

War and Empire: Portuguese East Africa and economic warfare (1914-1919)

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The African continent remains—as during the First World War—a worldwide issue of central importance, as evidenced by the 2012 EU/Africa summit held during the Portuguese presidency of the European Union. The continent throughout the twentieth century can be considered a stage in permanent mutation, where different elements arise from internal dynamics—yet influenced by realities foreign to the continent—interact and connect with each other. The observation tends toward greater accuracy and thoroughness once we focus on more specific realities, such as the situation resulting from the outbreak of World War One in the summer of 1914.

Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) is an example of the globalisation process; as (i) an element of direct action, particularly through the exploitation of its natural resources in the widest sense possible, and also through the unique features of its political situation as regards international relations, and (ii) by the role it played as a crossroads, that is a space and passage for various material and non-material flows on a worldwide scale in relation to neighbouring British territories, in particular South Africa.

It is worth mentioning that during the ‘Belle Époque’ the network of transactions of goods and people had spread, thereby bringing closer to the centre of the world-economy remote and

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peripheral places like the African territories. It was then that Mozambique gained a global dimension, and began, considering its geo-strategic importance in East Africa and the relevance of its natural resources, to be disputed by both Britain and Germany.

This paper aims at exploring in a critical and integrated manner, the main policies and measures (or the lack thereof) implemented during the Portuguese First Republic in the field of production development, as well as in the search for instruments necessary to boost the recovery of East African colonial markets, in an attempt—with varied degrees of success—to minimize the effects of external dependency, particularly as regards basic necessities. From a strategic point of view we will consider, questioning their role and importance, the new means of transport and communications: railways, steamboats, and particularly, the telegraph and wireless communications. We will consider their impact on Mozambique, particularly as tools of defence and safeguarding of the Portuguese Empire. The economy is thus the starting point for highlighting the international and multiracial nature of the Great War, with impacts and consequences falling vastly beyond the territories covered by European remembrance, in other words spanning across the collective global memory.

Europe and the rest of the world – Africa and nineteenth-century globalisation

In 1914 when the First World War started all major European powers, with the exception of the Habsburg Empire, ruled over territories outside Europe. In this paper we analyse the strategic importance of the Portuguese colonies in Africa namely Mozambique; understanding its importance in a comparative reading frame, and studying it from three perspectives: (i) the dispute of empire; (ii) mobilisation and strategy of the European powers toward war in Africa and (iii) the protection, preservation and maintenance of the integrity of the Portuguese colonial empire.

At a time and in a context of profound internationalisation, communications (terrestrial and ‘voice’) had acquired a new dimension, becoming, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the main instrument in the construction of an international economic model that involved and unleashed a

scene of global and general mutation, prompted by the same technological leap that produced the Industrial Revolution (or the two Industrial Revolutions). The economic dynamism that marked these years thus reinforced the positivist faith in the notion of progress, while at the same time promoted the alliance between scientific research and technical development. Thus emerged a single global economy, supported by a thickening circulation network of people, capital and goods, a reality made visible by the growing and continuous interdependence between developed countries and the underdeveloped world. This connection was well illustrated by the signing of international conventions regulating telegraphic and postal services, and also train timetables.

On the eve of the war, Britain controlled about four-fifths of the trade in the Sub-Sahara region. Germany, continuing the policy initiated by Bismarck in the late nineteenth century, had a small, but strategically placed, empire extending itself from Madagascar to the entrance of the Red Sea. Both empires bordered territories under Portuguese administration, for whose political and economic interest they began to compete, particularly after the British ultimatum of 1890, and which would culminate in August 1913 in a secret agreement that aimed to share the Portuguese colonies in Africa between Britain and Germany.

War and empire

The colonies during the First World War were not mere battlefields, they were an integral part of the economic warfare of European countries, providing raw materials and food. Therefore, the strategic position occupied by the East African territories is important to understand, considering them as agents in the globalisation process, particularly through the exploitation of natural resources in the widest sense possible, but also through the role they played as a crossroads, connecting space and passage for various material and immaterial flows across the world.

We shall consider, as regards the Portuguese case, three major issues:

1. the extent to which the changes resulting from difficulties in cross-border commerce might have played a relevant role in the attempts to adjust Portuguese exports to wartime condi-

tions, with an emphasis on the efforts towards expansion to new markets (Africa and Latin America);

2. the Portuguese role in the strategy of conquer of commercial positions carried out by the British Foreign Office;
3. the extent to which the war altered the way in which governments and society regarded the national economic structure, acknowledging the limitations of the Portuguese productive system.

Although most of the clashes occurred on European soil, the involvement of the African continent played an essential role within the Great War: for over four years Africa provided human and material resources on an unprecedented scale to the Western Front. From the 'black continent' standpoint, it is worth noting, how the First World War contrasted in terms of objectives, impact, scale and duration with the many conflicts that erupted throughout the nineteenth century which were conducted mainly against native populations, and motivated by local and limited objectives.

Immediately after Britain's declaration of war on Germany, on 4 August 1914, one of the main priorities of London was to eliminate and/or control the strategic potential of the German colonies and possessions all over the world; a strategy that was felt with particular intensity in Latin America and in Africa and that consisted of capturing port facilities, submarine communications, cable and radio masts.

East Africa and economic warfare

For Portugal what was actually at stake, during August 1914, was not so much the direct effect of the armed conflict as the disarticulation of the economic workings and the regular distribution circuits. It is worth noting how devastating and far-reaching the consequences of the decrease in imports were to the economy and people's daily life. This reality was soon acknowledged and denounced by British Ambassador to Lisbon, Lancelot Carnegie, who, in a letter to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not hesitate to identify it as the decisive factor explaining why intervention by the Portuguese government was ' . . . at this early stage even more drastic than has been necessary in States that are more affected politically' by the conflict.²

² TNA: FO 368/1063, Letter 26 Aug 1914 Lancelot Carnegie to Edward Grey

The Portuguese government had also developed some policies towards the promotion and development of agriculture in its colonial territories: as a first step a law was published, establishing a service agency responsible for the Portuguese colonies.³ The new agency reflected the pretext and the opportunity to promote the export of agricultural products, while taking into account that these would only be viable if exported at a competitive price. Much more than the promotion of agricultural specialisation, the main goal of the agency had to do with the rigorous calculation of the price of agricultural products and the presentation of effective methods of reducing production costs.⁴ For such objectives to be achieved it was required that, within a short period of time, significant improvements be introduced into the colonial infrastructures, such as building more roads and railways and completing a network of modernly equipped commercial ports to serve as mandatory connection points on the world trade routes. However, the Act failed to provide a single solution.

This story cannot be properly interpreted and understood if one does not bear in mind the impact and consequences of the vigorous economic recovery campaign launched by the Foreign Office immediately after the declaration of war, which sought to counteract German commerce and commercial strategies. In other words, the idea was to establish a policy (symbolising—more than really imposing—the will) to persuade British commerce and finance to invest in Portugal. It was one of the key points made by British Consul to Portuguese East Africa Errol MacDonell on Britain's chances of reclaiming German businesses throughout Portuguese Africa.

The concern of His Majesty's Government regarding the gathering of all essential information in the pursuit of a commercial policy, mostly focused on promoting and valuing British trade, was reinforced by a telegram sent ten days after the onset of hostilities by Foreign Secretary Edward Grey to the British consulates.⁵ As the situation became clearer, the British Government established a specific strategy and put together the necessary instruments (similar to what it did in Latin America),

³ Decree, no. 1 142, *Diário do Governo*, I Series, no. 226 3 Dec 1914

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ 'A guerra comercial' in *Jornal do Comércio e das Colónias*, 26 Nov 1914, p. 1

aimed at controlling the Portuguese colonial markets, particularly Mozambique, where the German presence was notorious.⁶ For the rest, it was well known that, as the British Secretary of Commerce phrased it, 'War creates no trade, but it may correct it'.⁷

The way in which the British government welcomed pressure from British commercial agents interested in the Anglo-Portuguese trade is therefore unsurprising. British diplomacy would put its best effort into providing more favourable conditions to its commercial activity, eventually achieving most of its goals through the trade treaty entered into by both countries on 12 January 1914.⁸ The British strategy grew more intense throughout the months that followed Pimenta de Castro's rise to power (25 Jan–15 May 1915). In reality, due to circumstances and the alleged pro-German standing of the Portuguese head of Government, the attitude of the British Foreign Office evolved into reinforcing trade relations between the two countries, through the adoption of specific measures aimed at persuading British trade and finance to invest in Portugal and thus take over German businesses and trade positions in Africa,⁹ particularly in Mozambique. This was made necessary by the significant increase in the consumption by the German army of Portuguese colonial products, notably foodstuffs (cocoa, coffee and sugar). To access these products, the Germans had established alternative routes that enabled them to ship

⁶ Report of September 1914, put together by the British Secretary of Commerce, where the situation is well analysed: 'while the commercial relationship with Portugal is not perhaps of the first importance, it is one which may, even more than any other, repay a special effort to take advantage of war conditions'. Cf. TNA: FO 368/1063, Report Sep 1914 by the British Secretary of Commerce, p. 1

⁷ Ibid, p. 1, 'The German conquest of the Portuguese market has been as quick and easy as the conquest of its territories by Junot, and it may be supposed that their hold may be as quickly and easily loosened'. One should recall that when the war was declared, 734 German ships had sought refuge on neutral waters, thus leaving them with only 600 ships and a total of 2,875,000 tons. Marc Ferro, *A Grande Guerra, 1914-1918* (Lisbon, 2002) p. 144

⁸ On the signing of the Treaty of Trade and Navigation between Portugal and Britain, refer to, in particular, Sacuntala Miranda, *O Declínio da Supremacia Britânica em Portugal (1890-1939)* pp. 392ff

⁹ TNA: FO 368/1382, Memorandum 22 Feb 1915, put together by the general consult Errol MacDonell. On the policy of conquer and acquisition of markets of raw materials by Germany, refer to Luís Manuel Alves de Fraga, *Portugal e a Primeira Grande Guerra*, pp. 38ff

colonial products into Germany, while avoiding ‘war zones’ and taking advantage of the situation and ‘goodwill’ of their neutral neighbours.¹⁰

Nationality of companies established in the main ports of Mozambique, 1915:¹¹

Place	Germany	Britain	Other Nationalities
Porto Amélia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Wm. Philippi ▪ Deutsche-Ost-Afrikanische Gesellschaft 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consolidated Nyassa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ –
Moçambique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Wm. Philippi 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ JF dos Santos (Portugal) ▪ Societé du Madal (France)
Quelimane	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Wm Philippi ▪ Lüdwig Deuss 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Companhia da Zambézia (Germany, France, Britain, Portugal, USA) ▪ Companhia do Boror (Switzerland) ▪ Companhia do Lugela (Germany and Britain)
Chinde	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lüdwig Deuss ▪ Wm. Philippi ▪ Deutsche-Ost-Afrikanische Gesellschaft 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ African Lakes and British Central Africa Company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪
Beira	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Wm. Philippi ▪ Deutsche-Ost-Afrikanische Gesellschaft 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪

German companies clearly controlled the trade of Mozambican colonial products: a situation which contributed to the develop-

¹⁰ TNA: FO 368/1383, Confidential memorandum on trade and finances of Portugal, 22 Mar 1915, Lancelot Carnegie to Edward Grey and C. Roque da Costa, ‘A situação dos neutrais’ in *O Jornal do Comércio e das Colónias*, 3 Mar 1915, p. 1

¹¹ TNA: FO 368/1382, Memorandum 22 Feb 1915, drafted by general consul of Britain in Lourenço Marques, Errol MacDonell.

ment of equipment and infrastructure (ports, railroad and navigation lines) necessary to transport those products to European markets. Considering the importance of German investment in Mozambique and the level of competition between investors, MacDonell estimated that the minimum amount of capital needed by any British firm to operate in Portuguese East Africa was around £100,000 as it required adequate maritime premises, regular work schedules and one or two small cargo vessels to ship the products to minor ports.¹²

British diplomacy in Lisbon persevered in its intention to intensify Anglo-Portuguese trade relations, with the involvement of the British Chamber of Commerce and the Commercial Association of Lisbon which put efforts into studying the trade and finances of Portugal.¹³ The British authorities were evidently aware of the difficulties in putting their strategy into practise, as the lack of interest of the financial milieu in investing in what was deemed 'a small market about which little is known and that little unfavourable'¹⁴ was rather notorious; at best, the exploitation of Portuguese colonial resources might raise some interest, particularly concerning Angola and Mozambique. On the other side, Britain was starting to come to terms with the fact that it might be required to proffer financial support to Portugal, as Carnegie argued 'in return for the supplies and support given us'.¹⁵

As results of Portugal's commercial activities started to appear and knowledge of the economic and financial reality became more apparent, the country's strategic value and potential became increasingly notorious, particularly in connection with its links between Central Africa and South America. This reinforced Britain's interest in promoting investment in a country described by the first secretary of the British Mission in

¹² Ibid, p. 5

¹³ At the presentation of the report, the British ambassador in Lisbon, Lancelot Carnegie, evidenced commitment into uphold its publication and allow the effects in terms of investment in Portugal stand out: 'the enclosed report would, if published show British interests what conditions here really are, and it might also direct the attention of the local authorities to the advantage of seconding the efforts of the British interests in Lisbon(...)' TNA: FO 368/1383, Note 17 Mar 1915 Lancelot Carnegie to Edward Grey, p. 1

¹⁴ TNA, FO 368/1383, Note 17 Mar 1915 Lancelot Carnegie to Edward Grey, p1

¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 1-2

Lisbon, George Young, 'as naturally and necessarily a customer of ours as Ireland.'¹⁶

This move was also in reaction to several signs and evidence that confirmed the continuation of German-Portuguese relations, particularly the involvement, during Pimenta de Castro's government, of an important Portuguese banking institution, Fonseca, Santos & Vianna (who maintained strong ties to the Burnay & C. firm) in a gold transaction where agents from Deutsche Bank¹⁷ were also present. According to the British Foreign Office, this situation evidenced the influence that 'German finance still had in Lisbon',¹⁸ though ignoring the intentions and goals behind the operation, particularly the destination of the gold. As far as the head of the British Legation in Lisbon, Lancelot Carnegie, knew the gold was either going to the United States of America, in payment for German purchases, or to Spain or Germany (via neutral countries).¹⁹

The British obviously feared that the gold was heading to Germany as its final destination and, facing such possibility, Carnegie made clear that any negotiations involving a loan or financial advance to Portugal should take into consideration not only the political hesitation of Pimenta de Castro's government, but also the rather unclear economic ties between Portugal and Wilhelm II's *Reich*.²⁰ The possibility of a British loan would also be compromised by the enactment of a bill by British Finance Minister Lloyd George introducing restrictions on loans to companies and foreign governments. As regards Portugal, this policy reflected on the shrinking investment in some territories of the Portuguese colonial empire, mostly in Africa. It caused investment plans and modernisation of sugar companies in Mozambique and Angola to be postponed, as well as mining

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 5-6

¹⁷ TNA: FO 368/1383, Note 3 Mar 1915 Lancelot Carnegie to Edward Grey, p. 1. Also refer TNA: FO 368/1383, Note 24 Mar 1915 Treasury Chambers to Under Secretary of State, p. 1

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ It was an inconvenient situation for Britain, but whose solution, as it had been made clear, should not include prohibition: '... it does not seem worthwhile asking the Portuguese Government to prohibit the export of gold or take measures to stop its irregular exportation; for if they do not do so in their own far more imperative interests they will not for us ...' TNA: FO 368/1383, 11 Mar 1915 Lancelot Carnegie to Edward Grey, pp. 1-2

activities in Tete and Manica, and the agricultural concessions in Guinea, Cape Verde and Timor to be delayed.²¹

It is, therefore, no surprise that the measure was received with discontent and disappointment by some within Portuguese society, especially amidst those with colonial interests, or that it raised accusations in the Portuguese press, which denounced what it considered double standards of the British government toward Portugal:

all that would be fine if, in spite of everything, the law was equal to all, but the authorisations recently granted to a sugar company in Cuba, the £2,500,000 just granted to Argentina Railways Ld. and another emission already promised to Java place our colonial interests in a state of development that cannot be satisfactorily justified.²²

In reality, the real issue concerned the frustration of expectations that the British policy had raised, along with the failure to profit from opportunities that had been offered to the Portuguese colonies as a result of the war through the announcement of projects whose implementation depended greatly on the financial capacity of London:

our colonies require a great amount of capital in order to develop and if the London market becomes closed to them, as is happening currently, with no effort from the Government to obtain the same treatment that is given to Cuba, Argentina or Java, the crisis they are going through shall grow significantly worse.²³

In defence of this claim, the alliance between both countries was reinforced, in order to sustain the need for an exception that protected Portuguese interests.²⁴

In summary, since the summer of 1914, British foreign policy had sought to profit from the wartime conditions in order to foster the expansion of British commercial interests around the world. In particular, Britain sought to conquer German commercial and industrial positions, both in Europe and in Africa, where the Portuguese colonies, notably Mozambique, played a significant role.

²¹ 'Relações externas' in *Revista Colonial*, Year 2, no. 29, 25 May 1915, p. 149

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

As far as Portugal was concerned, the impact and effect of the world-wide conflict raised many difficulties beside those strictly resulting from the war. This reflected the weak development of Portugal's peripheral economy, which was based on an agricultural sector whose levels of production and productivity lagged behind the minimum necessary, was strongly dependent on foreign funding, freighting and essential goods (food stuffs, fuels and even equipment, technology and raw materials that were essential to its small industrial sector that by then had become reduced to a minimum). This was in spite of a vast 'empire' that was economically and strategically relevant, particularly in the context of the world-wide conflict. The war also raised awareness of the weaknesses of the domestic economy. This led to debate and internal pressure to introduce a programme of economic modernisation for the primary sector fostering industrialisation and intensifying of economic relations with the colonies, especially Angola, Mozambique and São Tomé e Príncipe. This intention was aligned to the British strategy regarding their position on the mainland and especially in the colonies. As a result, Britain encouraged it to an extent.

In Mozambique, in particular, a set of initiatives aimed to develop the commercial and economic relations between the territory and the mainland started appearing. That was the purpose behind the appeal, in February 1916 (one month before Germany's declaration of war on Portugal), by the Governor of Mozambique, Álvaro de Castro, to the Chamber of Deputies, inviting its chairman to organise and send a mission to the colony in order to collect information necessary to the execution of a survey that served '... as propaganda at the same time'.²⁵ On the same day, 4 February 1916, the Governor sent a note to the representatives of industrial and commercial associations informing them of the advantages of closer economic ties between Mozambique and the mainland; an option that could be justified, according to Álvaro de Castro, by the market conditions and the variety, value and wealth of the products of the territory.²⁶ The government pledged to invest all means

²⁵ Refer to the note from the Government of Mozambique to the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies in 'Reforma das Pautas' in *O Trabalho Nacional*, no. 15, Mar 1916, p. 81. The proposition was only submitted to Parliament a few months later, in early May: *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, Session no. 79, 2 May 1916, p. 4

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 81-2

available to adequately disseminate the initiative, through exhibitions and the distribution of all sorts of informative elements. The initiative actually raised the interest of the Oporto Industrial Association, which regarded the investment in Eastern African markets with some enthusiasm, underlining the need to join forces with the Commercial Association and the Commercial Centre of Oporto in order to pursue actions.²⁷

The Governor's power to send the list of requests of exclusive industrial rights on the colonial territories to industrial associations (instead of sending them to the Minister of Colonies) was recent and reflected a decentralising policy regarding the administration that had been introduced by the First Republic and which seemed to produce positive results. Although the number of requests increased, the activities they pertained to were, with few exceptions, of an artisanal nature, resorting to techniques and equipment that were more often than not somewhat inadequate.

Shortly afterward, in April 1916, a draft bill authorising the Governor of Mozambique to enter into a loan of \$500,000 to fund the construction of infrastructure to develop the colony was discussed in the Portuguese Parliament.²⁸ Until then, the intervention of the republican government concerning Mozambique was limited to exploiting revenue that directly depended on relations with neighbouring territories, particularly with South Africa, with no programme in place that fostered the development of the productive activities within the colony. This was a much criticised situation, as it was widely deemed 'imprudent'.²⁹

Even so, the Portuguese Parliament hesitated in its answer to Álvaro de Castro's request, arguing that it lacked a structured development plan encompassing the construction works in need of funding.³⁰ Upon repeated enquiries from the

²⁷ Ibid. p. 82

²⁸ The loan at an interest rate of six per cent was to '... install a telephone line to Johannesburg, complete the telegraph and telephone lines of Zambezia and perform some works in order to prepare Lourenço Marques for the tourism season and open certain roads in the southern part of the province. *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, Session no. 64, 3 Apr 1916, p. 16

²⁹ See, particularly the intervention by unionist MP Armando Ochoa. Ibid.

³⁰ Further details on this discussion in *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, Session no. 66, 5 April 1916, pp. 8-14

**Official list of requests for exclusive industrial rights in
Mozambique³¹**

Proponent	Type of Industry	Duration of the exclusive right	Place	Decision
Napoleão Luís Ferreira	Pottery	20 years	Lourenço Marques	Annulled
Lúcio Veloso da Rocha and António Correia Pinto	Noodles, crackers and cookies	10 years	Lourenço Marques, Quelimane and Moçambique	Denied
Julius Antonius Aurelius Schultz	Paper and parchment	20 years	All provinces	No information is available on the outcome of this procedure
Paulino dos Santos Gil and Francisco Maria da Silva	Soaps and candles	20 years	All provinces	Idem
José Joaquim de Morais	Hydraulic cement	20 years	All provinces	Idem
Giuseppe Cavallari and Giuseppe Miglietti	Ice	10 years	City and suburbs of Lourenço Marques	Idem
Napoleão Luís Ferreira Leão	Matches	20 years	No information available	Idem
Giuseppe Cavallari and Giuseppe Miglietti	Beer	20 years	All provinces	Idem
Manuel de Jesus Martins and Aurélio Augusto Loureiro	Vegetable fibre	20 years	All provinces	Idem

Chamber, the drafter of the proposal, Ernesto de Vilhena, eventually put forward an explanation that convinced few of the proposed direction:

³¹ 'Exclusivos industriais nas colónias' in *O Trabalho Nacional*, no. 15, Mar 1916, pp. 70-1

. . . one should not be required to thoroughly describe all the development works to which the \$500,000 loan is intended, firstly because it is not customary to do so; secondly, it is inconvenient; thirdly, because such insertion would in no way increase the guarantees for the State represented by the loan in accordance with the legislation in force; and, fourthly, because the Parliament was adopting a centralising orientation that contravened its own decision.³²

The matter was undoubtedly important. Therefore, in spite of the vaguely defined and loosely integrated goals, the proposal was eventually approved by the Chamber of Deputies.³³

The interest and expectations of the possibility of the colonies supplying the mainland and Madeira with essential products grew as internal hardship increased. In reality, the government had 'discovered', somewhat late, the colonies as a source of provisions through which it could help supply the mainland and thus contain the general discontent and protests from an increasingly dissatisfied population suffering from the effects of war, aggravated by the route (or rather the lack thereof) undertaken by the political power in terms of wartime economy, mostly as regards subsistencies. All of a sudden, the colonies appeared on the horizon as the solution to a number of difficulties that afflicted the economy on the mainland. In addition to direct supply, there was also an interest in exploiting raw materials, attracting the investment of Portuguese capital in Africa. The colonies were regarded beyond political sovereignty, as part of the 'national economic space', worthy of investment, something similar to the idea that the State would try to assert much later. As the Member of Parliament José Barbosa claimed '(...) our colonies were never an advantage to the mainland, but rather the only market that has enabled us to maintain our trade and industrial balance'.³⁴ However, the economic exploitation of the colonies suffered little change in the long run and remained behind the possibilities and resources offered, even though their importance to the mainland cannot be assessed solely by the results of investments or colonial trade and these kept playing a vital political and economic role for Portugal.

Re-exportation of products from Mozambique (1913-1916):³⁵

³² *Ibid.*, p. 11

³³ *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, Session no. 68, 7 Apr 1916, p. 14

³⁴ *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, Session no. 67, 6 Apr 1916, pp. 13-4

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	1913	1914	1915	1916
Tons				
Raw materials	12	39	827	934
Foodstuffs	1 749	120	-	89
Total	1 761	159	827	1 020
'Contos'				
Raw materials	6	4	66	71
Foodstuffs	105	113	-	12
Total	111	117	66	84

The case of Angola was very different from the situation of Mozambique during World War One. On the other side of Africa, regardless of its immense resources, Angola was not targeted by a propaganda campaign or any appeal to investment in the same way that Mozambique was. Although it underwent noticeable development in 1914-1915, the Angolan economy fell into recession in 1916, as a result of the considerable plunge in the amount of food stuff exported to the mainland.

However, interest in Mozambique remained. Even when, after the takeover of Kionga and the occupation of Xivinga, the commercial and industrial mission that the Parliamentary Committee for the Colonies had decided to send to Mozambique in May 1916, had to be postponed, the impetus of industrial and commercial agents by no means weakened.³⁶

Globally, one can assert that Portugal's involvement in the war marked a turning point in the way politicians and industrial tycoons regarded the need for closer relations between the mainland and the colonial space, in order to profit from opportunities and resources that had meanwhile become essential for fuelling a growing war effort. As Lisboa de Lima puts it, there was only one way Portugal could possibly face those challenges and it was by 'joining the efforts of each and every one . . . both on the mainland as well as in the colonies, to work with one single goal, with no attempt to make mainland or colonial interests prevail over the others, as they are all Portuguese . . .'.³⁷

³⁵ 'Ainda a reexportação colonial' in *O Economista Português; Revista Financeira, Económica, Social e Colonial*, Year 10, no. 95, 8 May 1920, p. 156

³⁶ *Diário da Câmara dos Deputados*, Session no. 89, 15 May 1916, pp. 29-30

³⁷ 'Conferência na Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa em 8 de Maio de 1916 feita por Lisboa de Lima' in *Revista Colonial*, Year 4, no. 41, 25 May 1916, pp. 120-1

The war had ultimately proven that the time was ripe to conquer abandoned markets in East Africa. This was basically the idea made public by the Oporto Industrial Association when it declared that the industrial development achieved during the war required expansion into new markets, as well as the intensification of Anglo-Portuguese trade relations.

The centenary anniversary of World War One, in 2014, raised great interest both at domestic and international level, with multiple initiatives in many countries, and also within the scope of international dynamics. In addition to the importance of the study of World War I and its impact in Africa, in a multiple and global perspective at the national level, the evocation of the centenary, organised and studied in the international context, involves a dynamic that requires an active role by Portugal, as well as an opportunity to raise awareness among academics and the general public—both nationally and internationally—in the involvement and participation of the country in the Great War, both on the African front, from 1914 onward, as in Europe from 1917. Such evocations are still significant opportunities to stimulate the renewal and further research and historical dissemination and to raise awareness of the importance of historical memory and knowledge, the valuing and dissemination of both material and non-material heritage and the importance of its preservation.