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Historiography as Critique of Ideology: The Legacy of Hobbes in International Relations Theory¹

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"What can one learn from Martin Wight's example?" (Bull 1991: xxiii). In his famous answer to this question, Hedley Bull stresses the importance of associating theoretical (i. e. moral and normative) inquiry with historical inquiry. Professional diplomatic historians have no interest in theoretical questions, he continues, nor the theorists of international relations in historical ones, which they consider mere "data". "Wight is one of the few to have bridged this gap" (Bull 1991: xxiii). He did see that the great classic in international relations – Thucydides's *Peloponnesian War* – is not theoretical, but a historical work, and that central issues in international relations have been better dealt with in historical rather than in theoretical contexts. At the same time, he believed that traditional historical work should be associated with theoretical work, leading to a philosophical reflection on ethical questions (Wight 1966: 33; Bull 1991: xxi). The difficulty of associating theoretical with historical inquiry is a core problem in international relations. If classical realism had a predominantly historical approach, and specifically as one of its main targets is the a-historicity of utopian-idealism, most contemporary theoretical reflection in international relations lacks historiographical categories. A problematic effect of this absence of historical inquiry is a deficiency in analysing the contingent character of social phenomena. Hence there is a necessity to reintroduce historiography as a fundamental method of analysis in the theory of international relations. A reaction in this sense can be found in recent works on classical realism (Guzzini 2001) as well as in more recent works that consider themselves to be a part of this tradition (Cox 1997).

In this context, we ask how Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679), as one of the principal sources of classical realism, can contribute to this debate. Authors concerned with historical investigation find in Hobbes the historian and the reader of Thucydides. Normativists find in Hobbes a theory of state and natural law, in which history is reduced to a mere retelling of facts. Between the historian Hobbes and the theorist Hobbes there seems to be no correspondence. Hobbes' historiography further presents the problem of being above all anthropological, focusing more on the constancy of human nature than on the variability of social formations. The materiality of his theory is thus restricted to a natural and psychological one. His theory of state and natural law is to this day also criticised for its excessive institutionalism. However, the systematic coupling of his historiography with his theory of state and law goes

¹ This chapter is a revised version and translation of Nour & Zittel 2003.

beyond the dualism of opposite approaches such as idealism vs. realism, and normativism vs. materialism, developing a criticism of idealism and ideology, that analyses how ideas configure societies – although primarily addressing theoretical systems others than his own, whose contingency Hobbes will not recognise.

Our purpose is to investigate how Hobbes associates theoretical with historical inquiry, and how a reconstruction of Hobbes can solve some of the theoretical problems of today. To begin, in the first part, we study how Hobbes justifies his methodology of thinking both historically and theoretically. Then, in the second part, we analyse how this way of thinking allows Hobbes to develop his critique of ideology and evolutionism, a decisive aspect of the importance of Hobbes in international relations. Finally, in the third part, we can verify how some contemporary theories fall prey to the same difficulties with which Hobbes struggled.

I. Hobbes' Historiography

1. Readings of Hobbes in International Relations Theory

Hobbes is for realists the ultimate reference to a war of all against all (and the myth of Hobbes as a philosopher of war still dominates the public rhetoric, as voiced by American diplomat Robert Kagan) – which occupies only a few lines in *Leviathan* (Hobbes 1651: chap. 13). Realists attribute to Hobbes a distinction between law and rational ethical precepts as well as the conception of the so called “security dilemma”: the fear of being attacked leads to the search for more security and power than the other, in a vicious cycle of competition for power (Herz 1950), until a common wish for (and aversion to) a sovereign power (Navari 1996: 27–31) unifies everyone. This reading no longer finds favour among Hobbes-inspired normativists: Hobbes' Laws of Nature are rational and ethically genuine obligations of *foro interno* (they oblige the sovereign), associated with sociability and the good life, providing “a standard beyond desire and aversion for directing behaviour” (Navari 1996: 31–33). The association of Hobbes with rational prudence – the cooperation between rational egoists in the context of the “security dilemma”, a vision developed by the games theorists – is also no longer accepted. For Hobbes the cooperation between rational egoists is not sufficient to save them from the state of nature. Prudence, which can always adapt itself, can not produce peace and order (coalitions of states can lead to war). Only the international “Leviathan” can guarantee stability (Navari 1996: 28–31).

This is also the difficulty with Thomas Johnson's reading of Hobbes, for whom the value of realism actuality in the post-cold-war world is a result not of its justification of reason of State, but of its “sophistic” structure, which allows criticising every intention of universality. A premise of sophistic epistemology, says Johnson – the subjective nature of truth – can be identified in Hobbes's nominalism, according to which human beings differ from other animals through speech, by which attribution of names creates what is correct or wrong (Johnson 1996: 194–196): “For *true* and

false are attributes of speech, not of things. And where speech is not, there is neither *truth* nor *falsehood*; *error* there may be, as when we expect that which shall not be, or suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth” (Hobbes 1651: 23). Hobbes still says: “for one man calleth *wisdom*, what another calleth *fear*; and one *cruelty*, what another *justice*; one *prodigality*, what another *magnanimity*; and one *gravity*, what another *stupidity*, &c” (Hobbes 1651: 29). It is thus for Johnson, as a human creation, subject to change and personal interpretation. Norms change with modification of the social conditions where they appeared, which is a reflection of a certain arrangement of power at a certain time in history (Johnson 1996: 246). Realism, concludes the author, is still the most appropriate doctrine to identify and analyse power arrangements. But Hobbes would not agree with a reading that ignores the normative concerns of his work and interprets his nominalism in the sense of relativism.

It’s still Carr who can rightly be considered the realist most near to Hobbes, for not separating morality and politics, and reconciling in this way two antagonistic traditions – idealism and realism: “any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia (i. e. values) and reality (i. e. power). Where utopianism has become a hollow and intolerable sham, which serves merely as a disguise for the interests of the privileged, the realist performs an indispensable service in unmasking it. But pure realism can offer nothing but a power struggle which makes any kind of international society impossible” (Carr 1939: 93)². David Boucher also emphasises Hobbes’s normative concern, showing the relation between history and theory in Hobbes’s work. Inspired by Forsyth’s reading of Hobbes (Forsyth 1979), Boucher identifies an evolution of three phases in relationships between individuals as well as states: the war state of all against all is the first phase; the second one is the relationship between groups; the third is the establishment of a community through the institution. Boucher’s purpose is to analyse relations between communities in this modified state of nature, presupposing a distinction between on the one hand the state of nature, a mere hypothetical or logical state, and on the other hand the pre-civil historical condition (Boucher 1998: 148 – 149). The state of nature is fiction, which has the function to show the necessity of a strong government and doesn’t have any historical basis³. But the modified state of nature has really existed; it appeared through institution and conquering. Patriarchal authority is the basis of social cohesion, developed through the procreation of its members, conquering, and the gathering of individuals searching for protection. Even though that there is no natural law for these relationships, there is a code of honour. And if there is no historical parallel to the state of nature, there is one for the pre-civil: amazon women, Saxon and German families, in-

² Power and value do not exclude themselves: “the utopian who dreams that is possible to eliminate self-assertion from politics and to base a political system on morality alone is just as wide of the mark as the realist who believes that altruism is an illusion and that all political action is self-seeking” (Carr 1939: 97).

³ “There had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another” (Hobbes 1651: 115).

digenous Americans and paternal communities in ancient Greece. In history, domination by conquest prevails: hypothetical sovereignty is rare. However, the rights of these both are the same (Boucher 1998: 157)⁴. Analysing Hobbes's historiography in the sense of progress, Boucher criticises the classical interpretation of Hedley Bull, who denies in Hobbes any conception of evolutionism: "Hedley Bull has argued the 'the conception of progress is, of course, entirely absent from Hobbes's account of the international state of nature' (Bull 1981: 730). My account of how Hobbes perceived the international sphere, and his advice to sovereigns for the better conduct of their relations (...) indicates that Hobbes believed progress to be both possible and desirable in international affairs" (Hobbes 1651: 115; Boucher 1998: 161). This identification of Hobbes's historical conception with evolutionism is however not accepted by Hobbes, for whom human nature is constant, and the achievements of civilisation transient. Furthermore, the concept of an intermediary condition between the state of nature and civil society, composed of alliances and confederations of States and quasi-States, is not sufficiently normative: "Even here, however, we have to answer the question from whence the obligations derives and the validity and duration of such contracts" (Navari 1996: 34). Only the natural law can explain why these obligations are imposed.

The difficulty consists in understanding which forms the international Leviathan must have, since according to Hobbes it is a legal entity, and not a security system (Navari 1996: 28–29). For Navari, the natural laws by Hobbes (general guides to the reason of individuals), can constitute the basis for an international legal and moral order between them. Hobbes can contribute to international relations with his theory of law, whose principal characteristics are: (1) a distinction between precepts of reason and prudence, on the one hand, and civil laws, on the other; (2) the idea that natural law is possible only as civil law; (3) the connection between civil law and sociability. A coherent legal order and respect therefore make social life possible. When people are freed from dominant traditions, they can follow rational imperatives (Navari 1996: 7–39). What matters for Navari is more the doctrine of law than the relationship between history and theory.

2. Hobbes' Historiography⁵

Hobbes's view on historiography is rarely a prominent question in the course of research on his work. It is not difficult to understand the reasons for this. According to the traditional and widely accepted reading of Hobbes, his official theory of the division of science accords to historiography the status of knowledge, but not of sci-

⁴ "In sum the rights and consequences of both *paternal* and *despotical* domination, are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution" (Hobbes 1651: 190).

⁵ See Detel and Zittel 2001.

ence. Knowledge is for Hobbes the knowledge of facts or the knowledge of causes⁶, and only the knowledge of causes is science. In other words, science is the knowledge of the consequences of assertions; its object is the connection of causes to effects and it is presented methodologically in the form of arguments. Knowledge of facts is natural history or civil history. Historiography seems to have no other task than the sheer listing of historical facts, and thus is not science (Hobbes 1655: I 1 and 6; Hobbes 1651: chap. 9).⁷ Furthermore, while natural history plays a crucial role in the natural sciences since the facts of nature constitute its empirical basis, historiography does not seem to play a similar role in the civil sciences, particularly in state philosophy.⁸ Historiography does not seem to Hobbes to be an interesting field, and this is the reason why Hobbes's research has dealt little with this topic.⁹

However, this analysis is difficult to reconcile with the fact that Hobbes has always written as a historiographer. In his early humanistic phase, he provided with his *Tacitus Essay*¹⁰ a historical interpretation of Octavian's (Augustus) ascension to Emperor of Rome; with his translation and introduction to Thucydides' work on the Peloponnesian War, he reflected on the study of history and the conditions for an adequate historiography, that accord to Thucydides' one a highly scientific and moral value. This attitude is generally seen as part of the humanistic phase in Hobbes' work which was later abandoned after a methodological and epistemological turn. But these interpretations do not explain why the mature Hobbes wrote works like *Behemoth* and

⁶ It is frequently accentuated in research on Hobbes that this elementary distinction is also presented by Bacon (1605: 351–356) and Descartes (1676: 502–503). What is not frequently mentioned is that it is also an Aristotelian distinction, which was already explicitly presented in the *Analytica Posteriora* (II 1–2). Collections of facts can be found among Aristoteles's writings on biology (principally the *Historia Animalium*) as well as his etiological writings (such as *De Partibus Animalium*). Aristotle, in contrast to Hobbes, considers the collection of facts methodologically, see Kullmann 1974 and Detel 1998.

⁷ “The register of knowledge of fact is called *history*. Whereof there be two sorts: one called *natural history*; which is the history of such facts, or effects of nature, as have no dependence on mans will; (...). The other, is *civil history*; which is the history of the voluntary actions of men in commonwealths.” (Hobbes 1651: 71). Science is characterised in *De Corpore* (Hobbes 1655: I 1) as knowledge of causes, and in *Leviathan* (Hobbes 1651: chap. 9) distinguished by *Reasoning* and the *Knowledge of the Consequence of one Affirmation to another*. For distinctions in Hobbes's division of the sciences, see Sorell 1996. Also, according to Sorell, these distinctions do not influence the fundamental role of Hobbes's historiography.

⁸ Natural history as a collection of facts is fundamental to the philosophy of nature (Hobbes 1655: I 8), while the study of history is not instructive for morals and even frequently politically dangerous (Hobbes 1651: chapters 19 and 24).

⁹ An affirmation among others: “Hobbes insists on a geometrical procedural foundation of political order, and attributes less importance to history, reducing it to a historical contingency.” In the dedication in *De Cive*, he deals with “a procedure of historical and spatial de-contextualisation, in order to generate in the field of moral philosophy and political theory universal assumptions” (Münkler 1993: 21).

¹⁰ For the new edition of *Horae Subsecivae*, which was published anonymously by Hobbes in 1620, see Reynolds and Saxonhouse (1995) and also Tuck (2000).

the *Historia Ecclesiastica*, two other comprehensive historical works, as well as other, shorter historical writings.

Tom Sorell and G.A.J. Roger, two renowned Hobbes researchers, edited a short time ago a volume of essays expressly dedicated to Hobbes' treatment of history as a field of research (Rogers and Sorell 2000). These essays deal with his historical works, his conceptualisation of history in his systematic works, his reflection on the rhetorical possibilities of historiography and his theoretical and methodological evaluation of historiography. These four aspects of Hobbes' relationship with history show that there is far more to say about it than has been traditionally suggested. The difficulty is that these essays do not systematically connect these different aspects. This does not allow us to put aside or even diminish the tension between on the one hand Hobbes' methodological and political view of historiography and on the other his practice of historiography. The essays on Hobbes' historiography simply echo the traditional reading,¹¹ and the works which accentuate the argumentative value of historical examples in Hobbes' systematic works do not relate it to his theoretical conception of historiography.¹² We aim to investigate this problem.

a) Hobbes as a Historian

Hobbes put a heavy emphasis in his early works on the practical and theoretical aspects of historiography. The *Tacitus* Essay, for instance, presents not only historical

¹¹ Schumann indicates that Gerhard Johann Voss in his *Ars Historica* from 1623 tried to settle the historiography as a specific *Ars* in the humanistic sense, which should bind the truth of facts with an appropriate moral election and sequence. Schumann sees the early Hobbes works in the framework of this tradition (also in his work as the history tutor of William Cavendish), but he believes, as is usually interpreted, that Hobbes latter broke with this tradition. Schumann (2000) observes that Hobbes considers the historiography as epistemologically insecure. But this is not a sufficient argument, since Hobbes also considers the search for physical causes as epistemologically insecure, without refuting the premise that physics is science (see Dear 1998: 152). According to Sorell (2000: 82), the distinction by Hobbes between philosophy and history remains absolutely deep: philosophy definitively excludes historical writing in Hobbes's complete work. Also Rogers (2000) affirms the usual distinction by Hobbes that knowledge is divided into philosophy and history, and that philosophy and history are each further divided into a natural and a civil part.

¹² Deborah Baumgold (2000) argues that Hobbes's analysis of the Norman Conquest fulfils an argumentative function in his political philosophy, and Patricia Springborg (2000) affirms that nationalistic propaganda in favour of the formation of an English nation was a central aspect of Hobbes's political philosophy, and that the appeal to History in this literary framework is indispensable. But both authors do not explain the relationship of this process to the division of sciences in *Leviathan* and *De Corpore*. Springborg seems to accept that literature and rhetoric are different from philosophy, and that historiography plays an essential role not in philosophy, but in literature and rhetoric in a humanistic sense. But then the question remains, how literature and rhetoric can play any role in political philosophy, according to the division of sciences of the later writings. According to John Rogers (2000), historiography is by Hobbes an important additional element to the science of causality, near the causal sciences, in order to acquire better insights into the world and our place in it. He sees here no connection, but only a supplementation.

facts, but complex explanations of action (including a lot of general social rules), of how Octavian step by step attained dominance of the Roman Empire. This is exactly what we today call action rationalisation, which is not an attempt to explain why people *necessarily* act in such a way, but why it is *reasonable* to act in this way. However, seventeenth century authors – including Hobbes – consider good reasons for action (why it is reasonable to act like that) to be causes of action (why it is necessary to act like that). There is for these authors no relevant difference between causal explanations of action and action rationalisation. If we compare Hobbes' *Tacitus* Essay with the work of Tacitus itself (whose first four paragraphs are commented on in Hobbes' essay), the explanatory claim of Hobbes' essay becomes even stronger. Hobbes adds to Tacitus's brief economical explanations much more detailed explanations, but not more facts.

Hobbes admires Thucydides for his love of truth and his vivid narrative, which make his readers into spectators (one of the most important rhetorical virtues for Hobbes); but it does not mean that Hobbes fails to recognise Thucydides' explanatory claim. What Hobbes most admires is that Thucydides describes historical facts in a way that enables his readers to easily see his point.¹³ Just as Hobbes' introduction to Thucydides' work (much before 1640) is an analysis of the causes of war, Hobbes sees Thucydides as an analyst of the causes of war. Thucydides explains how out-of-control political emotions led to the Peloponnesian War and the ruin of Athens (Scott 2000). His explanatory historiography shows the problems that can be solved only in a systematic state philosophy (Scott 2000).

Hobbes also in no way abandons this explanatory claim of historiography in his late historical works. *Behemoth* shows Oliver Cromwell's ascension to power methodologically in the same way that Tacitus' essay shows Octavian's, namely in the form of explanations of action in the context of general social rules. Divided into four dialogues, *Behemoth* presents not only the horrible account of a civil war but seeks above all to make clear how it came to happen that the English people rebelled against their legitimate sovereign Charles I and in this way brought about that civil war. Evidence for the causes of war is not only to be found only in English history; Hobbes looks back to ancient times and the birth of Christianity to discover the deep roots of rebellion and civil war (Borot 2000).

The *Historia Ecclesiastica*, the last great work written by Hobbes, is generally seen as a predominantly narrative history that offers not simply a history of the church, but illustrations and historical confirmations of the role of religion, which is systematically analysed in *Leviathan* (Lessay 2000). It cannot however be contested that the *Historia Ecclesiastica* emphasises these aspects and its poetical form as a

¹³ Hobbes says about Thucydides "he filled his narrations with that choice of matter, and ordereth them with that judgement, and with such perspicuity and efficacy expresseth himself that, as Plutarch saith, he maketh his auditor a spectator" (Hobbes 1629: VIII), and "these things, I say, are so described and so evidently set before our eyes, that the mind of the reader is no less affected therewith than if he had been present in the actions. There is for his perspicuity" (Hobbes 1629: XXII).

dialogue between Primus and Secundus is neither for Hobbes himself a scientific work in the fullest sense. But here also he offers a lot of explanations. The gullibility and weakness of most people as well as their tendency to be superstitious about life's dangers and secrets, are mentioned to explain why and how in many moments in history astrologers and charlatans have gained so much power over kings and whole peoples. He explains methodologically in a way similar to the case of Octavian and Cromwell how the Papal power developed following the fall of the Roman Empire and could finally be solidly established in the sixteenth century. He investigates which methods and political means Popes have employed to gain and strengthen their absolute control over the hearts and minds of the European people. And finally he analyses the reasons for the weakening and division of Church institutions since the thirteenth century. Also, in this last historical work, he reveals his ambition to interpret history – in this case, holy history – in such a way that human behaviour is explained through general social or mental structures. Among the causes and consequences of the behaviour of a Chaldean astrologer, a Roman priest or an Anglican or Presbyterian spiritual guide there is no difference to be found.¹⁴

The mature Hobbes remains essentially faithful to the historiography practices of his humanistic phase. Historiography has explanatory ambitions; it is an attempt to understand the ordinary causes of behaviour and human actions, particularly about political issues. Thus the question now is how Hobbes in his official theory of science describes civil historiography as a mere register of social and political facts, and for this reason does not recognise its scientific stature, while at the same time (in a way similar to other prominent, and much better, historiographers of his time, for instance Selden) he constantly practised historiography with explanatory claims (research of causes). For a thinker like him, who cares about the consistency of his assertions, this would be an insupportable contradiction.

b) *Historiography and Science*

Leviathan presents a highly differentiated division of sciences (Hobbes 1651: chap. 9). But it is not enough just to distinguish philosophy from historical writing, and to define historical writing as a mere register of social and political facts, as research on Hobbes frequently does. It is necessary to analyse how Hobbes situates ethics, poetry, rhetoric, logic, and the science of the just and unjust in the schema of *Leviathan* (Hobbes 1651: chap. 9). These sciences investigate the consequences (and thus also the causes) of the qualities of persons through successive investigations of the consequences of the qualities of animals, generally of bodies terrestrial, more generally of bodies permanent, even more generally of the qualities (physics), and most generally of bodies natural (natural philosophy). What then does Hobbes consider to be the aim of specific explanations of these sciences? Ethics deals with

¹⁴ In a paradoxical way, Lessay characterises the *Historia Ecclesiastica* methodologically as plain narrative (Lessay 2000: 157). This shows how worthless a lot of Hobbes researchers find the explanatory aspects of Hobbes's historical work.

the causes and consequences of human passions, while the other four sciences with the causes and consequences of language (linguistic expressions), namely in the form of magnifying and vilifying (poetry), persuasion (rhetoric), reasoning (logic) or contracting (the science of the just and unjust).

This division is an expression of the explicit naturalism that Hobbes, since his inter-mediate period of creation, vehemently defends. They show above all exactly how based on a decisive naturalism (that eliminates the difference between mind and nature, act and behaviour, foundation and cause) human behaviour can be explained and scientifically treated. Regarding ethics, Hobbes also puts forth this idea in *Leviathan* (Hobbes 1651: chap. 8) and in a general way, it is clear that Hobbes applies this explanatory way to both his early and later historical works. Constant and regular causes and consequences about passions, convictions, manipulation (based on thought acts) and the establishment of contracts and rights (as shown in the way that Octavian, Cromwell or the Popes could step-by-step increase their domination), are repeatedly used by Hobbes to explain historical events. It is this same level of universality of explanations (found equally often in the other physic branches) that deal with the causes and the consequences of the qualities of bodies devoid of life or sensibility. From the terminological perspective of this division of sciences, the human sciences of ethics, law and contract assume the explanatory tasks of the historiography practised by Hobbes and the most important historiographers of his time.

What can therefore conclude that Hobbes, in his late writings, *makes an important conceptual distinction*. According to the Aristotelian tradition, he *defines* history (in the sense of historical writing, that is, history in the ancient sense) as a mere listing of facts. And this listing of facts is for Hobbes completely *scientifically useful*, since it provides the empirical foundation and the factual explanation for the scientific investigation of causes, providing for physics a natural history, and for the science of state and of morals a history of states (Hobbes 1658: chap. 11) (the historical emergence of states still belongs to natural science, since it is the state of human nature). History, in the sense of a deterministic kind of historiography, in no way makes obsolete the conception of scientific explanatory historiography.

Two kinds of historiography can be defined: factual historiography (civil) has only the goal of describing historical facts; explanatory historiography has, on the contrary, the goal of explaining these facts and has for this reason a scientific character. Hobbes reserves the term history in the sense of historical writing for factual historiography. What he himself in his early and late historical works practised can therefore be called explanatory historiography, which investigates the causes and consequences of qualities of the human being (as explained by ethics, rhetoric, poetry, logic and the science of the just and unjust). So it is understandable that Hobbes can always refer to historical examples in his systematic works, without the danger of a methodological self-contradiction. It is not only the quotation of historical facts, but the historical explanations that confirm the assumptions of the systematic philosophy

of the state. It must also be noted that Hobbes is not alone in such a conception: Bacon also propounded a similar thesis.¹⁵ From this perspective, the apparent contradiction between theory and historical writing disappears.

c) Fictitious History

It was shown that the traditional interpretation of Hobbes accords to him a very limited conception of historiography that does not correspond to his writings on history. One of the most important aspects of Hobbes' explanatory historiography is the refutation of the Aristotelian idea that in a causal explanation, all considered facts must be established and certain. Historical facts are often not sufficiently reliable:

“Letters are also good, especially languages and histories: for they are pleasing. They are useful, too, especially histories; for these supply in abundance the evidence on which rests the science of causes: in truth, natural history for physic and also civil histories for civil and moral science: and this is so whether they be true or false, provided that they are not impossible. For in the sciences causes are sought not only of those things that were, but also of those things that can be” (Hobbes 1658: 50).¹⁶

¹⁵ Bacon criticises the traditional moral philosophers because they act “as if a man that professteth to teach to write did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of good, Virtue, Duty, Felicity; propounding them well described as the true objects and scopes of man's will and desires: but how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and unprofitably” (Bacon 1605: 418; see Hirschmann 1987: 28 f.). According to Bacon, poets and historians, as opposed to philosophers, are able to describe their emotions so realistically, that is possible to recognise their way of functioning: “(...) the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge: where we may find painted forth with great life, how affections are kindled and incited: and how pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves, how they work, how they vary, how they gather and fortify, how they are inwrapped one within another, and how they do fight and encounter one with another, and other the like particularities: amongst the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters: how (I say) to set affection against affection, and to master one by another; even as we use to hunt beast with beast and fly bird with bird, which otherwise percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation is erected that excellent use of *praemium* and *poena*, whereby civil states consist; employing the predominant affections of *fear* and *hope*, for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government within” (Bacon 1605: 438). Hobbes formulates a similar criticism of the tradition moral philosophy in *De Cive* (Hobbes 1642: V) and in *Behemoth* (Hobbes 1668: 43 ff.).

¹⁶ In Part 1 of *Elements of Law*, Hobbes uses a double concept of experience. In the strictest sense, experience is a memory of events that repetitively follow one another, and for this reason permits a prognosis (Hobbes 1640: 32). This experience is more secure depending on the frequency of the repetition, “but never full and evident”. Experience, so understood, provides no universal conclusion, but only prudence, that is, “conjecture from experience” (Hobbes 1640: 33). Science, on the contrary, is an experience that is at the same time “knowledge of the truth of propositions” and the correct naming of objects, and for this reason

The constructive sciences for Hobbes are epistemologically more certain:

“Finally, politics and ethics (that is, the sciences of *just* and *unjust*, of *equity* and *inequity*) can be demonstrated *a priori*; because we ourselves make the principles – that is, the causes of justice (namely laws and covenants) – whereby it is known what *justice* and *equity*, and their opposites *injustice* and *inequity* are” (Hobbes 1658: 42–43).¹⁷

In his practical historical work, Hobbes often begins with a mere listing of facts that he considers reliable. But most explanations of the motivations and actions that these facts provide contradict other known facts and can even be fiction. The *Tacitus* Essay for instance begins with an enumeration of the facts presented in the four first paragraphs of Tacitus’ work, but the detailed explanations that Hobbes adds remain a constructive explanation (fallible and hypothetical). Hobbes considers his favourite historiographer, Thucydides, to be a master of this illustrative speculation. To mention one of the most well-known examples, Thucydides begins with the facts that the Athenians occupied Melos, that they were militarily superior, that the inhabitants knew that the surrender of Melos was being negotiated and that they refused to surrender and so had to submit to the foreseen terrible sanctions. That the inhabitants of Melos in such a situation did not surrender needs an explanation. The Melian dialogue, explicitly a fiction¹⁸, provides an explanation that is well adapted to the given facts¹⁹. Similarly, Hobbes begins in his *Tacitus* Essay and in *Behemoth* with the fact that individuals like Octavian and Cromwell achieved dominance against

is derived from understanding (Hobbes 1640: 40). “Both of these sorts are but experience: the former being the experience of the effects of things that work upon us from without: and the latter the experience men have of the proper use of names in language. And all experience being (as I have said) but remembrance, all knowledge is remembrance: and of the former, the register we keep in books, is called history: but the registers of the latter are called the sciences” (Hobbes 1640: 40).

¹⁷ Hobbes says in *Six Lessons*: “Of arts, some are demonstrable, others indemonstrable; and demonstrable are those the construction of the subject whereof is in the power of the artist himself, who, in his demonstration, does no more but deduce the consequences of his own operation”. And also: “Geometry therefore is demonstrable, for the lines and figures from which we reason are drawn and described by ourselves: and civil philosophy is demonstrable, because we make the commonwealth ourselves” (Hobbes 1656: 183 – 184 and Hobbes 1658: 42).

¹⁸ Hobbes refers indirectly to Melian dialogue in his introduction (Hobbes 1629: XXVIII).

¹⁹ Hobbes describes Thucydides’ methodology in this way: Thucydides “declared the causes, both real and pretended, of the war he was write of. (...) The grounds and motives of every action he setteth down before the action itself, either narratively, or else contriveth them into the form of deliberative orations in the persons of such as from time to time bare sway in the commonwealth. After the actions, when there is just occasion, he giveth his judgement of them; showing by what means the success came either to be furthered or hindered” (Hobbes 1629: XXI). See also: “In a word, the image of the method used by Thucydides in this point, is this: ‘The quarrel about Corcyra passed on this manner; and the quarrel about Potidea on this manner’: relating both at large: ‘and in both the Athenians were accused to have done the injury’. Nevertheless, the Lacedaemonians had not upon this injury entered into a war against them, but that envied the greatness of their power, and feared the consequences of their ambitions” (Hobbes 1629: XXVII).

considerable opposition – an admirable fact, which must be explained in part speculatively. But this historical speculation is necessarily limited by the known facts.²⁰ For each fact there are certainly many possible explanations – and this is especially the case with historical facts. But this is the case with any theory. This procedure, as the quotation from *De Homine* above shows, makes sense even when the facts are not certain, but only plausible. Only from this perspective is it understandable why Hobbes in *Leviathan* (Hobbes 1651: chap. 9) considers rhetoric and poetry to be explanatory natural sciences that are useful for historical explanations.

What Hobbes himself wins from this weak knowledge of historical causes are *insights* into human affects and motivation – insights that even lead to a topology of human affects and their effects (Hobbes 1651: chaps. 6–8). What we learn, according to Hobbes, from Octavian's ascension are specific rules of prudence²¹ as well as more general ones²²: for instance, that power often relies on knowledge, and not on physical power²³; that those seeking to dominate assure their power not only over bodies but also over emotions and understanding²⁴; and that not only reason but also irrationality drives human action.²⁵ In this way we can, according to Hobbes, learn

²⁰ Here an example: “But this war against the Germans, was to defend the reputation of the Roman Empire, and was necessary, not for the curiosity alone, and niceness, that great Personages have always had, in point of honour, much more great States, and most of all that of Rome, but also for a real and substantial damage (for some man might account the other but a shadow) that might ensue upon neglecting o such shadows. For oftentimes Kingdoms are better strengthened and defended by military reputation, than they are by the power of their Armies” (Hobbes 1620: 59).

²¹ In relation to the skilful choice of the title: “therefore he would not at the first take any offensive title, as that of King or Dictator” (Hobbes 1620: 38), and: “He had three reasons to leave that title; (...) but the chief cause was this that the name carried with it a remembrance and relish of civil wars, proscriptions, which were hateful to the people.” (Hobbes 1620: 43).

²² “Soldiers are commonly greedy” (Hobbes 1620: 44).

²³ “Honours sometimes be of great power, to change a man's manners and behaviour into the worse, because men commonly measure their own virtues, rather by the acceptance that their persons find in the world, than by the judgement which their own conscience makes of them, and never do, or think they never need to examine those things in themselves, which have once found approbation abroad, and for which they have received honour” (Hobbes 1620: 64). See Hobbes's theory of power as recognition, developed later in *Leviathan* (Hobbes 1651: chaps. 10/11).

²⁴ “And now having power over the bodies of the people, he goes about to obtain it over their minds, and wills, which is both the noblest and surest command of all other” (Hobbes, 1620: 42). “He gets up by little and little. For it is not wisdom for one to take away all the show of their liberty at one blow, and on a sudden make them feel servitude, without first introducing into their minds some *præviae dispositiones*, or preparatives, whereby they may the better endure it” (Hobbes 1620: 45).

²⁵ Here relations to Macchiavelli are revealed. Arlene Saxonhouse observes that Tacitus was used by Hobbes as a substitute for Machiavelli, who could not be quoted (Saxonhouse 1995: 129). She observes that Tacitus is rarely quoted by Macchiavelli, but offers no explanation of the contents. Macchiavelli quotes Thucydides much more frequently Thucydides. It can be shown that there are communalities between the way that Macchiavelli quotes

from history, and history can claim to offer truth and explanation²⁶, even when we know that one or more of the historical “facts” mentioned are only suppositions and mere constructions.²⁷ So it’s possible to describe more precisely the relationship between the mere listing of historical facts and their explanation– and also between the determination of history in a strictly classical sense and the explanatory historiography, presented by rhetoric, poetry, logic and the science of just and unjust, as special variants of natural philosophy.

Thucydides and that Hobbes uses Tacitus. For Macchiavelli’s reading of Thucydides, see Reinhardt (1960). For Machiavelli’s realistic concept of power, see Mittelstrass (1990).

²⁶ Against Dionysion von Harlikarnass, Hobbes says in his Thucydides-introduction: “A historian must write not as a lover of his country, but of truth”. It is also said there that we become informed through knowledge of past instructed and are then able to understand present and future actions (Hobbes 1629: p. VII f.) And so observes Hobbes in the dedication to Henry Bennet in the beginning of *Behemoth*: „There can be nothing more instructive towards loyalty and justice than will be the memory, while it lasts, of that war” (Hobbes 1668: V). And the dialogue opens with the following observation: “If in time, as in place, there were degrees of high and low, I verily believe that the highest of time would be that which passed between the years 1640 and 1660. For he that hence, as from Devil’s Mountain, should have looked upon the world and observed the actions of men, especially in England, might have had a prospect of all kinds of injustice, and of all kinds of folly, that the world could afford, and how they were produced by their dams hypocrisy and self-conceit, whereof the one is double iniquity, and the other double folly” (Hobbes 1668: 1).

²⁷ It is here in no way the only moral example of history, as it is repeatedly again affirmed (see for instance Beverly Southgate for Thucydides (also referring to Melian Dialogue) and Hobbes: “Hobbes is similar convinced of history’s moral value. In the Preface of his translation of Thucydides, he writes of ‘the principal and proper Work of History being to instruct, and enable men by the knowledge of Actions Past, to bear themselves prudently in the Present, and providently towards the Future’. Again the moral dimension is clear: history is to be not only delightful, but also useful and instructive” (Southgate 1995: 30 f.)). Hobbes warns in *Leviathan* not only against the reading of ancient historians, but also of the old philosophers: “(...) by reading of these Greek, and Latin authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit, under a false show of liberty, of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their sovereigns, and again of controlling those controllers; with the effusion of so much blood, as I think I may truly say, there was never any thing so dearly bought, as these western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues” (Hobbes 1651: 203. See Hobbes 1651: 315). But Hobbes only warns against the adoption of these books at universities and schools, because they can provoke rebellion. He notes that previously great damage has been done have been arisen due to the reading of old writers. Firstly, this is an historical argument, and secondly, Hobbes doesn’t contest that useful insights on affects and their possibilities of manipulation could be won for readers and for himself, but this knowledge may not be general. Hobbes’s sentence that young people should not read historians is frequently incorrectly interpreted (Münkler 1993: 23) in the sense that Hobbes in general gives no theoretical value to history.

II. Historiography as Criticism of Ideology and Idealism

1. Ideology

History, according to Hobbes, can only be understood through the realisation that the dominant set of convictions of a certain time in a certain society is what configures that society²⁸. This is for Horkheimer the formulation of the problem that in post-Hegelian times would be called “ideology” – even when Hobbes himself does not use this expression (Horkheimer 1930: 228)²⁹. It does not mean that all ideas are ideological, but only those which contradict “correct reason” as identified with science and natural law (Horkheimer 1930: 229). In his doctrine of State and Natural Law³⁰, Hobbes opposes the conviction common in the Middle Ages that the regent’s authority was granted by God. He advances the idea that only the will of the people legitimates the State, whose aim must be to promote wellness. As Horkheimer observed, “when professors and students of Oxford University condemned Hobbes’s doctrine and burnt his books, they have very well recognised the danger of the social contract theory of natural law” (Horkheimer 1930: 216 – 217). Hobbes’ question is how moral, metaphysical and religious representations, although not a part of natural law, can dominate people for centuries. He answers that all ideas differing from theories of nature and natural law were invented to subjugate people. Their origin is the will of domination on the one side and the lack of instruction on the other. Their aim is the preservation of power for those who would propagate such ideas (Horkheimer 1930: 222). All social groups that influenced government in the past are attacked with this criticism (Horkheimer 1930: 222).

²⁸ Thus Hobbes analyses the ideological resources that guaranteed the power of nobles and ecclesiastics during the Middle Ages (Horkheimer 1930: 228).

²⁹ The foundation of Hobbes’s criticism is his concept of liberty. Reform and counter-reform stressed the opposition between liberty of the will and natural science: human action is not explained through natural causes, but through its free will, or the choosing of one action from all possible ones. This doctrine is not only of religious interest, but also of social, since it assigns the responsibility for actions (Horkheimer 1930: 211). Hobbes, on the contrary, has no concept of liberty of the will in this idealistic sense, but deals only with liberty of action (Horkheimer 1930: 212). Liberty of the will unifies all people without distinction – for theologians, since all are sons of God; for the Enlightenment, for political reasons. This liberty of the action makes social differences into a problem. Liberty of the will does not differentiate between master and slave: both for example have the liberty of will to enjoy luxuries. Hobbes, on the contrary, considers through the liberty of action that the master can enjoy luxuries, but the slave would lose his life for this. This difference of liberty is what matters in social reality (Horkheimer 1930: 213).

³⁰ There is a difference between Hobbes and the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment conceives history as progress: history is the process through which humanity becomes rational. For Hobbes, the reason is already given, but is distorted by the church. Both have in common the concept that reason and truth are eternal (Horkheimer 1930: 230). Modern philosophy considers its doctrine of nature and society as definitive; in the same way, religious thought separates other views of the world from their contexts to align them with stated dogma, instead of analysing their historical role. The believers divided the world into sinners and saints; the “rational” philosopher, into fools and the wise (Horkheimer 1930: 231).

In *Leviathan*, Hobbes analyses how scientific doctrines are evaluated in the context of their conformity to the dominant ideology:

“For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man’s right of domination, or to the interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was able” (Hobbes 1651: 91; Horkheimer 1930: 222–223).

And *Behemoth* verifies how philosophical doctrines – for example, the Aristotelian one – are used to justify interests:

“They have made more use of his obscurity than of his doctrine. For none of the ancient philosophers’ writings are comparable to those of Aristotle, for their aptness to puzzle and entangle men with words (...)” (Hobbes 1668: 41–42; Horkheimer 1930: 223–224).

It is particularly in Universities, through the instruction of those who would pass judgement on crucial social questions, that this effect is produced. These individuals learn to confound understanding with meaningless distinctions, useful only to impress uncultivated people and to render them obedient. (Hobbes 1668: 41; Horkheimer 1930: 225). Horkheimer sees in Hobbes’ reflection an “explosive historical dialectic”, since individual thought can have a public effect when it becomes criticism of the dominant ideas (Horkheimer 1930: 229). But Hobbes, just like Machiavelli, thinks that the new state also has to make use of ideological means of power to affirm itself – the cause of much of the criticism levelled against him (Horkheimer 1930: 222 e 225).

Hobbes has thus formulated the problem of ideology (even without using this expression) while observing the relationship between false dominant ideas and social situations. But instead of considering historical ideas in the context of social life, he attributed them to human nature (Horkheimer 1930: 234). To understand history though, argues Horkheimer, it is not enough simply to recognise that religious and metaphysical representations are in error, just like fallacious hypotheses in natural sciences, but it is necessary to see what has provoked these false ideas: “The significant representations that dominate an epoch have a more profound origin than the bad will of some individuals. They themselves have already been born inside a social structure” (Horkheimer 1930: 233). The dependence of representations on their historical condition dictates no relativism. Hobbes’s fault was not to consider as illusory the doctrines diverging from the science of his time but to consider this science as the eternal one, and not as a part of the historical process itself, subject to transformation (Horkheimer 1930: 235).

2. Idealism

Hobbes’ historiography stands in opposition to evolutionary theories supposing moral development – a very fundamental aspect of his reception by classical realists

in theories of international relations. The idealism of the between-the-wars era saw social conflicts to be a result of a lack of social and personal development. More developed social orders had the task of bringing enlightenment and social progress to the less developed, encouraging political initiatives like the League of Nations (Navari 1996: 24). Moral progress could be attained particularly through education, which could inculcate a sense of social responsibility. The perfectibility of human beings would bring them to wish for more perfect social orders. This concept results in idealism's belief in the power of public opinion. Idealists believed that international juridical institutions, as *fora* of international public opinion, could pacify relations between states. The League of Nations, thought trouble-plagued and disrespected, sought to represent humanity's opinion, the "voice of reason" (Fried 1910: 174) governing what is true and false (Claude 1965: 11–12). Negotiations and secret accords between states would be replaced by the League's public diplomacy, personified by the image of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson – although he had practised secret diplomacy in Paris and did not consider private discussions on "delicate" subjects incompatible with a prohibition of secret accords, he appealed in his *Fourteen Points* for open diplomacy, conceiving the League as the "ventilator" of "smoky diplomatic rooms" (Claude 1965: 11–12). Material sanctions would not be necessary, since the rational force of public opinion would be always more powerful than any economic or military force: "The moral disarmament is the only way to secure peace" (Richet 1927: 431–432). Idealists believed that there was already a "universal moral conscious", manifested in the movement of public opinion (Zimmern 1934: 38), and able to subjugate the material forces (Dubois-Richard 1927: 393–394). This belief was linked to the idea that the development of means of communication and transportation – telegraphy, telephone, trains, automobiles, and particularly the new discoveries: aeroplane and radiophone – would favour interactions between people: "In 1950, each of us will be practically some hours away of Berlin and even New York and will receive at home, through radio, all the news of the world, and all great moral ideas will come into our home, invading our heart and mind". The defeat of Imperial Germany was attributed to reactions of universal conscience against violations of human morals (Dubois-Richard 1927: 397–398). Additionally, the idea that the defence of one's own country is unjustifiable without first appealing to the arbitration of the League of Nations was widespread. In this case it would be possible through an "objection of conscience", officially recognised or not by the state, to refuse military service (Soltau 1927: 121)³¹. Moral disarmament would be promoted through the education of children (Richet 1927: 432). Schools would have the task to turn the abstract thesis "peace through law" into reality (Périé 1927: 145–149). Campaigns

³¹ In England in 1927, in a famous protest great English manifestation, more than 100,000 persons signed a solemn declaration, pledging not to take up arms in a conflict if their government had not previously sought the arbitration of the League of Nations. The coordinator of this campaign, Ponsonby, said: "It is necessary to choose between conscience or blind obedience to government, between living for the homeland or dying for opportunists and exploiters, between freeing the world from the evil of war or to leave civilisation to consume itself" (Prudhommeaux and Rousseau 1927: 38).

against bellicose songs and manuals, as well as the promotion of pacifist education manuals, aimed to replace in children the admiration for heroes of the war with the admiration for scientists and artists, the heroes of peace (Bovet 1927: 240).

These ideas, funded on the liberal legacy of the eighteenth century, became problematic when connected to some evolutionist social theories dominant at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century: Hegelian Idealism, social Darwinism, evolutionism (particularly progressive Spencerionism), and Durkheim's functionalism. In Spencer's schema, societies were in an irreversible progressive process of simultaneously differentiating and integrating, unifying always in more complex levels, including international ones. English Hegelians, like T. H. Green, Bosanquet, Bradley and Ritchie, absorbing evolutionist theories, saw a progressive process of unifying individuals in organised associations – which could even supersede the State (Navari 1996: 24). Durkheim's functional sociology, distinguishing between mechanical social forms and organic (more advanced) social forms, influenced Hegelian as well as non-Hegelian Utilitarians, such as Angell and Hobson, who became functionalists. It is against this ideology of progress that Hobbes is rehabilitated in the revision of the idealist program as well as in the realist one.

Although Hobbes is most often associated with realism, he became relevant to the theory of international relations in the revision of the idealist program. To reform idealism, Collingwood's *The New Leviathan* (1942) aims to give a picture of the human condition without presupposing that an irreversible level of moral progress has already taken place. The idealistic vision of the first half of the twentieth century postulated to be in a historical evolutionism, where civilisation had decisively succeeded in barbarism. For Hobbes, on the contrary, civilisation is fragile and conditional: the enlightened community can revert to the kingdom of darkness; civilisation can revert to barbarism³².

Realists, contrary to Collingwood, used Hobbes not to review, but to destroy idealism. The use of Hobbes was not so obvious, since other social theories could also have been used. There was a parallel between Hobbes's intentions and the efforts of the realists in the 1930s and 1940s (Navari 1996: 23). Hobbes was living in a period of intense ideological conflict. His method was to attack *ideological* views through their historicisation³³.

Carr would do the same with Mannheim's sociology: the historicisation of deep beliefs provokes scepticism of their validity. In the final part of *Leviathan*, "The Kingdom of Darkness", Hobbes attacks the Roman Catholic Church for advocating its suzerainty over sovereign states, what he calls the "kingdom of fairies". Carr, in a parallel way, criticises the League of Nations, which would be giving continuity to

³² "It was as appeal to the consciousness of the subject to understand the factors making for civilisation, and not to take them for granted" (Navari 1996: 21–22).

³³ "He asked his audience not to listen to received wisdom and to see all claims of this sort as simple aspects of desire, inducing a moral scepticism" (Navari 1996: 26).

the *Pax Britannica* (Wight 1991: 17). His interest in 1939, when he wrote *The Twenty Years Crisis*, like Thucydides and Hobbes, was not to find those responsible for the imminent war, but “to analyse the underlying and significant, rather than the immediate and personal causes of the disaster” (Carr 1939: IX). His book is an attempt to understand “the more profound causes of the contemporary international crisis” (Carr 1939: IX). Inspired by Machiavelli and Hobbes, Carr thinks that “the exercise of power always appears to beget the appetite for more power (...). War, begun for motives of security, quickly becomes war of aggression and self-seeking” (Carr 1939: 112). As Thucydides, as Hobbes would later learn from him, saw Athenians proclaiming “self-defence”, that would soon turn into aggressive power, so too observed Carr about the first world war:

“Nearly every country participating ... regarded it initially as a war of self-defence; and this belief war particularly strong on the Allied side. Yet during the course of the war, every Allied government in Europe announced war aims which included the acquisition of territory from the enemy powers. In modern conditions, wars of limited objective have become almost as impossible as wars of limited liability” (Carr 1939: 112–113).

III. The Role of Hobbes in Contemporary Discussion

Hobbes’ historical approach continues to present a challenge to contemporary international relations theorists. As has been seen, one of the central motivations of the rehabilitation of Hobbes by classical realism was a reaction against idealism. But classical realism’s historical approach was discarded by neo-realism (whose principal advocate was Kenneth Waltz). If classical realists thought in historical terms, neo-realism, on the contrary, claimed to be an atemporal science. Each state – the central unit of analysis – would have a calculable power and a specific interest. Relations between states would be governed by a “balance of power”. Neo-realists “aspired to a technology of power. They thought in universalistic ahistorical terms. ... History was just a store of data illustrating an unchanging game” (Cox 1997: XV)³⁴.

Normativism today, in a legitimate opposition to neo-realism, reconsiders crucial problems of idealism – including the absence of historiography and evolutionism. The normative approach of international relations is characterised by the discussion of ethical questions, defined in the framework of the “return of great theory” – political and social philosophy. It refutes the epistemological postulation of different logical statutes for empirical (or explicative) theory and normative (or ethical) theory. According to this division, political science has to deal with political facts, law with juridical-political norms and institutions, and political philosophy with political val-

³⁴ Cox’s “new realism” differs from classical realism in analysing determinant forces beyond the power of states. It differs from neo-realism in analysing structural changes understood in historical terms: “The new realism develops the old realism, using its historical approach, so as to understand the realities of power in the present and emerging world” (Cox 1997: XVI). Moreover, its view of international relations contains a great normative concern.

ues and ideals (Giesen 1992: 5– 7). Normativism doesn't accept, however, that a theory can be ethically neutral in international relations, as the theories that consider themselves purely explicative claim to be (Brailard 1992: XII). An ethical reflection in international relations consists of an investigation into ethical problems of empirical cases and a metatheoretical interpretation of ethical suppositions of theories of international relations (Hoffmann 1994: 27). Normativism seeks to present a juridical analysis of international politics and ethical analysis of law that doesn't fall into a "moralisation", in such a way that conflicts between states and infractions of international law aren't judged by moral criteria, but by political and juridical procedures (Habermas 1996: 192). Its intention is the establishment of a foundation of emancipatory universal ethics through criticism of the epistemological basis of positivism, often blamed for the lack of a universal ethics in international relations. It claims to recuperate the classical concept that politics is part of ethics, establishing a view of history that aims to explain the development of universal moral norms (Jahn 1998: 622).

One of the authors that inspire normativism particularly in the so-called "critical theory", is the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. Trying to escape the "pessimistic" historical conception of Max Horkheimer (rooted in Max Weber's diagnosis of modernity), Habermas developed a historical conception which contains some evolutionary traces. (Habermas 1988), Habermas finds in Weber a diagnostic view of cultural modernity characterised by a division of substantial reason into three cultural spheres (expressed in religious and metaphysical world visions): science/technique, law/moral and art/literature. The cultural transmission of each one of these cultural spheres occurs in institutions. Cultural spheres are also differentiated through an abstract measure of value, a claim to universal validity: truth, normative rightness and authenticity (or beauty), which Weber comprehends as enhancement of value (*Wertsteigerung*). Habermas comprehends "enhancement of value" in the sense of progress. It is communication that makes possible the "objective progress". Science/technique, law/moral and art/literature are understood as "cognitive potential" constantly progressing. Weber (Weber 1920), on the other hand, doesn't have this concept of progress. He uses the concept of enhancement of value only to evaluate historical development. He doesn't differentiate the level of cultural transmission from the system of institutionalised action. According to Habermas, it is exactly the institutionalisation of cognitive potential of science, law, morals and art that makes their use possible. What he considers problematic is when the cultural transmission is not sufficiently institutionalised, and thus without a structural effect on the whole society³⁵. If Weber explains social rationalisation exclusively from the aspect

³⁵ The differentiation of value spheres, according to Weber, shows the internal tension between them. Habermas, on the contrary, with his concept of cognitive potential, sees science, law/moral and art similarly oriented by universal values. This implies a "harmony" between these spheres. Weber's empirical investigation, according to Habermas, concentrates itself directly on the problem of appearance of capitalism and institutionalisation of action with rational instrumental aims. But the universal "claims of validity" are not further consi-

of instrumental rationalisation, as in his analysis of law rationalisation, Habermas considers also in the modern moral consciousness the fundamental criticisability and the necessity of justification of norms – and so the possibility of a moral theory that asks for a discursive explanation of the validity of moral norms, what is progress in the domain of practical rationality. Weber perceives the loss of substantial unity of reason as “polytheism”, with irreconcilable claims of validity. Habermas, on the contrary, considers that the unity of rationality in the plurality of spheres of value is assured by the formal level of argumentation with a claim of validity. Weber sees the tendency that social rationalisation loses freedom as a necessary consequence of capitalist development. Modern law in the positivist sense results from decisions without foundation. For Habermas, Weber doesn’t consider the “principle of the necessity of foundation” and the exigency that legal power is legitimated, the “legitimation of legality”: modern juridical order asks for validity in the sense of rational comprehension, even when participants accept that, if necessary, only specialists can present good reasons.

The end of the Cold War, the resulting acceleration of globalisation and the expansion of interdependence among states represent for several authors the possibility of a resurgence of normative theory and its conceptualisation of history. Realists presented history during the Cold War as a struggle for power between great powers. Andrew Linklater, on the contrary, presents a history which aims to explain the development of universal moral norms (Jahn 1998: 622) with a lot of similarities with Habermas, but losing the latter’s critical potentiality (since Habermas’s aim is to contest the persistency of Carl Schmitt’s thought in political and legal philosophy). For Jahn,

“this is not an engagement with history as such, rather it is an exercise in the construction of history. In *Men and Citizens*, he mobilises ‘principles of historical periodisation in order to place different social formations upon a scale of ascending types in accordance with the extent to which each approximates the conditions of realised human freedom’. In already familiar fashion the normative yardstick – human freedom – has been set first and now he proceeds to develop a three-stage model” (Jahn 1988: 622).

Linklater explains that it represents “ideal types” to show that in some kinds of international relations there is more understanding than in others and that it doesn’t represent a historical scale. Each level is a “construct”, an “ideal type”, to which nothing that has occurred corresponds (Linklater 1982: XII – XIII). But an ideal type for

dered. Each sphere of value is analysed as a discipline. The special values supposed by each discipline determine its validity. Weber conceives labour in systems of cultural action as production of means to ends with relative validity. So he doesn’t differentiate sufficiently between particular contents and universal values, with which cognitive, normative and expressive parts of cultures become spheres of value. The concept of claim of validity comprehends several significant dimensions: reality, under differentiated measures of values, is reflected, becoming objective, social and subjective realities. The objective progress of knowledge, founded on argumentative comprehension and centred on these intentions of validity, becomes possible.

Weber is an image to which reality is compared, not an end in itself, and is constructed with certain traces of reality.

However, observes Jahn, if the ideal type contains ideas in the sense of values, as theorised by Linklater, it is not an auxiliary logic to comprehend reality, but a means by which to judge it.³⁶ The result is thus an evolutionism, in which “time, in the sense of real historical time defining particular concrete social orders, has ended” (Jahn 1998: 622).

Normativism identifies Hobbesian Realism with Waltz’s neo-realism (in international relations) or with Carl Schmitt’s decisionism (in political philosophy). But Waltz’s neo-realism presents a “Machiavellian” vision of prudence in international relations that Hobbes, as has been shown above, doesn’t accept. Habermas’s justifiable criticism of Schmitt cannot also be extended to Hobbes. Schmitt combines decisionism (sovereignty) and institutionalism (objective socio-political order: not normativism as Balibar observed, but normality) (Schmitt 1938). The possibility that Schmitt doesn’t explore, says Balibar, is exactly the combination of institutionalism and normativism, expressed in the equation of civil law and natural law, as in *Leviathan*.³⁷ This is the meaning of “artifice” or institutional construction: the foundation of law on contract (liberty of individuals) and the exclusive expression of contract in the form of law. This institutionalism is a product of the human creation: “it needs no natural, supernatural, traditional or customary foundation” (Balibar, 2002: 50).

We may not agree with Hobbes anymore. We would emphasise in history social formations instead of psychological historiography, we would not put the priority on the institutional solutions for political problems and we would see the science of the day as fallible. But we would learn from him that politics presupposes, besides the foundation of the normative principles, also the historicisation of ideas as opposed to their naturalisation.

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³⁶ “Linklater wants to demonstrate that (European) political thought has developed progressively toward higher stage, that is, more universality” (Jahn 1988: 628). The first level, the lowest one, is the nature state – which Linklater calls the tribal societies. The second level is the State. There is also a third level, in which the progressive moral development of domestic politics must be projected onto the international scene: “(...) with Francisco de Vitoria this becomes ‘the basis for a comprehensive theory of the legitimate principles of world organization’” (Jahn 1988: 629).

³⁷ Chap. 22 and 26: “The law of nature, and the civil law, contain each other, and are of equal extent” (Hobbes 1651: 253; Balibar 2002: 50).

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