congestion management. The value proposition of platform operators relies on local market clearing, and customers evaluate it based on price, partially ex-ante on a subscription basis or continuously during operation. Purchase options for customers are either single sign-up with automatic execution or continuous though manual interaction through active bidding. Customer segments consist of a variety of actors with a single point of delivery to the grid, as well as aggregators and grid operators. Customer relationships are either automated or community-based. Revenue streams for platform operators consist of registration fees and transaction fees or profit margin on the total trading amount. Moreover, platform operators can generate cash flows from arbitrage between wholesale and local markets. Key resources are the non-tangible market platform and related market algorithms. Tangible resources are the distribution- or micro-grid, and smart meters and other ICT infrastructure. Grid operators, retailers, and other platform operators act as high-level partners to make the BM work. The reported cost structure is based on the purchase of electricity from different markets in case the BM comprises also retailing to local consumers. Further detail are outlined in Fig. 11 or with individual references in Table D.16.

Observations on platform operator BM: The reviewed papers identify the pivotal role of the platform operator, which is the only actor

that interacts with all the other actors. In most of the reviewed papers, the platform operators are also the market operators. Nevertheless, some platform operators can also be community managers, or energy sharing coordinators. In most cases, this actor connects passive market participants that are optimising their electricity use. The mere platform provision is thereby topped up by complementary services such as central optimisation [37,70,85,105,108–110,130,163,165,167,168], forecasting [130,167,168] or the connection to higher-level markets [37,70]. Centralised optimisation is prevalent in platforms for fair energy sharing (rather than energy trading). Some authors describe such sharing with central optimisation as an additional value above the direct P2P trading [108]. Yet there seems to be no common understanding in the literature of sharing and trading. While solutions that exchange power from participants without their active interaction are usually referred to as sharing platforms (e.g., [105,108]), in some examples, they are also referred to as trading (e.g., [109]). In most cases, platform operators connect market participants who optimise their electricity use. However, in a few cases, this is also extended to direct control of customers' assets for optimal dispatch [108,163,165,167].

Despite this diverse field of activities, no revenue streams connected to the core activity of platform provision are reported in the reviewed research, except one paper noting fixed registration fee [162] and another a fixed transaction cost [110]. Neither is there detail on the costs of the required ICT infrastructure, except in [167].

4.3.6. Aggregator

Aggregators act as entities on behalf of bundled customers. They aggregate small-scale downstream customer assets to form a sizeable capacity and then engage in a market on their behalf. There are various types of aggregators operating in different segments of the electricity system, such as load aggregators, DR aggregators, microgrid aggregators, and aggregators as virtual power plants. Fig. 12 shows the BMC of an aggregator archetype.

Customer segments of aggregators comprise essentially the full set of LEM actors, divided into downstream and upstream customers. Downstream customers are mainly prosumers and pure consumers, or also DER generators and storage operators. Upstream customers, on

KEY PARTNERS	KEY ACTIVITIES	VALUE PROPOSITION	CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS	CUSTOMER SEGMENTS
Grid operator (4) Retailer (3) Pure generator (1) Platform operator (1) None or not specified (14)	I. forecast (3), forward flex needs to customers (1) II. macroeconomic optim. (13), ensure optimal dispatch (5), clear market (20) III. distribute clearing inform. (4), provide supplementary electricity to customers (4)	platform (20) for: electricity trading (13) electricity sharing (7) ancillary service prov. (4) increased monetary benefits (15) through: reduced costs for consuming parties (4) enhanced revenues for generating parties (3) locational services (2) local coalition formation (1)	automated (19) community (4)	Prosumer (17) Pure consumers (6) Grid operator (4) Aggregator (2) Pure generators (1) Storage operator (1) Platform operator (1) Retailer (1)
	KEY RESOURCES tangible: distribution or micro-grid (5), EMS & other ICT infrastructure (3) non-tang.: market platform (18), central controller (11), forecast ability (3), aggregation ability (1) human: none or not specified (7)	optimal dispatch at local level (3), by controlling customers assets: directly (2) indirectly (1) connect upstream market layer (3) to exchange excess demand/supply	CHANNELS evaluation: price (16): ex-ante (2), continuous (4) purchase: passive assignment (11), active bidding (11) delivery: commercial: local market particip. (10), community management scheme (3) physical: distribution grid (10)	
COST STRUCTURE		REVENUE STREAMS		
CAPEX	investment costs (4) for: ICT infrastructure (2), BESS (1), grid (1) none or not specified (17)	fixed: service fee (2), registration fee (2), none or not specified (16) variable: selling electricity to local consumers (4) arbitrage (2): - on price diff. from wholesale to local market (1) - on price diff. of local market with own BESS (1) price diff. between matched buy and sell offers (pay-as-bid) (1) profit margin as % of total trading amount (1)		
OPEX	purchased electricity for consumers (4), operation & maintenance costs of assets (2), none or not specified (16)			

Fig. 11. The business model canvas of platform operators as reviewed in literature. A total of 20 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in Table D.16.

KEY PARTNERS	KEY ACTIVITIES	VALUE PROPOSITION	CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS	CUSTOMER SEGMENTS
Platform operator (5) Grid operator (5) Pure generator (2) Prosumer (2) Retailer (2) Aggregator (1) Representative (1) none or not specified (3)	I. aggregate & centrally manage DERs and loads (19) II. interact with markets and upstream actors on behalf of downstream customers (12) III. facilitate electricity exchange among local customers (3)	VIRTUAL AGGREGATION & CENTRAL DISPATCH <u>Downstream customers:</u> optimization of asset operation (19), to: reduce consumption costs (14) increase sales revenues (6) reduce imbalance costs (5) enable new revenue streams (2) guaranteeing individ. preferences (2) facilitate local electricity exchange (2) <u>Upstream customers:</u> untap new flexibility sources (12) with locational component (9), e.g., to react to local network constraints without locational component (6), e.g., to balance portfolios or network areas	automated (17) self-service (1) not specified (3)	Prosumer (12) Pure consumer (10) Grid operator (10) Pure generator (6) Platform operator (4) Aggregator (3) Storage operator (4) Retailer (2)
	KEY RESOURCES tangible: smart devices (1), none or not specified (20) non-tang.: ICT, software and algorithms (16), none or not specified (5) human: none or not specified (21)		CHANNELS evaluation: prices (10), revenue (2), preference (2), cost and benefits (2), not specified (8) purchase: direct purchase (14), platform (6), wholesale market (3), active bidding (1), not specified (2) delivery: physical: distribution grid (9), specific networks (2); commercial: platform and algorithms (7), aggregators and representatives (2); not specified (3)	
COST STRUCTURE		POTENTIAL REVENUE STREAMS		
CAPEX	investment cost, e.g. BESS (1) and ICT (1), none or not specified (18)	fixed: service fees (1), capacity payments (1), none or not specified (19) variable: sale of electricity (8), sale of flexibility (4), sale of ancillary services (3), revenue from cost minimization (4), none or not specified (9)		
OPEX	purchase of electricity (7), generation of electricity (4), imbalance costs (6), opportunity costs for local flexibility (6), not specified (10)			

Fig. 12. The business model canvas of aggregators as reviewed in literature. A total of 21 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in Table D.17.

the other hand, can be grid operators and platform operators, or also large-scale generators and retailers. The essential value proposition of aggregators circles around virtual aggregation and central dispatch. For downstream customers, aggregators optimise asset operation, generating additional revenue from electricity trading or flexibility provision and cost minimisation in terms of scheduling cost or imbalance costs. For upstream customers, aggregators unlock new flexibility sources, either with a locational component to react to network constraints or without such to balance portfolios or network areas.

Aggregators rely for their value propositions mainly on non-tangible key resources, especially ICT, to communicate with connected units as

well as software such as algorithms for forecasting and central optimisation. The key activities in which these resources are then applied are designed to bundle and manage customers' DERs, interact with markets and upstream actors on behalf of downstream customers, and facilitate electricity exchange among local customers. Similar to their customer portfolio, aggregators interact with a large partner network (by and large the full set of LEM actors) to provide their value proposition.

The majority of reviewed papers describe the aggregator business with little detail on the cost structure. The most noted costs are variable OPEX related to the purchase or generation of electricity for downstream customers, imbalance costs for their portfolio of controlled

assets, and opportunity costs for flexibility activation. The main revenue streams of Aggregators come from payments or revenue sharing from electricity sales, flexibility capacity, or ancillary services (see Table D.17 for further details and individual references).

Observations on aggregator BM: While ICT resources are identified as key enablers for the aggregator's BM, the related conditions of such are inadequately discussed in the reviewed research. Only one paper mentions associated investment costs [167] and likewise only one other paper describes the underlying tangible resources such as computers or other relevant hardware [80].

Another noteworthy aspect concerns the revenue streams. Especially for their downstream customers, aggregators create a variety of benefits, from enabling new revenue streams of additional market access (e.g., [37,167]), to reduced imbalance costs (e.g., [158,173]) or reduced consumption costs from shifting load to off-peak times (e.g., [166,169]). However, it remains unclear for the most part how these benefits are shared between customers and the aggregator. Essentially all mentioned aggregators' revenue streams are based on variable components, only one paper mentions a fixed service fee [167]. This appears reasonable for the commodity-based activities around the provision of electricity given their cost-driven character. Yet, the value-driven activity of flexibility services might require different forms of remuneration, such as capacity payments for flexibility provision. The ownership of the electricity that aggregators buy or sell on behalf of their customers also remains unspecified.

4.3.7. Representative

Similar to aggregators, representatives are agents that represent an aggregate of client's resources and that act on the client's behalf in a market or in interaction with other agents. However, unlike aggregators, representatives always represent only the portfolio of a single client (see actor descriptions in Table 2 and Appendix C).

As shown in Fig. 13, the representative's value proposition is to increase the monetary benefits while balancing the individual customer's preferences. Customer segments for this BM includes prosumers and pure consumers. Representatives impersonate the active market role of their customer's EMS processing information from appliances, forecasts, and markets. Their key activity is to represent and optimise the customers' interaction with other peers and agents. The representative schedules and controls customers' appliances either directly [145,146] or through subordinate agents [90]. Overall, this BM is comparably asset-light, with key resources being primarily non-tangible such as the abilities to forecast, aggregate and control appliances, as well as to optimise bidding (see more detail and individual references in Table D.18).

Observations on representative BM: Representatives are facilitators of the interactions between two levels of actors. On the lower level are energy end-users (e.g., prosumer [141,145,176,177] or pure consumer [90,141,146,157]), whereas the upper level may include aggregators or grid operators [145], platform operator with any generic market [146,177], or a group of peers in P2P models [90,141]. Representatives generate financial benefits for their downstream customers by delivering a "secondary" value proposition to upstream actors. For instance, a localised flexibility service is delivered to a retailer using a pure consumer's assets, and, in return, financial gain is delivered to the asset owner. However, all reviewed papers lack a description of the financial structure of Representatives.

4.3.8. Retailer

Retailers are usually virtual entities within the local market that trade with local participants, buying electricity from generators and selling to consumers. The value proposition of retailers is centred around cost reduction using load shifting or innovative pricing strategies (e.g., time of use) and guaranteeing the security of supply in case the local market fails. Customer segments of retailers generally comprise both pure consumers and prosumers. Aggregators, grid operators,

and even autonomous trades with the Internet of Things entities, such as electric vehicles are also included in the TE model. In deciding whether the retailer's value proposition is agreeable, the prospective customers evaluate the expected cost-saving and the perceived discomfort (e.g., due to shifting energy use in time). There are various value delivery channels observed in the reviewed literature, although, in some cases, the retailer is a monopolistic supplier. Retailers can also participate in upstream markets (e.g., the wholesale market), optimising bidding strategies. In downstream markets, retailers may also be the local market operator and aggregator. To deliver their services, the retailers rely on several key resources and key partners as shown in Fig. 14.

The provided cost structure of retailer BMs in P2P and TE literature consists almost exclusively of variable OPEX. The reported costs concern the purchase of electricity on multiple markets or through bilateral negotiations, own generation costs, or transaction costs. The shape of the defined cost functions can vary from linear (e.g., for transaction costs) to quadratic. Finally, the studied research lacks detail on economies of scope and scale. Only one paper considers decreasing marginal costs for P2P through economies of scope (with and without storage). See Table D.19 for further detail and individual references.

Observations on retailer BM: Retailers are versatile actors, undertaking various vital activities and responsibilities from delivering the overall balancing to acting as a supplier of last resort [59,167,168]. In parallel, retailers often take somewhat hybrid roles, e.g., additionally acting as a grid operator [59,151,167,168], aggregator [78,148,167,168], or platform operator [167,168,178]. The regulatory compatibility of such a "super-actor" would require further analysis, especially for regulated activities or in a monopoly context. This, however, is not covered in the reviewed research. All reviewed retailers supply electricity and therefore run a commodity-based BM, both with regards to costs and revenues. However, the purchase or generation costs are often not described, resulting in cost and revenue stream composition inconsistencies [130,151]. Where described, the revenues are often equal to the costs and the reported BM would therefore represent a non-profit business case. Only one paper explicitly states that retailers will make a margin by selling at higher than purchase prices [78].

4.3.9. Grid operator

Unlike the other electricity market actors, a grid operator is typically a regulated body whose role is to own and operate the power system to guarantee a reliable electricity supply and universal network access [182,183]. This is a relatively passive business that mostly partners or customers to other actors. However, in some studies, the grid operator also takes an active role in LEMs to operate the electric network [112,119,120,161,166,168,174,179–181], to act as the local market operator [120,161,168,174,179,181], or as a retailer [55,112,168]. The value proposition of grid operators in LEMs includes ensuring the continuity of electricity supply and (where relevant) the provision of a platform and clearing of the LEM. Its key activities often bring increased monetary benefits for its customers, such as, for example, reduced costs for consuming parties, increased revenues for generating parties, or additional revenue streams for local flexibility providers.

Given the service role (of access and continuity), grid operators serve a particularly extensive portfolio of customer segments. Key partners are local platform operators if the grid operators themselves do not incorporate this role (see Fig. 15 for more details and Table D.20 for individual references).

Observations on grid operator BM: Most of the reviewed papers study the grid operator BM in the TE market; only one paper focuses on P2P. Moreover, the grid operator undertakes the role of a natural monopoly, where it owns and operates the electricity network [55,112,120,161,166,168,174,179–181]. Only Hu et al. [119] differentiate the owner and operator as distinct actors.

KEY PARTNERS	KEY ACTIVITIES	VALUE PROPOSITION	CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS	CUSTOMER SEGMENTS
Platform operator (4) Aggregator (2) Grid operator (1) None or not specified (1)	I. process information (7) on: status of devices (7), demand / generation forecast (4), market prices (2) II. actively represent and optimize customer (7) in: local market (2), interaction with peers (2), interaction with higher level agent (2), wholesale market (1) III. schedule and control customers appliances (7)	increased monetary benefits (6) through: reduced costs for consuming parties (6) enhanced revenues for generating parties (2) balancing monetary benefits with individual preferences (6): comfort (3) risk (1)	automated (6)	Prosumer (4) Pure consumers (4) Aggregator (1)
	KEY RESOURCES		CHANNELS	
	tangible ICT infrastructure (1), none or not specified (6)		evaluation individual preferences vs. monetary benefits (3), cost (2)	
	non-tang. appliance control ability (7), forecast ability (5), scheduling & bidding optimization ability (5), aggregation ability (3)		purchase through EMS (4) with: passive assignment (3), active bidding (1)	
	human none or not specified (7)		delivery commercial: indiv. EMS (5), physical: distribution grid (2)	
COST STRUCTURE		REVENUE STREAMS		
CAPEX	none or not specified (7)	fixed	none or not specified (7)	
OPEX	none or not specified (7)	variable	none or not specified (7)	

Fig. 13. The business model canvas of representatives as reviewed in literature. A total of 7 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in Table D.18.

KEY PARTNERS	KEY ACTIVITIES	VALUE PROPOSITION	CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS	CUSTOMER SEGMENTS
Other retailer (3) (as additional BRPs / BSPs) Grid operator (3) Pure generator (3) Platform operator (2) (wholesale and/or local market) Aggregator (1) Metering operator (1) None or not specified (1)	I. connect upstream & downstream market levels (6) to wholesale market (4) with aggregated customer bids (4) to other Retailers (2) II. run & clear local market (6), supply electricity (11), III. assume local balancing responsibility (5)	providing electricity at convenient rates (10) by activating DR (5) through innovative ToU tariffs (4) by utilizing own storage (2) security of supply (5) by serving as a balancing responsible and supplier of last resort platform provision and central intermediary for P2P market (3)	automated (11)	Prosumer (7) Pure consumers (4) Pure generators (2) Platform operator (1) (here: wholesale market) Grid operator (1) Aggregator (1)
	KEY RESOURCES		CHANNELS	
	tangible distribution grid (4), EMS & ICT infrastr. (3), generation assets (3), BESS (2)	enabling local flexibility from DR (2)	evaluation price (7), no evaluation (monopoly) (3), individual utility function (2)	
	non-tang. optimal bidding ability (7), market clearing and/or LMP calculation ability (6), aggregation ability (4)	purchasing electricity at convenient rates (1)	purchase passive assignment (6), active interaction (3)	
	human none or not specified (7)		delivery commercial: local market clearing (2), indiv. EMS (1), physical: distribution grid (7)	
COST STRUCTURE		REVENUE STREAMS		
CAPEX	ICT investment costs (1), none or not specified (10)	fixed	service fee (1), none or not specified (10)	
OPEX	cost for bought electricity at (7): - wholesale market price (4) - variable local market price (2) - fixed PPA or feed-in price (2) generation (fuel) costs (2), transaction costs (1), none or not specified (7)	variable	electricity sold (11): - times variable local market price (8) - times fixed retail price (3) avoided costs from active DR usage (1) none or not specified (2)	

Fig. 14. The business model canvas of retailers as reviewed in literature. A total of 11 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in Table D.19.

As previously noted, some papers combine additional services (e.g., local market operation, retailing with price arbitrage, etc.) with this BM. However, this is likely to cause regulatory challenges. For example, the unbundling and liberalisation of the electricity sector does not allow price arbitrage for grid operators in the European Union. Given that all customers are captively connected to the grid operator's network, such regulatory challenges must be carefully considered, being a gap in the present research. Additionally, the cost and revenue analysis related

to the actual grid operation (e.g., cost of key resources, such as ICT infrastructure) are also insufficiently detailed.

5. Discussion

Having discussed each individual BM, this section discusses some overarching observations, relevant to all of the presented BMs.




Fig. 15. The business model canvas of grid operators as reviewed in literature. A total of 11 associated papers were analysed for this actor. Numbers in parentheses behind individual features represent the number of references, more details in Table D.20.

5.1. Central role of prosumers

Prosumers are by far the most pronounced and present players in the LEM research reviewed in this work; they are the lead players in around 100 papers from the reviewed set of 135. As shown in Table 4, there is a clear, gradual increase in the complexity of various prosumer-led BMs: from simple (e.g., directly maximising one's use of own generation and trading with peers) to more complex arrangements (e.g., using an aggregator to coordinate the peer's trading in several markets). Accordingly, four distinct subcategories of prosumer BMs were identified. The more complex models are all structured around integrating additional value streams into the base BMs and collaborating with increasingly more actors as the business grows in the scope of engagement: from ultra-local self-consumption to transacting at the national level. Thus, the prosumer is the key and most innovative actor, bringing about many new value creation opportunities at different scoping levels.

Compared to the prosumers, the other actors often play a more auxiliary role in the reviewed papers. Nevertheless, these auxiliary roles (e.g., aggregators, retailers, etc.) are critical in enabling access to the decentralised energy market for most smaller players (e.g., prosumers, pure consumers, and generators). For instance, retailers often serve as the suppliers "of the last resort", assuring energy service availability, even when the parties of the decentralised energy trading infrastructure are unavailable.

It is interesting to note that the intermediary/facilitating actors could have a BM that sometimes fulfils a "super-actor" function (i.e., takes on several actor roles at once, for example, acting as an aggregator, retailer, and platform operator at the same time). Some models even include the grid operator into their generic BM setup. Clearly, the regulatory compliance of such super-actors is, at the very least, questionable, especially if an actor exerts a monopoly. However, these issues have not been considered in the reviewed research.

5.2. Differentiating P2P, CSC, and TE market models

While the individual BMCs show the customers and partners of each business type, this section considers the integrated perspective of for whom each company is a customer and partner to (note that this is not

a reciprocal relationship). Figs. 16–18 provide a visual representation of actor interactions in the different market models. Both the thickness of, and the numbers on the arrows indicate the number of mentions a business has in the reviewed literature as a customer or a partner to the linked business.

5.2.1. Parties to the CSC market model

Overall, the CSC model is the least studied and also has the least number of roles associated with it. Here the roles of pure generator, retailer, representative, and grid operator are not mentioned as active businesses in the reviewed literature, although they can be present as either passive or supporting parties (thus, their grey outlines in Fig. 16).

This model tends to operate with a reduced variety of actors. The main actors are prosumers who interact with each other in peer groups. Thus, the CSC model is designed to support the "many-support-many" context, i.e., many prosumers supporting each other with their excess generation and consumption. Platform operators often act as facilitators in these cases, especially for those markets that adopt an effectively passive energy sharing approach (instead of active energy trading). On the one hand, this is not surprising, as CSC is set up for the self-consumption of its members. On the other hand, it indicates that, to remain in a "pure" CSC form, such organisations must generate and consume all of their energy, as any shortage or surplus will require the broadening of the set of participating actor roles.

Looking at the figure for the total number of customer and partner relationships extracted from the presented analysis (and depicted in Fig. 16), one notes that this model is characterised by the interaction between three main kinds of actors:

- Prosumers (15 mentions) who serve as customers mainly to their peer-group prosumers;
- Pure consumers (7 mentions) who are also customers to their peer-group prosumers;
- Platform operators (7 mentions) who partner mainly with prosumers and storage operators.




Fig. 16. Actor relationships in reviewed CSC models.

5.2.2. Parties to the P2P market model

P2P has a clear focus on the end-user businesses of pure consumers and prosumers, with other roles such as aggregators only used sparsely.

Given that P2P models are characterised by many individual customers or prosumers that interact (in the majority) directly with each other, it appears that the “pure” P2P model is best suited for a “one-supports-one” trading context.

Fig. 17 also reveals that, within the P2P context, the pure consumer is not a very active business by itself (i.e., it does not have many customers of its own); however, it is a key customer for many other businesses.

Finally, while platform operators are also seen as an active business on their own, they are actually the most frequently referenced key partner for P2P businesses. This clearly demonstrates their crucial facilitation role in such models.

The figure for the total number of customer and partner relationships extracted from this analysis (and depicted in Fig. 17) shows that the P2P model is characterised by the interaction between five main kinds of actors (with other actors taking more minor roles):

- Prosumers (87 mentions) acting as customers mainly to their peer prosumers;
- Pure consumers (30 mentions), who serve as customers to the whole set of other market actors;
- Platform operators (33 mentions), who are close partners with prosumers as well as with all other market actors.
- Grid operators (28 mentions), who have a strong partnership with prosumers and also collaborate with the wider market participants.
- Retailers (18 mentions), who, again, have strong partnerships with prosumers and have a broader market engagement.

5.2.3. Parties to the TE market model

The TE model finally has the greatest variety of actors engaged with the most diverse interactions, as shown in Fig. 18. The diversity is higher than for P2P models, even though there were fewer TE papers (and therefore BMs) reviewed.

TE also has the highest presence of all the facilitator roles. The focus on prosumer is reduced here and the three actors that play a more important role are aggregators, grid operators and retailers. Aggregators are key partners to many businesses and have many customers of their own. This indicates that the TE model is best suited for a “many-support-one” context, e.g., when many distributed energy market actors support a single customer or service for each trading period. Grid operators and platform operators are the other key facilitators of the TE models.

The figure for the total number of customer and partner relationships extracted from the analysis (and depicted in Fig. 18) shows that the TE model is characterised by interactions between six main kinds of actors (with other actors taking more minor roles):

- Prosumers (42 mentions) acting as customers to their peer prosumers, aggregators, grid operators and other market actors;
- Pure consumers (27 mentions) who serve as customers to all market actors and specifically as major customers to aggregators;
- Pure generators (14 mentions) who are a major customers to the aggregators and also purchase from other market actors.
- Grid operators (16 mentions as a customer, 20 as a business partner) and aggregators (17 customer and 8 business partner mentions) who are mutually major customers and major business partners to each other, and also serve the broader market.
- Platform operators (31 mentions), with partnerships across all of the market actors.

To summarise, Table 5 provides a comparative overview of the identified actor relations in the three market models. Despite the absence




Fig. 17. Actor relationships in reviewed P2P models.




Fig. 18. Actor relationships in reviewed TE models.

Table 5
Identified actor relations across the three LEM models.

Actor category	P2P			CSC			TE		
	Actor presence	Customer mentions	Partner mentions	Actor presence	Customer mentions	Partner mentions	Actor presence	Customer mentions	Partner mentions
Prosumer	62	85	2	8	14	1	37	41	1
Pure consumer	14	29	1	2	6	1	3	27	0
Pure generator	5	3	3	0	0	0	5	11	3
Storage operator	5	4	1	3	2	1	3	5	0
Platform operator	12	2	31	6	2	5	12	4	27
Aggregator	8	1	7	2	0	0	21	17	8
Representative	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	1	2
Retailer	6	3	15	0	0	3	5	5	5
Grid operator	1	2	27	0	3	1	15	16	20

of a formal delimitation between P2P, CSC, and TE models, aggregated findings from the literature converge on the characterisations that:

- CSC models operate (groups of) peer prosumers and pure consumers acting as costumers to each other and in partnership with a platform operator.
- P2P models operate as (groups of) peer prosumers and pure consumers acting as costumers to each other and in partnership with platform operators, grid operators, and retailers.
- TE models operate as (groups of) prosumers, pure consumers, and pure generators acting as costumers to the aggregators and grid operators, and in partnership with platform operators, grid operators, and aggregators.

5.3. Under-specified business model elements

Another general observation from this study is that various models have different levels of detail in describing key elements of their business, but hardly any of them are complete.

5.3.1. Tangible and intangible assets

For instance, the tangible assets (e.g., PVs, consumption loads, etc.) are generally quite well described, especially for asset-based actors such as pure generators or prosumers.

The non-tangible assets, in contrast, are often lacking in detail if they are mentioned at all. For instance, the ICT services and infrastructure are essential for the communication and interaction with partners and customers. Most BMs also noted automated communication channels for interaction with their customers, which implies the use of ICT solutions. However, many models do not account for ICT resources, or even human resources, required for the BM operation. In short, the models reviewed in this study appear to be incomplete concerning their resource requirements.

5.3.2. Financial aspects

Another poorly described section of the BMs concerns the financial aspects. Both revenue streams and cost structures are often described in a rudimentary way, or not at all. In general, fixed operational costs (OPEX) are the least considered and only mentioned in sporadic cases. Investment costs (CAPEX) are noticed more, although still rarely. If any cost structure is given, it is usually about the variable OPEX such as fuel costs or electricity purchase costs. Specific costs for transactions, trading, or supporting services remain mostly unspecified.

Similarly, the revenue side remains, for the most part, rudimentary. For this, the most common cash flows in the reviewed models stem from the sale of electricity or flexibility services. More specific or detailed revenue streams that are not based on the direct sale of the commodity, such as potential community services, are not specified. There is also a lack of fixed component revenues (e.g., fees for subscription to ICT

platform services, etc.). Therefore, from a financial point of view, some actors do not have any evidence for a viable business case. For instance, it seems that most of the Platform Operator providers would operate on a pro-bono basis.

In short, while the literature review undertaken in this study allows to define the types and key components of the BMs reported upon in the reviewed research, the lack, or poor quality, of reported information prevents an ascertainment of their financial viability and suitability for practical operation.

5.3.3. Regulatory context

The reviewed literature concerns original proposals from a theoretical and technical perspective, hence they can be considered merely proposals rather than BMs ready to be exploited. Compliance with the applicable regulation is a fundamental first step to enable the exploitation of the identified BMs in real-life contexts. However, at more than 75%, the majority of reviewed papers lack an explicit discussion of the regulatory implications even if regulatory innovations appear necessary to enable the original BM proposed. Few of the reviewed papers explicitly address the regulatory topic by aligning their proposals with existing regulation [57,76,129,164,172,176,179]. An additional limited number go a step further to not only align their proposal, but also discuss the policy implications and regulatory gaps and barriers that arise from the applied regulation. The vast majority of this body of literature addresses regulation in a European context [28, 37,55,61,68,79,80,84,109,118,139,144,160,167], while only a limited number do so in a North-American context [75,87,114,161], an African context [63,132], or an Asian context [94]. No reviewed paper engaged with regulatory aspects in a Latin-American context. This is unfortunate as LEMs are particularly relevant for areas where security of supply and universal access to electricity are still development goals to be achieved [64].

Within the regulatory topics mentioned, the topics of responsibilities and opportunities of market participation (see e.g., [37,80,139]), grid cost allocation (see e.g., [75,87]) and dedicated incentive schemes to support DERs integration (see e.g., [68,164]) prevail. However, while these papers address some main regulatory topics, this does not mean that the individual proposals actually comply with all applicable regulation within any given country. Thus, the full regulatory compliance of the proposed models remains unclear.

The potential real-life deployment of the proposed BMs from the reviewed papers requires a dedicated regulatory assessment. Some recent literature addresses the emerging regulatory framework on deployment of collective self-consumption, P2P trading, and energy communities (e.g., [21,46,184]). The interplay of innovative regulatory aspects with emerging BM opportunities, however, has been explored only by a very few authors so far, for example by Müller and Welpé [8] in the context of storage operation at community level. While the identification of specific policy implications of the identified BMs and vice versa the analysis of emerging opportunities from recent regulation development

is out of this paper's scope, this represents future research for working groups that will leverage the outcome of the research described in this paper.

5.4. Study limitations and threats to validity

While undertaking this study, a number of limitations and potential threats to the study validity have been noted. The most significant limitation is in having to set a cut of date for new research inclusion. This was set to March 2020. Yet, given that LEMs is a vibrant research area, an ever increasing volume of published research is recognised. Thus, the most recent work will be missed from this paper and some of our conclusions may not relate to such recent publications. The presented conclusions, however, remain valid for the reviewed period.

Construct Validity: At present, the notions of P2P, CSC, and TE models are not clearly defined and so are not always consistently used in the current literature. There are also no mutually accepted guidelines for differentiating these market models. Consequently, this paper's search and categorisation process included all papers where authors self-defined their work as belonging to one of these categories. The reliance on such self-categorisation was not deemed to be a serious threat to the construct validity. This is because one of the key objectives of this study is to delineate the differentiating features of such BMs, as perceived by the publishing research community itself.

Coding BMs against the nine elements of the BMC was arguably the most difficult judgement to make because, at times, researchers had to rely on their own interpretation of implicit implications (e.g., often trading platforms may not be explicitly mentioned as a resource, yet these are essential for undertaking any electricity trade). To enable consistent coding, an initial independent coding and subsequent discussion of a test paper was carried out by all researchers, which helped to improve the general understanding and agreement across the coders. As a subsequent validation, all coded content was second-checked per element (for each of the nine BMC elements) for relevance by another checker. Additionally, while undertaking data analysis and report writing, another (third) researcher revisited the papers where the reported BM elements were unclear or were deemed to be missing contextual detail.

Internal Validity: Although the good practice guidelines for systematic literature reviews were followed [47], no explicit measure of the publication quality was constructed; instead it was opted to include only articles published in peer-reviewed journals. By making this decision, quality checks were implicitly deferred to the anonymous peers. Given that reputable journals tend to maintain good peer review practices, such an implicit quality check was considered to be acceptable. This, however, also introduced a selection constraint (e.g., by disregarding papers published at conferences), which is a threat to the external validity of the study findings.

External Validity: As previously noted, included papers were limited to only journal publications, and the search was also limited to two databases. Neither was there any snowballing conducted. Although enhancing replicability, this limits the external validity of the findings. However, the used databases are commonly considered to be the main sources for business and energy-related publications. Consequently, although a representative body of literature on energy markets is captured in this study, the conclusions drawn here may not be generalisable across the board.

6. Conclusions

Local energy markets receive an increasing interest in academic research as they are considered to be a fundamental building block of the ongoing energy transition. While much attention focuses on the transition of the overall system with its respective market perspective,

considerably little attention focuses on the individual actor with its business model perspective.

As the novel contribution to the work on local energy markets, the systematic literature review presented in this paper identifies market actors and outlines their business models in peer-to-peer, community self-consumption, and transactive energy market models. The review identified 221 active business options out of a total of 135 peer-reviewed journal papers and analysed them by utilising the business model canvas framework. Nine macro actor business categories were identified across the three local energy market types.

While prosumers appear to be by far the most mentioned actors across all reviewed market models, pure consumers, pure generators, and storage operators are identified as additional grid-connected actors with varying presence. Platform operators, aggregators, and representatives constitute the three macro-categories of facilitating actors, complemented by retailers and grid operators.

Based on the reviewed research, this paper outlines the emerging business models of the identified key actors. For each of the nine actors, a synthetic business model is derived, and key elements, peculiarities, and gaps are discussed. In general, the reviewed papers focus on such activities as information exchange, optimisation of the generating or consuming resources, and coordination of the actors' behaviour. The presented review points out the need for enhanced discussion on underlying resources such as information and communication technologies to enable the main business activities. Furthermore, it highlights the lack of a deep analysis of the financial aspects of the business activities, leaving the financial viability of the reported business models under a question mark.

The derived business models are generic models from academic literature that engage in their conceptions at most with individual elements of regulation. Due to the great diversity of the regulatory landscape, their compliance or necessary adaptations to legal framework conditions in different geographical locations remain to be examined. As revealed by this review, such is especially the case for regions where security of supply and universal access to electricity are a development goal yet to be reached. Recognising the importance of regulatory analysis for emerging business models, this paper encourages future research on the assessment of regulatory framework, gaps, and barriers from different geographical areas. Particularly, the interaction of emerging business models and regulative development is a key point to leverage the outcome of the research activities described in this paper.¹

Furthermore, the three market models are differentiated in accordance with their business actor interactions. Prosumers appear to be both the most cited actor as well as the central actor for all three market models. The presence of and interactions with the other actors vary for the three market models. Peer-to-peer models appear to be constructed around the interaction of prosumers with other prosumers and pure consumers in particular. Community self-consumption models add to these platform operators as key facilitators and partners. Finally, transactive energy market models appear even further diversified with both platform operators and especially aggregators becoming key facilitators, and grid operators acting as active businesses.

In summary, this review provides an overview of the emerging key actors in local energy markets, how they interact and how their business models are expected to operate. While many opportunities for further research remain (some of which were already noted in the previous sections), the following three are particularly noteworthy:

¹ In fact, the international research group of the IEA's Global Observatory on P2P, CSC, and TE models, to which the authors adhere, will shift its focus in the next stage of the project from academic literature to pilot project implementations. Existing barriers, challenges, and opportunities for large-scale implementations of the named local energy market models are thereby one of the key research objectives.

- As previously noted, publications post March 2020 are outside of the scope of this review. However, due to the high speed of content generation around local energy markets, the data set that matches the initial search terms has almost doubled since the research cut-off date. This will remain an issue for all literature review papers. Thus, building a dashboard based on this research that would automate data extraction and categorisation from literature could help keep a more up-to-date overview of the published models and data.
- The research published on local energy markets is almost entirely theoretical. There is a severe lack of empirical evidence and reports on such market trials to demonstrate the practicability and profitability of the proposed models. Therefore, addressing this gap in research by reporting on the empirical results of ongoing or recently completed pilot projects is an immediate priority for future work.
- Future research can leverage the outcome of this paper to formulate business models for local energy markets that reflect more comprehensively on realistic conditions in real-life settings, especially by incorporating policy and regulatory components. By doing so, the created business models themselves could contribute, in return, to inform policymakers of practical policy implications, leading to a more aligned development towards a sustainable future.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

J.M. Schwidtal: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. **P. Piccini:** Formal analysis, Investigation, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. **M. Troncia:** Formal analysis, Investigation, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. **R. Chitchyan:** Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. **M. Montakhabi:** Formal analysis, Investigation, Validation, Writing – original draft. **C. Francis:** Formal analysis, Investigation, Visualization, Writing – original draft. **A. Gorbacheva:** Conceptualization, Investigation, Methodology, Project Administration, Validation, Writing – review & editing. **T. Capper:** Conceptualization, Investigation, Methodology, Project Administration, Validation, Writing – review & editing. **M.A. Mustafa:** Investigation, Validation, Writing – review & editing. **M. Andoni:** Investigation, Validation. **V. Robu:** Investigation, Validation, Writing – review & editing. **M. Bahloul:** Investigation, Validation. **I.J. Scott:** Investigation, Validation. **T. Mbavarira:** Investigation. **J.M. España:** Investigation. **L. Kiesling:** Investigation.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

The completed data extraction table which formed the basis of the analysis presented in this paper is available at <https://doi.org/10.48420/16930768>.

Acknowledgements

This publication is part of the work of the Global Observatory on Peer-to-Peer, Community Self-Consumption and Transactive Energy Models (GO-P2P), a task of the User-Centred Energy Systems Tech-

nology Collaboration Programme (Users TCP), under the auspices of the International Energy Agency. GO-P2P benefits from the support of Australia, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and United States. GO-P2P is also supported by the EPSRC EnergyREV project EnergyREV (EP/S031863/1).

The author Ruzanna Chitchyan received funding from the EPSRC project Refactoring Energy Systems (EP/R007373/1).

The author Mehdi Montakhabi received funding from the Flemish Government through the FWO SBO project SNIPPET S007619.

The author Anna Gorbacheva received funding from the EPSRC Centre for Doctoral Training in Energy Demand (LoLo), grant numbers EP/L01517X/1 and EP/H009612/1

The author Timothy Capper received financial support from the EPSRC (grant number EP/L016141/1) through the Power Networks Centre for Doctoral Training.

The author Mustafa A. Mustafa received funding from the EPSRC through the project EnnCore EP/T026995/1, Flemish Government through the FWO SBO project SNIPPET S007619, and The University of Manchester through DKO Fellowship.

The author Mohamed Bahloul would like to acknowledge the support of the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications (DECC) received for the “International Energy Agency Task Go-P2P” project. The authors would like to thank Nicola Sorrentino for his helpful contribution in the early stages of this work.

Appendix A. Data extraction codebook

This study developed a data extraction table which was used to consistently extract data from each paper in the review. The data extraction table is based on the business model canvas framework [10] and defined 16 data extraction fields for the nine business model elements. For more details on the data extraction process see Section 3.2. Details about how to access the full data extraction table are available in the section data availability. Table A.6 contains the codebook for the data extraction table. The codebook contains a list of all data extraction fields, the BMC element they are related to and a description of the data required.

Appendix B. HRM role definitions

The following definitions stem from the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). They are part of a wider set of definitions from their harmonised electricity market roles (HRM) [49] (see Table B.7).

Appendix C. Identified actor characterisation

The following table reports the macro-actor characterisations that were derived by mapping extracted BMs from reviewed literature to HRM roles. Each actor covers per definition a minimum combination of such roles and, depending on the actual BM configuration, a potentially extended set of roles (see Table C.8).

Appendix D. Detailed actor's business models per market model

See Tables D.9–D.20.

Table A.6

Data extraction codebook.

BM element	Data extraction field	Description
Value proposition	Value proposition	What is the value proposition of the business for each of their customer segments, i.e., what service or product does the business offer to its customers? What problem is it trying to solve? Which customer needs are satisfied?
Customer segments	Customer segments	Which are the groups of target customers of this business, i.e., who is the business trying to sell to?
Customer relationships	Customer relationships	Type of relationships a business establishes with specific customer segments, e.g. personal assistance vs. automated services vs. self-service vs. communities vs. co-creation.
Channels	Evaluation channels	How can customers evaluate the business' value proposition, i.e., how do customers choose which product or service to buy?
	Purchase channels	How can customers purchase the business' value proposition, i.e., how do customers indicate to the business that they want their product or service?
	Delivery channels	How is the business' value proposition delivered to the customers, i.e., how does the businesses' product or service reach to its customer?
Key activities	Key activities	The choreography of the business, i.e., what activities must the business undertake to deliver its value proposition and in what order. Production? Problem solving? Platform/network operation?
Key resources	Tangible resources	Physical assets of individual business that are key to provide its value proposition, e.g. solar panels, batteries, etc.
	Non-tangible resources	Non-physical assets of individual business that are key to provide its value proposition, e.g. an ability to forecast supply and demand, algorithms, software, patents, etc.
	Human resources	People with specific skills which are required by the business to provide its value proposition, e.g. does the business require a home owner to manually bid within a market.
Key partner	Key partner	What other business could this business not deliver its value proposition without. Key Partners? Key suppliers? And what are they doing?
Cost structure	CAPEX	What investment costs must the business pay to provide its value proposition?
	Fixed OPEX	What operating costs does the business incur to provide its value proposition which do not vary with output?
	Variable OPEX	What operating costs does the business incur to provide its value proposition which do vary with output?
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues	Revenues from value proposition based on static variables, e.g. licensing or subscription fees.
	Variable revenues	Revenues from value proposition based on dynamic variables, e.g. sales with changing prices based on market conditions.

Table B.7

Definitions of the harmonised electricity market roles from ENTSO-E [49].

Harmonised role	Definition
Billing Agent	The party responsible for invoicing a concerned party
Consumer	A party that consumes electricity. Additional Information: This is a type of "Party connected to the grid"
Data Provider	A party that has a mandate to provide information to other parties in the energy market
Energy Supplier	An Energy Supplier supplies electricity to or takes electricity from a "Party connected to the grid" at an accounting point
Energy Trader	A party that is selling or buying energy
LFC Operator	Responsible for the Load Frequency Control (LFC) for its LFC Area or LFC Block Additional information: This role is typically performed by a TSO
Market Information Aggregator	A party that provides market related information that has been compiled from the figures supplied by different actors in the market. This information may also be published or distributed for general use. Note: The Market Information Aggregator may receive information from any market participant that is relevant for publication or distribution.
Market Operator	A market operator is a party that provides a service whereby the offers to sell electricity are matched with bids to buy electricity. Additional Information: This usually is an energy/power exchange or platform. The definition is based on the "Regulation (European Union) 2019/943"
Merit Order List Responsible	Responsible for the management of the available tenders for all Acquiring LFC Operators to establish the order of the reserve capacity that can be activated
Party Connected to the Grid	A party that contracts for the right to consume or produce electricity at an Accounting Point
Producer	A party that generates electricity. Additional information: This is a type of "Party connected to the grid". The definition is based on the "Directive (European Union) 2019/944"
Reserve Allocator	Informs the market of reserve requirements, receives bids against requirements and in compliance with the prequalification criteria, determines which bids meet the requirements and assigns bids
Resource Aggregator	A party that aggregates resources for usage by a service provider for energy market services. Note: In the current version, the only service provider in HRM is the Balancing Service Provider
Resource Provider	A role that manages a resource and provides production/consumption schedules for it, if required
Scheduling Area Responsible	A party responsible for the coordination of nominated volumes within a scheduling area. Additional information: This role is typically performed by a TSO
System Operator	A party responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance of and, if necessary, developing the system in a given area and, where applicable, its interconnections with other systems and for ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the distribution of transmission of electricity. Additional information: The definition is based on "Directive 2009/72/EC"

Table C.8

Derived actor characterisations based on HRM roles.

Actor	Minimum combination of HRM roles	Potential combination of HRM roles	Characterisation	Associated synonyms in literature
Prosumer	Party Connected to the Grid, Producer, Consumer	Party Connected to the Grid, Producer, Consumer, Resource Provider, Energy Supplier, Energy Trader (& BRP, CRP, BSP, PRP)	A Prosumer is an entity which is connected to the grid and that injects and withdraws energy at the same grid connection point. It is characterised by a bidirectional electricity flow based on generating, consuming and storing assets at its grid connection point. The operation of its assets can either be done by the Prosumer itself or further delegated to a third party. Prosumers exist in various dimensions from electric vehicles to residential households, over commercial buildings up to microgrids interacting with other microgrids	Residential Prosumer, Commercial Prosumer, Electric Vehicle, Energy Node, Microgrid Grid-Edge Resource
Pure Consumer	Party Connected to the Grid, Consumer	Party Connected to the Grid, Consumer, Resource Provider, Energy Supplier, Energy Trader (& BRP, BSP, CRP)	A Pure Consumer is an entity connected to the grid which possesses and potentially operates its own assets to consume electricity. Storage assets can also be among such assets, as long as they are only used to shift consumption without reinjecting electricity into the grid. A Pure Consumer is therefore characterised by a unidirectional withdrawing of electricity flow at its grid connection point	Consumer, Customer, End user, Household
Pure Generator	Party Connected to the Grid, Producer	Party Connected to the Grid, Producer, Resource Provider, Energy Supplier, Energy Trader (& BRP, BSP, PRP)	A Pure Generator is an entity connected to the grid which possesses and potentially operates its own assets to generate electricity. It is thereby characterised by a predominately unidirectional flow, which injects electricity at its grid connection point	Distributed Generators, Generators, Producer, Seller
Storage Operator	Party Connected to the Grid, Resource Provider, Energy Supplier, Energy Trader (& BRP, BSP)		A storage operator is an entity connected to the grid which possesses and operates its own assets to store electricity. It neither generates nor consumes energy (except minor process losses), yet it buys, keeps for a time, and then sells energy to the local market at different points in time. It is thereby characterised by a bidirectional electricity flow at its grid connection point	Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) owner, BESS operator, Battery storage operator, Gas energy storage system
Platform Operator	Market Information Aggregator, Data Provider	Market Information Aggregator, Data Provider, Billing Agent, Market Operator, Energy Supplier	An Platform Operator is an entity which operates a platform for energy trading or sharing. It is not connected to the grid and does not own any relevant generation or consumption assets, although it facilitates the exchange among them. This activity can encompass the mere provision of the platform, or it can also conduct more active tasks such as market clearing and the subsequent billing. In some cases, the Platform Operator will also be responsible for supplying the cleared energy to local participants, hence taking over the role of a local supplier	Local Market Operator, Community Manager, Coordinator, Crowdsourced Energy System Operator, Microgrid Operator, Transactive Energy Operator, Virtual Energy Company
Aggregator	Resource Provider, Resource Aggregator	Resource Provider, Resource Aggregator, Energy Supplier, Energy Trader (& BRP, BSP, CRP, PRP)	An Aggregator is a virtual entity, not physically connected to the grid, which acts on behalf of a variable group of parties connected to the grid (or their representatives). Aggregators manage the combination of their clients' individual assets as one virtually aggregated asset, with various levels of activity on a potentially plurality of markets. As such, and in the simplest case, they can represent one type of actor with one unidirectional offering (e.g., as a load aggregator for a number of Pure Consumers) up to a diverse number of actors with a diverse portfolio of controllable and non-controllable assets with bidirectional needs and offerings on multiple markets (commodity and services) in more advanced cases	Demand Response Aggregator, Load Aggregator, Micro Grid Energy Manager, Virtual Power Plant, Commercial Aggregator, Flexibility Service Provider
Representative	Resource Provider or Energy Supplier, Energy Trader	Resource Provider, Energy Supplier, Energy Trader (& BRP, BSP, CRP, PRP)	A Representative is a virtual entity, not physically connected to the grid, which acts on behalf of a single party connected to the grid. Representatives manage (the potential combination of) their clients' individual asset(s) towards a potential plurality of traders (such as Retailers or Aggregators) or market platforms with varying products or services depending on each client's preferences and asset capabilities. Other than Aggregators, they always represent only one single client. A common example of Representatives are home energy management systems	Agent, Broker, Building Energy Management System (BEMS), Home Energy Management System (HEMS), Local Intelligent Software Agent, Domotic Node

(continued on next page)

Table C.8 (continued).

Actor	Minimum combination of HRM roles	Potential combination of HRM roles	Characterisation	Associated synonyms in literature
Retailer	Energy Supplier, Energy Trader	Energy Supplier, Energy Trader, Resource Provider, Producer, Party connected to the grid	A Retailer is usually a virtual entity, not physically connected to the grid, which does not own any physical assets. It buys and sells energy to the individual clients, and in exchange for Platform Operators, rather than either generating or consuming energy. Retailers often connect markets of different levels, e.g., the local market with an overarching wholesale market. In some exceptional cases, they also own generation assets and so are an actual party connected to the grid, in parallel to their virtual trader and supplier role	Local Energy Company, Load Serving Entity, Utility company, Supplier
Grid Operator	System operator	System operator, Scheduling Area Responsible, LFC operator, Merit Order List Responsible, Reserve Allocator	A grid operator is an entity that manages, develops, and maintains the electricity or gas network for a specific territory. Such management can range from the mere infrastructure provision to a rather passive management style by only flagging potential resource scheduling issues up to an active grid management with reserve provision and deployment	Distribution Network Operator, Distribution System Operator, Distribution Independent System Operator, Independent System Operator, System Operator

Table D.9

Detailed business model elements with references of reviewed prosumers (peer-peer) in local energy markets.

Prosumer peer-peer			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	- providing electricity [28,37,50,53,54,59–61,63,65,67,74,75,77,78,80,82,84–87,94,95,107]^a - at more convenient rates (e.g. than wholesale market) [54,59,61,86,94,95] - at auctioned local market price (no comparison to other markets) - providing flexibility [64,72] - through demand response (incl. EVs & battery) - through dispatchable generation - providing reactive power [84]		- providing electricity [28,107,113,116,126]^a - at more convenient rates (e.g. than wholesale market) [113,116] - at auctioned local market price (no comparison to other markets) - providing flexibility [114] - through demand response (incl. EVs & battery) - through dispatchable generation
Customer segments	- Prosumer [28,37,50,54,59–61,63–65,67,72,74,75,77,78,82,84–86,95,107]^a - Pure Consumer [53,80,84,85,87,94,95]		Prosumer [28,107,113,114,116,126]^a
Customer relationships	automated [28,37,50,53,59–61,65,67,72,74,75,77,78,80,82,84–87,94,107]^a		automated [28,107,113,116,126]^a
Channels	Evaluation: - price [28,50,53,54,59–61,63,67,72,74,75,77,78,80,82,85–87,94,107]^a - availability [61,64,94,95] - personal preferences (e.g. energy source, autarky, etc.) [87,95] Purchase: - through interaction with P2P marketplace [37,50,59,60,63–65,67,72,74,75,77,80,82,85,86,94,107]^a - through bargaining of representatives [54,61,78,87] - through passive assignment from retailer [53] Delivery: - physically: through the distribution grid [50,59–61,63–65,72,85–87,94,107]^a - commercially: through P2P platform [53,67,75,77,85–87,94]		Evaluation: - price [28,107,113,114,116,126]^a Purchase: - through TE platform [107,113,114,116]^a Delivery: - physically: through the distribution grid [107,113,114,116]^a
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [28,37,50,53,54,59–61,63–65,67,72,74,75,77,78,80,82,84–87,94,95,107]^a Variable revenues: - electricity sold [28,50,53,54,59–61,63,64,67,74,75,77,80,84–87,94,95,107]^a - times local market price [50,61,67,85–87,95] - times auction price [28,54]^a - times bilaterally agreed price [53,59,64,94] - times fixed feed-in tariff [63,85] - flexibility sold [72]		Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [28,107,113,114,116,126]^a Variable revenues: - electricity sold [28,107,113,114,116,126]^a - times local market price [114] - times auction price [28]^a - times bilaterally agreed price [113]
Key partners	- Platform Operators [28,54,60,61,65,72,85,87,107]^a - blockchain platform [60,65,72] - Grid Operators [64,65,75,84,86,87,107]^a - Retailer [53,59,78,85,86,95] - Aggregator [80] - none or not specified [37,50,63,67,74,77,82]		- Platform Operator [28,107]^a - Grid Operators [107,113]^a - Retailer [113] - none or not specified [114,116,126]

(continued on next page)

Table D.9 (continued).

Prosumer peer-peer			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Key resources	Tangible: • Generation assets [28,37,50,53,54,59–61,63–65,67,72,74,75,77,78,80,82,84–87,94,95,107]^a – PV [28,53,54,59–61,63,64,67,72,77,78,80,84–87,95]^a – conventional [59,72] • BESS [28,59,63,64,67,72,77,84–86,95]^a – stationary [28,59,63,64,77,84–86,95]^a – non-stationary (EVs) [28,59]^a • Loads [28,37,50,53,54,59–61,64,65,67,72,74,75,77,78,80,85,94,107]^a – controllable (e.g. HVAC, household appliances etc.) [28,72,75,77,78]^a – non-controllable [28,59,72,75,78]^a • ICT infrastructure (e.g. sensor, smart meters etc.) [80,87,94] Non-tangible: • ability to forecast own demand and or generation [50,54,60,61,63,67,72] • ability to actively interact with market [60,74,86,107]^a • ability to optimise proprietary operations [59,72] • ability to interact with blockchain [60,63,65] • ability to communicate with other peers in the network [59,60] Human: • none or not specified [28,37,50,53,54,59–61,63–65,67,72,74,75,77,78,80,82,84–87,94,95,107]^a		Tangible: • Generation assets [28,107,113,114,116,126]^a – PV [28,114,116,126]^a – conventional [113,116] • BESS [28,116]^a – stationary [28,116]^a – non-stationary (EVs) [28]^a • Loads [28,107,113,114,116]^a – controllable (e.g. HVAC, household appliances etc.) [28]^a – non-controllable [28,114,116]^a Non-tangible: • ability to forecast own demand and or generation [116] • ability to actively interact with market [107,113,114,116,126]^a • ability to optimise proprietary operations [113] Human: • none or not specified [28,107,113,114,116,126]^a
Key activities	• supply and demand management [28,37,50,53,54,59–61,63–65,67,72,74,75,77,78,80,84–87,94,95,107]^a – forecast own demand and or generation [50,54,60,61,63,67,72] – produce electricity [28,37,50,53,54,59–61,63–65,67,72,74,75,77,78,80,84–87,94,95,107]^a – schedule own load and generation profile [59,63,72] • price management [28,50,54,63,72,74,82,107]^a • trade electricity [28,50,53,54,59–61,63,67,72,74,77,80,82,107]^a		• supply and demand management [28,107,113,114,116,126]^a – forecast own demand and or generation [116,126] – produce electricity [28,107,113,114,116,126]^a • price management [116,126] • trade electricity [28,107,113,114,116,126]^a
Cost structure	CAPEX: – investment costs [53,63,64,85,86,95] – of PV [53,63,64,85,86] – of BESS [63,64,85,86] • none or not specified [28,37,50,54,59–61,65,67,72,74,75,77,78,80,82,84,87,94,107]^a Fixed OPEX: • maintenance costs [53,67] • none or not specified [28,37,50,54,59–61,63–65,72,74,75,77,78,80,82,84–87,94,95,107]^a Variable OPEX: • generation (fuel) costs for non-renewables [59] • consumption costs for not self-generated electricity [59,85] • operation (degradation) costs of BESS [59,65] • transaction costs [53,72,85] • grid related costs [75,84] • none or not specified [28,37,50,54,60,61,63,64,67,74,77,78,80,82,86,87,94,95,107]^a		CAPEX: • investment costs of PV [114] • none or not specified [28,107,113,116,126]^a Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [28,107,113,114,116,126]^a Variable OPEX: • generation (fuel) costs for non-renewables [113,116] • consumption costs for not self-generated electricity [113,116] • operation (degradation) costs of BESS [116] • grid related costs [113,116] • none or not specified [28,107,114,126]^a

^aEntry refers to a paper that contains more than one energy market model.

Table D.10

Detailed business model elements with references of reviewed prosumers (peer-group) in local energy markets.

Prosumer peer-group			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	• providing electricity [54,62,68,74,104,106,108]^a – at more convenient rates (e.g. than wholesale market) [54,68,104,106,108]^a • providing flexibility [62,66,108]^a – through Demand Response (inc. EVs & battery) [66,108]^a	• providing electricity [37,104,106,108–110]^a – at more convenient rates (e.g. than wholesale market) [37,104,106,108,110]^a • providing flexibility [108,109]^a – through Demand Response (inc. EVs & battery) [108,109]^a	• providing electricity [119,130,135] – at more convenient rates (e.g. than wholesale market) [130,135] • providing flexibility [119,120,130] – through Demand Response (inc. EVs & battery) [120,130] • – short time dispatch [119,130]

(continued on next page)

Table D.10 (continued).

Prosumer peer-group			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Customer segments	- Prosumer [54,62,66,74,104,106,108]^a - Pure Consumer [68,104,106,108]^a	- Prosumer [37,104,106,108–110]^a - Pure Consumer [104,106,108]^a - Platform Operator (<i>wholesale market</i>) [110]	- Prosumer [130,135] - Aggregator [119,120] - selling to DSO (Grid Operator) [120] - selling to TSO (Grid Operator) [119] - Retailer [130]
Customer relationships	- automated [62,66,74,104,106,108]^a - community [54] - contractual [68] - Anonymous [104]^a	- automated [37,104,106,108,110]^a - community [110] - anonymous [104]^a - not discussed [109]	automated [119,120,130,135]
Channels	Evaluation: - price [54,66,68,74,106,108]^a - personal preferences [62] - no evaluation (once subscribed) [104]^a Purchase: - through active interaction and continuous bidding [54,62,66,74] - through passive assignment from community once signed up [68,74,104,106,108]^a Delivery: - physically through the grid [54,62,66,68,104,106,108]^a - commercially through: - community [68,104,106,108]^a - individual EMS [68] - P2P market clearing [54] - not discussed [74]	Evaluation: - price [106,108–110]^a - community preferences [109,110] - no evaluation [37,104]^a (once subscribed) [104]^a (once physically connected) [37] Purchase: - through passive assignment from community once signed up [104,106,108–110]^a - not specified [37] Delivery: - physically through the grid [37,104,106,108–110]^a - commercially through community [104,106,108,110]^a	Evaluation: - price [119,120,130,135] Purchase: - through active interaction and continuous bidding [130] - through passive assignment from community once signed up [135] - not specified [119,120] Delivery: - physically through the grid [119,120,130,135] - commercially through transactive market clearing: - with Aggregator [119,120,135] - with platform operator [130]
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [54,62,66,68,74,104,106,108]^a Variable revenues: - electricity sold times local clearing price [54,68,74,104,106,108]^a - reduced costs for electricity consumed [54,66,108]^a - none or not specified [62]	Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [37,104,106,108–110]^a Variable revenues: - electricity sold times local clearing price [37,104,106,108,110]^a - reduced costs for electricity consumed [108]^a - none or not specified [109]	Fixed revenues: - electricity sold times fixed ToU price of grid [135] - none or not specified [119,120,130] Variable revenues: - flexibility sold to Aggregator [119,120] - times local flex clearing price [119] - unclear at which price or how remunerated [120] - electricity sold times local clearing price [130,135] - reduced costs for electricity consumed [130,135]
Key partners	- other Prosumers (in same coalition) [54] - Grid Operator [68,106]^a - Retailer (as retailer of last resort) [68] - Platform Operator [66,104,108]^a - none or not specified [62,74]	- Grid Operator [106]^a - Retailer (as retailer of last resort) [37,109] - Platform Operator [104,108,110]^a	- Aggregator [135] - Grid Operator (to approve local network feasibility) [119,130,135] - Platform Operator [130] - none or not specified [120]
Key resources	Tangible: - Generation [54,62,68,74,104,106,108]^a - PV [54,62,68,104,106,108]^a - BESS [54,62,66,108]^a - stationary [54,62,66,108]^a - non-stationary (EVs) [66] - Distribution grid [68] - ICT infrastructure (e.g. controller, meter) [68,106]^a Non-tangible: - ability to determine optimal bidding [74] - ability to optimise own consumption (EMS) [66,68] - none or not specified [54,62,104,106,108]^a Human: - none or not specified [54,62,66,68,74,104,106,108]^a	Tangible: - Generation [37,104,106,108–110]^a - PV [37,104,106,108,109]^a - conventional generation [110] - stationary BESS [108,109]^a - Loads - controllable [110] - non-controllable [37] - Distribution grid [37] - ICT infrastructure (e.g. controller, meter) [37,106]^a Non-tangible: - ability to perform the actions of a retailer [37] - none or not specified [104,106,108–110]^a Human: - none or not specified [37,104,106,108–110]^a	Tangible: - Generation [130,135] - PV [130,135] - wind turbine [130] - conventional generation [130] - BESS - stationary [120,130,135] - non-stationary (EVs) [119,120,130,135] - Loads - controllable [120,130] - non-controllable [130,135] - ICT infrastructure (e.g. controller, meter) [119,135] Non-tangible: - ability to determine optimal bidding [120,130] - EMS [120,135] - none or not specified [119] Human: - none or not specified [119,120,130,135]

(continued on next page)

Table D.10 (continued).

Prosumer peer-group			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Key activities	1. forecast own generation and consumption [54,66] 2. join local market [54,104,106]^a 3. exchange information with other actors [54,66] 4. interact with market • with optimised bidding [54,62,66,74] • with passive communication of surplus/net-demand of electricity [68,104]^a 5. generate electricity [54,62,68,74,104,106,108]^a 6. operate own controllable assets [54,62] • according to self-optimisation [54,62,108]^a • according to central optimisation [108]^a 7. clear local market [54] 8. buy (supplemental) electricity from other Prosumers [54,62,104,106]^a	1. install required infrastructure [37] 2. join local market [104,106]^a 3. exchange information with other actors [37,110] 4. interact with market • with passive communication of surplus/net-demand of electricity [104]^a • with communication of cost function [110] 5. generate electricity [37,104,106,108–110]^a 6. operate own controllable assets [108–110]^a • according to self-optimisation [109] • according to central-optimisation [108–110]^a 7. buy (supplemental) electricity • from other Prosumers [104,106]^a • from Retailer [37]	1. join local market [119] 2. exchange information with other actors [120,135] 3. interact with market • with optimised bidding [120,130] 4. generate electricity [130,135] 5. operate own controllable assets • according to central-optimisation [119,120,130,135] 6. buy (supplemental) electricity from other Prosumers [135]
Cost structure	CAPEX: • installation costs of BESS [108]^a • none or not specified [54,62,66,68,74,104,106]^a Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [54,62,66,68,74,104,106,108]^a Variable OPEX: • transaction costs [66] • electricity consumption costs at local clearing or retail price (upon availability) [108]^a • BESS depreciation [108]^a • none or not specified [54,62,68,74,104,106]^a	CAPEX: • installation costs [108,109]^a • of PV [109] • of BESS [108,109]^a • installation of local grid and ICT infrastructure [37] • none or not specified [104,106,110]^a Fixed OPEX: • maintenance of local grid and ICT infrastructure [37] • none or not specified [104,106,108–110]^a Variable OPEX: • generation costs based on individual cost function [110] • electricity consumption costs at local clearing or retail price (upon availability) [37,108,110]^a • costs for transaction with community [110] • BESS depreciation [108]^a • none or not specified [104,106,109]^a	CAPEX: • none or not specified [119,120,130,135] Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [119,120,130,135] Variable OPEX: • generation costs for non-renewable generation [130] • electricity consumption costs [119,120,130,135] – for not self-generated electricity, paid at retail price [119] – within DR scheme, paid at local clearing price [120] • revenue sharing costs with Aggregator [135]

^aEntry refers to a paper that contains more than one energy market model

Table D.11

Detailed business model elements with references of reviewed prosumers (peer-EMS) in local energy markets.

Prosumer peer-EMS			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	• providing electricity [56,58,69,73,76,98–100] – at more convenient rates (e.g. than wholesale market) [56,58,69,73,99,100] – at auctioned local market price (no comparison to other markets) [76,98] • providing flexibility [56,68,98,99,101] – through demand response (incl. EVs & battery) [56,68,99,101] – through dispatchable generation [98] • Providing heat – at auctioned local market price (no comparison to other markets) [98,99]		• providing electricity [122,131,140–142] – at more convenient rates (e.g. than wholesale market) [122,131,140–142] – at auctioned local market price (no comparison to other markets) [140] • providing flexibility [117,122,133,140] – through demand response (incl. EVs & battery) [117,122,133,140] • providing reactive power [140] • providing spinning reserve [142]
Customer segments	• Prosumer [56,58,68,69,73,76,98–101] • Pure Consumer [58,76]		• Prosumer [122,131,140,142] • Pure consumer [140] • Pure Generator [140] • Grid Operator [117,140,142] • Platform Operator [133,140,141] – Energy management agent at microgrid level [133] – market at next higher voltage level [140] – community energy management system [141]

(continued on next page)

Table D.11 (continued).

Prosumer peer-EMS			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Customer relationships	• automated [56,69,73,76,98,100,101] • community [58] • contractual [68] • personal assistance [73] • not specified [99]		• automated [117,122,131,140,141] • community [133] • not specified [142]
Channels	Evaluation: • price [56,58,69,73,76,98–101] • individual preferences [56,100] • technological suitability [99] Purchase: I (a) through EMS [56,58,69,73,100,101] (b) through aggregator [58,101] (c) through Platform Operator [73,100] II (a) with active interaction and continuous bidding [56,69,76,100] (b) with passive assignment once signed up [58,68,98,101] III not specified [99] Delivery: • physically: through the grid [56,68,69,73,76,98–100] • commercially: through P2P scheme with – community [58] – individual EMS system [68,69,73,76,98,100,101] – central market platform [73,100] – blockchain validation [69]		Evaluation: • price [117,122,131,133,140–142] • individual preferences [117,122,133] • resources' status [122] Purchase: I (a) through EMS [117,122,131,133,141] (b) through [133] II (a) with active interaction and continuous bidding [117,122,131,133,140] (b) with passive assignment once signed up [140–142] Delivery: • physically: through the grid [133,141] • commercially: through TE scheme with – community [141] – individual EMS system [117,141] – central market platform [122,131] – nested system of multiple market levels [140,141] • not specified [142]
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues: • none or not specified [56,58,68,69,73,76,98–101] Variable revenues: • electricity sold [58,68,69,73,76,99,100] – times local clearing price [58,69,73,76,100] – times fixed feed-in tariff [68,69,76] – times fixed local sharing price [99] • heat sold times fixed local sharing price [99] • reduced costs for electricity consumed [58,68,69,73,98,100,101] • reduced costs for heat consumed [98] • none or not specified [56]		Fixed revenues: • none or not specified [117,122,131,133,140–142] Variable revenues: • electricity sold [122,131,140–142] – times local clearing price [122,131,140–142] – times fixed feed-in tariff [122] • ancillary services sold times respective market price [140,142] • reduced costs for electricity consumed [117,122,131,133,140–142] • reduced imbalance costs [133]
Key partners	• Aggregator [58,101] • Grid operator [68,73] • Platform Operator [73,100] • none or not specified [56,69,76,98,99]		• Aggregator [133,135] • Grid operator [122] • Retailer [122] • Representative [133] • Platform Operator [131,133,141] • none or not specified [117,140,142]
Key resources	Tangible: I Generation • PV [56,58,69,73,76,98–101] • wind turbine [69,76,98] • conventional, fossil fuel based (e.g. CHP) [98,99] II BESS • stationary [56,58,69,73,76,98,99] • non-stationary (EVs) [99,101] III Loads • controllable (e.g. HVAC, household appliances) [56,68,73,98,99] • non-controllable [73,98,99] IV EMS [56,58,68,69,73,76,98,100,101] V ICT infrastructure (e.g. sensor, meter) [68,69,73,100] Non-tangible: • ability to forecast individual demand and supply [58,69,76,98,100,101] • ability to determine optimal bidding [56,69,73,76,100] • ability to form coalitions [69] • ability to optimally schedule loads [58,68,69,101] • ability for local information processing [98] • ability to verify (blockchain) transactions [69] • none or not specified [99] Human: • none or not specified [56,58,68,69,73,76,98–101]		Tangible: I Generation • PV [122,131,140–142] • wind turbine [140] • conventional, fossil fuel based (e.g. CHP) [142] II BESS • stationary [117,122,131,133,140–142] • non-stationary (EVs) [131,133] III Loads • controllable (e.g. HVAC, household appliances) [117,122,131,133] • non-controllable [131] IV EMS [117,122,141] V Reactive power sink (e.g. smart inverters) [140] Non-tangible: • ability to forecast individual demand and supply [117,122,133,140,142] • ability to determine optimal bidding [122,133,140] • ability to optimally schedule loads [117,122,131,142] • ability to respond to dispatch signals [133,140,142] • none or not specified [141] Human: • none or not specified [117,122,131,133,140–142]

(continued on next page)

Table D.11 (continued).

Prosumer peer-EMS		
	P2P	CSC
Key activities	I In general (a) forecast own consumption and generation [58,100] (b) exchange information with other actors [58,98] (c) interact with market i. deciding to trade with grid or local agents [69] ii. with optimised bidding [76,100] iii. calculating the local market clearing price [58,98] (d) generate electricity [56,58,69,73,76,98–100] (e) operate own controllable assets [76,98,99] i. according to self-optimisation [76] (f) validate financial transaction in blockchain [69] II Specifically of Prosumers themselves (a) set individual preferences (<i>comfort parameters, profit expectation, risk preferences, willingness to trade with a specific counterparty</i>) [56,100] III Specifically of EMS (a) forecasting of • own consumption and generation [76,98,101] • market price [76] (b) interact with market through • with optimised bidding [56,69,73,98] • coalition forming [69,99] (c) operate own controllable assets [56,58,68,69,101] (d) exchange information with other actors [69,73,99]	II In general (a) exchange information with other actors [142] (b) interact with market through passive communication of surplus/demand of electricity [131] (c) generate electricity [122,131,140–142] (d) operate own controllable assets [131,133,142] II Specifically of Prosumers themselves (a) set individual preferences (<i>comfort parameters, profit expectation, risk preferences, willingness to trade with a specific counterparty</i>) [122,133] III Specifically of EMS (a) forecasting of own consumption and generation [117,122,133,140,142] (b) aggregate individual assets for unified bidding [140] (c) interact with local market through • optimised bidding [117,122,133,140] • passive communication, e.g. of surplus/demand [141] (d) operate controllable generation and consumption assets [117,122,140–142] (e) illustrate relevant information for decision making to Prosumer [131] (f) exchange information with other actors [117,131,142]
Cost structure	CAPEX: • Investment costs [73,99] • none or not specified [56,58,68,69,76,98,100,101] Fixed OPEX: • maintenance costs [73,99] • none or not specified [56,58,68,69,76,98,100,101] Variable OPEX: • consumption costs for not self-generated electricity – paid at local clearing price [56,58,69,73,76,99,100] – paid at grid (retail) price [56,73,76,99,101] • generation (fuel) costs for non-renewables [69,76,98,99] • operation (degradation) costs of BESS [69,73,101] • opportunity costs for DR [56,69] • curtailment (opportunity) costs for renewables [98] • variable maintenance costs for generation assets [99] • imbalance costs [101] • none or not specified [68]	CAPEX: • Investment costs [117] • none or not specified [122,131,133,140–142] Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [117,122,131,133,140–142] Variable OPEX: • consumption costs for not self-generated electricity – paid at local clearing price [117,122,131,133,140,142] – paid at grid (retail) price [122] • generation (fuel) costs for non-renewables [142] • operation (degradation) costs of BESS [133] • opportunity costs for DR [117] • greenhouse gas emission tax for non-renewables [142] • none or not specified [141]

Table D.12

Detailed business model elements with references of prosumers (peer-market) in local energy markets.

Prosumer peer-market			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	• providing electricity [37,38,52,55,70,79,81,88,89,91–93,96,103,105]^a – at more convenient rates (e.g. than wholesale market) [38,55,79,89,91–93,96,103,105]^a – at auctioned local market price (no comparison to other markets) [37,38,52,70,88] • providing flexibility [71,79,96] – through demand response (incl. EVs & battery) [79,96] – through dispatchable generation	• providing electricity at more convenient rates (e.g. than wholesale market) [105]^a	• providing electricity [115,118,121,127,128,137] – at more convenient rates (e.g. than wholesale market) [118,121,127,128,137] – at auctioned local market price (no comparison to other markets) [115] • providing flexibility [123,137,138] – through demand response (incl. EVs & battery) [137] – through dispatchable generation [137,138] • providing reactive power [115]
Customer segments	• Prosumer [38,55,70,71,79,81,88,89,92,93,96,103,105]^a – EVs [81,88] • Pure Consumer [79,91,93] • Storage Operator [55,105]^a • Platform Operator (<i>wholesale market</i>) [38,52,70,79,105]^a • Retailer [37]	• Prosumer [105]^a • Storage Operator [105]^a • Platform Operator (<i>wholesale market</i>) [105]^a	• Prosumer [115,121,128,137] • Pure Consumer [118,121] • Platform Operator (<i>wholesale market</i>) [127] • Aggregator [118,123,127] • Retailer [123] • Grid Operator [138]
Customer relationships	• automated [37,38,52,55,70,71,79,81,88,89,91–93,105]^a	• automated [105]^a	• automated [115,118,121,123,127,128]

(continued on next page)

Table D.12 (continued).

Prosumer peer-market	P2P	CSC	TE
Channels	Evaluation: - price [38,52,55,70,71,79,81,88,89,91,93,105]^a - personal preferences (i.e., generation resource, proximity, comfort etc.) [70,71,92] - technical feasibility [89] - no evaluation [37] Purchase: - active interaction and continuous bidding [38,52,55,70,71,81,88,89,91–93,105]^a - passive assignment [37,79] Delivery: - physically: through the grid [37,52,55,79,91,105]^a - commercially: through P2P market clearing [38,71,81,88,105]^a	Evaluation: - price [105]^a Purchase: - active interaction and continuous bidding [105]^a Delivery: - physically: through the grid [105]^a - commercially: through P2P market clearing [105]^a	Evaluation: - price [118,121,123,127,128,137] - personal preferences (i.e., generation resource, proximity, comfort etc. [123,128] - no evaluation (once subscribed) [115] Purchase: - active interaction and continuous bidding [115,118,121,127,128] - passive assignment [123,137] Delivery: - physically: through the grid [115,127] - commercially: through TE market clearing [118,121,123,127]
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [37,38,52,55,70,71,79,81,88,89,91–93,96,103,105]^a Variable revenues: - electricity sold [37,38,52,55,70,79,81,88,89,91–93,105]^a - times local market clearing price [38,52,55,70,79,81,88,89,91–93,105]^a - times fixed feed-in tariff [37] - flexibility provided times local clearing price [71] - reduced costs for electricity consumed [91,105]^a	Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [105]^a Variable revenues: - electricity sold times local market clearing price [105]^a - reduced costs for electricity consumed [105]^a	Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [115,118,121,123,127,128,137,138] Variable revenues: - electricity sold [115,118,121,127,128,137] - times local market price [115,118,121,127,128,137] - times bilateral contract price [118] - flexibility provided times local clearing price [123] - reactive power provided times local clearing price [115] - reduced costs for electricity consumed [127,137]
Key partners	- Platform Operator [38,70,79,91,105,127]^a - Aggregator [71,81,88] - Representative [71] - Retailer [92,96,103] - Grid Operator [37,52,55,71,81,91,103] - none or not specified [89,93]	Platform Operator [105]^a	- Platform Operator [115,121,128] - Grid Operator [115,123,137] - none or not specified [118]
Key resources	Tangible: - Generation assets [37,38,52,55,70,71,79,91–93,105]^a - PV [37,38,52,55,70,79,91–93,105]^a - Wind [79] - conventional [52] - BESS [38,70,79,81,88,89,91,93,105]^a - stationary [79,89,91,93,105]^a - non-stationary (EVs) [38,81,88] - Loads [38,89] - controllable (e.g. HVAC, household appliances etc.) [38,89] - non-controllable [89] Non-tangible: - ability to forecast own demand and or generation [55,105] - market platform [38,70,71,81,88] - ability to optimise proprietary operations [38,91] - own bidding agent [38,92,93] - ability of blockchain interaction [88] Human: - none or not specified [37,38,52,55,70,71,79,81,88,89,91–93,105]^a	Tangible: - Generation assets (PV) [105]^a - BESS (stationary) [105]^a Non-tangible: - ability to forecast own demand and or generation [105]^a Human: - none or not specified [105]^a	Tangible: - Generation assets [115,118,121,127,128,137] - PV [115,121,128] - Wind [121,127,128] - Biomass [121] - conventional [118,128] - BESS [115,123,127,128,137] - stationary [115,127,128,137] - non-stationary (EVs) [123] - Controllable loads (e.g. HVAC, household appliances etc.) [128,137] Non-tangible: - ability to optimise proprietary operations [137] - own bidding agent [137] Human: - none or not specified [115,118,121,123,127,128,137]

(continued on next page)

Table D.12 (continued).

Prosumer peer-market			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Key activities	• forecast own consumption and generation [38,52,55] • exchange information with other actors [38,52,88,91] • interact with local market [37,38,52,55,70,71,79,81,88,89,91–93,105]^a – with active bidding [38,52,70,71,79,81,88,89,91–93] – with passive communication of surplus/net-demand of electricity [55,79,105]^a • generate electricity [37,38,52,70,79,91–93,105]^a • operate own controllable assets [38,52,71,79,81,89,91,93,105]^a – according to self-optimisation [38,52,91,93] – according to central optimisation [79,105]^a	• interact with local market with passive communication of surplus/net-demand of electricity [105]^a • generate electricity [105]^a • operate own controllable assets according to central optimisation [105]^a	• forecast own consumption and generation [115,121,127] • exchange information with other actors [115,123,127,128] • interact with local market [115,118,121,123,127,128,137] – with active bidding [118,121,137] • generate electricity [118,121,128,137] • operate own controllable assets [115,123,127,128,137] – according to self-optimisation [137] – according to central optimisation [115,123,127,128]
Cost structure	CAPEX: • installation costs [37,79,105]^a – of PV [37,79] – of wind generation [79] – of BESS [79,88,105]^a • none or not specified [38,52,55,70,71,81,89,91–93] Fixed OPEX: • monthly operation & maintenance costs for BESS [105]^a • none or not specified [37,38,52,55,70,71,79,81,88,89,91–93] Variable OPEX: • consumption costs for not self-generated electricity [70,88,89,91,105]^a • operation (degradation) costs of BESS [70] • opportunity costs for DR [89] • costs associated to network constraints [91] • none or not specified [37,38,52,55,71,79,81,92,93]	CAPEX: • installation costs of BESS [105]^a Fixed OPEX: • monthly operation & maintenance costs for BESS [105]^a Variable OPEX: • consumption costs for not self-generated electricity [105]^a	CAPEX: • none or not specified [115,118,121,123,127,128,137] Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [115,118,121,123,127,128,137] Variable OPEX: • consumption costs for not self-generated electricity [121,123,127,128] • generation (fuel) costs for non-renewables [118,128] • opportunity costs for DR [128] • imbalance costs [127] • transaction costs [115] • none or not specified [137]

^aEntry refers to a paper that contains more than one energy market model.

Table D.13

Detailed business model elements with references of reviewed pure consumers in local energy markets.

Pure Consumer			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	• Electricity demand at convenient prices (i.e., buying electricity for a price higher than the FIT rate or the price offered by other buyers such as retailers) [61,76,93,94,108]^a • Flexibility from demand response (e.g. from battery) [104,148,150,151,163]^a • Reduced transaction costs for electricity provision [149]	• Electricity demand at convenient prices (i.e., buying electricity for a price higher than the FIT rate or the price offered by other purchasers such as retailers) [108]^a • Flexibility from demand response [104]^a	• Electricity demand at regular market prices [154] • Flexibility from demand response [153,154]
Customer segments	• Prosumer [61,76,93,94,108,149–151,163]^a • Platform Operator [104,148]^a • Local market operator [104]^a • Wholesale market [148]	• Prosumer [108]^a • Platform Operator, i.e., local market operator [104]^a	• Prosumer [153] • Retailer [153] • TSO/wholesale market [154]
Customer relationships	• Automated [76,93,94,148,149] • Communities [150]	• Automated [104,108]^a	• Automated [153,154]

(continued on next page)

Table D.13 (continued).

Pure Consumer	P2P	CSC	TE
Channels	Evaluation: - Price or cost saving [76,94,108,149,151]^a - Technical fit [104,151,163]^a - No active evaluation, but passive allocation based on (1) distance, (2) volume of electricity needed per trading period (3) volume of electricity needed per day, (4) random selection and (5) price offers [61] Purchase: - active interaction and continuous bidding [76,93,94,104,148,149,151,163]^a - passive assignment [61,108,150]^a Delivery: - commercially: through P2P market clearing and respective operational adjustments [76,148,149,151] - Physically: through local distribution grid [61,93,94,104,108,150,163]^a	Evaluation: - Price or cost saving [108]^a - Technical fit [104]^a Purchase: - active interaction and continuous bidding [104]^a - passive assignment [108]^a Delivery: - Physically: through local distribution grid [104,108]^a	Evaluation: - Price or cost savings [153,154] Purchase: - active interaction and continuous bidding [153,154] - Bidding to coordinator [153] - Participating in auctions [154] Delivery: - commercially: through communication with the TE coordinator (Platform Operator) [153] - Physically: through the transmission grid [154]
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [61,76,93,94,104,108,148–151,163]^a Variable revenues: - reduced costs for electricity consumed [61,93,94,108,148–150,163]^a - flexibility provided times local flexibility clearing price [104]^a - none or not specified [76,151]	Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [104,108]^a Variable revenues: - reduced costs for electricity consumed [108]^a - flexibility provided times local flexibility clearing price [104]^a	Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [153,154] Variable revenues: - reduced costs for electricity consumed [153] - flexibility provided times local flexibility clearing price [154]
Key partners	- Local market operator [61,149,163] - Hierarchical load serving entities that aggregate bids [148] - Full nodes (blockchain miners) [94] - Microgrid agent [150]	None or not specified [104,108]^a	- Platform Operator (TE coordinator) [153] - Grid Operator (TSO) [154]
Key resources	Tangible: - Loads [61,76,93,94,104,108,148–151,163]^a - controllable (e.g. HVAC, household appliances etc.) [104,148,151,163]^a - BESS [151,163] - stationary [151] - non-stationary (EVs) [151,163] - ICT infrastructure (e.g. smart sensors, smart meters etc.) [150,151] Non-tangible: - Central controller [149] - Automated agent/energy management system to control loads [104]^a - Blockchain as a service platform [151] Human: - None or not specified [61,76,93,94,104,108,148–151,163]^a	Tangible: - Loads [104,108]^a - controllable (e.g. HVAC, household appliances etc.) [104]^a Non-tangible: - individual energy management system to control loads [104]^a Human: - None or not specified [104,108]^a	Tangible: - Loads [153,154] - controllable (e.g. HVAC, household appliances etc.) [153] Non-tangible: - None or not specified [153,154] Human: - None or not specified [153,154]
Key activities	- forecast [61,150,163] - own consumption [61] - own flexibility availability [163] - interact with local market [61,76,93,94,104,148,150,151]^a - with active bidding [76,93,94,104,148,151]^a - with passive communication of electricity demand or flexibility availability [61] - operate own controllable assets [149,151,163] - interact with blockchain to register and pay transactions [94,150]	interact with local market through active bidding [104]^a	- forecast own consumption and flexibility availability [154] - interact with local market through active bidding [153,154] - operate own controllable assets [153]

(continued on next page)

Table D.13 (continued).

Pure Consumer			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Cost structure	CAPEX: - Investment costs for ICT infrastructure (in this case: advanced smart meters) [150] - none or not specified [61,76,93,94,104,108,148,149,151,163] ^a Fixed OPEX: - none or not specified [61,76,93,94,104,108,148–151,163] ^a Variable OPEX: - purchased (i.e., consumed) electricity [61,76,93,94,104,108,148–151,163] ^a - times local market price [61,76,93,148,149,151,163] - times grid (retail) price [163] - opportunity costs for providing demand response (comfort costs) electricity costs [148,151] - transaction costs [149,150] - imbalance costs [149]	CAPEX: - None or not specified [104,108]^a Fixed OPEX: - None or not specified [104,108]^a Variable OPEX: - purchased (i.e., consumed) electricity [104,108] ^a	CAPEX: - None or not specified [153,154] Fixed OPEX: - None or not specified [153,154] Variable OPEX: - purchased (i.e., consumed) electricity [153,154]

^aEntry refers to a paper that contains more than one energy market model

Table D.14

Detailed business model elements with references of reviewed pure generators in local energy markets.

Pure generator			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	- selling electricity below wholesale market price [147,155] - Selling electricity at market conditions [150,156] - trade electricity (buy & sell) to balance portfolios [78]		selling electricity at market conditions [154,157,158]
Customer segments	- Pure consumer [147,150,155,156] - Prosumer (with electricity demand) [156] - Retailer [78] - Pure generator [78] - Wholesale market [147,155]		- Pure consumer [157,158] - Aggregator [159] - Wholesale market [154]
Customer relationships	- automated [78,147,155,156] - community [150] - anonymous [147] - not fully anonymous, but with options for personal preferences [155]		- automated [154,157,158] - anonymous [157]
Channels	Evaluation: - price [78,155,156] - personal preferences (i.e., eagerness factor) [155] - none (i.e., monopoly) [147] Purchase: - through active interaction and continuous bidding [78,155,156] - through passive assignment once signed up [147,150] Delivery: - commercially: through market operator [155] - physically: through distribution grid [78,147,150,155]		Evaluation: - price [158] Purchase: - through active interaction and continuous bidding [154] - through passive assignment once signed up [157,158] Delivery: - physically: through distribution grid [157,158]
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [78,147,150,155,156] Variable revenues: - sold electricity times individual (transaction) price [78,150,155,156] - sold electricity times local market clearing price (based on Shapley value) [155] - avoided imbalance costs [147]		Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [154,157,158] Variable revenues: - sold electricity times local market clearing price [154,157,158] - avoided imbalance costs [158]
Key partners	Platform operator [147,150,155]		- Platform operator [157,159] - Grid operator [154] - Aggregator (VPP) [158]

(continued on next page)

Table D.14 (continued).

Pure generator			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Key resources	Tangible: • Generation assets [78,147,155,156] – PV [147,155] – Wind [155] – Gas turbines [155] – Diesel generators [78] Non-tangible: • demand and or generation forecast capability [147,155] • price determination capability [147] Human: • none or not specified [78,147,150,155,156]		Tangible: • Generation assets [154,157,158] – Wind [158] – Gas turbines [158] Non-tangible: • none or not specified [154,157,158] Human: • none or not specified [154,157,158]
Key activities	Ex-ante: • forecast generation [147,150,155] • calculate forecast uncertainty [147] • determine offer price [78,78,147,150,155] • choose from customer offers [78,156] Real-time: • generate electricity [78,147,150,155,156] Ex-post: • register transaction in blockchain [150]		Real-time: • generate electricity [154,157,158] – self-dispatched [157] – centrally dispatched [158]
Cost structure	CAPEX: • none or not specified [78,147,150,155,156] Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [78,147,150,155,156] Variable OPEX: • generation (fuel) costs [78] • imbalance costs [147] • transaction costs [150] • cost for traded electricity to balance portfolio [78] • none or not specified [155,156]		CAPEX: • none or not specified [154,157,158] Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [157,158] Variable OPEX: • generation (fuel) costs [154,158] • none or not specified [157]

Table D.15

Detailed business model elements with references of reviewed storage operators in local energy markets.

Storage operator			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	• providing flexibility [51,104]^a – for balancing the P2P market, reducing the overall power exchange at retail market prices [51] – to compose additional DR offers from community to Grid operator [104]^a • trading electricity - electricity at prices usually below other market price, e.g. the wholesale market price [91,104,105]^a • coordinating and operating the local market [105]^a	• providing flexibility - to compose additional DR offers from community to Grid operator [104]^a • trading electricity - electricity at prices usually below other market price, e.g. the wholesale market price [104,105]^a • coordinating and operating the local market [105]^a	• providing flexibility - for balancing the VPPs renewable generators [158] • trading electricity - electricity at prices usually below other market price, e.g. the wholesale market price [158,159]
Customer segments	• Prosumer [51,91,105]^a • Pure Consumer [91,104]^a • Platform operator [104]^a	• Prosumer [105]^a • Pure Consumer [104]^a • Platform operator [104]^a	• Prosumer [55] • Pure Consumer [55,158] • Pure Generator [158] • Aggregator [159]
Customer relationships	• automated [51,91,104,105]^a	• automated [104,105]^a	• automated [158,159]
Channels	Evaluation: • price [51,91] • availability & fit [104]^a • no evaluation [105]^a Purchase: • through active interaction and continuous bidding [51,91] • through passive assignment from community [105]^a Delivery: • commercially: through P2P market clearing [104]^a • physically: through the grid [91,104,105]^a	Evaluation: • availability & fit [104]^a • no evaluation [105]^a Purchase: • through passive assignment from community [104,105]^a Delivery: • commercially: through P2P market clearing [104] • physically: through the grid [104,105]^a	Evaluation: • price [158,159] Purchase: • through passive assignment from community [158] Delivery: • physically: through the grid [158]

(continued on next page)

Table D.15 (continued).

Storage operator			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues: • none or not specified [51,91,104,105]^a Variable revenues: • sold electricity times local market clearing price [51,91,104,105]^a • sold electricity times variable wholesale market price [105]^a • sold flexibility times proposed flex price by Grid operator [104]^a	Fixed revenues: • none or not specified [104,105]^a Variable revenues: • sold electricity times local market clearing price [104,105]^a • sold electricity times variable wholesale market price [105]^a • sold flexibility times proposed flex price by Grid operator [104]^a	Fixed revenues: • none or not specified [158,159] Variable revenues: • sold electricity times local market clearing price [159] • none or not specified [158]
Key partners	• Platform operator [104]^a • Grid operator [51,91]	• Platform operator [104]^a	• Platform operator [159] • Aggregator [158]
Key resources	Tangible: • Energy storage asset [51,91,104,105]^a – BESS [104,105]^a [91] – Gas storage [51] • electrolyser (power-to-gas unit) [51] • generation asset: fuel cell [51] Non-tangible: • market platform [105]^a • none or not specified [51,91,104]^a Human: • none or not specified [51,91,104,105]^a	Tangible: • BESS [104,105]^a Non-tangible: • market platform [105]^a • none or not specified [104]^a Human: • none or not specified [104,105]^a	Tangible: • BESS [158,159] Non-tangible: • ability to determine optimal bidding [159] • none or not specified [158] Human: • none or not specified [158,159]
Key activities	• trade electricity, leveraging price differential on local market [51,91,104,105]^a • offer additional capacity as flexibility [104]^a • operate the market (sharing) platform [105]^a	• trade electricity, leveraging price differential on local market [104,105]^a • operate the market (sharing) platform [105]^a	• react to dispatch signals of VPP controller [158,159]
Cost structure	CAPEX: • investment costs of BESS [105]^a • none or not specified [51,91,104]^a Fixed OPEX: • monthly O&M costs for BESS [105]^a • none or not specified [51,91,104]^a Variable OPEX: • purchased electricity times local clearing price [51,91,104,105]^a • purchased electricity times wholesale market price [105]^a	CAPEX: • investment costs of BESS [105]^a • none or not specified [104]^a Fixed OPEX: • monthly O&M costs for BESS [105]^a • none or not specified [104]^a Variable OPEX: • purchased electricity times local clearing price [104,105]^a • purchased electricity times wholesale market price [105]^a	CAPEX: • none or not specified [158,159] Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [158,159] Variable OPEX: • purchased electricity times local clearing price [159] • none or not specified [158]

^aEntry refers to a paper that contains more than one energy market model

Table D.16

Detailed business model elements with references of reviewed platform operators in local energy markets.

Platform operator			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	I Platform provision for • electricity trading [37,54,70,85,104,105,162,163,165]^a • electricity sharing [104,108]^a • ancillary service provision [104]^a II Optimal dispatch through • direct control of customers assets [108]^a III Increased monetary benefits [37,70,104,105,162,163,165] ^a • through enhanced revenues for generating parties [104]^a • reduced costs for consuming parties [104]^a • locational services [104]^a IV Facilitate self-consumption [162] V Invest in and operate central storage system [105] ^a VI Interaction with upstream market layer for excess demand/supply [37,70]	I Platform provision for • electricity trading [104,105,110]^a • electricity sharing [37,104,108,109]^a • ancillary service provision [104,110]^a II Optimal dispatch through • direct control of customers assets [108]^a III Increased monetary benefits • through enhanced revenues for generating parties [104]^a • reduced costs for consuming parties [104]^a • locational services [104,110]^a IV Preserving trading fairness by balancing individual and community preferences [110] V Invest in and operate central storage system [105] ^a VI Interaction with upstream market layer for excess demand/supply [37]	I Platform provision for • electricity trading [130,166] • electricity sharing [141] • optimised electricity provision [121,167,168] • ancillary service provision [130,153] II Optimal dispatch through • direct control of customers assets [167] • indirect control of customers assets [168] III Increased monetary benefits [121,130,153,167,168] • through enhanced revenues for generating parties [121,168] • reduced costs for consuming parties [121,167,168] IV local coalition formation [130]

(continued on next page)

Table D.16 (continued).

Platform operator			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Customer segments	• Prosumer [37,54,70,85,104,105,108,162,163,165]^a – residential [37,85] – commercial [37] • Pure Consumer [104,108]^a • Storage operator [104]^a • Grid operator [104]^a	• Prosumer [37,104,105,108–110]^a – residential [104,105,109,110]^a – within microgrid [37] • Pure Consumer [104,108]^a • Storage operator [104]^a • Grid operator [104,110]^a	• Prosumer [121,130,141,168] – residential [130] – microgrids [168] • Pure Consumer [121,141,153,167] – residential [141,153] – commercial [167] • Pure Generator [168] • Aggregator [166,168] – electric vehicle Aggregator [166] – load Aggregator [168] – DR Aggregator [168] • Grid operator (DSO) [166,168] • Platform operator (wholesale market) [168] • Retailer [130]
Customer relationships	• automated [37,54,70,85,104,105,108,162,163,165]^a • community [104]^a • anonymous [105]^a	• automated [104,105,108–110]^a • community [104,109,110]^a • anonymous [105]^a	• automated [121,130,141,153,166–168] • community [167] (while for TE it is case dependent either automated or community, for CSC it is both at the same time)
Channels	Evaluation: • price [37,54,70,104,162,163,165]^a – ex-ante price evaluation [104,165]^a – continuous price evaluation [104,165]^a • network feasibility [104]^a • individual preferences [70] • not specified [85,105,108]^a Purchase: • automatically, once signed up [37,85,105,108,165]^a • manually, via active bidding to platform [54,70,104,162,163]^a • selectively, accepting or refusing individual offers from Platform operator [104]^a Delivery: • physically through the grid [70,104,105,162,163]^a • commercially through – local market participation and clearing [70,85,104,165]^a – community management scheme [104]^a	Evaluation: • price [104,109,110]^a – ex-ante price evaluation [104]^a – continuous price evaluation [104]^a • network feasibility [104]^a • no evaluation (monopolistic operation) [37] • not specified [105,108]^a Purchase: • automatically, once signed up [105,108–110]^a • automatically, once being physically connected [37] • manually, via active bidding to platform [104]^a • selectively, accepting or refusing individual offers from Platform operator [104]^a Delivery: • physically through the grid [37,104,105,109]^a • commercially through – local market participation and clearing [104,109]^a – community management scheme [104,110]^a	Evaluation: • price [121,130,141,153,167,168] – continuous price evaluation [130,168] • no evaluation (monopolistic operation) [168] Purchase: • automatically, once signed up [141,167,168] • manually, via active bidding to platform [121,130,153,166,168] Delivery: • physically through the grid [121,141,168] • commercially through – local market participation and clearing [121,153,166–168] – community management scheme [141]
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues: • registration fee to platform [162] • service charge for forecast and maintenance activities [162] • none or not specified [37,54,85,104,105,108,163,165]^a Variable revenues: • arbitrage on fluctuating local market prices with own BESS [105]^a • arbitrage on fluctuating wholesale market prices with own BESS [105]^a • profit margin as percentage of total trading amount [85] • sold electricity (from wholesale market) times local market price [70] • none or not specified [37,54,104,108,162,163,165]^a	Fixed revenues: • fixed fee per transaction [110] • none or not specified [37,104,105,108,109]^a Variable revenues: • arbitrage on fluctuating local market prices with own BESS [105]^a • arbitrage on fluctuating wholesale market prices with own BESS [105]^a • none or not specified [37,104,108–110]^a	Fixed revenues: • service fee [167] • none or not specified [121,130,141,153,166,168] Variable revenues: • arbitrage on price differences from local to wholesale market [168] • price differences between matched buy and sell offers on local market (pay-as-bid clearing) [121] • selling electricity to local consumers within distribution grid [167,168] • none or not specified [130,153,166]
Key partners	• Grid operator [37,163] • Retailer [37] • none or not specified [54,70,85,104,105,108,162,165]^a	• Retailer [37] • none or not specified [104,105,108–110]^a	• Grid operator [130,167] • Retailer [167] • Pure Generator [167] • Platform operator [168] • none or not specified [121,141,153,166]

(continued on next page)

Table D.16 (continued).

Platform operator			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Key resources	Tangible: • distribution or micro-grid [162,165] • BESS [105]^a • multi-channel power router [163] • none or not specified [37,54,85,104,108]^a Non-tangible: • market platform [37,54,70,85,104,105,108,163]^a • central controller [85,105,108,163,165]^a • order monitoring software [104]^a • ability to aggregate multiple (flexibility) bids [104]^a • ability to clear market [37,54,70,85,104,105,108,162,163,165]^a • ability to operate and maintain grid infrastructure [162] Human: • none or not specified [37,54,70,85,104,105,108,162,163,165]^a	Tangible: • distribution or micro-grid [37] • BESS [105]^a • ICT infrastructure (electricity meter) [37] • none or not specified [104,108–110]^a Non-tangible: • market platform [37,104,105,108–110]^a • central controller [37,105,108–110]^a • order monitoring software [104]^a • ability to aggregate multiple (flexibility) bids [104]^a • ability to clear market [37,104,105,108–110]^a Human: • none or not specified [37,104,105,108–110]^a	Tangible: • distribution or micro-grid [167,168] • central energy assets (e.g. central heat pump, diesel generators and BESS) [167] • ICT infrastructure [167] • none or not specified [121,130,141,153,166] Non-tangible: • market platform [121,130,141,153,166–168] • central controller [130,167,168] • ability to clear market [121,130,141,153,166–168] • ability to forecast and evaluate uncertainty [130,167,168] Human: • none or not specified [121,130,141,153,166–168]
Key activities	Ex-ante market: • forward Grid operators flex needs to customers [104]^a Continuous: • aggregate individual flex offers of customers [104]^a • ensure that local trading does not inflict grid operation [162,165] • macroeconomic optimisation at platform level [37,70,85,105,108,163,165]^a • ensure optimal dispatch through – direct control of customers assets [108,163,165]^a • clear the market [37,54,70,85,104,105,108,162,163,165]^a Ex-post market: • distribute clearing information among participants [54] • monitor the proper performance of individual flex offers [104]^a • provide customers (supplemental) electricity [37] • O&M of: – grid infrastructure [162,165] – BESS [105]^a	Ex-ante market: • forward Grid operators flex needs to customers [104]^a Continuous: • aggregate individual flex offers of customers [104]^a • macroeconomic optimisation at platform level [37,105,108–110]^a • ensure optimal dispatch through – direct control of customers assets [108]^a • clear the market [37,104,105,108–110]^a Ex-post market: • monitor the proper performance of individual flex offers [104]^a • provide customers (supplemental) electricity [37] • O&M of: – grid infrastructure [37] – BESS [105]^a	Ex-ante market: • forecast and evaluate uncertainty of: – non-programmable RES generation [130] – load [167] – other markets prices [167,168] Continuous: • enable and coordinate customers: – DR [153] – capacity market participation [167] • ensure that local trading does not inflict grid operation [130] • macroeconomic optimisation at platform level [130,167,168] • ensure optimal dispatch through – control of own assets [167] – customer guidance based on local marginal prices [168] • clear the market [121,130,141,153,166–168] Ex-post market: • distribute clearing information among participants [141,153,166] • provide customers (supplemental) electricity [141,167]
Cost structure	CAPEX: • Investment costs for: – BESS [105]^a • none or not specified [37,54,70,85,104,108,162,163,165]^a Fixed OPEX: • O&M costs for: – BESS [105]^a • none or not specified [37,54,70,85,104,108,162,163,165]^a Variable OPEX: • bought electricity times: – local market clearing price [105]^a – wholesale market price [70,105]^a • maximum demand charge for Grid operator [105]^a • sold flexibility times flex price of Grid operator (forwarding revenue to flex providers) [104]^a • none or not specified [37,54,85,108,162,163,165]^a	CAPEX: • Investment costs for: – BESS [105]^a • local grid and metering infrastructure [37] • none or not specified [104,108–110]^a Fixed OPEX: • O&M costs for: – BESS [105]^a • local grid and metering infrastructure [37] • none or not specified [104,108–110]^a Variable OPEX: • bought electricity times: – local market clearing price [105]^a – wholesale market price [105]^a • maximum demand charge for Grid operator [105]^a • sold flexibility times flex price of Grid operator (forwarding revenue to flex providers) [104]^a • none or not specified [37,109,110] • [108]^a	CAPEX: • Investment costs for: – ICT infrastructure [167] • none or not specified [121,130,141,153,166,168] Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [121,130,141,153,166–168] Variable OPEX: • bought electricity times: – local market clearing price [168] – wholesale market price [167] • none or not specified [121,130,141,153,166]

^aEntry refers to a paper that contains more than one energy market model.

Table D.17

Detailed business model elements with references of reviewed aggregators in local energy markets.

Aggregator			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	For upstream customers I untapping new flexibility [37,104] ^a • with locational component to react to network constraints, e.g., for congestions [104]^a • without locational component to balance portfolios or network areas [37] II trading electricity [80,170] • at convenient rates (buy above wholesale, sell below wholesale price) [170] • at regular market rates [80] For downstream customers I virtual aggregation and central dispatch [37,80,101,108,169] ^a • for supply of (deficit) electricity with reduced procurement costs [80,101,169] • for purchase of (surplus) electricity with enhanced revenues [80,108]^a • to reduce imbalance costs [101] • to enable additional revenues from utilisation of assets' flexibility [37] II facilitate electricity exchange amongst customers [104,108] ^a	For upstream customers I untapping new flexibility with locational component to react to network constraints, e.g., for congestions [104] ^a For downstream customers I virtual aggregation and central dispatch for purchase of (surplus) electricity with enhanced revenues [108] ^a II facilitate electricity exchange amongst customers [104,108] ^a	For upstream customers I untapping new flexibility [119,120,123,127,140,145,154,166,171,174] • with locational component to react to network constraints, e.g., for congestions [120,123,140,145,154,166,174] • without locational component to balance portfolios or network areas [119,123,127,140,145,154] • for optimal electricity procurement on upstream markets [171] For downstream customers I virtual aggregation and central dispatch [119,123,127,140,145,158,166,167,171,173,174] • for supply of (deficit) electricity with reduced procurement costs [119,123,127,140,145,158,166,167,171,173,174] • for purchase of (surplus) electricity with enhanced revenues [127,140,158,173] • to reduce imbalance costs [119,158,167,173] • to enable additional revenues from capacity market participation [167] • while guaranteeing individual preferences [123,145] II No specific value proposition to downstream customers [120,154]
Customer segments	• Prosumer [37,80,101,108]^a – EVs [101] – residential prosumers [37,80,108]^a • Pure Consumer [108,169,170]^a – Loads [169,170] – EVs [108]^a • Pure Generator [170] • Storage Operator [170] • Aggregator [170] • Retailer [80] • Grid operator [37], [104]^a	• Prosumer (residential) [108]^a • Pure Consumer (EVs) [108]^a • Grid operator [104]^a	• Prosumer [119,120,123,127,140,145,166,173] – residential prosumer [119,120,145] – EVs [119,123,166] • Pure Consumer [127,140,158,167,171,172,174] • Pure Generator [127,140,154,158,172] • Storage Operator [127,158,172] • Platform Operator [140,145,154,172] – wholesale market [145,154,172] – nested market at next higher voltage level [140]
Customer segments (cont'd)			• Aggregator [127,154] • Retailer [171] • Grid Operator [119,120,140,145,154,166,172,174]
Customer relationships	• Automated [80,101,169,170], [108]^a • Not specified [37], [104]^a	• Automated [108]^a • Not specified [104]^a	• Automated [119,120,123,127,140,145,154,158,166,167,172,173] • Self-service [167] • Not specified [174]

(continued on next page)

Table D.17 (continued).

Aggregator			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Channels	Evaluation: - Bid and ask prices [169,170] - Price merit order (for a grid operator) [37] - Not specified [37,80,101], [104,108]^a Purchase: - P2P market/platform [80,169,170] - Energy Management System (EMS) [101] - Aggregator [108]^a - Established balancing market (for a grid operator) [37] - Platform Operator (local market operator) [104]^a Delivery: - Market algorithm [80] - Representative (HEMS) [101] - Distribution grid [37,104,169,170]^a - Balancing market [37] - Aggregator [37] - Not specified [108]^a	Evaluation: - Not specified [104,108]^a Purchase: - Aggregator [108]^a - Platform Operator (local market operator) [104]^a Delivery: - Power network [104]^a - Not specified [108]^a	<i>For upstream customers:</i> Evaluation: - Price [119,120,127,140,154,171] - Constraints of DERs [120] - Cost [172] - Not specified [166] Purchase: - Auction [145,154,171] - TE platform [127,166] - Direct purchase through aggregators or VPP [120,167,173] - Wholesale market [140,172] - Not specified [119] Delivery: - Distribution grid [119,120,127,145,154] - Wholesale markets [119,172] - TE platform [167] - Not specified [171] <i>For downstream customers:</i> Evaluation: - Preference for charging EVs [123] - Revenue generation [167,173] - Benefits from aggregator's services [158] - Price [174] - Types of services [167] - Not specified [127,145,166] Purchase: - Direct purchase from aggregator [119,120,127,145,158,166,173,174] - TE market [123] - Microgrid [140] Delivery: - TE platform [120,123,127,166,167] - Specific systems/networks - Bus network [173] - A nested system [140] - Distribution grid [158] - Not specified [171]
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues: - None or not specified [37,80,101,104,108,169,170]^a Variable revenues: - Sale of electricity [170] - Revenue from accepted bids and offers for flexibility [37,104]^a - Not specified [80,101,108,169]^a	Fixed revenues: - None or not specified [104,108]^a Variable revenues: - Revenue from accepted bids and offers for flexibility [104]^a - None or not specified [108]^a	<i>From upstream customers</i> Fixed revenues: - Capacity payments for flexibility provision [167] - None or not specified [119,120,127,140,145,158,166,171,172,174] Variable revenues: - Sale of electricity [127,140,145,158,167,172] - Sale of ancillary services [140,172] - Sale of flexibility [119,167] - Revenue from cost minimisation [119,158] <i>From downstream customers</i> Fixed revenues: - Services fees [167] - None or not specified [120,123,127,140,145,158,166,171,173,174] Variable revenues: - Sale of electricity to prosumers [127,140,145,158,167,173] - Sale of ancillary services [140,167] - Revenue from cost minimisation [123,158,173] - None or not specified [120,166,171,174]

(continued on next page)

Table D.17 (continued).

Aggregator			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Key partners	- Grid operator [169,170] - Platform Operator (microgrid operators) [169] - Prosumer [104]^a - Pure Consumer [104]^a - Storage Operator [104]^a - Pure Generator [170] - Aggregator [101] - Retailers [37] - None or not specified [80,108]^a	- Prosumer [104]^a - Pure Consumer [104]^a - Storage Operator [104]^a - None or not specified [108]^a	- Grid Operator [123,145,167] - DSO [123,167] - TSO [145,167] - Platform Operator [123,127,166,174] - TE platform operator [166] - Market operator [123,127,174] - Prosumer (DERs and EVs) [119] - Pure Generator [167] - Representative (commercial agent) [167] - Retailer (Utility and retailer) [167] - Not specified [140,158,173]
Key resources	Tangible: - Smart devices [80] - None or not specified [37,101,169,170], [104,108]^a Non-tangible: - ICT and software to manage and communicate with customers and operate relevant activities [37,80,101,169,170], [104]^a - None or not specified [108]^a Human: - None or not specified [37,80,101,169,170], [104,108]^a	Tangible: - None or not specified [104,108]^a Non-tangible: - software to manage bids and control individual flex [104]^a - None or not specified [108]^a Human: - None or not specified [104,108]^a	Tangible: - None or not specified [119,120,123,127,140,145,158,166,167,171–174] Non-tangible: - ICT and software for: - Demand response forecast [171] - Aggregating and managing DERs [140,154,158,166] - Optimisation [120,123,167] - Generation and loads forecast [140,158] - Interaction with the market [140,167] - None or not specified [119,145,172,173] Human: - None or not specified [119,120,123,127,158,166,167,171–174]
Key activities	For upstream customers - Facilitate service provision through: - aggregating individual flexibility [37,104]^a - controlling the performance of individual flexibility providers [104]^a - Facilitate energy trading through: - aggregation of individual consumption/generation profiles [80,170] For downstream customers - Aggregate and actively manage assets of customers [37,108,169,170]^a - Shifting load to off-peak periods [169] - Control, schedule and reschedule DERs for optimised production [37,108,170]^a - Operate local market and facilitate exchange amongst customers [80,104,108]^a - Forward external flexibility needs to customers [104]^a - Interact with other local market participants on behalf of customers to buy/sell supplemental/surplus electricity [101,169,170] - Participate in the wholesale market (bidding) on behalf of aggregated customers [101]	For upstream customers - Facilitate service provision through: - aggregating individual flexibility [104]^a - controlling the performance of individual flexibility providers [104]^a For downstream customers - Aggregate and actively manage assets of customers [108]^a - Control, schedule and reschedule DERs for optimised production [108]^a - Operate local market and facilitate exchange amongst customers [104,108]^a - Forward external flexibility needs to customers [104]^a	For upstream customers - Facilitate service provision through: - Submit DR [171] - Submit requirements and bids from EVs [119,166] - Communicate with DSO [120] - Optimisation [120] For downstream customers - Aggregate and actively manage assets of customers: - Manage DR [158,171] - Manage DERs and submit bids to the market [127,140,158,167,172–174] - Manage EVs and submit bids to DSO and TE operator [119,123,166] - Optimisation of DERs [120,127,158,173] - Participate in the wholesale market (bidding) on behalf of aggregated customers [172,174] - Trade electricity on behalf of prosumers [127,173] - Communicate with DERs [120]
Cost structure	CAPEX: - Not specified [37,80,101,169,170], [104,108]^a OPEX: - Remuneration paid to prosumers for provided flexibility/ancillary services [37,104]^a (Cost equals revenue received [104]^a) - Purchasing electricity from DNO and microgrid operators [169] - grid costs [169] - Not specified [80,101,108,170]^a	CAPEX: - Not specified [104,108]^a OPEX: - Remuneration paid to prosumers for provided flexibility/ancillary services [104]^a (Cost equals revenue received [104]^a) - Not specified [108]^a	CAPEX: - BESS investment cost [173] - ICT [167] - Not specified [119,120,123,127,140,145,158,166,171,172,174] OPEX: - purchase costs for electricity from upstream (wholesale) market [119,123,140,158,167] - generation (fuel) costs for local electricity [127,158,172,173] - opportunity costs for local flexibility (e.g., load shifting) [158,167,172,173] - imbalance costs [119,123,127,158,167,173] - Not specified [120,145,154,166,171,174]

^aEntry refers to a paper that contains more than one energy market model

Table D.18

Detailed business model elements with references of reviewed representatives in local energy markets.

Representative	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	- increased monetary benefits through - reduced electricity procurement costs [90] - balancing monetary benefits with individual preferences - comfort [90]		- increased monetary benefits through - reduced electricity procurement costs [141,145,146,157,177] - enhanced revenues for generation [145,177] - balancing monetary benefits with individual preferences - comfort [145,146] - risk [177] - local flexibility to mitigate network issues or solve local imbalances [176]
Customer segments	Pure Consumer [90]		- Pure Consumer [141,146,157] - Prosumer [141,145,176,177] - Aggregator [176]
Customer relationships	automated [90]		- automated [141,145,146,176,177] - not specified [157]
Channels	Evaluation: - individual comfort preferences versus financial gains [90] Purchase: - contracting representative [90] - through EMS - automatically, once EMS is installed [90] Delivery: - commercially through individual EMS [90]		Evaluation: - individual preferences versus financial gains [146,177] - cost [141,176] - none or not specified [145,157] Purchase: - through EMS - automatically, once EMS is installed [141,146] - manually, via active bidding [176] - not specified [145,157,177] Delivery: - commercially through individual EMS [141,145,146,177] - physically through local distribution grid [141,146] - not specified [157,176]
Revenue streams	Fixed Revenues: - none or not specified [90] Variable revenues: - none or not specified [90]		Fixed revenues: - none or not specified [141,145,146,157,176,177] Variable revenues: - none or not specified [141,145,146,157,176,177]
Key partners	- Aggregator [90] - Platform Operator (local energy market) [90]		- Aggregator [145] - Platform Operator [141,146,157,177] - local energy market [141,157,177] - wholesale market [146] - Grid Operator (DSO) [145] - none or not specified [176]
Key resources	Tangible: - none or not specified [90] Non-tangible: - ability to process multiple forecast and input information [90] - ability to aggregate individual customer appliances in one joint bidding function [90] - optimisation algorithm for optimal bidding [90] - ability to control customer appliances [90] Human: - none or not specified [90]		Tangible: - none or not specified [141,146,157,176,177] - ICT infrastructure [145] Non-tangible: - ability to forecast: - individual demand [141,146,157] - demand elasticity [176] - individual generation [141,146] - weather conditions [146] - market prices [146,177] - ability to aggregate individual customer appliances in one joint bidding function [145,177] - optimisation algorithm for optimal bidding [146,157,177] - ability to control customer appliances [141,145,146,157,176,177] Human: - none or not specified [141,145,146,157,176,177]
Key activities	Ex-ante: - process information - on demand forecast [90] - on weather forecast [90] - on market prices [90] - on updated status of local devices [90] Real-time: - actively represent and optimise customer's position - in interaction with other peers [90] Ex-post: - schedule and control customer's appliances [90]		Ex-ante: - process information - on demand and or generation forecast [146,157,177] - on weather forecast [146] - on market prices [146] - on updated status of local devices [141,145,146,157,176,177] - customer preferences [177] Real-time: - actively represent and optimise customer's position - in interaction with other peers [141] - interaction with higher level agent (Aggregator/Grid Operator) [145,176] - in local energy market [157,177] - in wholesale market [146] Ex-post: - schedule and control customer's appliances [141,145,146,157,176,177]

(continued on next page)

Table D.18 (continued).

Representative			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Cost structure	CAPEX: • none or not specified [90] Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [90] Variable OPEX: • none or not specified [90]		CAPEX: • none or not specified [141,145,146,157,176,177] Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [141,145,146,157,176,177] Variable OPEX: • none or not specified [141,145,146,157,176,177]

Table D.19

Detailed business model elements with references of reviewed retailers in local energy markets.

Retailer			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	• increased monetary benefits through reduced costs for electricity consuming customers via – DR and load shifting services [148,151] – innovative ToU pricing [37] • security of supply (supplier of last resort) [59,92] • balancing responsibility provision [59] • platform provision and central intermediary for P2P market [78,92,148]		• increased monetary benefits through reduced costs for electricity consuming customers via – DR and load shifting services [167,168,171] – innovative ToU pricing [130,167,178] – own storage [167,171] • local flexibility from DR [168,178] • increased monetary benefits through enhanced revenues for generating parties [168] • security of supply (supplier of last resort and local Grid Operator) [167,168]
Customer segments	• Pure Consumers [151] • Prosumer [37,59,78,92,148] • Platform Operator (<i>wholesale market</i>) [148] • Pure Generators [78]		• Pure Consumers [167,171,178] • Prosumer [130,168] • Aggregators (<i>Load- & DR-Aggregators</i>) [168] • Grid Operators (<i>DSO</i>) [168] • Platform Operator (<i>wholesale market</i>) [168] • Pure Generators [168]
Customer relationships	• automated [37,59,78,92,148,151]		• automated [130,167,168,171,178]
Channels	Evaluation: • no evaluation, monopolistic operation or last resort [92] • price with financial gains vs. – individual utility functions (e.g. based on comfort level for load shifting) [148,151] – local (P2P) market price [78] Purchase: • last resort whenever local (P2P) market is exhausted [59,92] • being involved in a network contract [78] • offering a load schedule and adapting accordingly when required [151] Delivery: • physically through distribution grid [37,59,78,148,151] • commercially through EMS [151]		Evaluation: • no evaluation, monopolistic operation [168,171] • price with financial gains [130,167,168,178] Purchase: • automatically, once signed up [167,168,178] • manually, through active bidding to a platform provided by the retailer or the Platform Operator [130,168] Delivery: • physically through distribution grid [130,168] • commercially through local market participation and clearing [130,168]
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues: • none or not specified [37,59,78,92,148,151] Variable revenues: • sold electricity times fixed retail price [59,92] • sold electricity times variable market price [78,148,151] • none or not specified [37,92]		Fixed revenues: • Service fee [167] • none or not specified [130,168,171,178] Variable revenues: • sold electricity times fixed retail price [168] • sold electricity times variable market price [130,167,168,171,178] • avoided costs from DR usage [168] • none or not specified [178]
Key partners	• other Retailers (<i>acting e.g. as BRPs</i>) [37,148] • Grid Operators [37] • Pure Generators [37,78] • Metering Operators [37]		• other Retailers (<i>acting e.g. as BRPs</i>) [167] • Grid Operators [130,167] • Pure Generators [167] • Platform Operators [130,168] • Aggregator [171] • none or not specified [153,178]
Key resources	Tangible: • distribution grid [59,151] • ICT infrastructure [148,151] • generation assets (conventional) [92] • EMS [151]		Tangible: • distribution grid [167,168] • ICT infrastructure [167] • generation assets (conventional) [167,178] • BESS [167,171] • none or not specified [130]

(continued on next page)

Table D.19 (continued).

Retailer			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Key resources (<i>cont'd</i>)	Non-tangible: - ability to aggregate individual flexibility bids of customers [78,148] - ability to clear local market with Nash equilibrium [92] Human: - none or not specified [37,59,78,92,148,151]		Non-tangible: - ability to aggregate individual flexibility bids of customers [167,168] - ability to clear local market [167,168,171,178] - local market platform [168,171,178] ability to determine optimal bidding [130,167,168,171,178] - none or not specified [153] Human: - none or not specified [130,167,168,171,178]
Key activities	- supply electricity to customers [59,148] [37,78,92,151] - run and clear local market [78,92] - assume local balancing responsibility (<i>for unmet demand, unmet transactions and other uncertainties</i>) [59,92,151] - connect downstream and upstream market levels [37,148,151] - to other Retailers [37] - to wholesale market [148] - with aggregated customer bids [148,151] - facilitate electricity exchange amongst customers [37]		- supply electricity to customers [130,167,168,171,178] - run and clear local market [167,168,171,178] - assume local balancing responsibility (<i>for unmet demand, unmet transactions and other uncertainties</i>) [130,167] - connect downstream and upstream market levels [167,168,171] - to other Retailers [167] - to wholesale market [167,168,171] - with aggregated customer bids [167,168]
Cost structure	CAPEX: - none or not specified [37,59,78,92,148,151] Fixed OPEX: - none or not specified [37,59,78,92,148,151] Variable OPEX: - bought electricity times - fixed power purchase agreement price [37] - fixed feed-in price [59] - variable wholesale market price [78] - variable local market price [148] - transaction costs [78] - generation costs [92] - none or not specified [151]		CAPEX: - ICT infrastructure investment [167] - none or not specified [130,168,171,178] Fixed OPEX: - none or not specified [130,167,168,171,178] Variable OPEX: - bought electricity times - variable wholesale market price [167,168,171] - variable local market price [168] - generation costs [178] - none or not specified [130]

Table D.20

Detailed business model elements with references of reviewed grid operators in local energy markets.

Grid operator			
	P2P	CSC	TE
Value proposition	- increased monetary benefits [55], through - electricity provision at convenient rates (below regular retail rate) [55] - electricity purchase at convenient rates (above feed-in tariff) [55] - security of supply (supplier of last resort) [55]		- active grid operation, guaranteeing power quality [112,119,120,161,166,168,174,179–181] - peak shaving [166] - dispatches aggregator resources to avoid congestion and voltage problems [119] - procures capacity [161] - increased monetary benefits [112,120,161,166,168,174,180,181], through - electricity provision at convenient rates (below wholesale or regular retail rate) [168] - electricity provision at wholesale or regular retail rate [112] - electricity purchase at convenient rates [168] - flexibility purchase [112,120,161,166] - platform provision and central intermediary for local market [120,161,168,174,179,181] - security of supply (supplier of last resort) [112,168]
Customer segments	Prosumer [55]		- Prosumer [119,166,168,174,181] - Pure Consumer [120,168,179] - Pure Generator [168,179] - Storage Operator [161,179] - Aggregator [120,166,174,180] - Representatives [112] - Wholesale market [168] - other Grid Operator [168]
Customer relationships	Automated [55]		- Automated [112,119,120,161,166,168,174,179,180] - Collaborative [181]

(continued on next page)

Table D.20 (continued).

Grid operator		
	P2P	CSC TE
Channels	Evaluation: • None (captive) Purchase: • Active market participation (also submitting own bids) [55] Delivery: • Distribution network [55]	Evaluation: • pure price (local market vs wholesale) [161,174,179–181] • “eagerness factor” [112,120,166] • none [119,168] Purchase: • Simple (market) mechanism sign-up [120,161,166] • Active market participation (also submitting own bids) [112,168,179,181] • not specified [119] Delivery: • operational (often) through market/platform operator [112,161,180] • physically always through distribution grid [120,166,168,174,179,181] • not specified [119]
Revenue streams	Fixed revenues: • none or not specified [55] Variable revenues: • sale of electricity at price above P2P clearing [55]	Fixed revenues: • none or not specified [112,119,120,161,166,168,174,179–181] Variable revenues: • sold electricity times wholesale market price [168] • none or not specified [112,119,120,161,166,174,179–181]
Key partners	• None [55]	• Platform Operator [112,119,166] • Wholesale market [168,181] • Aggregator [120] • other Grid Operator (TSO) [181]
Key resources	Tangible: • Electrical network [55] • Storage system [55] Non-tangible: • none or not specified [55] Human: • Supervision of the operation [55]	Tangible: • Electrical network [112,119,120,161,166,168,174,179–181] Non-tangible: • Optimisation algorithm [112,120,168,179,181] • Forecasting algorithm [119,168,179] • Pricing algorithm [168,181] Human: • Supervision of the operation [179] • none or not specified [112,119,120,161,166,168,174,180,181]
Key activities	• retailing electricity [55] • resource management [55]	• grid operation [112,119,120,161,166,168,174,179–181] • market operation [120,168,174,179–181] • retailing electricity [112,168] • resource management [161]
Cost structure	CAPEX: • none or not specified [55] Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [55] Variable OPEX: • purchase of electricity from local prosumers at price lower than P2P clearing [55]	CAPEX: • none or not specified [112,119,120,161,166,168,174,179–181] Fixed OPEX: • none or not specified [112,119,120,161,166,168,174,179–181] Variable OPEX: • purchase (dispatch) of electricity within local distribution area [168] • purchase of flexibility at local flex price [112,119,120,161,166] • renewable curtailment costs [181] • none or not specified [174,179,180]

References

- [1] IEA. Net zero by 2050: A roadmap for the global energy sector. Paris; 2021.
- [2] World Energy Council. World energy trilemma index 2020, published by the World Energy Council in partnership with OLIVER WYMAN. World Energy Council; 2020, p. 1–79, URL: https://www.worldenergy.org/assets/downloads/World_Energy_Trilemma_Index_2020_-_REPORT.pdf.
- [3] Hirsch A, Parag Y, Guerrero J. Microgrids: A review of technologies, key drivers, and outstanding issues. *Renew Sustain Energy Rev* 2018;90(September 2017):402–11. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.03.040>.
- [4] Glachant JM. New business models in the electricity sector. 2019, URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/63445>.
- [5] Khorasany M, Mishra Y, Ledwich G. Market framework for local energy trading: A review of potential designs and market clearing approaches. *IET Gener Transm Distrib* 2018;12(22):5899–908. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-gtd.2018.5309>.
- [6] Zhou Y, Wu J, Long C, Ming W. State-of-the-art analysis and perspectives for peer-to-peer energy trading. 2020, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eng.2020.06.002>.
- [7] Abrishambaf O, Lezama F, Faria P, Vale Z. Towards transactive energy systems: An analysis on current trends. *Energy Strategy Rev* 2019;26. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2019.100418>.
- [8] Müller SC, Welpel IM. Sharing electricity storage at the community level: An empirical analysis of potential business models and barriers. *Energy Policy* 2018;118(February):492–503. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.03.064>.
- [9] Hall S, Brown D, Davis M, Ehrtmann M, Holstenkamp L. Business models for prosumers in Europe. PROSEU - Prosumers for the Energy Union: Mainstreaming active participation of citizens in the energy transition (Deliverable N°D4.1). Technical Report May, 2020.
- [10] Osterwalder A, Pigneur Y. Business model generation: A handbook for visionaries, game changers, and challengers. New Jersey, USA: John Wiley & Sons; 2010, URL: www.businessmodelgeneration.com.
- [11] Park C, Yong T. Comparative review and discussion on P2P electricity trading. *Energy Procedia* 2017;128:3–9. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2017.09.003>.
- [12] Rodríguez-Molina J, Martínez-Núñez M, Martínez JF, Pérez-Aguir W. Business models in the smart grid: Challenges, opportunities and proposals for prosumer profitability. *Energies* 2014;7(9):6142–71. <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en7096142>.
- [13] BestRES. Existing business models for renewable energy aggregators. 2016, URL: http://bestres.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/BestRES_Existing-business-models-for-RE-aggregators.pdf.
- [14] Watson N, Gorbacheva A, Schneiders A, Shipworth D, Fell M. Defining peer-to-peer energy trading, community self-consumption and transactive energy

- models: Concept definition paper. SSRN Electron J 2022. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4207445>.
- [15] Zhang C, Wu J, Zhou Y, Cheng M, Long C. Peer-to-Peer energy trading in a Microgrid. *Appl Energy* 2018;220. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.03.010>.
 - [16] IRENA. Innovation landscape brief: Peer-to-peer electricity trading. Technical Report, Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency; 2020.
 - [17] European Parliament. Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast). 2018.
 - [18] Chen S, Liu CC. From demand response to transactive energy: state of the art. *J Mod Power Syst Clean Energy* 2017;5(1):10–9. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40565-016-0256-x>.
 - [19] Liu Z, Wu Q, Huang S, Zhao H. Transactive energy: A review of state of the art and implementation. In: 2017 IEEE Manchester PowerTech, Powertech 2017. IEEE; 2017. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/PTC.2017.7980892>.
 - [20] GridWise Architecture Council. GridWise transactive energy framework version 1.0. Technical Report, 2015, URL: www.gridwiseac.org.
 - [21] Frieden D, Tuerk A, Roberts J, D'Herbement S, Gubina A. Collective self-consumption and energy communities: Overview of emerging regulatory approaches in Europe. Technical Report, COMPILE; 2019, URL: <https://www.compile-project.eu/>.
 - [22] Frieden D, Tuerk A, Neumann C, D'herbement S, Roberts J, Furlan M, Herenčić L, Pavlin B, Marouço R, Primo N, Antunes AR, Rónai B. Collective self-consumption and energy communities: Trends and challenges in the transposition of the EU framework. Technical Report, 2020.
 - [23] Osterwalder A, Pigneur Y, Tucci CL. Clarifying business models: Origins, present, and future of the concept. *Commun Assoc Inf Syst* 2005;16(July). <http://dx.doi.org/10.17705/1cais.01601>.
 - [24] Khorasany M, Mishra Y, Ledwich G. Market framework for local energy trading : A review of potential designs and market clearing approaches. *IET Gener Transm Distrib* 2018;(May 2019). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-gtd.2018.5309>.
 - [25] Bjarghov S, Loschenbrand M, Ibn Saif AU, Alonso Pedrero R, Pfeiffer C, Khadem SK, Rabelhofer M, Revheim F, Farahmand H. Developments and challenges in local electricity markets: A comprehensive review. *IEEE Access* 2021;9:58910–43. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3071830>.
 - [26] Aggarwal S, Kumar N, Tanwar S, Alazab M. A survey on energy trading in the smart grid: Taxonomy, research challenges and solutions. *IEEE Access* 2021;9. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3104354>.
 - [27] Andoni M, Robu V, Flynn D, Abram S, Geach D, Jenkins D, McCallum P, Peacock A. Blockchain technology in the energy sector: A systematic review of challenges and opportunities. *Renew Sustain Energy Rev* 2019;100. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.10.014>.
 - [28] Siano P, De Marco G, Rolan A, Loia V. A survey and evaluation of the potentials of distributed ledger technology for peer-to-peer transactive energy exchanges in local energy markets. *IEEE Syst J* 2019;13(3). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JSYST.2019.2903172>.
 - [29] Mengelkamp E, Dising J, Weinhardt C. Tracing local energy markets: A literature review. *IT - Inf Technol* 2019;61(September 2018):101–10. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/itit-2019-0016>.
 - [30] Tushar W, Saha TK, Yuen C, Smith D, Poor HV. Peer-to-peer trading in electricity networks: An overview. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2020;11(4):3185–200. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2020.2969657>.
 - [31] Ahl A, Yarime M, Tanaka K, Sagawa D. Review of blockchain-based distributed energy: Implications for institutional development. *Renew Sustain Energy Rev* 2019;107. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2019.03.002>.
 - [32] Soto EA, Bosman LB, Wollega E, Leon-Salas WD. Peer-to-peer energy trading: A review of the literature. *Appl Energy* 2021;283. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.116268>.
 - [33] Zhang C, Wu J, Long C, Cheng M. Review of existing peer-to-peer energy trading projects. *Energy Procedia* 2017;(105):2563–8. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2017.03.737>.
 - [34] Hu J, Yang G, Kok K, Xue Y, Bindner HW. Transactive control: a framework for operating power systems characterized by high penetration of distributed energy resources. *J Mod Power Syst Clean Energy* 2017;5(3):451–64. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40565-016-0228-1>.
 - [35] Sousa T, Soares T, Pinson P, Moret F, Baroche T, Sorin E. Peer-to-peer and community-based markets: A comprehensive review. 2019, p. 367–78. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2019.01.036>.
 - [36] Zia MF, Benbouzid M, Elbouchikhi E, Mueen SM, Techato K, Guerrero JM. Microgrid transactive energy: Review, architectures, distributed ledger technologies, and market analysis. *IEEE Access* 2020;8:19410–32. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2968402>.
 - [37] Brown D, Hall S, Davis ME. Prosumers in the post subsidy era: an exploration of new prosumer business models in the UK. *Energy Policy* 2019;135. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.110984>.
 - [38] Zhou Y, Wu J, Long C. Evaluation of peer-to-peer energy sharing mechanisms based on a multiagent simulation framework. *Appl Energy* 2018;222. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.02.089>.
 - [39] Montakhabi M, Zobiri F, van der Graaf S, Deconinck G, Orlando D, Bal-lon P, Mustafa MA. An ecosystem view of peer-to-peer electricity trading: Scenario building by business model matrix to identify new roles. *Energies* 2021;14(15):1–22. <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en14154438>.
 - [40] Pang Y, He Y, Cai H. Business model of distributed photovoltaic energy integrating investment and consulting services in China. *J Clean Prod* 2019;218. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.01.317>.
 - [41] Burger SP, Luke M. Business models for distributed energy resources: A review and empirical analysis. *Energy Policy* 2017;109(June):230–48. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.07.007>.
 - [42] Adams S, Brown D, Pablo J, Chitchyan R, Fell MJ, Hahnel UJJ, Hojckova K, Johnson C, Klein L, Montakhabi M, Say K, Singh A, Watson N. Social and economic value in emerging decentralized energy business models : A critical review. *Energies* 2021;14:1–29.
 - [43] Capper T, Gorbacheva A, Mustafa MA, Bahloul M, Schwidtal JM, Chitchyan R, Andoni M, Robu V, Montakhabi M, Scott IJ, Francis C, Mbavira T, Espana JM, Kiesling L. Peer-to-peer, community self-consumption, and transactive energy: A systematic literature review of local energy market models. *Renew Sustain Energy Rev* 2022;162:112403. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2022.112403>.
 - [44] Dudjak V, Neves D, Alsaif T, Khadem S, Pena-Bello A, Saggese P, Bowler B, Andoni M, Bertolini M, Zhou Y, Lormetieu B, Mustafa MA, Wang Y, Francis C, Zobiri F, Parra D, Papaemmanouil A. Impact of local energy markets integration in power systems layer: A comprehensive review. *Appl Energy* 2021;301(March):117434. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.117434>.
 - [45] O'Regan B, Silva F, O'leidin E, Tahir F, Mould K, Hayes B, Hosseinneshad V, Chitchyan R, Lyons P. P2p, CSC and TE: A survey on hardware, software and data. *Energies* 2021;14(13):1–21. <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en14133851>.
 - [46] De Almeida L, Cappelli V, Klausmann N, Van Soest H. Peer-to-peer trading and energy community in the electricity market : analysing the literature on law and regulation and looking ahead to future challenges. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2021/35, 2021, <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3821689>, URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3821689.
 - [47] Kitchenham B. Procedures for performing systematic reviews. Technical Report, Keele: Keele University; 2004, p. 1–26.
 - [48] Guest G, MacQueen K, Namey EE. *Applied thematic analysis*. Sage Publications; 2011.
 - [49] ENTSO-E. The harmonised electricity market role model. 2020, p. 1–23, URL: https://mwgstorage1.blob.core.windows.net/public/Ebix/Harmonised_Role_Model_2020-01_new.pdf.
 - [50] Khorasany M, Mishra Y, Ledwich G. A decentralized bilateral energy trading system for peer-to-peer electricity markets. *IEEE Trans Ind Electron* 2020;67(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIE.2019.2931229>.
 - [51] Basnet A, Zhong J. Integrating gas energy storage system in a peer-to-peer community energy market for enhanced operation. *Int J Electr Power Energy Syst* 2020;118. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2019.105789>.
 - [52] Le Cadre H, Jacquot P, Wan C, Alasseur C. Peer-to-peer electricity market analysis: From variational to Generalized Nash Equilibrium. *European J Oper Res* 2020;282(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.09.035>.
 - [53] An J, Lee M, Yeom S, Hong T. Determining the Peer-to-Peer electricity trading price and strategy for energy prosumers and consumers within a microgrid. *Appl Energy* 2020;261. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.114335>.
 - [54] Tushar W, Saha TK, Yuen C, Morstyn T, Nahid-Al-Masood, Poor HV, Bean R. Grid influenced peer-to-peer energy trading. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2020;11(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2019.2937981>.
 - [55] Yebiyo M, Mercado R, Gillich A, Chaer I, Day A, Paurine A. Novel economic modelling of a peer-to-peer electricity market with the inclusion of distributed energy storage—The possible case of a more robust and better electricity grid. *Electr J* 2020;33(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2020.106709>.
 - [56] Liu W, Qi D, Wen F. Intraday residential demand response scheme based on peer-to-peer energy trading. *IEEE Trans Ind Inf* 2020;16(3):1823–35. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TII.2019.2929498>.
 - [57] Tushar W, Saha TK, Yuen C, Azim MI, Morstyn T, Poor HV, Niyato D, Bean R. A coalition formation game framework for peer-to-peer energy trading. *Appl Energy* 2020;261. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.114436>.
 - [58] Wang Y, Wu X, Li Y, Yan R, Tan Y, Qiao X, Cao Y. Autonomous energy community based on energy contract. *IET Gener Transm Distrib* 2020;14(4). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-gtd.2019.1223>.
 - [59] Wang Z, Yu X, Mu Y, Jia H. A distributed peer-to-peer energy transaction method for diversified prosumers in urban community microgrid system. *Appl Energy* 2020;260. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.114327>.
 - [60] Hayes B, Thakur S, Breslin J. Co-simulation of electricity distribution networks and peer to peer energy trading platforms. *Int J Electr Power Energy Syst* 2020;115. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2019.105419>.
 - [61] Neagu B-C, Ivanov O, Grigoras G, Gavrilas M. A new vision on the prosumers energy surplus trading considering smart peer-to-peer contracts. *Mathematics* 2020;8(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math8020235>.
 - [62] Chakraborty S, Baarslag T, Kaisers M. Automated peer-to-peer negotiation for energy contract settlements in residential cooperatives. *Appl Energy* 2020;259. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.114173>.

- [63] Samuel O, Almogren A, Javaid A, Zuair M, Ullah I, Javaid N. Leveraging blockchain technology for secure energy trading and least-cost evaluation of decentralized contributions to electrification in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Entropy* 2020;22(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e22020226>.
- [64] Etukudor C, Couraud B, Robu V, Früh W-G, Flynn D, Okereke C. Automated negotiation for peer-to-peer electricity trading in local energy markets. *Energies* 2020;13(4). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en13040920>.
- [65] Leelasantitham A. A business model guideline of electricity utility systems based on blockchain technology in Thailand: A case study of consumers, prosumers and SMEs. *Wirel Pers Commun* 2020;115(4). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12777-020-07202-8>.
- [66] Yang X, Wang G, He H, Lu J, Zhang Y. Automated demand response framework in ELNs: Decentralized scheduling and smart contract. *IEEE Trans Syst Man Cybern: Syst* 2020;50(1). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSMC.2019.2903485>.
- [67] Reihani E, Siano P, Genova M. A new method for peer-to-peer energy exchange in distribution grids. *Energies* 2020;13(4). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en13040799>.
- [68] Pires Klein L, Krivoglazova A, Matos L, Landeck J, de Azevedo M. A novel peer-to-peer energy sharing business model for the portuguese energy market. *Energies* 2019;13(1). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en13010125>.
- [69] Luo F, Dong ZY, Liang G, Murata J, Xu Z. A distributed electricity trading system in active distribution networks based on multi-agent coalition and blockchain. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(5). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2876612>.
- [70] Morstyn T, McCulloch MD. Multiclass energy management for peer-to-peer energy trading driven by prosumer preferences. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(5). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2834472>.
- [71] Troncia M, Galici M, Mureddu M, Ghiani E, Pilo F. Distributed ledger technologies for peer-to-peer local markets in distribution networks. *Energies* 2019;12(17). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12173249>.
- [72] Li Y, Yang W, He P, Chen C, Wang X. Design and management of a distributed hybrid energy system through smart contract and blockchain. *Appl Energy* 2019;248. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.04.132>.
- [73] Paudel A, Chaudhari K, Long C, Gooi HB. Peer-to-peer energy trading in a prosumer-based community microgrid: A game-theoretic model. *IEEE Trans Ind Electron* 2019;66(8). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIE.2018.2874578>.
- [74] Khorasany M, Mishra Y, Babaki B, Ledwich G. Enhancing scalability of peer-to-peer energy markets using adaptive segmentation method. *J Mod Power Syst Clean Energy* 2019;7(4). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40565-019-0510-0>.
- [75] Baroche T, Pinson P, Latimier RL, Ahmed HB. Exogenous cost allocation in peer-to-peer electricity markets. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(4). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2019.2896654>.
- [76] Chen K, Lin J, Song Y. Trading strategy optimization for a prosumer in continuous double auction-based peer-to-peer market: A prediction-integration model. *Appl Energy* 2019;242. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.03.094>.
- [77] Alam MR, St-Hilaire M, Kunz T. Peer-to-peer energy trading among smart homes. *Appl Energy* 2019;238. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.01.091>.
- [78] Morstyn T, Teytelboym A, McCulloch MD. Bilateral contract networks for peer-to-peer energy trading. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2019;10(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2017.2786668>.
- [79] Zepter JM, Lüth A, Crespo del Granado P, Egging R. Prosumer integration in wholesale electricity markets: Synergies of peer-to-peer trade and residential storage. *Energy Build* 2019;184. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2018.12.003>.
- [80] Cali U, Cakir O. Energy policy instruments for distributed ledger technology empowered peer-to-peer local energy markets. *IEEE Access* 2019;7. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2923906>.
- [81] Liu H, Zhang Y, Zheng S, Li Y. Electric vehicle power trading mechanism based on blockchain and smart contract in V2G network. *IEEE Access* 2019;7. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2951057>.
- [82] Wang N, Xu W, Xu Z, Shao W. Peer-to-peer energy trading among microgrids with multidimensional willingness. *Energies* 2018;11(12). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en11123312>.
- [83] Lüth A, Zepter JM, Crespo del Granado P, Egging R. Local electricity market designs for peer-to-peer trading: The role of battery flexibility. *Appl Energy* 2018;229. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.08.004>.
- [84] Di Silvestre ML, Gallo P, Ippolito MG, Sanseverino ER, Zizzo G. A technical approach to the energy blockchain in microgrids. *IEEE Trans Ind Inf* 2018;14(11). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TII.2018.2806357>.
- [85] Nguyen S, Peng W, Sokolowski P, Alahakoon D, Yu X. Optimizing rooftop photovoltaic distributed generation with battery storage for peer-to-peer energy trading. *Appl Energy* 2018;228. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.07.042>.
- [86] Park L, Lee S, Chang H. A sustainable home energy prosumer-chain methodology with energy tags over the blockchain. *Sustainability* 2018;10(3). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su10030658>.
- [87] Mengelkamp E, Gärtner J, Rock K, Kessler S, Orsini L, Weinhardt C. Designing microgrid energy markets. *Appl Energy* 2018;210. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.06.054>.
- [88] Kang J, Yu R, Huang X, Maharjan S, Zhang Y, Hossain E. Enabling localized peer-to-peer electricity trading among plug-in hybrid electric vehicles using consortium blockchains. *IEEE Trans Ind Inf* 2017;13(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TII.2017.2709784>.
- [89] Alam MR, St-Hilaire M, Kunz T. An optimal P2P energy trading model for smart homes in the smart grid. *Energy Effic* 2017;10(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12053-017-9532-5>.
- [90] Lopez-Rodriguez I, Hernandez-Tejera M. Infrastructure based on supernodes and software agents for the implementation of energy markets in demand-response programs. *Appl Energy* 2015;158. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.08.039>.
- [91] Guerrero J, Chapman AC, Verbic G. Decentralized P2P energy trading under network constraints in a low-voltage network. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2019;10(5). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2018.2878445>.
- [92] Ghosh A, Aggarwal V, Wan H. Strategic prosumers: How to set the prices in a tiered market? *IEEE Trans Ind Inf* 2019;15(8). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TII.2018.2889301>.
- [93] Zhou S, Hu Z, Gu W, Jiang M, Zhang X-P. Artificial intelligence based smart energy community management: A reinforcement learning approach. *CSEE J Power Energy Syst* 2019. <http://dx.doi.org/10.17775/CSEEJPES.2018.00840>, URL: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8661902>.
- [94] Inayat K, Hwang SO. Load balancing in decentralized smart grid trade system using blockchain. *J Intell Fuzzy Syst* 2018;35(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/JIFS-169832>.
- [95] Hahnel UJ, Herber M, Pena-Bello A, Parra D, Brosch T. Becoming prosumer: Revealing trading preferences and decision-making strategies in peer-to-peer energy communities. *Energy Policy* 2020;137. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111098>.
- [96] Cui S, Wang Y-W, Xiao J-W. Peer-to-peer energy sharing among smart energy buildings by distributed transaction. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2019;10(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2019.2906059>.
- [97] Sorin E, Bobo L, Pinson P. Consensus-based approach to peer-to-peer electricity markets with product differentiation. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2872880>.
- [98] Zhang H, Li Y, Gao DW, Zhou J. Distributed optimal energy management for energy internet. *IEEE Trans Ind Inf* 2017;13(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TII.2017.2714199>.
- [99] Jing R, Xie MN, Wang FX, Chen LX. Fair P2P energy trading between residential and commercial multi-energy systems enabling integrated demand-side management. *Appl Energy* 2020;262. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.114551>.
- [100] Anoh K, Maharjan S, Ikpehai A, Zhang Y, Adebisi B. Energy peer-to-peer trading in virtual microgrids in smart grids: A game-theoretic approach. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2020;11(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2019.2934830>.
- [101] Wu J, Hu J, Ai X, Zhang Z, Hu H. Multi-time scale energy management of electric vehicle model-based prosumers by using virtual battery model. *Appl Energy* 2019;251. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.113312>.
- [102] Hou W, Guo L, Ning Z. Local electricity storage for blockchain-based energy trading in industrial internet of things. *IEEE Trans Ind Inf* 2019;15(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TII.2019.2900401>.
- [103] Tushar W, Saha TK, Yuen C, Liddell P, Bean R, Poor HV. Peer-to-peer energy trading with sustainable user participation: A game theoretic approach. *IEEE Access* 2018;6. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875405>.
- [104] Zhou S, Zou F, Wu Z, Gu W, Hong Q, Booth C. A smart community energy management scheme considering user dominated demand side response and P2P trading. *Int J Electr Power Energy Syst* 2020;114. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2019.105378>.
- [105] Rodrigues DL, Ye X, Xia X, Zhu B. Battery energy storage sizing optimisation for different ownership structures in a peer-to-peer energy sharing community. *Appl Energy* 2020;262. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.114498>.
- [106] Kuruseelan S, Vaithilingam C. Peer-to-peer energy trading of a community connected with an AC and DC microgrid. *Energies* 2019;12(19). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12193709>.
- [107] Khorasany M, Mishra Y, Ledwich G. Hybrid trading scheme for peer-to-peer energy trading in transactive energy markets. *IET Gener Transm Distrib* 2020;14(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-gtd.2019.1233>.
- [108] Long C, Wu J, Zhou Y, Jenkins N. Peer-to-peer energy sharing through a two-stage aggregated battery control in a community Microgrid. *Appl Energy* 2018;226. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.05.097>.
- [109] Heinisch V, Odenberger M, Göransson L, Johnsson F. Organizing prosumers into electricity trading communities: Costs to attain electricity transfer limitations and self-sufficiency goals. *Int J Energy Res* 2019;43(13):7021–39. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.4720>.
- [110] Moret F, Pinson P. Energy collectives: A community and fairness based approach to future electricity markets. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(5). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2808961>.
- [111] Amato A, Martino BD, Scialdone M, Venticinque S. Distributed architecture for agents-based energy negotiation in solar powered micro-grids. *Concurr Comput: Pract Exper* 2016;28(4). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3757>.

- [112] Nizami MSH, Hossain MJ, Fernandez E. Multiagent-based transactive energy management systems for residential buildings with distributed energy resources. *IEEE Trans Ind Inf* 2020;16(3). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TII.2019.2932109>, URL: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&number=8782552>.
- [113] Wang Y, Huang Z, Shahidehpour M, Lai LL, Wang Z, Zhu Q. Reconfigurable distribution network for managing transactive energy in a multi-microgrid system. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2020;11(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2019.2935565>.
- [114] Lin J, Pipattanasomporn M, Rahman S. Comparative analysis of auction mechanisms and bidding strategies for P2P solar transactive energy markets. *Appl Energy* 2019;255. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.113687>.
- [115] Di Silvestre ML, Gallo P, Ippolito MG, Musca R, Riva Sanseverino E, Tran QTT, Zizzo G. Ancillary services in the energy blockchain for microgrids. *IEEE Trans Ind Appl* 2019;55(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIA.2019.2909496>.
- [116] Liu Y, Gooi HB, Li Y, Xin H, Ye J. A secure distributed transactive energy management scheme for multiple interconnected microgrids considering misbehaviors. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2019;10(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2019.2895229>.
- [117] Faqiry MN, Wang L, Wu H. HEMS-enabled transactive flexibility in real-time operation of three-phase unbalanced distribution systems. *J Mod Power Syst Clean Energy* 2019;7(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40565-019-0553-2>.
- [118] Pinto T, Faia R, Ghazvini MAF, Soares J, Corchado JM, Vale Z. Decision support for small players negotiations under a transactive energy framework. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(5). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2861325>.
- [119] Hu J, Yang G, Ziras C, Kok K. Aggregator operation in the balancing market through network-constrained transactive energy. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(5):4071–80. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2874255>.
- [120] Nazir MS, Hiskens IA. A dynamical systems approach to modeling and analysis of transactive energy coordination. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(5). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2834913>.
- [121] Chen T, Su W. Indirect customer-to-customer energy trading with reinforcement learning. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2019;10(4). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2018.2857449>.
- [122] El-Baz W, Tzschentschler P, Wagner U. Integration of energy markets in microgrids: A double-sided auction with device-oriented bidding strategies. *Appl Energy* 2019;241. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.02.049>.
- [123] Liu Z, Wu Q, Ma K, Shahidehpour M, Xue Y, Huang S. Two-stage optimal scheduling of electric vehicle charging based on transactive control. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2019;10(3). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2018.2815593>.
- [124] Morstyn T, Teytelboym A, McCulloch MD. Designing decentralized markets for distribution system flexibility. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(3). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2886244>.
- [125] Palacios JP, Samper ME, Vargas A. Dynamic transactive energy scheme for smart distribution networks in a Latin American context. *IET Gener Transm Distrib* 2019;13(9). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-gtd.2018.5272>.
- [126] Li J, Zhang C, Xu Z, Wang J, Zhao J, Zhang Y-JA. Distributed transactive energy trading framework in distribution networks. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2018;33(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2854649>.
- [127] Liu Y, Zuo K, Liu XA, Liu J, Kennedy JM. Dynamic pricing for decentralized energy trading in micro-grids. *Appl Energy* 2018;228. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.06.124>.
- [128] Marzband M, Azarnejadian F, Savaghebi M, Pouresmaeil E, Guerrero JM, Lightbody G. Smart transactive energy framework in grid-connected multiple home microgrids under independent and coalition operations. *Renew Energy* 2018;126. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2018.03.021>.
- [129] Pinto T, Fotouhi Ghazvini M, Soares J, Faia R, Corchado J, Castro R, Vale Z. Decision support for negotiations among microgrids using a multiagent architecture. *Energies* 2018;11(10). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en11010526>.
- [130] Marzband M, Fouladfar MH, Akorede MF, Lightbody G, Pouresmaeil E. Framework for smart transactive energy in home-microgrids considering coalition formation and demand side management. *Sustainable Cities Soc* 2018;40. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2018.04.010>.
- [131] Yaghmaee Moghaddam MH, Leon-Garcia A. A fog-based internet of energy architecture for transactive energy management systems. *IEEE Internet Things J* 2018;5(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2018.2805899>.
- [132] Prinsloo G, Dobson R, Mammoli A. Synthesis of an intelligent rural village microgrid control strategy based on smartgrid multi-agent modelling and transactive energy management principles. *Energy* 2018;147. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2018.01.056>.
- [133] Nunna HSVSK, Srinivasan D. Multiagent-based transactive energy framework for distribution systems with smart microgrids. *IEEE Trans Ind Inf* 2017;13(5). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TII.2017.2679808>.
- [134] Prinsloo G, Mammoli A, Dobson R. Customer domain supply and load coordination: A case for smart villages and transactive control in rural off-grid microgrids. *Energy* 2017;135. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2017.06.106>.
- [135] Qi W, Shen B, Zhang H, Shen Z-JM. Sharing demand-side energy resources - A conceptual design. *Energy* 2017;135. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2017.06.144>.
- [136] Chen Y, Hu M. Balancing collective and individual interests in transactive energy management of interconnected micro-grid clusters. *Energy* 2016;109. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2016.05.052>.
- [137] Nezamabadi H, Vahidinasab V. Microgrids bidding strategy in a transactive energy market. *Sci Iran* 2019. <http://dx.doi.org/10.24200/sci.2019.54148.3616>.
- [138] Liu Z, Wang L, Ma L. A transactive energy framework for coordinated energy management of networked microgrids with distributionally robust optimization. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2020;35(1). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2019.2933180>.
- [139] Lezama F, Soares J, Hernandez-Leal P, Kaisers M, Pinto T, Vale Z. Local energy markets: Paving the path toward fully transactive energy systems. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(5). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2833959>.
- [140] Moslehi K, Kumar ABR. Autonomous resilient grids in an IoT landscape vision for a nested transactive grid. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(5). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2810134>.
- [141] Akter M, Mahmud M, Oo A. A hierarchical transactive energy management system for energy sharing in residential microgrids. *Energies* 2017;10(12). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en10122098>.
- [142] Chen Y, Hu M. Swarm intelligence-based distributed stochastic model predictive control for transactive operation of networked building clusters. *Energy Build* 2019;198. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2019.06.010>.
- [143] Janko SA, Johnson NG. Scalable multi-agent microgrid negotiations for a transactive energy market. *Appl Energy* 2018;229. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.08.026>.
- [144] Martínez Ceseña EA, Good N, Syri AL, Mancarella P. Techno-economic and business case assessment of multi-energy microgrids with co-optimization of energy, reserve and reliability services. *Appl Energy* 2018;210. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.08.131>.
- [145] Nguyen HT, Battula S, Takkala RR, Wang Z, Tesfatsion L. An integrated transmission and distribution test system for evaluation of transactive energy designs. *Appl Energy* 2019;240. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.01.178>.
- [146] Nizami M, Hossain M, Amin BR, Fernandez E. A residential energy management system with bi-level optimization-based bidding strategy for day-ahead bi-directional electricity trading. *Appl Energy* 2020;261. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.114322>.
- [147] Zhang Z, Li R, Li F. A novel peer-to-peer local electricity market for joint trading of energy and uncertainty. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2020;11(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2019.2933574>.
- [148] Mukherjee M, Marinovici L, Hardy T, Hansen J. Framework for large-scale implementation of wholesale-retail transactive control mechanism. *Int J Electr Power Energy Syst* 2020;115. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2019.105464>.
- [149] Dang C, Zhang J, Kwong C-P, Li L. Demand side load management for big industrial energy users under blockchain-based peer-to-peer electricity market. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2019;10(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2019.2904629>.
- [150] Yu Y, Guo Y, Min W, Zeng F. Trusted transactions in micro-grid based on blockchain. *Energies* 2019;12(10). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12101952>.
- [151] Noor S, Yang W, Guo M, van Dam KH, Wang X. Energy demand side management within micro-grid networks enhanced by blockchain. *Appl Energy* 2018;228. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.07.012>.
- [152] Hasanpor Divshali P, Choi B, Liang H, Söder L. Transactive demand side management programs in smart grids with high penetration of EVs. *Energies* 2017;10(10). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en10101640>.
- [153] Lian J, Ren H, Sun Y, Hammerstrom DJ. Performance evaluation for transactive energy systems using double-auction market. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(5):4128–37. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2875919>.
- [154] Liu C, Zhou J, Pan Y, Li Z, Wang Y, Xu D, Ding Q, Luo Z, Shahidehpour M. Multi-period market operation of transmission-distribution systems based on heterogeneous decomposition and coordination. *Energies* 2019;12(16). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12163126>.
- [155] Amin W, Huang Q, Afzal M, Khan AA, Umer K, Ahmed SA. A converging non-cooperative & cooperative game theory approach for stabilizing peer-to-peer electricity trading. *Electr Power Syst Res* 2020;183. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2020.106278>.
- [156] Saxena K, Abhyankar AR. Agent based bilateral transactive market for emerging distribution system considering imbalances. *Sustain Energy Grids Netw* 2019;18. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.segan.2019.100203>.
- [157] Behboodi S, Chassin DP, Djilali N, Crawford C. Transactive control of fast-acting demand response based on thermostatic loads in real-time retail electricity markets. *Appl Energy* 2018;210. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.07.058>.
- [158] Qiu J, Meng K, Zheng Y, Dong ZY. Optimal scheduling of distributed energy resources as a virtual power plant in a transactive energy framework. *IET Gener Transm Distrib* 2017;11(13):3417–27. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-gtd.2017.0268>.
- [159] Faqiry M, Edmonds L, Zhang H, Khodaei A, Wu H. Transactive-market-based operation of distributed electrical energy storage with grid constraints. *Energies* 2017;10(11). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en10111891>.
- [160] Kloppenburg S, Smale R, Verkade N. Technologies of engagement: How battery storage technologies shape household participation in energy transitions. *Energies* 2019;12(22). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12224384>.

- [161] Moazeni S, Defourny B. Optimal control of energy storage under random operation permissions. *IIESE Trans* 2018;50(8). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24725854.2017.1401756>.
- [162] Huang H, Nie S, Lin J, Wang Y, Dong J. Optimization of peer-to-peer power trading in a microgrid with distributed PV and battery energy storage systems. *Sustainability* 2020;12(3). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12030923>.
- [163] Zhang H, Zhang H, Song L, Li Y, Han Z, Poor HV. Peer-to-peer energy trading in DC packetized power microgrids. *IEEE J Sel Areas Commun* 2020;38(1). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2019.2951991>.
- [164] Meena NK, Yang J, Zacharis E. Optimisation framework for the design and operation of open-market urban and remote community microgrids. *Appl Energy* 2019;252. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.113399>.
- [165] Wang S, Taha AF, Wang J, Kvaternik K, Hahn A. Energy crowdsourcing and peer-to-peer energy trading in blockchain-enabled smart grids. *IEEE Trans Syst Man Cybern: Syst* 2019;49(8):1612–23. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSMC.2019.2916565>.
- [166] Masood A, Hu J, Xin A, Sayed AR, Yang G. Transactive energy for aggregated electric vehicles to reduce system peak load considering network constraints. *IEEE Access* 2020;8:31519–29. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2973284>.
- [167] Good N, Martínez Ceseña EA, Heltorp C, Mancarella P. A transactive energy modelling and assessment framework for demand response business cases in smart distributed multi-energy systems. *Energy* 2019;184. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2018.02.089>.
- [168] Renani YK, Ehsan M, Shahidehpour M. Optimal transactive market operations with distribution system operators. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2018;9(6). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2017.2718546>.
- [169] Zhang J, Hu C, Zheng C, Rui T, Shen W, Wang B. Distributed peer-to-peer electricity trading considering network loss in a distribution system. *Energies* 2019;12(22). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12224318>.
- [170] Lyu, Xu, Wang, Fu, Xu. A two-layer interactive mechanism for peer-to-peer energy trading among virtual power plants. *Energies* 2019;12(19). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12193628>.
- [171] Feng C, Li Z, Shahidehpour M, Wen F, Li Q. Stackelberg game based transactive pricing for optimal demand response in power distribution systems. *Int J Electr Power Energy Syst* 2020;118. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2019.105764>.
- [172] Mohy-ud din G, Muttaqi KM, Sutanto D. Transactive energy-based planning framework for VPPs in a co-optimised day-ahead and real-time energy market with ancillary services. *IET Gener Transm Distrib* 2019;13(11). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-gtd.2018.5831>.
- [173] Qiu J, Zhao J, Yang H, Dong ZY. Optimal scheduling for prosumers in coupled transactive power and gas systems. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2018;33(2). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2017.2715983>.
- [174] Siano P, Sarno D, Straccia L, Marrazzo AT. A novel method for evaluating the impact of residential demand response in a real time distribution energy market. *J Ambient Intell Humaniz Comput* 2016;7(4). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12652-015-0339-y>.
- [175] Wang D, Hu Q, Jia H, Hou K, Du W, Chen N, Wang X, Fan M. Integrated demand response in district electricity-heating network considering double auction retail energy market based on demand-side energy stations. *Appl Energy* 2019;248. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.04.050>.
- [176] Babar M, Grela J, Ozadowicz A, Nguyen P, Hanzelka Z, Kamphuis I. Energy flexometer: Transactive energy-based internet of things technology. *Energies* 2018;11(3). <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en11030568>.
- [177] Ghorani R, Fotuhi-Firuzabad M, Moeini-Aghtaie M. Optimal bidding strategy of transactive agents in local energy markets. *IEEE Trans Smart Grid* 2019;10(5). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2018.2878024>.
- [178] Tan X, Leon-Garcia A, Wu Y, Tsang DH. Posted-price retailing of transactive energy: An optimal online mechanism without prediction. *IEEE J Sel Areas Commun* 2020;38(1):5–16. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2019.2951930>.
- [179] Faqiry MN, Edmonds L, Wu H, Pahwa A. Distribution locational marginal price-based transactive day-ahead market with variable renewable generation. *Appl Energy* 2020;259. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.114103>.
- [180] Melendez KA, Subramanian V, Das TK, Kwon C. Empowering end-use consumers of electricity to aggregate for demand-side participation. *Appl Energy* 2019;248. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.04.092>.
- [181] Liu W, Zhan J, Chung CY. A novel transactive energy control mechanism for collaborative networked microgrids. *IEEE Trans Power Syst* 2019;34(3). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2881251>.
- [182] European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU. 2019, p. 125–99. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_285/l_28520031101en00330037.pdf.
- [183] IRENA. Innovation landscape brief: Co-operation between transmission and distribution system operators. Technical Report, International Renewable Energy Agency; 2020.
- [184] Löbbe S, Sioshansi F, Robinson D. Energy communities. Academic Press; 2022. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/C2021-0-01002-6>.