



Memories of the SAAL in Lisbon

Socialism was not around the corner

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“Abaixo com o Fascismo

Acima a Revolução

Morte ao Capitalismo

Casas sim – barracas não!”

António Albino Machado

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TESE DE DOUTORAMENTO

Camila Rodrigues

RESUMO

A tese encontra-se organizada em dois momentos que analisam criticamente e apresentam alternativas à literatura relativa à evolução da sociedade civil pós-revolucionária portuguesa. Esta literatura é consideravelmente extremada, uma vez que alguns autores desvalorizam fortemente as consequências ativadoras da revolução enquanto outros vêem essas consequências de uma forma bastante positiva. Num primeiro momento geral e contextual, a tese considera a evolução do contexto político e institucional português, em particular no que se refere às associações de moradores e às cooperativas de habitação, para demonstrar que as consequências da revolução na ativação das organizações da sociedade civil apresentam variação de acordo com o tipo de organização constituída, uma vez que alguns tipos organizacionais apresentam mais vitalidade do que outros. Um olhar mais profundo sobre esta variação, apoiado em análise documental e entrevistas em profundidade com atores relevantes, demonstra que a revolução constituiu um incentivo significativo para a constituição das organizações da sociedade civil em geral, mas o regime democrático pós-revolucionário não incentiva igualmente todas as organizações, o que tem um impacto considerável na sua posterior evolução.

Num segundo momento exaustivo que constitui o núcleo da tese, é apresentada uma análise histórica comparativa a longo prazo, ao nível micro, dos bairros SAAL que foram construídos na cidade de Lisboa, desde a revolução até o presente, contribuindo assim para a compreensão deste programa para além do contexto imediato de sua implementação. As organizações SAAL que emergiram do movimento de moradores no contexto revolucionário tiveram que lidar com um ambiente político radicalmente distinto, uma democracia liberal fortemente influenciada pela adesão à UE. Durante 40 anos, muito aconteceu nestes bairros, revelando alguns aspectos importantes sobre a evolução dos movimentos de moradores. Num contexto político e institucional semelhante, estas organizações idênticas evoluíram de forma diferente, considerando que algumas entraram em colapso enquanto outras foram notavelmente resilientes. Em alguns casos, foi possível observar uma reativação destas organizações, sob sua forma institucional original ou com uma nova constituição formal. Uma abordagem etnográfica baseada na reconstituição dos caminhos históricos dos bairros através da memória oral dos seus líderes clarifica as múltiplas idiosincrasias da participação de moradores. Alguns fatores explicativos subtis mas significativos que muitas vezes passam despercebidos em estudos comparativos quantitativos são identificados e expostos através de uma abordagem qualitativa raramente utilizada na ciência política, contribuindo assim para ampliar seus horizontes conceptuais e metodológicos.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: SAAL, participação, qualidade da democracia, movimentos de moradores

ABSTRACT

The thesis is organized in two different moments that critically scrutinize and present alternatives to the literature around the evolution of the Portuguese post revolutionary civil society. This literature is considerably extreme, since some authors strongly devaluate the activating consequences of the revolution, while others see these consequences in a rather positive light. In a first general and contextual moment, the thesis considers the evolution of the Portuguese political and institutional context, particularly concerning the associative and cooperative housing sectors, to demonstrate that the consequences of the revolution in the activation of civil society organizations presents variation according with the type of organization constituted, since some organizational types present more vitality than others. A deeper look into this variation, supported in documental analysis and in-depth interviews with relevant actors, demonstrates that the revolution did constitute a significant incentive to the constitution of civil society organizations in general, but the post-revolutionary democratic regime does not encourage all organizations equally, which has a considerable impact in their posterior evolution.

In a second exhaustive moment which constitutes the core of the thesis, it presents a long-term micro-level comparative historical analysis of the SAAL neighbourhoods that were built in the city of Lisbon, from the revolution to the present day, to further the understanding on this program beyond the immediate context of its implementation. The SAAL neighbourhood organizations that were drawn from the neighbourhood movement in the revolutionary context had to cope with a radically distinct political environment, a liberal democracy strongly influenced by the adhesion to the EU. During 40 years, a lot has happened in these neighbourhoods, revealing some important aspects concerning the changing role of neighbourhood participation. In a similar political and institutional context, these identical organizations evolved differently, considering some collapsed while others were remarkably resilient. In some cases, it was possible to observe a reactivation of these organizations, under their former institutional form or in a new institutional guise. An ethnographic approach based in the reconstitution of the historical paths of the neighbourhoods through the oral memory of their leaders sheds light into the multiple idiosyncrasies of neighbourhood participation. Some subtle but significant explanatory factors that often go unnoticed in quantitative comparative studies are identified and exposed through a qualitative approach seldom used in political science, thus contributing to widen its conceptual and methodological horizons.

KEYWORDS: SAAL, participation, quality of democracy, neighbourhood movements

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INTRODUCTION

The idea of democracy as the «good» form of government is rather complex and unsurprisingly debatable. It is a complex concept that travelled a long way since it was initially coined, in the 5th century BC, in the context of the Greek city-states. Generally speaking, it can be regarded as morally desirable if it promotes socially valued outcomes, such as equality, justice and legitimacy; and it may be considered as functionally advantageous if it allows for an effective and smooth governance, that produces expected results in a reasonable timing. More than that, it is inherently good. As Larry Diamond eloquently summons up in an interview about alternatives to democracy¹, authoritarian regimes' legitimacy depends exclusively on their performance, since they cannot legitimize themselves by the intrinsic nature of their rule, an advantage enjoyed by democratic regimes.

Moreover, democratic regimes are not so prone to developmental disasters, considering most failed states are authoritarian. To justify democracy as the best political system, Larry Diamond enunciates the conquests achieved in terms of human rights, rule of law, human dignity, immunity from famines and long run political stability, considering democratic regimes can better manage and absorb political change. Moreover, there subsists a main institutional advantage over authoritarian regimes, which is the possibility for self correction, considering people can peacefully and institutionally replace their flopped leaders without massive mobilization or revolutionary action.

Interesting as the subject may be, the purpose of the thesis is not to discuss the multiple definitions and dimensions of democracy or to analyze its desirability, but to question its quality, understood in terms of the achievement of the above mentioned outcomes. Taking equality as a starting point, it is possible to consider it solely as equality in the access to the electoral exercise – one citizen, one vote; or to adopt a broader perspective that brings into to the equation several factors that may affect the capacity each citizen has of actually influencing the political processes that concern

¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jkb5PfBgg0Q>

him. Factors such as economical inequality, which may place certain individuals in a privileged position comparing with others, when it comes to the distribution of resources and opportunities. Factors such as the establishment of patronage networks that affect the way services and goods are distributed among citizens, favouring those who are involved in asymmetric relations of political favour. Considering these factors, it can be argued that electoral equality, *per se*, is not enough, and that it is necessary to implement equalizing mechanisms that may contradict any propensity towards political inequality.

This acknowledgment raises the matter of the role played by citizens in a democracy. If additional mechanisms are to be implemented beyond the elections, in order to further equalize the representative political system, these will certainly demand for a deeper involvement in politics. The extent of this involvement, the ways in which it may be achieved and its possible consequences are then a matter of debate. This means we have two opposite perspectives on participation: in one end, democratic governance may involve the direct participation of the members of a society in the decision making processes; in the opposite pole, it implies solely the participation of those members in selecting representatives to make the decisions for them.

The debate around the role of participation in contemporary democracy is not limited to the theoretical field, it stretches to the operational level and underlies both the political speech and practice. At this level, the object is not a scientific one, aimed at furthering the knowledge in itself, but assumes a practical nature, since it intends to promote tangible desirable outcomes, such as the prosperity and wellbeing of a given society. As Procacci (1991) argues, it is thus an object over which the political agents will act, and therefore explicitly reflects the dominant perspective of power. To analyze the practical implications of participation it is necessary to place it in a given time and place, for empiric confirmation is fundamental to assess the extent to which it may in fact promote democratic quality.

Portugal offers a fertile ground for such research. In April 1974, the «carnations revolution» inaugurated the third wave of democratic transitions, when a military coup determined the end of a fascist regime that had lasted for over 40 years. The

revolutionary period was characterized by an intense political instability - two presidents and six provisional governments in two years. This instability was determined by the heterogeneity of the emerging political forces that, in common, had only their opposition to the former fascist regime, a challenging and unique consensus in itself, but a consensus which leaves a wide margin for major discrepancies in other areas. The moderates relied mainly on electoral legitimacy, while the most radical left wing forces, sidelined in the elections, relied on a revolutionary legitimacy supported by popular mobilization, thus placing grassroots organizations, and not only the parties, at the heart of the political system (Ramos Pinto, 2008).

Popular movements, namely the urban movement,² were very intense during the revolutionary period, which turned them into a political weapon to be used by the contending forces. However, as noted by Ramos Pinto (2008), the urban movement was mainly focused on the right to housing and, in general, refused to radicalize, opting instead for a moderate course of action. This option supported the outcome of the political struggle, with the victory of the moderates in November 1975. It was the beginning of a pluralist representative democracy which was far away from the popular direct democracy that had been proposed by the radicals.

In the heat of the revolution, a social housing program was implemented to accommodate the grievances of people housed in deficient conditions. The SAAL (Local Ambulatory Support Service – Serviço de Apoio Ambulatório Local) absorbed and institutionalized a significant part of the neighbourhood movement; it created the possibility to get a house through formal and legalized means, in opposition to the occupations that had been taking place. The SAAL captured the socialist spirit of the time and proposed an intense participation of the populations involved in the construction and management of their own neighbourhoods. When the revolutionary period was over, the first constitutional government terminated the program, but many processes were already under implementation and were not discontinued. In Lisbon, 7 out of 11 processes that had been initiated were built.

²When the April 1974 revolution arose, about 25% of the population living in continental Portugal resided in homes deprived of any criteria of privacy, safety and comfort. In about two and a half million households, 67% had no toilet facilities, 60% were not served by the sewerage system, 53% had no electricity and 52% had no water supply. The housing shortage was estimated at about 600 000 households (Bandeirinha, 2007: 68).

The thesis is organized in two different moments that critically scrutinize and present alternatives to the literature around the evolution of the Portuguese post revolutionary civil society. These literature is considerably extreme, since some authors strongly devaluate the activating consequences of the revolution (Ramos Pinto, 2008; Cerezales 2003, 2008), while others see these consequences in a rather positive light (Fernandes, 2012, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2017; Fishman, 2011). In a first general and contextual moment, the thesis will consider the evolution of the Portuguese political and institutional context, particularly concerning the associative and cooperative housing sectors, to demonstrate that the consequences of the revolution in the activation of civil society organizations presents variation according with the type of organization constituted, since some organizational types present more vitality than others.

A deeper look into this variation, supported in documental analysis and in-depth interviews with relevant actors, will demonstrate that the revolution did constitute a significant incentive to the constitution of civil society organizations in general, but the post-revolutionary democratic regime does not encourage all organizations equally, which has a considerable impact in their posterior evolution.

In a second exhaustive moment which constitutes the core of the thesis, it will present a long-term micro-level comparative historical analysis of the SAAL neighbourhoods that were built in the city of Lisbon, from the revolution to the present day, and hopefully it will contribute to further the understanding on this program beyond the immediate context of its implementation during the revolutionary period. The SAAL neighbourhood organizations that emerged from the neighbourhood movement in the revolutionary context had to cope with a radically distinct political environment, a liberal democracy strongly influenced by the adhesion to the EU.

During 40 years, a lot has happened in these neighbourhoods, revealing some important aspects concerning the changing role of neighbourhood participation. In a similar political and institutional context, these identical organizations evolved differently, considering some collapsed while others were remarkably resilient. In some cases, it was possible to observe a reactivation of these organizations, under their former institutional form or in a new institutional guise. Either way, *“later*

movements may express predecessors' concerns and absorb their activists", considering "movements seemingly in decline may be reflected and transformed in ongoing social and political struggles" (Meyer, Whittier, 1994, p. 293).

An ethnographic approach based in the reconstitution of the historical paths of the neighbourhoods through the oral memory of their leaders will shed some light into the multiple idiosyncrasies of neighbourhood participation. Some subtle but significant explanatory factors that often go unnoticed in quantitative comparative studies will be identified and exposed through a qualitative approach seldom used in political science, thus contributing to widen its conceptual and methodological horizons.

ON PARTICIPATION

Participation and the quality of democracy

Democracy, largely regarded as the most advantageous form of government, has been for long among the preferential objects of political science. Under democracy studies there are two aspects that deserve the most attention: transitions to democracy and the quality of democracy. This last feature has been drawing more and more academic consideration, for once the desired transition to a democratic regime is concluded, a «lived happily ever after» scenario does not emerge, since democracy is not a teleological purpose; it is in itself complex, dynamic and varied. Not all democracies are the same, considering a democratic regime can change over time and several democratic regimes may present variation among them. This variation can be measured in terms of quality, assuming that some democracies, at a given time, may be better than others, for they are closer to the ideal type of democracy, its theoretical and superlative definition.

To measure and compare the quality of democratic regimes, some possible dimensions of the concept are usually used and participation has often figured among them. The relevance of participation for the quality of contemporary democratic regimes encloses a multilayered debate around several key aspects regarding the way a democratic society is organized and functions. To determine the kind and intensity of participatory arrangements that support democratic governance, it is fundamental to analyze which conditions affect participation, how participatory mechanisms function in practice and how do citizens react to socio-political contexts that favor or hinder participation. In a broader understanding, the democratization of organizational structures of authority beyond the state can be regarded as an important aspect of this debate, since it covers civil society organizations in an holistic societal perspective that looks beyond the democratic method in its strictest understanding – periodic elections.

This concern discloses two antagonistic perspectives. Those who object participation regard it as an instrument at the service of the electoral competition

between political elites. Political equality represents merely the equality in the access to the electoral system granted through the right to vote. To foster other kinds of participation may be disruptive for it places the political system under too much pressure. The proponents of participation defend exactly the opposite view. For them, representative institutions, by themselves, do not constitute a sufficient guarantee of democratic quality. Citizens must be educated for democracy in numerous social spheres, so that they develop their civic consciousness, that is, their awareness towards the common good.

Nowadays, the proponents of participation seem to have dominated the debate, both at an academic and at a policy making level, and it became politically incorrect to directly oppose participation. However, the opposition may emerge in disguise, when more restricted notions of participation are enforced or up-bottom participatory mechanisms minimize any real transference of power to those who are supposedly participating. In these cases, participation is vulnerable to manipulation and instead of fostering empowerment it may in fact promote injustice, which has lead some authors to question its potential for tyranny (Cooke, Kothari, 2004).

As Lopes de Sousa (2006) arguably puts it, in a representative system any conquests are at least partially digested by the metabolism of domination. This assumption highlights the most fundamental aspect of the debate; once participation became the way to go, both for academics and political agents, it can be considered in a reformist or in a revolutionary perspective, for it may involve procedures that reinforce the legitimacy and efficiency of the representative political system or it may imply a transformative rupture, with a deep reconfiguration of power relations. In some perspectives, the first way leaves much to be desired and can simply reinforce inequalities, like those who are implied in a capitalist society. The quality of democracy is thus hindered rather than reinforced by a pseudo-participation that can only be fully realized in an alternative society, perhaps under a socialist order.

In the end, it all depends on the way we look at it. Definitions and arrangements concerning participation must be critically scrutinized considering that participation is a complex concept and it is open to numerous approaches and understandings. To fully understand the intended goal of the relevant political agents,

this complexity must necessarily be acknowledged, since the possible definitions of participation are socially and culturally situated and serve specific purposes.

Fernandes et al (2015) identify several indexes on democratic quality that include participation among its dimensions and each one has a different understanding of the concept. Designed to compare a large number of democratic regimes, these definitions are aimed towards quantification and may disregard the most subtle and qualitative aspects of participatory dynamics. Despite this possible limitation that is extensive to all, the authors identify further shortcomings and highlight the most relevant two: in general, they are not historical enough, since they are mostly focused on contemporary issues; and they tend to be insensitive to gradations over time and between countries, which leads them to confer similar scores to very distinct realities.

Participatory arrangements are dynamic and peculiar; they are adjusted and redefined over time according with changes in political and social contexts. They respond to different needs and opportunities and present diverse goals and motivations. For example, an intense participatory process may be initiated during a revolution, but once the critical juncture ends it may either collapse or reinvent itself, like it happened in Portugal with the neighbourhood movement, which was partially institutionalized and formalized as neighbourhood associations or housing cooperatives and had long lasting effects that went much beyond the two year revolutionary process. It may start with a transformative logic and then evolve to a reformist one, or the other way around. It may shift between a process from below and a process from above, considering that in different moments diverse actors may take the initiative and control over it. Either way, the most defining aspect of participation, the fundamental factor to consider in all circumstances, is power. It is a process that, by definition, involves a relationship between the state and its citizens in which there is a transference of power, voluntary or not, from elected officials to the citizens that are participating. The extent and scope of this transference will define the real implications of the participatory context under analysis.

The classics

Rousseau's «Social Contract» (1966) remains an emblematic classical reference in the discussion of participation, for although its backdrop is not the modern democratic state, it still presents an inspiration for those who support it in this context. In Rousseau's understanding, the government is no more than an agent of the «sovereign», an intermediary that holds responsibility for the safeguard of civic and political liberties and the respect for the law. It should be dominated by the general will and its power is not really his, it is the public power vested in it. If the government starts to pursue its particular interests independently of the public will, it will conflict with the «sovereign», endanger the public union and annihilate the political body. The remedy against such risk is participation, not delegated in representatives, but direct participation in decision making.

The members of the government are not representatives but merely agents with limited decisional power and the law, to be valid, must be ratified by the people. As such, the guarantee of good government emerges from the participatory process. Sovereignty cannot be represented, it must be fulfilled by each and every citizen, and its practice fosters political responsibility; the individual learns that there are wider matters that must be protected before his own private interests, and this is his only guarantee that he will benefit from cooperation with the other individuals.

Participation has an educative function and is self-sustaining because it fosters the very qualities necessary for the participatory system to function. This educative function makes participation crucial for individual liberty: if individuals are not educated in socially responsible action there can be no law to protect everyone's individual freedom. It is also fundamental for the individual's control over the political system, for it is by taking part in decision making that he retains the capacity to manage his social environment. In the participatory system proposed by Rousseau, the individual remains his own master, as public and private interests cannot be dissociated. Individual freedom rests on the interdependence among all individuals.

Alongside with Rousseau, Tocqueville (2001) stands as an essential classical reference for the debate on participation. Motivated by his experience with American town meetings, Tocqueville claimed that political participation had undoubtedly an

influence in the development of the individual character, in the interiorization of individual rights and duties, and in the commitment to the common good. The individual's character and personal growth result from his proximity to the common interests, for which he makes an active contribution and apprehends as his own. Participation is not limited to township democracy but it extends to voluntary associations. The individual is involved in decision making about his polity in proximity, modeled on his personal experience with his own property and immediate interests.

Inspired by Tocqueville and written in the midst of great political contestation within Britain, surrounding the extension of the right to vote to women and the working class, Mill (2014 [1859]) took on Aristotle's' argument for the full development of human capacities. A politically active individual would be more intellectually and morally developed than a passive one and would possess the essential qualities to foster the good government, the fellow-feeling necessary to concern himself for his share of the general interest. The fundamental quality of political institutions would be their ability to promote the advancement of the community, by nurturing the desirable human attributes: intellectual capacity, efficiency and virtue. Besides this educational function, participation possesses an integrative purpose for it aids the acceptance of political decisions. By participating in the political discussion the individual acquires the consciousness that he is a member of a community that partially depends on him.

The ideal polity would be a popular democratic government with participatory institutions, for it is only in such a context that the individual can participate in politics and, as a consequence, an active character can develop. At the national level it is hard for the individual to serve in a political body and to deal with issues directly connected to his everyday life. The political involvement at the local level and in the workplace constitute the central educational arenas in which the individual is educated for civic responsibility. For this process to be effective, the industrial work relations would have to be democratized, so that the workers could have a voice in company management.

The roots of the theory of participatory democracy can be found in their classical references, from which it is possible to extract the main arguments: participation has educative and integrative functions; the participatory system is self-

sustaining; there is a relationship between the authority structures of institutions and the psychological traits of individuals; lawfully guaranteed freedoms depend on socially responsible action, which in its turn is fostered by participation. The desirable polity is then one where the benefits and burdens are equally shared among all individuals, which can only be guaranteed by participation. The general will is righteous because it is made by all and affects all equally, so individual rights are protected while the public interest is furthered.

Proponents and opponents

Pateman (1970) questioned the place of participation in a modern and viable theory of democracy and identified the academic dilemma, which led renowned political theorists to consider it a myth, a misunderstanding promulgated by classical theorists. The opponents of participatory democracy consider that a wide popular participation in politics constitutes a risk to the stability of the political system. Participation was often associated with totalitarianism and empirical confirmation of this assumption was found in the collapse of the Weimar Republic into fascism, a process that was supported by high rates of mobilization. This process spread to other totalitarian regimes which were also based on mass mobilization, a more restricted concept frequently confused with the one of participation.

In Schumpeter (1987) we find one of the main detractors of the classics, since he considered their assumptions rested on empirically unrealistic foundations. The electoral mass was viewed by Schumpeter as incapable of constructive collective action and its only means of participation rested with voting, so that the electoral process continued to function satisfactorily. Leaders, and not the common citizen, should be active, and the main feature of the democratic method was the competition among them. Sartori (1995) was not far from Schumpeter's standpoint when he disregarded one of the main arguments of the theory of participation, its educative function. In his understanding, the lack of practice in democracy on the part of the majority of the citizens was a misleading concern, for the electorate was only able to apprehend matters of which it had personal experience, which was not a realistic possibility for complex political matters.

The opponents of participatory democracy base their arguments mostly on the assumption that *“the majority (non-elites) gain maximum output (policy decisions) from leaders with the minimum input (participation) on their part”* (Pateman, 1970, p.14). The focus of democracy is set on the competition between leaders at free and periodic elections, and it is through the electoral exercise that the people retain control over political elites. Political equality is understood as universal suffrage and participation is limited to the choice of decision makers, which must protect each individual from arbitrary decisions and safeguard private property, thus justifying the democratic method.

The participatory theory of Democracy, on the other hand, sustains that *“for a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a participatory society to exist”* (idem, p. 43), that is, a society where not just the state, but all political sub-systems, such as organizations, enterprises, associations, have been democratized, so that socialization through participation can occur in all areas of life. In this perspective, participation possesses fundamental functions that cannot be disregarded: it aids the acceptance of collective decisions; it produces an integrative effect; and it educates for democracy. It does not endanger the democratic political system for it is self-sustaining: through the educative impact in the political system it fosters the very qualities necessary for its maintenance. Political equality is not just equality in the access to the electoral process, but equality of power, understood as the capacity to determine the outcomes of political decisions.

These beneficial effects of participation are not without empiric confirmation. Concerned with the sense of political competence, Almond and Verba (1989) conducted a comparative study on political attitudes in five countries (U.S.A., Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico), and discovered a positive correlation between the sense of political efficacy and political participation, since the level of competence was highest in the countries (the U.S.A. and Britain) where there were more institutional opportunities for political participation at the local level. The authors concluded that citizens generalize their participatory experiences in non-governmental structures to the wider level of national politics, which makes these participatory experiences crucial for the development of a feeling of political efficacy. Participation is cumulative, since

the more the individual participates, the higher his feeling of political efficacy will become.

More recently, Fung (2006a) reported the beneficial effects of participation in six Chicago neighbourhoods, in which an engaged community has managed to reduce crime and improve the educational system through a deliberative process involving residents, teachers, police officers and other concerned stakeholders. To empirically test the effects of participation, Fung (2006b) suggests three dimensions along which mechanisms of participation may vary, thus allowing for the determination of the amounts and kinds of participatory mechanisms that are more appropriate to address the main issues raised by contemporary complex governance. These dimensions are the scope of participation (who participates); the mode of communication and decision (how participants communicate with each another and make decisions together) and the extent of authorization (the link between discussions and policy action). Different positions in the institutional space regarding the intensity of the above mentioned dimensions, will be more or less suited to address fundamental qualities of democratic governance, such as its legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness.

Social Capital

One of the main empirical studies enhancing the virtues of participation remains Putnam's seminal work on social capital, a concept that emerges as fundamental for the discussion of participation since it analyzes the contribution of a vibrant civil society for the quality of democracy. Putnam (1993, 2005) relates the capacity of citizens to get organized around common goals with the quality of democratic governance, to the extent that it bears a positive influence in the performance of institutions.

The concept of social capital is understood as aspects of social organization that facilitate coordination and cooperation between stakeholders for mutual benefit, such as social networks of civic activity (with a particular focus on voluntary associations), social norms and trust. The positive connotation associated with the concept highlights its benefits: it feeds generalized reciprocity; it facilitates coordination, communication

and collective action; it reduces incentives to opportunism; it allows the internalization of positive experiences of collaboration that constitute a model for future action; and it enhances the participants' awareness of collective benefits.

Putnam's empirical work is based in a comparative analysis among Italian regions that present a significant variation in terms of social capital and democratic quality. Putnam concluded that the norms and networks of civic engagement deeply affect the performance of the representative government. Although formally the several regional governments present considerable similarities, their efficiency levels vary considerably according with the degree of civic engagement of their citizens, measured in terms of participation in elections, newspaper reading habits and membership in sports clubs (football clubs) and cultural clubs (choirs). The historical analysis suggests that organized reciprocity and solidarity networks are a prerequisite for socio-economic modernization.

The concept of social capital is prone to a variety of meanings and should therefore be used with caution, in order to void misleading research based on poor conceptualization (DeFilippis, 2001). For instance, Bourdieu (1986) is more aware of the conflicting nature of human relations and of the structures of power and violence that are generated among the actors, even at the internal level of the associations, and he is sceptical about the possibility of purely altruistic action. Disinterestedness is only possible in a context in which it is rewarded and where a habitus (dispositions and modes of socially acquired behaviour) favourable to it prevails.

Any conceptual development must be oriented to its operationalization, to apprehend and understand the essential aspects of the social reality under analysis. The empirical world is inherently complex and different forms of social relationship are likely to generate diverse consequences, so it is fundamental to consider what types of relationships originate what kinds of effects on the social structure, and depending on the cases it may be more appropriate to draw from a perspective based on the instrumentality of external relations or an approach focused on their intrinsic value to the actors: elements of instrumentality may persist in social ties that are valued intrinsically, but in this case the fundamental objectives of the actors are internal to

interaction rather than external benefits that they hope to obtain from it (Fishman, 2009).

Assuming that there are factors underlying the action that can elude the most obvious intentions, be they the pursuit of material or symbolic benefits, such as profit or merit, or the development of relations of trust and mutual respect for a common purpose, it is nevertheless necessary to adopt a conceptual tool that, not capturing all the elements of reality, captures at least those essential to the understanding of the phenomenon to be analyzed. For the construction of this tool it is useful to consider the academic work already developed and to collect those elements that present a potential of enrichment in the concrete case under investigation. The concept of social capital, in each of its particular understandings, will not impose artificial boundaries in the object of the study; it will constitute one more theoretical instrument, among others, that will be used whenever it provides an useful insight into the participatory dynamics of the SAAL neighbourhoods.

Deliberative Democracy

One of the main paradigms of contemporary political thought presents deliberation, instead of the electoral exercise, as the main pillar of a democratic political system. Habermas' (1994, 2002) theorization around communicative rationality and the public sphere proposes a concept of democracy where normative decisions result from a real discussion among all those who have an interest in the subject under consideration. A norm acquires its legitimacy in its rational discussion by those who are affected by it, from which the consent must emerge as the best argument generates consensus. The citizen is both the author and the recipient of the norm as the public sphere creates an equalitarian and inclusive network of voluntary associations, organizations and social movements – the civil society - where social concerns are discussed and the political system supervised. In the political system, a formal sphere regulated by the administrative power interacts with the informal sphere that emerges from the communicative power.

The success of deliberative democracy results from the institutionalization of the communication proceedings and of the relation between institutionalized deliberative procedures and informally organized public opinions. Just and reasonable results can be obtained as long as the relevant information is available. Once the decisional process is respected, the state, free from the influence of private interests and respecting the consensus, can legitimately act.

The operationalization of deliberative practices, however, may prove challenging, as citizens are often ill informed or not informed at all on the issues under discussion, and may express opinions that are not their own, opinions that were imported from others or simply advanced without proper reflection and confrontation with diverse views. To overcome such difficulties, Fishkin (2011) proposes a process in which it becomes possible to consult the public under conditions where people can think and become informed, while they remain representative of a given political community. In deliberative polling, participants in a survey are chosen through a scientific random sampling process. They are invited to participate in a supposedly balanced and transparent deliberation process, open to scrutiny and supported by moderators that guarantee that all have the opportunity to express their opinions.

It is a truly scientific experiment, supported by advisory boards from the several points of view, with control groups, briefing materials and experts who answer key questions. It has been applied in person or on-line in several countries like Australia, Denmark, Bulgaria, Taiwan, USA, to discuss specific issues and concerns. Fishkin concludes that when people believe their opinions are really considered, they make the effort to overcome rational ignorance and acquire a broader perspective on relevant matters.

But one of the most significant and generalized experiences in deliberative democracy is still the participatory budget, a process through which the people directly decide, in meetings and discussion groups, on public priorities and the allocation of public resources. It was first implemented in Porto Alegre in 1989 as an effort to improve the quality of the democratic governance in a political context deeply affected by corruption and patronage, and it has since been replicated all over the democratic world. Baiocchi (2003) concluded that it has successfully established an efficient and

redistributive practice with generous participation and learning opportunities, both for individuals and collectivities. The replicability of the experiment depends on the capacity of municipal governments to timely deliver goods and to convince citizens with a limited amount of time that participation is worthwhile.

In comparative research held in eight different midsized semiperipheral Brazilian cities, half of which with the participatory budget, Baiocchi et al (2011) observed profound disparities in the levels of implementation and impact of institutional reforms. At the beginning of the study in the late nineties, the «municípios» were being governed by traditional elites largely unaccountable to the people, but from then on all but one adopted participatory mechanisms. Although not all of these measures were truly empowering, the authors regarded this evolution as a result of the legitimating power of the principle of participatory democracy in Brazil. They also observed that the cities that had implemented the participatory budget experienced a considerable intensification of civic engagement which, in the most successful cases, made citizen input in decision-making processes binding. However, the participatory budgets themselves presented variation: in one of the cities, Mauá, it remained merely consultative and had limited democratizing effects, while in Diadema the governance transformation was mostly conducted from below, by an engaged civil society.

The authors concluded that civil society's support to collective action makes it fundamental for the quality of democracy since it facilitates the involvement of underrepresented groups and, through deliberation, fosters the consensus around collective values. The participatory budget, in particular, tends to deepen democracy, although this is not always the case, like it happened in Mauá. Its contribution to the self-organization capacities of civil society, however, seems to be rather modest, since pre-existing configurations present a considerable causal force: passive civil societies became more active but only under the guidance of a reformist state; civil societies that were already engaged were the ones that benefited more significantly from the process, as they managed to improve their capacities without abdicating from their autonomy.

Participation in the city

In the heat of the late sixties, Lefebvre (2012) departed from the effects of industrialization on urban society to present the concept of the right to the city, hence initiating a long lasting theoretical discussion that maintains its vitality. Industrialization is understood as a disrupting process that requires the breach of the pre-existing urban system, thus producing a clash between the urban and the industrial realities. The crisis of the city emerges from the reconfiguration of the urban system around the demands of the industrialization process, which in an initial moment triggers the «explosion» of the traditional city. Subsequently, the urban society develops on the ruins of the ancient city that is no longer the passive receptacle of industrialization. Those who detain information, culture and power retain the capacity of deciding on the urbanization process through the exploitation of labour entailed in the industrial production.

Throughout the nineteenth century an urban democracy could have risen, but since it threatened the privileges of the new ruling class, it was prevented from being born by the expulsion of the proletariat from the city centre and from the city itself. The working class suffers the segregating consequences of the explosion of ancient urban morphologies. The old proletarian misery is attenuated and tends to disappear in the large industrial countries but a new poverty emerges, a misery of the habitat that affects all those expelled from the centres to the outskirts, which thus become deprived of the city. In these difficult conditions arise the rights that define civilization, the right to work, education, health, housing. Among these entitlements is the right to the city, understood as the right to a urban life translated in the full use of times and locations. For the working class this right assumes a particular value but it also represents the general interests of civilization and the particular interests of all social strata of people for whom integration and participation matter.

The urban reform envisioned by Lefebvre has a revolutionary range since it gives way to a strategy which opposes the strategy of the currently ruling class. It entails a revolutionary transformation of society necessarily planned by the working class and its political representatives that will result in socialism. The proletariat is the

one who can destroy the ideology of consumption and produce a distinctive new liberal humanism, the humanism of the urban man whose implementation will require three types of evolution: economic (reorientation of urban planning for social needs); political (democratic control of the state and self-management) and cultural. As Marcuse (2014) points out, Lefebvre makes a moral claim for social justice sustained in the highest human values. The metaphoric city represents a new way of life for the urban society in general and its realization demands for a deep reconfiguration of the power structures behind urbanization.

Beyond its metaphoric understanding, the right to the city is a broad concept that requires further clarification on which rights it entails and who will benefit from them. It can be regarded as an exclusive right for the most dispossessed – the homeless, ethnic minorities, people in a situation of poverty - thus entailing a positive discrimination dimension aimed at contradicting the inequalities produced by the capitalist system; or it can be understood as an inclusive right ascribed to all those who live in the city and desire to accede its resources and opportunities to satisfy their needs and aspirations. But a right to what? A right to housing, to transportation, to resources, to common goods, to define the way the urban space is organized, or all those combined? And what if these various rights - and all those who believe themselves entitled to them - conflict with each other? Who and what takes precedence?

The multidimensionality of the concept entails a conflicting dimension that complexifies it and as such it can hardly be regarded as a single uniform entity that is there to be enjoyed equally by all. Attoh (2011) argues that second generation socio-economic rights that pertain to the right to the city are potentially incompatible to the extent that their promotion implies costs that demand for the sacrifice of some for the others. Besides, while an individual or a group acquire the right to occupy, design or define the public space, others are denied that same right as long as their goals and interests are not compatible, which often happens in a complex urban society, where different cultures, religions and races coexist in anonymity and rapidly interact with each other. A society that extends more and more into the countryside, as the metropolis extends and embraces new territories, fading the boundaries that once

limited it. On the other hand, if individuals or groups have the right to enjoy their way of life autonomously, without state interference, others may feel disregarded or offended. A good example of this is the way the city deals with its Roma inhabitants, which maintain specificities that are often seen as inadequate by the general population, leading to the classical conflict minority *versus* majority.

To determine which rights to the city should be granted to whom it is necessary to situate that same city in its democratic context and so obtain the necessary background in terms of intended goals. If the quality of the democratic system is at stake, then the right to the city must be conceived in order to enhance it as much as possible. However, the matter of the quality of democracy is a complex one and it can be understood and measured differently. For instance, it may depend on its contribution to individual freedom, regarded in terms of autonomy achieved through resources, institutions, deliberating arenas and reason (Ringen, 2007), or it can be related with institutional characteristics like consensus democracy (Lijphart, 1999).

Taking on Dahl's (1973) definition, democracy is a political system characterized by the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens. At the city level, it would involve civic control over urban planning policies, which implies its orientation towards the public interest in opposition to its orientation towards the interests of particular groups. But then again, the capitalist society produces inequalities and those who have more economical resources have a wider range of choice on where and how they want to live. Land, equipments and services are there to be bought by those who can afford them and the less well-off inhabitants have to settle for what they are able to acquire. It is also possible that networks of influence with local and national authorities may privilege the interests of some individuals and groups over others, thus disturbing the so desired urban civic control.

Considering the facts, the right to the city can be viewed as a way to correct the inequalities of the capitalist system. This means that it must be enjoyed differently by diverse individuals and groups: to contradict the dominance of some, it must favour the others. This goal could be achieved by the implementation of participatory arrangements in urban planning that would empower less resourceful groups. In a more radical perspective, like Lefebvre suggests, it should entail an alteration of the

political system itself, away from capitalism and into socialism. Only then inequalities would be corrected at their origin. Like participation itself, the right to the city can also be viewed as a stepping stone into socialism, or a palliative for capitalism.

Whatever the approach to the right to the city – revolutionary or reformist – to situate it in the democratic context implies some notion of social justice, insofar as it constitutes a dimension of the quality of democracy that can be furthered through a spatial approach, thus leading to the much debated concept of spatial justice. As we have seen, the right to the city may positively discriminate its most dispossessed and disadvantaged inhabitants, so that the city becomes more responsive to all: it can correct inequalities and as such promote social justice. Soja (2009) regards spatial justice as more than just a category included in the wider concept of social justice, it is a central concept in itself since it emphasizes the impact of the geographical dimension in the production and reproduction of (in)justice. Spatial discrimination is generated by the biases imposed on certain populations due to their geographical location and it is critical in the production of spatial injustice by the creation of long lasting spatial structures of privilege.

In this perspective, the political organization of the space in a capitalist society often leads to an unequal and discriminatory distribution of the results of urbanization that can be contradicted by a fair and balanced distribution in space of socially valued resources and the opportunity to use them. There is a dialectic relation between the spatial and social dimensions that reciprocally influence each other: if the space is socially produced then it can be socially modified. The space is conceived as an active force that influences the human existence at various levels - economical, artistic, environmental, social. To adopt a spatial approach to justice enlarges the theoretical understanding of the causal factors that determine it. To combine the terms spatial and justice opens a new range of possibilities for political and social action, as well as social theorizing and empirical analysis, which would not be so incentivized if the two terms were not used together.

For Marcuse (2014) the right to the city is regarded as a common cause that mobilizes alienated social groups in the rejection of profit for other forms of solidarity and as such it should aim for the deprived, exploited, impoverished, discontent. The

spatial dimension arises as just one of many causes that contribute to worsen the city's problems, whose origins are structural and lie in wider societal arenas. The spatial question is therefore essentially derivative and must be integrated in a wider social context, but on the other hand social injustices also have a spatial dimension. Spatial injustice is essentially due to the involuntary confinement of alienated groups and to an unequal distribution in space of resources. Its correction depends on the alteration of historically situated social, political and economical conditions, considering spatial remedies are necessary but not enough to contradict injustice in the city.

Alternative settings and perspectives

Harvey (2012) views capitalism as a feral monopolistic, predatory and standardizing system that must be challenged in the city, taken in a broad sense, which bursts with social inequalities but also with revolutionary potential. The traditional proletariat is obsolete in contemporary occidental society and the rallying cry of the disposed emerges in new and dynamic urban social groups, such as the occupy movement in New York, strongly repressed by the capitalist forces who fully understand the threat it represents.

These heterogeneous groups are not concentrated in factories and their dispersive nature places organizational challenges to the traditional left, that must overcome its reluctance in accepting a new reality and consequently merge the new social movements with classist work based organizations. Left wing parties and syndicates must join efforts with locally based transversal forces that gather different groups from several sectors in a common struggle, thus constituting a new political force in the city, a city-wide anti-capitalist movement capable of organizing production, distribution and consumption for the benefit of all the people, instead of privileging just a few. Such a coalition would demand for a joint effort from the forces of culture and political radical tradition, which must mobilize citizens beyond class interests.

For several realities there are various possible strategies and it is possible for the capitalist structure to be challenged from within without a revolutionary transition.

However, it is demanding for alternative organizations, such as associations and cooperatives, to maintain their integrity in a competitive capitalist system that entails exploitation practices. On the other hand, to create an isolated socialist city in a capitalist environment would certainly generate intense repression. As an alternative, some cities, such as Porto Alegre, have managed to implement transforming democratizing measures, as the participative budget, which can contribute to deepen urban democracy without generating much opposition and can be exported to other contexts.

Nevertheless, according to Harvey, the consolidation of urban rebellions demands for intervention at a higher level of global coordination, the level of the system that embeds all states. Otherwise, state level reformism will simply reconstitute neoliberalism. Urban networks are crucial in such a movement, networks that are democratic, egalitarian and supportive in their struggle against class dominated capitalism. In his view, the starting point for the revolutionary process resides in the reinvention and reorganization of cities for anti-capitalist struggle, which implies alternative forms of urbanization, which remains a mean for the absorption of capital and labour surpluses in a highly speculative capitalist environment.

As we have seen, the concept of the right to the city emerges as a response to injustices perceived in the capitalist system. In a highly competitive and individualist environment dominated by private property entitlements and free markets, the classic conflict liberty *versus* equality is prompted by phenomena of exploitation and dispossession. An unequal distribution in space of valued resources and the opportunity to use them deepens as disparities in income increase and networks of privilege pull their strings in the backgrounds of urbanization processes. The access to housing, equipments and infrastructures is conditioned by one's capacity to acquire them in the market, for they are scarce goods that are not available to everyone. The neoliberal ideal of the self made deserving man that conquers his rights by his own personal effort imposes itself more and more in contemporary democracies. Using austerity as an argument, it justifies the withdrawal of compensation mechanisms, such as the ones entailed in a redistributive social state, thus reinforcing inequalities.

Alternatives are presented under the right to the city conceptualization, some revolutionary, others reformist, but they all have in common the concern with a decline in democratic quality that results from the decrease of civic control over urbanization processes. Harvey's radical cry for revolutionary action generates controversy given its strong connection to a Marxist theoretical approach that may be regarded as obsolete. Such is the understanding of Souza (2010), which criticizes Harvey for his attachment to what he regards as a reductionist, centralistic and prejudiced Marxism that undermines his understanding of the complexity of contemporary social movements, which are wrongfully accused of being so involved in local action that they fail to see the big picture.

From a left libertarian point of view, Sousa deplores Harvey's attachment to hierarchies and refuses any pretention to a socialist state. Instead, he proposes free association and horizontal networks as strategies against oppression by class exploitation, but also by a centralized, hierarchical state. In this perspective, institutional struggle is just a supplement for a broader direct action that demands for a pragmatic relation with the state, therefore preventing appropriation and sectarianism.

As Lefebvre recognized, the political utility of the right to the city concept depends on its usefulness as a tool that assists us in experimenting with reality. Whatever the perspective – revolutionary or reformist; vertical or horizontal - the right to the city, both in its theoretical assumption and as a rallying cry for urban social movements, is challenged by the risk of trivialization of Lefebvre's initial concept. Once it is appropriated by a large spectrum of actors, from local to national authorities, from NGOs to social movements, it may become detached from its original meaning. Another concern resides in the particularism of the actors who mobilize for this right. One of the main challenges to the right to the city is the extent to which social actors can move beyond their own interests and embrace a common global struggle that can effectively produce a better democracy for all. Finally, there remains a risk of cooptation by actors who intent to «domesticate» the concept, thus neutralizing its transformative potential. As «The Leopard» well taught us, «something has to change, so that everything remains the same».

But the challenges to the right to the city are yet not exhausted. Another fundamental aspect to consider is the applicability of the concept to different geographies, for concepts drafted in the western academia naturally reflect a very specific understanding of reality that emerges in emblematic contexts, which cannot be simply extrapolated to other scenarios without considering particular causal relations. Paris and Chicago are not Cairo or Mumbai, so to which point a conceptual framework drafted considering one can be applied to the other is a pertinent matter to bear in mind.

Roy (2009) challenges researchers to rethink their list of big cities and to look beyond generalist and prejudiced assumptions of third world underdeveloped urban realities that must be regulated and corrected under the framework of the western ideal model. She boldly suggests dislocating the western centre of theoretical production to the global south in order to generate alternative analytical readings and overcome current epistemological limits. Concepts are geographically grounded and may be more or less susceptible to generalization, but opening up the geographies in which they are produced enriches the theoretical universe available to any researcher in search of the most adequate conceptual tools. A city like Lisbon, who is in the periphery of the centre, faces the risk of remaining virtually unnoticed unless it also reclaims its analytical territory, thus becoming an active contributor to knowledge production on the metropolis.

The paradox of participation

The perspectives on participation presented here are not meant to exhaust the subject; they are simply considered the most relevant for this specific investigation. Each understanding on participation draws on its own interpretation of reality, with more or less solid empirical support to back it up, but the dividing line among its proponents and opponents remains a matter of principle; it rests in their regard for a representative system sustained in free elections: the electoral exercise is understood either to dominate or to coexist with other forms of civic engagement; it is either a guarantee of democracy in itself, or just another element that, in the most extreme

views, can be viewed as counterproductive, since it is regarded as a domination instrument in the hands of capitalism.

Barber (1984) differentiated thin and strong democracy, the first a representative democracy based in an individualistic approach to citizenship, the second a participatory democracy where citizens govern themselves to the greatest extent possible. Liberalism brought to the extreme, and not participation, is viewed as a threat to democracy for it fosters alienation from public life and, consequently, endorses the paralysis of the democratic governance structure.

In his view, the concretization of a strong democracy requires a profound institutional reform that involves measures such as the constitution of neighbourhood assemblies with deliberative and legislative functions; the constitution of national civic communications cooperatives to regulate the civic use of new telecommunications technologies; a civic education postal act to equalize the access to information; experiments in decriminalization and in informal justice; national initiatives and referenda; experimenting in national balloting; local elections by lottery; internal voucher systems; programs of universal citizen service; local volunteer programs; experiments in workplace democracy; and a new architecture of civic and public space.

These rather ambitious proposals constitute a few of the many practical suggestions that the proponents of participation have been presenting in order to lead participation from a theoretical ideal into a common practice in policy making. There are numerous possible ways to implement participatory mechanisms in a democratic society, not all of which have been subjected to empirical confrontation. Even when they all share a common principle, the proponents of participation diverge more or less significantly as to how this goal should be achieved. Participation became a wide umbrella concept that includes numerous and varied perspectives and approaches, an interesting universe of thought that deserves a closer attention.

It is a complex multidimensional phenomenon that poses considerable challenges to researchers, since it may occur in very different settings and present diverse features that are not always obvious or easy to grasp. Chaudhuri and Heller (2003) departed from the study of a campaign for decentralised planning in the Indian state of Kerala to explore the explanatory power of three theories of participation:

social capital, rational choice and social-historical. They concluded that the level and social depth of participation are highly variable and are not likely to be explained solely by a single paradigm, since the determinants of participation are multiple and entail not only stock variables, but also institutional factors and political contingencies.

Participation is often a disturbing paradox; it seems to mean one thing and its opposite at the same time. As Baiocchi et al put it (2011), *“civil society is the terrain where new claims emerge but also where consent to the dominant order is organized”* (p.22). The role played by civil society organizations as agents of civic practice is highly influenced by their policy making know-how, their observance of good governance criteria and their ability to act jointly. These are the main factors that will allow them to effectively link citizens to governance mechanisms. Whenever they become more dependent on the interests of particular groups than on the public and their members, and whenever the institutions restrict the access to the policy making process, limiting it only to stakeholders that are incorporated in the most relevant networks, the participation process results in a corporatist system that excludes and discriminates.

In some contexts subsists a tension between democratic efficiency and a broader participation, which favours those organizations that have a deeper technical and technocratic knowledge, which are not necessarily those that are more representative. As a result, civil society organizations that wish to participate in decision making processes feel the difficulty of conciliating the representation of the interests of their members/clients with their own professionalization and efficiency as partners in the political game. Another obstacle to participation resides in the lack of independence of civil society organizations, which frequently depend considerably on government or agency funding and support. This fact makes them vulnerable to capture and manipulation.

Despite the challenges the concept presents, it would be simplistic to dismiss it as redundant or regard it as an instrument for the reinforcement of inequalities under the guise of consent. Participation is not simply an ideal type to be fulfilled under a purely equal society; it can take place in unequal societies such as contemporary liberal democracies. To assess the real extent of its influence it is necessary set aside personal preferences and erroneous generalizations and simply consider what are the

implications of each participatory arrangement for the actors involved in a particular context.

PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC QUALITY IN PORTUGAL BEYOND THE REVOLUTION

Portugal between critical junctures

Portugal's transition to democracy was not banal. After 48 years of a dictatorship that strongly discouraged popular mobilization, various sectors of society were actively engaged in political action and enthusiastically discussing the real possibility of a shift to a socialist mode of production. In the end, as Schmitter (1999) remarks, through an atypical path, Portugal successfully managed to consolidate a liberal democracy. The November 1975 repositioning of the military hierarchy determined the beginning of a gradual process of counter-revolution that at some point in history difficult to determine with exactitude marginalized the socialist project and condemned all attempts of direct democracy (Varela, 2014). The understanding around the real meaning and content of the revolution is far from consensual, as it remains highly debatable its long lasting effects in participation.

The revolution was not the only critical moment in Portugal's recent history. The Portuguese democratic path was strongly influenced by the adherence to the EEC (European Economic Community), in 1986. As stated by Royo and Manuel (2003), Portuguese policymakers during the eighties relied on the accession to the EEC to assist the consolidation of the recent democratic institutions, which implied a modernization of the economic structures and a normalization of the relations with the other member states in a context characterized by the instability of the institutions that had been established during the transition. The integration process entailed the promotion of economical competition, the privatization of public enterprises, the restructuring of the industrial sector and a process of economical deregulation, measures that drove Portugal further away from the socialist path.

The influence of the EU in the Portuguese political evolution is an explanatory factor to consider and to some extent can be viewed as a turning point, a new critical

junction that somehow reversed the effects of the critical juncture that had preceded it - the revolutionary transition to democracy and its socialist inspiration. The EU neo-liberal orientation, enforced namely through the influence of the Thatcher governments, motivated member states to undertake processes of privatization and deregulation with the goal of intensifying market competition, therefore reducing the role of the state in the provision of resources and expanding the role of the markets. As Hall (2003) pointed out, this process, facilitated by the single market and the economic and monetary union, underlies the idea is that a more intense competition leads organizations to perform more efficiently, an objective that is openly prioritized over the cooperation proposed by the socialist way, embedded in the first draft of the Portuguese Constitution.

This tendency was accentuated with the revision of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, which, following the Kok (2004) report, proposed a reinforcement of EU (European Union) competitiveness through employment and economical growth. This option for a neoliberal conception of rights and responsibilities of citizenship instead of the more equalitarian approach envisaged in the initial formulation of the Strategy reflected the growing influence of a majority of right-wing governments at EU level, which derived from the enlargement process. The design and implementation of the Strategy Europe 2020 in a context of economical crisis and strengthening of the inter-governmental logic, with Germany and France becoming the main decisional forces while the European Commission continued to lose relevance, accentuated the neoliberal orientation granted to communitarian economic and social policies.

Unlike other stable European democracies that were able to hold on to their welfare states despite the introduction of neoliberal economic reforms, in Portugal the welfare state had been born crippled in a context of crisis and never really took off in a neoliberal world. In the flow of this process, Portugal lost the growth train and, following the example of Greece and Ireland, in 2011 had to seek and agree to a three-year 78-billion-euro bailout with the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the EC (European Commission) and the ECB (European Central Bank), after the opposition parties flunked Socrates's IV Stability and Growth Program, the PEC IV. The demands of the financial assistance program, which aimed for a cut of 5.9% of the gross domestic

product in the budget deficit in that year, implied a comprehensive economical program that severely affected the quality of life of many Portuguese citizens, with increases in taxes and user fees, and cuts in social and unemployment benefits.

Portugal was already one of the most economically unequal countries in the EU, after Lithuania, Latvia and Spain. In 2010, Lithuania recorded the most unequal distribution of income, with a Gini index of 37%, followed by Latvia with 35.9%. Spain came third with 34.4% and Portugal was close behind with 33.7%, while the EU-28 average was 30.5%.³ From 1985 to 2009, the concentration of income in the most affluent groups deepened in Portugal. Between 1976 and 1982, a phase of socialist inspiration prior to the constitutional revision of 1989, the share of total income controlled by the richest groups of the Portuguese population declined but since the late eighties in started increasing and in 2005, 1% of the richest Portuguese citizens detained 9,8% of the total income.⁴

In a study with data until 2009, Farinha Rodrigues (2012) detected a strong reinforcement in wage inequality with the Gini index increasing from 28.4% to 34.4%. To an initial period from 1985 to 1994 of accentuated inequality, it followed, in the second half of the nineties, a period of attenuation of wage disparities that was not enough to revert the previous worsening. The highest income decile saw its share increase between 1985 and 2009, from 24% to 29.8% of the total gain. This roughly coincides with Portugal's adhesion to the EU and with the Cavaco Silva governments,⁵ which entailed profound structural reforms that ruptured with the revolution's socialist orientation. The main goal was to make the transition to a liberal and competitive economical system, based in private ownership, which would enable Portugal to align with its European partners.

The housing sector follows the general trend. In 1993, the White Book on Housing Policies in Portugal (ENH: National Strategy for Housing – Estratégia Nacional de Habitação) identified the structural prevailing evils of the Portuguese society and

³ In Eurostat: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tessi190>

⁴ In Observatory of Inequalities:

<http://observatorio-das-desigualdades.cies.iscte.pt/index.jsp?page=indicators&id=229&lang=pt>

⁵ Aníbal Cavaco Silva, with his party PSD (Partido Social Democrata - Social Democratic Party), was elected prime minister for three consecutive times: he held office in a minority government from 1985 to 1987 and in two majority governments from 1991 to 1995 and from 1991 to 1995.

the “*chronic delays of several decades in relation with industrialized European countries*” (p. 11) that affected our society, which were related with economical matters, but also with cultural and social aspects, namely regarding the prevalence of landownership over productive activity. According with this document, the administration had been unable to effectively regulate and control the use and transformation of the soil; the policy was not operative and the speculation around construction land prevailed for the benefit of the financial sector.

In this setting, the high tax rates and exaggerated prices of construction land rendered housing unaffordable for the majority of the population. There was an estimated shortage of 500 000 houses, while there were about 300 000 houses in need of rehabilitation, while about 12% of the houses in Lisbon were unoccupied and the construction of houses for tourism and secondary occupation had risen spectacularly (p.12-13). The bridge between the income of the families and the cost of housing was increasing significantly, which greatly affected the cooperative sector for the lower income population, as it will be seen in detail in the next section.

Considering the data, it is possible to conclude that the implementation of capitalism in Portugal, particularly in the most liberalizing periods, has been promoting economical inequalities to a degree that may affect the quality of democracy, although to a smaller extent than in other countries, namely Spain (Fernandes, 2014a, 2014b). As labour rights shrank, with the most radical amendments related with the facilitation of the regime on the termination of the work contract being declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, the unemployment rate increased to 16.2% in 2013.⁶

Despite these challenges, we observe the absence of «critical and alternative social movements» (Freire, Lousada, 2013, p. 8), aimed at a deep structural social transformation, acting in the margins of political institutions and the state. After the revolutionary enthusiasm over a socialist transformation, the social alternatives were integrated in the participatory mechanisms envisaged by the democratic system; in a reformist approach, they dedicated themselves to specific and restricted concerns and set aside any transformative ideologies.

⁶ Data Base of Contemporary Portugal
(PORDATA):[http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Taxa+de+desemprego+total+e+por+sexo+\(percentagem\)+\(R\)-550](http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Taxa+de+desemprego+total+e+por+sexo+(percentagem)+(R)-550)

In this context, the debate over the quality of the Portuguese democracy is extensive and far from consensual. The persistence of low levels of civic engagement and trust among citizens, and of these in relation to the political class, has been observed in Southern European countries (Putnam, 1993, 2005, Villaverde Cabral, 2007, 1993, Montero et al 1997), raising the possibility of a common cultural matrix. In the case under analysis, it is not only the existence of these characteristics, but its permanence over a relatively long and troubled time, full of institutional transformations.

Contrary to the conclusions of Mishler and Rose (2001), the research will support the culturalist model, which emphasizes the resistance to the change of the political attitudes formed during long processes of socialization that tend to reproduce themselves, in detriment of the institutionalist model, which emphasizes precisely the permeability of political attitudes to institutional changes. The testimonies recollected will provide a detailed picture of this phenomenon, as opposed to quantitative approaches that are based on closed, standardized questions.

The issue of social trust, one of the central dimensions of this phenomenon, will be presented in all its aspects, from the persistent mutual mistrust among individuals to the dubious relations with institutions, emphasizing its negative impact on the collective action of the neighbourhood organizations, imbued with a corrosive spirit of suspicion. However, the research also highlights seemingly contradictory aspects in this context, such as the resilience of leaderships and the fulfilment of the financial responsibilities on the part of the neighbours in most but not in all neighbourhoods. The phenomenon is much more complex than simply to determine if the citizens believe they can trust each other, the most commonly used question to measure it in quantitative studies⁷. Moreover, if there is variation at the micro level, between several neighbourhoods in the same city, it may also exist at a macro level among several countries.

Another pertinent matter concerns the relationship between educational level and political interest. Based on quantitative data, Torcal and Magalhães (2010, p. 83)

⁷ For more information on this issue see Miller e Mitamura (2003).

conclude that the level of education is precisely the most relevant causal factor to explain this phenomenon, since the countries of South Europe have low levels of education compared to a sample of 22 European countries. In their view, this finding contributes to discredit the thesis of the Southern European exceptionalism, since the explanation for the low levels of political interest may lie not in long lasting cultural legacies but rather in a «more trivial» fact. However, in the SAAL neighbourhoods in Lisbon we will observe that the relationship between the level of education and the level of political interest is not linear, at least insofar as it involves neighbourhood concerns and the activities of the organizations, considering the most participative elements are often the least educated, while increasing the level of education from one generation to the next does not translate into an increase in the interest to participate.

This fact suggests that under appropriate institutional conditions the negative effects of a low formal educational level can be overcome. In the case under analysis, it is not a matter of a real competence, but a matter of perceived capacity. When the neighbours find themselves in a context that does not look down on them for their low educational level and respects them as valuable actors, they deliver and go on delivering even when the favourable context terminates because they become motivated and they gradually learn in the process. The educational effects of participation overshadow the formal educational level, insofar as the democratic culture acquired through experience is more relevant than a degree of formal education, which only slightly educates for democracy. The causal relation between the two variables will not be linear, making it necessary to consider other potential explanatory factors, such as issues related with incentives and opportunities for a greater political involvement.

The impact of the various modes of transition on the quality of democracy is a key aspect to consider. In a comparative study between Portugal and Spain, Fernandes (2014a, 2014b, 2012) concludes that in Portugal the revolutionary transition produced a positive impact on the organizational capacity of citizens and the institutional openness to the organized expression of popular interests due to the intense popular pressure exerted on the newly created political institutions during the transition

period. Civil society organizations acquire institutional recognition and have the capacity to obtain support and resources from the regime, unlike in Spain, where the continuity between the democratic regime and the previous authoritarian regime has led to the perpetuation of a poorly politicized civil society, which remains unequal and weakly oriented towards popular causes. Fernandes fundamentals his observations on quantitative indicators, such as the percentage of adult population affiliated in voluntary associations, the percentage of the different types of organizations and the ratio of adult population affiliated in political parties.

However, the data demonstrate a blurring of the differences between the two countries since the mid-1990s, in both of which the civil society has weakened ever since. This leads Fernandes (2012) to question the duration of the revolutionary legacy, with the hypothesis that the technocratic and neoliberal impact of the European Union has contributed to reduce popular participation in two countries that have a fractured left and are unable to resist external pressure, a phenomenon enlightened by weak union membership. This hypothesis is consistent with the case under review, although the political shift began to unfold long before the adhesion, with the end of SAAL as one of its symptoms. There is a more or less explicit perception, on the part of the leaders interviewed, that after the revolutionary period the SAAL became *persona non grata*, something that was to «let it be, do not move, do not talk about it», which was reflected in the «degradation» of the relations with the institutions.

In close agreement with Fernandes, Bernardo (2015) states that the transition to democracy in Portugal intensified the collective action at the local level. The Portuguese local associative life is classified as quantitatively dense and historically relevant insofar as urban centres have constituted focal points for political and civic engagement. Residents in urban centres usually present a higher educational level and are faced with a structure of opportunities that favours the politicization of associational activity, considering the proximity to the state's symbolic and material power.

It is nevertheless recognized that there is no confirmation of a direct positive causal relation between consultative mechanisms and participation, as well as among the density of civic participation, the participation mechanisms and the quality of local

governance (Bernardo, 2015; Fernandes, 2014c). The interviews with the leaders of the SAAL neighbourhoods will enlighten the dubious character of participatory arrangements. They are often categorized as «intimidating», excessively slow and ultimately inefficient, which makes it necessary to activate personal connections in order to obtain the «favours» that will overcome the sluggish bureaucratic machine.

Fishman's (2011) regards Portugal the example of an inclusive, equitable society that remains open to dialogue as a result of a social revolution that has partially reversed institutional hierarchies and redefined cultural repertoires and understandings. One dimension of the phenomenon emphasized refers to the relations between the protest movements and the holders of institutional power. The example of specific and punctual cases involving residents of illegal neighbourhoods in Amadora is advanced to illustrate what he designates as the “*relative openness of Portuguese policy elites to pressures from below*” (2011, p.11). In these cases the neighbours, supported by a housing rights movement, the Habita, managed to obtain considerable concessions from the government, and João Ferrão played a key role in the negotiations, as Secretary of State for Urban Planning and Cities in the XVII Constitutional Government.

However, more recent events demonstrate a less optimistic reality, with the initiative Critical Neighbourhoods being sidelined when its main supporters left the positions of power that enabled its continuity, while Amadora City Council continues the consecutive evictions that lead the Habita to define their actions as «unacceptable in democracy» and incompatible with the «rule of law», revealing the most complete «disrespect for the life of the neighbours» while undertaking «a violent and systematic process of expulsion of hundreds of people over the years», using physical and moral violence by the police and social services⁸.

In interview, a representative of the City Council confirmed that they are not making any exceptions for people who were not included in the PER (Special Rehousing Program – Programa Especial de Realojamento)⁹, although the

⁸ Newsletter sent by Habita in April 2015. In February 2017 the situation remained the same. In April 7th a publication in Habita's Facebook Page reported the eviction of a family with a baby in Bairro 6 de Maio.

⁹ Created by the Decree-Law nº 163/93, of May the 7th.

implementation of the program has lasted for over 20 years and the data on the residents to be rehoused became obsolete. This is but an example of a long, exhausting and not very constructive relationship between a social movement that is not in the least tamed, and a City Council that is not in the least open to pressures from below.

This particular matter is still ongoing and every day brings new developments. In August 2016, the Ombudsman finally recommended the revision of the PER, considering it is clearly outdated. This recommendation followed the submission of a legal complaint by Habita in July 2012 and a request for investigation by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, regarding the evictions and demolitions carried out by the City Council of Amadora in Santa Filomena. The openness from below envisioned by Fishman is there, but it can be argued that it is rather modest, for despite all the efforts undertaken by Habita, the PER is more than 20 years old and has sanctioned numerous evictions through the years. Naturally, if we are comparing the Portuguese democracy with a democratic system that was built on a pact of silence, such as the Spanish one (Simões, 2012), it will seem good enough, but if we compare it with Fukuyama's Denmark¹⁰ (2015, p.40-42), there is still a long way to go.

Thus, the case of Habita's relations with the Amadora City Hall is not a paradigmatic example of the openness of Portuguese political elites to popular pressures, but rather of the erratic, dubious and personalist nature of the relations between institutions and civil society in Portugal, which will also be detected in the institutional relations of the SAAL neighbours under analysis. The character of political practice must be situated in its context and viewed from an ethnographic and historical perspective that embraces a considerable period of time and captures the «profound meanings of events». If it is assessed on the basis of isolated episodes or by taking into account only quantitative indicators it can conceal its true essence. It entails an historical relationship which, *“like any other relationship, it is a fluency which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomise its structure”* (Thompson, 1963, p.9).

¹⁰ Fukuyama is not referring to the real Denmark, but to an idealized society. He describes the modern effective government as the one that balances a strong and capable state with institutions that guarantee its accountability, which limit it and force it to act in the general interest (2015, p. 40; 688).

These somewhat optimistic theoretical perspectives on the inclusive character of the Portuguese democracy are contradicted by a literature mainly focused on the revolutionary context, which presents a radically opposed interpretation on the matter. In this pole, Cerezales (2003) views popular mobilizations during the revolutionary period as a short termed anomaly that emerged during a delimited juncture. The revolutionary period represented an external political opportunity, considering the state was temporarily unable to effectively exercise its coercive power. The neighbourhood movement, in particular, benefited from a decrease in police repression and took advantage of the possibility of forging valuable alliances within the state and with the revolutionary left and the COPCON (Mainland Operational Command – Comando Operacional do Continente), under a project of socialization of the public space.

When the political allies were defeated, the political opportunity faded away, considering that the neighbourhood movement remained strongly stigmatized by its former political associations. The constitution still recognized neighbourhood organizations and direct democracy, but the political practice did not invest in the legal framework necessary for its implementation. The mobilized disadvantaged groups could no longer contribute to legitimize the political power and the collective approach gave way to the competition for scarce goods in a market economy.

This perspective is largely compatible with the present research, but it must be said that some participatory institutional arrangements that were initiated during the revolutionary period produced long lasting effects that were not entirely reversed and should not be overlooked. The SAAL favoured the institutionalization and perpetuation of a part of the neighbourhood movement that managed to hold on to some of its conquests in the democratic context, despite the opposition it often faced. Several neighbourhoods were built in privileged locations by neighbourhood organizations that are still active today and were able, in a capitalist environment, to hold on to their right to the place.

Ramos Pinto (2008) emphasizes the moderation of the urban social movement during the revolutionary period, a feature often disguised under a rhetoric of radicalism. Initially the movement was mostly focused on the right to housing, but over

the summer of 1975 some neighbourhood commissions, inspired by the radical government and the military leadership, started to endorse a revolutionary social transformation. However, in November 1975 the movement abstained itself from supporting the radicals. The radical course of action was but an option of a few recent commissions from comparatively well-off areas of the city, while many commissions adopted a moderate posture, which facilitated the victory of the moderates in November 1975.

The research will show that the neighbourhood movement that was institutionalized through the SAAL in Lisbon took advantage of the socialist inspiration of the revolution to further its true goals. Albano Pires, a charismatic leader of these neighbourhoods in the heat of the revolution, stated that the neighbours were mainly concerned about the improvement of their housing conditions and had only a very superficial notion of the political ideas under discussion. They sympathized with the left but their notion of socialism and collective property was rather shallow.

The participatory process itself was a political school, as the neighbours gradually became more aware during the struggle. However, the end of the revolutionary period and the transference of the SAAL to the City Councils condemned the processes that were still in an initial phase, which significantly reduced the number of organizations involved in the fight. The main collective demands related with the loan interest rate, the expropriations and the right to build the neighbourhoods in the territories they already occupied had been successfully met, so the processes that were already ongoing focused on their own personal issues and dispersed. In the end, the organizational structure which gathered all these neighbourhoods simply faded away, considering it had fulfilled its purpose, since its goals were met in the neighbourhoods that were finally built.

Although the partial success of the process is undeniable, the dispersion of the neighbourhood organizations and the lack of a consistent political project hindered their contribution to the quality of democratic governance, which presents entropies that cannot be ignored. There subsists an underlying problem of governing efficiency that largely transcends the matters of housing and is transversal to several

fundamental areas where the state is unable to establish a transparent and coherent relation with civil society.

In a distant policy area such as the management of coastal areas, Schmidt, Mourato and Delicado (2014) detect a severe inefficiency in the implementation of the instruments design to address this matter due to an extremely complex network of 93 institutions that is in constant redefinition. These institutions have undefined and overlapping responsibilities and are unable to coordinate efforts. This fact, associated with the multiple and contradictory legal framework, creates a bureaucratic mess that is largely indecipherable for the common citizen and unmanageable for policy makers.

Dias and Allegretti (2015) classify the Portuguese public administration as bureaucratic, authoritarian and centralized. Despite some progress made in the past five years regarding the implementation of a participatory culture within institutions, participatory mechanisms remain fragile, considering they are divided between the desire to innovate and the fear of substantial reform. The local power often tries to control participatory processes through low risk consulting subordinate models of domesticated participation. There is a low degree of institutionalization of participatory arrangements, which often are no more than ephemeral localized projects. Most participatory experiments present a low impact in terms of the quality of social dialog and methodological diversity, while the civil society remains sceptic and highly critical of such arrangements.

The study will illustrate this situation through the example of the GABIP ex-SAAL (Office for the Support of Priority Intervention Neighbourhoods - Gabinete de Apoio aos Bairros de Intervenção Prioritária), a municipal project designed to support the pending regularization processes in some SAAL neighbourhoods through a participatory approach that nevertheless is clearly designed in an up-bottom methodology. Nevertheless, it has been presenting very positive outcomes in the improvement of the living conditions in the neighbourhoods and contributed to the reactivation of neighbourhood organizations that had been dormant for many years. Considering *“protest cultures tend to reproduce themselves through reactivation of activist networks surviving in the doldrums, organizational persistence, deeply rooted norms, and long-lasting narratives”* (della Porta, Andretta, Fernandes, Romanos and

Vogiatzoglou, 2017, p. 201), the GABIP ex-SAAL provided a fertile ground for their revival under a not so revolutionary and more reformist guise.

The extremes in which the debate is situated make it hard to conciliate radically opposed perspectives. It is difficult to situate the continuous rise in the number of associations constituted each year in an interpretation that somehow detects a capture of the state by political elites. Moreover, new data keeps emerging and fuelling the debate. More recently, Fernandes (2017) reinforced his arguments with a comprehensive analysis of the social movements in Portugal which emerged as a response to the economical crisis and the subsequent austerity measures. He exposed not only a comparatively high volume of social protest in the southern European context, but also demonstrated the cohesiveness and stability of the coalitions created, which found powerful allies in the left-wing parties, the union movement, the constitutional court, the parliament and even in the police and armed forces, which came to their support in a political context which embraced protest.

The impact of the revolutionary transition to democracy in participation cannot be disregarded, since it did not reverse to the insignificant levels it presented during Estado Novo, as the associations constituted each year and the recent social movements testify. However, the intense empowered participation observed during the revolutionary period did not proceed unscathed into the democratic regime. To a great extent, it was gradually transformed and integrated into a political system that welcomes participation in homeopathic dosages.

Citizens are welcome to constitute their organizations and to interact with institutions, considering it is almost unanimously accepted that this vitality constitutes an healthy symptom of a vibrant civil society. However, this interaction is generally controlled from above so that local and national institutions do not lose control over the process. This phenomenon is not easily apprehended through quantitative approaches or documental analysis, considering the number of civil society organizations can be deceiving and the official rhetoric can disguise the less attractive aspects of the reality. To grasp the real reach of participation in Portugal, the research must consider how these organizations are constituted and operate in their daily

activities, namely regarding their relationship with public institutions and their involvement in policy making.

This reality is more pressing with the most disempowered groups, which are often masters in the arts of political disguise (Scott, 1990). Pushed by their vulnerability, their resistance to instituted powers is often insinuated more than overtly assumed, a clever tactical choice that is largely invisible to the naked eye of quantitative research. Even in a liberal democracy that apparently tolerates contestation and defiance, subtle rewards and punishments can still be attained by cunningly playing the game of power. Some hints to this game can be inferred through direct observation and through the narratives of those who play it. They do not exhaust the subject, but a closer look into specific relevant contexts, couple with more general data, can provide a clearer picture of the participatory dynamics that remain after a revolutionary transition to democracy.

A good example can be found in rehousing programs, namely regarding the considerable shift from the SAAL to the PER. If the SAAL was focused in the internal resources of auto-mobilized populations, the PER viewed the populations as problematic passive receivers of social housing and of social intervention programs conducted by IPSS and the City Councils. The Decree-Law that instituted the program goes provides an explicit reference to some of the problems that supposedly affect these populations, such as drug addiction, prostitution and criminality.

Previous exploratory field work regarding this subject was conducted in Bairro de Santo António, in Camarate (Rodrigues, 2014), the ideal setting for such a study since it is a SAAL neighbourhood that also has a PER project. The testimony of a leader of the housing cooperative clearly indicates the radical change in the institutional posture regarding the involvement of the neighbours in the processes. If in the SAAL the neighbours were key actors with considerable decisional power, in the PER the City Council bluntly rejected any kind of involvement of the cooperative in the process, with the argument that it was a municipal project.

Later on, the neighbourhood became the passive recipient of a social project conducted by an external non profit organization chosen by the City Council. This project, a CLDS (Local Contract of Social Development – Contrato Local de

Desenvolvimento Social), had among its main objectives the activation of neighbourhood participation and it effectively did so in the terms that are now the most current: it induced the constitution of a youth association that was totally dependent from the project and dedicated itself to recreational activities; and it organized sporadic up-bottom civic activities, such as a day dedicated to cleaning the neighbourhood, in which some neighbours agreed to participate.

In the meanwhile, the cooperative decayed due to the lack of participation of its aging members and the disempowered neighbourhood gradually became an involuntary enclave, with scarce equipments and infrastructures, namely regarding public transports and access ways, considering it is surrounded by highways that do not serve it and severed its local accesses. It is but an example, but still a very enlightening one, as to the manifold subtleties of participation in democratic Portugal.

Housing cooperatives between shifting tides

Cooperatives are associations that develop an economic activity: they are civil society organizations that have a foot in the market and another in the state, which must create the necessary conditions for their viability. As such, they are not incorporated in a relatively independent civic sphere governed by associational dynamics. Taking on Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Patrick Heller and Marcelo Silva's words, they are "*bounded and constrained by the media of power in the state and the media of money in the market*" (2011, p.26). This fact, as the authors argue, may hinder their reliance on social and communicative resources and compromise their capacity to act according with their normative *telos*, as it proved to be true in Portugal.

During the fascist regime, housing policies were used mainly as an instrument of social control, maintaining and reinforcing the established hierarchical relations. As observed by Queirós (2007), the appropriation of the central areas of major cities led the working classes to disseminate through the suburbs, preventing their concentration and the dangers it could pose to governmental stability. The housing discrimination was aggravated by the intense rural exodus that in the middle of the last century brought many workers from small villages all over Portugal to the major

industrial areas, where they sought employment opportunities that lacked in the country side. Social housing programs were scarce, scattered and assumed a strongly symbolic, disciplinary and selective character, being mostly directed to particular social and professional groups that complied with the dominant moral standards (Gros, 1994), hence excluding many of the most impoverished and precarious industrial workers. Despite the dramatic housing needs, the neighbourhood movement was rather incipient in a context where civic participation was repressed.


The revolutionary period presented a valuable opportunity for the affirmation of neighbourhood movements, which found themselves empowered in a context where the State was fragile due to the transition process and the social hierarchical structure was in a process of redefinition. It was a period of intense neighbourhood mobilization. Neighbourhood commissions were constituted spontaneously or with the impulse of the Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA), with the objective of increasing the level of participation of the neighbours in the management of their own neighbourhoods, namely in the demand for fundamental services and equipments. One of the most controversial initiatives of some of these commissions was the occupation of vacant houses, both public and private, with the objective of distributing them among the most needed populations, or of using these spaces to create equipments for the communities. The activity of the commissions decreased significantly after the November 1975 coup and the change in the political conjuncture it entailed. The popular movements lost ground in face of the moderate forces, which gained control over the state and demanded for the prevalence of governmental decisions over popular initiative.

The victory of the moderate faction in November 1975 and the approval of the Portuguese Constitution in April 1976 landmarked the demise of the most radical left wing political forces and the beginning of a new democratic regime. The constitution was still filled with the revolutionary spirit, and defended *“the transition to socialism through the creation of conditions for the democratic exercise of the power by the working classes”*. However, this disposition faded gradually during Portugal’s democratic experience and the political option was for a capitalist liberal democracy of

European inspiration, although the right to housing remain enshrined in the constitution.

As observed by Charles Downs (1983), this process implied an individualization of the fight for the right to housing that affected the neighbourhood movements: neighbours went from collective mobilization to the search for individual solutions, since the favourable political context had ended. However, the termination of the critical juncture that had favoured popular mobilization was not the end of neighbourhood organizations in Portugal, which persisted in the context of the consolidated liberal democracy and sought for new strategies of survival and intervention purposes. Neighbourhood participation acquired new contours, but it was not annulled nor did it reverse to the stage of nearly inexistence it had presented during the fascist regime.

Following a brief period of participatory frenzy during and immediately after the revolution, housing social movements evolved from revolutionary enthusiasm into a more mature organizational posture, aimed at aggregating collective interests and representing them in a consolidated democracy. This process entailed a reflux in the number of neighbourhood organizations constituted each year, which now presented two forms: housing cooperatives and neighbourhood associations. In the early eighties, the number decreased but further down the decade it regained some vitality. However, unlike neighbourhood associations, whose yearly constitution as been maintaining a relative stability until the present day, from then on the housing cooperative movement started to show a consistent decline, with a decrease in the number of cooperatives constituted in most sectors. Considering the housing organizational sector, we observe that it follows the general pattern, as shown in the following graphic:



Source: National Record of Collective Entities and Livro Branco do SAAL¹¹

As displayed by the graphic, before the 1974 revolution civil society organizations were rather incipient in Portugal, but they were not inexistent, particularly cooperatives. A rural country, only slightly industrialized and with a powerful catholic church (Quintão, 2011), Portugal did not feel the industrial revolution as strongly as some other European countries, where the working class made its way through oppressing working conditions to claim its civic rights. Throughout the XIX century, mainly after the Regeneration movement, cooperatives were scarce but made their presence felt and were seen in a benevolent eye as supportive forms of production that had the potential to improve the living conditions of the most deprived social classes.

In 1867, cooperatives acquired legal autonomy from the commercial sector with the publication of the «Andrade Corvo» law, that defined them as associations aimed at promoting mutual support among their partners. This political measure, together with a reinforcement of mutual-aid organizations and associations, initially envisaged the strengthening of the social economy as a whole but later on, due to the relative failure of a federalist approach to the sector, became a part of an effort to deepen the several cooperative and associative branches (Ferreira da Costa, 1999). This understanding of the autonomous nature of cooperatives suffered a setback with

¹¹ The National Record of Collective Entities gathers data on organizations that still existed or were created since 1978. As such, it misses some more ephemeral organizations created and dissolved in the heat of the revolution, namely organizations related with the SAAL. To overcome this limitation we complemented it with data from the White Book of the SAAL (Livro Branco do SAAL), a collection of raw documents from that program. We did not consider in this graphic the extinctions because their number is very low, suggesting that it may be inflated by “ghost” organizations that were not formally deactivated but in reality no longer function.

the commercial code, published in 1888, which constituted, for almost a century, the legal framework for the cooperative sector. Here cooperatives were understood as a sub-specie of traditional commercial companies (Rodrigues, 1999), thus losing their solidarity and not-for-profit character and becoming commercial agents as any other (Cardoso Pereira, 2012). Despite this setback, during the First Republic (1910-1926) the number of cooperatives increased more than 5 times and in 1926 there were 336 organizations active in the cooperative sector. This increase was due to the support granted to the sector, for although it assumed a paternalistic character and failed to create a consistent and integrated legal framework, it viewed cooperatives as a useful mean to improve the living conditions of the working classes, thus serving a purpose of social control: they contributed to decrease the risks associated with poverty and so limited social protest (Namorado, 1999).

The fascist regime maintained an ambiguous relationship with cooperatives. The rural policy of the regime promoted agricultural cooperatives as instruments of economic regulation and wage control. Consumption and cultural cooperatives, on the other hand, were repressed due to their proletarian social basis, which was regarded as a potential focus of political contestation and instability. Despite the exception made with agricultural cooperatives, who where integrated in the corporative logic of the regime, the general tendency was towards a repression of the cooperative sector and the fragmentation of its branches came as an unavoidable consequence (Ferreira da Costa, 1999). In 1971 new legislation determined that cooperatives had a similar status of associations, unless their activity was exclusively economic and in the interest of their members. This legal measure extended to the cooperative sector the restrictions already felt by associations, which motivated contestation movements, thus justifying, at the eyes of the regime, the extinction of the most troublesome cooperatives.

The revolution finally created the opportunity for the long repressed social forces to express themselves, initially in an informal and spontaneous way, and later on in a more organized and institutional manner. In 1975 the Commission for Cooperative Support was created to coordinate the public services responsible for the study and management of the cooperative sector. The Institute for the Cooperative

Sector António Sérgio (INSCOOP) was constituted a year later as a public institute aimed at supporting cooperative organization. The cooperative sector was then public assumed as a fundamental element in the democratic transition, *“fostering and intensifying the global productive capacity”* and *“creating employment”* (Decree-Law nº249/75 of July 4th).

The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, approved in April 1976, understood the cooperative sector as a cornerstone for the development of social property and determined the right to the free creation of cooperatives and the state’s responsibility to grant them fiscal and financial benefits, favourable credit conditions and technical support. In 1980 the Cooperative Code¹² was published to finally align the legislation with the constitution. It determined a high degree of autonomy for the cooperative sector in relation to all civil and commercial law that regulated other organizational forms and in agreement with the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), in its final formulation it understood cooperatives as collective autonomous organizations aimed at satisfying the needs of their members in a logic of cooperation (Rodrigues, 1999: 127).

These were times that gathered different perspectives on the role cooperatives could play in the Portuguese democracy, perspectives that could be found both in political agents and in cooperative managers for, as a representative of the cooperative movement stated, there are cooperative leaders from left to right. However, the understanding of the cooperative movement’s relevance differed substantially: if the moderate right wing parties understood the cooperative sector as a confined solution to specific problems, and never as a possible alternative for the future, the communists envisaged a transition to socialism through the cooperative sector (Namorado, 1999: 110). In spite of the political support granted to cooperatives, such conflicting perspectives and the priority given to the European Economic Community (EEC) membership originated some inertia and undefinitions in the development of the cooperative sector in the late seventies and early eighties, a situation aggravated in the following decade.

¹² The cooperative code was later revised by the Law nº51/96 of September 7th and altered by the Decree-Law nº 343/98 of November 6th (Rodrigues, 1999: 127).

The constitutional revision of 1989, which emerged in the context of a liberalizing economical reform, dictated the inclusion of cooperatives in the third sector, together with associations, mutual-aid organizations and foundations - the private initiatives of public utility, that presently constitute the cooperative and social sector. This option reflected a change in the role attributed to cooperatives, for if in the initial formulation of the Constitution they were understood as a cornerstone for the development of social property and, as such, an instigator of the transition to socialism, in 1989, under a majority Social Democratic Party (PSD) government, they became just another element in a mixed and stable economy. Socialism was no longer an option and capitalism was no longer just a stepping stone, it was the undisputed economical model adopted by the Portuguese Democracy.


As noted by Sebastián Royo and Paul Christopher Manuel (2003), Portuguese policymakers during the eighties relied on the accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) to assist the consolidation of the recent democratic institutions, which implied a modernization of the economic structures and a normalization of the relations with the other member states in a context marked by the instability of the institutions that had been established during the transition to democracy. The integration process entailed the promotion of economical competition, the privatization of public enterprises, the restructuring of the industrial sector and a process of economical deregulation, measures that drove Portugal further away from the socialist path.

The influence of the European Union (EU) in the Portuguese political course is then an explanatory factor to consider and to some extent can be viewed as a turning point, a new critical juncture that somehow reversed the effects of the critical juncture that had preceded it - the revolutionary transition to democracy and its socialist inspiration. The EU neo-liberal orientation, enforced namely through the influence of the Thatcher governments, motivated member states to undertake processes of privatization and deregulation with the goal of intensifying market competition, therefore reducing the role of the state in the provision of services and expanding the role of markets. This process, facilitated by the single market and the economic and monetary union, underlies the idea is that a more intense competition leads

organizations to perform more efficiently (Hall, 2003), an objective that is openly prioritized over cooperation.

As such, the socialist alternative proposed by cooperative organization was removed to the backstage where, in the understanding of some of its representatives, it longs for new opportunities. A representative of the cooperative movement considers that it is a strategic partner of the state that presents an alternative to capitalism, with its own jobs, agents and resources. In his words, *“capitalism is agonizing and other opportunities will come. The capitalist company is very recent and it is very difficult to ascertain who the agents are in the capitalist economy. Cooperatives will be one of the possible solutions for the future problems of human societies, privileging cooperation between individuals above individual profit”*.

However, these expectations are to be realized in Portugal. A report of the National Statistical Centre (INE) gives a rather exhaustive overview of the social and cooperative sector. This report on the Satellite Account of Social Economy for the year 2010 presents the analysis, by type of activity, of all relevant entities. According to it, in 2010 the Social Economy Gross Value Added (GVA) represented 2.8% of the total national GVA and 5.5% of full time paid employment. Of the 55 383 organizations considered, associations and other similar social economy organizations such as organizations of volunteer firemen were nearly hegemonic and represented almost the totality of the sector, 94%, accounting for 54.1% of GVA. Cooperatives were, at a considerable distance, the second group with higher relative weight in terms of number of units (4%) and GVA (17%) (INE, 2013a: 5-6).



In 2010 there were 2 260 registered cooperatives, mostly operating in the areas of trade, consumption and services (26.2%). Activities related with development, housing and environment also presented a significant weight (17.8%). It is estimated that cooperatives had a financial surplus of approximately € 170,3 million in 2010, and their resources were estimated at € 2 950,1 billion. As for the structure of these resources, the report concluded that production is the main source of funding and that property income assumes a greater relative weight in cooperatives that have a financial activity (47.1 %) (idem: 22-24).

The connotation of cooperatives with socialism, as we have seen, seems to have hindered their development and minimized their relevance, for the policy towards the sector was often ambiguous and contradictory: if institutional bodies and constitutional measures were created and defined to protect the cooperative sector, legislation did not always follow this tendency. For instance, in the mid eighties the access to some economical areas was denied to the cooperative sector, such as life insurance mediation, transport of merchandize and vehicle rental (Namorado, 1999). The fiscal policy towards the sector has also not been consistently favourable. A jurist in the social and cooperative sector believes that cooperatives lost some fiscal advantages, for despite constitutional prerogatives, the policy of the last years has been forgetting the cooperative sector. In agreement with this view, a representative of the cooperative movement considers that it weakened because the support the movement had during and after the revolution was gradually lost for political reasons and the constitutional requirements were no longer fulfilled.

The downfall of the sector began in the early nineties, during the Cavaco Silva governments¹³, which entailed profound structural reforms that ruptured with the revolution's socialist orientation. The main goal was to make the transition to a liberal

¹³Aníbal Cavaco Silva (Social Democratic Party - PSD) was elected prime minister for three consecutive times: he held office in a minority government from 1985 to 1987 and in two majority governments from 1991 to 1995.

and competitive economical system, based in private ownership, that would enable Portugal to align with its European partners, after becoming a member of the EEC in 1986. These reforms involved the privatization of public companies in key sectors of the economy or the concession of their management to private companies. Sectors such as telecommunications, transports and production were affected by such changes. Other measures included the reform of the agricultural system, with a reinforcement of private property; the flexibilization of the labour market, specifically as to the facilitation of the termination of employment contracts; the reduction of obstacles to the privatization and development of the financial system; and the revision of the fiscal system, namely in the area of direct income taxation, with a simplification of regulations and procedures.

Cooperatives were not absent from the governments' projects. The program of the X constitutional government (1985-1987) stressed *"the importance of cooperative development and its contribution to the quality of life of the Portuguese people, achieved through a greater social justice, an improvement of the production and marketing channels and an effective response to the needs of the people"*. As such, the government intended to support the cooperative sector and to assist it through the challenges entailed in the EEC membership. The program of the XI constitutional government (1987-1991) maintained its apology of the cooperative sector, which was viewed as an important instrument of *"social progress"* and a key element in the *"reduction of tensions and conflicts"*. The plan was then to consolidate the sector through awareness raising actions, training programs and technical support to cooperatives, particularly those in branches that could give a greater contribution to socioeconomic development and job creation. The program of the XII constitutional government (1991-1995) was coherent with its predecessors and continued to consider the cooperative sector as a source of *"civic education"*, a *"promoter of solidarity"* and a valuable contributor to *"economic development"* and *"social progress"*. Cooperative organization was considered *"very demanding"* and, as such, it was deemed necessary *"to be very selective regarding the fields where it can flourish"*. The modernization and professionalization of the management bodies of cooperatives

was understood as fundamental for their adaptation to European demands and competitiveness, which emerged as more relevant than the cooperative principles.

In spite of this defence of the cooperative sector, it is during the Cavaco Silva's majority governments that the creation of new cooperatives starts to show a decline, which suggests that the political speech doesn't always coincide with its practice. Rui Namorado (1999) saw here a dissimulated obstruction of the state to cooperative development, opinion shared by a representative of the cooperative sector, which confirmed that the loss of a positive discrimination for the cooperative sector was particularly notorious during the Cavaco Silva governments.

Gomes Santos (1999) identifies several models to characterize state/cooperative sector relations in Portugal: a «developing model», implemented from 1980 to 1988, and a «disadvantageous neutral model», implemented from 1989 to 1994. The first model involved the implementation of a policy aimed at extending the tax advantages applicable to cooperatives, which implied a generic immunity of the results of cooperative activity from business taxation. The second model, initiated with the tax reform on income and real estate, was characterized by a mercantilist and lucrative approach to cooperative activity that understood cooperatives as any other commercial or industrial entity, and determined a reduction of the benefits formerly granted to the sector. This policy involved, among other measures, the disappearance of the generic exemption that covered all liquid surplus generated by cooperatives; the exclusion of all cooperatives from the exemption of profit subjected to IRC by retaining tax; and the restriction of exemptions to housing cooperatives¹⁴.

In his article written in 1999, Gomes Santos envisaged a third moment in the state/cooperative sector relation, a «supportive strategic model», initiated in 1995 with the constitution of an inter ministerial committee to redefine the fiscal policy for the cooperative sector and by a resolution for a tax reform that included the adaptation of the tax regime for the social economy. However, the decline of the cooperative sector remained, with less cooperatives being constituted each year. This

¹⁴ Before these alterations, only income earned in transactions with third parties were excluded from the exemption (Decree-Law No. 737-A/74 of December 23rd). According with the new IRC Code, only income directly related with the construction, sale, purchase, repair or remodelling of homes for housing of its members was exempt.

suggests that the policy measures adopted during the Cavaco Silva governments generated a path dependency that was not significantly altered by posterior more favourable measures. Moreover, the inconformity between political speech and practice is not limited to the Cavaco Silva's governments. According with a representative of the cooperative movement, the positive differentiation for the cooperative sector tends to be attenuated but the government can always argue that it still exists, thus defending itself from any accusation of unconstitutionality. For example, the base law for the social economy recently approved by unanimity in the parliament is very favourable and is in tune with the constitution, stating clearly that the state has the obligation to support cooperatives and that there must be a fiscal differentiation for the sector. This differentiation exists but it has been fading gradually because specific legislation on fiscal benefits or on access to credit doesn't follow the guidance of these generic institutional requirements.


Without a consistent support from the state, agricultural and production cooperatives lost ground in face of their competition and the decline of some economical activities, such as metalwork and textile production. As an alternative, cooperatives turned to education, culture or services, or to other areas that were less appealing to the market economy, such as social services. It is a cooperative organization directed towards the satisfaction of the needs of heterogeneous users, understood as clients, and not a mobilization of supportive members towards common goals. In some areas such as consumption, cooperatives have been trying to face the competition of the large commercial Centres by fusing with each other. Cardoso Pereira (2012) considers that the adaptation effort made by cooperatives to adjust themselves to a mass consumer society compromises their classist basis and their own identity. As stated by a jurist in the social and cooperative sector, there are market demands that oblige cooperatives to lose some of their identity; there is a mixture of capitalist interests with cooperative interests, a situation that intensified with the adhesion to the European Union (UE) and the strong economical competition it generated. As a result, the frontier between cooperatives and for profit companies is increasingly blurred: there are for profit companies constituted by cooperatives,

cooperatives constituted by companies and associations between small/medium sized companies and cooperatives, constituted to face the competition of the “big capital”.

Housing cooperatives were not left unharmed. Cooperative construction reached its peak in 1989 with 4 582 houses contracted, but after that that it has been decreasing dramatically (IHRU, 2007, p. 26). As we have seen, during and immediately after the revolution, cooperatives were seen as a valuable instrument in the resolution of the severe housing needs that affected the country. According with IHRU, in the late 70s the cooperative movement was responsible for the development of residential complexes, with the support of the municipalities, which were innovative in their user involvement approach. These projects presented high quality standards at the level of housing, outdoor spaces and social facilities, something which was unprecedented until then in housing built at controlled costs. The extinction of the FFH in the early eighties temporarily disturbed the ongoing cooperative processes, but the creation of the National Housing Institute (INH) favoured a new phase of development that hinted to a clear political option to support the sector. At the end of the eighties, a government plan to promote housing at controlled costs raised expectations that were frustrated by unfavourable policy measures and by the absence of an effective dialogue between the government and the social partners in the construction sector. As a consequence, housing cooperatives began to experience difficulties in the development of their projects, particularly those directed to the most disadvantaged social groups. As such, the nineties represented a period of withdrawal of the prior expectations of consolidation and growth of the cooperative housing sector.

With the growing imposition of market economy, the state itself has been redrawing from housing construction, understood as an unwelcomed expense that generates unsolvable social problems; as such, it should be left in the hands of the market (Carreiras et al, 2011). And the market did take over, as is clearly shown in the following graphic. The number of houses concluded from 1997 to 2012 derived almost in its totality from private initiative, since the cooperative and the public sectors assumed a residual role in such development. House construction reached its peak in 2002 with the conclusion of 129 278 houses, 124 864 (96,5%) of which of private initiative, 2 555 (2%) of public initiative and 1 859 (1,5%) of cooperative initiative. From

then on the crisis in construction determined the constant decrease in the number of houses concluded each year, that reached its bottom in 2012 with just 34 294 houses. The crisis transversely affected all sectors – private, public and cooperative, which in that year finalized only 33 703 (98,3%), 507 (1,5%) and 84 (0,2%) houses, respectively, but the relative weight of both the public and the cooperative sectors decreased even more in comparison with 2002.



Source: INE, 2013b:31

Housing cooperatives have been faced with several difficulties that hinder their activity, namely obstacles that interfere with the final price of their offer, which affects their competitiveness. The cooperative tax status, define by the Law nº 85/98 of December 16th, opened the possibility for cooperatives to use non-subsidized loans for construction of housing at controlled costs with an increase of 20 %, the application of reduced VAT rates and tax benefits, such as the exemption from the municipal tax on real estate transfer (IMT) in land acquisition and the municipal tax on real estate (IMI) in the case of residential buildings of urban collective property destined to co-operators. In metropolitan areas, the use of this statute allowed the construction of better quality housing priced below the free market (IHRU, 2007: 78). The Decree-Law nº 145/97 of July 11th stipulated that housing cooperatives have the right to several advantages, such as subsidized loans for construction; the reduction of the added value tax (VAT) in the construction at controlled costs; the exemption of the IMT for

the acquisition of construction soil, of the payment of fees and charges for the construction of urban infrastructures, and of registration fees and charges related with mortgage loans; and the gratuitousness of registration acts.

However, IHRU found several shortcomings related with a disconnection between the construction costs and sales values of the houses, considering the requirements for construction, in particular those relating with accessibilities and heating requirements of the buildings; the absence of any limitation or requirement on the household who can access this type of housing (including those who could afford to buy a house in the free market); the preference for the individual property of the houses (through mortgage schemes at market conditions), instead of the collective property; the preference for acquisition instead of renting; and a production capacity constrained by the scarcity of soil compatible with the promotion of housing at controlled costs.

The difficult access to affordable construction soil presents itself as one of the main constraints to housing cooperatives. The lack of differentiated financial mechanisms for reimbursement of the costs implies that cooperatives acquire the soil at market conditions. Moreover, the lack of available and affordable soil for construction in the most central city areas compels cooperatives to seek for it in the outskirts, which entails additional costs of travel for potential co-operators, is distanced from the most coveted areas and is therefore less appealing. The territorial progressive expansion of Municipal Master Plans (MDPs) made it difficult for municipalities to acquire soil at low prices and pass it on to cooperatives, since the regulated zoning of urban soil elevated the expectations of the owners as to the price of their soil. The absence of a special regime for expropriation for cooperative development aggravated this situation since it favoured a pricing of expropriation at current market costs. This situation prevented the municipalities from constituting a reserve of municipal land that could support cooperative construction for non-solvent social strata. Finally, the benefits granted by IHRU to housing construction at controlled costs (subsidizing a third of the current interest rate), does not compensate for the excessive bureaucracy involved in the approval of funding and projects (IHRU, 2007: 74-77). As a representative of the department for cooperative relations of a City

Council declared that the bureaucracy is such that an allocation process may take up to 12 years: *“frequently, when the City Council believes the process of allotment is concluded, the Land Registry considers that there were shortcomings in certain aspects that have to be revised, and so the process has to be restarted from square one”*.

On top of all these constraints to cooperative development, Bingre do Amaral (2011, p.15) mentions the gradual transformation of housing in a financial asset detached from its real purpose, a phenomenon that has been supported by a urban planning legislation¹⁵ that favours particular interests of private ownership of the soil as an economical factor, relegating its social function to the background. As such, the system of spatial planning determines which soil will absorb, through its price, the availability of mortgage credit and, consequently, which entities will benefit from the future rents entailed in these mortgages. As the graphic showed, these entities were not housing cooperatives, but the construction companies and, naturally, the banks.

Despite some attempts to liberalize and modernize the renting market¹⁶, the stimulation was very tenuous and the acquisition of a house remained the privileged means of access to housing (Figueiredo, 2004). This was facilitated by low tax rates, by subsidized credit schemes and by a favourable loaning legislation¹⁷, which artificially increased the purchasing power of the Portuguese population and promoted the acquisition of houses transacted by construction companies, since for the reasons listed above the final cost proposed by housing cooperatives was not significantly more competitive.

¹⁵It was the case of the Decree-Law nº46 673/65 of November 29th on the juridical regime of urban allotments, whose spirit is still present in recent legislation, or the Decree-Law nº168/99 of May 18th, which approved the code of expropriations.

¹⁶The government issued legislation with the objective of stimulating the rental market, such as: the Decree-Law nº13/86 of April 23rd on the reformulation of conditioned renting, the Decree-Law nº68/86 of March 27th on renting grants to low income households, the Decree-Law nº 321-B/90 of October 15th on the new regime for urban rental (RAU), or the Decree-Law nº 162/92 of August 5th on the incentive to youth renting.

¹⁷ The legislation accompanied and supported this context favourable to acquisition: approval of a new credit regime for the acquisition of a house (Decree-Law nº 328-B/86, of September 30th; liberalization of subsidized credit (Decree-Law nº 150-A/91 of April 22nd; possibility of opting for progressive or constant mortgages (Decree-Law nº 224/89 of July 5th; possibility of contracting loans at a fixed interest rate in subsidized credit (Decree-Law nº 250/93 of July 14th). The results were notorious: in 1985 were celebrated approximately 27 700 mortgage contracts, but in 1994 the number increased to over 83000. Between 1991 and 1994 the number of contracts grew at an annual average rate of 25% and the overall contract value grew at an annual average rate of 45%. Subsidized loans consisted, in this time frame, in about half of the total of loans to housing purchase.

When it became a member of the EEC, Portugal's determination of exchange rates had to consider the integration in an Economic and Monetary Union. This implied that the deficit of the public sector could not exceed 3% of GDP, the public sector debt could not exceed 60% of GNP, the inflation rate could only be 1% above the three best rates of the European Union and the stability of the exchange rate had to be maintained within the European Monetary System. Consequently, there was a decline in interest rates, which greatly facilitated the access to credit (Idem: 272). The volume of mortgage credits increased from 5 000 million Euros in 1990 to 104 000 million Euros in 2008 and in this year about 68% of the private Portuguese debt resulted from these mortgages (Bingre do Amaral, 2011: 8-9, quoting the Plano Estratégico de Habitação 2008/2013, IHRU and the Boletim Estatístico do Banco de Portugal – March 2009).

The easy access to credit made the housing market more dependent on interest rates than on the demographic pressure or on the real income of the Portuguese population. Moreover, a favourable fiscal policy promoted the retention of houses, including vacant ones, for speculation, thus artificially lowering the offer and turning it into the «good and safe investment» for everyone. A representative of the department for cooperative relations of a City Council considers that the need to own things, including houses, was inculcated in the Portuguese citizens through the aggressive credit advertising conducted by financial institutions. Cooperatives were caught in this process and detached themselves from their initial goal, thus becoming more like construction companies than housing cooperatives: *“in these new cooperatives, co-operators rapidly become proprietors of their house, once it is built, and immediately detach themselves from the cooperative. The spirit of ownership is constantly stronger than the spirit of cooperation. Currently I would say that what makes people join a cooperative is not the spirit of cooperation but this need that has arisen which requires that a person must be the owner of a house”*.

This led to another problem: an excess of houses in the market. From a dramatic shortage of adequate households, Portugal evolved to an excess of available houses and today it presents the second highest ratio in the EU of houses per family (1,5), after Spain (Idem: 34, quoting INE). In the last 3 decades housing provision grew

considerably, as did the average comfort levels of the dwellings. About 18% of the buildings were built after 1960 and 30% were built during the last two decades (Marques et al, 2014: p.2). However, the growth in numbers did not signify an end of some persisting problems nor did it prevent the arousal of new ones, such as overcrowding, household insolvency and indebtedness, lack of adequate bathing facilities and housing amenities (such as thermal comfort), and an increase in the number of senior citizens living alone. The deterioration of older buildings is also persisting, namely in the historical centres of major cities and, considering the poor quality of recent construction, this problem is expected to intensify in the future and to be exacerbated by the economical crisis, which will make it difficult for the owners to carry out the maintenance of their houses.

It is also possible to observe a significant increase in the number of houses that are repossessed by the banks because people cannot comply with their house loans. In the first times of the crisis, in 2009, there were 127 377 people in a situation of mortgage default, but in 2013 the number had increased to 145 766 (Idem: p. 12, quoting the Bank of Portugal). The economical crisis dictated a decrease in the purchasing power that affected most of the population, up to the middle class, a situation worsened by an inversion of the credit policy of the banks, that began to adopt much more restrictive measures. This behaviour was due, firstly, to an increase of the cost of capital, which made it difficult for banks to finance themselves and, secondly, to the sharp deterioration of the expectations regarding the economic activity in general and the housing market in particular, which included the decrease of the banks' expectations as to the capacity of consumers to fulfil their mortgage responsibilities.

As a result, the low to average income citizen could no longer afford to buy a house, either through cooperative initiative or in the free market. As a consequence, it takes much more time to sell a house now than it did a few years ago: in 2006, the average time to sell a house in Portugal was 8 months, but in 2013 it had more than doubled to 17 months (Idem: p.14, quoting Confidencial Imobiliário/ PORDATA). A jurist in the social and cooperative sector describes the strong negative impact this situation had in the housing cooperative sector: *"Housing cooperatives have been*

suffering a lot with the crisis in construction. Because of this, many are now bankrupt. The new credit lines that were created for the cooperative sector are peanuts, comparing with the necessities, and their effects are not felt. These are loans that need to be repaid and so housing cooperatives don't even apply because they cannot pay. There is no market for their offer, so they have no resources".

The strain put on housing cooperatives had its consequences. In 2008, 3 new housing cooperatives were constituted, while 12 were extinguished, making it the worse ratio of the several cooperative branches, although the housing sector still remained the second most significant (17%), after the agricultural branch (27,4%) (INSCOOP, 2010: 5-6). In 2009, there were 8 housing cooperatives in the ranking of the 100 largest cooperatives in Portugal, the first of which, the Urbanização Varandas de Queijas (CUPH), in the 42nd place (CASES, 2011: 34-40).

This new reality makes it necessary for housing cooperatives to reinvent themselves and rethink their purpose, since the product they traditionally offer is now surplus. They can direct themselves towards rebuilding, urban requalification, rental or the management of urban areas, but this adaptation is still to be made, particularly because it also requires investment funds and because they are mostly focused on construction for alienation. A representative of the housing department of a City Council confirms that the City Council has cooperation protocols with some cooperatives that manage municipal neighbourhoods, but considers that housing cooperatives have no money to invest in urban rehabilitation due to their financial difficulties. Many of their co-operators are demanding for the devolution of the money they have invested. Even if they want to sell the soil they already acquired they cannot, at least not for the same acquisition prices. Many are now bankrupt. In face of all these troubles and in an effort to become more competitive, housing cooperatives tend to adopt the business management models of construction companies and so run the risk of deviating from their founding principles and from the populations with a lower income. They may also opt for a middle and upper-middle class that can afford to access the free market, thereby undermining their status of public utility and their role as social policy instruments (IHRU, 2007).

The data suggests that Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Patrick Heller and Marcelo Silva (2011) are right in their consideration that civil society organizations' dependency on the state and the market constrains their capacity to act according with their principles and, more than that, it hinders their activity. The decline of housing cooperatives in democratic Portugal can be partially explained by the economic vocation of the cooperative sector, which leads it to compete with the corporate sector in a context of market capitalism that privileges profit. Their competitive disadvantage puts cooperatives in a dependency of the regulatory instruments of the state, which has proved unwilling to promote a consistent positive discrimination for the sector, as it has valued competitiveness and economical growth over cooperation and solidarity. Although it is difficult to ascertain for sure, it is also possible that a connotation of cooperatives with socialism may have lingered on since the revolution in the minds of some liberal government officials, thus contributing for this lack of support.

As a reaction, housing cooperatives try to compete with construction companies in a territory that is not their own – the territory of growth and profit, not the territory of cooperation and public service. In this effort they tend to adjust their management models and seek for more solvent co-operators, which may detach them from their founding principles and undermine their public interest component, further hindering their public support. To aggravate this situation, citizens are often ill informed about the cooperative sector, are also concerned with profit, are mainly motivated by private ownership and their stimulus to participate, when it exists, leads them to seek forms of involvement that require lesser financial risk and investment. As a professional in the social and cooperative sector states, one of the greater challenges is to inform the general population, particularly the younger generation, about this sector, since it is virtually unknown and it is thought to depend solely on voluntarism, without professionalization; it is often associated with the *“traditional agricultural wine cellar where the grandfather trades his grapes or potatoes”*.

To contradict this disposition, awareness raising actions are held in several universities but the management courses, particularly in the most renowned universities where the main future Portuguese managers are trained, are hard to reach, since the *“not for profit concept is particularly difficult to grasp in a context*

where the main goal is to work for a multinational company and earn a lot of money”.

On top of that, cooperatives frequently lack an effective marketing and communication strategy. As a result, the cooperative sector tends to play a marginal role in key sectors of the economy or to be remitted to less competitive areas.

THE SAAL NEIGHBOURHOODS IN LISBON

The SAAL

Even now, more than 40 years after its inception, there is not a common understanding on the SAAL. There are multiple perspectives and interpretations of its potentialities and implications, depending on the ideological setting and role played by the actors involved. Even its mentor Nuno Portas seems to have had mixed feelings about it. It is understandable, considering the volatility of the context in which it emerged and the profound implications it entailed in terms of urban planning. The revolution, undertaken by a military movement that had no defined ideology beyond some common general grievances, gave rise to a revolutionary period in which radical socialist ideas coexisted with moderated political projects and communist models of soviet inspiration.

The state was nearly paralyzed by the constant confrontation of the emerging powers and the successive governments, under military control, were subjected to an enormous pressure from below, where new social movements were constantly emerging and presenting new claims, and from outside, for the rest of the world was fully aware of what was going on in the south of Europe in the context of the Cold War. The fragile democratic project and the revolutionary context did not coexist peacefully and often clashed, creating opportunities that were taken by those who had long been repressed.

In particular, the revolutionary period presented a valuable opportunity for the affirmation of neighbourhood movements, which found themselves empowered in a context where the state was fragile due to the transition process and the social hierarchical structure was in a process of redefinition. Moreover, they were confronted with receptive policy makers who regarded their claims in a favourable light. A policy maker in particular assumed a fundamental role in this process, Nuno Portas, an architect who was secretary of state for housing and urbanism during the first three provisory governments, in 1974 and 1975. From the early sixties he had worked in the National Laboratory for Civil Engineering (LNEC) where he coordinated

the research Centre on architecture, housing and urbanism. His concern with the serious housing problems faced by the most deprived populations in Portugal in the later years of the regime led him to seek for possible solutions and alternative interventions. He and other co-workers represented a new progressive understanding on urban planning inside a growingly obsolete and rigid political structure that resisted any possibility of change. However, despite the obvious housing problems it faced, the political system resisted the alternative approaches discussed by a class of young and scientifically aware architects, so their influence remained confined to a small circle of specialists (Bandeirinha, 2007; p. 106).

These progressive thinkers had been involved in the organization of meetings which dealt with the consequences of massive construction, the social role of architecture and the rights of the most deprived populations to housing, which implied participatory approaches to urban planning. Such was the case of the meeting held by the Architects Syndicate in 1960 on the “Social aspects of habitat construction”, or the meeting on “Housing policy” organized by the Ministry for Public Construction in 1969. In the late sixties, Nuno Portas visited several countries that were implementing participated housing programs, such as Brazil, Peru and Morocco. These experiences inspired the report on «Evolutionary Housing» written in 1970 in partnership with Francisco Silva Dias, which latter influenced the SAAL.

These concerns emerged in a context of severe housing deprivation. In 1970, from a total of 2,8 million families, about 35 thousand families lived in shacks and 620 thousand were living in overcrowded houses. 40% of the houses were more than 50 years old, 53% had no water supply, 48% had no electricity and 57% had not a complete toilet. Only 29% of the houses had water supply, electricity and toilet. 40% of the badly housed population resided in the districts of Porto and Lisbon (INE, 1973; Propriedade Imobiliária, 1981). Among the most affected populations were the rural migrants that had migrated to the big cities in search of better living conditions.

The economical development policies during the sixties marginalized all incentives to agriculture and neglected regional alternatives, while there were strong incentives to secondary and tertiary activities that took place mostly in the major urban areas. As a consequence, there was a mass migration process from the country

side to the urban areas that were unable to find timely housing solutions for the newcomers (Jornadas Luso-suecas de habitação, 1981).

It was the revolution that finally provided the opportunity to implement the participatory experimental programs that had been dwelling in the backstage. The strength of the neighbourhood movement, fuelled by the precarious living conditions, demanded for an unconventional alternative that could provide immediate solutions to urgent problems, something that the conventional centralized bureaucracy, with all its time-consuming requirements, was unable to do.

The SAAL resulted from a joint dispatch of SEHU and MAI and was published in the Government Diary of August 6th 1974, which presented it as a social housing program *“aimed at deprived social groups with internal organization that allows for their immediate involvement in self-solutions, with the support of the state in soil, infrastructures, technical and financing”*. The technical aspect of the SAAL was an important feature since it implied the constitution of intermediary interdisciplinary structures that not only possessed the know-how, but also mediated the relations between the neighbours and the state and, when necessary, assisted their self organizing efforts. These brigades were defined as *“technical specialized bodies that will support, through the municipalities, the initiatives of the populations badly housed in order to cooperate in the transformation of their own neighbourhoods, investing their own latent resources and, eventually, monetary”*.

The core of the SAAL was located in a team of internal and hired experts affiliated to the FFH. The SAAL was meant to evaluate acceptable locations for the operations, namely in the same place they already occupied; to come up with feasible collective credit schemes, under the legal terms and financial capacity of the state; to prepare the constitution of the brigades; to determine the types of housing and infrastructures adequate for each operation; to provide technical support to the brigades and the organized neighbours; to administer funding destined to SAAL related activities; to elaborate theoretical studies, legal projects and activity plans and to be responsible for the production and distribution of construction materials. The operations could include the improvement of the access to services and infrastructures, upgrades in the public space, namely through the construction of

collective venues, and the improvement, reconstruction or demolition of the existing houses, in this last case with new constructions. The operations could not be determined *a priori*, they had to be the result of the priorities of the neighbours and of their capacity to get collectively organized and integrate the program (Teotónio Pereira, 1996).

Considering the contingencies of the time, Portas (1978) identified the main political priorities that underlined the SAAL:

1. The operations could not wait for the institutional and political conditions that would guarantee the necessary legal and technical framework; they had to sustain themselves in the spontaneity of the popular movements, giving them political, financial and technical support. That meant that each obstacle had to be overcome by the process, which would gradually conquer a new legislation and the support of the local authorities;

2. The SAAL was meant to connect the search for popular housing with the available offer, considering the local specificities and variations. The SAAL was oriented towards the specific organization of the populations that were interested in each specific operation, thus guaranteeing a balance between offer and demand, in which the demand had a collective and not an individual dimension;

3. The refusal of a particular area was only admissible if it came from the population and not from the administration, which meant that the neighbours could choose to stay in the same areas they already occupied. As such, the appropriation of central city areas was not a rule but a consequence of the operations that involved privileged located shanty towns;

4. The SAAL comprised a self-help dimension. The financing of the operations should avoid institutionalization, keeping away from a strict bureaucratic control over the projects. The financing process should not be very formal and should depend on the type of management adopted by the neighbours for each specific operation. The differences regarding the final costs of the houses were compensated by one of several possible options, such as

self-construction, personal loans or cooperative loans. The neighbours had to decide how far they were willing to go in terms of cooperation and sacrifices in order to promote the construction of the largest quantity of better houses;

5. The SAAL involved the experimentation of innovative cooperation forms between technical experts and the concerned populations, an alternative methodology that should originate new types of urban housing. The political dimension of the brigades should be oriented to the clarification of the technical and urbanistic context of the SAAL and to the discussion of practical aspects of the projects, without being absorbed by the political orientation of the neighbourhood organizations.

Portas declared that the main initial political goal was to extend the SAAL as much as possible, in time and space, so that it became the main program for the following three to five years. Its main strength was not its efficiency of technical achievements, but its contribution to the general economy through the reduction of public investment and credit.

The SAAL was a profoundly innovative housing program. Coelho (1986) described it as a dynamic process that questioned not only the housing policy in its all, but even the state itself. It aimed for a quick answer to the needs of the populations sustained in an effective intervention, capable of overcoming all bureaucratic obstacles and of guaranteeing a total administrative priority. It assured the right to remain in the areas already occupied by the shanty towns, without the traditional dislocations to the outskirts; it guaranteed financial and technical support to the populations that were involved in the processes and, moreover, the management and control of the operations was largely in their own hands (Barata Salgueiro, 1986).

The neighbours were thus supposed to actively engage in the planning and construction of their neighbourhoods, assisted by teams of architects, social workers, students and other technical staff that would see them through all the process. Between 1974 and 1976, 170 SAAL actions were initiated, involving a total of 41 665 families and involving the construction of 2 259 households (Livro Branco do SAAL, 1976). During 1976, 1 119 houses were adjudicated in the region of Lisbon, 749 in the south region, 312 in the north and 50 in the Centre of the country. 106 houses were

concluded in the region of Lisbon and 6 in the Centre. In the south there were 881 houses under construction, more than in the region of Lisbon, 736 (FFH, 1977b). The implementation of the SAAL encouraged the consolidation of neighbourhood committees, which evolved into associations and cooperatives, in order to participate more effectively in the management of the resettlement processes. The SAAL involved 158 neighbourhood organizations, including 128 associations, 14 cooperatives and 16 commissions (Livro Branco do SAAL, 1976).

The relatively low proportion of cooperatives in relation with associations contrasted with the orientation of the SAAL. The SAAL unequivocally advocated the formalization of neighbourhood committees either in the form of associations or cooperatives. However, more specific posterior documentation on the subject indicated only cooperatives: the promulgation of a law on the constitution of housing cooperatives was due to be issued, but the same did not happen for associations, about which nothing was said (Brochado Coelho, 1986). Regarding the assistance in the social management and self-organization of the neighbours, only the statutory corpus of cooperatives was contemplated.

In a document entitled «A problem of local organization: cooperative or association?» (Livro Branco do SAAL, 1976), the Commission of Leal District, in Oporto, stated what it considered to be the verifiable motivations for this option. According to this document, the SAAL was conceived for a solvent population that would fit the cooperative solution, since it implied their own investment funds. However, in the north of the country, by the time of the elaboration of this document, neighbours had mostly opted for associations, given their insolvency, the ambiguity of the exact terms of the state's support, the uncertainty as to the quality of the construction and the bureaucratic difficulties inherent to the constitution of cooperatives. Associations presented themselves as more generic entities, allowing for a greater freedom of action.

Despite the specific organization type adopted, Portas (1978) acknowledged that the SAAL had undoubtedly contributed to strengthen the popular movement in the urban areas, considering it aimed for attainable long lasting objectives and it implied the constitution of stable organizations in which the neighbours were

motivated to discuss their problems and priorities. However, this contribution was not linear. Unlike the spontaneous occupations of vacant houses, the SAAL involved the cooperation with the provisional governments and a gradual conquest of rights through relatively formal means, raising the question of its real impact in the urban movements, considering it could contribute to its development but also to its mitigation.

Regardless of all the enthusiasm it generated, the practical results of the SAAL can be viewed as modest, given all the contradictions that emerged among the actors involved in the process (the neighbours, the brigades and the local and central powers). The disputes were mostly related with the access to the highly coveted construction land, that in some cases had to be expropriated (Barata Salgueiro, 1986). This particular issue was of great importance and accentuated the contesting character of the program. Many constructions began without the fulfillment of the required legal demands; if the operations were to wait for the required legal framework on expropriations that only came out in 1976 and for the necessary financing legislation, the SAAL would have never been initiated (Pinho et al, 2002, p.52). This appropriation of valuable land by the neighbours and the refusal of a geographic marginalization could have had profound urban implications in the evolution of the city central areas, if the SAAL had not been discontinued (Fernandes de Sá, 2006).

Architect Nuno Matos Silva that worked in Portugal Novo brigade and followed the neighbourhood for over 10 years, considers this territorial implication the main impact of the SAAL while sidelines its participatory dimension: *“Lisbon was like an hand, it had a consolidated nucleus like the palm of a hand and five fingers that corresponded to the access routes Algés, Jamor, Benfica, Odivelas/Loures, Sacavém. The shacks occupied the space between the fingers, near the Centre. To me is the biggest conquest of the SAAL, it is the right to urbanity and that is the contribution of Portas. Until then what was done was to kick the neighbours further away... The great conquest of the SAAL was the reversion of this, it was the right to stay in the place. As for the rest, participation and I do not know what else, I think this is more in the ideology and in people's heads, that is, it did not correspond to anything substantially different from the usual order from a client. Maybe if it had been a promotion of the*

Development Fund for the neighbours it would have went much better, with more control, more in tune with the people's interests, some pay X, there are other people who can pay Z and now we will find a solution for those who cannot pay".

The SAAL explicitly defied the dominant economical model around private property as it envisaged the appropriation of valuable land for the benefit of destitute neighbours while questioning the private appropriation of urban soil; it integrated the socializing spirit of the revolution as it claimed for the right to the city against powerful real estate interests. These interests found in the administration an influential ally that mobilized the bureaucracy to boycott the processes: in October 1976, about 60 processes, some of which had been delivered for over an year, were still waiting for a declaration of public utility necessary for the beginning of the operations; only about one tenth of the 20 thousand hectares for expropriation were under administrative property, although all the documental processes had been concluded (Martins Pereira, 2014, p. 29).

Moreover, the process cannot be dissociated from its wider context. The transition from authoritarian rule in Portugal occurred in an international context of accentuated crisis and reconfiguration of the economical order which, together with internal factors, produced a negative impact in the newborn social policies. The extensive nationalizations, the agrarian reform and the colonization process overwhelmed the state's fragile capacity in a period of insipient productive, technological and organizational investment, thus contributing to a process of economical instability that dissociated redistributive policies from accumulation processes, which enhanced the class struggle (Andrade, 1992).

The victory of the moderate faction in November 1975 and the approval of the Portuguese Constitution in April 1976 landmarked the relative demise of the most radical left wing political forces and the beginning of a new democratic regime. The constitution was still filled with the revolutionary spirit, and defended "*the transition to socialism through the creation of conditions for the democratic exercise of the power by the working classes*". However, this disposition faded gradually during Portugal's democratic experience, considering the political option was for a capitalist liberal democracy of European inspiration.

The SAAL suffered a blow with the first constitutional government, under the socialist Mário Soares, which in October 27th 1976 issued a joint dispatch of the ministry for internal affairs and the ministry for housing, urbanism and construction, Manuel da Costa Brás and Eduardo Pereira, withdrawing the power and leadership from the self-organized neighbours and the brigades, who were accused of transcending the tasks they had been assigned and acting on the margins of state institutions and local authorities: *"some SAAL brigades strayed from the spirit of the program that organized them, operating at the margins of the Housing Promotion Fund (FFH) and the local authorities"...* *"municipalities were denied the possibility of giving their contribution, the FFH was not requested to provide the necessary technical support for this type of operations, the soil was not made available as speedily as the process demanded and the number of houses built to date is insignificant"*.

From then on, the control of the operations was in the hands of the City Councils that had to constitute the brigades and, if necessary, could ask for the technical and financial support of the FFH. The financial support consisted in the attribution of a non refundable grant of 90 thousand \$ for each house and of a subsidized loan for the remaining costs that had to be reimbursed within 25 years. The technical support included assistance with all the technicalities of the projects (FFH, 1977a).

Despite all the difficulties that were already being felt, the SAAL III National Council, held in February 1976, decided not to further institutionalize and regulate the program, which would defeat its purpose of flexibility and independence. The Minister of Housing, urbanism and construction justified the termination of the SAAL with this same lack of institutionalization, accusing the brigades of constituting a parallel power structure whose main purpose lied in political action and not on solving the housing problems of the populations involved. The neighbours and the brigades strongly protested with public demonstrations of discontent but were unable to reverse the process of dissolution of the SAAL. The downfall of the process was determined by one of its strongest features - the flexibility derived from its institutional detachment. This was presented as the main argument for its termination, precluding any possibility of revival (Bandeirinha, 2007).

The difficulties in the implementation of the program may have arisen from the lack of an adequate support structure for their pursuit (Ferreira, 1975), which conveys the idea that the relationship among the actors involved in the various stages of the process was not an easy one. Even during the revolutionary period, neighbourhood organizations were viewed with suspicion by some moderate sectors of the local and national authorities. Ramos Pinto (2008) describes how the fear of their mobilization by the radical left, in opposition to electoral legitimacy, led the moderates to distance themselves from the urban movement, and even to accuse some neighbourhood commissions of undemocratic practices.

The SAAL was caught in the middle of this process and, as a result, the projects under implementation met with bureaucratic and administrative difficulties, such as the delay in the expropriation orders or statements of public utility of the construction soils, or the absence of a decree on the financing of the actions, which resulted in their obstruction by lack of funding. Brochado Coelho (1986) explains how the governmental undefinition about the SAAL intensified gradually until the rupture of the program. The political power only went as far as popular pressure demanded it to go and its role was limited mostly to last minute solutions. In his view, the central power did not do more than to sustain a process that exceeded and antagonized it and in the end it had no other option than to extinguish it in a brutal and sloppy manner. The neutralization of the SAAL was fundamental for a new housing policy that no longer promoted popular mobilization and strongly opposed the popular distribution of highly valued land (Fonseca Ferreira, 1987).

In 1978, Portas already feared that the SAAL would simply disappear by administrative initiative, considering there was an ongoing process of bureaucratic institutionalization through the reinforcement of the control over the technical apparatus. The functioning of the operations was becoming more and more traditional in its obedience to the projects, attribution of contracts and promotion of conventional operations. In his words, *“the number of beneficiary families will be reduced as the credit lines will be limited in the name of efficiency, in favor of more conventional solutions. Due to the lack of results, the popular mobilization process that the SAAL should strengthen will in fact become weaker, not only in its contestation regarding the*

state and its institutions, but also, in a parallel way, at the level of the trust of the means of production. In the SAAL, the mobilization is already taking place in terms of collective solidarity over the management of distinct initiatives; if the demobilization process occurs, there only remains the individualistic way of saving oneself” (p. 22).

Architect Leonel Fadigas coordinated the office for planning and programming in Lisbon’s City Council during 1975 and in the summer of 1976 he was hired as a consultant by the FFH to report on the most problematic SAAL neighbourhoods, which were in Algarve: *“there was a perception in the FFH that some of those operations were going badly and it was an attempt to get the hands on the mess and try to finalize the projects, finishing what had already been started”.*

According to him, his feed-back on what was happening in Algarve contributed to the extinction of the SAAL. In his view, the SAAL only provided sporadic solutions for structural housing problems. He regarded its flexibility, described as nearly anarchic, as a failure of the program, considering it did not allow for a structured approach to housing and made urban planning impossible. In his words, *“the SAAL was a very vague program that did not provide any administrative trust regarding its practical implementation”.* It also implied a waste of valuable and scarce resources, considering there was a considerable discrepancy between the number of houses produced and the number of houses planned, due to a lack of coordination between the neighbours, the brigades and the FFH: *“there was a persistence of paralyzing conflicts in some operations, between the brigades and the neighbours who did not accept the rationality of the process”.*

Moreover, the political parties used it as an instrument for the political mobilization of the neighbours, which instigated more conflicts with the administration. In October 1976, deputy Gomes Fernandes had already stated in the national assembly that if the philosophy that underlined the constitution of the SAAL was correct, namely to rapidly solve the housing problems of destitute populations through a local and participatory approach, its implementation had been perverted by the political manipulation of the process, which led to a growing frustration and weariness among the neighbours regarding *“ the constant appeal to campaigns of political agitation”* and the *“political ambitions, opportunism and incompetence of*

some technical staff that has been using them to reach goals that are not those for which there are paid” (Livro Branco do SAAL, p. 419).

Leonel Fadigas considers that if in some cases the brigades were instruments of political agitation, in other cases their technical capacity could be strong enough to absorb and channel the input of the population. However, in the weaker brigades chaos took over. He observed this situation in some operation in Algarve, where the brigades lacked qualified workers due to the shortage of specialized technical staff: *“in Meia Praia the neighbourhood was built below the sea level; in the operation in Monte Gordo they took down a pine forest to build the neighbourhood and in the end it was left without any shade. Then they wanted to plant trees, a cost that could have been avoided if they had taken advantage of the trees of the pinewood”*. He considers that the SAAL could not continue since it *“could only take place in a context of political, social and economic anomaly, considering that it was implemented regardless of any urban planning; It was simply to transform shacks into houses using land that had been left over by formal urbanization, since it was not suitable for urbanization”*. As such, he considers that the right to remain in the same place is merely the confirmation of marginalization.

The discrepancy of perspectives exposes ideological divergences that persist to the present day, namely regarding the right to the place. Moreover, the SAAL’s capacity for popular mobilization represented a risk (or an opportunity, depending on the perspective), since it entailed a deep transformation of power structures. The participatory methodology of the SAAL surpassed its initial prospects and transformed it in one of the main unifiers of the neighbourhood movement. It represented an alternative approach to urban planning whose *“simplicity is in itself a method”*, based on the working classes’ appropriation of the city for reason either than profit. Despite all the obstacles and attacks it suffered, which included bomb attacks¹⁸, it was bound to leave *“not only memories, but useful concrete and operative results which will be useful in the future”* (Alves Costa, 1986, p. 73).

¹⁸ In January 14th 1976 a bomb exploded in the Oporto SAAL headquarters. In March 4th Alves Costa’ car was also destroyed by a bomb.

It comprised a conflicting nature, since it acted as a part of the state apparatus that identified itself with the neighbours' goals and channelled those goals against the state itself, a contradiction used by the first constitutional government to neutralize the SAAL's transformative potential as it went back to the last years of Estado Novo to opt for technocratic and centralized approaches to urban planning. Alves Costa highlighted the ambiguous role of the «elected powers», as they summoned the «rationality» and «harmonious development» of capitalism against both the uncontrolled housing speculation of Estado Novo and the supposed anarchy of the urban movements. The neutralization of the SAAL through its integration in the municipal urban administration fitted right into the «institutionalization of bourgeois democracy», which meant to *“control its effects before they could get so far as to break the system”* (p. 75).

However, Portas (1986) himself constitutes a privileged source of information concerning his own creation. From the standpoint of the government official responsible for the implementation of the program, he presents an interpretation of the facts that is not entirely in tune with the perspective of most analysts. He describes how the fight for the elimination of shanty towns constituted the main rallying cry not only during the revolutionary period, but even before it; it was, in his perspective, one of the few admitted ways to criticize the fascist government. After the revolution, the social movements took on that same privileged subject, which made it a priority for the state. People expected immediate results that were not realistic considering the planning and construction natural timings.

For that reason, Portas dissociates the SAAL from the forceful occupations; in his view, the SAL did not constitute a strategy to deal with such problems, moreover considering that the main participatory ideas behind it had already been elaborated and discussed before the revolutionary opportunity presented itself. The revolution did create the necessary conditions for the implementation of the program: it made the neighbours willing to accept to negotiate with the state and the state willing to create such an initiative.

The SAAL was regulated by a single dispatch and its administrative frailty was relevant for the evolution of the program. It was an experimental governmental

initiative that depended greatly on the neighbours, which led it to contain some undefinitions willingly assumed as a calculated risk, since the pressing nature of the context did not allow for a lengthy bureaucratic process. The legal and practical issues would have to be solved and regulated gradually, as they came along, to consolidate the most positive experiences. Portas highlights the most important initial objectives of the SAAL: to connect the state with some of the most dynamic sectors of civil society through a participatory mechanism; to bond the technical public servants with the people they were supposed to serve; to mobilize the resources of the neighbours; to recognize the right of the neighbours to remain in their selected areas and to create an unbureaucratic process that could be implemented much faster than the usual housing program (it usually took about seven years for such a program to be implemented).

The financial aspect was a fundamental empowering instrument, since the initial idea was to provide the monetary resources and let the neighbourhood organizations manage their funds with no control or supervision. Some more conservative sectors did eventually look for irregularities after more than a year into the program, but they found no evidence to sustain their suspicions that the organizations were misusing the money. Another important aspect, in Portas' perspective, was the political affiliation of the local power, the brigades and the neighbourhood associations, since ideological incompatibilities significantly hindered the processes in some specific geographical areas, considering they generated highly disrupting conflicts with the local authorities, particularly around the right to occupy certain areas. In Oporto, under PSD management, an intense confrontation with neighbourhood associations led them to invade the City Council to press for the transference of the land; in the outskirts of Lisbon, even with MDP/CDE or PCP municipalities, the neighbours, enticed by radical left wing groups, strongly opposed the supposed unwillingness of the City Councils to support the people.

The SAAL brought into question broader issues related with city planning, creating a debate around the way it should be done, from bottom-up or up-bottom. Portas considers that, to some extent, the neighbours themselves hindered the program, when they claimed for an increment of state intervention and accountability.

On top of that, the leaders of the organizations and the brigades often imposed their will upon the neighbours, which further compromised the participatory dimension of the SAAL. As a result of all these factors, the program was not formally extinct, but lost its autonomy and it could only have continuity at the local level. The responsibility for the SAAL's significant demise, in his view, must be shared among the several actors involved in the process, instead of being solely attributed to the state in general, and to specific governmental officials in particular.

For the mentors of the SAAL, the participation of the neighbours and the mobilization of their own resources was designed to make the process more costly effective and expedient. However, this option was often criticized by the political parties that regarded housing as a given right that should not be attained through the effort of the neighbours (Arriscado Nunes and Serra, 2002). This no doubt complicates matters, for the oppositions to the participatory nature of the program came from different directions, no matter how unsuspected. Even from those that were supposed to benefit most from it, the neighbours, seem to have had mixed feelings regarding their own involvement. In the end, the SAAL was so out of the box that all those who were somehow touched by it felt an awkwardness that was never entirely overcome.

Oliveira and Marconi (1978) stated that the restructuring of shanty towns or the recuperation of degraded areas does not, in itself, transform the urban structure, but the appropriation of valuable construction land does generate new class conflicts. In the end, it can be transformed in a fight for the right to private property that stands in the way of the troublesome expropriation proceedings. In their words, the SAAL was, above all, a political process since it favoured neighbourhood organization and neighbourhood control over the housing processes, which had a valuable educational and empowering effect. The neighbours were able, for some time, to effectively pressure the government and have their claims accepted. Majority political parties were not in the least interested in the SAAL, a process that promoted political forces either than themselves. They were merely interested in affordable housing as a way to control class struggles over the reproduction of the workforce, as well as a way to sustain the construction sector.

The SAAL raised multiple concerns but also expectations regarding the possible transition to a socialist society. It could be the start of something new, a feasible option that could be extended to other areas. Its relative institutional autonomy, its participatory nature and its questioning of private property were an important contribution to the revolution (David, 1976). It did not go so far as to affect the social division of labour or the housing production method, but it raised expectations that in a more favourable context, not only the neighbours but also the workers could have their collective needs met in order to find their socialist way of expressing themselves.

This potential scared instituted powers. When faced with all its enemies, both internal and external, the SAAL did not resist. It remains as a short lived radical housing experiment that nevertheless left long lasting effects in those who experienced it. As Varela Gomes (1995) stated, the SAAL was a completely radical program that was miles away from traditional approaches; the idea of the SAAL maintains its applicability and still lingers on as some kind of «ignored or repressed ghost» that joined the past with the future and imposed itself as an epitome of participatory approaches to urban planning.

It also left some very practical legacies in the way the city councils manage social housing policies. If the overall reaction of the local administration was one of rejection of the program and the posterior approaches to social housing, namely under the heavily bureaucratic and centralized PER, were not in the least participatory, some city councils continued to use a few of the SAAL teachings. This phenomenon was reported in Oeiras City Council by Santos (2016). Former members of the SAAL brigades were gradually hired by the City Council, which influenced posterior municipal housing programs regarding the articulation among the several stages of the process (planning, project, construction and social support) and the prevalence of a multidisciplinary and participatory approach. Moreover, the City Council inherited a considerable amount of free construction land that was to be used in the SAAL but remained unoccupied given the termination of the program. This valuable resource favoured the development of municipal housing policies and the implementation of a municipal policy for the elimination of shanty towns that resorted heavily to construction land left by the SAAL. Although with the PER there was an obvious

withdrawal from the SAAL's teaching, even so the resources that were gathered through it were still being used more than 20 years after its termination. Partly thanks to it, in 2002 Oeiras became the first City Council to eliminate all the shacks in its territory.

This legacy touches another fundamental issue related with one of the main possible potentialities of the SAAL: its contribution to the modernization of public administration. The SAAL was expected to *“carry in its dynamics the germen of renovation to the passive and obsolete local administration, through the clarification that the initiative of the organized neighbours would bring”*. If in a first stage this passiveness worked against the process, in a second stage it was substituted by an active and systematic boycott, expressed in the refusal of the necessary resources and supports (Cidade/Campo, 1979, p.13). As it was seen, there was a modernizing legacy at least in Oeiras City Council, although it eventually relapsed into centralized approaches to social housing. The intensity and extent of this modernization is an important aspect that requires deeper analysis.

The SAAL in Lisbon

The SAAL in Lisbon was characterized by numerous dispersed and individualized projects (Serralves, 2014), built in the proximity of the former neighbourhoods, up to five floors, including collective equipments that were not always concluded (Associação dos Arquitectos Portugueses, 1987). Lisbon's shanty towns occupied well delimited areas that eluded the system of restructuration or expulsion that was involved in the growth of the city, which departed from an initial core that progressively dilated, creating successive peripheries. In each dilation, the dispossessed populations that occupied the area and had no economical capacity to secure their place in the city were removed to the suburbs. City centre shanty towns had escaped this process (Oliveira, Marconi, 1978).

The White Book of the SAAL (1976) identifies 39 requests for SAAL intervention in Lisbon's City Council. In 31st October 1976, 19 operations had already been initiated, involving 13 509 families and 172 houses were under construction. There was an estimation of 601 being started until the end of that year and another 840 until the

end of March 1977. As it was already mentioned, the neighbours opted to live in buildings instead of ground floor houses. Oliveira and Marconi (1978) relate this option with the urban traditions of this population, to whom to live in the city meant to live in an apartment, considering the ground floor house represented an instrument of marginalization.

The following neighbourhoods were listed:

Neighbourhood	Number of families
Quinta das Fonecas	310
Quinta da Calçada	288
Quinta do Bacalhau	350
Bela Flor	903
Tarujo	585
Bairro da Liberdade	4200
Casal Ventoso	3600
Sete Moinhos	297
Curraleira	760
Embrechados	104
Alto dos Moinhos	330
Quinta do Alto	152
Quinta Grande	238
S. Cornélio	86

Quinta D. Leonor	160
Bairro 14 de junho	399
Pátio Vila Fernandes	67
Palma de Baixo	300
Pedrocesso	380

Most of these neighbourhoods had their organizations formally constituted during this period, for they played a crucial role in the process. The organizations constituted are as follows:

Organization	Publication of the by-law
CHE 25 de Abril	30/09/1975
CHE Unidade do Povo	18/10/1975
CHE Portugal Novo	02/10/1974
CHE Bela Flor	16/03/1976
CHE Unidos Venceremos	
CHE Bairro da Liberdade	07/11/1975
CHE Bairro Horizonte	14/11/1975
AM Bairro Lisboa Nova	03/11/1975
AM Alto dos Moinhos	07/04/1976
CHE os Três Unidos	03/11/1975

CHE São Cornélio	12/11/1976
CHE Bairro Dona Leonor	01/10/1975
CHE Vila Fernandes	07/04/1976
CHE Boa Esperança	09/03/1976
CHE Popular de Palma	
AM Pedrocesso	14/08/1976

Although the first steps were already being taken, not all the neighbourhoods reached an effective concretization. The most comprehensive study on the SAAL since the revolution (Bandeirinha, 2007), identifies only 11 SAAL projects in Lisbon, some of which result from a fusion of the neighbourhoods mentioned previously by the White Book of the SAAL:

Neighbourhood	Organization	Beginning of the process	Construction
Alto dos Moinhos	AM do Alto dos Moinhos	September 1974	Not built
Bairro da Liberdade	CHE Bairro da Liberdade	October 1974	Initiated in 1976
Casal Ventoso	CM do Casal Ventoso	October 1974	Not built
Curraleira Embrechados	CHE Horizonte e CHE Lisboa Nova	November 1974	Initiated in September and December 1976

Dona Leonor	CHE Bairro Dona Leonor	January 1975	Initiated in December 1976
Pátio Vila Fernandes	CHE Vila Fernandes	November 1975	Not built
Quinta da Bela Flor	CHE Bela Flor	September 1974	Initiated in December 1976
Quinta das Fonseca e Quinta da Calçada	CHE 25 de abril e Unidade do Povo	October 1974	Initiated in September 1976
Quinta do Alto	CHE Boa Esperança	October 1974	Initiated in October 1976
Quinta do Bacalhau Monte Côxo	CHE Portugal Novo	September 1974	Initiated in January 1977
Quinta Grande	CHE Os Três Unidos	January 1975	Not built

This final list identifies the seven SAAL neighbourhoods that were actually constructed in Lisbon and are referenced in SIPA's site¹⁹.

- *Bairro da Liberdade*

Location: Forest Park of Monsanto, inserted in the neighbourhood of economical houses of Serafina.

Parish: Campolide

Description: Four floored buildings, with the main facade oriented to the street.

Number of houses: 56 (and the cooperative's venue)

¹⁹ Sistema de Informação para o Património Arquitectónico (Information System for the Architectural Heritage), managed by the IHRU, the Instituto da Habitação e da Reabilitação Urbana (Institute for Housing and Urban Rehabilitation): www.monumentos.pt

Organization: COOPERATIVA DE HABITAÇÃO ECONÓMICA DO BAIRRO DA LIBERDADE.

- *Quinta da Bela Flor*

Location: Special protection area of Aqueduto das Águas Livres, in Campolide.

Parish: Campolide

Description: Four floored buildings, forming open blocks.

Number of houses: 288

Organization: COOPERATIVA DE HABITAÇÃO E CONSTRUÇÃO DA BELA FLOR.

- *Curraleira Embrechados*

Location: Dispersed in Rua Perry Vidal, Rua Nascimento Costa and Rua Carlos Botelho.

Parish: Penha de França and Beato

Description: Four floored buildings, forming open blocks, and two floored townhouses, forming blocks.

Number of houses: 938

Organization: The cooperatives went bankrupt. There are two new associations, Associação do Bairro Horizonte and Associação Crescer no Beato.

- *Dona Leonor*

Location: Benfica, near the famous Torres de Lisboa.

Parish: São Domingos de Benfica

Description: Four floored buildings, forming open blocks.

Number of houses: 160

Organization: COOPERATIVA DE HABITAÇÃO ECONÓMICA DO BAIRRO DONA LEONOR.

- *Quinta das Fonecas e Quinta da Calçada*

Location: Rua Mem de Sá and Rua D. Luís da Gama, on the side of a main Lisbon highway, segunda circular, near Campo Grande.

Parish: Campo Grande

Description: Four floored buildings, forming open blocks.

Number of houses: 615

Organization: COOPERATIVA 25 DE ABRIL / COOPERATIVA UNIDADE DO POVO

- *Quinta do Alto*

Location: Avenida Engenheiro Manuel Rocha, near the airport.

Parish: Alvalade

Description: Four floored buildings, forming open blocks.

Number of houses: 152

Organization: COOPERATIVA DE HABITAÇÃO ECONÓMICA BOA ESPERANÇA

- *Quinta do Bacalhau Monte Côxo*

Location: Around Rua Wanda Ramos, in Olaias.

Parish: Areeiro

Description: Four floored buildings, forming open blocks.

Number of houses: 384

Organization: The cooperative went bankrupt and there is no neighbourhood organization active in the neighbourhood.

Documentation related with the implementation of the SAAL in Lisbon highlights the ups and downs of a troublesome relationship between the neighbours and the local and national authorities. During the revolutionary period, the neighbours from Lisbon's poor neighbourhoods and shanty towns were represented by ICL²⁰,

²⁰ Intercomissões de Moradores de Bairros da Lata e Degradados do Concelho de Lisboa (ICL), which means Inter-commission of the neighbours from shanty towns and degraded neighbourhoods from Lisbon's City Council.

which gathered the several movements, whose aim was to unify the struggle on the right to housing, the collective good that justified their action. These commissions were integrated in the so called popular based organizations identified in MFA documentation²¹ and legitimized in the 1976 Constitution, that should foster the involvement of the population in the local administration.

In February 1975²², the ICL drafted a list of demands to the government that reflected their main concerns and perceived difficulties. They claimed for favourable loans, a timely resolution of the processes, the involvement of unemployed neighbours in the brigades and the possibility of building their new neighbourhoods in the areas they already occupied. This last claim was largely fulfilled but, according with the leaders interviewed, the processes met with persistent blockages that were hard to overcome.

They refused self construction, the renovation of degraded neighbourhoods or prefabricated construction. Only in Curraleira self construction later occurred, not out of choice but out of necessity, since the cooperative left houses unfinished and the neighbours had to do it for themselves. Most of all, the neighbours reiterated the need of effectively participating in all the proceedings, which included the presence of their representatives in any official meetings and, more significantly, the possibility of deciding on the attribution of the houses. However, their claims did not meet with a favourable response from the government, which in May²³ prompted a manifestation held in Parque Eduardo VII against shanty towns and self-construction, and in favour of the occupations that had recently been criminalized.

In that same month²⁴, the SAAL brigades of Lisbon's City Council met in a plenary discussion and expressed their apprehension regarding the uncertainties that affected the process in the city. Without consulting the brigades or the neighbours, the central government intended to transfer the control over the program to the City Council, a decision that clearly conflicted with the participatory and empowering dimension of the SAAL. To deal with this and other problematic issues, the brigades

²¹ Documento-Guia do Projeto Aliança Povo-MFA, of July 1975.

²² Document nº 30 of the White Book of the SAAL.

²³ Document nº 47 of the White Book of the SAAL.

²⁴ Document nº 46 of the White Book of the SAAL.

felt they needed to reinforce their own self organization and articulation with the populations they were working with. For that effect, they proposed the constitution of an autonomous structure for the SAAL in Lisbon, an Assembly of Delegates (AD), which could be connected to an official organism as long as it retained executive autonomy. The brigades concluded that the SAAL could not be bound to self-construction. It should remain a dynamic, innovative and unconventional process, capable of rapidly overcoming any bureaucratic obstacles and of appropriating well located areas in the city.

In July²⁵ the brigades met again to further discuss the reconfiguration of the SAAL in Lisbon. In this document they state that the participation of the ICL in the coordination of the SAAL should be institutionalized and that the dynamics of the process was incompatible with large bureaucratic structures such as Lisbon's City Council. The simpler the organizational structure of the SAAL, the easier it would be for the neighbours to assert their claims. However, their demands were not heard. In October²⁶ they reacted to their transference to the Fundo de Fomento à Habitação (FFH)²⁷, which was being decided regardless of their resistance and without consulting them. They predicted new hardships, such as the extinction of some brigades and the sacking of workers that opposed the new configuration of the program. They intended to maintain their autonomy, and to guarantee it they demanded for: the recognition of the AD as their only representative; its participation in the commission responsible for the transference; work contracts with the members of the brigades and the attribution of a venue for their meetings and activities.

Meanwhile, ICL's list of demands remained unanswered. Moreover, some neighbours and neighbourhood organizations were losing interest in the process. As a reaction, in February 1976²⁸ it issued a new document urging the government to respond to their previous claims and to respond to new ones: the application of an inquiry to detect and dislodge tenants in social housing that had private lodgings or a high income; the legislation of favourable loans and rents; the attribution of non-

²⁵Document nº 66 of the White Book of the SAAL.

²⁶Document nº 90 of the White Book of the SAAL.

²⁷Housing Promotion Fund.

²⁸Document nº 124 of the White Book of the SAAL.

refundable loans to neighbourhood organizations; and the participation of ICL in municipal meetings on housing.

However, the termination of the SAAL later on that same year rendered all the demands hopeless and demobilized the organizations from any joint action. From then on, all contact between them practically ceased and each one became focused of the specific issues that affected each neighbourhood in particular. Without the incentive of a favourable institutional and political environment, any claims for social transformation were left behind as the neighbours saw their main goal came to life: the construction of their own houses, the houses they would someday own. The path dependency created by the SAAL was limited: neighbours fulfilled their most immediate goals but rapidly forgot general demands for more equality and empowerment. Organizations became not completely tamed, but relatively complying. The revolutionary social movement was over.

Portas (1978) went as far as to consider that, comparing with the rest of the country, the SAAL in Lisbon presented an “*operational failure*” that resulted from a “*paralyzing conflict*” (p. 12), which nevertheless, as we will see, left an undeniable legacy for the future. The difficulties felt must be understood considering the underlying political problems that emerged in the revolutionary context. According to him, the opposition between the governmental and the nongovernmental «lefts» was reflected in a troublesome relationship between the local authorities and some more aggressive elements of the neighbourhood commissions that, instigated by the brigades, found in the local administration a foe responsible for all the bureaucratic obstacles and indecisions that were in fact the responsibility of the central services. Oliveira and Marconi (1978) highlighted the difficult political role of the brigades, whose neutrality was difficult to achieve as they were placed between contending forces. They could not simply transfer their technical know-how to the neighbourhoods; they should promote the political mobilization of the neighbours without trying to become an ideological avant-garde. Therefore, they had a specific technical function that carried political connotations.

Portas (1978) testified that the SAAL meetings in Lisbon were very conflicting; the brigades were often accused of political radicalization, while the local

administration was burden with the responsibility for the lack of dynamism of the process. Considering these difficulties, the so called reformist left wing administrations were in a very difficult situation. Besides all the external confrontations, they were also troubled by the lack of internal cooperation in the central services, from those officials who sympathized with the former regime. Moreover, they still had to manage all the influence networks and speculation around housing construction. As such, they had to favour the constitution of other neighbourhood commissions that were not hostile and were willing to cooperate.

When the neighbourhood commissions that were interested in the SAAL began to constitute coordinating structures, the conflicts emerged once again, to a point that the dialogue with local authorities became impossible. Portas considers that in Lisbon the political radicalization hindered the process and jeopardized the interests of the populations, unlike in happened in Oporto, where there was a constructive dialogue among the different actors, in order to make the best of the opportunities available.

One of the main «battle horses» was self-construction, which was severely criticized by the left wing «intellectuals» that, in Portas' opinion, misinformed the neighbours about this and other issues. As a result, the neighbours in Lisbon were led to believe that the state should determine all the necessary conditions for the processes to function and their role would be to constantly criticize and contest the work of the administration and not to activate the initiatives through the realization, with their own means, of better living conditions, like it happened for example in Algarve. He considers that this strategy was not naive; it concealed the real purpose of reducing the number of houses and thus increase the rental values, and all this while spontaneous self-construction was still going on, with no projects, no technical support and no access to available financial help.

The SAAL in Lisbon is then a privileged ground to analyse the dilemma tame *versus* mischievous associations. To which point can social movements advance democratic values before they become disruptive? Can cooperation with the administration avoid capture? Fung (2003) places this dilemma in its political context: if in tyrannical contexts resistance is crucial, in mature democracies the costs for social peace and civic virtues may be too high, despite prevailing inequalities. During the

revolution, Portugal was in between both scenarios. Both the state and the associational sphere were under enormous transformations and it is difficult, if not inadequate, to dissociate political institutions from civil society. Both were deeply interconnected through political arrangements such as the SAAL and the considerable reduction of this interconnectedness during the democratic period is an important aspect to bear in mind. The SAAL was a reform strategy designed to advance democratic fundamental values, namely the right to housing, but it was more than that, since it forced the modernization of the administration by opening it to public scrutiny. The reaction of the state to the organizations thus generated, that present a complex combination of tameness and contestation according with particular circumstances, will shed light on their contribution to the quality of democracy in Portugal.

ANALYSIS

Approach

The thesis presents a micro comparative historical analysis of the SAAL neighbourhoods in Lisbon, from their inception during the revolutionary period to the present day. Its driving force resides in the desire to answer historically grounded questions instead of classical theoretical paradigms (Skocpol, 1984). Temporal sequences assume a major explanatory role on accounting for intended or unintended outcomes. However, unlike it is traditionally the case in historical studies, the analysis aims for the particular and not for large-scale structures, processes and patterns of change. The research does not enclose significant ambitions of generalization. The strategy is essentially interpretive, since the main focus resides in the culturally embedded intentions of the agents involved and the comparative approach intends to clarify the particular features of each neighbourhood, which will be used to test the most significant conceptual tools.

The historical comparison among individual neighbourhoods situated in the same City Council places the research at the local level, a micro cosmos that allows for the exclusion of causal factors often used to explain variation in participatory dynamics. The political, social and cultural contexts are identical in all the neighbourhoods, so the variations among them must be attributed to other factors that hopefully will make themselves known through this approach. These broad contextual factors will constitute the control variables that are not responsible for cross-case divergence, and their variation will be minimized with the selection of a single City Council.

The research will be two folded. In a first moment, the common aspects among the neighbourhoods will be identified in order to extract hypothesis regarding causal factors that characterize the SAAL in Lisbon. In a second moment, differences among the neighbourhoods will be contrasted in order to assess specific causal explanations. As Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003) put it, there is a comparison among a small number of similar and contrasting cases from which explanations of the outcomes are

presented, within a delimited historical context. Under this approach there is no sampling, all the instances of the phenomenon are considered, that is, all the SAAL neighbourhoods in Lisbon plus one that is the control case.

The historical sequences initiated during a revolutionary transition to democracy. The revolution constituted a phenomenon similar to a critical juncture, a period of significant change that resulted from a crisis in the antecedent conditions. In this particular case, it is not considered a critical juncture as such, since it was identical and produced the same legacy in the different cases under analysis. That legacy was neighbourhood participation and, as any legacy, it presents three components: mechanisms of production; mechanisms of reproduction and stability of its core attributes (Collier, Collier, 1991).

The explanation of the legacy is then related with a combination of factors that occurred at a given period in time and did not reoccur. It generated path dependency, which occurs when a contingent historical episode triggers a sequence that follows a fairly deterministic pattern (Mahoney, 2000). In this particular case, it is a reactive sequence, generated during a breakpoint in history. The deterministic pattern relates to a considerable intensification in neighbourhood participation that naturally followed the breakpoint. It is not a self reinforcing sequence because the institutional arrangement, the SAAL, was extinguished, and although most of the projects were not discontinued, this was due mostly to the determination of the actors involved and not to the stable reproduction of the institution over time.

It is obvious that the revolution is contingent, since it produced a trajectory that neither neighbourhood would have followed if it had not occurred. However, the reactive character of the sequences accounts for the variation among the neighbourhoods through time. Without the institutional background to unite them, each neighbourhood followed a particular chain of events that led them to drift apart. While some neighbourhoods maintained some level of participation, with their organizations permanently active throughout these years, others presented a reversal, temporary or permanent, of the participatory dynamics. The pattern was not simply reproduced, it evolved through a tight chain of reactions that led to previously unsuspected outcomes. Reversal may be difficult, but it is not impossible.

The assessment of the reason why some neighbourhoods followed a particular chain of events and others a distinct one demands for a deeper look into critical antecedents, important factors preceding the critical moment that contribute to produce divergent results (Slater, Simmons, 2010). There were conditioning causes that combined themselves with the causal forces inherent to the revolution and predisposed the cases to diverge. These causes were related with the geographical origin of the neighbours and the particular legal situation and conditions of the shanty towns they inhabited prior to the implementation of the SAAL, which differed and produced two sets of outcomes.

As Pierson (2004) rightly states, numerous events in the social world take a long time to occur, making it necessary to extend the analysis for considerable periods of time. After more than 40 years, the institutional documentation on the neighbourhoods is scarce and provides little information about the neighbourhood movement itself, since it is essentially related with specific bureaucratic aspects. It is dispersed through different official entities, IHRU, LNEC, the City Council, the Parish Councils, and it is more of a complement than a core from which the fundamental traces of neighbourhood participation can be inferred. It was chosen not to request access to the organizations' records. Whenever the neighbours interviewed decided, on their own initiative, to provide such documentation, it was certainly welcomed, but it was considered that to ask to consult these private documents could be regarded as a violation of the privacy of the neighbourhoods and could eventually compromise the possibility of developing a fruitful and constructive relation with the leaders of the organizations.

It must be reminded that these organizations survived numerous considerable challenges, often with little institutional support and frequently with considerable opposition. The neighbours lost the technical support in the initial stages of the process and had to fend for themselves, despite the low levels of formal education they often had. Regardless of this fact, records were usually kept and are still dully organized after all these years, although in some neighbourhoods where the neighbourhood organizations were dissolved such data is often missing. Anyway, it was not the purpose of the thesis to determine how well the records were kept and

obeyed formal requirements, neither to count who many neighbours paid their quotas or attended general assemblies, but to analyse qualitatively the constitution and evolution of the neighbourhood participatory processes in each neighbourhood, and the testimonies of the neighbours themselves constituted a rich source of such information.

The approach to the neighbourhoods was always spontaneous and direct, without the mediation of any external entity. Usually in person and rarely by phone or e-mail, the neighbours were frequently first approached in the streets of their own neighbourhood, where it became rapidly obvious that the majority of the neighbours had little knowledge about the participatory process, for they provided but dispersed and superficial information and immediately referred the main leaders of the organizations as the ones that could give the necessary insight. As such, although neighbours that were never involved in the managing bodies of the organizations were often approached and questioned, it was decided that the perspective of the leaders would constitute the main source of information from which the historical path of the neighbourhoods would be traced.

It is acknowledged that the perspective of the leaders may not always correspond entirely to the reality in its whole, but even so, the way the neighbours that took upon themselves to lead their neighbourhoods perceive their own role and the role of those about them is in itself an interesting observation standpoint. It is acknowledged that there may be some inconsistencies in the testimonies, undeliberate as they may be. For instance, a leader in Fonseca stated that he had a «wake-up call» when the Pope visited the Catholic University in the late sixties, and the neighbourhood was covered up with a wall of flowers to conceal it from the public eye. In fact, the Pope John Paul II did not visit the university until 1982, in 1967 it received the visit of Cardinal Cerejeira. This leader was but a child then and the confusion is understandable. The testimony was inaccurate in its details, but not in the feelings they produced. Like it happened with the death of Luigi Trastulli (Portelli, 2013d), the oral source did not contribute to clarify a fact but it opened a door to the subjective meaning of the event; the meaning does not depend of the specific circumstances in which the episode occurred. In this sense, the most important historical fact is the

memory itself. Certainly a visit of the Pope was more significant than a visit of Cardinal Cerejeira, hence his inclusion in a memory of discrimination and social exclusion, that becomes even more dramatic.

In this case there is public record of the events and it is possible to ascertain the truth. It is not always the case, particularly when the internal affairs of the organizations are under analysis. As such, when there is no documental data to confirm the statements, the study is sustained in interpretative memories of reality and not in the reality itself. Although it is not always acknowledged, written documents are also contaminated by lapses of memory, misdirections or simply false information. Often, the lapses reveal the interests of the author of the document, other times they may be involuntary. In the case of the death of Luigi Trastulli, two right wing newspapers that probably received their information from the police got his name wrong and called him Alvaro, while a communist newspaper was inaccurate in the name of the police commissioner responsible for the case. In this example so well documented by Portelli, the mistake was already a sign of an adaptation of events to a given ideology, but in other cases it is impossible to detect any intentionality.

The research draws all the observations and conclusions from the direct oral testimonies of these people or from written testimonies, which has an enormous potential but also some limitations. It does not exhaust the subject; it is a specific approach to it, an interpretation made by relevant actors from which the history of each neighbourhood's participatory process is withdrawn. The reader must always bear in mind that the thesis is not constructed around the historical paths of the neighbourhoods; it is built around the paths of the neighbourhoods through the eyes of their leaders. For instance, when a leader in Liberdade states that he believes the operation in the neighbourhood was hindered by dissatisfied landlords that feared the loss of income and statute and had personal contacts in the City Council, there is no evidence to confirm if this was so. Similarly, when a leader in Bela Flor declares his suspicions regarding an embezzlement by a former director and the incompetency or unwillingness of the responsible authorities to acknowledge that fact, there is no additional data to support that assumption. The relevant facts are not the events that

may or may not have happened, but the feelings of suspicion that these reports convey, which are symptomatic of a low trust society.

Besides the interviews and informal conversations with neighbours, some inferences were also obtained through direct observation in the neighbourhoods. Strolling around anonymously around the neighbourhoods provided useful insights concerning their collective dynamics. Portugal Novo has a life of its own that distinguishes it from the other neighbourhoods, with the Roma people evidencing a strong communitarian disposition. They are mostly oriented to the outside, the public spaces, and not so much to the inside, the house. There were people conversing in the streets about the buildings and some had their doors open, even when they were inside their houses. In the remaining neighbourhoods, in the daytime during the week, when the observation occurred, the neighbourhoods are generally quiet, with few people around. The common spaces, when they exist, are usually vacant, except for the coffee shops that present the usual attendance of such places. Occasionally, like in Bairro da Liberdade, it was possible to observe elderly people, mostly women, gathered in small groups at the entrance steps of the buildings, like they would have probably done in their home villages. Only in Quinta do Alto a significant community life could still be observed, since the elderly men spend their afternoons in a yard built by themselves, playing social games and conversing with each other. This is the last remnant of a community vitality that faded away considerably.

Considering that the objective is to capture the evolution of the neighbours through more than 40 years, some ethnographic methodologies, such as direct and participatory observation, can only be a complement, since they only capture the present moment. The core of the thesis still resides in direct testimonies and the procedures used to collect the evidence can be included in political ethnography, an enriching approach that holds considerable advantages over alternative more conventional methods that rely mainly on correlations and comparative statistics, considering that it *“brings field workers into direct contact with political processes instead of filtering that knowledge through other people’s testimony, written records and artifacts of political interaction”*... *“ethnography engages the analyst in looking at*

social processes as they unfold rather than reasoning chiefly from either the conditions under which they occur or the outcomes that correlate with them” (Tilly, 2007, p. 248).

Political ethnography challenges the researcher to deal with the subjectivity involved in the meaning that the actors attribute to their own experiences and to the world around them. It involves some level of immersion in the community that is under analysis, an emotional leap that may be uncomfortable to those most prone to positivism. It is a risk that must be conscientiously taken when sustaining a research mostly in testimonies that are but interpretations of the reality and not the reality itself. Nevertheless, it is valuable information that complemented and eventually rectified by other data, can provide an interesting picture of the facts.

As Schatz (2009) rightfully reminds us, political science has hardly been a methodologically plural discipline, with the cutting edge statistical technologies becoming nearly hegemonic, thus narrowing the horizons that could be opened by a more eclectic perspective. Auyero and Joseph disclose a double absence: of politics in ethnographic literature and of ethnography in the study of politics. From 1996 to 2005, the *American Journal of Political Science* (569 articles) and the *American Political Science Review* (360 articles) published but one ethnographic article (2007, p. 2). In Portugal, the scenario is not much different, with most academic production in political science relying in quantitative approaches, possibly due to an immersion in what Castells (2010) designates as the technocratic myth of disembodied science.

However, there is still much to be done regarding the use of ethnography in political science. The option for political ethnography is both a necessity and an opportunity: a necessity because the object was not prone to a statistical approach, since the cases were too few to favour a meaningful statistical comparison and the quantitative data available was too sparse to be compared; an opportunity because it can constitute an important contribution to political science in general, and to the Portuguese political academia in particular. Hopefully, this off the mainstream contribution will be more than marginal, if it can inspire others to follow suit in its quest for the deeper contexts of political events.

Portelli (2013a) argues that a complete investigation must necessarily consider all available sources, including the oral ones. Occasionally, oral sources are the main

sources available, as it is presently the case. The underlying meanings of daily events in the SAAL organizations over 40 years can hardly be captured in written documentation that focuses mainly the legal and institutional procedures, but can also not be thoroughly observed or experienced in direct participation and immersion. The foremost objective here is to apprehend the subjective meanings and beliefs of the leaders interviewed, which in themselves constitute historical facts, as Portelli rightfully argues, considering that the interest of the testimonies lies not only in their agreement with the facts, but also in their divergence. As it was already mentioned, it will not always be possible to confirm this convergence, due to the scarcity of complementary information, but the statements of the leaders, that emerge from their perspective of events, is in itself meaningful, for it encloses and interpretation of a personal significant experience which is historically relevant to the extent that it reveals something fundamental about key actors in the processes under analysis.

Moreover, the lack of credibility often associated with subjective qualitative information is also present in other sources that are usually, and wrongfully, viewed as more objective and reliable. As it was already noted, written documentation also carries the weight of the author's beliefs and even statistical data can be subjected to manipulation or simply be mistaken. In these cases, the subjectivity is less obvious and therefore potentially more damaging for the research, if it leads the researcher to assume as a fact information that was subjected to a process of transformation. In oral history, truth is not unique and absolute, it is relative since it is derived from multiple narratives of the past: there are infinite possible truths but they are not all equally truthful (Portelli, 2013b).

There is however a recurrent encounter with similar instances in the speeches of the leaders interviewed, which provides a considerable empirical confidence regarding the most relevant aspects to analyse. Although the leaders were interviewed separately and most of them do not know each other or have not been in contact for over 40 years, there is a considerable convergence in their speech. The particularities about specific events become irrelevant as a general trend emerges that reveals the common beliefs of the leaders. These beliefs, that may be more or less grounded in reality, are nevertheless widely shared. The individual memory becomes an original

collective memory based on the repercussions of events (Halbwachs, 1968) that to a considerable extent is not contemplated in the social memory that represents the triumph of a certain understanding of our recent past. This collective memory is not an uniform totality that dissipates the person, it consists of remembrances that are shared among different people, gathering them in a common experience. It is a weak memory, a memory of those that were not completely defeated, but that took a course of action that collided with the rote of the victors. It is the memory of a marginal socialist struggle within an hegemonic capitalist context.

There are not unlikely narratives; all seemed quite plausible and realistic, not only due to their convergence among each other, but also due to their compatibility with the evolution of the neighbourhoods and the known idiosyncrasies of the Portuguese political, cultural and social context. To a large extent, my experience in the quest for information presented revealing similarities with the reported experience of the leaders in the resolution of the bureaucratic and legal issues of the neighbourhoods.

If they complained about the lack of clarity and dispersion of information and of an erratic relation with institutions, the research met with the same obstacles. Initially I expected to start by seeking the support of national and local authorities, namely in the mediation with the neighbours, but in the end it was the other way around. Due to the considerable difficulty in attaining the cooperation of these authorities, it were the leaders that mediated the relation with them through their own personal contacts, which in itself confirms the strong personalistic and discretionary nature of the relations with these authorities. But the silence is in itself revealing; there seems to linger a particular discomfort towards the SAAL, which remains obscured by an ambiguous set of rules and procedures. There are no open channels of communication nor a direct access to institutional information. It is necessary to know the right people in the right places, a lesson that both the neighbours and I had to learn.

The information obtained results from open interviews that evolved into free, spontaneous and diverse conversations. In each case, there was enough freedom to adjust to the particular context of the interviewees. If once the interview took place in

the streets of the neighbourhood, with passersby spontaneously joining in the conversation, in other cases the interview was conducted in the privacy of the interviewees' homes or the premises of the cooperatives; if sometimes the interview was made to a single leader, in other cases the two most important leaders were interviewed together, or their extended families were present; if in most cases the information was transmitted orally and taped, in other cases the recording was not possible, or the information was transmitted in writing, by choice of the interviewees.

For each neighbourhood a narrative interspersed with quotations is presented. The quotations allow for a direct contact with the sources and are open to alternative views and interpretations. The remaining text was meant to remain faithful to the intention of the respondents but was filtered and reordered in order to present only the information that is relevant for the analysis, in a coherent and readable way. Subjectivity is recognized, but the aim of that section of the thesis is to present the perspectives of the leaders as faithfully as possible, and as such the analytical and critical component is presented separately. I assume that my interpretation may not entirely match the perspective of the respondents, but I try hard to distinguish what is what; I do not attribute my ideas to them, nor the other way around. Even the reader can draw his own conclusions from the descriptive material, which may certainly differ from mine. The thesis flows into a dialogic totality that includes multiple voices and interpretations: those of the respondents, mine and the readers' (Portelli, 2013b).

The main concern of the thesis is to make an active contribution to the recognition of an original collective memory that was muted by the construction of a dominant social memory. The capitalist ideology, like any other, is supported in funding narratives that provide the necessary symbolic framework. The entrepreneur, the self-made man which triumphs alone, is profit oriented and limits his social concerns to occasional philanthropy, is the hero of our times. In a society that views the capacity to generate income as a measure for success, all those how fail to do so in a satisfactory way are to some extent viewed as incompetent, and therefore in need of paternalistic support or utter abandonment, depending on the strength of the neoliberal orientation in a given context.

A group of poor people with low levels of formal education that successfully cooperate with each other for the common good and, moreover, intervene in a key market area - housing construction, is a tale that does not fit well into the dominant narrative and makes it difficult to justify the assumptions that legitimize overbearing social housing policies. In this context, António Albino Machado is the anti-hero of the capitalist ideology, considering that he never made a fortune, or even had a moderately regular income, but became the charismatic leader that dedicated his time and energy to the successful mobilization of his neighbours.

Weak collective memories, moreover when they are inconvenient, can thus find themselves domesticated, privatized, neutralized and deprived of their social capacity (Godinho, 2012). The myth of the undeserving/ incompetent poor, as the myth of the successful entrepreneur, is a powerful instrument of social control supported in a social memory that was extirpated from dissenting voices. In this context, the poor that transforms himself in an entrepreneur and becomes rich is an hero, but the competent poor that acts collectively, is not profit oriented and is bold enough to succeed in housing construction, is an aberration that needs to be forgotten since he is the living proof of the viability of an alternative organization of the market.

Considering this, it is not surprising that the SAAL is under a cloak of silence. In an article about four studies on popular mobilization arrangements that occurred during the revolutionary period, which were based mostly on oral memory, Baía confirmed that most of the documentation regarding these projects is *“dispersed, missing or is not available for public consultation, which compromises the work of those researchers that wish to study them”*, a problem that is particularly grievous in the case of the SAAL (2012, p: 112).

This is not just some left wing rumbling. It is never enough to remember the particular circumstances of the Portuguese revolution, where socialism was regarded not as a distant utopia but as a real possibility. The first draft of the constitution, in its 2^o article, clearly stated the transition to socialism as the main objective of the Portuguese democratic state, a transition that should be ensured by the creation of the *“necessary conditions for the democratic exercise of power by the working classes”*. The article 65^o on housing defined that the state had to *“encourage and support the*

initiatives of local communities and populations in an effort to solve their housing problems and foster self-construction and the constitution of housing cooperatives”.

Private initiative had to be subordinated to the general interest and, in a determination that still sends shivers down neoliberal spines, the state and local authorities were to exercise effective control over all construction and urban land was to be nationalized or municipalized, so that national and local authorities could decide on its use. The SAAL was a particular program that followed this inspiration. It embodies not only the implementation of the socialist ideal, but also its successful perpetuation into an antagonistic capitalist environment. No wonder that it survives mostly in the voices of those who have experienced it.

If oral history tends to be the history of those who have no voice, considering the lack of documents and archives that frequently affects the marginalized sectors of society, its importance must surely be acknowledged if we are not to ignore some of the most fundamental actors of our past; it is often the only existing record of relevant data, specially subjective data, that can be crucial to correct the limitations of the official historiography (Pozzi, 2012). Despite the difficulties, or because of them, oral testimonies emerge as a fundamental source of information whose limitations must be perceived as potentialities; these sources, like any others, present specificities that require a careful managing, which implies the effort to obtain meaningful information from a rigorous and critical process of examination and selection. It is a challenge worth taking.

As Tiago de Oliveira (2010) rightfully argues, memories represent an essential and often irreplaceable contribution to the analysis of historical problems, considering they open the way to new questions, hypothesis and results. In this case, the SAAL must be known in order to question the real implications of a truly participatory experience that presents an interesting variation between the neighbourhoods in Lisbon who implemented it; while most neighbourhoods were successful, other met considerable difficulties that compromised their efforts. The explanatory factors that underlie this variation must be uncovered.

Analytical model

The neighbourhood movement during the revolution had specificities that deeply differentiate it from any neighbourhood participation forms that emerged later on throughout the democratic regime. During the revolutionary period, the state itself was under deep transformation. Traditional hierarchies were not only challenged but altogether taken apart and the path to a classless socialist society was viewed by relevant political agents as a real and viable option. The neighbourhood movement organized itself around a set of specific demands that aimed for the improvement of the harsh housing situation under which many impoverished people were living, deprived of the access to the formal housing market and forced to settle for illegal construction and the lack of basic services and infrastructures. This plight included the improvement of housing conditions, affordable rents, the nationalization and socialization of construction companies and the access to socially valued resources and opportunities.

Cerezales (2003) provides a detailed and accurate account of the circumstances in which the movement emerged and of its main features. The constitution of neighbourhood commissions was rather spontaneous: following an assembly held to discuss the problems of the neighbourhood, a list of demands was drafted, which was to be taken to the Parish Council by an elected commission. These commissions were autonomous from the administration, represented entire neighbourhoods and generally had no party affiliation, although they resorted to revolutionary rhetoric. The revolutionary context eliminated police repression, which made the occupations possible. The neighbourhood commissions could thus get what they claimed for without institutional validation or governmental interference, which empowered them. They emerged as a new political force and a potential ally for sectors of the state apparatus that were struggling for legitimacy. As a consequence, neighbourhood committees became consolidated as autonomous organizations and managed to establish advantageous political alliances, namely with the revolutionary left and the COPCON.

The collective identity of the movement was procedural, for it was gradually forged as the movement acted according with the opportunities provided. If initially it was opportunistic and set on immediate goals, gradually it found wider political

references that validated and situated its action. As the institutional struggle to normalize the political process intensified, the movement tended to drift towards radicalization and rupture. If initially its demands were viewed as democratic rights inserted in a fight against fascism, in a second stage the movement claimed for socialism in opposition to capitalism. Finally, in a third stage, the movement assumed itself as inherently revolutionary.

This evolution cannot be detached from the political volatility of the time, characterized by shifting political alliances and ideological reconfigurations. Until September 1974, with the anti-fascist coalition, the JSN (Junta de Salvação Nacional – National Salvation Coalition) recognized the legitimacy of the occupations and army forces loyal to the MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas – Movement of the Armed Forces) protected the squatters to reinforce its connection with the popular forces. The MDP (Movimento Democrático Português – Portuguese Democratic Movement) took over local power and encouraged collective organization to obtain popular support. Until April 1975, Vasco Gonçalves was to lead the country towards socialism, a road never taken despite the growing radicalization of the political speech and practice. A decree-law determined that all vacant houses had to be rented in 120 days, the MFA organized popular mobilization campaigns with neighbourhood commissions as a role model and the COPCON itself took part in occupations, which were legalized.

The moderates won the April elections and tried to put an end to the revolutionary frenzy through party legitimacy, but the democratic socialism is not yet ready for burial and its proponents put up a fight. The alliance people/MFA proposed an alternative sustained in popular mobilization and direct democracy, with the neighbourhood commissions identified as one of the main political forces of the future popular assembly. The hot summer of 1975 was constantly heated by violent conflicts among the contending forces and a growing political instability that finally culminated in the victory of the moderates, in November 1975. The COPCON was dissolved and the state regained its coercive power. The neighbourhood movement, associated with the radical left, was sidelined and viewed with suspicion, but the SAAL was already being implemented and its roots were deep enough to generate a path dependency whose effects persist to the present day.

Born under revolutionary circumstances, the SAAL created a channel for the institutionalization of a part of the movement and proposed a kind of neighbourhood participation that can be categorized as transformative. Following the revolutionary spirit, it entailed a significant transference of decisional and executive power to self organized neighbours that could have an effective influence over their own resettlement processes, despite major political priorities. It embodied an experiment in associative participatory democracy during a period of intense reconfiguration of the political system that favoured such experimental governance designs. As Tarrow (1994) points out, movement organizations cannot be detached from the wider revolutionary context that surrounded their genesis. The SAAL represented a reaction of the political system to the intense neighbourhood movement that emerged in that context. There was a fear that it could radicalize, thus endangering the transition to democracy. The SAAL favoured its institutionalization by granting it access to the state and to valuable resources. It contributed to sustain the movement as it promoted the perpetuation of some of its effects.

The rallying cry «power to the people» was put into practice when dispossessed neighbours found themselves entitled to decide where and how they wanted to live, under certain constraints but with relative autonomy. This translated into the right to decide on specific and pragmatic issues such as the typologies of the houses, their disposition, the materials used, the necessary equipments and infrastructures. Ultimately, the neighbours had access to favourable loans that they could manage according with their own desires, needs and aspirations.

If extended to other areas of urban planning beyond resettlement, this kind of organizational model could have generated something like the right to the city taken in its broadest and most ambitious sense. It was sustained in the effective empowerment of the most dispossessed citizens, which could have equalizing effects that could translate into an universal right to the spaces and opportunities available in the city, that would be largely public, given the socialist ideology. Of course this is no more than an arguable assumption that lacks empirical confirmation, since this scenario is hypothetical. The SAAL was never generalized; due to counter reforming political

measures, it remained a constrained experience, with a limited scope both in time and space.

The first constitutional government rapidly extinguished the SAAL. Although practical reasons were invoked, related with an alleged inefficiency in the application of the program, this assumption lacked empirical confirmation and was meant legitimate the decision and conceal its real motivation, which was purely political. For the government of the time, socialism was no longer an option and the kind of transformative participation envisaged by the SAAL, given its socialist inspiration and intense participatory nature, strongly conflicted with the more vertical capitalist path that was the chosen alternative. The sudden interruption of the SAAL left most projects unfinished, but many were already under construction and had to be incorporated in the new logic of the political system.

One of the most significant aspects of the SAAL was its formal incentive to the constitution of democratic and horizontal secondary associations by destitute residents of shanty towns and their insertion in a somewhat horizontal structure of power. For a neighbourhood to be eligible to the SAAL, the neighbours had to constitute associations or cooperatives that would have a direct and intense participation in the process. Besides, they had to closely cooperate with technical brigades of experts and with the state, through the FFH, which were elements external to the neighbourhood that largely transcended primary relations of proximity.

The importance of secondary associations for the quality of democracy, extensively scrutinized by Putnam (1993a, 1993b, 1995, 2005), remains a fundamental aspect to consider, given its possible positive correlation with generalized reciprocity, which favours compliance with the requirements of democratic governance and enhances government accountability. Fung (2003) argues that associations enhance democracy through the intrinsic value of associative life; by fostering civic virtues and teaching political skills; by offering resistance to power and checking government; by improving the quality and equality of representation; by facilitating public deliberation; and by creating opportunities for citizens and groups to participate directly in governance. However, the relation between these aspects is not straightforward, since the causal relation among them is not necessarily direct and different kinds of

associations present differentiated contributions to each one of them. Moreover, democracy enhancement may mean different things in different political contexts. Proponents of a strict representative democracy will necessarily have a different understanding from those who support participatory democracy. The evolution of associations will reflect the role attributed to secondary associations by major political and social forces over time.

To analyze the SAAL's legacy beyond its ephemeral formal existence encloses a central riddle enunciated by Tarrow (1994), which is to determine the impact of the social movement beyond the short-lived mobilization, its real power. In this respect, it is fundamental to consider if these neighbourhood organizations are still active; if they fulfilled their attributions in the management of the neighbourhoods; if they remain representative, inclusive and horizontally organized and if they continue to be regarded as legitimate actors by national and local authorities. The understanding of democracy in contemporary Portugal differs greatly from the ideals of the revolution and the role attributed to neighbourhood organizations also changed. This evolution was gradual, although some particular events pushed it further in specific moments, such as the adhesion to the EEC in 1986 or, more recently, the economical crisis. The path taken by these organizations reflects the political environment in which they operate but also their internal or local contingencies, since there is variation in their evolution that occurred in spite of a similar political context.

By analysing Lisbon's SAAL projects in the present day, we observe the emergence of three possible scenarios, considering the relationship between neighbours and the state. Two of the scenarios are extreme and opposed to one another, and the third one is an intermediary one:

1) In one extreme we find a rupture between the neighbours and the national and local authorities who now hold the responsibility for the management of neighbourhoods. Such is the case of the neighbourhood Portugal Novo, where the cooperative went bankrupt following accusations of corruption by members of its managing structure. The neighbourhood movement eroded and some houses were occupied by Roma population that is not formally organized and maintains no relationship whatsoever with the authorities, making it «no man's land». There are no

legal documents on the houses whose transactions are made directly between the inhabitants, who pay cash in exchange for a key. In the absence of a formal relationship with the state, neighbours could have developed some kind of internal cooperation among them, but that did not happen. There are no organized condominiums, even informally. The neighbours do not cooperate with each other in the maintenance or supervision of the buildings. Any damage is solved by the neighbour who feels most affected by it and each one paints around his own window and cleans his own porch, or not, depending on his the cleaning habits. A representative of the City Council fears an eminent collapse of the buildings considering there is no supervision or maintenance whatsoever, and there is a suspicion that supporting walls may have been damaged to provide escape routes for the many drug traffickers concealed there.

2) In another extreme, the neighbours conquered their autonomy and manage their neighbourhoods independently from the local authorities. It is the case of neighbourhoods Quinta do Alto, Bela flor, Liberdade, Alto do Moinho and Dona Leonor, whose houses are now privately owned by their inhabitants that manage them as any other owners manage their private property, among themselves and with little interference from local authorities. This doesn't mean that there are no problems, simply the problems that exist resemble those faced by any other private neighbourhoods and are dealt with identical strategies or, in some specific circumstances, are unfinished residues of the SAAL that still require some commitment of the cooperatives for their resolution.

3) In an intermediary scenario, we observe a tutoring participation, in which the neighbours are urged to organize themselves and cooperate with the local authorities in the resolution of their neighbourhoods' pending problems. This cooperation does not involve a significant power shift, since the City Council retains most of the decisional and executive power and the neighbours play mostly a consulting role. However, they can negotiate the conditions presented to them and if they refuse to cooperate, they have the power to invalidate all the process. It is the case of the neighbourhoods included in the GABIP ex-SAAL, a municipal project that will be presented in detail further on. These neighbourhoods are Curraleira and Fonsecas e

Calçada. Officially, Portugal Novo is included in this process, but in reality no progress has been made so far.

This kind of participation cannot be considered ineffective if it doesn't involve the deep power transfer entailed in the transformative participation, since that is not its purpose. Its aim is reformist, given that it is conceived with the purpose of supporting a representative political system that is not under transformation, but under reinforcement, which is a natural process in the consolidation of democracy. It aims for a very specific right, the right to private property in its classical liberal understanding. It is an individual right to be enjoyed differently by everyone, according to one's merit, which determines one's place in society. In this understanding, the individual will have access to the places and opportunities that he can afford. Private places and opportunities must be acquired. Public places and opportunities are theoretically available to everyone, but in fact the access to them is conditioned by factors such as geographical proximity, and the most craved ones are usually located in the most expensive surroundings.

It is possible to conclude that in the democratic context, the neighbourhoods that were unable to manage the process on their own and were targeted by the City Council either become tamed or resistant and that plays a decisive role in their institutionalization and in their relation with national and local authorities. If the neighbours comply, they ascend from dependent public tenants to independent private owners, and thus occupy their desired place in the capitalist society. As such, the more the neighbours agree to voluntarily cooperate with the authorities, the more they approach autonomy, which will be viewed as the success scenario. Inversely, the more they refuse to do so, the more they approach rupture, understood as the failure scenario.

Voluntary cooperation is then the mechanism that will determine the success of the neighbourhoods. It will vary according with two independent variables: the neighbours' capacity for self-organization and their affiliation to the dominant system of beliefs, which implies the identification with capitalist principle of private ownership. This entails mostly a craving for formally recognized private property, instead of irregular, collective or municipal ownership.

When the neighbours are able to maintain their organizations and are oriented towards private property, voluntary cooperation will be intense and the autonomy scenario will be the most likely outcome. When neither of the variables are present, voluntary cooperation will be low and the rupture scenario will be a strong possibility. When one of them is high and the other is low, no matter which one, there will emerge a situation of impasse that can either perpetuate itself or evolve either way. Naturally, there can be intermediary degrees of each one of them that create intermediate scenarios.

These two variables can be divided into indicators that, when combined, facilitate the measurement of their intensity. The indicators selected are not the only ones present but, for an analytical purpose, they were the only ones chosen. There could be other indicators, such as the organizations' capacity to fulfil its intended goals or develop other activities, but the analysis showed that the selected indicators are the most meaningful considering the variation observed or the impact they produced. As such, other relevant aspects, namely related with the internal democratic functioning of the organizations, will be regarded solely in a qualitative perspective and will be referred to in a casuistic basis. To the several possible positions in the indicators selected a quantitative value will be attributed so that in the end it will become possible to measure the intensity of voluntary cooperation.

The neighbours' affiliation to the dominant system of beliefs can be accessed by the payment of the pending debts on the houses to the IHRU and to transfer the ownership of the land from the City Council to them. Since it does not seem to be a significant variation in the economical resources of the neighbours from different neighbourhoods, the payments implied here derive mostly from willingness. There are four possible situations on these two indicators: concluded; in progress; under negotiation; refused. Naturally, it is taken into account the main tendency in each neighbourhood and not sporadic cases of neighbours that do not comply with the majority. The indicators are considered regarding the present situation of the neighbourhoods and do not measure the different obstacles they had to overcome to get here.

AFFILIATION	Concluded	In progress	Under negotiation	Refused
Debts houses	4	3	2	1
Transfer of land	4	3	2	1

As for the neighbours' capacity for self-organization, two indicators will be considered, the continuity of the organizational structure and embezzlements. Regarding the continuity of the organizational structure, some organizations were never discontinued, others were discontinued but resumed their activity or were substituted by new organizations, while others simply remain inactive. As for embezzlements, some organizations were never embezzled, while others were. In this case, the embezzlement either affected the main funds destined for the payments to the IHRU or affected revenues generated by complementary activities of the organizations.

CAPACITY	Continuation	Reactivation	Substitution	Inactivation
Continuity	4	3	2	1

CAPACITY	no	yes revenues	yes main funds
Embezzlements	3	2	1

The measurement of the success or failure of the participatory processes will allow us to determine to which extent a mechanism conceived by a certain political system fulfils its intended goal. In the case of the SAAL, the political system changed

dramatically from its inception during the revolutionary period to the present day, so the analysis will focus the posterior adjustments of the program to a new political context, which implies, in the case of some neighbourhoods, new participatory approaches implemented by the City Council. In that respect, although it is a process managed from above that arguably encloses a dynamics of persuasion more than of decision, it nevertheless can be considered successful from the standing point of the political system if it reinforces and facilitates its political decisions. In this perspective, neighbourhood organizations have mostly a mediating and legitimizing function in a representative capitalist democracy. Venues for direct participation in decision making and policy implementation are more limited than during the revolutionary period, but formal mechanisms for transmitting concerns from below and specially to be informed on procedures from above are in place.

Considering this, the verticality of the process may contribute to strengthen the state. A strong state can control the intensity of participation it can endure and thus select the ideal level, the one that provides the most beneficial balance: it promotes the legitimacy of decisional processes by bringing citizens a little bit in, without placing the representative system under the stress of too many demands or of managing too much power in the hands of too many people. In this perspective, participation can be accommodated without altering the institutional arrangements of an hierarchical bureaucratic political structure. Despite the somewhat limit access to decisional mechanisms, direct participation can still take place inside the organization, among its members, who benefit from the educational potential of the experience.

However, it must be noted that the verticality of the process, to the extent that it disempowers secondary organizations, may also compromise generalized reciprocity and, through it, social trust. If the neighbours have very limited formal control over the management of their own neighbourhoods, they can relapse into personalist relations as a source of access to craved goods, such as equipments and infrastructures. On the other hand, national and local authorities, freed from civic control, may become less effective or even feel tempted to give in to patronage or corruption. The definition of the participation process from above may also signify that such phenomena are already in place and the political system, which feeds on them, is striving to reinforce

them by limiting civic control. The verticality of the formal participation proceedings may then be related with the reinforcement of a certain understanding of democratic system or with a decline into neopatrimonialism. The empirical analysis will hopefully provide some insight into this apparently complex and ambiguous causal relation.

Common Features

The data collected allows for the classification of the several SAAL neighbourhood organizations according with the previously identified indicators, with the objective of assessing their degree of voluntary cooperation.

AFFILIATION	Concluded (4)	In progress (3)	Under negotiation (2)	Refused (1)
Debts houses	Quinta do Alto; Alto do Moinho; Liberdade; Bela Flor; D. Leonor	Fonsecas do Calçada	Curraleira	Portugal Novo
Transfer of land	Alto do Moinho; Liberdade; Leonor	Quinta do Alto; Bela Flor D.	Fonsecas e Calçada; Curraleira	Portugal Novo
CAPACITY	Never discontinued (4)	Reactivated (3)	Substituted (2)	Inactive (1)
Continuity	Quinta do Alto; Alto do	Fonsecas	Curraleira	Portugal Novo

Moinho; Calçada Liberdade; Bela Flor; D. Leonor

CAPACITY	No (3)	yes revenues (2)	yes main funds (1)
Embezzlements	Quinta do Alto; Alto do Moinho	Liberdade	Curraleira; Portugal Novo; FONSECAS e Calçada; Bela Flor; D. Leonor

Degree of voluntary cooperation
Alto do Moinho - 15
Quinta do Alto - 14
Liberdade - 14
D. Leonor - 13
Bela Flor - 12
FONSECAS e Calçada - 9
Curraleira - 7
Portugal Novo - 4

This very simple and unassuming scale that simply considers the four most relevant features which distinguish the organizations proves effective in ranking their degree of voluntary cooperation. There is in fact a significant degree of variation and

to identify its causal factors we can start with the elimination of the features they all share. It is possible to identify several aspects that, apart from some minor details that will be clarified further on, are common to all neighbourhoods. These common aspects are the general attributes that characterize the part of the neighbourhood movement that became institutionalized through the SAAL, in Lisbon.

Generally, the original neighbours bordered illiteracy, with a maximum of four years of school attendance, the compulsory education in those days. Despite this fact, they were able to constitute and maintain neighbourhood organizations with some ease. Some were already Lisbon natives, but most were born and raised in villages or small provincial towns scattered all over Portugal, and came to Lisbon during the fifties and sixties in search for employment opportunities in factories, construction, informal commerce or housekeeping.

The formal housing market was largely unaffordable, considering their meagre salaries, so they resorted to informal construction in shanty towns tolerated by the fascist authorities. Neighbours questioned referred some level of institutionalized organization within several neighbourhoods and exemplified the relative acceptance they faced: neighbours from Bairro Dona Leonor recalled how they had to build their shacks very fast during the night so that in the morning they already had their roof tiles on, otherwise the shacks would be demolished. The clandestine construction played an important role in the stabilization of the regime, since it provided an housing solution to the migrant working classes, thus significantly reducing the costs of the reproduction of the work force. It was a reflex of the rupture between the urban policy of the fascist regime and the social needs of a considerable portion of the population, as well as a symptom of the incapacity of the state to adjust to new situations and power relations (Barata Salgueiro, 1986).

The leaders interviewed denied to have had any relevant participatory experience previous to the SAAL, or to have been affiliated with any political party. They also denied the capture of the neighbourhood movement by political forces either during the revolution or after. They claim that they decided to organize on their own initiative and that they remained independent and unattached to political

structures or ideologies. Unlike Hipsher (1996) observed in Spain and Chile, there was not a close relationship between political parties and the neighbourhood movement.

On the contrary, political independence seems to have constituted an important survival strategy for these organizations. The relationship with the local power, namely with the city and Parish Councils, is fundamental, since these entities are much more directly involved with the neighbourhoods' needs and desires than the central power. At the local level, the political power is more open than at the central level, and through the years it may present wider political shifts, with parties from left to right winning regional and local elections. The organizations must be able to negotiate and establish a constructive relationship with all the local managements, independently of their political orientation, for it will determine their access to financial and logistical support, as well as to decision making processes. If the organizations are too much connoted with a specific political orientation, it may hinder this flexibility.

Another interesting aspect to consider is their increasing isolation, which reflects the demobilization of the neighbourhood movement; although during the revolutionary period the organizations participated in joint actions together with other SAAL neighbourhoods, in order to promote common concerns, after that they relapsed into their own specific matters and stopped contacting each other. The contact between SAAL neighbourhoods has been mostly inexistent and they also do not exhibit a significant engagement in local, regional or national participatory structures.

Fernandes et al argue (2012) that the democratic political context empowered neighbourhood organizations, particularly during the seventies and eighties. At the municipal level, City Councils included these associations in their local government plans and in Lisbon Metropolitan Area, 78% of policy mechanisms involve the participation of associations in thematic councils. However, SAAL cooperatives have not been particularly interested in these participatory mechanisms. They were small groups joined by an ephemeral network that fed on the revolutionary spirit; once it was subdued, the connection was severed, and with it the incentive to make a broader difference faded away.

In their first years, most neighbourhoods developed an intense communitarian life that would have delighted Tocqueville. There were neighbourhood commissions organizing popular events, libraries, parties, sports, public venues where people could meet and share their concerns, communitarian businesses focused on the local community. All that faded away quite rapidly, in some neighbourhoods faster than in others. At some point the leaders began to feel it was too much weight on their shoulders and no one else offered to take in on. Occasionally, remnants of this activity subsist, usually sports associations with a specific goal and a limited scope.

Ramos Pinto (2008) states that the urban movement focused mainly on the right to housing and, in general, refused to radicalise, opting instead for a moderate course of action. The neighbours confirm that their main goal was indeed the access to housing, but this craving had some particularities. There was a shared grievance, a general dissatisfaction with the poor housing conditions and a desire to improve them, but it was more than that; the neighbours wanted to become the individual owners of a house, preferably an apartment. Like architect Silva Dias said, they wanted to have an address, a street name and a door number; they refused self construction on the grounds that the «gentry» don't build their own houses, so neither should them.

Some leaders interviewed referred that they simply lacked the technical skills to actively engage in the construction process, but it became obvious that on top of that there was a general adhesion to formal housing construction proceedings, which implied contracting specialized building companies. Neighbours technically empowered in this area could supervise the work, like it happened in Bairro da Liberdade, where a very rigorous and demanding neighbour, who could not read or write but was very experienced in construction, supervised the building process.

The socialist inspiration of the SAAL implied, at least in an initial moment of the process, the collective property of the houses through cooperatives or associations; it was a formal requirement with which the neighbours conformed. However, it was more of a necessity than a real compliance with socialist principles. Only in two neighbourhoods, Quinta do Alto and Alto do Moinho, the main community leaders tried to maintain the collective property of the houses beyond the payment of the debt, or at least to retain some collective control over the alienation of the houses, but

the proposals were flunked in the general assemblies. The neighbours were clearly oriented towards the individual ownership of their own houses and the collective property was but a stepping stone in this direction.

The neighbours wanted to individually own their houses and dispose of them as they pleased, and this craving was already there during the revolution and even before it, it did not emerge as a consequence of the strong incentives to personal credit and individual consumption that characterized Portuguese growth strategies after the adhesion to the EU, particularly during the Cavaco Silva governments. Neoliberalism took advantage of the craving for private property, it did not create it. The strong historical connection between property owning, predominantly of the land, and social status, including citizenship rights, is deeply embedded and becomes nearly an atavism, above all when severe housing disparities constitute a privileged indicator of economic inequalities, political exclusion and exploitation (Boaventura Sousa Santos, 1989).

This idea is not easy to digest, considering that it collides with the supposed spirit of the movement. Andrade (1992) goes so far as to declare the «purity» of neighbourhood organizations, evidenced in relevant documentation, since their main concern was not ownership but the collective appropriation of the real right to be housed. However, today, the neighbours and leaders questioned separately in different neighbourhoods and circumstances unanimously and undisputedly declare that their main goal from the beginning was a genuine craving for private property, although it might have been concealed under other objectives that at some particular historical moments may have imposed themselves as politically correct.

So, despite some ambiguities and contradictions, there is strong evidence that the neighbours chose to associate for a very specific and material personal interest and not for commitment to a cause, solidarity or desire to be part of a group. Their fragile ideology collapsed as soon as the revolutionary period terminated and individualism subdued the collective spirit without any real cognitive conversion. Ferreira (1987) and Andrade (1992) relate the absence of the symbolic references necessary for a consistent organization with the lack of an historical memory, characteristic of errant precarious workers. This fact accounts for the strong symbiotic relation of the

neighbourhood movement in Lisbon with specific critical junctures, namely the revolution, and sheds some light over the path these organizations took beyond it. The individualization of the fight for the right to housing that Downs (1983) attributed to a shift in the political context was in fact already there during the revolution; it was disguised under revolutionary action and speech in a context where that was the way to get things done. Popular mobilization was the way to go, and the neighbours went just as far as it was strictly necessary.

From this ideological frailty emerges another key aspect that deeply influenced the evolution of the neighbourhood movement; the low levels of social trust among neighbours, which made it difficult for them to cooperate for mutual benefit, a causal relation extensively scrutinized by Putnam (1993a, 1993b, 1995, 2005). In this case, associational membership did not provide a major contribution to social trust over time. Several leaders confessed the immense difficulties they felt in the initial mobilization process. In Alto do Moinho, a small group of motivated and mobilized leaders had to go from door to door, trying hard to convince their neighbours to join the association. In Quinta do Alto, the reluctant neighbours only started believing in the project when the building process started; if in the beginning it was terribly hard to gather enough people, after the construction began they had enough candidates to built three neighbourhoods.

But the difficulties persisted. In Bairro da Liberdade or Fonecas e Calçada, community leaders are still faced with occasional accusations of extracting personal benefits from their position. One even confessed to have on occasions felt to be in danger of physical harm. According with the majority of the leaders, neighbours have a hard time understanding why someone would go to such lengths out of selflessness, and as such they believe the worst. And the worst has occasionally happened, although in a small degree. All but two neighbourhoods, Quinta do Alto e Alto do Moinho, had at some point of the process an embezzlement. However, these events were residual, which suggest that there is a discrepancy between the levels of distrust and the real conduct of the leaders: even when the processes went smoothly and there is evidence of the leaders' straightforwardness, the accusations of misconduct persist.

If the ideology behind the movement was fragile, so were the shared understandings among neighbours. Once each one is pursuing his own personal interest, trust declines. The paternalist spirit of Estado Novo, funded in the passive obedience and alienation of the most dispossessed, seems to have produced an exacerbated individualism that perpetuates through time. If it was not for the leaders, it would be «the moral basis of a backward society» (Banfield, 1958) revisited.

As a reflex of this situation, neighbourhood organizations present some crystallization of the managing structure that can be inferred by observations of the leaders concerning the mobilization of the neighbours. Only in Quinta do Alto the leaders remarked they didn't find it difficult to «bring the neighbours in»; that difficulty was felt in the beginning but it was overcome by the development of a wide range of activities that were of the general interest of the neighbours and led them to become more involved, even if under the supervision of the main leaders. All the leaders in the other neighbours have been feeling persistent difficulties in the active engagement of the neighbours and some leaders remain active from the beginning to the present day. The neighbours are mostly oriented towards their own personal interests and to maintain their engagement it is necessary to constantly create initiatives that are oriented towards these personal interests.

Even when the neighbours participate in general assemblies and pay their quotas, they are not willing to take part in the managing bodies or, if they are, it is frequently but a formal participation. In these neighbourhoods, unlike Tarrow's (1994) observation that the real problem for social movements is social, there is in fact an individual dimension, an intrinsic problem of free riders that hindered the processes from the beginning. In Bairro da Curraleira or Fonecas e Calçada, only two or three people contribute with their work in this crucial period of the neighbourhoods' regularization processes and some responsibilities are totally delegated in the main leader. This fact certainly gets in the way of the educational potential of these organizations, or at least it limits it to the few leaders that do experience it.

In general, the neighbourhood organizations were composed, from the beginning, of a mass of free riders and a small group of leaders, the organic intellectuals envisaged by Gramsci (1974), that become so as a consequence of their

social role as organizers, not as a result of their higher culture. The load of the free-riders tends to worsen as the neighbourhoods approach their intended goal of private ownership. In Bairro da Liberdade, as soon as the neighbours became owners of their houses, they immediately stopped paying the cooperative's quotas and never again attended a general assembly. A leader has been trying to gather them to decide on the future of a common space that is presently abandoned, but so far was unable to do so because no one ever shows up for the meetings. On his own accord, he organized the condos of each individual building, but most of the neighbours did not follow up with this work and presently no one oversees the maintenance of most of the buildings.

In Alto do Moinho a similar situation has been occurring, although more gradually, and leaders confess that there are neighbours there from the beginning that never did anything for the neighbourhood. In Quinta do Alto, it is the leadership of the cooperative that means to dissolve it and maintain only a sports association. If the organizational capacity of the neighbours facilitated the construction of the houses, the payment of the debts and the privatization of the houses, the privatization, on the other hand, became a «shot in the foot» of the organizations.

The difficulties described must be considered according with the circumstances. The neighbourhood movement did not initiate the revolution; it took advantage of the revolutionary action initiated by the military, temporarily absorbing its methodology and ideology. These neighbours were people with little formal education and no prior participatory experience that struggled in underpaid and unqualified jobs to make ends meet. And ends never met, that is what drove them to live in shacks or overcrowded parts of illegal houses with deficient housing conditions, in circumstances that resembled the living situation of the working class in England depicted by Engels (1969 [1845]).

The SAAL contemplated technical support, but the termination of the program in 1976 left the neighbours to fend for themselves. And they did so with remarkable success. Out of the eight neighbourhoods analysed, five achieved their propose goals, two are on the way to do so and just one remains in a dead-lock. Furthermore, through the SAAL they were able to avoid gentrification and thus conquered their right to the city. The program enabled them to remain in the territories they already occupied,

even if it meant expropriating the former owners of the land. These neighbourhoods are now located in central and even privileged areas of the city and benefit from socially valued infrastructures and equipments.

However, this right can be an ephemeral conquest. In some neighbourhoods, the houses are already being sold to outsiders and, considering their privileged location and the fact that they were projected by renowned architects in the context of an emblematic program, it is possible that a gentrification process finally occurs, displacing the original neighbours and their descendants. A paradigmatic case of gentrification in the SAAL in Bairro da Bouça in Oporto, projected by Siza Vieira, that following a rehabilitation and finalization process in 2006 attracted more resourceful new residents, including young architects.

The SAAL absorbed and institutionalized a significant part of a social movement which had but a feeble repertoire of contention and whose political opportunities faded away quite rapidly. Even so, it left an indisputable legacy; it did not change the world but it certainly changed the world of those who took part in it. The neighbourhood movement did not simply decline, it reinvented itself. Institutionalized channels and the allocation of resources eliminated the grievances, the democratic context pushed for cooperation instead of opposition and the neighbours fulfilled the desire they always had. Not the craving for a socialist society, but the yearning for individual property. They were not a *tabula rasa* waiting for the imprint of external factors, such as configurations of power, resources or institutional arrangements; through all the duration of the process, from the revolution until now, they maintained their goals and lived according to them. These goals did not involve a strong communitarian life and an intense political struggle, but the enjoyment of their own private property.

Considering this, the demobilization of the neighbourhood movement cannot be attributed solely to the political context. The difficulties in collective mobilization did not follow the termination of the revolutionary period, they preceded it. Leaders were already facing considerable challenges in bringing neighbours in during the revolution. Behind a cover of revolutionary enthusiasm, they were faced with suspicion, discredit and apathy. In fact, these obstacles often only started to be

subdued long after the end of the revolution, when the construction processes started and the sceptic neighbours could finally see their future homes with their own eyes. Once they could occupy the houses as legitimate residents, their participatory enthusiasm faded once more. Private ownership, at last, gave it its final blow.

Although, as Cerezales (2003) truthfully argues, after the end of the revolutionary period the mobilized dispossessed populations were no longer a reference for the legitimacy of public power and their interests were diluted in democratic representation, the leaders of the SAAL neighbourhoods refused to drop the bone. They clung to it with all their strength and, beyond the demise of the SAAL, despite all the constraints and obstacles, the processes went on. As Oliveira and Marconi (1978) already predicted in 1978, the political evolution of the country indicated that the survival of the SAAL as it was would be obscured if not altogether annulled, however, there was something the instituted powers could not destroy, the organization of the neighbours. They were right. To consider that the movement died with the end of the revolutionary critical juncture and that the SAAL vanished with the 1976 decree-law is a reductionist perspective. In fact, it was just beginning.

The neighbourhood movement under the SAAL, in Lisbon, suffered a process of collective demobilization, but the individual struggle in each neighbourhood went on through institutionalized means, and met with a reasonable success and can be regarded as a legacy of the revolution. The neighbours did not get stuck in the revolutionary ideals; despite the fear they once inspired for their supposed radicalism, their political options through the years were somewhat machiavellian and that allowed them to survive. When revolutionary action and radical alliances were the way to go, they took them. When the tide suddenly changed for a moment they lost their ground, but they regained it as soon as they learned to dialogue with all political forces present in local, regional and national institutions. As Scott puts it, quoting Hobsbawm, most subordinate classes are less interested in producing major transformations in state and law than in *“working the system to their minimum disadvantage”* (1985, XV).

However, the lack of engagement in community life seriously compromises the quality of life in the neighbourhoods. Common interests are not duly pursued, such as the maintenance of the buildings, and, more importantly, the decisive role played by the

organizations in the attainment of some fundamental conquests, such as the transference of municipal land, can be jeopardized. These secondary associations proved themselves extremely useful; if they would not make Tocqueville proud of their intense community spirit and their educational role was somewhat restricted to the few leaders, at least they effectively aggregated and represented common interests in decisive moments of most of the neighbourhoods. Whenever they were gone, the neighbourhoods drift away from the desired path into autonomy.

There was also not a significant trauma of authoritarian repression pushing for self-limiting compromises around economic issues, since the neighbours had not suffered tremendously during Estado Novo, unlike it happened in other dictatorships, as reported by Hipsher (1996). Torture and detention were reserved for the elected few, the elite of political dissidents, not the common undifferentiated worker that went about his own business. So the neighbourhood movement simply served its purpose and there was no reason to perpetuate insurgency, considering inequalities and social exclusion are tolerated unless the neighbours become severely affected by them. It cannot be understood as simply a matter of opportunity; its evolution was determined by external factors inscribed in the political process to the extent that these factors addressed internal factors related with the personal objectives of the actors involved.

Beyond external or internal aspects, there is another fundamental analytical field to consider, the field of interaction. The relationship between the neighbours and the state changed significantly through the years as the neighbourhood movement evolved from an insurgent social movement organized around common grievances to a set of formal independent organizations with little contact among them. But the state also evolved from an unstable set of antagonist political forces during the revolution to a moderate liberal democracy. Documental analysis coupled with interviews to representatives of the cooperative movement highlight a somewhat ambiguous relationship between the state and the cooperative sector which translated into a gradual loss of support that dissipated positive discrimination in relation with the for profit sector. It is difficult to determine the intentions of political agents when they are not officially declared, but it appears that cooperatives remain a vestige of socialism

clearly inscribed in the first draft of the constitution, a remnant that is not well accepted by liberal government officials.

SAAL cooperatives in Lisbon were caught in this tendency that did not make their job easier, but the most determinant aspect to consider relates not with national tendencies in political practice and legislation but with local aspects regarding their relationship with the City Council, considering IHRU has remained a rather distant and passive agent. The City Council played an important role given that many practical aspects regarding the regularization of the neighbourhoods had to be dealt through it.

The testimonies of most of the leaders revealed a relationship with it that is mostly based on the good will of particular agents, regardless of their political orientation, or on personal contacts that facilitate the access to specific decision making processes. Persistent obstacles were often subdued when a particular official came into office and sometimes demanding regulations were bent by an understanding bureaucrat. Their allies through the times were people from all political backgrounds and not specific parties or political organizations. These alliances relied mostly on particular personalities and their personal concern regarding the problems faced by the organizations, than on ideological concerns. A good example is the depiction provided by the leaders in Bela Flor concerning the fundamental role played by Nuno Krus Abecassis in the construction of the neighbourhood.

Bureaucracy is always the biggest enemy and only well placed political agents and administrative officials can get the neighbourhoods through apparently unworkable bureaucratic obstacles. This evidences a deficiency in formal communication channels and a lack of procedural clarity, with a prevalence of bureaucratic demands and administrative constraints that are not always compatible with the real needs and capacities of the organizations. Since there is no longer any contact among the neighbourhoods, each one is left to fend for itself and the variety of solutions found accounts for these distinct routes to a similar end.

Moreover, the City Council clearly adopted a EU rhetoric on poverty and social exclusion that pushes for a territorial intervention in areas identified as vulnerable, a rhetoric that has been lingering about since the European programs against poverty, was reinforced with the national action plans for social inclusion, under the Lisbon

Strategy, and its Open Method of Coordination, and persists with Europe 2020. As such, it created social intervention programs, the BIP-ZIP and GABIP, which aim for specific areas viewed as problematic. Only three SAAL neighbourhoods were sufficiently troubled to merit this distinction, all the others did not benefit from the positive discrimination it entails. The chosen neighbourhoods, Portugal Novo, Fonecas e Calçada and Curraleira, benefit from the cooperation of a team of motivated officials that assist them through the process of transference of the construction plots, while other SAAL neighbourhoods that were more successful on their own and are not regarded as vulnerable are left outside of this effort, despite the fact that they are also struggling with this issue. Such is the case of Quinta do Alto and Bela Flor. In this last case, the cooperative is facing severe financial constraints due to the heavy fiscal burden on property it has been prevented from alienating.

If the neighbourhood movement in Lisbon under the SAAL evolved to several independent and disconnected neighbourhoods constituted by a small group of leaders that drag along a mass of free riders in a quest for private property, the state distanced itself from the socialist ideal and incorporated a somewhat contradictory mixture of neoliberal principles with a semi neopatrimonialist organization. In one hand, it gradually eliminated competitive advantages granted to the cooperative sector, namely fiscal benefits; on the other hand, its relationship with the SAAL neighbourhood organizations is somewhat discretionary and erratic, based on personal relations more than on norms and regulations clearly defined and equal to all.

This does not seem to be a specific problem of Lisbon's City Council, since the leaders from Alto do Moinho and, in a different context, from the Habita, testify to a similar situation in Amadora, and the IHRU seems to suffer from the same affliction. Even the research met with considerable institutional obstacles, since relevant documents are often nowhere to be found and sometimes it is strictly necessary to have the right institutional contacts (often facilitated by the SAAL neighbourhood leaders) to have access to vital information.

In a study about post-war Bosnia, Smith (2007, p.152) argues that the reliance in interpersonal trust relations undermines the development of institutional confidence. Networks of personal trust emerge as a response to deficiencies in public

services, a phenomenon often found in Central and Eastern Europe under socialism. Instead of trusting public institutions, Bosnian citizens trust particular individuals that may be placed in those same institutions, contributing to perpetuate a vicious circle of interpersonal dependency that hinders the development of trust in general impersonal rules and in the newly created institutions.

In Portugal, a similar phenomenon occurs. However, small gains came at a big cost, since the maintenance of discontentment at homeopathic levels deters collective action and contributes to perpetuate this state of affairs. Allen et al (2004) argue that in Southern European countries the consolidation of democracy took place long after the institutionalization of «corporatist income-maintenance systems», which results in specific administrative patterns, such as the prevalence of clientelism in some regions, and in the verticality of party dominated political structures, which inhibits the extension of welfare provision. As a result, the system is affected by «a kind of stasis» that hinders any possibility of transformation: *“either pressures must build up to the point of ‘crisis’ before significant changes can be implemented or changes can only be made in a piecemeal, decentralized way”* (p. 193)²⁹.

In general, the organizations are not particularly happy about the situation, but as things eventually get solved in this manner, discontentment never escalates to a point of ‘crisis’ that makes it mandatory to improve institutional performance and the state’s relation with civil society in order to avoid rupture. The dispersed nature and limited arguing power of these organizations also constrains their capacity to make an effective contribution to the quality of democratic governance, both at a local and national level, since each one looks for personal channels to solve specific issues while disregarding broader common concerns. However, it is not clear that it would have been advantageous for the organizations to have stuck together, either formally with the maintenance of the inter-commissions, or informally through other less conspicuous channels. Due to their initial troubled genesis and their connotation with the radical left, they could have met with resistance from political officials still concerned about the ghost of socialism past. On the other hand, the state’s support to

²⁹The authors complained about the lack of suitable historical data on Portugal, which resulted in a limited analysis of our country which is particularly problematic considering its distinctive path of a late and rapid urbanization and the expansion of home ownership underpinned by debt (p.188).

these organizations is sporadic and too much oriented to its own purposes to contribute significantly to a vibrant civil society. As such, *in statu quo res errant ante bellum*.

Differentiated paths

Now the common features among the neighbourhoods have been identified, a puzzling matter remains unanswered: if the organizations shared a common political and institutional context and a similar set of resources and opportunities, what can account for the differences in their degree of voluntary cooperation? As we have seen, it is possible to place the neighbourhoods in three distinct groups:

1) Rupture: there is no dialogue between the neighbours and the state (both local and national authorities) and the situation of the neighbourhood is in a stand still. Only Portugal Novo fits this scenario.

2) Autonomy: the process was successfully concluded and the neighbours manage their neighbourhoods independently from the local or national authorities. It is the case of neighbourhoods Quinta do Alto, Bela flor, Liberdade, Alto do Moinho and Dona Leonor.

3) Tutoring participation: neighbours are urged to organize themselves and cooperate with the local authorities in the resolution of their neighbourhoods' pending problems. These neighbourhoods are Curraleira (ongoing) and Fonecas e Calçada (successfully concluded).

The explanation for this divergence resides in critical antecedents related with the characteristics of the neighbours involved in each SAAL operation. The successful neighbourhoods involved mostly active first generation migrants from the country side that were uncomfortable with their living conditions and were fiercely determined to change them, using if necessary their own resources. These neighbourhoods were able to generate strong, long lasting, straightforward and highly committed leaderships that pushed things forward for over forty years. The neighbours, although suspicious and rather passive, still complied with their financial obligations and with the minimum associative requirements.

The unsuccessful neighbourhoods, on the other hand, gathered predominantly an urban marginal population that had resulted from several generations of extreme poverty and stigmatization. Often described as a *lumpen* by the former members of the brigades, they were frequently unemployed or occupied themselves with odd jobs or minor irregular activities, from small contraband to petty theft. Leonel Fadigas declared that in some neighbourhoods there existed a sub-world of crime that survived due to the marginal character of the inhabited space; by rationalizing it, there were no longer conditions to sustain the underground economy. This might have been the case in Curraleira. There were also issues of insolvency, distrust and a general lack of organizational skills. These neighbourhoods were either unable to generate strong and honest leaders, or these leaders collapsed in face of the mobilization difficulties posed by a population that was not motivated, either because they would rather maintain an irregular housing situation that would be in tune with their irregular activities, or because they attributed to the state the responsibility for their resettlement processes.

It is extremely difficult to gather information about these critical antecedents. The brigades were very flexible and operated independently from each other. There was nothing like a template for a characterization of the neighbours involved in each SAAL operation, each social team had its own criteria and the priority was to count the number of people and determine the typology of the families, so that the architects could design the houses accordingly. Moreover, many of these reports remained only in the hands of the members of the brigades and some eventually got lost. It was nevertheless still possible to recover this information in some of the neighbourhoods and in some cases the social team of the brigade elaborated quite a detailed report. In the part of the neighbourhoods that were successful in their process, Bela Flor has such information. On the side of those who were more troublesome, it was in Curraleira/Embrechados that this information was found. In the other neighbourhoods the information was obtained mostly through the testimonies of the interviewees, that present a very high degree of convergence, which reinforces their reliability.

Curraleira/Embrechados had an inactive population that presented high levels of insolvency³⁰ and illiteracy³¹. The report drafted by the social team of the brigade³² identified 45,6% illiterates in Embrechados and 33,1% in Curraleira (p. 32-33). In Curraleira, 29,6% were young people under 20 years old, 54,1% were adults and 16,3% were elderly people above 60 years old. In Embrechados these numbers were 32,2%; 54,6% and 13,2% respectively (p.23).The report declared that *“it is insignificant the direct arrival from the country side in recent years. Half of the percentages indicate as previous address «Lisbon, slam». This origin is naturally related with the phenomenon of internal migration due to employment (work place) and is carried out within the economic and cultural patterns of poor neighbourhoods. These cultural patterns are a profound acquisition, elaborated over years of coexistence and difficult to alter even though the economic pattern may occasionally have evolved. Hence in this chapter we have endeavoured to try to know their aspirations and their living conditions, so that they can be respected in the future housing program”* (p. 89).

From a total of 175 families in Curraleira that responded to the questionnaire, only 15,43% were not from Lisbon. 43% had come from other slams in Lisbon and 41,14% were from other type of unspecified housing situations, also in Lisbon. In Embrechados, the situation was similar: out of 98 families, 12,24% were not from Lisbon, while 46,94% were from other slams around the city and 40,82% had come from other housing conditions in Lisbon (p.88).

According with the testimonies, there was some prevalence of irregular activities among the neighbours, particularly those who worked in the harbour and managed to earn something «on the side». The neighbours were mobilized, had a strong collective identity (in Curraleira, not so much in Embrechados) and were highly contesting, but presented significant organizational handicaps that hindered their capacity to act collectively for a long term purpose. More than anything, the fact that

³⁰The data presents 20%, but the sociologist Matilde Henriques explained that the number should be much higher, considering the precarious work relations of many of the neighbours and their erratic income, which was impossible to determine with precision.

³¹ Information provided by the architects José António Paradela and Luís Gravata Filipe. This information is now available in the catalogue of the Serralves exhibition on the SAAL.

³² «Inquérito – Relatório de análise da equipa de apoio local Curraleira/ Embrechados, April 1976». This report is not published; it is in the possession of sociologist Matilde Henriques.

they had unstable and informal work relations compromised from the start their capacity to fulfil a long term financial obligation. The report stated that *“the greater the group that for various reasons does not work, the greater the burden on those who do, which in a population such as the one we are dealing with represents a worsening of their economic situation”* (p.63).

From the population between 14 and 65 years old that did not work in Curraleira, 16% was unemployed, 9, 3% were students, 34% were women that did not have an income considering they were housewives, 20,4% were retired, 0,6% were in the military service and 14,2% were people with chronic diseases that prevented them from working. In Embrechados these numbers were 11,7% unemployed; 8,5% students; 40,4 housewives; 10,6% retired; 8,5% with chronic illness; and 4,3% in the military service. The others were unspecified situations (p.6).

The men that worked dedicated themselves mostly to unskilled jobs in construction (46,2% in Embrechados and 31,5% in Curraleira), and in factories (19,2% in Embrechados and 29,8% in Curraleira). Although it is not clear in the report, Matilde Henriques explained that often these jobs were not permanent, they were odd jobs in these sectors and the neighbours worked «à jorna», which means they were paid by a day’s work, with no contract. This situation was more frequent in Curraleira than in Embrechados, where the population presented a higher professional stability. The women that worked were mostly employed in factories (28,4% in Embrechados and 24,2% in Curraleira) or worked as cleaning ladies (35,9% in Embrechados and 35,7% in Curraleira). There were also women working as peddlers (19,5% in Embrechados and 7,4% in Curraleira) (p.61-66).

In Portugal Novo it was not possible to retrieve the characterization report. However, the leaders, neighbours and members of the brigades interviewed referred that, unlike in happened in the other neighbourhoods, here the neighbours were mostly Lisbon born, a statement confirmed by Serralves (2014), which mentions people that had been living in that area for two generations. Another common feature among Portugal Novo and Curraleira/Embrechados is that both had a minority Roma population, although it was more significant in Portugal Novo. There are also some reports of a prevalence precarious and erratic odd jobs among the neighbours in

Portugal Novo, namely peddling. The absence of a professional institutional connection and of a fixed income could have intensified their individualism, hindered their capacity to act together for a common purpose and make them less disposed to submit to external authorities. The search for parallel survival strategies can be evidenced by another aspect that these two neighbourhoods share: the drug trafficking problem, a problem that emerged afterwards in both neighbourhoods.

Albano Pires provides a more complex comparative report on the two neighbourhoods, with which he maintained some contact while he was managing the intercommissions. According to him, Curraleira/Embrechados and Portugal Novo presented some differentiated features. In Curraleira he perceived that the leadership was never strong and the neighbours were never very motivated. In agreement with his statement, the members of the brigade had some difficulty in identifying the main leaders of the neighbourhood, something that did not happen with architect Nuno Matos Silva, who still cherished the memory of the leaders in Portugal Novo.

Albano Pires perceived that back then there were some illicit activities going on in Curraleira, such as garages where stolen cars were dismantled and sold in pieces. The drug trafficking was also starting to flourish. The neighbours who dedicated themselves to these activities were not keen to have the neighbourhood regularized, which could endanger their businesses. In Portugal Novo, on the other hand, a strong leadership constantly complained about the low motivation of the neighbours that saw themselves as destitute that should rely solely on the state. The adhesion to the cooperative was low, with many neighbours standing aside. Due to the lack of documental data to sustain these claims, they are left as mere hypothesis, but nevertheless they should be considered, since they greatly agree with the information gathered from other sources, namely concerning the neighbourhood *Fonsecas e Calçada*.

The report on *Bela Flor*, *Baltazar* and *Cascalheira*³³, located in *Campolide*, begins by emphasizing the housing and social exclusion problems faced by the first

³³ This report, drafted by the brigade, is in the possession of the cooperative. It has no date, so it is not possible to know when it was drafted. The number of the pages is usually missing, as are several charts that are mentioned but are not there.

generation migrants recently arrived from the country side, considering many neighbours in this territory came from Beiras and Trás-os-Montes: *“the growing concentration of the means of production in this urban cluster and the fact that it offers more evolved living standards makes it the centre of attraction for the population. Thousands and thousands of people flock to it, fleeing from the fields that do not offer them any stability. This migration brings with it a strong demand for housing that raises rents to a level unbearable, considering the meagre wages earned by the working class, since many of these people do not have any economic resources nor any specialized professional preparation that allows them to get integrated into the urban living standards... This forces them to resort to marginal solutions - over-occupation of old and deteriorated houses in the city centre, sublet of rooms, the construction of clandestine clusters and slums that are multiplying day by day...”* (p. 5-6).

The inquest was applied to 3702 people distributed by 1114 families that were housed in diverse circumstances, considering 33% were living in shacks and 60% in houses with deficient housing conditions. The migrant population was concentrated mostly in the shacks, where the Lisbon born amounted only to 18%, while in the degraded houses they amounted to half of the population. It was concluded that the people residing in the houses presented a slightly higher educational level and a better economical situation, which made it possible for them to pay for a monthly rent. Overall, there were 11 insolvent families and 205 with a very limited economical capacity. From the 255 families residing in shacks, about 60% joined the cooperative, which left out of the process many of the most needed families. This fact was attributed to a *“certain indecision concerning the intentions of the SAAL operation”*.

Out of the 645 families residing in the degraded houses, only 19% of the families joined the cooperative. 20% of the 276 members of the cooperative were considered insolvent. 26,5% of the population was illiterate, 23,3% had not completed the first cycle of education (4 years) and 40,6% had completed it. The male active population residing in shacks was mostly employed in construction (17,7%), as peddlers (9,8%) and in motor shops (6,9%). The women worked mostly in cleaning services (14,9%). In the degraded houses, 7,6% of the men worked in motor shops, 6,5% as peddlers and 4,9% in construction. Here there was a higher prevalence of men

employed as clerks, public servants and other more qualified professions. The women continued to work predominantly in cleaning services. 53% of the population living in the shanty town was active, while in the degraded houses this group amounted to 60%. There were 13,4% unemployed or unable to work and 10,3% were already retired.

It can be inferred that in all neighbourhoods the neighbours presented several similar characteristics, namely a low level of education and very limited economical resources. However, in Curraleira/Embrechados and Portugal Novo they were mostly an urban population with a propensity for odd jobs that compromised their solvency, while in Bela Flor it was a rural population that worked in the same sectors due to a deficient level of education, but there was a higher level of professional specialization and there is no mention to a propensity for odd jobs, apart from peddling. The qualitative data presented in these reports has a limited analytic potential when it comes to the analysis of the dispositions of the neighbours towards the housing process. It is better understood through the oral and written testimonies of those who lived through the process, as it will be verified further on when each neighbourhood is presented in detail. The ideal setting to analyse this divergence is Fonecas e Calçada, since it gathered in a single process a rural and an urban community, each one with its own cooperative.

It was the most politically active neighbourhood of the ones included in this study and the leadership of the intercommissions, that gathered both the neighbourhoods that were constructed and those who were never completed, was an initiative of its leaders. Besides this relevant particularity, the neighbourhood is, in fact, two neighbourhoods in one. Fonecas was a typical shanty town with recent migrants from the country side, while Calçada gathered neighbours that had been displaced from several areas around Lisbon. The two were joined in a single construction project and the neighbours are mixed up together, but each one has its own cooperative, which evolved differently.

Quinta das Fonsecaas had 931 residents³⁴ and was located in the area where now are the EPUL buildings and the Ismaili Centre. The neighbourhood began to develop in the fifties of the last century; it was a shanty town built on uneven ground near a lagoon. The land had two known owners, the east side belonged to a so-called "widow" and the west belonged to the priests of the Catholic University that built the first two blocks that still exist today. The residents of the land of the "widow" had to pay rent. The residents originated from various parts of the country, predominantly from Beiras, Trás-os-Montes and Alentejo. In their villages of origin, most people worked the fields and lived in humble homes that belonged to them or to their family members. Schooling was low or nonexistent, and very few people possessed the third or fourth grade; most would not even get the second grade. In Lisbon, most neighbours ended up working in Hospital Santa Maria or in factories. Many women also worked in cleaning services.

Quinta da Calçada occupied the land which is currently occupied by the golf course of the Campus. It was a municipal neighbourhood built between 1938 and 1940, properly planned, with straight and long streets with named after flowers. The houses were built in asbestos with roofs of corrugated sheet, and were supplied with water and electricity. There were some equipments such as a church, two schools, a police station, a dispensary and collective tanks. The families came from, among others, «Bairro da Bélgica», a slum in the Rego area, considering there was a huge fire there that left many families roofless. Joaquim Moreira reported that the houses in Calçada were so small that the people were always in the streets. The neighbourhood had a supervisor that controlled it and the neighbours paid a rent to the City Council. The neighbours were poorly educated and worked as peddlers or unskilled workers in construction, commerce or industry.

Joaquim Moreira recalled that a generation separated these events, the rehousing of Calçada and the beginning of Fonsecaas. When Fonsecaas began to presente elderly neighbours, the first neighbours of Calçada were dying. Their descendants were born in the neighbourhood or were very young when they arrived,

³⁴ This data was taken from the social report on Fonsecaas, provided by Adelaide Cordovil, which is very much aimed at the characterization of the typology of the families, so that the houses would be produced accordingly. Unfortunately it was not possible to locate the report on Calçada.

and this influenced their relationship with their neighbours of FONSECAS. The youngsters used to call them «shack people», thus ignoring their own origins and the misery experienced by their parents and grandparents. Over the years there was a considerable degradation of the houses in Calçada, which continued until the joint relocation process through the SAAL. Quinta das Covas and Azinhada das Torrinhas were also included in the project, but they were residual.

The creation of the neighbourhood commission was described as a normal outcome of the revolution. The residents, wearisome of the deplorable housing conditions in which they lived, got organized and formed the commissions. It was initially planned to build more than 600 houses, but with the delays in the access to the required funding and the end of the SAAL, it was extremely hard to build 335 dwellings spread over 3 blocks; A = 82 houses, B = 156 houses and block-C = 97 houses, which belong to the cooperative 25 de abril (168 houses) and Unidade do Povo (167 houses). The City Council rehoused the remaining residents in several locations, such as Padre Cruz and Quinta dos Barros.

With the completion and relocation of the residents in the third block in 1985, the final phase of the cooperatives' objective was concluded. The neighbours had already started, three or four years before, to make a payment of 4,500 \$ 00 each month, which constituted the self-financing of 5% that the INH (Instituto Nacional de Habitação – National Institute for Housing) did not fund. With the end of the self-financing, the monthly payment was updated to 5,100 \$ 00 and in May 1988 to 8,935 \$ 00, which include a quota of 50 \$ 00 and the 5% rate for the management and conservation, depending on the typology of the houses. The cooperatives presented constant requests to the INH, demanding for the monthly payments' plan, but the plans were only delivered in 1990, with considerable interests. In view of this fact, the cooperatives found themselves powerless, since they were unable to get the necessary funds from the neighbours to cover for these expenses. Some neighbours wanted to deactivate the cooperatives so that the state would take responsibility for the process. The effort was too great and led the cooperatives to shut down.

Only in 1995, with the support of the Parish Council, a meeting with the neighbours was held at the local school, which originated a committee responsible for

constituting a list and reactivating the cooperatives. Both were reactivated but the cooperative Unidade do Povo closed again in 2000 and remained inactive until 2011, which means that the debt to the IHRU is still being payed. During this period, the cooperative 25 de Abril had to bear the total cost of the repairs, for which it was later reimbursed. The interviewees declared that in Calçada the neighbours were more dependent on the state, while in Fonecas there was a greater notion of personal responsibility.

When they resumed the activity in 1995, the priority was the economic sustainability of the cooperatives: ascertain the payments made by neighbours in this period; determine the accumulated debt of each one; and find out about the collective debt to the INH. The accumulated debt to the INH amounted to 261 million \$, plus an large amount of 200 million in interests. In early 1996, a general assembly was summoned to inform the neighbours about the situation, which required a monthly payment of almost 3 million.

Cooperative 25 de Abril appealed to the good will of the neighbours and a monthly payment of around 17,500 \$ 00 was approved, depending on the typology of each apartment. It became possible to ask the INH to issue a monthly guide for the payments. Between 1997 and 2002, the payments where timely and the accumulated debt was reduced from € 1,300,000.00 to € 528,000.00. With the decrease in the interest rates, the monthly payment dropped and it was possible to negotiate the remaining debt with INH. A new payment of 300,000.00€ was made, with the possibility of an exemption of the remaining 472,000.00€ and of the interests being charged in relation with delayed payments. Payments were anticipated and in March 2013 the last payment of 28,000€ was finally made. In a 2012 General Assembly, the lowering of the monthly payments in about 40% was approved, beginning in January 2013. Each neighbour started to pay an amount for urgent repair works on the blocks and for the transference of the land³⁵.

Fonecas e Calçada is a paradigmatic example of the explanatory potential of the critical antecedents related with the characteristics of the neighbours is each neighbourhood. The process was implemented in two velocities, with Fonecas leading

³⁵ This data was provided by Joaquim Moreira.

the way and Calçada following, often with some reluctance. The interviewees unanimously agreed in this respect and attributed to the neighbourhoods in Calçada a prejudice in relation to their neighbours from FONSECAS, the «slam people», while they passively expected the state to solve their housing problems, considering they had been socialized into state dependency: they were already municipal tenants and did not expect anything different. The neighbours in FONSECAS, on the other hand, were much more active and motivated to participate in their rehousing process, considering they abhorred their living conditions and wanted to conquest their right to the city using their own resources in the process. The detailed reports on the neighbourhoods will highlight this reality through the testimonies of those who lived through the experience.

THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ACTORS

The following empirical section draws a closer look into each neighbourhood, through the eyes of the main actors involved. It is a people's history (Zinn, 1980), considering it presents their own experience in their own words. The perspective of the City Council was obtained from official documentation and from an interview to an official directly involved in the GABIP ex-SAAL and self-construction. The perspective on each neighbourhood emerges from a reconstruction of the narratives of the leaders interviewed, generously complemented with direct quotations. The interviews were very open; they consisted mostly in conversations that followed a few suggested topics, so that the interviewees had enough room to talk about what they consider important and relevant, instead of feeling over constrained by a restricted guideline.

This descriptive information, presented as literally and factually as possible, was the basis for the critical analysis presented separately in the former section, so that the view of the actors could be clearly differentiated from all analytical inferences. It is a section of storytelling that conveys *"the texture and conduct of class relations"* and *"the flesh and blood of detailed instances"*, fundamental to the extent that *"an example is not only the most successful way of embodying a generalization, but also has the advantage of always being richer and more complex than the principles that are drawn from it"* (Scott, 1985, XVIII).

The information about the neighbourhoods is organized according with the main dimensions that were considered in the analysis, some of which present variation, while others, except for minor nuances, are transversal to the generality of the cases. The dimensions that present the most significant variations constituted the independent variables that determine voluntary cooperation, the dependent variable considered above. As such, after a brief contextualization, the following dimensions are described:

- Characterization of the neighbours (who were the original members of the organizations);

- Political affiliation (to which extent the organizations were or still are connected to political parties);
- Organizational dynamics (activities and initiatives developed by the neighbours, who participates and how);
- Networking (participation in Parish Council and municipal assemblies; contact with the other SAAL neighbourhoods; membership in CASES or FENACHE).
- Capacity for self-organization (continuity of the organizations);
- Affiliation to the dominant system of beliefs (regularization of the debts on the houses; alienation of the houses to the neighbours; transference of the land).

The information on the neighbourhoods is quite unequal from one to the next and between categories. The interviews were very open, with but a few topics that were merely suggested. The leaders had a very wide margin to express themselves and each one did so under their own natural tendency and preferences. Some were more succinct or impersonal; others were more autobiographical or exhaustive. Some focused more on some subjects while others gave a more balanced perspective on each category. It was decided not to impose a posterior standardization of the information, which would certainly impoverish it.

Besides these central interviews, there was exploratory work conducted in order to clarify and place the information gathered in its broader context. This work included more interviews with privileged informants situated in city councils and cooperative organizations, as well as with people that had a relevant involvement in the SAAL. Only the people regarded as historical figures are identified, with their own permission. Here are included the leaders and people who played an important role in the SAAL brigades, whose personal path is relevant in itself for the participatory processes in each neighbourhood and, as such, should be acknowledged. The representatives of institutions are kept in anonymity for they are regarded as speakers of the departments and organizations they work for.

It follows a list of all the interviews that were conducted in the research. The institutional interviews were conducted in an institutional environment. The interviews

with the leaders of the neighbourhood organizations were more flexible and varied, as such, the specific context of each one will be briefly described.

Interviews

Exploratory

Local power:

- Lisbon's City Council - former councilmen for housing (Vasco Franco); December 20th 2012 – *it was a informal conversation that was not taped*
- Lisbon's City Council – representative of the support to the cooperative movement: April 4th 2013 (Coordinator of Support to the Cooperative Movement Luísa Ribeiro)
- Lisbon's City Council – representative of the housing department: November 13th 2013 (Department director Isabel Dias)
- Sintra's City Council - representative of the housing department: November 6th 2013 (Director of the housing department Ana Figueiredo)
- Odivelas' City Council - representative of the housing department: November 29th 2013 (Representative of the Division of Housing and Social Innovation - Sector Social Intervention Inês Fradique)
- Amadora's City Council - representative of the housing department: April 9th 2014 (Director of the division of Housing and Resettlement Manuela Gonçalves)

Central power:

- Representative of IHRU: November 18th 2013 (Director for heritage management Maria Paula Pereira) – *not taped*
- Advisor of FFH in the final stage of the SAAL (summer 1976) and coordinator of the department for planning and programming of Lisbon's City Council (1975): 19th October 2016 (architect Leonel Fadigas – *not taped, notes were taken and afterwards sent by e-mail to architect Leonel that confirmed the information.*

Cooperative movement:

- Representative of FENACHE (Treasurer Manuel Tereso): December 21st 2012 – *not taped*
- Two representatives of CASES: October 1st 2013 (General secretary Cátia Cohen)
- Representative of CONFECOOP: September 26th 2013 (President Jerónimo Teixeira)

SAAL brigades:

- Architect Silva Dias (Alto do Moinho): July 28th 2015
- Architect Nuno Matos Silva (Portugal Novo): January 16th 2017
- Social worker Adelaide Cordovil (Fonsecas e Calçada): March 16th 2017
- Architects José António Paradela and Luís Gravata Filipe (Curraleira/Embrechados): March 20th 2017
- Social worker Matilde Henriques (Curraleira/Embrechados): March 23rd 2017

Core interviews

GABIP: December 15th 2015

SAAL neighbourhoods (the interviewees were or still are members of the managing bodies of the organizations):

- Alto do Moinho (Alberto Nunes and José Serra Alho): August 26th 2015. Interviewed together in the association.
- Quinta do Alto (Fernando Godinho and Sr. Damásio): October 7th 2015. Interviewed together while strolling around the neighbourhood. A neighbour that was passing by spontaneously joined in and contributed to the conversation.
- Portugal Novo (non taped conversations with relatives of the deceased leaders in their homes): September 4th 2015; January 17th 2017

- Fonseca - Joaquim Moreira. Written testimony received by e-mail in April 20th 2016; (Albano Pires): May 3rd 2016. Interviewed in his home.
- Calçada (Jorge Neves): October 23rd 2015. Interviewed in the cooperative.
- Curraleira – Belo Horizonte (José Pires): October 15th 2015. Interviewed while strolling around the neighbourhood.
- Curraleira – Viver Melhor no Beato (João Paulo Mota): November 26th 2015. Interviewed in the association. A trainee in the Clube Intercultural Europeu attended the interview at her own request but did not participate in the conversation.
- Liberdade – Fernando Rosa (sold his house in 2006 but is still a member of the cooperative) and José Coelho: November 11th 2015. Interviewed together in Fernando's house.
- Bela Flor (José João Domingos and António Horta Pinheiro): January 15th 2016: Interviewed together in the cooperative. Before that the cooperative sent a written statement by e-mail, in December 18th 2015
- Dona Leonor (Rosa da Conceição Pelacha and her relatives): February 7th 2016. Interviewed at a relative's house. Several of her relatives were present and joined in the conversation, including José Costa, her son in law, who was a leader in Fonseca.

The City Council

Lisbon's City Council (CML) has been investing in a co-governance approach to its most challenging areas and the GABIPs³⁶ are one of the main instruments designed for that effect. The first GABIP was implemented in Bairro Padre Cruz in 2010. They are presented as coordination structures constituted to accompany participatory urban regeneration and rehabilitation processes in priority neighbourhoods³⁷, specifically designed according with the needs and features of each area and involving its main local agents. Hopefully, they will facilitate joint applications to EU funding for local development and thus complement the City Council's budget. There are five such structures in Lisbon, in Bairro Padre Cruz, Bairro da Boa Vista, Alto da Eira, AUGIs³⁸ and the former SAAL and self-construction neighbourhoods, which also comprises the PRODAC, two self-construction neighbourhoods that date back to the early seventies and will not be addressed here. Three more are about to be created in Ajuda, Avenida Almirante Reis and Alcântara.

They are integrated in a wider structure, the BIP-ZIP³⁹, a network that involves 66 entities with more than 320 partners that include local bureaus and civil society organizations. It is an instrument of municipal public policy aimed at the promotion of small local improvement interventions that may contribute to foster social and territorial cohesion⁴⁰. It involves a participatory approach, considering the projects are meant to be drafted, implemented and evaluated by the populations involved, formally organized and working in partnership.

Of the seven SAAL neighbourhoods in Lisbon, three were considered by the City Council to be in need of a GABIP, since there were pending unsolved problems that needed to be formally addressed. In these neighbourhoods, Curraleira, Fonecas e Calçada and Portugal Novo, the cooperatives were deactivated, permanently (Curraleira and Portugal Novo) or temporarily (Fonecas e Calçada). Under these

³⁶ Gabinetes de Apoio aos Bairros de Intervenção Prioritária (Support offices for priority neighbourhoods).

³⁷ In Câmara Municipal de Lisboa - Pelouro da Habitação e Desenvolvimento Local (<http://habitacao.cm-lisboa.pt/?no=400800100930,082>) (5/12/2015).

³⁸ Áreas Urbanas de Génese Ilegal (Urban ilegal áreas).

³⁹ Program for priority areas and neighbourhoods.

⁴⁰ In Câmara Municipal de Lisboa - Pelouro da Habitação e Desenvolvimento Local (<http://habitacao.cm-lisboa.pt/index.htm?no=151000101407>) (5/12/2015).

conditions, no public entity had taken responsibility for the neighbourhoods that were left in the hands of their demobilized neighbours, which led to a growing process of degradation of the social and living conditions.

The City Council had already tried to regularize the neighbourhoods, in collaboration with the IHRU and the LNEC. In July 2004, a diagnostic report was designed by LNEC and IHRU, which had not any follow-up. In 2010, the Charter of BIP-ZIP, approved by the Municipal Assembly, included the former SAAL neighbourhoods in the priority intervention areas of Lisbon. Bearing in mind the complexity of the problems to be solved and the positive experience of GABIP in their role as support offices for BIP-ZIP, the GABIP ex-SAAL and self-construction was constituted. Its general mission consists in the promotion of socio-urban cohesion in these territories, through the implementation and monitoring of processes of regeneration, rehabilitation and urban renewal, as well as the urban and financial regularization of the neighbourhoods. It is coordinated by the City Council and its executive commission, who accompanies the proceedings, and includes representatives of the neighbourhood associations⁴¹.

The GABIPs were created by the City Council's initiative. They are support offices for priority intervention neighbourhoods. In this case, the GABIP ex-SAAL and self-construction is a GABIP of municipal initiative that aims for the urban regularization of these territories.

Representative of the GABIP

The City Council owns the land in which the neighbourhoods are built, but does not own the houses. The neighbours live in houses that are not legalized, so they do not enjoy a complete right to property. The GABIP ex-SAAL and self construction started with the easiest neighbourhoods, the PRODAC, and the intervention in these neighbourhoods constitutes a model to guide the intervention in the SAAL projects. In north PRODAC, a plot corresponds directly to a single house. Once the alienation criteria are created it is possible to sell the land to each individual neighbour which

⁴¹ In Câmara Municipal de Lisboa - Pelouro da Habitação e Desenvolvimento Local (<http://habitacao.cm-lisboa.pt/?no=400800100930,082>) (5/12/2015).

inhabits that same house, and that is already being done. In all the other neighbourhoods the process is more complex.

A representative of the GABIP testifies that in the beginning it was not easy to approach the neighbours because for forty years there were some unsuccessful attempts from their associations and cooperatives to regularize the neighbourhoods, which did not meet with a favourable response from the authorities. As a consequence, neighbours became rather frustrated and suspicious. In some neighbourhoods, the first approach of the GABIP was met with discredit.

Initially, the approach with the population was not easy because in 40 years there were many attempts to regularize the houses and cooperatives; over time there were some attempts by the cooperatives and neighbourhood associations to get through to the City Council to understand how these situations could be solved. What we think, and we just started in this process a few years ago, is that the neighbours were a little sceptic about the resolution of the pending issues around the houses and of acquiring a full right to housing... In some neighbourhoods we met some opposition; they believed it was one more political campaign or one more promise that was not to be fulfilled.

Representative of the GABIP

The approach was made essentially through BIP-ZIP projects that stimulate partnerships between organized neighbours and other local non-profit entities, considering that the partnership itself is supposed to activate the neighbourhoods. In north PRODAC, some BIP-ZIP projects were implemented with this purpose, under the initiative of an external entity that proposed a partnership to the neighbour association. This process gradually bridged the neighbours with the City Council. In south PRODAC, there was a participatory assembly on the BIP-ZIP with the neighbours which enticed them to look beyond their own houses into the requalification of the surrounding areas, since there was not much investment during all the years the neighbourhood remained in an irregular situation. The neighbours voted for an amphitheater where they can organize their own collective activities.

The alienation and property transmission model developed in the PRODAC south neighbourhood will be exported to the SAAL neighbourhoods, considering each one's specificities. In these neighbourhoods, a plot corresponds to buildings with several individual apartments. In the neighbourhood Fonsecas e Calçada there are two active cooperatives, so the plots will be all alienated to them, and they will manage their distribution among the corresponding neighbours. When there are no cooperatives it is necessary to divide each plot into individual fractions that can be transmitted to each neighbour, so that each one has its own individual property. Otherwise, it would be necessary for all the residents in a given plot to meet in the civil registration office, which is largely unfeasible considering the advanced age, lack of motivation and number of the people involved.

A representative from the GABIP states that it required a lot of joint work from several municipal departments to come up with an alternative that made it possible for the neighbours to own the fraction which they inhabit and not just a part of the plot. It is also necessary to conduct an inquest in each neighbourhood in order to assess exactly who lives where and what is the connection of the inhabitants with the neighbourhood, since some are no longer the original neighbours. All the process is conducted under close consultation with the neighbours.

A representative of the GABIP confirms that in the SAAL neighbourhood Fonsecas e Calçada the process was initiated by the neighbours on their own initiative. The cooperatives were reactivated by the neighbours; they rehired the original architects and contacted the City Council to propose a regularization of the neighbourhood. In the other SAAL neighbourhoods, Curraleira and Portugal Novo, the City Council is not expecting a reactivation of the cooperatives. Curraleira was divided into two areas, Bairro do Horizonte and the former Cooperativas do Beato, each one with its own independent association. In Bairro do Horizonte there was already an informal neighbourhood commission that with the support of the City Council was formalized as an association. In here, the BIP-ZIP has also been a very useful tool for creating a trust relationship between the neighbours and the City Council. Regarding Beato, the City Council asked the Parish Council to initiate the contact with the neighbours and to urge them to get organized, which they eventually did. The City

Council considers that formalized neighbourhood organizations play an essential role in the negotiation processes, since they gather a large number of neighbours around common goals.

In Fonecas e Calçada and PRODAC north, the urban regularization process is almost concluded and in PRODAC south the process is half way there. In 2016, the fractions will begin to be transmitted to the neighbours and in two or three years it will all be regularized. In Bairro do Horizonte and Beato, there has been an intense participated intervention of the City Council through projects and initiatives such as the USER, an EU project aimed at the development of innovative participatory approaches to urban regeneration that gathers nine cities: Lisbon, Grenoble, Malaga, Pescara, Lublin, Krakow, Riga, Copenhagen and Dresden. Despite all these efforts, the regularization process is still being negotiated. A representative of the GABIP states that most of the bureaucratic work is completed but while in PRODAC, 99% of the neighbours are motivated for the regularization, in Bairro do Horizonte and, mostly, in Beato, there are more neighbours, about 10%, who are not willing to cooperate because they are not interested in the regularization of their houses.

The City Council promoted a meeting between the leaders of Beato and the leaders of Fonecas e Calçada, so that these, who are in a more advanced stage, could share their experience. However, the process will probably be much different, since in Beato the neighbours decided to create a new neighbourhood association, Viver Melhor no Beato, instead of reactivating the former cooperative. The City Council also took the initiative to meet with IHRU in order to discuss the pending debts on the houses but that is being dealt at a superior level and for now there is no formal resolution on this problem. A representative of GABIP claims that there are interests on the debts to be charged but during all these years the IHRU never did any maintenance work in the houses and that must be taken into account, which reinforces the arguments to the neighbours.

The debt to IHRU has not yet been repaid, but IHRU has also never carried out rehabilitation work over the last 40 years in the buildings, and so the neighbours had to maintain their own dwellings, the interior, but the common spaces ended up very degraded over time, and so there are some arguments on the part of the population to

negotiate part of the interests. The City Council has already initiated this negotiation with our councilwoman Paula Marques who requested a meeting with the IHRU, at this time we still have no feed-back... It seems to me that there is some willingness of the IHRU to regularize this situation, it is a debt that has been pending for a long time, it seems to me there is some commitment from the IHRU, after this initiative of our councilwoman Paula Marques, with the City Council's approach, it seems to me that there is some openness on the part of the IHRU to solve this situation.

Representative of the GABIP

In Bairro Portugal Novo, there are many neighbours who were not there from the beginning and were never a part of the cooperative. They either bought the keys of the houses or occupied vacant apartments and they are not interested in the regularization of the neighbourhood. They do not pay for their houses and many do not pay water or electricity, they get these services by irregular means. The City Council has made several attempts to create a trust relationship with the neighbours that, despite the efforts, remain unsuccessful. As many of these neighbours are Roma, they involved a Roma organization that operates in the neighbourhood but does not represent the neighbours, Pastoral dos Ciganos, and tried to build a children's park with the BIP-ZIP, but violent conflicts among the neighbours scared the construction company away and it was never finished.

The City Council tried to organize a meeting with the neighbours and was hoping for the Roma leaders to be there, but no one from this group showed up, although they said they would. In the end, only ten original neighbours showed up in the meeting. According with a representative of the GABIP, they are just a few fragile, elderly and scared people surrounded by Roma neighbours who often try to take over their houses. They said they feared leaving home even for small tasks, because the house could be occupied in their absence. They took the original documents of the cooperative and showed an interest in a possible solution for the neighbourhood, but they are just a small impotent minority so it was impossible to constitute any neighbour organization or to initiate the regularization process.

The representative of the GABIP states that the voluntary cooperation of the majority of the neighbours is fundamental for the process. Without this cooperation, it will hardly be possible to regularize the neighbourhood because under this methodology, the solution cannot be imposed, it must be negotiated. It is possible to infer that it becomes fundamental to reactivate the neighbourhoods without waking the dangers they supposedly once represented to democratic stability. If there is no channel of communication with the neighbourhoods nothing can be done, if the channel is against the system it will object to the proposed intervention. It must be compliant, so that it can maintain its action within the framework of institutionalized proper channels.

(The proximity with the community is) fundamental. In fact, without the will of the population to solve the problem of the neighbourhood, the resolution does not seem to me to be viable because these resolutions cannot be imposed, they have to be participated and negotiated with the population. The City Council is only the owner of the land, it does not own the social problem that is there, nor the houses. At the moment it is trying, through the constitution of a GABIP, to have a starting point, an engine for all this regularization, but in reality the City Council only owns the land.

Representative of the GABIP

Fonsecas e Calçada

Overview

Fonsecas and Calçada was a huge project, considering the SAAL average in Lisbon. Initially it had more than 600 houses planned, but with the demise of the SAAL only 335 were finally constructed, distributed by 3 blocks: A (82 houses), B (156 houses) and C (97 houses), 168 houses belonging to cooperative 25 de Abril and 167 to cooperative Unidade do Povo. With the rehousing of the neighbours in the B block, in 1985, the final phase was completed. The City Council relocated the remaining neighbours in several neighbourhoods around Lisbon, namely Bairro Padre Cruz and Quinta dos Barros.

The project resulted from the fusion of two contiguous neighbourhoods, Quinta das Fonsecas and Quinta da Calçada, a shanty town and a provisory prefabricated neighbourhood that dated back to the late thirties. The living conditions were considerable harsh in both neighbourhoods but for slightly different reasons, as is vividly described by Joaquim Moreira. Fonsecas, in particular, had much in common with the remaining shanty towns that existed all over Lisbon. His account is a firsthand report of the day-to-day life in such a context.

(Quinta das Fonsecas) was a shanty town, built on a rugged terrain and lagoon area. The land had two well-known landowners, the east zone belonged to a so-called "Widow" and the west was owned by the "Catholic" priests who in the meantime built the first two blocks that still exist today. The residents in the "widow" area paid for some time a so-called "rent... In this neighbourhood of Fonsecas, those who arrived first, and it was so for a few years, built their shack and at the same time delimited their area with wooden fences; they always included some extra land, destined to the cultivation in small gardens. We must not forget that it was a time of post-war crisis.

Their shacks were built with boards, which were replaced as they rotted, some with sheets of zinc to protect the outside and others with sheets of plywood to line its interior. The roofs were in zinc sheet or mostly in tile. If another family member arrived

there was no problem, the shack was increased or an annex was made, because there was enough room. And the same thing happened if and when someone got married.

Hygiene conditions were very precarious. Two or three pots of water were heated on the stove or in the fire for the bath. There was a bathroom, usually outside, that consisted in an archaic wood toilet and a pit for the droppings. When after a while the pit was filled, because the soil absorbed these excrements, they were distributed through the garden or a City Council car was hired to take them away. This happened a few years later.

The water was collected in the only existing fountain, in Largo das Fonsecaas, where the Azinhagas of Barros and Galhardas began. It was a square located on the outskirts of the neighbourhood in the east zone (100 meters further north of the petrol station that is there today). The water was transported in containers, pitchers or paint cans to each one's house. Later the more skilful neighbours built wooden carriages, where one or two bottles of 100 liters were fixed, depending on the strength of the adult or child in charge of filling them in the fountain and transporting them home.

Already in 1973, the neighbourhood was visited by university students, with the purpose of knowing the conditions of the neighbourhood and its inhabitants. With the revolution of April 1974, and with the creation of the neighbourhood commission, some improvements were made in the neighbourhood, such as electricity supply, arrangements of the main streets and placement of two or three fountains distributed throughout the neighbourhood.

With the arrival of electricity to the neighbourhood and with the easier access to water, the hygiene conditions improved immensely. The Lorenzetti shower was used extensively, which was electric, and there were only two or three water bottles strategically placed on the roof of the shower compartment. These barrels were filled with water once or twice a week, connecting a hose directly from the fountain. This meant that each had a few meters of hose that would have to extend and wait for the time to fill their barrels. This took a few hours and as such could only be done at night.

Joaquim Moreira, written testimony

Calçada, on the other hand, presented some specificities that differentiated it from the remaining neighbourhoods that originated the SAAL projects in Lisbon; its joining together with FONSECAS was motivated by the proximity between both neighbourhoods and not by any affinity among them.

It was a neighbourhood built between 1938/1940, properly planned, with straight and long streets with flower names such as Rua das Rosas, Malmequeres, Várzeas, Papoilas, etc. They were houses in asbestos with roofs in corrugated plate, supplied with water and light; the neighbourhood had a church, two schools, a police station, a dispensary, collective tanks, etc. An authentic luxury for the future inhabitants. The need and urgency of the construction of this neighbourhood, as well as the neighbourhood of Padre Cruz, was due to the fact that the families had to be relocated from, among other points of the city, the neighbourhood of Belgium, a very miserable shack town in the Rego area, where the Lisbon Stock Exchange currently exists and where there was a huge fire, rendering a huge amount of families homeless.

Joaquim Moreira, written testimony

Besides FONSECAS e CALÇADA, the process also gathered neighbours from other areas, so that it would have the required number of members, but they were residual in their numbers. The process met with some difficulties concerning the transference of the land for construction, since the land was not all owned by the City Council, some was private and had to be expropriated. It was already expectable that the area would become a privileged location, and that may have motivated the embargo of the construction with the argument that it did not fulfil all legal requirements. When the embargo was finally overcome and the construction could recommence, the construction company went bankrupt, which caused more delays, since it became necessary to hire another one and get a lawyer to deal with the bankruptcy.

Considering all the constraints, the first building was only concluded in 1983. The rest of the process was confronted with a rise in inflation and an increasing difficulty in the access to loans, which caused further delays. In the end, the costs were much higher than had been initially predicted. The cooperatives were supposed to

build more buildings but it became more and more difficult to proceed, since the initial interest of the state in the SAAL gradually subsided, the City Council stopped paying the architects who never delivered the final building schemes and the access to additional loans became extremely hard, even though the neighbours had already been paying for the houses. As such, the remaining buildings were never built.

Characterization of the neighbours

Quinta das Fonsecaas gathered mostly people from the north of Portugal, from around Lamego, Vila Pouca de Aguiar and Régua, who had come to Lisbon in search for better working conditions. Many worked in a bleach factory nearby by or in Hospital Santa Maria. They were unskilled workers with little formal education, as were their neighbours from Quinta da Calçada, even though these enjoyed, in their own view, a different status, since they were not living in shacks but in prefabricated houses. Nowadays it is mostly an elderly population living on small retirement pensions.

The neighbours of Quinta das Fonsecaas (a shanty town near a provisory neighbourhood that existed for more than 40 years, known as Quinta da Calçada), were from the most diverse areas of the country, predominantly from Beira Alta, Trás-os-Montes and Alentejo. It was from the fifties onwards that the neighbourhood began to develop. Usually the leader of the family arrived first, built his shack, and after a while the rest of his household, wife and children, which had been left behind, joined him. In their home villages, they were mostly people who worked the fields, although there were some with other professions or occupations and of course they lived in humble houses in the province, that were theirs or their relatives'. The formal education was low or nonexistent, and very few would have the third or fourth grade at that time. Most would not have more than the second grade. The work in the city for the majority of these people was of course the one of unskilled worker in construction.

Joaquim Moreira

Political affiliation

This was the most politicized neighbourhood, probably as a result of its proximity to the campus and all the previous awareness raising activities that had been conducted there by student activists. There was considerable party intervention during the revolution, namely from the PCP and the MES (Movimento Esquerda Socialista – Movement Socialist Left), and Albano Pires was quite critical on the role played by the PCP, which according to him made several unfruitful efforts to control the movement, namely by presenting a list of its own to run for the managing body of the cooperative. However, it was unanimously stated that the cooperatives remained free from party influence and did not engage in relevant political activity beyond the revolutionary period.

Me - In FONSECAS where did the first impulse come from?

In FONSECAS there is that first impulse, that natural explosion after the 25th of April, the people went to the street. And then people started to appear, from the MES mainly ... there was a strong component not only political but also of cultural impulse. We had interventions with Zé Afonso, with Adriano Correia de Oliveira, with Sergio Godinho. After having built a venue with the neighbourhood association, a library was created ...

Me - But were the neighbours themselves militants of these parties?

No, no, no ... there were people with various ideas, some were from the communist party, some were from the socialist party, and the MES boys started to be like that ...

Me - But what was their intention at the beginning? Was it really to control the movement?

To influence, I would not say to control because controlling was not possible, but to influence...

José Costa, FONSECAS

Despite the proclaimed political independence of the cooperatives, it is recognized that the contribution of particular members of left-wing political parties was fundamental to the successful organization of the neighbours and their participation in the SAAL, although the real intents of these agents may not have been fully materialized.

Of course, this local organization was only possible to be created, as well as continued, with the presence of left-wing political parties such as the MES, the Socialist Left Movement, and the PCP, the Portuguese Communist Party, which did everything to raise militants. Some of these people would be Adelaide Cordovil and her husband. They were the main mobilizers of the organization of these neighbours, perhaps we own them the fact that we arrived where we arrived and how we arrived.

Joaquim Moreira

Organizational dynamics

In the beginning the cooperatives had some activities for the members, such as a library, but when they reactivated the cooperatives in the mid nineties, they decided to leave all that behind and dedicate themselves solely to the management of the buildings and the payment of the debts, since it was too much work for such few people to handle and no one ever had any motivation to organize activities for the neighbours. Instead, they allow the Parish Council and a religious organization to use one of their vacant shops for community service. They organize workshops and provide a daily luncheon for the elderly. Occasionally they also lend a space to the Parish Council to organize activities for the neighbours.

We have a venue that we lend to the Parish Council to organize activities the way they want and with whom they want, we do not have the capacity to manage this intervention for the youth, we do not have and we recognize that we do not have, we never managed to get anyone to come here, who would like to come here in their spare time to organize activities.

Jorge Neves

The neighbours on themselves never get organized to do anything and never asked for a venue for any activity.

Unfortunately these people do not associate, unfortunately. I would really like if the neighbours got organized but I do not see that. If a group of young people from the neighbourhood came here saying they wanted to do this activity or that other one, «yes, okay, we lend you (the venue)”, but it does not happen.

Jorge Neves

Networking

The cooperatives are fairly isolated, since they do not participate in wider third sector networks. Nevertheless, they do maintain close and frequent relations with the local authorities, namely with the Parish Council, to whom they lend their venue, and most of all with the City Council, with whom they were until recently negotiating fundamental pending issues for the neighbourhood regarding the transference of the municipal land in which the neighbourhood is built⁴². Although these relations have been fruitful, the leaders describe a troublesome relationship that demanded a considerable investment and endeavour on their part to overcome all the bureaucratic obstacles that keep emerging.

Even if the people want to get together and say "let's do it, let's get it" is very difficult because there are a number of obstacles through the years that are very difficult to overcome. We do not have a society, in my opinion, that supports cooperative initiatives, or associations, we do not have, we do not have that. It is difficult for people to reach a consensus and then even if they have a common goal, for things to work out it is a load of work ... The state is extremely bureaucratic, for example, the sum 28⁴³, I went to the Department of taxation to talk to the head of the office, he agreed with me, «then if you agree, solve it». «No, I cannot». «But if you

⁴²The situation was finally regularized in December 20th 2016.

⁴³The publication of Law 55-A / 2012, of October 29, in its article 4, adds the sum nº 28 to the General Chart of Stamp Duty Tax. It determines that the owners of buildings evaluated in more than one million € must pay annually 1 % of stamp duty tax on the value of the property, taking into account the amounts calculated for the Municipal Property Tax (IMI). It is charged to individual and cooperative owners alike, which is contested by the cooperatives in Fonsecas e Calçada and in Bela Flor, which were affected by this problem.

come to collect, you can». Because it is in the law, even if it is not well defined. So this is all a hindrance. How do I solve this later... unfortunately what has been happening for a long time in Portugal, which is the «conveniência»⁴⁴, often it is not corruption, people have the habit of saying that this is all corruption, no. Sometimes they say «The City Council never solved the land issue». I understand why it does not solve, because the people there are not willing to solve it. Imagine that by decree they say «the land passes on to the cooperative» and then two or three journalists or someone comes along - and they have the right to do so - comes to investigate it in a few years and will say for some reason that the person responsible in the City Council was my friend and as such gave me the land. This is all the complexity that exists in the middle of it all and it is not easy, it is not easy to manage it.

Jorge Neves

Capacity for self-organization

The leaders consider that both cooperatives, from the beginning, experienced difficulties in the maintenance of their managing structures, since the neighbours are rather passive, do not want to be bothered and have not been motivated to contribute with their work because they do not perceive any personal advantage of working for free. This situation persists to the present day. Some agree to formally integrate the managing bodies, for example in the cooperative of Calçada there are 15 people in the board of directors but in the end only a restrict group of three or four people actually cooperate. They open twice a week to receive the neighbours and there are two people there every day doing some background tasks, the others do not work much. There has been some rotation of the people involved but not all have the same motivation and sometimes they just let things slide.

Due to the low level of education of its neighbours, the difficulty of creating and forming lists of candidates dates back to the beginning of the constitution of the cooperatives in mid 1975. Even today, this difficulty is enormous and unsurpassable even if there are more learned and younger neighbours. The initiative must always

⁴⁴Favour.

depart from the ones who are already there. That is why there are and there were people with long periods in the Management Bodies of the Cooperatives.

Joaquim Moreira

In the beginning of the process, the neighbours were more driven because they were political, in the sense that they had interests and concerns that needed to be enforced through political action, but that state of mind gradually faded away in the democratic context. In this context, although neighbours have not been actively involved in the cooperative, they attend the general assemblies where they tend to be quite critical on the leaders and on occasions become confrontational and refuse to cooperate with the process, namely by not paying for their houses.

This generated internal controversies; the general assemblies were participated but highly wearing and not very productive. Essentially, the leaders would ask for money from the neighbours and the neighbours would argue that the state should pay, not them. Particularly in the beginning, neighbours were quite sceptical due to all the obstacles the project faced. As a result, on occasions the leadership got discouraged and abandoned the process, which led both cooperatives to remain inactive for some periods during the nineties.

In 2001, the cooperative of Quinta da Calçada, Unidade do Povo, was again deactivated and, while it remained so, was embezzled in more than 200 000 € by a former member of the board of directors who managed to have access to a bank card of the cooperative and allegedly used it for his own personal expenses, since they were never properly accounted for. Despite this problem, the cooperatives have been very careful in preventing such situations. They always maintained an organized accounting controlled by an independent accountant and no neighbour pays in cash, all payments are made directly in the bank.

Cooperative Unidade do Povo resumed its activity in 2010 and it managed to retrieve its former fiscal number, which was very difficult, considering it had been formally extinguished. However, there was no alternative, due to the pending debts. The leadership explained to the neighbours that it would be in the best interest of the

neighbourhood to solve its financial problems and they met with a favourable response. However, Jorge Neves considers that most neighbours would not mind much about the situation because, although the houses were not officially theirs, they could live there without paying. The problem was that the buildings were degrading. The neighbours could make some reparations on their own, but there are structural problems in the buildings that are very costly to repair and demand for funds that no individual neighbour possesses. This was the main motivation to revive the cooperative.

Affiliation to the dominant system of beliefs

This neighbourhood presents a particularity that makes it the ideal setting to analyse the importance of critical antecedents in the explanation of cross case divergence. The neighbours from Calçada, an urban population that had been moved from other areas of the city and lived in a prefabricated housing neighbourhood built by the state, had a different mindset from their neighbours in FONSECAS, the newcomers from the country side that were living in shacks. If the first were more passive, less prone to comply with the payments and more depending on state intervention, the second were more active and keen to take responsibility in their own housing process. Isabel Cordovil was a social worker that was confronted with this reality while working in the SAAL brigade.

Calçada was already a re-housing neighbourhood. It was one of those re-housing neighbourhoods built to relocate people from Casal Ventoso... This population was completely different from the one in FONSECAS, completely. With some population that was already marginal, who no longer worked, who lived on odd jobs. It was a population that was expecting to be re-housed, the City Council would provide other houses, it had already brought them there and would provide other houses. In FONSECAS no, it was more recently constructed, with people coming mostly from the province and who were very ashamed to live there. They had come to Lisbon in search of better living conditions and were ashamed to live in shacks. They had built them, they had no other solution, but they were very ashamed, and so the change for them was something that was their concern and that they wanted to embrace, the others did not, they were

expecting «the City Council will (provide)... The project was to be just one cooperative or an association, whatever they decided to do... For the neighbours from Calçada the others were from the slam even when they were living in similar terrible conditions, of even worse, because they lived in poorly constructed houses, very hot in the summer, very cold in the winter, already very deteriorated, the neighbourhood was already a few years old, but Fonseca was viewed as the slam, they were something different. And so they reacted very badly to being united, we tried and we thought «well, we are not going to get into this fight of trying to unite them in a single organization, maybe it is better to create two organizations and then get them to converge». It was the strategy that was proposed to the team and we ended up making two cooperatives, the Cooperative Unidade do Povo in Calçada and the Cooperative 25 de Abril in Fonseca. And in fact they were completely different, the other (in Fonseca) was much more dynamic.

Adelaide Cordovil

This phenomenon was already exposed in detail so it suffices to say that presently about 15% of the residents from Calçada are delayed in the payment of their houses. Some are facing this problem from the beginning, but in the last years the situation got worse due to the economical crisis. In Fonseca the situation is considerably better. However, the leaders feel that most of the neighbours are now finally motivated to solve the problems related with the accumulation of the debt. The leaders consider that presently, neighbour attendance in the general assemblies is satisfactory and productive. There is not much discussion and almost all proposals are accepted, since the neighbours finally understood that there is no alternative than the path that is being taken and value the progress recently made.

The IHRU was asking for 2 million € for all the debts accumulated on the houses, plus interests. The leaders understood this was not a realistic amount that could never be repaid and negotiated for a more adequate value. They paid 1 million € in a single share, considering some neighbours, mostly in Fonseca, had been saving the money or depositing it in the cooperative's account during all the years the cooperatives were inactive and so it was possible to gather such an amount. As a

result, the cooperative 25 de Abril liquidated the debt while cooperative Unidade do Povo is still paying it.

But there was always that matter of the City Council giving me a little house. It's much harder to get the people on the other side (In Calçada) to cooperate ... on our part, most of the neighbours recognized the effort ...

Me - That is, there was a difference of mentality between FONSECAS and Calçada and the people of the Calçada were more difficult ...

I'll give you an example ... in that period when the cooperatives had nobody to run them, about 90%, I'm saying a number, maybe even by default, about 90% of the members of the cooperative 25 de abril continued to pay. When the managing bodies took office they had a lot of money in the bank ...

Me - And in the other side this did not this happen?

It did not happen...

José Costa, FONSECAS

Curraleira

Overview

Curraleira/Embrechados was a huge dispersed project that differs significantly from the remaining neighbourhoods, considering the cooperative was extinguished and most of its records were lost. The reasons behind this fact could not be ascertained for sure, considering the testimonies recollected do not agree in this subject and there is no documental proof that may shed some light on the events. It probably resulted from a lack of organizational capacity and motivation on the part of the leadership and, possibly, from an abusive and irregular utilization of the cooperative's resources. After years of abandonment, the City Council urged the neighbours to once again organize themselves, so it could have a partner with whom it would be possible to negotiate the regularization of the neighbourhood, which is not yet done considering the debt to the IHRU was not paid and the transference of the use of the land was not formalized.

As a result, the neighbourhood was recently divided in two, according with the Parish Councils involved, each one with its own association, Viver Melhor no Beato in Beato Parish Council and Belo Horizonte in Penha de França Parish Council. Each one of these associations has been involved in a close relationship with the City Council, which is reinforced through the BIP-ZIP, that has enabled several improvements in the neighbourhoods, both in the maintenance of the buildings and in the construction of infrastructures and equipments. The negotiations between the neighbours and the IHRU, mediated by the City Council, are expected to lead to the successful conclusion of the process that will culminate with the transference of the property of the houses to each neighbour.

Characterization of the neighbours

The first differentiating factor in Curraleira is related with the geographical origin of the neighbours. While in the other neighbourhoods the neighbours were mostly first generation migrants from the country side, in this neighbourhood it seems

they were mostly, although not only, city folk. This fact emerges solely from the testimonies recollected, considering the documentation on the neighbourhood was lost, and cannot be taken for granted, but there is indication of a different community living here, which can account for the differentiated path evidenced by Curraleira. Despite this possible difference, the other main characteristics of the neighbours were similar, since, as it happened in the remaining neighbourhoods, these people were poorly educated and held unskilled jobs in several professional areas.

The majority were from Lisbon ... and a part were people who came from rural areas but already settled here many years ago, the children are already from here.

José Pires (Belo Horizonte)

Me - I wanted to ask you, in the beginning it were your parents who were members of the cooperative?

My parents were the members of the cooperative.

Me - They were already from Lisbon or did they come from the country side?

No, no, they were really from Lisbon.

Me - They were already from Lisbon.

They were already from Lisbon, they were from Patio das Águias, which was there in the old Alto do Pina ...

João Paulo Mota (Viver Melhor no Beato)

Political affiliation

The neighbours had no particular political affiliation and remained politically independent throughout the process, although most neighbours sympathized with the left. They seem to have been mostly independent tinkers with no specific ideology that were simply trying to improve their living conditions, and for that effect used whatever means that came their way.

Organizational dynamics

The cooperative went sour in a very early stage of the process, while its main goal, the construction of the neighbourhood, was still not concluded, leaving the neighbours to fend for themselves. João Paulo Mota described it as an organization aimed essentially at the interests of its own managers, which meant that whatever activities that could be developed for the neighbours were sidelined regarding profitable informal businesses that benefited the managing bodies.

There, in the old rubber factory, the cooperative was created and these people took possession of a heritage that was not theirs, used it for workshops... rented the space, carpentry, did what they wanted.

Me - The cooperative itself?

The cooperative itself. Certain people who took control over it and did what they wanted.

João Paulo Mota

In face of this situation, aggravated by the institutional indifference, through the years the neighbours took upon themselves to maintain the neighbourhood, guarantee the access to basic services and do whatever was necessary to guarantee a minimum life standard.

The IHRU is also responsible for this situation, after all those years, it never got to the neighbours to ask for an explanation, what were we going to do, what were we going to decide for this neighbourhood. Because in the end I came here and there was nothing. You wanted a sidewalk and there was none, you wanted street light and there was none, you wanted water supply and there was none, the neighbours did it all on their own.

Me - That's not accounted for.

None of this is accounted for. Not even the cooperative itself, it left the neighbours here with nothing, the neighbours had to stretch a cable down here that

they bought among themselves, the water was the same situation and the houses were not finished, it were the neighbours themselves that finished the houses.

Me- Without the cooperative?

Without the cooperative, because the cooperative after that began to collapse and each one was left to himself.

João Paulo Mota

Networking

The neighbourhood suffered a considerable degradation as a consequence of the dissolution of the cooperative and the utter indifference of the responsible authorities, but in the last years it has been slowly reviving thanks to the initiative of the City Council, who has decided to include in the GABIP ex-SAAL. In 2009, in the part of Curraleira now designated as Bairro do Horizonte, the neighbours spontaneously constituted a neighbourhood commission that in 2014 was formalized as an association. It has been presenting successful applications to the BIP-ZIP program, which enabled several improvements: the buildings were painted fresh and the roof tops repaired, and a sports area was built, which includes a football camp and a skate park. The constructive relationship with the City Council was in part due to specific officials that were particularly concerned and receptive.

Who was in the City Council at that time was an important person, who was interested ...

Me - Who was it then?

It's the same one as today, Manuel Salgado ... and the buildings were painted in 2010, 2010-2011.

José Pires

Since the association was constituted, it has been very engaged in local partnerships, but José Pires considers that it takes a long time for the City Council to

get things done due to its complex bureaucratic structure, that demands for the articulation of multiple departments. The GABIP and the BIP-ZIP were an improvement, but it is still difficult to get problems solved. However, José Pires considers that these institutional experiences with official entities and other formal partners present a very positive learning potential; the neighbours begin to see beyond the neighbourhood and learn how to function in different environments. He feels his opinion is respected; although he only studied for four years, he has professional and participatory experiences that are valued by the institutions concerned.

However, there are strong limitations to what the neighbours can do to shape the space they inhabit. For example, there is an electric station being built near the neighbourhood and the neighbours strongly opposed to it, with no success. They met with representatives of several entities, namely the City Council, to present their opposition and discontentment, but they felt the decisions had already been taken and there was nothing they could do about it.

Me - Were you able to oppose that (the electric station)?

How can you fight against EDP and REN? When the governments, the administrators, are all the same crap? ... We've been here for a year and a half playing dumb with the City Council, in meetings over the station, when they already knew what was going on. Later we found out that the lines were already coming from Olaias, if they had already spent millions who could stop something like that. It could be stopped, there's only one way to stop it, there was only one way to stop it, it was to grab some guns and start shooting, they would all leave, but no one is up for it now.

José Pires

In the part of the neighbourhood that now belongs to Beato, the association was constituted in 2011. The City Council made known its intention to regularize the situation of the neighbourhood, a process that João Paulo Mota considers to be fundamental but very slow, frustrating and not always effective. Through the BIP-ZIP and with the direct assistance of the Parish Council, it has been possible to make some

improvements in the buildings and in the surrounding areas, but even so a lot is left undone due to bureaucratic delays.

Many years have passed and still today, if the City Council did not come here, it remained the same ... the City Council, however, forced the Parish Councils to create a neighbourhood commission to take on the legalization process... they came to see if we wanted and I, as a resident here, knowing the needs and difficulties of this neighbourhood, I also felt a little obliged to do something and here is the result. More has been done in 4 years than in the 30 years that the cooperative existed.

João Paulo Mota

We sail without a captain, we have no one to steer the boat. We have the Lisbon City Council that should try to solve our problems and has been here for 4 years. Formerly it was because they had no association to follow the process, now there is an association, every time we go there it's just meetings, meetings, meetings, meetings, they like meetings, they like to talk, they like to hang out and so we go on. We are always talking about the same thing.

João Paulo Mota

Capacity for self-organization

During the revolution, the neighbours spontaneously decided to constitute a neighbourhood commission which was formalized as a cooperative so that they could join the SAAL. Initially, the neighbours met the process with some discredit because they were used to charity work under the fascist regime, a rather limited approach that never really changed their living conditions. They started to believe things could actually change when they started to see and experience the intensity of the popular mobilization during the revolution, namely the demonstrations. But it was only when the construction process initiated that they really became confident.

In the previous regime, in fascism, those women and those ladies of charity appeared in the neighbourhood and made promises, they would give us A, B, C, we would get out of here, we would go there, they made promises and the people did not believe, but when they started to see the movement, the people out in the streets, there was a big demonstration in Lisbon at that time, «houses yes, shacks no», and the people got mobilized, they began to see the first stone being laid (of the construction process), and then began to believe.

José Pires

The cooperative began to fade away from the early nineties, before the debt on the houses was fully paid for and the transference of the use of the land was concluded, which means the process was interrupted and the houses remain in an irregular situation. The testimonies differ on the reasons that determined that event. José Pires, an initial member of the cooperative, attributes it to a lack of motivation and managing skills on the part of the board of directors:

That's what happened, they extinguished the cooperative because the directors who were there at the time did not know what to do, they started to get upset and they started to leave because they did not had that willpower to go to the fight, at that time the members that were there were not people who imposed themselves ... not in our time, in our time we opened the doors ... we were even thrown out by the police from the City Council...

José Pires

João Paulo Mota, the son of original co-operators, has a slightly different understanding on the subject, although not entirely incompatible. The dissolution of the cooperative is attributed mostly to an abusive management that eventually led to its bankruptcy, considering the responsible authorities never intervened.

The neighbours, as they did not want to go to City Council houses, proposed to the cooperative to finish the houses on themselves and then the cooperative would cut down on the rent, but none of this was accounted for. Even today, there are members of the cooperative that hold the co-operators accountable, which was for lack of paying their shares, it was for lack of payment of the quotas that the cooperative did not pay to the Housing Development Fund, this is a lie, it was not so, this is not true ... all the documentation of the cooperative has disappeared, because the evil of this country are these things, as long as there is no legislation that covers these assets, each one does what he wants, it is the same in here, here it's the same thing. I get there, this is an example, «here's a check, take it»... and no one comes to ask us for anything ... I think this, a country to move forward and to end these miseries, I call it miseries. The people who have the ability and the power to end this, they should have already ended this, but they still continue to agree with these things.

João Paulo Mota

Most of the documentation on the neighbourhood vanished and is irretrievably lost, so there is no documental evidence on what really went on. At the same time, nothing was done for the neighbourhood; the construction was not concluded and basic equipments were missing. In some more extreme cases, the houses were left unfinished and the neighbours had to complete the construction on their own, since many have professional skills in construction. With the newly created associations there are once more formal organizations representing the neighbours.

Affiliation to the dominant system of beliefs

In this neighbourhood the neighbours display a weaker affiliation to private property, in the sense that they are less keen to regularize the neighbourhood's situation. To inhabit irregular housing with no expenses attached is not seen as a major concern by many neighbours who are happy to let things slide. This divergence of attitude distinguishes Curraleira from the remaining neighbourhoods and is the most likely explanation for the present situation of the neighbourhood; it lacks the

mobilization factor that pushed the other ones forward through hard times, characterized by the numerous internal difficulties and external challenges that were common to most of them. Even now, this mind-set is hindering the regularization process of the neighbourhoods considering it compromises the associations' capacity to gather the neighbours around a common goal. This problem seems to be more intense in Beato than in Belo Horizonte.

If you speak in the neighbourhood that you want to legalize things and that the neighbours have to pay taxes it is a very big problem, I do not know if you realize, because there are people who want to return to the time of the shacks, not to pay anything ...

Me - At this moment they do not pay anything, do they?

That's it, and they want to continue this way, but I'm sure that almost 90% of the population wants to have everything legalized, so that tomorrow they will own something...

João Paulo Mota

This was a neighbourhood that ... the people here: «we have to pay», «let them pay» ... For the people to pay here it is a bit difficult. One proposal that was made here was to pay the money to the Development Fund as ... open a credit there, pass on the payment to the individual responsibility of each neighbour.

Me - Individually, no longer collectively.

Exactly, individually, each one is obliged to pay that for x time ... each one would be responsible for his own loan.

Me - You do not see the association managing all this collectively?

No, the association is easy to do, it is easy to do, but it is not effective, because I will take responsibility and I do not know if tomorrow they will pay or not ... if they do it individually, a credit line is opened, the responsibility is of each one, each one gets at the end of the month and pays the money. Otherwise tomorrow I will not be here, two or three that are older will not be here, and then it's going to be in their hands again,

that's not the intention, if it's individual, I already have my children to guarantee (the payments).

José Pires

Matilde Henriques was a sociologist in the SAAL brigade and witnessed the beginning of the process. If in Embrechados the neighbours were more economically viable, in Curraleira there was a considerable prevalence of insolvent neighbours that worked in odd jobs and would never be able to comply with the payments. Although it was not openly declared, there was a tacit agreement that in the future the neighbours would be able to negotiate their way out of their financial obligations on the houses. This undoubtedly played an important role in the bankruptcy of the cooperative and in the present difficulties faced by the associations.

The issue of the rent, of paying for housing, was not understood as it is today. Today if the state gives anything, it will have to be paid. At that time the constitution guaranteed dignified housing, health and education, was is not.

Me - That is, they assumed they could not pay.

They could fight not to pay, it's different.

Me - Did they already have that perspective at the time?

Curraleira had to have it, Curraleira had no income to pay...

Matilde Henriques

Dona Leonor

Overview

Dona Leonor had a particularity that differentiated it from most of the other neighbourhoods: its main initial leader was a woman. This fact can be explained by the way the neighbourhood movement was organized from the beginning: it was in Sunday school that the priest and the catechist started urging the neighbours to get collectively organized and do something to improve their living conditions, which were very deficient in a shanty town that lacked all basic services and infrastructures.

Me - And how did you start this idea of constituting a cooperative?

To create the cooperative, first there was a neighbourhood commission. The children were in Sunday school, we had a meeting there sometimes with Father Nobrega and engineer Veloso, of St. Thomas Aquinas. We had meetings from time to time. During the April 25th it was being said that the neighbourhoods were starting to get organized. There was also a catechist at that meeting, an engineer, engineer João Veloso ... And then in conversation among each other, we (decided) that we were going to constitute a neighbourhood committee and so on. Padre Nóbrega gave us some sheets of paper, some posters to put in the neighbourhood ... to constitute the neighbourhood commission.

Me—Enticing the neighbours to participate?

Yes, yes, for them to be a part of it. That's when it began...

Me - And D. Rosa, was it easy?

A - It was not easy, no ... There were some who did not want, there were others who wanted, there were others who really wanted. Until we got constituted. There was only one fountain. We got access to the water, put up a bathhouse, made a pavilion for the meetings, because the EPUL (Empresa Pública Municipal de Urbanização de Lisboa – Public Municipal Company for Housing) engineers came, architects, not engineers, architects, came to make the meeting with the neighbours in my shack. And so it began, but it gave a lot of work, a lot of work, a lot of fatigue. Then my husband was

quite sick and it was my son who went with me, because I did not go alone to the evening meetings, (out of) respect.

Rosa Pelacha

Sunday school was a feminine arena, considering the women accompanied the children and met with the priest in a highly sexist society, that to a great extent maintained its sexual hierarchies under the equalitarian guise of the revolution. Even so, this 44 year old mother of an extensive offspring that had migrated from Lamego in the mid sixties with her children to join her husband who worked in Tabaqueira proved to be a natural leader; although, like most of her neighbours, she bordered illiteracy, she was well respected in the community for her reliability and she had the tenacity to get things done even when bureaucratic obstacles hardened the way.

Besides the strong personality she always had, her honesty, she had a spirit of leadership. Since she had credibility, people trusted her, she began to gather everything around her ... when there was a person who stood out a little, what happened, the neighbours began to gather around that person while they remained in the shade. To have a credible person, a serious person who can be trusted ... She began to take over while she secured the trust and support of the neighbours...

José Costa

D. Rosa was then able to subdue the generalized social distrust that can be found in all the neighbourhoods. In general, the process in D. Leonor went very efficiently. Many houses are now starting to be sold to outsiders for interesting values and the neighbourhood seems to be facing the initial stages of a gentrification process.

Characterization of the neighbours

In Dona Leonor, like in most Lisbon SAAL neighbourhoods, the neighbours were mostly migrants from small villages all over the countryside, mostly from Alentejo and the north of the country, with little formal education, that worked as unskilled

labourers in several areas: the men in construction and factories, the women mostly in cleaning services. In spontaneous conversations with the neighbours found around the neighbourhood it was easy to identify the main initial leader of the movement, called by all «Padeira de Aljubarrota», due to her fierce determination. Rosa da Conceição Pelacha describes her own experience, an example of the deficient access to a formal education for the rural poor during Estado Novo, which was even harder for the women, which left them with very limited employment opportunities.

The people worked in factories, worked in construction, worked in cleaning services, and then I also began to work in cleaning.

Me – For how long did you go to school?

Me, to school? I only have the second class and the second class was only from the end of the nuts until the beginning of the cherries.

Son - She could not attend all the time, only when there was no work (in the fields).

Rosa Pelacha and Son

Political affiliation

A leader in Fonsecaas that accompanied the process in Dona Leonor declared that in this neighbourhood it was essentially the PCP that was more active with the neighbours, while in Calçada it was UDP and in Fonsecaas the MES. He describes the neighbours from Dona Leonor as politically naive: they were receptive to party influence without being really aware of the real implications and intentions of those political activists that lurked around the neighbourhood, and although they were easily captured to display the much desired popular support to the party, the neighbourhood movement was never controlled by any political force. Despite party efforts, it were the unaffiliated neighbours that had a saying in the housing process, which was not much different from the processes in the other neighbourhoods. All agreed that party members acted mostly as advisors, but never as deciders.

Son - ... I got to go, the MRPP went to the neighbourhood after the 25th of April, «come on». They gave us signs to take, «houses, yes, shacks no»...

José - Most of them had no political training, there was some naivety here...

Me - Deep down these parties wanted to show that they had popular support, was that it?

Son and José - Exactly.

Rosa - That was it.

Rosa Pelacha, son and José Costa

Organizational dynamics

Unlike in most of the other neighbourhoods, in Dona Leonor there was never an intense community life, not even in the aftermath of the revolution. The cooperative was totally oriented towards housing construction and managed to conclude two other housing projects and a garage in the eighties and nineties, but it never developed other activities for the neighbours, who eventually constituted a sports association that had no formal relation with the cooperative, but whose activity has been discontinued. It was not possible to know much about the most recent dealings of the cooperative, considering its present leaders were the only ones who refused to be interviewed, but according with the neighbours approached spontaneously around the neighbourhood, as well as with the interview held with D. Rosa and her relatives, it is totally dedicated to the management of its property. Even the condos are managed directly by the neighbours, independently from the cooperative.

Networking

The neighbourhood is located in a very favourable area and is surrounded by expensive condos. During the negotiations for the construction of the neighbourhood, the City Council offered very good incentives for the neighbourhood to be relocated to the outskirts of Lisbon, but the neighbours peremptorily refused to be dislocated and were able to built the neighbourhood in the same area the shanty town had previously

occupied. To succeed the cooperative had to enrol external supporters, well connected people that assisted them through the negotiation process.

Rosa - The worst of D. Leonor, not worse, it was an achievement (the location) ... that's what had a lot of twists and turns. To go to the City Council, I did not know that there were so many Lisbon City Council venues, I did not know, my God. So that we could get the neighbourhood built where we were...

Son - But there were a lot of people back there who wanted it to get out of there, and there was a lot of opposition ...

Rosa - Yes, I got enemies, from the neighbouring buildings back there, I got enemies.

Son - And Benfica (the Football Club) wanted us out of there...

Rosa - ... There were voices in some meetings, especially the architect X, who wanted to make some (temporary) houses on Benfica grounds, on a plot of land that they had, to start building, and when Benfica knew about it, it wanted to meddle.

Son - At the time there was even a proposal to go out of Lisbon, that they would build villas, at the time ... they even made a proposal to the neighbours at the time, they would build villas for the neighbours, so they would get out of there. «You do not prefer villas instead of living in buildings, we build you homes outside Lisbon, in the outskirts, Amadora, Chelas or so». To get the people out of there they even offered better conditions. «No, no, we want to stay here»...

Rosa - ... We had a meeting with the City Council ... there was a man there called Y, now I cannot remember the name, he was from the party ... I do not remember. He told us to go to the land of Carregueira. At that time an official of the Carnide barracks, of the Pontinha barracks, went with us. It was necessary to have a lot of connections.

Rosa Pelacha and son

Capacity for self-organization

Despite the additional difficulty of being a woman in a men's world, D. Rosa managed to do what the other leaders had done in their respective neighbourhoods: prompted by the church and with the help of two or three other male neighbours, she constituted a neighbourhood commission that met local authorities and promoted some improvements around the neighbourhood. Later on, with the incentive of political activists that played a fundamental motivating role, the cooperative was constituted so that the neighbourhood could join the SAAL.

R - The first push forward was given by the church.

Me - And D. Rosa got involved since you attended the church meetings ...

Rosa – Yes, me and another lady...

Me - Maybe that's why it were the women.

Son - Exactly.

Rosa - ... I worked for a lady who was, and is, foreign, is French, is an international journalist and got along very well with Maria de Lurdes Pintassilgo... and there were other ladies also who were progressive who helped me, who influenced me, also helped.

Me - But were they people who worked with you?

A - No, ladies we used to talk to, we talked about how the neighbourhood was going, and this and that, they gave courage, in certain moments one got fed up, in certain moments one got fed up...

Rosa Pelacha and son

Regardless of the positive accomplishments, D. Rosa describes the process as very demanding and exhausting, moreover considering her family constraints and obligations, aggravated by the fact that her husband eventually developed some health problems. Even though the initial external influence of the church was notorious, when the revolutionary opportunity presented itself the neighbours

decided to get organized on their own and maintained their independence from external political or ideological agents. Like in the other neighbourhoods, it was a small group of motivated neighbours that kept the process going through the years, considering most of the neighbours were passive bystanders that nevertheless were keen to have their own houses, for which they were already buying furniture.

Me - After having the cooperative, was it easy to get the neighbours involved in the governing bodies of the cooperative or were they always the same people? Was it difficult to get people interested in participating?

R - Yes, there were some people, it had to be, there had to be someone to organize ...

Son - ... In terms of the cooperative they were almost always the same, there was one or another that changed, there was one from time to time, there was another one, but most of the time it was the same 3, 4 motivated headstrong...

Me - ...And did the neighbours generally attend the general assemblies or not?

Rosa - Participated, the neighbours participated to see what it was going to be like. The houses were still being built and some people were already buying the furniture.

Daughter - It was a great achievement...

Rosa Pelacha, son and daughter

The cooperative was once embezzled by one of its leaders, but this situation was easily contained and solved in court. In general, it was a successful process, with no major entropies.

Me - How was the embezzlement?

José – It was nothing much, it's that «pilha galinhas»⁴⁵ stuff...

Rosa - It was like this, there was the treasurer and when they were receiving there was the check book. The president of the board of the cooperative remembered

⁴⁵An idiomatic expression that means that it was negligible.

to ask the treasurer for the check book, the treasurer who was Mr. X, it seemed that he was such a person, that he was stupid, but his eyes were wide open. When he received the check book, it lacked a check, and it was not the last check, he took it from the middle of the book. Then they sent for me, they called me, I went there to the cooperative, to the board, we all got together, and we decided to go to court, I think they talked to him and he denied he had done it. It went to court and within a few days I received a notification from the judiciary police and what was it, it was to be a witness for him, the man who took the check, he put me there as a defence witness. I went there, when I saw what was going on, me, who at that age had never been to the police or anything, and he got me into something like that ... I could not sleep or rest ... I told the truth how it had been, he had not even spoken to me about it.

Son - The cooperative got him into court right away...

Rosa - ...I mean, he still had the nerve to drag me into it ...

Rosa Pelacha, son and José Costa

Affiliation to the dominant system of beliefs

D. Leonor seems to be the neighbourhood most strongly oriented towards individual ownership, considering it lacked all the communitarian dynamics that, at least in the aftermath of the revolution, took place in the other neighbourhoods. All the process went very efficiently in this neighbourhood, with the neighbours willingly complying with their financial obligations. Once the debts on the houses were paid for, the cooperative allowed the neighbours to decide if they wanted to individually own their houses or if they preferred to maintain collective property, but the great majority of the neighbours opted for individual ownership and only a few houses remain in the hands of the cooperative.

Quinta do Alto

Overview

The neighbourhood movement emerged spontaneously during the revolutionary period, prompted by four or five neighbours, one of which is still active. No one had any previous participatory or political experience. The construction started in 1978 and it was finished by 1982. The bureaucratic process was described as very hard and demanding.

Characterization of the neighbours

Neighbours from Quinta do Alto originally came from several small villages all over the country side, namely from north Alentejo. The lack of employment opportunities in their homeland enticed them to look for a better life in Lisbon, where there was work in factories, commerce, construction and transports. They were unskilled workers with little formal education that grasped all employment opportunities and whose salaries were insufficient to grant them access to the formal housing market. A neighbour that arrived in 1965 recalled how he was allowed to build his shack with no interference from the authorities. It was the normal procedure, since no alternative existed. He thus described his work experience, first in odd jobs and after in an unskilled but permanent position:

I worked one day in construction, another as a cobbler, afterwards I went to the military workshop. I worked in the military workshop there in Santa Clara. I left there to go to Carris, I worked 22 years in Carris.

Neighbour

Political affiliation

The neighbourhood movement was never politicized. Each one had his own party and that never interfered with the activity of the cooperative, not even in the

beginning, during the revolutionary period. The cooperative always allowed all parties to use their premises to address the neighbours.

There were many interventions here from all parties, when there were elections, whoever wanted could come ... the PPD came, the PCP came here, the UDP came, there was also UDP ... It was open to everyone for political rallies, even though we had our own political ideology, but there was no confusion.

Fernando Godinho

Sr. Damásio plainly stated their main goal was to get help, despite the political orientation of those who offered assistance. The main concern was obviously the success of the housing process and not the electoral concerns of particular parties:

We had people in politics who helped us, more from the left, although I never cared if it was from the left or the right, I just wanted to be helped.

Sr. Damásio

Organizational dynamics

The community life was quite intense, with frequent activities being organized that gathered and motivated the neighbours. They often organized parties, games or film exhibitions. It is still possible to observe some community life, more so than in the other neighbourhoods. Although some activities were discontinued, the elderly men of the neighbourhood meet daily in a common space to play social games.

The neighbours constituted a sports association, independent from the cooperative, that currently has football and futsal. They often participated in sport events for young people, such as the Lisbon city games organized by the City Council, where they represented their Parish Council. The association also has a small coffee shop where neighbours gather and organize several informal activities. In the beginning the cooperative organized alphabetization courses, holiday camps for the children, a theatre group, a library and many other activities, but the intensity of these activities has been gradually fading and once the cooperative is extinguished only the

sports will continue. The cooperative also lends its venues to any neighbour that wishes to organize a party or to the City Council, when it desires to hold some event. For some time, they had several social service trainees that organized activities for the neighbours, but those services have been discontinued.

Networking

Usually the cooperative no longer participates in municipal or local assemblies and they only approach local authorities when they have any specific problem of the neighbourhood to solve, although in the beginning of the process they were more involved. The relation with local and national activities is generally described as good:

I have always been to the municipal assemblies, at that time, and now I do not go because my age no longer allows it. I had the president of the Parish Council, the people who helped me at the time. We also collaborated with the Parish Council on sport activities.

Me: your relationship with the City Council, with the Parish Council and with IGHAPE has always been peaceful?

"Yes Yes.

Sr. Damásio

However, there are some entropies detected in these relations, particularly with the local authorities, when it comes to solve specific issues of the neighbourhood that go beyond the simple day to day sports related activities. It is the case with the transference of the municipal land in which the neighbourhood is built:

I've had many meetings in the City Council with several engineers, high rank officials... I think it's a political situation, nobody wants to take responsibility, I've already got a lawyer; now they are not even receiving the emails. The Parish Council president also wants to help us but sometimes he plays a little bit forgetful or I do not know, now he said he was going to take care of it, but in the City Council it has to go

through all the offices... Now they don't even meet us, we call them and send e-mails and they don't answer.

Sr. Damásio

In the first stages of the operation the local authorities had already hindered the proceedings. Fernando Godinho recalled how he had to carry all the files over and over again to different locations, for the offices of the City Council kept changing. Sr. Damásio claimed that at a given period he had to go to the City Council every day and he was constantly having meetings, which was extenuating.

Capacity for self-organization

In the beginning, the neighbours were very sceptic and it was quite hard to convince them to join the project. The leaders had to go from door to door trying to persuade them, one by one, but even so many refused to cooperate. In the end, 152 families joined in. Only when the construction started the reluctant neighbours started to believe and tried to join the cooperative.

It was extremely hard to get the 152 families... They thought: «I'm going to get into this and then I do not know what it will be like». Then when it started to be built they wanted to join in but the membership was already closed.

Fernando Godinho

The leaders where often accused of trying to extract personal profit from the process, as it is described in the following testimony:

We were called many things. Only here they did not say it in front of us... (when asked to join the process they answered): no, no, you just want to keep this for yourselves.

Sr. Damásio

Through the years, the level of engagement improved and it was not difficult to get neighbours to participate in the cooperative. There has been rotation of the leaders, although some persisted for a long time. The large majority of the neighbours participated in general assemblies and it was never difficult to get people to join the managing bodies. However, there was always a small group of neighbours that took the initiative and motivated the rest. The role of the leaders as motivators of the neighbourhood was fundamental. They developed initiatives and activities that were in the neighbours' direct personal interest, and that fostered collective engagement.

When we asked for collaboration, people always appeared, even in some activities that were not organized by the cooperative... There was always a small group of people that pushed things forward.

Sr. Damásio

Despite their low formal educational level, leaders claim they never had any difficulty in the management of the cooperative, since they could always rely on the technical support of people willing to provide their assistance.

Me: What is your level of education?

I had the 4th grade. I was a person with a life experience that went everywhere.

Me: Have you ever had difficulty with the more technical issues of the cooperative?

No, there were people who helped, the accountant ...

Me: Hired?

Hired for little money, he was a person who helped a lot in these things.

Sr. Damásio

Affiliation to the dominant system of beliefs

There were never big issues around the payment of the debts and the process went smoothly. Presently, the cooperative no longer has pending debts to the IHRU

and only three neighbours are still paying their debts. The cooperative still exists but it was decided that the neighbours no longer need to pay their quotas. The neighbours mean to extinguish the cooperative as soon as the matter of the land is solved, since there is no other motivation for its continuity. In the nineties, Sr. Damásio proposed to maintain the collective control over the houses beyond the payment of the debt, but the proposal was flunked in a general assembly. There would be some advantages, namely concerning taxes, but the neighbours desired to own and control their own houses so that they could sell them whenever they wished. Some have already been sold. However, no neighbour can sell the house without a declaration from the cooperative stating that there are no pending debts to it.

The neighbourhood has 16 plots that are still being paid to the City Council and besides the plots, the neighbours also have to pay for the IMI. The amount for the plots is charged to the cooperative, which distributes the bills by the corresponding condos and the person responsible by each one of them gathers the money from the neighbours. Some neighbours refuse to pay and so far the cooperative has been unable to convince them to fulfil this obligation. The City Council does not accept individual amounts, each plot must be paid in totality, so half of the buildings are heavily indebted because of some of their residents, despite the fact that the majority is willing to pay. The cooperative is trying to individualize the payments, so that neighbours do not depend so much on each other. As things are now, there are neighbours that may have to pay interests for the others' missed payments. The negotiations with the City Council over the plots have been going on for decades, with no solution in sight, although the Parish Council has been collabourating with the neighbours in the negotiations.

Liberdade

Overview

In Liberdade, most neighbours were tenants in illegal houses built informally in neighbouring Serafina by people that were scarcely more resourceful than themselves. Renting houses or, more often, very small rooms of those very small houses, to newcomers from the province, was an additional source of income. In this neighbourhood it is possible to find the only testimony linking the SAAL neighbourhoods in Lisbon to the occupations, but even here it seems to have had but a very tiny connection.

As you know, in the old days the people's concept of citizenship did not exist, these people went to the tavern to play the domino, cards, and that was all... What did the April 25th brought, it brought a certain freedom and a certain thought to the people and a certain dialogue with other people. As a result, there were a lot of people here, what was the first idea, it was to occupy houses, take over houses, especially in Chelas, which was where there was the great evolution in construction at that time.

Me - State Houses.

State houses that were unoccupied and unfinished at the time. A lot of people went and I was one of those that was invited to go. By my own mind, or at the time because I had a proper house, even shack like it was a house that had the minimum conditions, and I said no, I will not go.

Fernando Rosa

It is also in this neighbourhood that it was possible to get the only report of something like spontaneous contesting action in order to overcome the bureaucratic obstacles that emerged after the end of the revolutionary period and which are attributed, at least partially, to the landlords of the small «patios» in Serafina who feared their loss of income and, to some extent, to be overcome in statute by their former country side lodgers, which would be moving to the new apartments.

Fernando - At that time we relied on what, on a certain commitment of the population and a certain fear on the other side, you know how at the time ... maybe you have knowledge but did not live through those times. This can now be recorded what I am going to say ... to see how it was one of the situations that we had to create to unblock the situation, because there were obstacles and more obstacles. So what did we do, because of the dead-lock, a month, two months, they did not get things done, nothing, what did we do. I do not know if you know that road that gives access to Monsanto here next to the school ... then climbs to the right. This is a street that has a lot of movement in the morning and we got there at dawn and cut 4 or 5 trees and threw them into the road.

Me—When was this, do you have any idea?

Fernando - About 77, 78.

Me - It was already after the PREC.

Fernando - Already, already. 77, 78.

José - It does not mean that there was someone in the City Council who was ill-intentioned not to let it happen, the entire City Council was in favour and everyone was in favour of doing this (building the neighbourhood), the problem is that these owners, most of them, they were seeing their income flying away.

Me - Because people were going to leave the houses.

José - They were leaving the houses to go to better houses. And many of them, although they lived a little bit better, they also lived within the same system, in the courtyard, a better built house with one more room, or a bathroom with a toilet ...

Fernando - Every door, if you run down those streets, each door is an owner, there would be one or two that had two or three more patios, but not more.

José - You see, and then they saw this and thought so many houses and so many houses, they never imagined that it was only for 54 ... nor did they have the minimum idea, the concept of house for those people was a house with the dimension of this room, you see, so they looked there and saw rooms, we have some rooms and divisions with 5 meters long by 3, they got there and thought this can be turned into two houses

... This was encouraged, someone was told to say that, I think the complaint is this, that it was very close to the aqueduct, it was less than 30 meters from the aqueduct and is more, but no one came here to measure, and the height in relation to the monument, and it was embargoed because of that. Without measurements, without anything, it was because someone knew someone and someone wanted it embargoed, that must have been it.

Fernando - Faced with this we had to act and some of the ways we acted upon.

Me –Was that.

Fernando - It was a pandemonium.

Me- No one could get through the road.

Fernando - Well, no.

José - This was the only access there was, those who came from the A5, there was no A5 ... it was the only access to Lisbon practically.

Fernando - It was cut, it was a pandemonium ... It was the impact that unlocked the situation.

Me - Did it work?

Fernando - It was unblocked (the building process) the day after or two days after.

Me - There was no one arrested?

Fernando– No one, no, they never knew who it was.

Fernando Rosa and José Coelho

Despite these initial distresses, the process went quite smoothly and was regularized very steeply, considering the neighbours always complied with their financial obligations. About fifteen years ago, some members of the cooperative that had not been granted a house reactivated it with a new professional management and built a new neighbourhood nearby with controlled costs that had nothing to do with the SAAL. Once it was built they left the cooperative, which had been used with the

sole purpose of providing the necessary organizational framework to the building process.

Characterization of the neighbours

Most of the neighbours from Bairro da Liberdade came from the north of Portugal during the sixties, mainly from the areas of Viseu and Lamego, to work in the construction of the bridge over the Tagus river and in other construction sites around that area. They evolved in their own professions, from undifferentiated to specialized workers, and some eventually became small merchants. The most educated had but the fourth grade and illiteracy was common. As it was said, some built shacks, but others rented small rooms in illegal houses with deficient housing conditions.

Most of the people here, the maximum they evolved was in the normal sequence of their progression at work, from unskilled labourer to the corresponding specialized worker. My father began as a servant in the streets of Lisbon, moved on to «massador», who was the one who worked with the cement, then evolved to paver. All the people evolved in their profession, in their sector, evolved there.

José Coelho

According with the leaders, the neighbours retained a strong rural mentality, which is expressed in their suspicious posture and in the prevalence of activities related with the rural life.

José - ... There in the mountains, from above, you do not know the area, what is it like? That's right there on the mountain. Have you ever been to Lamego?

Me - No, I do not know the area. Did they bring the countryside mentality?

José - Completely, completely, they still sold blankets, they had them in their shacks ...

Fernando - They had their breeding in the bathtubs.

José - They still had, how do you call it, to make blankets?

Me - The looms.

J - Looms, they still had the looms and made blankets, and one of them is known as «Zé das Mantas⁴⁶», because besides working for the state, also in the navy, afterwards he sold blankets...

Fernando Rosa and José Coelho

That person (another neighbour) later evolved into sell goods from the province, there was a big fair here and she sold those items (choriças⁴⁷).

José Coelho

Political affiliation

The leaders claim that the cooperative always remained independent from party influence, although Fernando Rosa has been politically active on his own as a representative of CDU in Campolide Parish Council. José Coelho had previous experience as a union leader, which prompted him to get actively engaged in the cooperative.

José - I had some motivation at the time because I was a union leader.

Me - And Fernando too?

Fernando - No, I was a member of the Parish Council of Campolide.

Me - But tell me something, before the SAAL, did you already have any experience of participation?

Fernando – Not me.

Me - Can we say that it was your involvement here that gave you this political awareness?

José - No, it was more my experience there, because I was there before.

Me - It was the other way around.

⁴⁶ Zé of the bankets.

⁴⁷ Sausages.

José - It was the other way around. Because it gave me access to a lot of things, a lot of people, and motivated the help of the other, you see. I can tell you how the Carris syndicate works, the Carris syndicate is the father of those people ... we learn to help others and to be happy to help others.

Fernando Rosa and José Coelho

Organizational dynamics

In the beginning they had many activities for the neighbours, there was a neighbourhood commission that organized all initiatives and it was very popular, even people from other neighbourhoods around the area participated. All of that started to fade away from the early eighties, mostly due to an embezzlement in the bar carried out by one of the most engaged neighbours. Although they managed to get the money back, the dynamics of the collective space was ruined.

Me - What activities did you have?

Fernando - Athletics, ping pong, boxing ...

Me - And these activities lasted until when?

Fernando - They lasted a long time, there were new Year's Eves there, people could play ... there was a neighbourhood youth committee.

Me - Did it end when you sold the houses?

José - No, it ended before, there was a 10-year interregnum, after that problem with the embezzlement ... there was a scandal there, so nobody went there anymore.

Fernando - ... Because he (the embezzler) was from the bar.

Me - After the embezzlement people became unmotivated?

José - People went there because it was open and there was someone keeping it going, he was one of the people who got it going.

Fernando - ... It had an intense activity, it was the core here of the neighbourhood, from a certain hour people would come.

Fernando Rosa and José Coelho

The condos of the buildings were formally organized by José Coelho, among the distrust of his neighbours, but only one still functions, since no one follows the by-laws.

I started to organize the condominiums in the buildings, everything was organized as it should be, the only one that works must be the building where you've been ... and it's only working to collect the money ... I worked for 10 years and I organized everything ... I got the fame of being a thief, of taking advantage of the situation, you see, and it was just that small group of 11 people who all knew me from my childhood, as you have seen, 17, 18 years, everybody knew the kid, you see, and still...

José Coelho

Fernando Rosa felt compelled to exaggerate the legal responsibilities of the condominium so that his neighbours agreed to undertake fundamental maintenance work in their building, considering that without that urge they just let it deteriorate without taking any initiative for its preservation.

It remained 15, 20 years without maintenance work, without anything ... I'm even ashamed to bring people here to my house, from the door in is one thing, the hall was already another, and I said no, let's go. It was the first building, I legalized it, I made the condominium, I forced the people to pay for the maintenance work, I called the contractor, in the whole entrance hall we put everything in marble, every time with the neighbours contesting, at that time it was 6,000 «contos», or something. «Look, it is mandatory by law, the law says that all that is necessary is the condominium's responsibility». These people who complained ... I did the maintenance work there in the building, then they saw it, everybody saw it ... everybody did the same ... It was something, people are very selfish and think that a person who knows how to work is because it has a personal interest.

Fernando Rosa

Networking

Although Fernando Rosa has been elected to represent the CDU in the Parish Council and claims to have used his position to further the interests of the neighbourhood and surrounding areas, the cooperative has not been significantly engaged in wider local or national networks or taken part in local assemblies, and lost all connections with the remaining SAAL neighbourhoods.

Me - Do you not contact with the other SAAL neighbourhoods?

No, we lost contact. In the old days, at first, I went to meetings of all the cooperatives in the neighbourhoods, to decide on several issues, but this is complicated because after things started, there were specific interests, there was never a consensus, there are some that pull to one side and others that already have something else in mind.

Fernando Rosa

The companies that provide basic services such as electricity or water supply are described as extremely bureaucratic and morose in their procedures, which was not in tune with the neighbours' urgent needs and demanded, in an initial stage, for informal solutions.

I'm there in that building that was the first one to be built, my father was a founder, it was one of those who was in the first building, even to turn on the water and the electricity it was all through... because there were many blockages to the point where we were already living there, we had the electricity supplied by the contractor, the water was through some connection, the water worked but we kept the house down there because there could be something (problem).

José Coelho

The relations with the City Council have on occasions been troublesome. Despite the compliance of the neighbours with the fulfilment of their responsibilities regarding the payment of the debts on the houses, in the end it was the City Council

that hindered the regularization process. Once the debt was paid for, the cooperative initiated the required proceedings to regularize the neighbourhood, but, as it was reported in other neighbourhoods, all the documentation had gone missing from the City Council and it became necessary to gather all documents once more, a task described as extremely demanding.

You know why, I lived through all that and I tell you, I spent many sleepless nights, now with humility I tell you this, I spent many sleepless nights. And to legalize later, regardless of whether it was done through the state, with benefits that the state gave us and supported by the state. Regardless of whether we are paying later, I do not know where those documents went, in the Lisbon City Council disappeared the whole process of the neighbourhood Liberdade. Now you see, after 30 years, I do not know, after 30 years to go in search of these situations. That's why I tell you, I went back to contact people I had contacted at that time that were in fact exceptional and fortunately still alive, to obtain the necessary documentation, architect Norberto, engineer Crespo who made the stability, in «Largo do Carmo»⁴⁸, who is still there, at least he was about 10 years ago. So there were a number of situations that had to be hammered, hammered, hammered, and if the population or the people who were directing it were not stubborn, were not persistent, this had not gone ahead.

Fernando Rosa

The process had disappeared, he had to go through all these procedures to go get the projects all over again for the City Council, then there was a political situation that helped us a lot, because who was at the time in charge of the City Council, let's put it that way, did not want the opposition to know that it had disappeared and then things were done that way. As always, in this country, when things are dragged for a long time they can only be solved like this, because if we are going to get to all the legal paths, we will not go anywhere... the PRECs ended, this whole thing was finished, this was considered, all these projects, you must have known, was considered all this ... things that were not for ... let it be, do not mess with it, do not talk about it anymore. In the meantime he began to stir, began to take the documents to the City Council...

José Coelho

⁴⁸An address in Lisbon.

Capacity for self-organization

The leaders consider that, although the process went quite well, the level of trust among neighbours is very low and there were two small embezzlements that worsened this feeling, although they were easily contained and had no major financial consequences.

Me – Did you ever had any misuse of funds in the cooperative?

Fernando - We had two situations that marked us a lot because ... people thought that we who were born practically here were bullshit, so we took care of giving for example the treasury to the right people, a suitable person with a name in the neighbourhood ... employee in the state...

José - With responsibility ...

Me – Did he have an higher educational level?

José - Yes, he was an accountant.

Fernando - He was working in the navy. And then this gentleman once, (we told him) «boss, the television has broken down and we have to put a television here in the venue for the neighbours».

José - Only one thing, at first they charged a bit more, there was a small percentage that was for what you said, for the activities that were created ...

Me - ... But was it agreed?

Fernando - It was all agreed in assembly.

José - Everything was agreed.

Fernandos - And in the venue there was a bar that belonged to the cooperative ... that now is nothing. And then «but I do not have money», «You do not have the money?» We went to get him at Paço de Arcos, he worked in Paço and Arcos in the navy. «Mr. X, come here if you please», «Oh, I do not have ...», «You cannot even get through the gate anymore».

Me - But he was a resident here too.

Fernando - Yes, he was a resident of the buildings. «Let's go to the lawyer and you're going to say, you're going to make a statement saying what's going on and who's responsible for it».

José - The chit chat here was that everyone had taken advantage of it.

Fernando - Well ... we took him, we went to the lawyer, «No, sir, I'm the only one to blame, I'm the one who took the money». Well, the man paid for everything... So the situation was this and there was another with Y ... he took care of the bar and then it (the money) disappeared ...

Me - It was never the money of the quotas.

Fernando - No, no.

José – They took advantage of the working capital.

Me - And you detected the two situations and controlled them.

Fernando - We controlled and they paid ... this is so, everyone here pays ... for the people here in the neighbourhood, everyone was a thief at the time, everyone was a thief.

Fernando Rosa and José Coelho

The low levels of trust persisted throughout all the process and hindered the collective dynamics of the neighbourhood, but it was the individualization of the property of the houses that gave the cooperative its final blow.

José - While the buildings were not built everyone agreed with everything, when they started to see where they were going to live things started to change a little, so much so that they had to do that (make the person responsible sign a document assuming all responsibility) when that problem of the embezzlement arose, why, because of it. Because it is so, this is all very beautiful and also the PREC also ended, and began to spread the ideas of each one by himself, individualism, which is the last 20 years in Portugal, the last 25, 30 years. That is the culture of individualism and therefore each one has his own house and now I am here, I am clinging to this and it is just me.

Me - That is, when the neighbours started to have the houses in their property, they demobilized from the cooperative?

Fernando - Totally demobilized.

José - To the point that I did the last deed on the houses and no one else ever paid a quota, no one ever appears at a meeting ... those people do not give one more penny...

Fernando Rosa and José Coelho

There is a collective space still owned by the cooperative in the ground floor of one of the buildings that was once a place of intense community life. Today it is abandoned with some equipments degrading inside. To rent it, it is necessary for the cooperative to have organized accounting, which implies hiring an accountant, but that is impossible since no one pays the quotas, leaving the cooperative with no budget. The Parish Council proposed to buy it for an amount regarded as very low by the neighbours, so the cooperative refused to sell. The neighbours from the building where it is located believe it is only theirs, although the leaders have explained that it is common property of all the neighbours, through the cooperative. In the end, the individualism and prevailing distrust among the neighbours obstruct all collective efforts and produce a sense of weariness in the leaders, so much so that Fernando Rosa already sold his house and left the neighbourhood.

Fernando - I worked for the others, I legalized all the other buildings, everything, project by project. I had zero (recognition), if I was there it was out of personal interest.

José - And me too, they still say today that I got money from all that.

Fernando Rosa and José Coelho

Affiliation to the dominant system of beliefs

The attachment to collective property was never there; according with José Coelho, the northern countryside mentality is averse to such socialist ideals. Fernando Rosa states that the cooperative ideal never existed in the neighbourhood, the houses were built because the neighbours needed them but after the process was concluded each one went his own way.

Me - And there are people here who have never actually worked in the cooperative?

José - There are people here who have never stirred a straw and are the most demanding.

Fernando - The concept of cooperative organization never existed here, the concept is we will build these houses out of necessity of each one and after being solved, it is solved.

Me - Each one for himself.

Fernando - Each one for himself.

Fernando Rosa and José Coelho

For 25 years, the cooperative paid the debt to the INH and after that period it was possible to alienate the houses to the neighbours. There were never major problems with the payments and the INH allowed the neighbours to settle the debt in advance, which some did. About 25 years ago, some neighbours decided to liquidate the full amount of their debts and gradually some more neighbours took that opportunity. In the end, only about 30% of the neighbours took all the time initially defined to pay for the loan. When the process was finally regularized, it was necessary to begin to pay for the transference of the municipal land. That process also carried some difficulties because originally that land was destined for Monsanto park, and the former owners had to grant their permission for the construction of the neighbourhood. The City Council determined the value the cooperative had to pay and it did so effortlessly.

Bela Flor

Overview

The operation in Bela Flor did not differ significantly from the processes in the other neighbourhoods. Once more, the revolution provided an opportunity that was not missed by the dispossessed and badly housed neighbours. They constituted a cooperative, joined the SAAL and successfully, although arduously, managed to built their neighbourhood thanks to the voluntary efforts of their leaders, which have found it hard to deal with the erratic nature of the legislative and political framework within which they must operate.

The "Bela Flor", Housing and Construction Cooperative (CRL), was founded on February 13th, 1976, with the support of the Local Ambulatory Support Service (SAAL), to provide adequate housing to the neighbours of its area of intervention. It anticipated the intervention of the state, in about two decades and at its own expense. It was, as you might imagine, an enormous effort made by humble people under very difficult conditions. It should be emphasized that the management positions in this Cooperative have always been carried out in a voluntary way, after work, by simple people who do not identify themselves with the constantly changing legislative and regulatory framework. With the financial support of the former Housing Development Fund (FFH), the current Institute of Housing and Urban Rehabilitation (IHRU), and the technical and land support of the Lisbon City Council (CML), under The chairmanship of Nuno Abecassis, the project was developed with ups and downs and 239 houses were built with controlled costs, in twelve housing blocks, which were delivered to the members of the cooperative between 1984 and 1986, while they paid a monthly amortization to the Cooperative that was to be delivered to the IHRU, whose last payment occurred in June 2014.

Written testimony by the management of the cooperative

In the beginning the cooperative had more than 600 members, but between 1976 and 1984 many gave up since they needed a more expedite solution and could not wait, or they could not cope with the financial demands and opted instead for

state controlled social housing. In the end, many residents were no longer the original members, but their descendants or newcomers. The cooperative also housed insolvent neighbours that to this day pay a symbolic value of 10% of their social pensions. In these few cases, the houses remain in the property of the cooperative. There are about a dozen neighbours that are delayed on their payments and until now there was but an eviction of a neighbour that had delayed payments and never contested the legal action. The debts amount to little over 50 000€ and are due to neighbours in a very vulnerable economical situation that in most cases maintain a few regular payments.

In 1995, after 15 years of strict observance of the payments, the cooperative obtained the exoneration of the interests on the debt, but the transference of municipal land was not yet concluded. In 1997, the transference of 9 of the 12 plots was completed, but 3 were still to be transferred because they were private property. The delay in the resolution of the situation has had considerable financial consequences for the cooperative.

The publication of Law 55-A / 2012, of October 29, which in its article 4 adds the sum nº 28 to the General Chart of Stamp Duty Tax, determines that the owners of buildings evaluated in more than one million € must pay annually 1 % of stamp duty tax on the value of the property, taking into account the amounts calculated for the Municipal Property Tax (IMI). The process of evaluation for the purpose of IMI was done in a very expeditious way, full of errors and discrepancies, to a point that for similar buildings the evaluation of the older one is higher. Despite the complaints, the mistakes persisted. This Law regards equally individual owners and Cooperatives whose houses are attributed to their members. Having to suddenly and totally unexpectedly meet a very heavy burden of about 40 000€ (forty thousand) per year, since 2012, which it did not expect and for which it does not have resources, this Cooperative remains with its financial situation at risk, as well as the buildings of the neighbours who occupy the 67 houses burdened in this way, while we ignore, because it is not in our hands, when it will be possible to regularize the situation by the constitution of the horizontal property.

Written testimony by the management of the cooperative

Characterization of the neighbours

Bela Flor was constituted mostly by poorly educated migrants from all over the country side, but predominantly from Vila Real, Viseu and Castelo Branco, who came to Lisbon in the fifties and sixties of last century to work as unskilled labourers in several areas. The data base of the cooperative identifies nearly 13% of cooperative members working in construction, almost 11% in cleaning services and over 8% as drivers⁴⁹. Before the neighbourhood was built, they lived in shacks or in overcrowded houses with deficient housing conditions. As in the other neighbourhoods, they could not afford the housing market and so resorted to shacks that were tolerated by the fascist regime.

In general, the initial inhabitants of the neighbourhood were mostly from the province, with a predominance of Beira Alta and Trás-os-Montes, they were unskilled workers with little formal education. Before the neighbourhood was built, the majority of the neighbours lived in shacks, although a significant part lived in masonry houses with minimal living conditions or overcrowded.

Written testimony by the management of the cooperative

Political affiliation

Some of the most active leaders at that time were affiliated to left wing parties, but they state that there was never direct party control over the neighbourhood movement.

Me – There was never a political party, from above, to guide the movement?

There is always something behind, but not directly.... there were people connected, they were the most active maybe ... there was militancy ... more to the left.

José João Domingo

⁴⁹ There is no data concerning unionization.

Organizational dynamics

The cooperative had once several activities in addition to housing development that are still ongoing but were rented to outsiders, considering the difficulties associated with their management on a volunteer basis, by a small group of people that could not cope with all the work involved. The condos are managed by the neighbours themselves but the cooperative still plays an important role in the mediation of conflicts.

In the first years the Cooperative had a coffee shop, a mini market and a butcher's shop. Subsequently, the assignment of the exploitation to third parties was made due to the impossibility of a good management by the managers who had their own professional occupations (this work was always done on a voluntary basis). The Cooperative also developed for a few years some sports activity (athletics and soccer of five for young people) and also has a gymnasium for gymnastics and bodybuilding (operated by a third party).

Written testimony by the management of the cooperative

Networking

The cooperative has remained fairly isolated. Its involvement in umbrella organizations or participatory mechanisms has been motivated by particular concerns and not by a desire to participate in governance dynamics that go beyond the immediate interests of the neighbourhood.

Me - Have you ever been a member of FENACHE?

We were never part of FENACHE nor were we part of anything. Afterwards, in 98 or 99, we signed up for Antonio Sérgio, for we had not even that ... it is helpful, they give a credential to the cooperatives that are duly registered, we have to send the accounts report, we have to send them the records of the meetings, and then they give a credential, valid in terms of finances, valid for everything ...

José João Domingo

The relationship of the cooperative with IHRU has been good since the cooperative managed to find an ally in that institution which has been facilitating the resolution of relevant matters.

Me - How has it been, over the years, your relationship with the Parish Council, the City Council, the IHRU?

Very good with the IHRU, we can say, with the IHRU it was always very good, we only had contacts with them in the financial area, there was X, an impeccable individual, who is still there, I believe, always helped us with what we needed.

José João Domingo

The relation with the City Council has been more troubled, with no significant long lasting alliances were ever established to facilitate it, although punctual allies occasionally emerge. The right wing mayor Nuno Krus Abecassis was identified as an important supporter that was willing to overlook the strict observation of regulations to get the neighbourhood built.

This started, engineer Abecassis was an individual to get things done, he did not stop at anything, we build up and it is done, then we began to realize that it was built in someone else's land, but it was built.

I - But it was already built.

J - Yeah, then. Not many years ago (a City Council official said): «because you want to build.» «No, this was already built more than 20 years ago.» «It cannot be.» «It can be and it is, it was in the time of engineer Abecassis». «In that time everything was done». If you did not do everything, nothing would ever be done. The truth is that if he did not give this opening, even today...

José João Domingo

In general, the relationship with City Council officials has not been easy, considering bureaucratic procedures take a very long time and there is a considerable staff mobility that causes further delays and obstacles in the processes. The reliance on

well placed intermediaries such as the Parish Council president is fundamental to overcome the most difficult obstacles, moreover when there are some irregularities to account for, such as the loss of the documentation on the neighbourhood by the City Council, a situation also related in other neighbourhoods (Liberdade and Fonecas e Calçada).

José - In the meantime, the documents in the City Council had been lost, with the change from Alexandre Herculano ... the documents of the first phase were seen in Alexandre Herculano but later in Campo Grande (they had disappeared)... The architect remade the final screens, but the whole process they did not know of it.

Me - And they never found out?

José - No, they do not even want to know.

Me - And you had to find the documentation, or not?

José - Since there were the drawings, he remade it, took measurements and made the final screens that way. Because they do not want to know, that's the municipal archive ... they do not get upset about it ... what saved us was that we had a little receipt that was from the construction and we took it from there ... They were extremely nice and available people only things take a long, long time, if we go there in May, in December we go again and we are always at it. They are always available people, they are always polite people, but things do not go well. Even now with the land issue, it has already been purchased since 2011, from 2011 to 2015, 4 years have passed. We have dozens of letters to the president, to this one, to that one, talking about the land issue ...

António - I went to the City Council assembly, went to City Council meetings 4 or 5 times, during this whole period⁵⁰.

Me - This has been since 2011?

António - We've been at it all our lives...

⁵⁰ Intervention of António Horta Pinheiro in the assembly:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=phE_Hxi8Ow

José - Then they keep changing. Today this one is the head of division, then tomorrow we go there and he is not there, there is another one, and no one knows anything... Meanwhile, at the beginning of last year, we pressed on the issue (of the land), we took the president of the Parish Council and there we went to a meeting in the City Council, this was in April or May, the meeting, If I am not mistaken, and on December 29th we signed for the transference. Because it is so, who does not have godfathers dies barefoot, as the other one said. These 4 years and more those 10 or 12 back, they answered one is here, the other is there, the last answer was that they had had some problems ... They never tried nor do they want to know, the City Council ... we have two or three pending small problems and things are not solved...

António - We complained to everyone but no one answered ... we went through all the steps ... in terms of the ministry, since August ...

José - This is a piece of paper, the people who are hurt by the problem are not there.

António Horta Pinheiro and José João Domingo

Capacity for self-organization

The leaders consider that during the revolutionary period it was trendy to get collectively organized. They stated that in Campolide area alone, there were 17 neighbourhood commissions and 3 housing cooperatives. However, despite this trend, in the beginning it was not easy to bring the neighbours in due to a high level of distrust which generated reluctance and passiveness. Another aspect that hindered their motivation had to do with the loss of some benefits when they moved from the shacks to the buildings, namely regarding small gardens that were not feasible in the new houses. With all these constraints, about half of the neighbours from the shanty town did not join the cooperative, although some still managed to get a house later on, through their relatives.

Initially, the neighbours were more involved and keen to participate in the board of directors of the cooperative, but since the late eighties the enthusiasm to collaborate faded away considerably and the cooperative was left in the hands of a

small group of neighbours. According with the leaders, this situation was motivated by the feeling of security the neighbours gradually acquired in relation to their housing situation: their houses were guaranteed, so they were no longer concerned. As a consequence, they seldom participate in general assemblies and the situation tends to worsen with the private ownership of the houses, a phenomenon that is also common to the other neighbourhoods.

Me - And the neighbours participate in the general assemblies?

Very few participate, the last time for the elections there were more of the managing bodies than the members who were there to attend. We did not re-apply and no one showed up, then we did a second assembly in which the members that showed up were the directors and little more.

I - Has it always been like this or has it been getting worse over time?

A - It's getting worse, the tendency is to get worse, people own their houses, they start to disconnect themselves from the cooperative and those who are still dependent are elderly people ...

António Horta Pinheiro

As such, usually the same small group of neighbours participate in the board of directors, considering the others are not willing to get actively involved. The negative impact of the privatization of the property of the houses on the mobilization of the neighbours is reinforced in the written testimony.

Initially, the neighbours were participative and easily integrated into the social bodies of the Cooperative. Since the late nineties there has been a small group running the Cooperative due to the lack of participation of the remaining neighbours who already got what they wanted and no longer wish to collaborate.

Written testimony by the management of the cooperative

An aspect that may be surprising concerns the absence of a direct relation of causality between the degree of education and the intensity of the involvement in the

cooperative, since the motivation to collaborate is stronger in the neighbours who present a lower degree of education, which have been gradually driven out of their involvement by the growing bureaucratic requirements associated with the managing tasks.

Even these illiterates have skills, they have no education but have other skills and push things forward. And here there were a lot of semi-illiterate people who made it work, we had Fernandinho who was a hurricane, went everywhere ... they have an incapacity afterwards, when they start to have to do the accounting as it should be, the documentation as it should be, people there do not succeed, they have enthusiasm at work, have respect for each other, are disciplined, but then begin not to master things. There are emerging all these demands that later marginalize them ... The condominium, we had the receipts and it was the administrator, we called him the delegate of the block, who received from all the neighbours, 100 escudos or 150 and filled in a receipt. This he could do, either he or his family, received and came to hand over the money to the cooperative, all right, all right. When things start with more exigency, then he can no longer respond to that, he demobilizes himself, he begins to shrink and lets the others do it. Those who know, who are smarter, who have more education, do not want to do it and that is why things do not work afterwards. The one who has enthusiasm cannot get past it, the other one who has time, who knows but who is a trickster, does not want to do anything, abstracts himself from it and the only ones who still make things go, despite everything, are still the semi-illiterate.

José João Domingo

Affiliation to the dominant system of beliefs

There was never a strong affiliation to collective property among the neighbours in Bela Flor. During the heat of the revolution, more than anything, the neighbours wished to improve their living conditions, but after that immediate need was solved, and particularly now that they are getting older, they want to individually own their houses and pass the property on to their children. The effort made by the

neighbours to pay their debts was always consistent and it was rewarded with a debt relief.

The payment of the loan to IHRU was completed in June 2014 with great difficulty, since the interest rates were very high for the monetary possibilities of the neighbours. The process suffered some delays, it was constructed in three periods with increasing interest rates, considering the favourable loans faded away with the end of the revolutionary period and the suspension of the SAAL. The land in which the neighbourhood was to be built was all occupied with shacks, so it was necessary to build a provisory neighbourhood to house all those people, while the construction process went on.

This constraint held the construction back, which was only initiated in 1981. The second construction period already had high interest rates, but the cooperative still had some money left from the first phase that attenuated the financial burden. The third period, however, was extremely costly, since the interest rates were not in the least favourable and there were no savings left. As a result, the cooperative was left with a very high debt to the FFH. The cooperative had a limited geographical intervention area, but even so it was able to absorb more resourceful people whose living conditions were not so bad and could give a higher monetary contribution, otherwise this last period would not have been feasible.

The loan granted by the Housing Development Fund (current IHRU) has been paid in full since June 2014. Over time there has been a great deal of difficulty in complying with payments as interest rates were very high and in 1995 a debt forgiveness was granted, considering the payments had been made for 15 years without any failure.

Written testimony by the management of the cooperative

Me - In percentage terms, how many people had payment problems?

J - A dozen, not more ... 5, 6%.

I - Have you ever had any evictions?

J - There was a case of eviction because she never came here, we went to court, she did not contest and just left.

José João Domingo

The cooperative also had an important role in the provision of housing for insolvent neighbours who could not afford the financial effort involved in the process, at its own expense and with no support from the state. This initiative is specific of this neighbourhood, considering that unlike many other aspects of the processes that are common to several neighbourhoods, in this case there was no replication of the experience.

José - (The insolvent) were old couples with very small pensions in which we took only 10% of their retirement pensions, we had no support ... we never had support from anyone, it was just us....

António - We never excluded anyone for that.

António Horta Pinheiro and José João Domingo

Portugal Novo

Overview

The descriptive memory of the process⁵¹ elaborated by NUTAL in 1977 divided the construction in two stages. The first stage involved the construction of 312 houses distributed by six buildings (A, B, C, D, E, F) that would receive population from Quinta do Bacalhau, Quinta do Monte Coxo and the patios from Rua Alberto Pimentel. The second stage comprised 90 houses (buildings G and H) and involved the extension of the cooperative's intervention to people that lived near the shanty towns in buildings that presented deficient housing conditions, since the houses were degraded, over occupied and irregularly rented. The project was never finished and it was left with 221 houses.

Considering the particularities of the neighbourhood, namely the dissolution of the cooperative, it was not possible to get the testimony of its leaders, moreover considering that the ones who initially took over the process have passed away. The reports were obtained through informal not taped conversation with their relatives and other original neighbours that still reside in the neighbourhood. There is also some media coverage on the neighbourhood, considering its «problematic» connotation.

Following some incidents and a supposed official internal document on the neighbourhood, that warned against possible ethnic and house transaction conflicts among the residents, *Jornal de Notícias*⁵² stated that the police classified the neighbourhood as an area with a high conflict potential. The journalists met some difficulties in the contact with the neighbours; according with the news, many refused to talk for they feared retaliations. They managed to get declarations from a neighbour that attributed the conflicts to the degradation of the neighbourhood, but out of fear she refused to comment on the particular case of the occupation that had taken part recently, involving a gunshot episode. However, she gave the example of a neighbour that had to move in with her mother because her house was occupied.

⁵¹Included in Ofício 156/NT/77.

⁵²http://www.in.pt/paginainicial/pais/concelho.aspx?Distrito=Lisboa&Concelho=Lisboa&Option=Interior&content_id=1164751&page=-1 (07/01/2016)

Diário de Notícias⁵³ also confirmed the forceful occupations through the testimonies of some neighbours that accepted to provide their statement. An elderly neighbour testified that when an old person goes to the hospital, immediately someone keeps a constant eye on the door to occupy the house as soon as the person dies. Moreover, if a neighbour goes to his home village, when he returns the house is frequently vandalized or occupied. Another neighbour testified that it is impossible to live with the Roma people.

Despite all the constraints, the relatives of Afonso Barreto and Armindo Neves, the original leaders of the cooperative, declared to be quite happy with their houses and it is easy to understand why: the houses are well kept and present no obvious impairments due to the lack of maintenance. Moreover, the location is excellent, considering the proximity to public transportations and services. However, this perspective contrasts with the one several neighbours allegedly conveyed in the meeting with the City Council, considering a representative of the GABIP described them as vulnerable and frightened.

It is possible that these people do not feel they can freely express their opinions, for fear of their neighbours or of the monetary implications of a regularization process in the neighbourhood. Some of them have relatives living in the neighbourhood, usually descendants, and it would have severe implications for all of them to adjust to the new monetary constraints, considering they have not paid anything for the houses for many years. Although the considerable limitations in the access to the information naturally compromise the report on this neighbourhood, Bairro Portugal Novo seems to represent a paradigmatic case of individualism taken to the extreme, which is an excellent context to highlight the virtues of collective organized action. The neighbours enjoy the privileged of living in a central Lisbon area for free, but the common areas are degrading around them.

⁵³<http://www.dn.pt/arquivo/2006/interior/um-bairro-azul-de-miseria-num-enclave-nas-olaias-648753.html> (12/01/2016)

Characterization of the neighbours

The original neighbours seemed to be mostly city folk with little formal education struggling to make ends meet in odd jobs. Nowadays there is a considerable presence of Roma people and some people from Africa and India. Architect Nuno Matos Silva was in the brigade and accompanied the neighbourhood for about ten years. He provides his impressions about its original residents.

Me – They were not people who had just come from the province?

In Monte Coxo maybe because it was more recent, but I got the impression that in Bacalhau they were second generation, there were many expanded shacks to house the children that had gotten married.

Me - They were from Lisbon.

Exactly.

Me - That is, there was a difference between Bacalhau and Mount Coxo, they were different populations.

I suppose so, it was apparent on Monte Cox that it was a recent thing.

Me- And why did they join in the same process?

They were near each other.

Me – Because of the geographical proximity.

Geographical, it was going to be handled at the same time...

Nuno Matos Silva

Political affiliation

One of the main initial leaders of the cooperative, Afonso Barreto, worked for the communist party and continued to do so even after the cooperative had collapsed. However, apparently there was not a very strong party influence around the neighbourhood and Nuno Matos Silva explains why⁵⁴.

⁵⁴ This part of the testimony was received by e-mail in January 30th 2017.

As for Afonso being an employee of the PCP, I believe that this happened later and that the interference did not have any expression. The general situation of the neighbourhood was too marginal to fit into the typical "clientele" of the PCP, workers, employees, staff, ... The PCP was never averse to discipline and that was not easy to implement in a neighbourhood with such characteristics. This is the impression I have, but in truth I do not have enough data to state it.

Nuno Matos Silva

Organizational dynamics

Although there seems to be some new informal organizational structure involving the Roma population, the neighbours do not cooperate in the maintenance of the neighbourhood and there don't seem to be any relevant activities, equipments or services being provided for the neighbours. A neighbour interviewed said that each one looks after his own house and porch. If some degradation in the building is causing problems, the neighbour most affected must make pay for the reparation work. The neighbours said that there are no organized condos and it would be impossible to create them, since most of the neighbours would never comply with such an arrangement.

A representative from the City Council fears that the building may have structural damages, since no one controls what is being done. The neighbours confirmed that anyone can transform the houses and collective spaces without the knowledge and agreement of the other residents. This situation is quite obvious. The walls of the buildings are painted with different colours, usually white or different tonalities of blue. It is also possible to observe irregular brick constructions in the balconies.

Networking

The neighbourhood is isolated but for some local NGOs operating in the area that provide social services and the neighbours refuse any institutional proximity. A

representative of the GABIP ex-SAAL explains how unfruitful the City Councils' attempts have been so far.

We had a meeting, trying to get closer to the population, we had a BIP-ZIP project with which we tried to approach the population, namely with the president of Pastoral dos Ciganos, where we managed to have some dialogue to implement a playground, we could not implement it, it went wrong... because of the neighbours, there were some conflicts among the neighbours at the time we were implementing the playground and the construction company eventually abandoned the project, but the work was started, it just was not finished... We also had a meeting with the Pastoral dos Ciganos in the neighbourhood, where we wanted to get closer to the population, who was with us to bring about this meeting was architect Tiago Mota Saraiva, we went to the meeting, there was an approach, but the most relevant neighbours did not come.

Me - Who would these people be? The leaders of the Roma community?

The leaders of the Roma community said at the time that they were going to the meeting, before, when there was some local mobilization through Atelier Mob with architect Tiago Mota Saraiva, but the people did not appear. What we think is that this population is not very interested in the regularization of the neighbourhood.

Me - Was this Roma population part of the original housing cooperative?

No.

M - What about the original neighbours?

They were the ones who went to the meeting. They are elderly residents, they went to the meeting, many of them took the original documents. They live a little frightened in the middle of the Roma ethnic group ... these people live in the houses, they are original members of the cooperative, they are few, they live surrounded by Roma ethnic groups that try to take their houses from them. There are people who are afraid to leave home in fear that when they arrive from shopping, the grocery store, there is already a Roma family occupying their home and it is very complicated in these social situations, where people already have a fragility because of their advanced age and live a little frightened.

Me - How many people went to the meeting?

10.

Me - In Portugal Novo they had this meeting but the process did not advance?

No.

Me - They did not constitute a neighbourhood committee nor anything?

No, no ... They had the same opportunities of the other cooperatives, there were BIP-ZIP projects, but the approach to the community ...

Me - Was that the differencing factor?

That was the differencing factor.

Representative of the GABIP ex-SAAL

Capacity for self-organization

The cooperative collapsed and no other organization emerged to take its place, which places Portugal Novo in the worst scenario in terms of capacity for self-organization, miles away from the remaining neighbourhoods. According to the neighbours, the cooperative Portugal Novo collapsed under the burden of distrust. Its initial main leaders, Armindo Neves and Afonso Barreto, fought hard to get the process on its way but the constant and apparently unfounded accusations of misuse of funds by the neighbours led them to abandon the organization soon after the houses had been occupied, in the mid eighties. In the beginning of the process, Nuno Matos Silva already had some indications that this could eventually happen.

The skill was the skill of the “biscate” and “desenrasca”, it was not organizational know-how, neither of solidarity nor anything. Was there a solution for that population or not? There was, but it was not that way, through self-management.

Me - But did you realize that from the very beginning?

No, I became aware during the process, not from an early stage.

Me - Was it gradual?

It was gradual, more clearly to the end. And then when I saw the best ones, that they too were getting tired. This husband of D. Cristina, Armindo, was a brilliant, dedicated fellow, Afonso too, but Afonso himself got tired, Afonso was a five stars guy for whom I would put my hands on the fire. Mr. Armindo was older, but he was a venerable, respectable guy, There were more, for example in that photograph that I sent you, there were others who inspired trust, they seemed to be honest people.

Me - But the neighbours did not comply with (the payments) for lack of trust in the leaders or simply because of their personal posture?

At the time the payments began, it was at the time that I stopped going (to the neighbourhood). When I saw the people inside the houses, I had already done my duty, it was the time when I started not to accompany and I do not know how it happened, I do not have data, I have no memory from that moment, I can say a lot of nonsense. I know that the best at that time pushed things forward and when it got to the point of housing the people in the new houses they were already tired.

Me - Exactly of what?

Of the distrust, of the difficulty of answering for the neighbours, of the disregard, probably of the insinuations, false suspicions, I do not know.

Me - There was already that fret.

There was already that fret because things took a long time.

Nuno Matos Silva

The new board of directors was unable to get hold of the process and soon after the cooperative went bankrupt. The ground floor spaces that were still vacant or occupied by the cooperative's office and its grocery shop were invaded and vandalized by Roma people, the equipments were stolen and the cooperatives documentation was lost. Armindo Neves' widow still recalls seeing documents scattered around the neighbourhood, which had been simply thrown away into the streets. Some neighbours, confronted with this situation, began to sell the keys of their houses to newcomers, mostly, but not only, Roma people. There are also reports of punctual

forcible occupations of houses when their inhabitants were not at home, usually elderly isolated people that had been away at the hospital. Some houses have now been irregularly transacted over and over again and some are even rented.

According with the relatives of Afonso Barreto, recently the neighbourhood has become quieter, with the Roma people making an effort to get integrated. However, although there has been some informal talk about constituting condos to manage the buildings, so far the neighbours were unable to get organized and the degradation continues, prompted by the lack of maintenance but also by damages caused by some of its inhabitants. Unlike what happened in Curraleira under the GABIP ex-SAAL, in Portugal Novo the City Council has been unable to prompt the neighbours to constitute an association, for there is no one willing to take the leadership. Considering the irregular way through which the houses have been transacted, it is not clear how many neighbours would be in favour of the regularization of the neighbourhood and this feeling of uncertainty and possibly even threat deters all such initiatives.

Affiliation to the dominant system of beliefs

Since the houses are not regularized and officially cannot be sold, the neighbours sell the keys and by this simple process complete transactions that seem to be quite frequent. A representative of the City Council reported that often the neighbours do not pay water, gas or electricity, they get it through illegal means.

But there are people, particularly in Portugal Novo, who do not wish for the regularization of their houses... In Portugal Novo, most do not want that because most of the population living in Portugal Novo is Roma, they have housing without paying anything, many of them, they do not pay for water, they do not pay for electricity, they get those services illegally... We tried to make a new meeting with the population in Portugal Novo. It was also a meeting of our councilwoman Paula Marques, who has been the great promoter of this process... she is physically very close to the territory, everyone knows her, she knows the name of everyone and it is a friend, in quotation marks, of this population and is very interested in solving this process ... only in this way, with a political official committed and motivated to solve this problem, this can be

feasible, because in fact it is a very difficult job... It is a territory that has 40 years of inoperability, of disinvestment by any institution, and there is also a discredit among the population that this investment could be possible and this regularization, which owes a great deal to the councilwomen Helena Roseta and Paula Marques, who eventually seized this territory.

Representative of the GABIP ex-SAAL

Alto do Moinho

Overview

The genesis of Alto do Moinho differs significantly from the remaining SAAL neighbourhoods under analysis. It was a part of the Integrated Plan of Zambujal, implanted in the slope of a hill, on top of which is located the mill that gives name to the neighbourhood. Between 1962 and 1968, five contracts were signed between the Oeiras City Council, the Habitat construction company, the Santa Isabel Foundation and other entities. This foundation was intended to provide social and medical assistance to the neighbours, but its main objective was the construction of a neighbourhood for the 500 families of the Santas Martas and Pereiro shanty towns located in Algés. None of the contracts were fulfilled. The Integrated Plan of Zambujal was finally created as a result of an agreement signed in 1973 between the City Council, the FFH, the Family and Social Action Institute, Habitat and Joaquim Peña Mechó, the real estate promoter (IHRU, 29/11/2016)⁵⁵. Architect Silva Dias thus recalls the process that originated the neighbourhood:

The case of Zambujal is specific, there was an agreement. The neighbourhood of Santas Martas was a shanty town and a new urbanization was built next to it. From a commercial point of view, the promoter felt hurt because the neighbourhood was there, as Zé Maria (one of the main initial leaders) said with humour, when the works reached the 5th floor they thought it would be better to remove the shanty town, and an agreement was made with the FFH, even before April 25th, to give the money to the FFH to relocate the neighbourhood elsewhere ... they gave a reasonable amount with a very specific condition, they had to remove the neighbourhood from there in a relatively short time, even very short. However, the April 25th came and the FFH took the money from Pena Machó, who was the promoter, and integrated the neighbourhood in a SAAL operation. In that aspect the Zambujal is not a genuine operation.

Architect Silva Dias

⁵⁵ http://www.monumentos.pt/Site/APP_PagesUser/SIPA.aspx?id=28225

Unlike in the remaining SAAL projects, the brigade that supported the neighbourhood was located not in an independent architect studio but in the offices of the FFH, which reinforced its institutional connection.

In the case of Zambujal, I think this is a factor of success, it was the FFH that gave the support, we worked in the FFH ... the land had to be expropriated, there were some procedures and the FFH provided the guidelines ... it had a support which of course would not have if it had been an order to an atelier.... Zambujal had an important fact, there was an institution that accompanied the process... the state was there.

Me - Even during the implementation of SAAL, the relation of the projects with the state was not always very easy, but in your case maybe this did not happen.

In our case it did not happen because deep down the author of the projects was the state itself ... there is no doubt that there was a very remarkable state intervention here.

Architect Silva Dias

Considering these advantages, the process went more smoothly here than in the remaining neighbourhoods. Moreover, the neighbourhood benefited much from the proximity to IKEA. It now has new accesses, valuable services and important equipments which greatly contribute to its natural appeal. It is not surprising that there are signs of an initial process of gentrification, with available houses being rapidly sold to outsiders.

Characterization of the neighbours

The original residents, like in the other neighbourhoods, were uneducated, undifferentiated workers from the province with numerous children, which worked mostly in factories around Lisbon and struggled hard to make ends meet.

The neighbours came from Alentejo, also from the north, they came to work in Lisbon. At that time the rents were too high and they did not have the money to afford a house. There was a lady who happened to build a shack there and from then on the neighbourhood began to widen... The neighbours came to work in the factories, there was Lisnave, Setenave was in Setubal, there was the petrochemical, there was Sorefame, they came to the pasta factory and to the national steel industry... Around Lisbon there was a lot of work, a lot of factories in Sacavém, Vilafranca, Alverca... It was very difficult, people lived very poorly then. Today is the same, today people do not afford an household with the income they have and at the time it was the same thing, you did not earn 600 € but earned at that time a hundred and few escudos, not enough to afford a house. And the people at that time were different, they had 5 and 6 children and today it's 1, 2 and 2 is already a lot and the children come later, they have children later, it used to be at 19, 18 years old, they married and they already had children. It was a problem to get a house.

Sr. Alinho

Political affiliation

Both leaders interviewed were once affiliated to the MDP/CDE, but they claim the association always maintained its independence from political parties, although most neighbours sympathized with left wing parties, particularly in the late seventies and early eighties. The association thrived because the leaders, independently of their own political sympathies, were able to take advantage of a political context that initially was very favourable to popular mobilization and afterwards maintained a good relation with the different political parties present at the local level.

Alberto -The Parish Council is PSD, but I assure you that we have good relations with them, we the association, here in the neighbourhood there are people of all political parties as everywhere, we neighbourhood association have very good relations with the Parish Council of Alfragide and we also had very good relations with the PS Parish Council, we only belong to Alfragide since there was the division, we belonged to Buraca.

Me - And you also had a good relationship with them?

Alinho - We had, great. And we always attended the assemblies of the Parish Council and some of the City Council.

Alberto Nunes and Sr. Alinho

In addition, they also nourished good connections with relevant political officials that could facilitate their access to political decisions concerning the welfare of the neighbourhood.

They (the initial leaders) knew how to take advantage of the moment; through some influences and a lot of perseverance and stubbornness they were able to benefit from the situation and were also advised by people who were in key positions, which gave them some guidelines on what to do and how; these were people who were in the meanders of things.

Alberto Nunes

Organizational dynamics

Presently the association has a bar that is rented to an outsider and they still develop some activities for the community, such as karate lessons. These activities provide a fundamental income that, although meagre, contributes to the maintenance of the association:

To tell you the truth, we are currently going against the tide, as long as there are half a dozen stubborn people who come here for nothing to keep this going. From what do we live now, the association is able to continue how? We do not even have a collector to collect the quotas at the moment ... We have some quotas, the collector no longer wants to collect because many of them are mistreated when they go to the neighbours' houses. We gave the collector 20% to collect quotas and at this point I had to make an information only for the members, because we no longer give this information to a non-member, it does not make sense. We sent some information, and at the moment we live from some of the events we organize here, the rental of the

venue for weddings and baptisms, the karate teacher, there's a teacher who gives some classes, 50% for him 50 % for the association, we provided the whole logistics, and we had zumba classes here but not anymore. There is some income from the quotas, the bar, but the money we make is to make ends meet. We have some money in cash, we had to raise once 5000 € because the bathrooms were all broken, it was degraded, we managed to paint it, we hired a mason to come but it was we who worked the floor with those machines, we the directors, and he just did the job of putting the mosaics there. "

Alberto Nunes

With the support of the Parish Council they also maintain a traditional folk group. The activities developed by the association rely strongly on the good will of the leaders that through the years used their own private resources to make them happen:

We had a group of athletics, we had several activities there, he (Alinho) had a station wagon with 7 places and he always used and paid for the fuel. My van always goes from one side to the other, we have to go get this and that, we have to go get bottles of water at Macro and use our own cars, it's all voluntary.

Alberto Nunes

Networking

The leaders feel that that the mediating role of the association is valued by the local power, considering it acts in representation of the neighbours, aggregates common interests and is a suitable formal partner.

The institutions themselves also suffer with the discontentment of the population, and when there is a neighbourhood association, which is a tiny thing, a little satellite, we are speaking the same language.

Alberto Nunes

Nevertheless, there is a perceived lack of a privileged communication channel with the City Council so that the association can inform it immediately, as soon as some neighbour violates housing regulations by doing unauthorized alterations to his house, which sometimes happens. Moreover, the City Council does not always speedily answers to the association's requests, although in the end there is a positive evaluation of institutional feed-back.

Alinho - I have not had meetings with the councilmen for a long time, but when I had I said bluntly to them: you abandoned the association. The City Council abandoned the association. We had open doors in any City or Parish Council, we were always welcomed ... We were despised because we should have an open contact with the City Council for when our neighbours do not comply with the neighbourhood's requirements.

Me - Does the City Council always respond to your requests?

Alberto: Not always.

Me - But eventually it does.

Alberto – Eventually it does.

Sr. Alinho and Alberto Nunes

The support of the City Council to the neighbourhood, although it is recognized and valued, it is regarded as insufficient and is associated with electoral interests. However, this lack of communication is seen as a two way street that results from a passiveness on both sides; the authorities which are too much oriented towards their own self-interests and the neighbours who are not dynamic enough. In the beginning they were extremely active and took part in all municipal assemblies, but they gradually lost the motivation to participate and it is acknowledged that this fact compromises the association's capacity to get the City Council to consider its concerns.

Alinho - The City Council of Amadora has not done much here, besides cleaning the streets, because we pay our taxes, we pay the water, we pay the light, we pay the IMI...

Me - But the relationship with the City Council is good, when you need something they comply.

Alberto - When we have elections they are always more receptive.

Alinho - Yes, yes, they recognize us a little more, because we lend them our venue so they can come to give speeches and I do not know what else, but afterwards they forget. We should have a link to the City Council, they should acknowledge more what we have done over the years.

Alberto - But it is also true, to be honest I have to say this, the boards of directors of the association have not been very intervenient... We have to be more active ... I went to the last two assemblies, here in the Parish Council, in Amadora they do not care much if we attend, if we do not go to their website, they do not publicize it much.

Sr. Alinho and Alberto Nunes

Despite the difficulties described, through the years it is possible to identify specific positive outcomes of a profitable relationship with the local and national authorities. For instance, the association successfully urged the City Council to implement some equipments that are in the common interest of the neighbourhood, such as a playground; a stream that passes near the neighbourhood was very polluted and attracted rats. Acting at the request of the neighbours, the association negotiated with the City Council that agreed to get it cleaned. Now it has been solved and some neighbours are even able to use the water to raise chickens and ducks; there were some robberies around the neighbourhood and the association negotiated with the police to be there more often; the association also successfully negotiated with the Ministry of Education to get a school built there.

Capacity for self-organization

In the beginning of the process, the leaders had to go from door to door to convince the neighbours to join in, since the large majority was reluctant and passive. There were never many neighbours actively involved in the associative effort and there are neighbours that never did anything for the neighbourhood. Through the years, it was a small group of no more than five people that kept things going. Since 1995, the neighbours' motivation to actively engage in the association declined even more. They seldom attend general assemblies, many no longer pay the quotas and they are not interested in participating in the management of the association. The private ownership of the houses further hindered neighbourhood mobilization.

Me - Do people participate in general assemblies?

Alberto: Very little, now very little.

Me - And at the time (the beginning of the process)?

Alinho - At the time, at the time they showed up because they were interested in the houses.

Me - Do you feel a difference, from 95, that was when the people became owners of their houses, they demobilized from the association?

Alberto: Yes, yes, completely.

Alinho: Well, they began to demobilize.

Alberto: Increasingly, there is more and more demobilization.

Alberto Nunes and Sr. Alinho

In the last election it was extremely difficult to gather enough members to join in; they had to ask the neighbours who were in the assembly to give their names but most of them refused. Sr. Alinho is still actively and formally engaged despite his advanced age because no one else will take over. Alberto has also been active in the association for a long time and has occupied different functions. He considers that the leaders are reluctant to let the association simply fade away after all the effort that has

been involved in it; they do it out of stubbornness and not out of personal interest since no one profits from this involvement.

There are now seven people formally integrated in the managing structure of the association, but in the last meeting before the interview, only two showed up. For two times they were unable to elect a new board of directors because there were not enough members, and it was necessary to nominate a temporary administration until the election finally occurred in an extraordinary assembly. If this situation becomes systematic, it may endanger the continuity of the association. Of the 240 houses in the neighbourhood, there are presently but 130 members in the association and about half do not pay the quotas. Of those who pay, there are some who belong to the same household. Alberto stated that in his house there are three paying members, he, his wife and his daughter. Some houses have been sold to outsiders and these newcomers usually do not join the association.

The burden of the free riders in the neighbourhood is a frustrating aspect of the process for the leaders, who feel their work is disregarded by many neighbours that are solely oriented towards their own private concerns.

When things go bad, they always come to the association, even if they do not pay their quotas; when things are good, the houses are theirs, they simply do not care for the association. If the neighbours paid quotas and we managed to raise some money from these quotas, we could even make some improvements, the association could hire a person, fix a wall that is broken, paint, we could keep a waiting list, we could not solve everything, but we could do that, as long as we had the neighbours' money we could make improvements. There are houses here that are run down ... we know that the neighbours smoke, drink, but then the houses are run down. We could, in a way, maintain a certain order in the territory, to maintain the houses for the most disadvantaged, there are people here at the moment, old men who have low retirement pensions and who have difficulties, we know that.

Alberto Nunes

There is a perceived fear that in the future the association may be extinguished due to this lack of support from most of the neighbours, considering that, in the words of the leaders, each one only cares about himself. The association is only kept by the determination of a bunch of stubborn people that take the trouble of keeping it alive. They organize some events that provide a little income, rent their venue for weddings and parties, receive half of the payments for the karate lessons and receive the rent of the bar. Most of this small income is spent every month in current expenses and there is but a very few for extraordinary expenses. When it became necessary to do some maintenance work in their office, the directors themselves had to do it with the help of an hired stonemason. The leaders state that the little work there is represents a lot for the people involved because they are all volunteers. They also try to get the younger generation involved, but even if they agree to take part in the association, usually they lose motivation after two or three years. They need the cooperation of these younger people because of the new technologies, which the older members are unable to use. Due to all the mobilization difficulties, the future of the association is uncertain.

From the moment they cut the umbilical cord, it was definitely cut, but there should always remain a connection, even when the houses became the private property of the neighbours, which is what is happening now, the house is mine, it is paid for... but there should always be a connection with the association because the tendency is not for the houses to end, the tendency is for the association to close and give everything to the City Council... It's each one for himself.

Alberto Nunes

Affiliation to the dominant system of beliefs

The payment of the loan to the FFH went quite smoothly. Initially, the loan was to be repaid in 25 years, but the neighbours managed to pay the total amount in just 15 years and in 1995 the houses were all paid for. They never missed a single payment. When one of the neighbours was in financial trouble and could not pay, the association would pay for him with money from the quotas and from a saving the association had.

At some point there were already four or five neighbours with delayed payments, so the leaders decided not to issue new claim checks until the former payments were regularized. The neighbours had to go personally to the association to unblock the situation, otherwise, after three missed payments, the association would inform the FFH, and the neighbour could lose his house. Besides this risk, the association always charged interests in all delayed payments. These control measures proved effective and in the end all the neighbours managed to liquidate the debt on their houses.

It was like that, we agreed with IGHAPE, we made an agreement with IGHAPE, the first payment reversed on behalf of the association so that we had a fund for these situations, for every neighbour who missed a payment the association said nothing, we already had some available capital, we could pay his share. Later this neighbour was called here. What we started to do, when there were faults, then there was more than one, there were already 3 or 4, and we had to find a solution. What we did, for every neighbour who was behind on his payments, we did not issue new receipts, he was obliged to come here, because he had to come here to solve his problem. We would send it to IGHAPE and IGHAPE would seize the house. In order not to lose the house he had to come here. We charged interests on all delayed payments... we never admitted more than 3, 4 failures... we were very lucky with the people who came to live here, we still had some hard times going from door to door, but we succeeded.

Sr. Alinho

Conclusions

The continuity of the SAAL beyond the revolutionary period is a living proof of the participatory path dependency generated by the revolution. The program was terminated, but the organizations it originated did not roll over and die, they maintained their activity to the present day. Fernandes (2014a) discerningly exposes the main explanatory factor behind this phenomenon: radical social and economical transformations were not incompatible with political democratization since all occurred simultaneously. While ambitious participatory experimentations were taking place, the representative system was being consolidated. Moreover, the SAAL seems to have contributed to a successful revolutionary transition to democracy. In an highly tense and volatile situation, it allowed for a relieve of the pressure around one of the main popular claims, the right to housing. An immediate solution was provided trough institutional, although extremely flexible, means, assuming that there was good will on both sides to cooperate for the concretization of a common interest. The popular movements agreed to contain their action, while the state accepted to share its power.

The SAAL is an expressive example that a radical participatory program can provide a valuable contribution to a successful transition to democracy in a revolutionary and highly mobilizing context and, moreover, it can foster its future quality, with only a major obstacle standing on its way: the institutional unwillingness to make it last. It is a practical experiment with real implications, a test into a new social organization, a small scale trial of the real socialism considering it is not purely theoretical, it involves a confrontation with reality. However, the critics of a peaceful transition to socialism may be right when they regard it as unfeasible, considering that once more the multiplication of «reason» did not occur by means of its diffusion (Thompson, 1963, p. 785). Regardless of all expectations, possibilities and experimentations, the capitalist paradigm triumphed while the socialism dream subsided. Once capitalism imposed itself, the SAAL was faced with a question Cohen (2016, p.59) left unanswered: to which extent is socialism coherent with a human nature wrought by capitalism, considering the forces that can hinder its implementation can also boycott its efficiency.

A closer look into the toils of the SAAL organizations in a post-revolutionary democracy suggests a less optimistic reading of the path dependence generated by the revolutionary transition than the one provided by Bernardo (2015), Fernandes (2014) and Fishman (2011). The revolution did have a strong and long lasting effect in participation, but the inclusive potential of this participation is hindered by up-bottom approaches that are far from empowering, while the state relapsed into personalistic solutions for institutional problems. The communication channels between organized citizens and political elites are few and far between, the legislation is often ambiguous and discouraging and a generalized distrust between citizens and institutions compromises any serious attempts at genuinely equalizing participatory arrangements.

The organizations that were constituted under the SAAL retained some of its revolutionary spirit. Although they are usually not overtly confrontational, they are also not tamed, like those organizations that are now often constituted with the support of up-bottom participatory approaches. These organizations are not socialized into state dependency; they always relied on voluntary work and internal resources to solve their own problems, so they are not depending on project funding or any other kind of state or agency support for their activity. For that reason, they are much more independent and invulnerable to capture than most non-profit or ground root organizations that usually operate in neighbourhoods categorized as deprived. Instead of dedicating themselves to flower arrangements and street football, they are focused on all policy making that affects them and are willing to act independently of the political correctness of their action, as is the case of the joint efforts made by the cooperatives in Fonseca e Calçada and Bela Flor to get a reimbursement of the stamp tax they understand was unduly charged.

They will try to achieve this goal through legal institutionalized channels and not through demonstrations or other confrontational actions, and it is not clear if they will succeed. Nevertheless, their independency can constitute an extremely important contribution to the quality of democracy. They are well informed, extremely attentive and very unwilling to let things slide when they feel their interests have been harmed. They are also quite reasonable in their demands and expectations, showing a deep understanding of their civic rights and obligations in a democratic system. If they were

more interconnected and less residual, they could perform an important governance role, by externally controlling and supervising the legal and executive institutional performance.

Despite their dispersion and reduced quantitative significance, their main limitation is internal. The managing bodies of the organizations display a considerable crystallization and the associative mass is mostly composed of free riders that never had an active role in the fight for common interests, goals and expectations. Although there was a natural tendency towards this state of affairs, with a few natural leaders assuming the responsibility while the most passive neighbours stood by enjoying the results, this tendency was enhanced by the general adhesion to an organizational model of representative governance.

The reduced dimension of these organizations would certainly make direct democracy a feasible option. The board of directors could have been rotationally chosen, though a random selection or through any criteria that would guarantee general participation, such as alphabetical order. This way all neighbours could benefit from the participatory experience and these organizations would be much more equalitarian and open. If this had been successfully achieved, the SAAL neighbourhoods could certainly constitute an interesting participatory role model that with the necessary adaptations could be exported to other political areas and geographical contexts.

Moving from what could have been to what it is, the relation of the state, both at a local and a central level, with the SAAL organizations, suggests a process of repatrimonialization, since its ambiguous and chaotic nature is not in the least typical of a modern impersonal state. If during the revolutionary period the relations, although often conflicting, were rather open and transparent, the situation changed dramatically in the context of liberal democracy. One of the main symptoms of this affliction is a reduced efficiency level of the government that is rather notorious at the macro economical level.

In this specific case, it is possible to observe this phenomenon in a deficient management of the relations with organized civil society, particularly regarding the SAAL neighbourhoods. The rules and regulations are often conflicting and unclear,

while the administrative practice frequently lacks quality and transparency. Moreover, it is extremely difficult, if not completely impossible, to determine the intentionality and accountability of the actors involved; things happen the way they do and no one seems to be responsible for it. For instance, when the documentation on several SAAL neighbourhoods went missing from the City Council, the matter was presented as an accident for which there was no one accountable. This reality presents two interconnected aspects: a good-willed personalism, in which personal favours are granted by state officials to the neighbourhoods to compensate for institutional deficiencies that originated potentially unsolvable problems; and a welfarist patronage, in which participative approaches are substituted by top-down charity approaches to neutralize the contentious potential of the targeted populations.

The overall impact of such phenomena on democratic quality could not be positive. Political elites are reinforced as democratic accountability decreases and programmatic agendas, based on impartial general benefits, give way to the patron-client interests of specific groups. The explanation of this state of affairs can be found in profound social and cultural characteristics of the Portuguese society, namely in the persistence of oligarchic features in the Portuguese representative system. Villaverde Cabral (2003) raises a pertinent hypothesis when he questions if there is in Portugal a persistent historical distance between governing elites and the people that survived the revolutionary transition to democracy. The answer is yes. With the demobilization process that followed the democratic consolidation, the electoral routine and the reoligarchization of the political class, the distance to power once again produced its effects over political practice.

Most important in a long-term comparative study of the SAAL in Lisbon, because it is the most obvious signal of this reality, is the persisting authoritarianism enclosed in public administration that dictates a discriminatory submission to bureaucratic procedures. After the revolutionary period, and even during it, the SAAL neighbourhood organizations were submerged in a Kafkaesque paraphernalia of despotic, arbitrary and conflicting norms and regulations that boycotted their action. A good example is the ludicrous situation in Fonecas e Calçada, that in one hand is considered a vulnerable neighbourhood and in the other had to pay a stamp tax

equivalent to luxury real estate. As a last resource, the neighbourhoods relapsed into personal relations within institutions to solve their pending issues, which can be included in the vertical relations of intermediation characteristic of the amoral familism described by Banfield (1958).

Villaverde Cabral regards these rigid and sluggish administrative procedures as more than an inefficiency of the political system; they are deliberate functional instruments of power. As party oligarchies flood public administration through patronage, the vicious circle reinforces itself on and on. Fukuyama (2015, p.281) presents a process of peaceful reform based in a coalition of groups interested in an efficient and incorrupt government as a way towards the modernization of the state. In this process, the emergence of new social groups that are not interested in the patrimonialist system can contribute significantly to break the vicious circle of extraction (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2013, p. 434-437) which turns their involvement in politics into a fundamental tool in the transition to, and maintenance of, a modern state.

The SAAL provides encouraging examples on the participatory potential enclosed in the Portuguese civil society. Despite the most worrying features already described that indicate a tendency towards neopatrimonialism and a prevalence of some aspects of amoral familism, there are further important features that cannot be disregarded. Although the neighbours exhibited a considerable distrust among themselves and towards institutions, in most neighbourhoods they still complied with the main fundamental cooperative requirements, such as the payments of the loans on the houses, so that the processes could meet a successful conclusion. Moreover, through more than 40 years there were leaders willing to dedicate their time and energy to the selfless management of the cooperatives, since personal compensations were few or inexistent.

The neighbours who succeeded presented particular characteristics; they were mostly first generation migrants from the country side with a highly desired common purpose, scarce formal education, very limited economical resources and no prior participatory experience, which lived in relatively small and homogeneous communities. Once the opportunity presented itself they took it and stubbornly held

on to it in an hostile environment. The democratic experience did not contribute to the neighbours' participatory capacity which pre-existed it, considering the initial difficulties in the involvement of the associative masses felt during the revolutionary period persisted to the present day.

This fact is easily understandable considering the lack of institutional support to empowered participatory arrangements and the generalized lack of a participatory culture, which makes it easy to enforce participation from above as if it was something more than it actually is. The SAAL neighbourhoods are ill suited for this kind of arrangement, due to their strong empowered genesis. As such, the neighbourhoods are faced with a mixture of historical amnesia and bureaucratic boycott that seeks to minimize their relevance as a living proof of the participatory potential of apparently destitute populations.

In the neighbourhoods with a higher prevalence of city folk, the distrust was higher, the compliance with the norms and regulations of the cooperatives were lower and the leaders were unable or unwilling to bring the processes to a successful conclusion. This suggests that the participatory potential is not generalized, it emerges in specific circumstances with particular actors. It results from critical antecedents that transcend the political opportunity generated during the revolution, which has often absorbed all the credit for the activation of neighbourhood participation in Portugal. It was indeed critical, since without it, it would hardly have occurred. However, there are other aspects that need to be dully considered, for they present a considerable explanatory potential in the long term path of the neighbourhoods. The SAAL itself was conceptualized during the last years of Estado Novo by a civil servant that in the context of an authoritarian state was granted enough room to move to come up with it. By then, the neighbours' dormant participatory potential also had been marinating in appalling living conditions and the powerlessness to change them.

The process was more successful in the smaller and more homogeneous neighbourhoods, which seems to be self explanatory: these projects were less complex considering they involved fewer resources and people. Oliveira and Marconi (1978) consider that large projects, such as the one that was to be built in Casal Ventoso but was never constructed, could not respect the process's methodology, considering the

confrontation with the population was disguised when the number of neighbours overcame a certain limit, transforming the process in a traditional relation between technical staff and service users. The testimonies also suggest that in the largest and more dispersed neighbourhoods, such as Curraleira, there was a stronger orientation of the neighbours towards the informal market or even towards criminal activities, which made the regularization of the inhabited space less interesting, considering it could pose a threat to this way of life.

However, the story does not end here. One of the projects joined two different neighbourhoods, Fonseca, a shanty town of first generation migrants, and Calçada, a provisory state neighbourhood that housed city folk that had been displaced from several areas around Lisbon. The two cooperatives shared a single project, but the process evolved differently in each one of them. The cooperative in Calçada was deactivated for longer and it suffered a considerable embezzlement by one of its directors. While in Fonseca the debt to the IHRU is paid for, Calçada is still liquidating it.

According with the leaders from both neighbourhoods, the neighbours in Fonseca exhibited a deeper feeling of personal responsibility, considering they always had to fend for themselves. In Calçada, the neighbours saw themselves as possessing a higher social status because they were not living in shacks but in provisory social housing, and they expected the state to take full responsibility for a more consistent resolution of their housing problems. This suggests that up-bottom charity approaches may be, to some extent, incapacitating. The beneficiaries of such paternalistic policies may become addicted to it, which translates into a passiveness and unaccountability in the resolution of their own problems.

The possibility of this causal relation naturally demands for further empirical support for its confirmation, but the SAAL in Lisbon, and particularly the SAAL in Fonseca e Calçada, provides consistent evidence in this direction. As such, the implementation of the SAAL in Lisbon suggests that the process was more successful in small closely knit communities who had not been socialized into state dependency and who were not oriented towards informal or even criminal activities.

Despite particular difficulties felt in given neighbourhoods due to their specific characteristics, the relevance of the SAAL for the quality of democracy is enormous. Coelho⁵⁶ (1986) provided an insightful reading of this contribution in a detailed analysis of the program made ten years after its implementation. From within the state apparatus, she was able to shrewdly determine the impact of the SAAL in the public administration, an impact towards modernization and away from neopatrimonialism.

In her view, the SAAL represented a rupture in the state apparatus that imposed a new dynamics in the public administration, a dynamics that demanded for a closer relation with civil society: it was an experiment in the democratization of technical rationality, considering the experts had to work in a close relationship with the concerned citizens; it required a suppression of a centralized control, which was substituted by the prioritization of local specificities, bearing in mind general programmatic concerns; and it involved a strong transparency achieved through the liberalization of the access to information, in order to promote a public participation based in generalized trust. In the end, it involved sharing the power of the administration. As such, *“the SAAL was not a service against the state, but a service of the state designed for its transformation”* (p. 624). Due to its strong impact in the management of the city through a new organization of production, it implied an *“experiment of some of the most important aspects of a new possible development model for the country”* (p. 631).

In a low-trust society, the SAAL was a leap of faith that implied a tremendous trust of the state in some of its most deprived citizens, that were regarded as competent and honest enough to manage their own resettlement processes; it was an exception that demonstrated the enormous modernizing potential of political arrangements in which delegation and openness are possible. It was a micro-experiment of what Evans defined as *“embedded autonomy”*, a combination of *“corporate coherence and connectedness”* (1995, p. 12); it nurtured social ties with subordinate groups which would bind the state to society, creating continual institutionalized negotiation channels.

⁵⁶ Margarida Coelho is an architect that worked in the housing programs of the FFH from 1971 to 1981. She was responsible for the SAAL north from August 1974 to October 1976 and was part of the national coordination of the SAAL in 1976.

However, the coherence in the administration was never really there and the SAAL ended both as an *“asphyxiated experiment”* and a *“desirable solution”* (Coelho, 1986, p.634) that fell short of its potential due to all the obstacles it faced. According with Coelho, it involved a fast capacity of response in a public service that resulted from the external pressure of the popular movements and from an internal openness of the services to the proximity with the concerned citizens. However, this openness did not last long due to the absence of a real transformation of the state apparatus, which was unable to modernize itself.

Barata Salgueiro (1986) was in tune with this opinion, when she stated that after ten years it became clear that the revolution did not produce a decisive rupture in the housing market, which led to a perpetuation and even worsening of housing problems. Coelho observed that almost everything remained the same, or even worse due to the weight of more public servants and the lack of incentives for them to be more than simple *“gear parts”* (p. 623), subjected to a higher power that relentlessly controls all their movements and is accountable to no one. In her view, the problems raised by the SAAL were not technical, they were political and cultural. They were related with sharing the power, an idea that is a threat for a deeply rooted notion of a centralized state that is sustained in a public administration that disguises and absorbs social conflicts under the weight of bureaucracy and the rhetoric of public interest.

Alves Costa (1997) declared that it constituted an unprecedented innovation but its short duration did not allow for the consolidation of its underlying theory and practice. It was meant to transform the bureaucratic and corrupt local administration, but the opposite happen when the administrations hindered the process and compromised its viability. The City Councils, under the cloak of rationality and urban neutrality, displayed an obvious animosity towards the SAAL and alienated themselves from the projects.

The SAAL acquired a life of its own and began to transcend strict housing matters to concern itself with broader issues such as infrastructures and social or cultural equipments, and all this while the neighbourhood network of organizations was under a process of expansion and complexification. It was a practical methodological alternative that understood urban planning as a result of successive

consensus between the neighbours and the technical staff: *“from the particular to the general, from the neighbourhood to the city, from the right to the location to the right to the city”* (p. 68). However, in spite of the constant bureaucratic sabotage by the intermediary structures of territorial management that had their privileges threatened, the SAAL still left an important impression of the effects of neighbourhood participation in the city, which included a symbolic imprint of the beginning of a process that would become irreversible by the consolidating strength of its viability.

Portas (1978) had already declared that the main adversaries of the SAAL were the technical and administrative official entities that saw in it a strength that could menace their instituted power. The SAAL was regarded as a sabotage to planning; an appropriation by the citizens of technical exclusive functions; a competition with new autonomous agents; an imposition of new urban typologies that were contrary to the interests of the construction companies and, last but not least, an increase of the aggressiveness of organized popular movements that were weary of patiently waiting for solutions that never came and began to harass the administration. In his opinion, all these factors emerged from the internal contradictions of the state apparatus and the conflicting interests of the Portuguese society. Because of them, the SAAL was unable to constitute itself as a generalized reference for the autonomous popular movements, even if it guided them in the definition of procedures and objectives.

After forty years, a closer look into the SAAL neighbourhoods in Lisbon produces a strong impression of wasted potential. The posterior up-bottom participatory efforts made during the democratic period have been too modest and far between to produce any real impact in the modernization of the public administration. Even more ambitious measures such as the participatory budgeted are miles away from the empowering potential of the SAAL. Unlike the SAAL, who implied a deep reconfiguration of the structure and functioning of public services, posterior participatory arrangements were not designed with that transformative purpose, but with a reformist goal.

The revolutionary period shook the tree but not for long enough for the apples to fall, for if the instituted powers of the fascist regime were neutralized, namely through nationalizations, the state was not able to modernize itself as an expression of

the common good, considering particular private economical interests have been once again able to manipulate the political power for their own profit. There is a strong process of negative feedback that contributes to the perpetuation of a vicious cycle which benefits extractive institutions, understood as institutions created and maintained by elites with the purpose of benefiting themselves at the expense of the common good (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2013, p. 435; 475).

In the case of the SAAL, the program was perceived not as an opportunity, but as a threat by political officials that were in a position to discontinue it; they transferred the responsibility for the operations to the City Councils, which was a blow for the neighbourhood movements and the technical brigades that were assisting them, considering most municipal administrations were against the program. The institutional modernization was stopped before its transformative potential had fully unravelled.

The process faded away as new projects were not initiated, others were discontinued and the few resistant ones became isolated, had to reinvent themselves, sometimes with the reversion of their former logic (Bandeirinha, 2010), and lost their hold on the public administration. As was reported by Fukuyama (2015, p. 278-279), the patrimonialist features of the state can be extremely stable and resistant to change since they are constantly reinforcing themselves through a deeply rooted ideological framework and a well established hierarchical system. Elite groups are usually well organized and have a privileged access to resources that are fundamental for the perpetuation of their power. Under certain circumstances, they may be temporarily or permanently dislocated from power by other elite groups that are better organized, but they are seldom substituted by non elites.

In Southern European countries such as Portugal the modernization of the state is rendered troublesome by a powerful and generalized patronage system. In Portugal, a weak state with a feeble economy made its transition into democracy under the pressure of intense popular movements that demanded for steep effective action. In the end, it originated a fragile capitalist system that lacked broad opportunities for all. As a consequence, it was easily captured by new elite groups and by mass political

parties that had the power to distribute rare and highly coveted favours, considering it was not consistent enough to resist it.

The rural populations that constituted the SAAL neighbourhoods in Lisbon were culturally susceptible to the individual favours that constitute the basis of a subordinate personal client-patron relation and rapidly stopped fighting for broad public policies, a concept new to them and difficult to apprehend given their lack of experience with legitimate and modern democratic institutions. The urban population had been socialized into state dependency and had a different understanding of patronage, which for them was large scale and translated into clientelism. They expected the state to provide social housing for them and as such were not very motivated to actively participate in the process through the cooperatives.

The modernizing elite that was behind programs such as the SAAL was not in the least compact and closely knit around common purposes. Soon they lost themselves in internal disputes around technicalities and ideological discrepancies, while influential political officials quickly put aside the ideals of democracy and found creative ways of using the patron-client relations in their favour. If Estado Novo had already been affected by networks of patronage and lacked a professionalized bureaucracy, the new democracy easily imported and adapted these features, for the ambiguity and unaccountability of a complex set of contradictory rules, regulations and practices favoured their perpetuation. The socialist orientation of the SAAL could have rendered this perpetuation more difficult, as it would remove some fundamental instruments of patronage (coveted land, housing and equipments), from the control of the elites involved in such relations and place it in the hands of the neighbours through a transparent and participatory process. But as it was said, the forces invested in the modernization of the state were not powerful and consistent enough to carry it through.

A revolution does not necessarily produce significant institutional changes. An important causal factor for institutional transformation is the presence of wide coalitions that are interested in the constitution of inclusive institutions. In an highly unequal society, the constitution of these coalitions demands for the empowerment of large sectors of society, in order to promote a truly pluralist polity. In this process the

presence of strong and meaningful civil society organizations that are able to coordinate the interests of the population is extremely important, as long as they are able to avoid capture by former or emerging elites and can participate effectively in the constitution of the transforming coalition (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2013, p. 543-552).

The SAAL was an important instrument for the reinforcement of these civil society organizations and promoted their integration in a broader network of modernization. It constituted an effort to reform the public sector that could have contributed to improve its performance, transparency and accountability. Reversely, its demise seriously compromised the transformation of a vicious circle into a virtuous one. The persisting organizational dysfunction results from the appropriation of the administration by private interests, the same that are not in the least interested in any significant reform because they lacked strong incentives to change, namely because the citizens are unable to exert pressure from below since they are themselves predisposed to clientelism and patronage.

Portugal can be regarded as a case of “*modernization without development*” (Fukuyama, 2015, pp. 718-719). In the absence of a robust industrial sector, the emergence of a new educated middle class and a strong industrial proletariat was feeble and a large sector of urban poor ended up in the informal market. They were joined by migrants recently arrived from the country side, which frequently reproduced their rural lifestyles in Lisbon, with their small gardens as the main symptom of this reality. Allen et al (2004, p. 190) situate Portugal in the context of Southern European countries, which underwent a process of «late, rapid and massive urbanization» as a result of the disarticulation of the rural economy and the growth of the tertiary sector in the cities, and not as a result of industrialization.

An aspect of the perpetuation of the rural way of life is the reliance on patrons to get access to coveted resources, a necessary strategy in an unequal society that lacks opportunities. These relations are private and oppose the development of a common identity around common goals. Most leaders reported low levels of trust among the neighbours and a persisting difficulty in their active participation in the cooperatives. The absence of a consistent collective mobilization around common

purposes is a fertile ground for the establishment of patron-client relations that feed on personal benefits and rent seeking.

The first country in the third wave of democratizations, Portugal seems to share a major problem with its successors, despite its revolutionary transition: the democratic institutions imposed themselves before a strong, modern and effective state could be constructed. Fukuyama (2015, p. 690-691) argues that when the democracy is introduced before the modern state is consolidated, it often results in a weakening of the quality of the government, considering the construction of the state and the construction of democracy are two different things that are not necessarily mutually reinforcing. In the Portuguese case, the widespread networks of patronage make a meritocratic administration difficult to implement and place considerable dangers to bureaucratic autonomy, considering it can easily be used for particular purposes, namely through appointments for public offices that are not open to democratic control and are not sustained in merit.

In the case of the SAAL neighbourhoods in Lisbon, a relative bureaucratic autonomy allows for their problems to be solved by particular agents in the administration, but this autonomy results more from a set of excessive, contradictory and overlapping mandates and regulations than from a rational option. Bureaucrats confronted with specific and potentially unsolvable problems often choose which rules to apply because correct procedures cannot be verified in such a complex and chaotic myriad of regulations, originating an arbitrary micromanagement. They are usually good willed people with no private gains in mind, but in different contexts other interests may be at stake. The level of autonomy depends on specific circumstances and opportunities, and not on the degree of capacity of the administration. More rules do not translate into more control, since there is a transparency and accountability deficit.

As time goes by and neoliberal democracy imposes itself, more sophisticated mechanisms emerge that provide an illusion of improvement for the sake of legitimacy, considering that something has to change so that everything remains the same. Neoliberalism provides an ideal setting for the restoration of an hierarchical and unequal society; an already fragile state is further weakened while the surreptitious

political power of economical elites goes unchecked. If in an initial stage the Estado Novo was supported in the big land owners and in the commercial bourgeoisie, from the sixties onwards the new monopolistic industrial capital imposed itself. The revolution presented an opportunity for a more equalitarian society, but it soon faded away as the organized popular forces found themselves gradually minimized in a word that values competitiveness above all things and places the heart of development in a diffuse and hardly accountable myriad of financial entities and huge enterprises that provide attractive employment offers for the political elites in exchange for a privileged access to public goods and opportunities.

Naturally it did not reverse entirely to the hierarchical rigidity that existed during the fascist regime, but it is mostly because there are things that are not tolerated in a democracy, especially once the rhetoric for participation became nearly hegemonic. In this scenario, it is not surprising that Portugal occupies the 22nd position out of 28 in the European Index on Housing Exclusion (FEANTSA, 2016) and that Leilani Farha, ONU's special rapporteur on adequate housing, following a visit to Portugal, *"one of the most unequal countries in Europe"*, expressed her concerns regarding the *"housing conditions experienced by the Roma (ciganos) and people of African Descent, many of whom continue to live in informal settlements, without access to basic services including electricity, amidst garbage, and without secure tenure"*, to which she added *"long terms challenges which are directly linked to housing exclusion"* such as the *"lack of affordability"* and *"insufficient social housing"*, which are coupled with *"evictions and demolitions"*⁵⁷.

The state, both during the fascist regime and in the context of a neoliberal democracy, was largely determined according with the needs of capital (Barata Salgueiro, 1986). A more centralized alternative emerges when the expansion of the capital demands for large basic infrastructures and an uniform regulation that guarantees the economical integration of the territory and the homogenization of the space for the sake of the mobility of goods, workforce and capital. The decentralization seeks to neutralize class struggles by the separation between production and

⁵⁷<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21264&LangID=E>
[06/03/2017].

reproduction, which is achieved through the geographical fragmentation of conflicts that thus become depoliticized.

The central state absorbs production conflicts that are disguised as technical or macro-economical problems, while the matters related with the reproduction of the workforce, such as the matters related with housing, are dealt at the local level. In this context, some interesting and innovative initiatives, such as the SAAL, were discontinued or reversed even if it was never demonstrated that they were incorrect. In this hierarchical society, participation from above, with little power transfer, is the generalized option while the SAAL neighbourhoods, deprived of their institutional background, remain as residual participatory experiments in an hostile neoliberal environment that resist due to the stubbornness of their leaders. They are remnants of what could have been; too weak to make a difference, but a living proof that a difference could have been made.

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