

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master's degree in  
Management from the Nova School of Business and Economics.

**SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN UNION ENVIRONMENTAL  
DIRECTIVES AND REGULATIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE  
EUROPEAN REAL ESTATE SECTOR – EXPLORING RISKS, OPPORTUNITIES  
AND STRATEGIES FOR MOME – BROKEN FOUNDATIONS SCENARIO**

Andrei Razvan Fratila (39314)

Work project carried out under the supervision of:

Professor António Alvarenga

17-12-2024

**Abstract:** This work project applies the Intuitive Logics School to explore the future of EU environmental policies and their impact on the European real estate sector until 2030. Through a combination of interviews with EU employees, foresight experts, and industry leaders, as well as a collaborative workshop with MOME, the study analyzes plausible developments and their implications for market dynamics and regulatory adaptation. By addressing uncertainties such as ‘Supply Chain Stability’ and ‘Qualified Workforce Availability’, four scenarios are developed to enhance the sector’s preparedness for upcoming challenges. The work concludes with both scenario-specific and general strategic recommendations, providing MOME with actionable insights to ensure resilient operations through 2030.

**Keywords:** *Scenario Planning, Strategic Foresight, Strategic Implications, Real Estate Industry, Housing Cooperatives, Business Model Canvas, Porter’s 5 Forces, TOWS Matrix*

**Acknowledgements:** To the entire team at MOME, and in particular Nuno Pimentel, who provided valuable insights into the company and the industry during the course of the work and in the joint workshop. To the experts António Vicente, Tanja Schindler, Antonios Sfakiotakis and Christiane Conrads, who agreed to be interviewed and shared their knowledge with the team. And to Professor António Alvarenga for his precious support and guidance.

This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209), POR Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209) and POR Norte (Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209)

**Table of Contents**

- 1 Introduction ..... 1**
  - 1.1 Market Overview – European Real Estate Industry..... 2
  - 1.2 Introduction of MOME ..... 3
  
- 2 EU Environmental Measures Overview ..... 4**
  - 2.1 Green Deal 2050..... 4
  - 2.2 Fit for 55..... 4
  - 2.3 Critical Raw Materials Act..... 8
  - 2.4 Circular Economy ..... 9
  - 2.5 EU Taxonomy ..... 10
  - 2.6 Financing ..... 10
  - 2.7 Transparency ..... 12
  
- 3 Literature Review ..... 13**
  - 3.1 Historical Context and Purpose of Scenario Planning ..... 13
  - 3.2 Principal Approaches of Scenario Planning ..... 14
  - 3.3 Critiques and Evolution of Scenario Planning ..... 15
  
- 4 Methodology ..... 16**
  - 4.1 Research Design and Implemented Tools ..... 17
  - 4.2 Strategic Collaboration: Client and Expert Involvement ..... 21
  
- 5 Phase 1 – Framing & Scoping ..... 22**
  - 5.1 Focal Issue..... 22
  - 5.2 Time Horizon ..... 24
  
- 6 Phase 2 – Explore ..... 25**
  - 6.1 Megatrends & Trends..... 25
    - 6.1.1 *Megatrend 1: Climate Change* ..... 25

6.1.2	<i>Megatrend 2: Global Realignment – Demographic and Political Shifts</i> .....	25
6.1.3	<i>Megatrend 3: Digitalization</i> .....	25
6.1.4	<i>Megatrend 4: Urbanization</i> .....	26
6.2	Uncertainties .....	28
<b>7</b>	<b>Phase 3 – Synthesize</b> .....	<b>33</b>
7.1	Grouping & Identification of Key Uncertainties .....	33
7.1.1	<i>Key Uncertainties</i> .....	34
7.1.2	<i>Scenario Matrix</i> .....	37
7.1.3	<i>Cross-validation of the Scenario Matrix</i> .....	38
7.2	Scenario Narratives .....	39
7.2.1	<i>Scenario 1 – Voltage Revolution</i> .....	39
7.2.2	<i>Scenario 2 – Digital Backbone</i> .....	39
7.2.3	<i>Scenario 3 – Efficiency Gambit</i> .....	40
7.2.4	<i>Scenario 4 – Broken Foundations</i> .....	40
7.2.5	<i>Scenario Comparison</i> .....	49
<b>8</b>	<b>Phase 4 – Act</b> .....	<b>52</b>
8.1	Scenario 1 – Voltage Revolution .....	52
8.2	Scenario 2 – Digital Backbone .....	52
8.3	Scenario 3 – Efficiency Gambit .....	52
8.4	Scenario 4 – Broken Foundations .....	52
8.5	Cross – Scenario Strategic Recommendations .....	56
<b>9</b>	<b>Phase 5 – Monitor</b> .....	<b>60</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>65</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>Limitations &amp; Further Research</b> .....	<b>66</b>
<b>12</b>	<b>References</b> .....	<b>68</b>
<b>13</b>	<b>Appendix</b> .....	<b>95</b>

**List of Figures**

Figure 1 - Methodology Overview | (E): Expert, (C): Company | Source: Own Creation ..... 16

Figure 2 - PESTLE | Source: Own Creation ..... 33

Figure 3 - Uncertainties Mapping | Source: Own Creation ..... 34

Figure 4 - Scenario Matrix | Source: Own Creation..... 38

Figure 5 - Scenario Structure | Source: Own Creation ..... 39

Figure 6 - Scenario Comparison | Source: Own Creation ..... 49

Figure 7 - Porter's 5 Forces Scenario Comparison | Source: Own Creation ..... 51

Figure 8 - Scenario 4: TOWS-Analysis | Source: Own Creation ..... 53

Figure 9 - General Strategic Roadmap MOME | Source: Own Creation ..... 60

Figure 10 - Monitoring Thresholds 2026 | Source: Own Creation ..... 64

Figure 11 - Monitoring Thresholds 2028 | Source: Own Creation ..... 64

Figure 12 - Monitoring Thresholds 2030 | Source: Own Creation ..... 64

Figure 13 - European Real Estate Valuation Balance | Source: Own Creation based on Statista 2024c ..... 95

Figure 14 - European Real Estate Transaction Volume | Source: Own Creation based on Statista 2024c ..... 95

Figure 15 - European Real Estate Industry 2024 Porters 5 Forces | Source: Own Creation based on Deloitte 2024b; PwC 2023a; CBRE 2024b..... 96

Figure 16 - Lifecycle Cooperatives MOME | Source: Own Creation based on MOME 2024c ..... 96

Figure 17 - Costs Housing Cooperatives Portugal | Source: Own Creation based on MOME 2024c ..... 97

Figure 18 - Business Model Canvas | Source: Own Creation based on MOME 2024c..... 97

Figure 19 - Defined Climate Goals EU | Source: Own Creation based on EC 2024s ..... 97

Figure 20 - Urban and Rural Population of the World, 1950-2050 | Source: UN 2014 ..... 98

Figure 21 - Urban Population in 2023 | Source: Own Creation based on EC 2024s ..... 98

Figure 22 – Uncertainty Ranking | Source: Own Creation ..... 99

Figure 23 - Selected CRMs with Highest Import Dependency | Source: Own Creation based on Blengini et al. 2020; EC 2020c ..... 99

Figure 24 - Photovoltaic Power Potential Portugal | Source: Global Solar Atlas 2023 ..... 100

Figure 25 - Natura 2000 & Biodiversity Areas Alentejo Region | Source: EIGL 2024 ..... 100

Figure 26 - Geopolitical Risk Index | Source: Own Creation based on Statista 2024b ..... 101

Figure 27 - Supply Chain Stability Index | Source: Own Creation based on KPMG 2024 ... 101

Figure 28 - JVR EU | Source: Own Creation based on eurostat 2024e ..... 101

Figure 29 - Employment EU | Source: Own Creation based on eurostat 2024b..... 102

Figure 30 - Permits (Employment) EU | Source: Own Creation based on eurostat 2024g.... 102

Figure 31 - Personnel Cost Index Construction EU | Source: Own Creation based on eurostat 2024d..... 102

Figure 32 - Renewables Energy Share EU | Source: Own Creation based on EEA 2024b ... 103

Figure 33 - Workshop Miro Board 1/2 | Source: Own Creation ..... 113

Figure 34 - Workshop Miro Board 2/2 | Source: Own Creation ..... 114

**List of Tables**

Table 1 - Workshop Participants | Source: Own Creation ..... 112

Table 2 - Uncertainties | Source: Own Creation..... 116

## Glossary

AI – Artificial Intelligence	ETS – Emission Trading System Directive
approx. – approximately	EU – European Union
BIM – Building Information Modeling	EuGB – EU Green Bond (Regulation)
BTR – Build to Rent	GDP – Global Domestic Product
CAGR – Compound Annual Growth Rate	GHG – Greenhouse Gases
CBAM – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism	GRI - Geopolitical Risk Index
CEAP – Circular Economy Action Plan	IoT – Internet of Things
CO <sub>2</sub> – Carbon Dioxide	JVR – Job Vacancy Rate
CRMA – Critical Raw Materials Act	KU(s) – Key Uncertainty
CRM(s) – Critical Raw Material(s)	LCA – Life Cycle Assessment
CSDDD – Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive	MEPS – Minimum Energy Performance Standards
CSRD – Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive	MMC – Modern Methods of Construction
DNSH – Do No Significant Harm	MNC – Multinational Corporations
DT – Digital Twins	MSR – Market Stability Reserve
EC – European Commission	NBS – Nature-based Solutions
ECI – Early Contractor Involvement	PMT – Probabilistic Modified Trends
EED – Energy Efficiency Directive	RED – Renewable Energy Directive
EII(s) – Energy-intensive industries	RRF – Recovery and Resilience Facility
EPC – Energy Performance Certificate	SFDR – Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation
EPBD – Energy Performance of Buildings Directive	SMEs – Small & Medium-sized Enterprises

## 1 Introduction

"Scenarios are not predictions, they are stories about how the future might unfold", emphasizes Peter Schwartz (1991) in his fundamental work on scenario planning. The complexities of today's regulatory environment and sustainability challenges resonate deeply with this principle. Faced with the intersection of rapid climate change, geopolitical conflicts, and pandemic recovery, the European Union (EU) has introduced ambitious environmental initiatives such as the Fit for 55, which represents a key milestone of the European Green Deal by 2030. Such measures promise to have a severe impact on industries, particularly the real estate sector, which accounts for 37% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (UNEP 2023b). This work project aims to address the uncertainties and strategic implications arising from the evolving EU regulatory landscape by focusing on MOME. The key challenge, identified in collaboration with MOME's leadership, can be formulated as follows: 'How can MOME adapt to the future development of the EU environment shaped by directives and regulations by 2030 in order to increase its competitive edge and achieve its objectives?'

Using the *Intuitive Logics School's* scenario planning methodology, this project explores plausible futures that highlight the critical uncertainties affecting the EU's environmental policies and their implications for the real estate sector. This qualitative approach facilitates the management of uncertainty while encouraging dynamic and adaptive thinking (Bradfield and Van Der Heijden 2005).

Therefore, the intent is to provide MOME with strategic tools and actionable insights that will help the organization thrive in an uncertain future. The ultimate goal of this work is to improve MOME's resilience and align its mission with the broader objectives of the EU's sustainability agenda by identifying risks, exploring opportunities, and developing responsive strategies.

## 1.1 Market Overview – European Real Estate Industry

The total value of the European real estate market will reach approximately (approx.) €106.8 trillion in 2024, representing an increase of 4.5% year-on-year. About 81% of the value relates to the dominant segment "residential real estate"<sup>1</sup> (19% to "commercial real estate"<sup>2</sup>). This valuation imbalance (Figure 13) is primarily due to the strong demand for housing in Europe's major cities, coupled with the low supply of housing as urbanization continues (Statista 2024c). The year 2023 has been associated with geopolitical challenges that have led to high inflation and subsequent interest rate hikes. Due to the level of uncertainty and the increased cost of capital, investors and private clients have adopted a "wait-and-see" approach (PwC 2023a), which has significantly weakened demand ( $\Delta$  transaction volume 2023: -11% – Figure 14). Looking forward, the market is projected to stabilize and grow steadily at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 3.2% to €125.1 trillion by 2029 as it recovers from the recent downfall (Statista 2024c).

As a result of rising house prices and the aforementioned surge in borrowing costs, affordable housing is in high demand, particularly in the EU's major cities. The associated decline in demand for home ownership favors investment in the build-to-rent (BTR) sector. Investors are looking for long-term, stable returns as long as current trends in urban living continue. Developers are focusing on urban, modern rental buildings with amenities such as onsite gyms and co-working spaces aimed at young professionals or city dwellers, adding to the BTR trend (Deloitte 2024b). In the commercial real estate sector, logistics is experiencing an upturn as a result of the ongoing shift towards e-commerce. On the other hand, demand for traditional office buildings is declining due to remote working and the wider adoption of hybrid working models. In general, environmental regulations are seen as the critical and defining factor for the future

---

<sup>1</sup> Residential real estate market covers houses and apartments

<sup>2</sup> Commercial real estate market covers office buildings, retail spaces, warehouses, industrial properties

development of the entire European real estate industry. Both the growing demand from buyers and investors for sustainability-compliant properties/projects and the tightening of standards are putting pressure on the industry and will result in additional costs (e.g., renovations, green tech). Assets that are already compliant are currently traded at a premium, whilst in the longer term the associated efficiency benefits and reduced environmental impact will lead to a further uplift in property values (PwC 2023a) (Figure 15 for detailed analysis).

## **1.2 Introduction of MOME**

MOME is a Porto-based start-up company founded in 2023. It focuses on the development and management of housing cooperatives. The business model aims to address the growing problem of housing affordability in Portugal. MOME manages the entire lifecycle of a cooperative - from land identification and construction to ownership transfer (Figure 16).

MOME's housing cooperatives operate as non-profit entities, where individual ownership homes are sold at cost, covering only the actual development costs (Figure 17). This ensures transparent pricing with no extra profit margin. Upon completion, members can freely dispose of their homes without restrictions. MOME's main target group is the Portuguese middle class, with actual customers belonging to both the middle and upper classes.

The start-up follows strict principles to ensure the sustainability of its projects. The standards are set in line with the EU taxonomy to help reduce environmental impact. In practice, this means using modern methods of construction (MMC) and modular components to reduce material waste or integrating nature-based solutions (NBS), such as green roofs, to contribute to better air quality in the city. Currently, the company manages two housing cooperatives: PEDRAS.COOP in Vila Nova de Gaia (13 houses), and HERA.COOP in Porto (96 units). Until 2030, MOME aims to provide more than 1,500 homes at affordable and transparent prices in urban centers throughout Portugal (MOME 2024c) (Figure 18 for Business Model Canvas).

## **2 EU Environmental Measures Overview**

To critically examine the future of the EU's sustainability policies and their implications on the real estate sector, it is essential to have a comprehensive understanding of relevant environmental regulations and directives. The following subchapters provide an overview of these legal frameworks, discussing their purpose and objectives, as well as their current state.

*EU directives* set legally binding targets to be reached by all Member States. However, they grant national authorities flexibility in the form and manner of transposition into national law within a certain period (usually two years). Thus, directives may allow for differences in how countries intend to meet the targets (EU 2022a).

*EU regulations*, by contrast, are directly binding and applicable in all Member States without requiring national implementation. Hence, they are generally applicable and foster uniformity within the EU, with no room for national divergence or deviation (EU 2022b).

### **2.1 Green Deal 2050**

The EU Green Deal, a concept to combat climate change, was first outlined in 2018 and was legally adopted in June 2021 as the European Climate Law. The main objective of the Green Deal is to create a climate neutral EU by 2050. This is to be achieved by having zero net domestic emissions by 2050, while decoupling economic growth from resource use and leaving “no person or place behind”. The package of measures can be divided into several policy areas, such as Clean Energy, Sustainable Industry, Building and Renovation or Pollution Elimination (European Parliament & Council 2021).

### **2.2 Fit for 55**

Following on from the Green Deal, the Fit for 55 package was adopted in July 2021, setting out initiatives to reduce GHG emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels (EU 2024d). It provides a specific plan of 19 directives and regulations with milestones up to 2030

(European Parliament 2024). It should be noted that any legislative proposal will have to go through the EU legislative process, requiring approval by the Parliament and the Council. A detailed overview of the Fit for 55 initiatives follows in this chapter.

The *EU Emission Trading System Directive* (ETS), introduced in 2005, is the EU's main emission-reducing tool and has led to a 41% decrease in emissions. The scheme operates on a cap-and-trade basis, with a decreasing cap over time on the total amount of emissions allowed in the energy-intensive industries (EIIs), commercial aviation, electricity and heat generation sectors. Around 10,000 companies are allocated<sup>3</sup> certificates or they acquire them (auction based), which confer the right to emit one ton of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>). They are obliged to submit regular reports on their emissions and sufficient certificates without being fined for every surplus ton of CO<sub>2</sub>. Unless allowances are earmarked for a specific fund, most auction revenues will go to national budgets (around 75.7% in 2023), with 50% to be invested in climate or energy-related projects (EC 2024d). The ETS is being reformed as part of the Fit for 55 initiatives to bring it into line with the new targets. This involves increasing the emissions reduction target in selected sectors from the original -43% to -62% by 2030. The annual cap reduction of -2.2% will be accelerated to -4.3% (2024-2027) and -4.4% (2028-2030). The free allocation of certificates is to be gradually phased out by 2034. From 2024, the maritime sector will be included in the ETS, while the ETS2 system for the combustion of fuels in buildings, road transport and smaller sectors will be introduced as a complement in 2027. ETS2 will be based on an upstream cap-and-trade principle, which requires fuel suppliers to monitor and report their emissions. The cap is set at a level that will result in emissions being 42% lower in these areas than they were in 2005 by 2030.

---

<sup>3</sup> Allocation is based on factors such as product-related benchmarks (avg. emission of the 10% most efficient plants in the sector), historical production data (capacity, activity), carbon leakage risk (sectors at risk of relocating production to countries with fewer regulations receive more allowances to protect competitiveness) (EC 2024x).

To mitigate the risk of carbon leakage<sup>4</sup>, the EU has devised the *Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism* (CBAM) Regulation to ensure that a fair price is placed on the carbon emissions embedded in imported goods. It aims to align the carbon costs of imported goods with those of domestic production within the EU, in addition to adhering to the standards set by the World Trade Organization. The transitional phase, which will end in 2025, serves as a pilot for reporting considering cement, iron, steel, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity and hydrogen. Currently, importers operating in the EU must disclose the embedded emissions of goods covered by the CBAM Regulation without surrendering ETS allowances. From 2026, they will be required to register with the relevant national authorities and declare their annual number of imported emissions. From this date, importers will be obliged to acquire<sup>5</sup> and surrender allowances for the imported embedded emissions. Upon the conclusion of the transitional phase, a review of the system will be conducted, with the possibility of subsequent adaptations. Furthermore, the intention is to extend the scope of the program to include additional goods by 2030.

New climate targets required the EU to adapt its existing *Renewable Energy Directive* (RED). These adjustments include a mandatory target of 42.5% of renewable energies in the energy mix of 2030 (previously 32%). To counteract disparate developments in different economic sectors, respective targets for 2030 have been defined. The transportation sector must either reduce its GHG intensity by 14.5% or increase the share of renewable energies to at least 29%. In the context of buildings, a target of 49% renewable energy must be achieved, while the EU's industries in general must increase the annual share of green energy forms by 1.6%. With respect to the heating and cooling sector, the utilization of renewable energy must improve by 0.8% on an annual basis by 2026 and by 1.1% by 2030. Beyond this, the new directive is designed to expedite the approval process by categorizing projects as being of public interest,

---

<sup>4</sup> Risk of companies moving production sites to countries with laxer emission restrictions (EC 2024d)

<sup>5</sup> Price is based on the weekly average auction price of the ETS allowances (€/ton of CO<sub>2</sub> emitted)

thereby accelerating the integration of renewables within the EU (EU 2023a). The RED was adopted in November 2023 and should be transposed into national law by May 2025 (EC 2024g).

According to the EU, saving energy and reducing its consumption will be as critical as the transition to renewable energies. Therefore, modifications to the existing *Energy Efficiency Directive* (EED) were conducted. Such amendments include the implementation of heightened energy efficiency standards, which have been designed to facilitate a reduction in final energy consumption of 11.7% on a EU level by 2030 (compared to 2020 forecasts). Member States are now required to establish indicative targets at national level, while the EU has identified key sectors for energy efficiency measures, including buildings, industry and transportation. Average annual energy savings of 1.49% are anticipated, reaching 1.9% by the end of 2030. Furthermore, the public sector is obliged to register annual energy savings of 1.9%, including a commitment to renovate 3% of the floor area of public buildings each year (EU 2023b). The official deadline for the national transposition of the EED is set for 11<sup>th</sup> October 2025 (EC 2024p).

The *Effort Sharing Regulation* (ESR) sets binding targets for each Member State to reduce GHG emissions in sectors not covered by the ETS. These include road transport, buildings, agriculture, small industry and waste, which together account for 60% of EU emissions. The regulation was adopted in 2018 with an initial target to reduce GHG emissions in these sectors by -29% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels. As part of Fit for 55, the ESR has been adapted to meet the ambitious Green Deal targets, hence the new target is a 40% reduction compared to 2005. Each Member State contributes to the achievement of the targets. However, the level of each reduction target is differentiated according to Global Domestic Product (GDP) per capita to ensure a fair distribution of the financial burden of the green transition. Economically strong countries such as Finland, Sweden or Germany must achieve -50%, while Bulgaria, for

instance, only has to reach -10%. Member States are given flexibility. If countries emit less than their annual limit, they can carry over the surplus to the following year. Likewise, allocations for the next year can be brought forward if the limit is exceeded. Countries can also trade allocations with other countries. The amendments were approved by the Council in March 2023 and have thus entered into force (EC 2024w).

A further cornerstone of the EU's sustainability agenda is the *Energy Performance of Buildings Directive* (EPBD), addressing their significant impact, which accounts for 40% of final energy consumption and 36% of energy-related GHG emissions. The revised directive establishes new standards and timelines for all building types, recognizing the potential for improvement of existing buildings (75% are energy inefficient): Starting in 2028, all new buildings owned by public bodies must be zero-emission, while all others must comply by 2030. With regard to existing non-residential buildings, Member States are required to define a minimum energy performance standard (MEPS) to target the 16% of worst-performing buildings by 2030 and 26% by 2033. In addition, existing residential buildings must reduce their primary energy consumption by 16% by 2030 and 20-22% by 2035. However, 55% of the anticipated energy savings will be achieved through renovations. Beyond that, the directive creates incentives for green energy solutions, including solar. These become binding in phases between 2027 and 2031, applying to various building types and sizes (e.g., new residential buildings from 2030) (EU 2023c). The revision was adopted in April 2024 and has to be transposed by all Member States until May 2026 (EC 2022a).

### **2.3 Critical Raw Materials Act**

The *Critical Raw Materials Act* (CRMA), which was introduced in 2023, represents an initiative designed to secure the EU's supply of critical raw materials (CRMs)<sup>6</sup>, which are

---

<sup>6</sup> 34 materials raw materials of high economic importance for the EU, with a high risk of supply disruption due to their concentration of sources and lack of good, affordable substitutes (EC 2024l)

indispensable for the green and digital transition. In light of the accelerated growth in global demand for CRMs and the prevalence of geopolitical instability, the CRMA is designed to mitigate the reliance on third-party suppliers. The objective is to achieve a minimum extraction rate of 10%, a processing rate of 40%, a recycling rate of 25%, and a maximum source rate of 65% for the EU's annual consumption. Furthermore, the administrative burden associated with obtaining permits for extraction, processing, and mining is to be reduced, and national programs for exploring geological resources are to be established. The act empowers the Commission to regulate the environmental footprint, thereby increasing the circularity and sustainability of critical materials. In order to reduce dependence on third countries, a network of strategic partnerships is to be established, and soft and hard infrastructure projects along the entire raw materials value chain are to be created (EC 2024m).

## **2.4 Circular Economy**

In 2020, the EU adopted a new *Circular Economy Action Plan* (CEAP), a key component of the Green Deal, which is primarily focused on reducing the environmental impact by introducing circular material use practices. These pertain to the design, production, consumption and disposal of products, thus establishing sustainable products as the norm within the EU. The plan comprises measures specifically targeting sectors with high resource consumption, such as electronics, packaging, buildings, and construction (EC 2020b). Additionally, waste prevention plays a central role in the CEAP. To this end, a uniform model for the separation and labeling of waste will be introduced in all Member States. Efforts will also be taken to reduce waste exports and illegal shipments in the EU (EC 2020a). By 2030, the use of circular materials is to be doubled, and the overall consumption footprint significantly reduced (EU 2020). To track the progress and effectiveness of policy measures in the Member States, the CEAP has now introduced a monitoring framework with new indicators, such as the material footprint or resource productivity (eurostat 2024a).

## 2.5 EU Taxonomy

The *EU Taxonomy* is the key framework for the EU's plan to channel investment towards sustainable economic activities as a further lever to achieve climate neutrality. The regulation sets out criteria for defining which economic activities are considered environmentally friendly and sustainable (EC 2024t). A distinction is drawn between "eligible" and "aligned" activities. The former are activities that potentially meet the taxonomy's technical screening criteria, while the latter are fully compliant (EC 2021e). These are centered on six climate targets (Figure 19). Large and listed companies are required to report on their percentage of aligned turnover / CapEx / OpEx<sup>7</sup> providing insight into their current sustainable state, but also their future direction (EY 2024). The aim is to enhance transparency and combat greenwashing (EC 2024t). As of November 2024, the taxonomy encompasses sectors such as energy, transportation, and real estate, with the intention to incorporate more in the future (EC 2021e). For taxonomy-aligned companies, this means improved access to green funding, increased investor confidence and a stronger market position (EC 2021e). From 2025, companies will have to disclose their compliance with the "Do no significant harm" (DNSH) principle<sup>8</sup>. One year later, credit institutions will have to publish their alignment of the trading books and fees with the taxonomy (EC 2024u).

## 2.6 Financing

In order to finance the Green Deal, the European Commission (EC) has pledged to mobilize a minimum of €1 trillion in sustainable investments over the next decade (EC 2024v). Consequently, 30% of the *EU's annual budget* (MFF 2021-2027) and the *Next Generation EU* instrument, devised to facilitate recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, will be allocated to green investments. A core component of this fund represents the *Recovery and Resilience Facility*

---

<sup>7</sup> Capital Expenditure, Operating Expenditure

<sup>8</sup> To not carry out economic activities that do significant harm to any environmental objective (EC 2021c).

(RRF), obtaining a budget of €672.5 billion. Member States are obliged to invest 37% of the allocated RRF funds in climate-related projects and reforms.

Moreover, the *EU Cohesion Policy* aids regions and municipalities in the implementation of large-scale investments aligned with the Green Deal with at least 30% of the *European Regional Development Fund* and 37% of the *Cohesion Fund* allocated towards climate neutrality (EC 2024v). Furthermore, the EC has devised the *Just Transition Mechanism*, which is anticipated to mobilize at least €55 billion of private and public investment from 2021 to 2027. The aim is to support the regions that are most affected by the green transition. The emphasis is on initiatives such as the reskilling of labor and combating energy poverty (EC 2024ah).

The *InvestEU* program offers both funding and an EU budget guarantee to support investments in key areas such as sustainable infrastructure, innovation and social skills (EU 2024a). At least 30% of the investments must be climate related. Furthermore, an additional *Just Transition Scheme* within the program facilitates investments in regions affected by the change (EC 2024v).

Alternatively, the *EU Green Bond Regulation* (EuGB) represents a different way of financing the green transition and defines a voluntary framework for the issuance of bonds by EU / non-EU organizations (e.g., listed companies, government institutions, financial institutions). The aim is to facilitate the allocation of capital to environmentally sustainable projects that align with the EU taxonomy (Debevoise & Plimpton 2024). Consequently, green bonds are prominent in sectors such as energy or buildings (Climate Bonds Initiative 2024). According to the new regulation, a minimum of 85% of the bond proceeds must be allocated to activities that meet the criteria of the EU taxonomy. The remaining 15% may be utilized for activities that have not yet been defined in the taxonomy, if they do not violate the DNSH principle. This flexibility permits issuers in nascent green sectors to access green bonds as a funding option regardless (Debevoise & Plimpton 2024). However, it is bound to strict disclosure requirements

(e.g., pre-issuance fact sheets, impact reports), which must undergo external review (Ashurst 2023; BaFin 2024), offering issuers and investors an increased transparency with reduced greenwashing risks (EC 2021a). Driven by a high demand for green investments, green bonds can have lower interest rates than conventional funding, making them potentially more favorable (KPMG 2015). The EuGB entered into force in December 2023 and will be fully applicable one year later in December 2024 (Debevoise & Plimpton 2024).

## 2.7 Transparency

In order to track the progress of the green transition while providing investors, consumers and other stakeholders with transparency on the sustainability performance of companies, the EU has adopted three directives in the area of disclosure: the *Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive* (CSRD), the *Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation* (SFDR) and the *Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive* (CSDDD). The first (national transposition: July 2024 (EC 2024h)) requires selected EU companies<sup>9</sup> to disclose how they manage social and environmental risks and their impact on people and the environment. The aim is to harmonize sustainability reporting and reduce costs, with first reports expected in 2025 (EC 2024k). By setting out how financial market participants must disclose sustainability information, the SFDR helps investors allocate their capital in sustainable projects and companies. In this way, the regulation contributes to the EU's goal of attracting private funding for a shift towards climate neutrality (EC 2024af). The CSDDD (national transposition: July 2026) aims to ensure that all major EU companies<sup>10</sup> identify and mitigate the impact of their value chain on human

---

<sup>9</sup> Requirements (two out of three): Large companies (+€50m net turnover, +€25m assets, +250 FTE); listed SMEs (+€8m net turnover, +€4m assets, +50 FTE); Non-EU companies will also have to comply if they generate a +€150m net turnover in the EU (Normative 2024)

<sup>10</sup> EU Companies: +€450m Global net turnover, +1000 FTE; Non-EU Companies: +450€m net turnover (Deloitte 2024a)

rights and the environment by requiring due diligence and the submission of an action plan by 2027 (EC 2024j).

### **3 Literature Review**

#### **3.1 Historical Context and Purpose of Scenario Planning**

Scenario planning is a strategic method for exploring a range of plausible futures in the context of uncertainty. Its various methods are applicable to a set of entities, including companies and political institutions. The aim of this literature review is to provide a consolidation of the most important academic papers on the topic and review the key findings on the principal approaches, their limitations as well as the evolution of scenario planning.

According to Bradfield and Van Der Heijden (2005), the concept of scenario planning has its roots in military strategy, where it was first used by Herman Kahn from the RAND Corporation. He applied scenario planning to anticipate and prepare for possible future events in the context of national defense (Wack 1985). Thanks to Kahn's pioneering work on "thinking about the unthinkable" (1962), Pierre Wack was able to apply this knowledge to corporate strategy. His mission to navigate Royal Dutch Shell through the oil crises of the 1960s and 1970s and to anticipate the oil shocks remains the classic case of scenario planning and provides the first evidence that it can help organizations improve their strategic position.

Throughout the literature, most authors stress that scenario planning is not a tool that can predict the future. Rather, it is a tool that helps to simulate a number of potential scenarios in the future. Schoemaker (1995) highlights the value of scenario planning in facilitating the navigation of uncertainty, enabling managers to identify the key drivers of change. Consequently, scenario planning allows any organization to increase its strategic flexibility. As van der Heijden (1996) claims, it can also facilitate corporate learning by encouraging strategic conversations about the future. This encourages participants to consider possibilities beyond those typically addressed

in conventional problem-solving and thereby makes organizations more agile and resilient to future challenges in the long term.

The relevance of scenario planning nowadays extends beyond the realm of business and has notable applications in public policy, healthcare and environmental management (Ramírez and Wilkinson 2016). Peterson, Cumming, and Carpenter (2003), for example, examine the use of scenario planning in the context of climate change adaptation and show how it facilitates the formulation of adaptive strategies to cope with potential environmental change.

### **3.2 Principal Approaches of Scenario Planning**

Based on Bradfield and Van Der Heijden (2005), three dominant methods of scenario planning have emerged over the years, each with its own characteristics: The *Intuitive Logics School*, *La Prospective* and the *Probabilistic Modified Trends School* (PMT).

The *Intuitive Logics School* approach, first articulated by Wack (1985) and later refined by Schwartz (1991), is the entirely qualitative of the three and has emerged as the most common in business settings. It is based on narrative scenarios and focuses on understanding and identifying the key drivers of change. Scenario building is achieved through structured workshops in which the identification of key uncertainties (KUs) and the formulation of plausible future narratives are critical steps. The principal objective is to challenge established mental models and expand strategic thinking. This technique is especially valued for its flexibility and adaptability in contexts where quantitative data is scarce or unreliable (Schwartz 1991).

*La Prospective*, which originated in France, was first developed by Michel Godet. This approach is more formal than Intuitive Logics and uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative data to construct potential scenarios. The main purpose of *La Prospective* is to help organizations formulate long-term visions through a systematic examination of trends, risks and potential disruptions (Godet 1991).

The *PMT* approach stands out from the range of scenario planning methodologies being the only purely quantitative technique. Its origin is rooted in statistical and probabilistic concepts, which is why it attempts to assign probabilities to potential future events. It uses historical data and trends as a basis and is known as the most analytical and data-driven of the three dominant schools.

### 3.3 Critiques and Evolution of Scenario Planning

Despite the many advantages, critics such as Goodwin and Wright (2001) have identified some limitations of the various approaches to scenario planning.

On the one hand, they point out that qualitative methods, such as the *Intuitive Logics School*, often lack the precision for which quantitative forecasting is known. As Bradfield and Van Der Heijden (2005) analyzed that the effectiveness of scenario planning depends on the quality of the scenarios, a potential limitation could be that scenarios based on narratives are too subjective. However, as the willingness of decision-makers to engage with scenarios is equally important, it is crucial that decision-makers do not disregard scenarios because they challenge deeply ingrained mental models or even power structures of the organization.

On the other hand, the *PMT's* quantitative approach is accused of being overly deterministic and relying too much on past trends to predict the future, thus failing to account for unforeseen or disruptive changes.

As most organizations' strategic environment is in a state of constant evolution and increasing complexity, it is inevitable that scenario planning methods also evolve in response. Krupp et al. (2014) specifically recommend the incorporation of new tools such as big data, artificial intelligence (AI) and computational modeling to increase the rigor and relevance of scenario planning. This approach could lead to the creation of more dynamic, data-driven scenarios that more accurately reflect the complexities of the modern world. In addition, Ramírez and

Wilkinson (2016) present a perspective on scenario planning as a way to help organizations prepare for the future, but also to challenge their understanding of the present.

In conclusion, scenario planning continues to be a central technique for strategic consideration in environments subject to uncertainty. It brings the ability to consider many plausible future scenarios, creating a useful tool in multiple sectors that can benefit from enhancing organizational resilience.

#### 4 Methodology

The following section provides an overview of the scientific methods employed in the preparation of this report. It offers an outline of the principal stages of the scenario planning methodology and a comprehensive description of the procedures and other frameworks and instruments utilized. Additionally, it presents a summary of the data collection process and includes a detailed illustration of the client's involvement in this project.

INTUITIVE LOGICS SCHOOL						
	00	01	02	03	04	05
TASKS	<p><i>ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify and describe relevant EU environmental measures for defined focal issue</li> </ul>	<p><i>FRAMING &amp; SCOPING</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify key challenge with MOME</li> <li>Develop and validate focal issue and time horizon</li> </ul>	<p><i>EXPLORE</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify drivers of change</li> <li>Discuss and evaluate the list of those drivers (megatrends, trends, uncertainties, etc.)</li> </ul>	<p><i>SYNTHESIZE</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Determine key uncertainties</li> <li>Construct scenario narrative framework</li> <li>Challenge and validate scenarios with experts</li> <li>Conduct Porter's 5 forces analysis for comparison</li> </ul>	<p><i>ACT</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Explore implication of each scenario for MOME</li> <li>Create scenario – specific and overall strategic action plan</li> </ul>	<p><i>MONITOR</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify set of early indicators</li> <li>Set an objective value and a range for each indicator</li> <li>Monitor developments and challenge assumptions</li> </ul>
TOOLS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Desk research</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Unstructured meeting</li> <li>✓ Desk research</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ PESTLE analysis</li> <li>✓ Expert interviews</li> <li>✓ Desk research</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Scenario Matrix</li> <li>✓ Expert interviews</li> <li>✓ Porter's five forces</li> <li>✓ Desk research</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Workshop w/ MOME</li> <li>✓ TOWS Matrix</li> <li>✓ Miro board</li> <li>✓ Desk research</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Scenario Cockpit</li> <li>✓ Desk research</li> </ul>
INVOLVEMENT		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nuno Pimentel (C)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>António Vicente (E)</li> <li>Antonios Sfakiotakis (E)</li> <li>Tanja Schindler (E)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>António Vicente (E)</li> <li>Christiane Conrads (E)</li> <li>João Braz Pereira (C)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nuno Pimentel (C)</li> <li>Francisco Antunes (C)</li> <li>Sofia Barbosa (C)</li> <li>João Braz Pereira (C)</li> <li>Maria Fontes (C)</li> <li>Susana Brito (C)</li> <li>Vasco Gomes (C)</li> </ul>	

Figure 1 - Methodology Overview | (E): Expert, (C): Company | Source: Own Creation

#### 4.1 Research Design and Implemented Tools

The real estate industry requires significant change to cope with the environmental challenges of the future (Walacik and Chmielewska 2024). Given the fact that MOME operates in this field, a significant part of this work project is dedicated to researching and identifying the key drivers of change that shape this industry and thereby enable the company to keep pace with changing trends and increasing uncertainties.

After analyzing the merits and drawbacks of the different scenario planning approaches outlined in the Literature Review chapter, the research team decided to adopt the *Intuitive Logics School* method to address the focal issue within the defined time horizon. The main reason for this choice revolves around the participatory nature of this approach that permits the incorporation of valuable insights from the partner company, thereby ensuring that the research is aligned with its perspective. Yet, the chosen method also allows for flexibility in handling uncertainty as it focuses on discussing multiple plausible futures while also fostering creativity by employing scenarios based on narratives (Bradfield and Van Der Heijden 2005). The input of the partner organization was complemented by the involvement of industry- and institutional experts through interviews at different stages of the process, which proved invaluable during the examination of the five phases of the *Intuitive Logics School*.

**Phase 1 (Framing and Scoping):** The first phase of the collaborative field lab was kicked off by an initial working meeting on September 6, 2024. The aim of this first discussion was to align MOME's current challenges and research interests with the student team's proposed hypotheses, supporting questions, and initial idea of the project design and implementation. As a result of previous desk research and this exchange of ideas, the focal issue and time horizon were determined and validated by the supervisor, the client's CEO Nuno Pimentel, and the project team. This set the stage for the following phases and enabled the project team to continue and narrow down its research.

**Phase 2 (Explore):** With the objective of identifying the industry's patterns of change and the factors that impact the implementation of the EU's sustainability measures, the second phase was initiated by individual, independent research on the focal issue. By scanning relevant literature, such as journal- and news articles as well as reports from political institutions, the first goal was to get an overview of the most influencing trends, megatrends and predetermined elements. Rather than treating predetermined elements as static constants, the research team decided to integrate these elements directly into the broader discussion of trends and megatrends. This allows their influence to be seamlessly reflected alongside dynamic changes, providing a more coherent and realistic understanding of the factors at play. Next to that, the PESTLE framework was applied to collect and organize the most important uncertainties in a structured manner. This tool proved particularly suitable as it comprehensively considers the main dimensions of the industry's external environment (Yüksel 2012). The individual members' findings were then discussed and consolidated during a team-internal workshop to conclude the phase.

**Phase 3 (Synthesize):** The selection of the above-mentioned uncertainties and especially their ranking from 1-10, based on their level of uncertainty and impact, were both discussed and validated with three different interview partners (Figure 1). As the initial classification of the uncertainties stemmed from desk research conducted by the project team, the discussions and interviews with renowned experts added an additional, valuable layer in terms of robustness. After validating the list of uncertainties and their respective classification, the next step consisted of determining the KUs for the subsequent scenario development. Considering that all upcoming phases depend on this decision, it was of utmost importance to ensure that the resulting scenarios comply with the following criteria: *Plausibility, Internal Coherence, Relevance, Divergence, Engagement and Actionability* (Wright and Cairns 2011).

Given these prerequisites, the area of interest within the upper right quadrant of the uncertainties matrix (Figure 3) resulted from applying a combined threshold of 8 between both the level of uncertainty and the impact on the focal issue. The uncertainties meeting this requirement were then subject to controls of interdependency among each other to ensure that they are suitable for becoming potential KUs.

Additionally, uncertainties with commonalities, intersections or supposed correlation were merged into clusters to avoid repetitiveness. Upon completion of these steps, the two KUs with the highest combined ranking served as the two axes of the scenario matrix. This matrix consists of four quadrants that are generated by assigning one KU to the horizontal- and one to the vertical axis. Thereby, each quadrant represents a distinct scenario with a unique narrative behind.

To ensure its practical relevance and internal consistence, the four scenarios were validated by an industry expert and the client organization. The project team's decision to apply a uniform approach to all narratives and conclude them by analyzing the real estate industry's attractiveness through a Porter's Five Forces framework is supposed to maintain comparability and enable the reader to differentiate between the scenarios. The outcomes were presented and discussed during the second official working meeting with the supervisor and the client's CEO Nuno Pimentel on November 13, 2024.

**Phase 4 (Act):** The fourth phase of the work project commenced with a collaborative workshop with the partner organization on November 27, 2024. Its aim was to present the finalized scenarios to MOME's core team and jointly derive strategic implications for each of the four narratives. For that purpose, the project team considered a TOWS matrix to be the most suitable tool for this exercise, provided that by comparing internal strengths and weaknesses with external opportunities and threats, the TOWS matrix enables specific strategies to be derived that are tailored to the company's particular situation. Hence, the TOWS matrix helps to make

strategic decisions that take both internal and external factors into account (Derr, Georg, and Heiler 2021).

To conceptualize the approach, the project team created a Miro board which served as a visual workspace to collectively brainstorm and gather ideas. The first step consisted in defining MOME's strengths and weaknesses together. Subsequently, the project team introduced each scenario's specific opportunities and threats that were prepared beforehand to guide the discussion. Based on the examined strengths and opportunities, as well as the opportunities and strengths identified, the aim was to commonly answer the following questions:

- *How can MOME leverage strengths to benefit from opportunities and overturn threats?*
- *How can MOME overcome weaknesses to benefit from opportunities and avoid threats?*

The drawn conclusions contributed substantially to the derivation of specific strategic implications for the distinctive scenarios, as well as an overall action plan for MOME. Given the time restriction of the workshop, the project team additionally conducted further desk research and made use of the information gathered through the expert interviews from previous phases to complete the analysis and provide additional strategic recommendations.

**Phase 5 (Monitor):** The final phase of the field lab focused on the identification and monitoring of early indicators. These indicators, identified by the research team, serve as critical signals to guide MOME in assessing which scenario is likely to unfold and ensure that the organization remains vigilant and adaptable to emerging changes in its evolving landscape. Constant monitoring is thus required to capture both gradual trends and sudden changes to anticipate future scenarios. The tool that proved to be the most suitable for this purpose is the Scenario Cockpit as its visual representations aid in communicating strategic actions to stakeholders, fostering a shared understanding and facilitating collaborative decision-making.

## 4.2 Strategic Collaboration: Client and Expert Involvement

Irrespective of the work project's phase, the input from both renowned experts and the client organization has been of great support for the research team and contributed significant additional value. To address MOME's research interests and the focal issue within the agreed time horizon, the insights received from third parties encouraged the team to challenge the status quo and take new perspectives.

During the initial stage, *Framing & Scoping*, no experts were involved in defining the cornerstones of the field lab, namely the focal issue and time horizon. The phase consisted of an unstructured meeting with the client organization's CEO Nuno Pimentel to understand MOME's strategic priorities and research interests for the upcoming years. This information exchange based on informal questions prepared beforehand by the project team culminated in the validation of the project scope.

In contrast, the next two phases of the project, i.e. *Explore* and *Synthesize*, included several expert interviews and validations of the project team's findings and main assumptions (Appendix 1). António Vicente (Deputy Head of Representation at the EC), Tanja Schindler (Foresight Advisor to the EC) and Antonios Sfakiotakis (Policy Coordinator at the Secretariat General – European Green Deal Unit) assisted the team in ranking the uncertainties according to their level of impact and uncertainty, as well as in the selection of the KUs and scenario matrix validation through semi-structured interviews. Likewise, Christiane Conrads (Partner and Global Real Estate Leader at PwC) participated in a semi-structured interview and approved the different scenarios and their implications on the real estate industry. João Braz Pereira (Head of Knowledge and ESG Initiatives at MOME) supported by sharing industry insights and valuable feedback during a semi-structured interview which was implemented to more accurately address MOME's research interest.

To examine MOME's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for each scenario and derive strategic recommendations in response, the *Act* phase consisted of a two-hour collaborative workshop with seven members of MOME's core team (Appendix 2). It served to answer the last part of the project's challenge set out in the title, namely '*Exploring risks, opportunities and strategies for MOME*'.

During the final *Monitor* stage of the project, no experts were consulted. However, all five phases highly benefited from the valuable insights received while conducting the work project.

## **5 Phase 1 – Framing & Scoping**

The initial phase establishes the foundation for scenario planning by outlining the focal issue and the time frame of the project (Schwartz 1996). The focal issue defines the contextual and transactional scope of the project. It is important to ensure that the focal issue is specific enough to enable strategic decisions, yet broad enough to allow for exploration. A clearly stated focal issue enables a structured and comprehensive analysis of plausible futures, thereby enhancing clarity and focus in the decision-making process (Chermack 2011; Bradfield and Van Der Heijden 2005). The time horizon defines the temporal scope of the scenario planning process and ensures that it is aligned with the focal issue and the organization's objectives. An optimal time horizon should be long enough to allow for fundamental changes and distinctive scenarios, but short enough to ensure practical relevance for strategic decisions (Schwartz 1996; Ramírez and Wilkinson 2016). It therefore enables the organization to anticipate future opportunities and challenges and to strengthen its ability to adapt.

### **5.1 Focal Issue**

With 40% of the EU's total energy consumption, the European real estate sector is the single largest energy consumer in Europe and is responsible for a significant carbon footprint with

36% of energy-related GHG emissions. It is therefore evident that the sector has a key role in reducing Europe's emissions (EC 2022a).

Concurrently, the EU has declared itself to be a global leader in the creation of a sustainable world. With the Green Deal, a package of targets and measures to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 has been declared, which will significantly transform every sector and industry (EC 2024a). The huge emission impact of the real estate industry highlights the crucial role it will play. However, while many of the Green Deal measures have already been passed into law, the actual implementation faces major challenges and uncertainties (EC 2021b). The impact of climate change, technological disruption through AI, growing geopolitical tension, migration and demographic change are just a few of the factors that have the potential to significantly influence the EU and therefore the measures of the Green Deal (Eurofound 2024).

To explore the future development of the European real estate industry, it is essential to understand the dynamics of implementing EU sustainability measures. The interplay of these factors will not only determine the industry's ability to align with climate neutrality goals but also its capacity to remain competitive and resilient in an evolving environment. This necessity leads to the focal issue of this study: *'Future of EU environmental directives and regulations and their implications for the European real estate sector'*.

To investigate the focal issue in depth, a framework was constructed using the following supporting questions:

- What are the main obstacles faced by the EU in coordinating the green transition amid a rapidly evolving global landscape, shifting demographics, rising populism, and changing migration dynamics?
- How can real estate companies sustain their competitiveness while complying with the increasing regulatory measures imposed by the EU?

- How are EU environmental directives and regulations driving changes in construction methods, materials, and building technologies?
- What are the implications of the Green Deal on the availability and development of affordable housing across the EU?

## **5.2 Time Horizon**

Upon first consideration, the 2050 target established by the Green Deal appears to offer a reasonable timeframe for addressing this focal issue. Nevertheless, an examination of the rapidly evolving circumstances within and surrounding the EU reveals that the initial timeframe is too expansive to provide a sufficient foundation for analyzing developments (EC 2024s; Schwartz 1996).

The Fit for 55 represents a pivotal initial milestone in the pursuit of the Green Deal, delineating tangible objectives and measures that must be implemented and achieved by 2030 in order to facilitate the realization of the 2050 objective (EU 2024d). Despite some of the measures already being codified into law, there remains significant uncertainty regarding the extent to which they will be implemented by 2030. This timeframe aligns with MOME's primary objective of providing 1,500 residential units by 2030. An objective that is directly aligned with the company's mission of providing affordable and sustainable housing and is thus significantly influenced by the implementation of EU measures until 2030.

The project team therefore determined that the time horizon until 2030 serves as an ideal reference point, as it accommodates sufficient uncertainties and changes in EU measures, as well as their impact on the real estate industry. Simultaneously, this timeframe facilitates the evaluation and scenario development through specific objectives, which ensure meaningful and reliable scenarios for MOME.

## **6 Phase 2 – Explore**

Phase 2, *Explore*, aims to deepen the understanding of the research topic by systematically scanning the broader environment to identify external drivers of change that could directly or indirectly shape the future development of the EU environmental directives and regulations and their impact on the real estate industry. In the *Intuitive Logics School's* Phase 2, predetermined elements are also analyzed as events that are nearly certain to occur or have already taken place, but whose consequences have not yet fully unfolded (Wack 1985). These elements are often treated as static constants; however, this paper takes a different approach by embedding these elements within the discussion of trends to more seamlessly reflect the underlying dynamics. This captures the interconnected drivers influencing the future, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the forces at play and the pathways they may create.

Individual Part – Elena Cox

### **6.1 Megatrends & Trends**

#### **6.1.1 Megatrend 1: Climate Change**

**Trend I: Increased Societal Environmental Awareness**

**Trend II: Green cities**

#### **6.1.2 Megatrend 2: Global Realignment – Demographic and Political Shifts**

**Trend III: Migration & Political Shift**

**Trend IV: Increasing Fragmentation of Globalization**

#### **6.1.3 Megatrend 3: Digitalization**

**Trend V: Remote Work**

**Trend VI: PropTech (Property technology)**

#### 6.1.4 Megatrend 4: Urbanization

The megatrend '*Urbanization*' describes a transformation within societies. It can be observed on a global level and is marked by a rapid and accelerated shift of population to urban areas as well as a steady expansion of cities. More than 56% of the total world population currently lives in cities, a significant increase from one-third in 1950. By 2050, this figure is expected to reach about two-thirds (UN, n.d.-b) (Figure 20), with Asia and Africa being driven by migration from rural areas. Populations in these areas are primarily seeking better living conditions and economic opportunities in urban settings (PwC 2016). Meanwhile, in Europe 75% of the population already lives in cities (Figure 21) (Statista 2023), which is expected to increase to around 83.7% by 2050 (EC 2020f).

Well-structured urbanization has the potential to contribute positively to societal well-being (Correia et al. 2024). However, this trend also poses significant challenges. In more developed economies and older cities in the developing world, infrastructure will be stretched to its limits and beyond as populations grow. In the developing world, rapidly expanding cities will require significant (smart) infrastructure investment simply to accommodate the rate at which they are growing and people are migrating. In addition, a large proportion of the population lacks access to basic infrastructure (Zhang 2015). Although cities occupy only 2% of the earth's land surface, their activities consume more than 75% of the world's material resources (WEF 2022). Moreover, poorly planned urbanization is a major contributor to rising CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (Xiaomin and Chuanglin 2023). This suggests that unplanned urban growth can have serious consequences for both public health and the environment. In addition, loss of green space and fertile land, housing shortages, increased traffic and pollution are other related problems that are likely to occur (Evers, Katuric, and van der Wouden 2024).

Cities play an important role in developing smart, sustainable and inclusive economies through urban renewal projects (UN-habitat 2021). To fully realize their benefits, the focus must shift

to accommodating rapid population growth and creating vibrant urban environments that contribute positively to society and the planet. Investing in efficient infrastructure, strengthening urban resilience and promoting inclusive urban policies can transform growing cities into engines of sustainable development.

### **Trend VII: Gentrification**

*'Gentrification'* is the process of renovating and refurbishing working-class or low-income neighborhoods to make them more appealing to wealthier residents or businesses (Tulier and Allen 2019). This typically results in elevated property prices, rental rates, and cost of living, which displaces long-term residents who can no longer afford to stay. Although it can result in enhanced facilities and economic revival, there are concerns about how it might affect social cohesiveness as well as the neighborhoods' cultural identities. This duality has sparked ongoing debates among policymakers, who remain divided over its implications for social justice and urban development (Smith 2023).

The drivers of gentrification involve a combination of political, social, and economic factors. People with higher incomes get drawn to urban areas due to economic shifts like the growth of high-tech industries or the inflow of capital into urban real estate markets (Zuk et al. 2017). The phenomenon is further fueled by social changes, including a growing preference for inner-city, cosmopolitan lifestyles (Florida 2017). Moreover, the implementation of gentrification projects in aging neighborhoods is further encouraged by government policies such as tax breaks for real estate developers (Hwang and Sampson 2014).

To address these challenges, cities must promote economic inclusion. They must adopt equitable urban development strategies that both prioritize affordability and mitigate the risk of displacement. The implementation of targeted policy tools can ensure that gentrification contributes to long-term urban success while preserving social equity and inclusion.

### **Trend VIII: Collaborative Living Models**

'*Collaborative living models*', including co-living and co-housing, are becoming increasingly popular as an innovative approach to changing urban lifestyles and housing needs. They are particularly appealing to professionals, students and individuals looking for an affordable, convenient and socially connected housing option (Jarvis et al. 2016).

The rise of co-living highlights a shift in real estate trends, with developers increasingly adapting their projects to meet these preferences. Co-living spaces offer flexible lease terms, affordability and shared amenities, making them especially attractive to those seeking convenience and community (Corfe 2019). This trend highlights the importance of housing innovation in addressing challenges such as population density and social isolation (Hacke, Muller, and Dutschke 2019). In contrast to traditional models, co-living spaces encourage interaction and support networks through the direct integration of shared kitchens, lounges, co-working spaces and community-building events (Steding 2019). They address urban housing needs by offering fully furnished private rooms or studios alongside shared amenities such as co-working spaces, gyms and terraces (Bergan and Power 2024). At the same time, co-housing offers a more suburban or rural alternative by clustering privately owned units around shared spaces, where residents can often manage their own communities (Beck 2019).

As interest in collaborative housing options continues to grow, it is foreseeable that they will play an important role in the future of urban development. Their long-term success will depend on their ability to scale in different urban contexts, while remaining affordable, inclusive and adaptable to changing societal needs.

### **6.2 Uncertainties**

In the final stage of the *Explore* phase, the uncertainties regarding '*the future of EU environmental regulations and directives*' were systematically analyzed. Uncertainties are unpredictable factors that have a significant influence on the focal issue, often by shaping a

range of different possible future scenarios (van der Heijden 1996). Through a combination of desk research and an internal team workshop, 12 uncertainty factors were identified and defined (Appendix 3). These uncertainties were filtered into the categories of the PESTLE framework (Figure 2) which suggests a structured approach to identifying and understanding relevant external factors (Buye 2021).

*Institutional Stability & Unity of the EU:* The EU is a dynamic institution, constantly adapting to changing circumstances both inside and outside the EU. As a result, there is uncertainty about the future institutional stability and cohesion of Member States. While a stable and united EU enables coherent development and implementation of environmental policies, instability and disagreement can lead to delays or even blockages. Cohesion also influences consistency of implementation, which is a key factor in efficiency and the emergence of internal conflict (EC 2024s).

*Political Right Shift of Member States:* Right-wing populist parties tend to prioritize sovereignty and economic concerns over EU energy and climate policies (Huber et al. 2021). In power, they could counteract national and EU policies with political instruments that can reduce the overall impact of policies and make it more challenging to achieve environmental goals. In particular, the election years of 2025 and 2026, when influential countries such as Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy and Poland vote, will provide insight into the extent to which right-wing populist parties influence the implementation of environmental measures (Bundestag 2024).

*Geopolitical Stability:* Countries with stable political environments, where terrorism and political violence are minimal, often demonstrate a stronger commitment to social and environmental causes (Costantiello and Leogrande 2023). However, geopolitical risks, such as military conflicts, sanctions or blockades can disrupt the focus on environmental initiatives across the EU. Such events can create uncertainty over resources and cause governments to

shift focus and funding away from sustainability efforts, making it harder for them to achieve their environmental goals (K. Khan, Khurshid, and Cifuentes-Faura 2023).

*Economic Situation:* Economic fluctuations can create uncertainty and shape how regulations are prioritized and carried out. There is generally increased support for improving environmental practices and advancing sustainability initiatives during periods of economic growth, when more financial resources are available, and investor confidence is high (Delova-Jolevska et al. 2024). However, during economic downturns or financial crises, the focus can shift away from long-term environmental goals as other political priorities take over, and investor confidence drops, which can hinder or delay sustainability efforts (Geels 2012).

*Financing Conditions and Inflation:* Financial conditions and inflation can affect the investment flows into environmental measures. When financing conditions are favorable, characterized by low interest rates and a stable and controlled inflation, there's a low borrowing cost which expands the willingness to invest in sustainable initiatives. Conversely, an increase of the interest rates and inflation raises the cost of borrowing and therefore decreases investment in ambitious sustainable projects due to the reduced availability of funds (Busch, Bauer, and Orlitzky 2015).

*Supply Chain Stability:* The EU's green transition is critically reliant on specific components and raw materials<sup>11</sup> essential for sustainable technologies (Christou and Carrara 2024). As the EU mainly imports these resources from abroad, disruptions in these supply chains can delay the timely implementation of environmental measures and significantly increase the cost of the transition. In addition, they could lead to a loss of transparency in supply chains, jeopardizing the assurance of sustainable standards (Nobletz, Svartzman, and Dikau 2024).

*Societal Acceptance:* Surveys show large regional and social differences in the acceptance and support for more sustainable and environmentally responsible practices. Further discrepancies

---

<sup>11</sup> Such as Lithium, Cobalt, Nickel, Copper, Manganese and Rare Earth Elements (RRE).

arise in the degree to which citizens are willing to adapt their lifestyles. These are accompanied by a growing mistrust of national and EU institutions (PwC 2024a; Jon Henley 2023). A lack of social acceptance can cause politicians to counteract environmental measures and can deter companies from investing in sustainable practices (EC 2021b).

*Qualified Workforce Availability:* To cope with the challenges associated with the green transition, companies need to ensure large-scale recruitment and sufficient investment in reskilling and upskilling of their employees (EC Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2022). The main challenges include increased reporting requirements such as CSRD, a structural lack of construction, roofing and electrical workers as well as bureaucratic hurdles to employing foreign manpower (Brucker Juricic, Galic, and Marenjak 2021). Therefore, EU Member States are tasked to identify gaps in their workforce and respective skillsets within the frame of the RED. This is because qualified professionals can significantly impact the implementation of environmental initiatives and either expedite or slow the achievement of EU targets (Bezerra, Martins, and Macedo 2024).

*Mass Migration Patterns:* Recent data (eurostat 2024c) show a steady increase in first-time asylum applications in the EU. However, it is uncertain whether this trend will continue or be mitigated by measures such as the EU Migration Pact (EC 2024aa). According to the Eurobarometer, immigration is the second biggest concern of the EU population at 8%, ahead of the environment and climate change (EC 2024ab). A heightened public attention can put pressure on policy makers and influence the setting of government priorities (Bundesinnenministerium 2024), potentially reducing the importance of the green agenda.

*Technological Innovation:* The EU's capacity and the development for innovation will influence both the effectiveness and the long-term viability of environmental policies. Incorporating new technological paradigms is increasingly seen as a driver of resource efficiency. The incorporation of innovative technologies acts as a driver that enhances resource

efficiency (Chatzistamoulou and Koundouri 2024) and can facilitate the transition to a decarbonized economy (Fleiter 2019). However, the definition of innovation implies uncertainty, as its potential value may or may not be realized in the future (Jalonen 2011).

*Climate Change Intensity:* In recent decades, Europe has been affected by a series of extreme weather events, including droughts, forest fires, and floodings, which are expected to increase in the future. An increase is likely to drive greater public awareness and an elevated focus on the environment, potentially prompting substantial policy shifts (Davidsson 2020). The catastrophes do not only pose risks to human health, but they also result in substantial economic losses (approx. €740 billion from 1980 – 2022 in the EU) (EEA 2024b). Moreover, enormous costs may also lead to a reallocation of EU financial resources towards warning systems, protection measures and reconstruction funds (Davidsson 2020; EC 2021d).

*Project Backlog:* Given that renewable energy licensing is a lengthy process and usually takes years, the EC tasked the EU Member States to identify, evaluate, and denominate suitable *go-to areas* that are available for renewable energy projects to accelerate the expansion. Despite the commission's effort, the current levels are not consistent with the aspired plan (EC Directorate General for Communication 2022). To date, projects are still evaluated on a first-come, first-served basis, which means that the most mature projects - i.e. those that are most likely to be realized, cannot be prioritized by public administration (WindEurope 2024). This causes delays, which can be significantly reduced by streamlined administrative processes, less bureaucratic hurdles and effective stakeholder engagement (Silva, Sánchez-Hernández, and Carvalho 2023; Marques et al. 2021).




Figure 2 - PESTLE | Source: Own Creation

## 7 Phase 3 – Synthesize

The purpose of the *Synthesize* phase is to identify the two KUs, which are defined by the events or forces whose outcomes are the most uncertain and that could have the highest impact on the focal issue within the time horizon. These two critical uncertainties are then mapped in a matrix and will serve as the basis for the scenario planning exercise (Schoemaker 1995). For the exact procedures of the uncertainty mapping and the scenario matrix development please refer to the Methodology (s. Chapter 4.1), for the ranking of all uncertainties, refer to Appendix 3.

### 7.1 Grouping & Identification of Key Uncertainties

The critical uncertainties resulting from the defined area of interest were *Supply Chain Stability*, *Geopolitical Stability*, and *Qualified Workforce Availability*. By grouping uncertainties with chronological and causal relationships, one can ensure that each cluster remains sufficiently independent of the others (Wright and Cairns 2011). In this way, the distinctive impact on the focal issue can be clarified. The critical uncertainty of *Supply Chain Stability* is increasingly driven by *Geopolitical Stability*. In an interconnected, globalized world, rising tensions between nations can lead to supply chain disruptions that restrict access to goods and resources. These disruptions often take the form of trade restrictions, sanctions or regulatory barriers, which can also be described as the weaponization of the supply chain to achieve political objectives

(Aronow 2024). Recent international conflicts underscore the direct link between geopolitical dynamics and supply chain vulnerabilities (KPMG 2022).

Conversely, *Qualified Workforce Availability* represents an independent critical uncertainty. Factors such as the reskilling of existing personnel or the bureaucratic hurdles related to labor mobility in terms of the green transition are not influenced by potential supply chain disruptions or geopolitical stability, since they are mainly restricting the availability of goods and materials. Thus, the analysis identified two distinct clusters. The first cluster encompasses *Geopolitical Stability* and *Supply Chain Stability* (named after the chronologically last), while the second cluster consists solely of *Qualified Workforce Availability* (Figure 3).




Figure 3 - Uncertainties Mapping | Source: Own Creation

### 7.1.1 Key Uncertainties

#### Key Uncertainty 1: Supply Chain Stability

*High Impact:* The EU's green transition is inextricably linked to increasing the share of renewable energies in the energy mix. However, the introduction of renewable technologies for energy production is strongly linked to imports, as the EU relies heavily on external suppliers for solar panels, lithium batteries, wind turbine components, and the CRMs necessary for its

production (EC 2023e). Given the limitations of the EU's own procurement and production capabilities, there is a risk of significant gaps in the supply of renewable energy (IEEP 2024). The reduction of the share of fossil fuels in the energy mix would not be possible, with serious consequences for the environment, society and the economy. Consequently, a decelerated and less stable inflow would result in a significant delay to the green transition and in a substantial increase in cost (IEA 2023). Serious disruptions would even make it impossible to implement the measures as currently planned.

*High Uncertainty:* The significant uncertainty surrounding the stability of the supply chain originates from the EU's reliance on imports and refining of CRMs and technologies from only a few countries with which there has been a history of repeated geopolitical tension in recent times. China is the dominant producer of six of the ten most production-concentrated CRMs, while Russia is the second largest producer in three of them (Kowalski and Legendre 2023). With regard to heavy rare earths, which are essential for the development of renewable energy technologies and especially electric vehicles, the EU currently relies on China for 100% of its supply (EC 2024i). Other key suppliers of CRMs are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Peru, South Africa, Indonesia and Australia. In all ten of the most important CRMs, production is concentrated in a maximum of two countries, which account for at least 70% of global production (Kowalski and Legendre 2023). Geopolitical tensions, especially with China, have in the past led to artificial disruptions in supply chains. The export ban on magnet production technologies announced in 2023 as a means of exerting pressure on the US, the export restrictions on gallium and germanium announced in July and the most recent export ban on three critical raw materials to the US in December 2024, serve to illustrate this point (Pickles 2023; Seaman 2024; GLOBSEC 2024). The current extremely tense geopolitical situation, as well as specific EU conflicts with China, such as its close cooperation with Russia and an ever-escalating trade war, has led to heightened political tensions between the EU and China. These

tensions are reaching levels not seen in decades and pose significant risks to global supply chains (Xiatong 2024; CB 2024) (Figure 23).

### **Key Uncertainty 2: Qualified Workforce Availability**

*High Impact:* To realize the full potential of the green transition, the EU needs to close the skills gap as the availability of a sufficiently qualified workforce significantly impacts the achievement of climate targets. An insufficient number of skilled labor force could hamper the EU's transition to a green economy and lead to delays in the implementation of the European Green Deal, especially in high-demand sectors such as renewable energy and construction. This skills gap could lead to economic disruption and job displacement, especially in carbon-intensive industries, while exacerbating regional and demographic inequalities. In addition, a lack of readiness in workforce development could drive up economic costs as labor markets struggle to keep pace with the demands of the green transition (EC Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2022). Thus, the existence of skilled workers exerts influence on two crucial dimensions of the measures' implementation, i.e. time and costs, and is hence to be classified as highly impactful.

*High Uncertainty:* The degree of uncertainty surrounding the *Qualified Workforce Availability* is highly affected by the EU's acute shortage of technical workers and other skilled professionals. The mentioned transition could require over 1 million new jobs by 2030, with jobs in the renewable energy sector and other clean energy technologies growing faster than in other sectors (European Labour Authority and Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini 2024; CEDEFOP 2021). Yet, it remains unclear to what degree the EU will tackle the bureaucracy regarding effectively employing workers from abroad. Time loss in this respect results from ongoing difficulties in recognizing foreign diplomas. Although the EU has a framework for the mutual acknowledgement of professional qualifications, it does not cover all professions or countries outside the EU (EC Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

and ECORYS 2016). This is complemented by complex work permit and visa procedures. Each Member State has its own requirements, leading to inconsistencies and making it difficult for employers to recruit workers from outside the EU in a timely manner (European Court of Auditors 2024). Thus, both the bureaucracy associated with hiring foreign workers and the time needed to diligently train workers adds a considerable level of uncertainty to the implementation of the EU's sustainability measures.

### 7.1.2 Scenario Matrix

The scenario matrix was built by combining the two KUs: *Supply Chain Stability* and *Qualified Workforce Availability*. The integration of both uncertainties – and the definition of the two opposing and extreme spectrums of each axis – allows for the emergence of four distinct scenarios. Each scenario results as a unique combination of factors that impact the future of the EU environmental regulations and directives.

The first axis represents the *Supply Chain Stability* and is defined by the following spectrums: Spectrum 1, which addresses an '**Unstable Supply Chain**' and is characterized by an environment of geopolitical tensions, resulting in CRMs shortages and increased prices due to tariffs. Contrarily, spectrum 2 consists of a '**Stable Supply Chain**', where the EU maintains healthy relationships with key trade partners, thus ensuring a secure and stable supply of CRMs without shortages or imposed tariffs. The second axis, *Qualified Workforce Availability*, encompasses the subsequent spectrums. Firstly, spectrum 1 embodies a '**Scarcity of Qualified Workforce**' mainly caused by a lack of talent in the EU and strict immigration policies. In contrast, spectrum 2 is classified as an '**Availability of Qualified Workforce**', foreseeing the EU has been able to address the skilled workforce gap.

As a result, the four scenarios that arise from the combination of two different spectrums of each axis are the following: '**Voltage Revolution**', '**Digital Backbone**', '**Efficiency Gambit**' and '**Broken Foundations**'. The scenario matrix helps guarantee that all scenarios are distinct

enough while covering all possible future factors and combinations of the KUs that could impact the focal issue (Figure 4). Moreover, each scenario provides a descriptive narrative that envisions the possible real-life challenges and opportunities by the specified time horizon.




Figure 4 - Scenario Matrix | Source: Own Creation

### 7.1.3 Cross-validation of the Scenario Matrix

To ensure the robustness of the scenario matrix, a cross-validation was carried out with further expert input. To this end, the project team held a semi-structured meeting with Christiane Conrads, Global Leader for Real Estate and ESG at PwC (Appendix 1). Her dual expertise in EU environmental policy and the real estate sector provided an additional critical perspective to validate the approach adopted. During the discussion, Conrads highlighted the strong link between the stable supply of CRMs/green technology with geopolitical tensions and their impact on the European real estate industry, particularly given that a stable supply of these materials is crucial to achieving the sector's sustainability goals. At the same time, her insights into workforce dynamics confirmed that targeted reskilling to meet the demands of new technologies, as well as labor mobility and migration, are key to implementing these policies, thus confirming the second KU. The feedback not only validated the approach taken, but also enriched the scenario development with nuanced perspectives on its potential logical evolution.

## 7.2 Scenario Narratives

The structure of the following scenarios is based on the respective attributes of the two KUs. The consequences resulting from these effects are examined in two interlinked layers: the contextual environment from an EU perspective and the transactional layer specific to the European real estate sector. The contextual layer examines the broad systemic influence of the uncertainties on the implementation of the relevant EU measures and their interlinking in a logical chain. Whether or not the measures can be successfully implemented is influenced by factors such as the energy mix, energy prices or carbon prices. These factors shape the wider environment in which EU industry and society act. The transactional layer thus describes market developments, pursued by both the KUs and the contextual environment. Finally, the attractiveness of the industry is evaluated with the Porter's 5 forces framework, creating comparability (Figure 5).




Figure 5 - Scenario Structure / Source: Own Creation

Individual Part – Moritz Fischer

### 7.2.1 Scenario 1 – Voltage Revolution

Individual Part – Theofanis Orfanidis

### 7.2.2 Scenario 2 – Digital Backbone

### **7.2.3 Scenario 3 – Efficiency Gambit**

### **7.2.4 Scenario 4 – Broken Foundations**

The EU finds itself in a turbulent environment in 2030. It struggles to maintain a decade-long ambition of a green transition while confronting the harsh reality of an economy marked by a disjointed supply chain and a severe shortage of skilled workers in the majority of industries. Although the EU has in general avoided direct involvement in the Taiwan issue, its closer alignment to the US policy of supporting its autonomy and military assistance has provoked retaliation from China, including economic and political actions (Taiwan News 2024). Amid rising geopolitical tensions between major powers, states with significant reserves of CRMs have increasingly turned to resource nationalism as a strategic approach to protect their economic and political interests (Barteková and Kemp 2016). Material shortages, exacerbated by trade restrictions and soaring prices resulting from the implementation of high tariffs, have pushed the cost of CRMs to unprecedented highs. Simultaneously, the EU is confronted with a severe shortage of skilled workers, especially with the necessary green skills to develop low-carbon technologies (Karachalios and Kotsios 2023). This bottleneck is exacerbated by strict immigration policies and associated bureaucratic hurdles, which have failed to improve and represent significant obstacles to recruiting employees from outside the EU (Mazzeschi 2016). While other global regions have slowly transitioned to greener economies, the EU's leadership on sustainability is slowly fading over the horizon.

#### **Contextual Analysis (EU Perspective):**

At the heart of this struggle is the failed implementation of the **CRMA**, a promising initiative that aimed to build a domestic supply chain within the EU, to reduce its dependency on CRMs imports (EC 2020d). Countries like China, which possess the highest amount of CRMs, have

increased their control over exports by prioritizing domestic needs and by using these resources for political and economic influence. Conversely, the EU has not made meaningful advancements in the development of domestic extraction and processing of CRMs (Lewicka 2021). Despite the planned efforts, the EU's overall need for skilled workers has more than doubled, and training initiatives have failed, rendering it impossible to fill the growing labor gap (ELA 2023). As a result, the EU was unable to achieve its proposed targets, and the main objective of not making more than 65% of the total CRMs supply dependent on a third country was deemed impossible.

Over the last decade, nearly all key EU actors have highlighted, in countless reports, the importance of a stable and secure supply of CRMs (Vlaskamp 2024) in developing renewable energy sources. However, the majority of green energy projects in the EU encountered substantial material shortages that proved difficult to overcome, resulting in significant delays. Furthermore, the EU encountered challenges in accessing a sufficiently qualified workforce for the manufacturing, deployment, and maintenance of clean energy infrastructure (EC 2024n). Consequently, the three principal renewable energy sources – wind, hydropower, and solar photovoltaic – were the most significantly impacted, resulting in constraints on their growth and delays in the expansion of their share in the energy mix until 2023 (EEA 2024d). In order to achieve the target set out in the **RED** of increasing the share of renewable energy in the EU energy mix to 42.5%, the EU would have had to significantly accelerate the growth rate of renewable energy sources, far beyond the modest pace of around 1% annually over the past decade (EEA 2024a). Consequently, by 2030, the EU fell short of its renewable energy goals and was compelled to maintain significant reliance on fossil fuels for electricity generation. The **EED**, as revised in 2023, aimed to improve the EU energy efficiency by setting national targets.

Nevertheless, the way these targets were calculated<sup>12</sup> lacked transparency, allowing Member States to mask their compliance levels. According to the **EED**, only the use of the formula is binding, but not compliance with the resulting targets (CES 2022). The absence of binding targets at the Member State level resulted in poor enforcement, therefore allowing countries to have extra flexibility in deciding their own contribution efforts. In addition, the lack of electrification resulted in high reliance on fossil fuels to meet growing energy demand in sectors such as transport, water and agriculture (EC 2018b). As a result, the shared goal of reducing total energy consumption by 11.7% was not achieved.

The **CEAP** had great potential to help ensure the security of supply of essential raw materials for renewable technologies by emphasizing sustainable use and recycling practices that reduce waste. Yet, its implementation fell short in several areas. Not only did the EU lack sufficient recycling facilities and technological infrastructures, but it also faced a key obstacle that could not be overcome – the CRMs recycling rate. While the average recycling rate of the 34 CRMs is only 8.3%, materials such as the 15 elements that make up the rare earth elements have an extremely low rate of 1% (V&E 2024). These figures are well below the ambitious 15% recycling rate target for CRMs by 2030. At the same time, the decarbonization efforts failure became apparent in the building sector, where fossil fuels remained the essential source for heating and cooling systems (EEB 2022). Considering that 80% of the available buildings in 2050 have already been constructed (WEF 2022), the importance of undertaking major retrofitting projects became clear. However, insufficiently qualified workers and planning professionals, as well as increased project costs and limited resources, hampered the implementation of retrofitting efforts, resulting in most projects being delayed or even canceled. Thus, by 2030, many real estate developers have chosen not to meet **EPBD** standards, resulting

---

<sup>12</sup> The EED recast proposal requires Member States to use a formula based on four variables with equal weight - energy intensity, GDP per capita, energy savings potential and a fixed energy consumption reduction (Energy Coalition, 2022).

in widespread non-compliance across the EU. Consequently, the **EPBD** goal of reducing GHG emissions in the building sector by at least 60% and achieving a zero emissions target for new buildings was not successful and the enforcement of this energy efficiency standard has been suspended.

Initially, the **ETS** played a crucial role in reducing carbon emissions by setting a limiting cap on the number of allowances. Nonetheless, by ambitiously reducing the cap each year, it encountered several systemic barriers that challenged its feasibility. Firstly, during Phase 4<sup>13</sup> around 40% of the total allowances were allocated for free to mitigate carbon leakage<sup>14</sup> risks (EC 2024c). In addition, the industries that accounted for more than 90% of emissions were receiving free allowances that covered or even exceeded their emissions levels. Not only were companies in these industries able to sell their surplus allowances on the market but it also led to excessive windfall profits<sup>15</sup> (European Court of Auditors 2020). Such inefficiencies showcased the system's inability to effectively align with the 'polluter pays' principle, while effectively rewarding high-emission industries for maintaining their emission levels. In summary, it reduced the urgency to decarbonize and failed to provide significant incentives. Therefore, the **ETS** was stopped entirely due to its ineffectiveness. Moreover, the **ETS2** expansion to buildings and transport also failed as a result of the lack of success of the **EED** and **EPBD** and the consequent widespread non-compliance.

In essence, the **CBAM** has proven to be largely symbolic in nature. Its efficacy was undermined by the failure of the other measures and the constrained advancement of low-carbon technologies, culminating in an acute reliance on carbon imports. As geopolitical tensions intensified, the EU's principal trading partners initiated retaliatory measures against the **CBAM**

---

<sup>13</sup> That lasts during the following period: 2021-2030

<sup>14</sup> A situation where companies transfer production to third countries with laxer constraints on GHG emissions, which may lead to an increase in their total emissions (EC 2018a)

<sup>15</sup> Process characterized by companies passing their carbon costs onto the final consumer, despite receiving free allowances (EC 2018a)

pricing mechanism, implementing and fortifying their own pricing systems (Cornago and Berg 2024). To guarantee a more secure and stable supply of materials and avoid severe shortages, the EU decided to stop the implementation of the **CBAM**.

As the EU faces a challenging transition towards a green economy, characterized by heavy fossil fuel import reliance and high carbon emissions, most companies have a hard time complying with reporting obligations under the **CSRD** framework. On the one hand, they lack qualified workers with data collection and reporting skills. On the other hand, it is hardly possible for most companies to comply with the criteria of **EU taxonomy** alignment, which creates difficulties in access to green funding. In particular, the majority of companies are unable to comply with the **DNSH** criteria, which represents a fundamental aspect of taxonomy alignment. This criterion stipulates that any activities undertaken must not result in harm to the environmental objectives set out in EU regulations and directives (PwC 2024d). Consequently, the EU has acknowledged that the majority of companies encounter difficulties in meeting the strict environmental criteria due to factors such as technological deficiencies, substantial compliance expenses, and workforce limitations. Therefore, the EU has redirected its attention within the taxonomy framework, by placing greater emphasis on the social aspects of sustainability (EC 2024z). This shift involves integrating mandatory social measures, such as respecting workers' rights, ensuring workplace equality, and upholding principles of fair treatment. As a result, the EU ensures that green funding remains accessible to companies that may struggle to meet stringent environmental standards, enabling them to contribute to sustainability through social equity while progressing toward environmental goals.

#### **Transactional Analysis (European Real Estate Industry):**

The challenges of successfully achieving the EU environmental goals, by 2030, have caused a significant shift in the real estate sector. As a result, the industry is undergoing a remarkable transformation shaped by an unstable supply of raw materials and a lack of qualified workforce.

Firstly, the rising operational costs for real estate assets – primarily driven by increased material prices and the lack of renewable energy integration – have been passed down to customers, resulting in higher rents and buying prices of buildings (Sante 2022). As social cohesion is compromised, affordability becomes a main concern, especially for lower-class residential tenants. Additionally, the skilled workforce gap incentivized the available qualified workers to demand higher wages and improved working conditions, thus significantly increasing the costs incurred by real estate developers. Therefore, the real estate sector does not have the sufficient manpower and resources to successfully conduct retrofitting projects by 2030. Moreover, new construction projects also face significant delays, particularly in areas of high demand. Consequently, most buildings remain energy-inefficient, and the industry struggles to address the affordability issue.

The above-mentioned causes an economic downturn that results in a highly fragmented market. Unquestionably, the lack of green buildings leads to the available sustainable options being priced at a premium (Al Mamun et al. 2023). Furthermore, the traditional buildings market will suffer from increased demand that supply cannot keep up with until 2030. In addition, urban centers have become highly unaffordable, forcing many lower and middle-income households to move to suburban areas. This creates new challenges for urban planning and increases emissions and energy consumption in transportation due to longer commutes.

As an alternative, the surge of co-living models such as communal housing and shared apartments, have become increasingly popular and are now the preferred solution to avoid the rising rents, especially for young professionals and students (Nicolescu 2022). This type of model is also seen as a great tool to improve energy efficiency per capita and optimize resource usage, for example, by heating shared common spaces rather than entire individual apartments (Pless et al. 2022). Accordingly, real estate developers pivot toward planning the construction of co-living buildings, which mainly consist of individual units with shared amenities.

However, such construction projects take a considerable amount of time and are therefore seen as a medium-to-long-term sustainable solution that cannot immediately tackle the affordability problem.

By 2030, modular and other off-site construction practices emerge as crucial innovations to address the challenges of high material costs and labor shortages in the EU real estate market. These construction models involve prefabricating the building components – such as walls, floors, and roofs – off-site and transporting them to be assembled on-site. Considering that components are manufactured in a controlled factory environment, it allows for process automation, thus reducing labor needs (BM 2021). Furthermore, it has the ability to optimize material usage, lower material waste, and increase the recycling rate of CRMs. Finally, modular constructions significantly reduce project durations compared to traditional construction models (McKinsey 2019). This makes it an effective, shorter-term solution that has been widely adopted by most real estate developers in the EU, considering it addresses both the labor gap and the scarcity of raw materials challenges that are predominant in the industry.

The mix between the adoption of co-living and modular building models serves both as a measure to promptly relieve the affordability issue and as a continuous effort to create a permanent sustainable transition in the real estate sector. Nevertheless, the high initial investment costs of modular construction factories and co-living buildings (Bello et al. 2024) act as a critical barrier, emphasizing the need to secure access to funding. As social cohesion and housing affordability become a pressing concern across EU nations, the green funding criteria, as well as the **EU taxonomy** alignment requirements, are changed (Merle et al. 2022). Consequently, modular and co-living projects are now considered more sustainable practices, and the criteria for taxonomy alignment shifts to include a greater focus on social practices. As a result, to guarantee access to funding, the **EU taxonomy** now mandates the following minimum requirements: ensure workers' rights such as fair wages and safe working conditions,

equal pay and treatment at the workplace, non-discrimination, gender equality, and identical opportunities (EC 2022b). Compliance with these criteria not only ensures access to capital needed to deploy projects but also helps construction companies navigate the labor gap and attract a qualified workforce, which is essential to the viability of these projects. As a result, social standards have become normalized in the real estate sector, which is well on the way to addressing the issue of affordability.

### **Porter's 5 Forces:**

According to the time horizon considered, the level of *competitive rivalry* in the real estate sector is considered to be high. The fragmented nature of the market and the limited availability of green buildings are concentrating the competition around improving traditional building practices. To maintain their presence in this evolving landscape and ensure profitability, developers compete fiercely for scarce CRMs and green funds. In addition, the severe shortage of skilled labor is leading to intense competition for talent, with larger firms often dominating the labor market by leveraging their ability to offer higher wages, better benefits and more stable work opportunities (Kuptsch and Pang 2006). As a result, smaller firms face several challenges, such as shortages of materials and labor, which heighten the intense rivalry in the market. The above-stated conditions lead to overall reduced profit margins, leaving developers scrambling to sustain profitability.

Moreover, the *threat of new entrants* is characterized as moderate to high. The undeniably high operating costs, including the rising cost of labor, are seen as a major barrier to entry. Additionally, the soaring initial investment needed for the industry's new emerging models – modular and co-living projects – significantly deter new entrants (McKinsey 2019). However, the regulatory ambiguity around the EED and EPBD standards has led to widespread non-compliance practices across the real estate industry, thus slightly lowering the immediate environmental compliance costs. Furthermore, the **EU taxonomy** alignment requirements also

favor established players with resources and expertise, therefore further raising entry barriers. Despite that, alignment with the new taxonomy alignment criteria, and the resulting possibility of having access to funding might decrease the overall initial capital needed to enter the market. Although the adoption of modular construction optimizes the use of critical materials and increases recycling rates (Garusinghe, Perera, and Weerapperuma 2023), it does not change the fact that the EU will still be heavily dependent on imported CRMs for construction materials in 2030, mainly from geopolitically sensitive regions such as China, South Africa, and Turkey (Blengini et al. 2020).

In addition, the severe shortage of skilled workers, especially those with the necessary skills to carry out these new projects, allows labor suppliers to demand higher wages and better conditions. The existing workforce in the EU is further empowered by strict immigration policies that hinder the ability of companies to diversify their workforce. As a result, the *bargaining power of suppliers* is characterized as high.






On the other hand, the dynamic is reversed when considering the buyers' perspective. The imbalance between supply and demand naturally favors sellers, given the limited construction and retrofitting projects, resulting in a constrained market. At the same time, the few green buildings that are available are selling at a premium due to their low availability (Al Mamun et al. 2023), leaving the majority of buyers with less attractive traditional options. In addition, rising rents and real estate prices (European Commission. Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 2022) limit buyers' ability to negotiate. This is especially true for lower and middle-income households. Nevertheless, buyers are influencing market trends, such as the rise of co-living and suburban migration, which may lead to an increase in supply. However, suburban migration or the adoption of co-living and other shared housing models is often a necessity rather than a preference, underscoring the minimal influence of buyers. In summary, the real estate sector presents a low *bargaining power of buyers*.


As previously mentioned, by 2030 there is a growth in popularity for alternatives to the traditional individual housing market. The main emerging models such as co-living, modular buildings, and communal housing address affordability and sustainability challenges. In addition, these models have proven to be an efficient solution to overcome the scarcity of skilled workers, and the material shortages resulting from the unstable supply chain (BM 2021). As substitutes capture market share from traditional offerings, existing players must ensure they diversify their offerings to remain competitive. This puts real estate developers under pressure to rapidly integrate the new models into their planning, as construction projects are often slow and time-consuming. As a result, the *threat of substitutes* is moderate to high.


Group Part


### 7.2.5 Scenario Comparison


The EU, its industries and its society are differently impacted by the four distinctive scenarios. To facilitate their comparison, this section offers a consolidated view on the most important contextual/transactional factors (Figure 6) and illustrates the attractiveness of the real estate industry per narrative based on the Porter's 5 forces framework (Figure 7).

	 RENEWABLE ENERGY EXPANSION	 ENERGY EFFICIENCY ENHANCEMENTS	 EMISSION OF GREENHOUSE GAS	 INDUSTRY ELECTRIFICATION	 KEY LEVER
Scenario 1: Voltage Revolution	↑	↑	↓	↑	ELECTRIFICATION
Scenario 2: Digital Backbone	↗	↗	↓	↗	TECH / AI / DIGITAL
Scenario 3: Efficiency Gambit	→	↑	→	→	ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Scenario 4: Broken Foundations	→	↓	↗	→	EU TAXONOMY

 Increase

 Slight increase

 Stagnation

 Slight decrease


 Decrease

Figure 6 - Scenario Comparison / Source: Own Creation

In *Scenario 1*, significant progress is made in all areas. Renewable energies and energy efficiency are greatly expanded, industrial electrification progresses, and GHG emissions fall significantly. This scenario is therefore the most ambitious and reflects a comprehensive transformation in which electrification serves as a key lever.

In contrast, *Scenario 4* shows only minimal progress. Renewable energies are stagnating, as is the electrification of industry. There is also no improvement in the reduction of GHG emissions. This scenario emphasizes the importance of regulatory framework conditions such as the EU taxonomy criteria, which need to be adapted to the industry needs.

*Scenario 2* focuses on technological and digital innovations, in particular AI and automation. Although there are slight improvements in energy efficiency and a smaller reduction in emissions in this scenario than in *Scenario 1*, progress in renewable energies and electrification remains rather moderate given the scarcity of skilled workers.

In *Scenario 3*, energy efficiency is increased, but other areas largely stagnated, particularly the expansion of renewable energies and electrification. Nevertheless, a moderate reduction in emissions is achieved.

Overall, *Scenario 1* stands out as the most optimistic vision of a sustainable energy transition, while *Scenario 4* paints a conservative picture. *Scenarios 2 and 3* move between these extremes and each focus on specific approaches. The scenarios therefore not only show different development paths, but also the areas of tension between technological, regulatory and infrastructural measures to achieve climate targets.






	 INDUSTRY RIVALRY	 BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS	 BARGAINING POWER OF BUYERS	 THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS	 THREAT OF SUBSTITUTES
<b>Scenario 1: Voltage Revolution</b>	HIGH	LOW – MODERATE	MODERATE – HIGH	MODERATE – HIGH	MODERATE
<b>Scenario 2: Digital Backbone</b>	HIGH	HIGH	LOW – MODERATE	LOW – MODERATE	MODERATE
<b>Scenario 3: Efficiency Gambit</b>	MODERATE	MODERATE	MODERATE	LOW – MODERATE	MODERATE – HIGH
<b>Scenario 4: Broken Foundations</b>	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	MODERATE – HIGH	MODERATE – HIGH

Figure 7 - Porter's 5 Forces Scenario Comparison | Source: Own Creation

Operating in an environment characterized by a stable supply chain and a sufficient number of skilled workers, the *'Voltage Revolution'* scenario offers the best conditions for buyers to leverage their bargaining power and new players to enter the market.

Contrariwise, the *'Broken Foundations'* narrative represents a unique opportunity for suppliers to take advantage of their high negotiating power given the scarcity of qualified labor and the unstable supply chain which results in an ever-increasing reliance on few providers in the market.

The *'Digital Backbone'* and *'Efficiency Gambit'* scenarios present opposing challenges to the industry. While the first one forces the industry to find solutions to compensate for the labor market shortages, the latter is affected by an unstable supply chain and insufficient supply of CRMs. More precisely, the *'Digital Backbone'* scenario offers more favorable conditions for suppliers in terms of bargaining power while the *'Efficiency Gambit'* scenario is more advantageous for buyers provided that they can choose from a wider range of substitutes than in the *'Digital Backbone'* scenario.

Common to all narratives is the intensity of competition, i.e. industry rivalry, which is at least moderate across all four. Apart from that, the threat exerted by substitute firms or products is at least moderate in all scenarios as well.

## **8 Phase 4 – Act**

The Act phase is of central importance for translating scenario findings into strategic action. To this end, MOME's strengths and weaknesses were jointly examined in a collaborative workshop and a TOWS matrix served as the basis for deriving implications for each of the four narratives (Phadnis, Sheffi, and Caplice 2022). Additionally, an overarching action plan was developed to guide the client organization effectively under various plausible future circumstances.

Individual Part – Moritz Fischer

### **8.1 Scenario 1 – Voltage Revolution**

Individual Part – Theofanis Orfanidis

### **8.2 Scenario 2 – Digital Backbone**

Individual Part – Joshua Peter Jungblut

### **8.3 Scenario 3 – Efficiency Gambit**

Individual Part – Andrei Razvan Fratila

### **8.4 Scenario 4 – Broken Foundations**

In this scenario, the fragmented supply chain and the skilled workforce gap disrupt the real estate industry. The increase in operational costs and the intensified competition to secure materials and labor – both crucial for the development of construction projects – have created a volatile environment, making it increasingly challenging to progress efficiently. These pressures have fundamentally reshaped the industry, necessitating innovative strategies to ensure resilience and competitiveness. Therefore, the following four strategies were developed to help MOME navigate this environment.

		EXTERNAL FACTORS	
		OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
INTERNAL FACTORS	STRENGTHS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Leverage the affordability crisis</li> <li>New emerging models (modular constructions and co-living)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High material prices</li> <li>High bargaining power of suppliers</li> <li>Project delays and implementation struggles which reduce stakeholders' confidence</li> </ul>
	WEAKNESSES	<p><b>S/O – Strategy</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Utilization of MMC and streamlined processes to quickly integrate modular construction</li> <li>Leverage co-living models to provide affordable housing solutions</li> </ul>	<p><b>S/T – Strategy</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Benefit from technologies and collaborative approach to reduce material and labor usage</li> <li>Leverage project transparency and affordability to build stakeholders' trust</li> </ul>
		<p><b>W/O – Strategy</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increase awareness through the development of small-scale projects</li> <li>Partnerships with municipalities to address affordability crisis</li> </ul>	<p><b>W/T – Strategy</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain a balanced mix of local and global suppliers, thus reducing price volatility and material shortages</li> </ul>

Figure 8 - Scenario 4: TOWS-Analysis / Source: Own Creation

**S/O – Strategy:** In the evolving landscape of the real estate industry, MOME stands out for its knowledge and expertise in MMC. In addition, its streamlined construction processes, which include ECI and digital representation tools (BIM), can be leveraged to capitalize on modular construction solutions, making MOME well-positioned to emerge as a leader in off-site construction practices (MOME 2024a). To strategically capitalize on these opportunities, MOME should start by launching projects targeting areas facing housing affordability issues, such as Lisbon or Porto. Considering the increase in rents and the consequent suburbanization aspects of this scenario, MOME should also pay specific attention to key residential areas. Therefore, it is crucial to target becoming one of the first players in the market to implement modular projects that plan to cover the suburban area of these two big cities. Moreover, the factory environment benefits of modular production – such as reduced waste and safer working conditions – align closely with the new EU taxonomy requirements of this scenario, reinforcing MOME’s ability to fund these projects. Simultaneously, MOME’s cooperative model, built on principles of affordability and transparency (MOME 2024b), creates a strong basis for developing shared housing solutions. The growing popularity of co-living in urban areas reflects a rising demand for affordable, community-focused housing, particularly among

younger groups such as professionals and students. Considering the demographics that are most attracted by co-living models, it is recommended that MOME seeks to strategically carry out construction projects around Lisbon's and Porto's key universities and business centers. By combining the cooperative model's strengths with innovative modular construction methods, MOME can position itself as a pioneer in offering highly affordable and efficient shared housing options while staying competitive on pricing.

**W/O – Strategy:** In order to address its internal limitations to better capitalize on market opportunities MOME should first adopt a strategy that enhances its brand recognition and reputation. As a new company, the lack of track record combined with its cooperative model, unknown in Portugal, may lead to difficulties in the visibility and credibility of MOME's projects. Therefore, it is crucial to first execute small-scale projects – based on the emerging practices in the market – in main urban areas to create tangible examples of MOME's capabilities. These pilot projects act as a proof of concept, thus strengthening the company's market presence and portfolio of successful stories. To further increase awareness around the cooperative housing model in Portugal, MOME should also seek partnerships with municipalities to integrate cooperative housing into urban planning policies, especially in areas of increased housing shortages (André 2024). This collaboration with public institutions not only increases the model's visibility but also has the potential to provide MOME with access to public incentives, such as land grants, subsidies, and initial infrastructure investment to reduce the company's upfront costs. At the same time, MOME is dependent on third parties like real estate evaluators and insurance companies which are slow to adapt to the industry's innovative models. To successfully overcome possible bottlenecks, the company must include and conduct plans and webinars to educate and support third parties in adapting to innovative construction models. By highlighting the long-term benefits of the new models, MOME should focus on creating a lasting strategic alliance that is mutually favorable.

**S/T – Strategy:** By adopting modular construction and other off-site methods that are backed up by its expertise in MMC, MOME should be able to strategically mitigate the industry's risks. The employment of modular practices along with streamlined construction processes allows the company to minimize its dependence on materials and the scarce labor market. On one side, MMC directly addresses the threat of material shortages and rising costs by operating in controlled factories that increase recycling and allow for a more optimized use of materials (WEF 2016). On the opposing side, planning projects utilizing BIM's precision increases overall project efficiency, while ECI helps find collaborations with contractors and suppliers early in the project development, thus mitigating risks of delays due to workforce shortage. Utilizing this strategy will position MOME as a reliable developer that delivers projects on time, even under workforce constraints. Additionally, to mitigate the increased scrutiny from stakeholders, MOME should look to emphasize its transparency and affordability to build trust among stakeholders (MOME 2024b). A possible strategy would be to conduct regular workshops where stakeholders – including investors, suppliers, and customers – can review ongoing projects, as well as their current timeline, and provide input. For this, it is essential to implement a structured feedback mechanism where customers and cooperative members can propose changes or improvements to housing projects. Lastly, MOME should ensure it shares projects performances with data-driven insights such as cost savings, decreased waste, and reduced labor needed.

**W/T – Strategy:** Considering the characteristics of this scenario, MOME is reliant on both: third-party companies that operate in the real estate sector and materials and labor suppliers with great bargaining power. To mitigate the risks of this excessive dependency, MOME should identify and establish long-term relationships with smaller, regional Portuguese suppliers that have higher flexibility and are more responsive than global suppliers. By maintaining a balanced mix of local and global suppliers, MOME is able to reduce the price volatility and

material shortages risks occurring from supply chain disruptions (Deloitte 2024c). Moreover, aligning with local suppliers directly encourages local economic development, thus attenuating the weakness of being unknown and improving MOME's brand image. Simultaneously, it is recommended that MOME partners with other new developers, construction firms, or cooperatives to build shared procurement networks, therefore being able to purchase materials in bulk and trade surpluses. Additionally, such collaborations allow for better negotiation terms with suppliers, mitigating their high bargaining power.

Group Part

### **8.5 Cross – Scenario Strategic Recommendations**

The preceding strategies have been elaborated based on the scenario-specific configurations of the selected KUs. Given that there are plausible events for which the company should prepare independently of the scenario to navigate the future successfully, the following section presents an overarching action plan that aims to provide concrete guidance. This involves identifying actions that can be effective under multiple future conditions, thereby enhancing organizational adaptability (Phadnis, Sheffi, and Caplice 2022).

***Marketing and Awareness:*** A first, important point that MOME must capitalize on is the use of marketing strategies to raise general awareness of the cooperative housing model in Portugal, while increasing its visibility as an emerging player in this market. To achieve this, MOME should resort to different marketing strategies. To build brand recognition and establish credibility, MOME must focus on leveraging its unique strengths in sustainability and innovative construction practices. The company can highlight its expertise in MMC and NBS through targeted marketing campaigns. By demonstrating the environmental benefits and cost efficiencies of these methods, MOME can position itself as a leader in sustainable and affordable housing. MOME's digital presence should be optimized to engage potential customers and stakeholders. The company's website must feature comprehensible explanations

of its cooperative housing model, along with educational blogs, videos, and testimonials. Social media platforms can amplify this content and run targeted campaigns to reach younger, environmentally conscious audiences. Emphasizing affordability and transparency will resonate strongly with those struggling with the current housing crisis. Establishing thought leadership is another critical step. MOME should publish whitepapers and articles on the advantages of cooperative housing and innovative building practices. Participating in real estate expos, delivering presentations, and collaborating with sustainable housing forums can further enhance credibility. Additionally, highlighting partnerships with well-known organizations in press releases and marketing materials will help offset concerns about MOME's lack of a track record and establish the company as a trustworthy entity.

***Customer and Product Focus:*** To reach audiences that may not have access to social digital platforms, MOME should use traditional marketing which entail collaborations with TV channels, local newspapers, and community radios, particularly in urban centers like Lisbon and Porto. Moreover, MOME should bet on physical advertising strategically placed in high-traffic urban areas such as crowded train- and metro stations in city centers. These locations are perfect for reaching the attention of daily commuters who may be searching for affordable housing options. According to diverse studies, these physical ads create instantaneous awareness and increase brand recognition and recall (Roux 2016). To increase the conversion rate, MOME should consider hosting workshops and webinars to explain the process, benefits, and financial commitments required and meet potential cooperators in person. Simultaneously, to engage with the younger demographics, it is recommended that MOME takes into consideration strategic collaborations with influencers who tour cooperative housing projects and discuss their potential. This represents a great way to resonate with younger audiences and attract their attention in an authentic and trustworthy way.

**Community-centric approach:** Fostering engagement by creating lasting value for the communities MOME serves, has the potential to become central to the company's mission of providing affordable, sustainable living. Therefore, several actions can be taken to encourage collaboration and build trust. To begin with, MOME's projects should include shared, community-oriented spaces such as co-working areas, recreational facilities or common gardens. This can help to create interaction and develop a sense of involvement and ownership. Apart from that, the company could assist in the organization of events such as charity runs or community cleanups which can help to strengthen local connections. The cooperatives managed by MOME can, for instance, initiate partnerships with schools and NGOs, thereby making sure that they gain publicity from people who share the same values. Finally, MOME can significantly contribute to promoting equity and inclusivity in the Portuguese society. Through policies that welcome individuals from different socioeconomic, cultural, and generational backgrounds while keeping housing costs accessible to a diverse demographic, MOME's housing cooperatives can create communities where members not only live but thrive together, fostering both individual well-being and collective progress.

**Risk Mitigation:** The scarce availability of workforce and the rising cost of materials present a significant risk for MOME, given the company's reliance on suppliers and construction service providers. The guarantees provided to the cooperative's members in the *Preliminary Contract of Sales* could potentially become a significant financial burden for MOME in the event of delays or price increases. This could have a detrimental impact on the company's early-stage success, particularly if it lacks sufficient capital reserves. It is therefore of the utmost importance to be able to rely on an existing network of suppliers and partners. To mitigate this risk, it is recommended that MOME transparently report these clauses to the supplier side within the ECI Model. Furthermore, a risk analysis should be conducted, and if feasible, a contractual clause for a maximum price and project duration should be implemented. It is

therefore recommended to engage in collaboration with local, sustainable partners whose reliability has been demonstrated in previous projects and whose business risk is more readily assessable. This approach facilitates transparency while mitigating dependence on volatile global supply chains. Additionally, it would be advisable to explore the possibility of concluding long-term, cross-project framework agreements with fixed price ranges to ensure long-term planning security.

**Financing:** MOME's access to EU funding is constrained as a purely private sector entity, with funding limited to small-scale projects due to restricted resources. However, in addition to accessing national funding opportunities, MOME is eligible for funding under the InvestEU program. The InvestEU Fund offers direct and intermediate financing options for sustainable and inclusive investments. InvestEU can be particularly relevant, as it explicitly provides funds for subsidized loans and guarantees for small businesses (EU 2024a) and as MOME has already demonstrated compliance with the requisite criteria for funding, it is highly recommended to apply for InvestEU (Appendix 4). To access InvestEU, MOME must first verify and document its own eligibility. This includes classic business documents that demonstrate the economic viability of MOME, as well as project specific information. These include a description of the project, detailed funding requirements and evidence of the project's impact on EU objectives (EU 2024e). As the InvestEU Fund works through selected financial intermediaries, applications must be submitted directly to them. In Portugal, the main partner is Banco Português de Fomento, with many other smaller, private and regional financial service providers awarding smaller contracts (EU 2024b). Once the financial partner has been selected, a project proposal is submitted outlining the project and its conformity with the objectives of InvestEU. If the proposal is successful, the financing terms are negotiated.




Figure 9 - General Strategic Roadmap MOME | Source: Own Creation

## 9 Phase 5 – Monitor

The *Monitor* phase is the final phase of the *Intuitive Logics School* approach. It aims to keep track of each scenario's evolution by comparing it with the progress of the real-world environment. As a result, it enables identifying which possible scenario is most likely to unfold, and therefore which strategy is best employed (van der Heijden 1996).

For this purpose, the '*Scenario Cockpit*' approach is used, which consists of the following two main steps. First, the early indicators must be clearly defined, and threshold values are attributed to each indicator. The second and final step involves constantly monitoring the value ranges of each indicator (Wulf, Brands, and Meissner 2010). This approach allows MOME to understand which scenario is likely to emerge and thus quickly adapt its strategy.

### Early Indicators and Threshold Values

The selection of early indicators must be carried out carefully, based on the following specific criteria: *measurable and quantifiable; relevant to the development of the scenarios; specific to a certain aspect of the scenarios; timely to provide information early enough; and actionable to provide insights into strategic changes*. Using these criteria, six early indicators were selected. Moreover, thresholds were introduced in two different ways. First, for those indicators for which it was feasible and appropriate to do so, a trend line was established, and the

corresponding thresholds were set by considering the trend values for the years 2026, 2028 and 2030. Then, for the remaining metrics, fixed thresholds were set by analyzing historical trends while ensuring there is sufficient time to act strategically before they escalate.

*Geopolitical Risk Index:* The Geopolitical Risk Index (GRI) serves as an effective instrument for the early recognition of emerging tensions. The intensifying trade conflict between the USA, the EU and China illustrates how geopolitical crises can directly impact the supply chains of entire sectors. When the index value is situated within a range of 150 – 200, geopolitical tensions have emerged and are bound to escalate (Figure 26). In all previous instances, values for the GRI exceeding 200 have signified global crises that have exerted a substantial influence on the global economy and supply chains (Statista 2024b). Considering this, the threshold value of 150 provides accurate and precise insights on geopolitical developments while also serving as an early warning system that allows for a timely strategy adaptation before outcomes escalate. Contrarily, values below 150 represent a stable geopolitical environment and low conflict risk, fostering economic growth.

*Supply Chain Stability Index:* The Supply Chain Stability Index represents the reliability of the supply chain over time. It provides a quantifiable way to monitor disruptions and other dependency risks that affect the operational efficiency of the supply chain. This enables the identification of instabilities that are not merely geopolitical in nature, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a sharp increase in the index between 2020 and 2022 (KPMG 2024). In recent years, the index has fluctuated between -1.5 and 3, with -1.5 representing a low level of supply chain stress and 3 indicating a fragmented supply chain (Figure 27). Given that critical disruptions in the past have been caused primarily by geopolitical developments that are impossible to predict and trend, the threshold value of 0 should be considered when assessing supply chain robustness. This baseline level encompasses normal supply chain stability in the absence of disruptions. Values below this threshold may represent a stable supply chain with

respect to CRMs, while values above indicate a stressed supply chain environment where affected materials should be promptly identified, and appropriate measures taken to mitigate potential supply chain dependency risks.

*Job Vacancy Rate & Employment Rate:* The EU job vacancy rate (JVR) is a key indicator for assessing the state of the labor market. Job vacancies are defined as paid positions that employers advertise and actively seek to fill immediately or in the short term. Over the past decade, the rate in the EU has risen from 1.3% to 2.4%, signaling challenges in filling advertised positions (eurostat 2024e) (Figure 28). Future values exceeding the trend line may indicate a growing shortage of skilled workers, while lower values could either suggest an influx of additional workers into the bloc or targeted retraining of existing workers to match labor market demands. However, it should be noted that a downturn in the EU's economic situation may result in fewer job vacancies being advertised, potentially distorting the information provided by the JVR alone. Therefore, the employment rate represents a vital complementary indicator. The EU tracks the seasonally adjusted rate quarterly, considering all persons aged 20 – 64 who are employed or have an unmet need for employment. As of Q2 2024 the rate stands at around 75% and has increased by 8% within one decade (eurostat 2024b) (Figure 29). When combined with the JVR, the employment rate provides insights into the labor market's health. If the JVR falls, for instance, below its trend line and the employment rate's values also stagnate or decline below its threshold, this indicates fewer job advertisements rather than an increasing number of vacancies being filled, as was the case during the COVID-19 pandemic. Conversely, if the JVR falls below the threshold and the employment rate rises above, it can be assumed that workers' access to vacancies has improved, for example through a larger workforce and skills adapted to the transition.

*Labor Migration:* This indicator assesses the inflow of foreign labor into the EU by tracking the issuance of first-time residence permits for employment. In 2014, the number of issuances

amounted to approx. 457,000, while in 2024 it had already reached 1.26 million (eurostat 2024g), corresponding to a CAGR of 10.7%, thus illustrating the increasing trend of labor migration in the European labor market (Figure 30). An inflow of first-time residence permits for employment above the trend line slope may indicate a harmonization of EU labor migration policies or agreements between different Member States and third countries to facilitate the issuance of work visas. Values below the threshold may signal a less relevant and attractive European market for foreign workers, potentially causing labor shortages.

*Personnel Cost Index of Construction Industry:* The index tracks the costs of gross wages and salaries for employers in the construction industry. Accordingly, it uses Q1 2015 as the base value of 100. The indicator shows stable and steady growth through Q4 2019, with a CAGR of approx. 4.6%. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the index fell by about eleven points, but quickly recovered and continued its previous upward trend to 149.7 points in Q3 2023 (eurostat 2024d) (Figure 31). Future movements above the trend line may indicate that the industry will continue to experience labor shortages with increased wage levels. Conversely, should the index drop below the trend line, it can be associated with lower construction activity or indicate that there is sufficient labor available in the bloc and the industry, leading to non-competitive wage structures.

*Renewables Share in Energy Mix:* The share of renewable energies in the EU's total energy production is an important indicator that quickly helps to identify which scenario is most likely to unfold. A target line has been established by the EU, which demonstrates a threshold for the period up to 2030. It illustrates the requisite increase in the share of renewable energy to achieve the 2030 target of 42.5% (EEA 2024c) (Figure 32). Values that fall below this target line may represent either CRMs shortages or a lack of skilled workforce that stagnate the development of renewable energy technologies. Alternatively, values that are on par or above the planned

line could indicate stable and reliable access to CRMs, as well as the availability of skilled workers which are crucial to the growth of renewable energy share.




Figure 10 - Monitoring Thresholds 2026 | Source: Own Creation




Figure 11 - Monitoring Thresholds 2028 | Source: Own Creation




Figure 12 - Monitoring Thresholds 2030 | Source: Own Creation

### **Constant monitoring**

The last and most important step of the Scenario Cockpit framework is to constantly monitor the development of the early indicators. Accordingly, threshold values have been provided for the years 2026, 2028 and 2030, therefore allowing for continual monitoring, which is adapted over the years to ensure alignment with the evolving environment of each scenario. The selection of these years as key monitoring points is closely aligned with the nature of the real estate industry and the slow pace of the EU environmental regulatory landscape. Adhering to this approach enables companies to be agile and proactive in their decision-making processes, allowing them to quickly adapt to the most appropriate strategy.

## **10 Conclusion**

This work project focused on exploring the future of the European real estate sector, particularly in light of evolving environmental regulations and their implications for MOME. Employing the *Intuitive Logics School's* scenario planning methodology, and leveraging insights from industry experts, four plausible scenarios for 2030 were developed, along with strategic recommendations to enhance MOME's competitive edge while aligning with sustainability goals.

To better understand how the sector will evolve, key trends and patterns of change were identified. They include the rising importance of sustainable building practices and digitalization, as well as the ongoing demographic and urbanization shifts shaping housing demand. Further, common to all scenarios is the critical role of regulatory frameworks such as the Fit for 55 package and the EU taxonomy, which drive the need for innovation in construction methods, energy efficiency, and sustainable materials. However, the industry also faces critical uncertainties, particularly regarding *Supply Chain Stability* and *Qualified Workforce Availability*, which have a significant impact on its future trajectory.

To respond to the external environment's evolution, MOME should adopt general strategies independently of which scenario unfolds. These entail focusing on modular and energy-efficient construction, deepening long-term collaborations with innovative and sustainability-focused stakeholders, and investing in cutting-edge technologies. For instance, in the '*Voltage Revolution*' scenario, where regulatory alignment is strong, MOME should position itself as a leader in the lower-income segment and offer smaller projects and units to meet the new target group's needs. Conversely, in the '*Broken Foundations*' scenario, where sustainability and regulatory progress stagnates, MOME would need to emphasize cost efficiency and adaptive resilience to survive in a highly competitive and low-growth market. The remaining scenarios, i.e. '*Digital Backbone*' and '*Efficiency Gambit*', call for tailored strategies focusing on digital integration and optimized resource management to thrive in varying regulatory and technological landscapes.

Finally, several indicators have been identified to help MOME monitor and adapt its strategy as these trends and uncertainties evolve. This ensures that MOME remains resilient and competitive. The indicators include advancements in green technologies, shifts in societal and regulatory attitudes, and disruptions in global supply chains.

In conclusion, this research highlights the complexity of the EU regulatory landscape and the critical role of strategic foresight for companies like MOME. By understanding potential directions of change and preparing to evolve accordingly, MOME can position itself as a sustainable and innovative leader in the European real estate sector.

## **11 Limitations & Further Research**

This report utilizes the *Intuitive Logics School* approach for scenario planning to analyze the potential development of the EU environmental directives and regulations and their impact on the real estate industry by 2030. This qualitative approach served as the primary methodology for constructing the scenarios; however, the lack of quantitative data limits the ability to

measure specific impacts that could otherwise make the findings more robust and actionable. Additionally, while the methodology captured a range of potential developments, it does not adequately prepare for ‘black swan’ events, which are unexpected, high-impact disruptions that although unlikely, can have significant effects on the EU environment as well as the European real estate sector and merit consideration for future scenario planning. Moreover, the analysis in this report is carried out at EU level, which may overlook significant country-specific differences, such as those for Portugal. This work primarily considered the most relevant environmental policies and their interactions, while future research could include additional EU measures to develop even more detailed scenarios at EU and industry level. The real estate industry is also large and multifaceted, encompassing a range of activities such as construction, property development, facility management and investment across residential, commercial and industrial segments. This diversity makes it inherently difficult to capture the full complexity of the industry in a single report. Furthermore, the workshop was conducted exclusively with the partner company, which is primarily specialized on the housing cooperative sector. Future research would benefit from the involvement of a wider range of stakeholders, such as commercial property developers and investors.

## 12 References

- Ahmad, Moid, and James Murray. 2019. "Understanding the Connect between Digitalisation, Sustainability and Performance of an Organisation" 17 (1): 83–96.
- Akinsulire, Adetola, Courage Idemudia, Azubuike Okwandu, and Obinna Iwuanyanwu. 2024. "Economic and Social Impact of Affordable Housing Policies: A Comparative Review." *International Journal of Applied Research in Social Sciences* 6 (7): 1433–48. <https://doi.org/10.51594/ijarss.v6i7.1333>.
- Al Mamun, Abdullah, Muhammad Khalilur Rahman, Muhammad Mehedi Masud, and Muhammad Mohiuddin. 2023. "Willingness to Pay Premium Prices for Green Buildings: Evidence from an Emerging Economy." *Environmental Science and Pollution Research* 30 (32): 78718–34. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-023-27998-9>.
- Alliance Experts. 2023. "10 Considerations for Market Entry Strategy in EU Countries." November 8, 2023. <https://www.allianceexperts.com/10-considerations-market-entry-strategy/>.
- André, Mário Rui. 2024. "Lisbon City Council moves forward with program to build affordable housing by cooperatives." LPP / Lisbon For People. 2024. <https://lisboaparapessoas.pt/en/2024/03/17/lisbon-housing-construction-program-cooperatives/>.
- Antweiler, Werner, and Felix Muesgens. 2021. "On the Long-Term Merit Order Effect of Renewable Energies." *Energy Economics* 99 (July):105275. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105275>.
- Aronow, Stan. 2024. "The Geopolitical Weaponization of Supply Chain." Gartner. December 15, 2024. <https://www.gartner.com/en/supply-chain/insights/beyond-supply-chain-blog/the-geopolitical-weaponization-of-supply-chain>.
- Ashton, Daniel. 2024. "A Guide to Prefabrication (and How It's Transforming Construction)." University College of Estate Management. March 25, 2024. <https://www.ucem.ac.uk/whats-happening/articles/what-is-prefabrication/>.
- Ashurst. 2023. "European Parliament Adopts EU Green Bond Regulation." Ashurst. October 12, 2023. <https://www.ashurst.com/en/insights/european-parliament-adopts-eu-green-bond-regulation/>.
- Asif, Muhammad, Ghinwa Naeem, and Muhammad Khalid. 2024. "Digitalization for Sustainable Buildings: Technologies, Applications, Potential, and Challenges," *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 450 (March). <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959652624012629>.
- Awewomom, Jonathan, Felicia Dzeble, Yaw Takyi, and Winfred Ashie. 2024. "Addressing Global Environmental Pollution Using Environmental Control Techniques: A Focus on Environmental Policy and Preventive Environmental Management," February. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44274-024-00033-5>.
- Aydin, Erdal, Santiago Bohórquez Correa, and Dirk Brounen. 2019. "Energy Performance Certification and Time on the Market." *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 98 (November):102270. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102270>.
- BaFin. 2024. "EU Green Bond Standard: Stringent Requirements Bring Greater Clarity." EU Green Bond Standard: Stringent Requirements Bring Greater Clarity. January 19, 2024. [https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Fachartikel/2023/fa\\_bj\\_23\\_12\\_Green\\_Bonds\\_en.html](https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Fachartikel/2023/fa_bj_23_12_Green_Bonds_en.html).
- Barnard, Lucy. 2022. "How Are Materials Passports Changing Construction?" Construction Briefing. June 8, 2022. <https://www.constructionbriefing.com/news/how-are-materials-passports-changing-construction/8020985.article>.

- Barteková, Eva, and René Kemp. 2016. "National Strategies for Securing a Stable Supply of Rare Earths in Different World Regions." *Resources Policy* 49 (September):153–64. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2016.05.003>.
- Bassi, Francesca, and Mariangela Guidolin. 2021. "Resource Efficiency and Circular Economy in European SMEs: Investigating the Role of Green Jobs and Skills." arXiv. <https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2108.11610>.
- Bauindustrie. 2024. "Trotz leichter Preisberuhigung bei einzelnen Produkten seit." 2024. <https://www.bauindustrie.de/zahlen-fakten/publikationen/brancheninfo-bau/baumaterialpreise>.
- Baum, Andrew. 2017. "PropTech 3.0: The Future of Real Estate." Oxford Real Estate Initiative. <https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-07/PropTech3.0.pdf>.
- BCG. 2021. "The Offsite Revolution in Construction." BCG Global. January 8, 2021. <https://www.bcg.com/publications/2019/offsite-revolution-construction>.
- Beaney, Abigail, Aleksandra Przydrozna, Rachel O'Donnell, and Omar Addis-Elyassir. 2023. "A Multidisciplinary Approach to Decarbonisation Pathways for Commercial Stranded Assets in the UK." *Corporate Real Estate Journal* 12 (4): 351. <https://doi.org/10.69554/YSGN4565>.
- Beck. 2019. "What Is Co-Housing? Developing a Conceptual Framework from the Studies of Danish Intergenerational Co-Housing" 37 (2): 1–25.
- Bello, Abdulkabir Opeyemi, Ayaz Ahmad Khan, Abdullahi Idris, and Hamzat Mohammed Awwal. 2024. "Barriers to Modular Construction Systems Implementation in Developing Countries' Architecture, Engineering and Construction Industry." *Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management* 31 (8): 3148–64. <https://doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-10-2022-1001>.
- Benga, Btissam, and Azzouz Elhamma. 2024. "Navigating the Digital Frontier: A Literature Review on Business Digitalization." *ESJ Social Sciences* 20 (10). <https://ejournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/18092>.
- Bergan, and Power. 2024. "Microgeographies of Assetisation: Realising Value of Households and Residents in Co-Living Housing" 56 (5). <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0308518X241233102>.
- Bertoldi, Paolo, Marina Economidou, Valentina Palermo, Benigna Boza-Kiss, and Valeria Todeschi. 2021. "How to Finance Energy Renovation of Residential Buildings: Review of Current and Emerging Financing Instruments in the EU." *WIREs Energy and Environment* 10 (1): e384. <https://doi.org/10.1002/wene.384>.
- Bezerra, Rodrigo, Vitor Martins, and Alcebiades Macedo. 2024. "Validation of Challenges for Implementing ESG in the Construction Industry Considering the Context of an Emerging Economy Country," July. <https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/14/14/6024>.
- biancanicolescu. 2022. "Significant Opportunity Materialises for Coliving in Europe According to ULI and JLL Coliving Best Practice Guide." ULI Europe. October 19, 2022. <https://europe.uli.org/significant-opportunity-materialises-for-coliving-in-europe-according-to-uli-and-jll-coliving-best-practice-guide/>.
- BIM. 2021. "How Modular Solves Skilled Labor Shortages in Construction." 2021. <https://www.boxxmodular.com/resources/blog/skilled-labor-shortages-construction/>.
- Blengini, Gian Andrea, Umberto Eynard, Cristina Torres De Matos, Dominic Wittmer, Konstantinos Georgitzikis, Claudiu Pavel, Samuel Carrara, et al. 2020. *Study on the EU's List of Critical Raw Materials (2020): Final Report*. Publications Office of the European Union. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2873/11619>.
- BMW. 2022. "BMW Group Joins Responsible Lithium Mining Project in Chile." BMW Group Joins Responsible Lithium Mining Project in Chile. February 24, 2022.

- <https://www.press.bmwgroup.com/global/article/detail/T0370113EN/bmw-group-joins-responsible-lithium-mining-project-in-chile?language=en>.
- BNP Paribas. 2022. "ECONOMICS OF THE BUILD-TO-RENT SECTOR IN EUROPE." April 2022. <https://www.realestate.bnpparibas.com/sites/default/files/2022-04/ECONOMICS%20OF%20THE%20BUILD%20TO%20RENT%20SECTOR%20IN%20EUROPE%20VF.pdf>.
- Bradfield, Ron, and Kees Van Der Heijden. 2005. "The Origins and Evolution of Scenario Techniques in Long Range Business Planning." *Futures* 37 (8): 795–812. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2005.01.003>.
- Braesemann, Fabian, and Andrew Baum. 2020. "PropTech: Turning Real Estate into a Data-Driven Market?" University of Oxford. <https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-05/PropTech%20Turning%20real%20estate%20into%20a%20data-driven%20market.pdf>.
- Brucker Juricic, Belinda, Mario Galic, and Sasa Marenjak. 2021. "Review of the Construction Labour Demand and Shortages in the EU." *Buildings* 11 (1): 17. <https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings11010017>.
- Brückner, S., H. Schäfers, I. Peters, and E. Lävemann. 2014. "Using Industrial and Commercial Waste Heat for Residential Heat Supply: A Case Study from Hamburg, Germany." *Sustainable Cities and Society* 13 (October):139–42. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2014.04.004>.
- Bundesinnenministerium. 2024. "Limiting Irregular Migration and Protecting Internal Security: Border Checks at All German Land Borders to Start 16 September 2024." Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community. September 9, 2024. [https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/EN/2024/09/binnengrenzkontrollen\\_en.html;jsessionid=E34176FE051879C3914685239668F823.live862?nn=9384552](https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/EN/2024/09/binnengrenzkontrollen_en.html;jsessionid=E34176FE051879C3914685239668F823.live862?nn=9384552).
- Bundestag. 2024. "Deutscher Bundestag - Wahltermine der Mitgliedsländer der Europäischen Union." Deutscher Bundestag. 2024. [https://www.bundestag.de/europa\\_internationales/wahltermine\\_eu/wahltermine-eu-249876](https://www.bundestag.de/europa_internationales/wahltermine_eu/wahltermine-eu-249876).
- Busch, Timo, Rob Bauer, and Marc Orlitzky. 2015. "Sustainable Development and Financial Markets: Old Paths and New Avenues," February. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0007650315570701>.
- Buye, Ronald. 2021. "Critical Examination of the PESTEL Analysis Model." [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349506325\\_Critical\\_examination\\_of\\_the\\_PESTEL\\_Analysis\\_Model](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349506325_Critical_examination_of_the_PESTEL_Analysis_Model).
- Caixa. n.d. "InvestEU Green Box." Accessed November 29, 2024. <https://www.cgd.pt/English/Corporate/Investment-Capitalisation/Pages/caixa-invest-eu-green.aspx>.
- Cantrell, Mark. 2023. "Rooftop Extension 'grafts' New Homes to London Blocks." *Housing Digital* (blog). November 13, 2023. <https://housingdigital.co.uk/rooftop-extension-grafts-new-homes-to-london-blocks/>.
- CB. 2024. "EU-China Relations After the 2024 European Elections: A Timeline." China Briefing News. October 31, 2024. <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/eu-china-relations-after-the-2024-european-elections-a-timeline/>.
- CBRE. 2024a. "Build-to-Rent Residential Market Overview." Build-to-Rent Residential Market Overview. October 16, 2024. <https://www.cbre.com/insights/reports/build-to-rent-overview-2024>.

- . 2024b. “European Real Estate Market Outlook 2024.” CBRE. <https://www.cbre.com/insights/books/european-real-estate-market-outlook-2024>.
- CEDEFOP. 2021. *The Green Employment and Skills Transformation: Insights from a European Green Deal Skills Forecast Scenario*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2801/112540>.
- CES. 2022. “Policy Brief: A Guide to the 2030 Energy Efficiency Target | The Coalition for Energy Savings.” 2022. <https://energycoalition.eu/latest/guide-2030-energy-efficiency-target/>.
- CFI. n.d. “Bargaining Power of Suppliers.” Corporate Finance Institute. Accessed November 21, 2024. <https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/management/bargaining-power-of-suppliers/>.
- Chatzistamoulou, Nikos, and Phoebe Koundouri. 2024. “Is Green Transition in Europe Fostered by Energy and Environmental Efficiency Feedback Loops? The Role of Eco-Innovation, Renewable Energy and Green Taxation.” *Environmental and Resource Economics* 87 (6): 1445–72. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-024-00849-y>.
- Chazanas, Ari. 2022. “Council Post: What Can Property Owners Expect When Tenants Work From Home?” Forbes. October 19, 2022. <https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbesbusinesscouncil/2022/10/19/what-can-property-owners-expect-when-tenants-work-from-home/>.
- Cheng, Qiuli, Bassam A. Tayeh, Yazan I. Abu Aisheh, Wesam Salah Alaloul, and Ziad A. Aldahdooh. 2024. “Leveraging BIM for Sustainable Construction: Benefits, Barriers, and Best Practices.” *Sustainability* 16 (17): 7654. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su16177654>.
- Chermack, Thomas. 2011. *Scenario Planning in Organizations: How to Create, Use and Assess Scenarios*.
- CHI. n.d. “Cooperative Housing Models.” *Coop Housing Int’l* (blog). Accessed November 29, 2024. <https://www.housinginternational.coop/sdgs-2/cooperative-housing-models/>.
- Chong, Heap-Yih, Cen-Ying Lee, and Xiangyu Wang. 2016. “A Mixed Review of the Adoption of Building Information Modelling (BIM) for Sustainability.” *Journal of Cleaner Production* 142 (4): 4114–26.
- Christou, Michalis, and Samuel Carrara. 2024. “The Scale of the EU’s Dependency on Imports for Critical Minerals.” The Conversation. May 23, 2024. <http://theconversation.com/our-research-reveals-the-scale-of-the-eus-dependency-on-imports-for-critical-minerals-needed-for-the-green-transition-heres-how-that-can-change-230244>.
- Climate Bonds Initiative. 2024. “Green Bond Proceeds Share Worldwide by Sector 2014–2023.” Statista. June 13, 2024. <https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/512542/green-bond-use-of-proceeds-share-globally-by-sector/>.
- Cooper, Charlie. 2023. “EU Green Deal’s Weak Point, Exposed.” POLITICO. August 9, 2023. <https://www.politico.eu/article/skills-shortage-achilles-heel-green-deal-europe/>.
- CORDIS. 2022. “INNOVating the Uptake of Energy Auditing Schemes for SMEs | INNOVEAS Project | Fact Sheet | H2020.” CORDIS | European Commission. October 21, 2022. <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/847095>.
- . 2023. “Bio-Based Insulation Materials Facts & Myths.” CORDIS | European Commission. 2023. <https://cordis.europa.eu/article/id/123721-biobased-insulation-materials-facts-myths>.
- Corfe. 2019. “Co-Living: A Solution to the Housing Crisis?” <https://www.smf.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Co-Living.pdf>.

- Cornago. 2022. “High Energy Prices Threaten the EU Emissions Trading System.” Centre for European Reform. 2022. <https://www.cer.eu/insights/high-energy-prices-threaten-eu-ets>.
- Cornago, and Berg. 2024. “Learning from CBAM’s Transitional Phase: Early Impacts on Trade and Climate Efforts.” Centre for European Reform. 2024. <https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2024/learning-cbams-transitional-impacts-trade>.
- Correia, Ferreira, Zopounidis, and Ferreira. 2024. “Urban Expansion Effects on Real Estate Ecosystems: Identification and Neutrosophic Analysis of Causal Dynamics” 93. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0038012124000570>.
- Costantiello, Alberto, and Angelo Leogrande. 2023. “The Role of Political Stability in the Context of ESG Models at World Level,” April. <https://hal.science/hal-04055326v1/file/02-04-2023%20The%20Role%20of%20Political%20Stability%20and%20Absence%20of%20Violence%20or%20Terrorism.pdf>.
- Cyber Risk GmbH. 2024. “The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) - Directive (EU) 2024/1760.” July 5, 2024. <https://www.corporate-sustainability-due-diligence-directive.com/>.
- Dang, Duc Huy, Karen A. Thompson, Lan Ma, Hong Quan Nguyen, Son Tung Luu, Minh Thao Nguyen Duong, and Ashlyn Kernaghan. 2021. “Toward the Circular Economy of Rare Earth Elements: A Review of Abundance, Extraction, Applications, and Environmental Impacts.” *Archives of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology* 81 (4): 521–30. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00244-021-00867-7>.
- Davidsson, Åsa. 2020. “Disasters as an Opportunity for Improved Environmental Conditions.” *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction* 48 (September):101590. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdr.2020.101590>.
- Debevoise & Plimpton. 2024. “EU Green Bonds Regulation.” Debevoise. February 20, 2024. <https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2024/02/eu-green-bonds-regulation>.
- Dechezleprêtre, Antoine, Daniel Nachtigall, and Frank Venmans. 2023. “The Joint Impact of the European Union Emissions Trading System on Carbon Emissions and Economic Performance.” *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 118 (March):102758. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2022.102758>.
- Decoene, Ulrike. 2021. “3 Ways to Expand EU Taxonomy and Accelerate Green Transition.” World Economic Forum. November 18, 2021. <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2021/11/3-ways-expand-eu-taxonomy-accelerate-green-transition/>.
- Deloitte. 2024a. “CSDDD: Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive.” CSDDD: Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. 2024. <https://www.deloitte.com/nl/en/issues/climate/csddd-corporate-sustainability-due-diligence-directive.html>.
- . 2024b. “Property Index - Overview of European Residential Markets.” 13. Deloitte. <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/cz/Documents/real-estate/property-index-2024.pdf>.
- . 2024c. “Restructuring the Supply Base: Prioritizing a Resilient, yet Efficient Supply Chain.” Deloitte Insights. 2024. <https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/manufacturing/global-supply-chain-resilience-amid-disruptions.html>.
- Delova-Jolevska, Evica, Andrej Illievski, Ljube Jolevski, Ágnes Csiszárík-Kocsir, and Janos Varga. 2024. “The Impact of ESG Risks on the Economic Growth in the Western Balkan Countries,” September. <https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/19/8487>.

- Demirel, Gökhan, Simon Grafenhorst, Kevin Förderer, and Veit Hagenmeyer. 2024. “Impact and Integration of Mini Photovoltaic Systems on Electric Power Distribution Grids.” arXiv. <https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2404.02763>.
- Derr, Tatjana, Stefan Georg, and Chris Heiler. 2021. “SWOT-Analyse und TOWS-Normstrategien.” In *Die disruptive Innovation durch Streamingdienste*, by Tatjana Derr, Stefan Georg, and Chris Heiler, 17–24. essentials. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34011-7\\_5](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34011-7_5).
- Dezember, Ryan. 2024. “Your Junk Is Needed for the New Electric Era.” WSJ. 2024. <https://www.wsj.com/finance/commodities-futures/your-junk-is-needed-for-the-new-electric-era-504a7e8f>.
- DG. 2024. “EPC Ratings: A Complete 2024 Guide for Property Owners.” 2024. <https://datagardener.com/blogs/epc-ratings/>.
- Dollington. 2023. “Restart of Germany’s Reactors: Can It Be Done?” REG. July 18, 2023. <https://www.radiantenergygroup.com/reports/restart-of-germany-reactors-can-it-be-done>.
- Donnelly, Rory, and Jennifer Johns. 2020. “Recontextualising Service Work and HRM in the Digital Economy: An Integrated Framework for Theory and Practice.” *International Journal of Human Resource Management*. [https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/223279014/Donnelly\\_Johns\\_IJHRM.pdf](https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/223279014/Donnelly_Johns_IJHRM.pdf).
- DUH. 2024. “EU-Finanzierungsinstrumente Für Die „Sanierungswelle“.” [https://www.duh.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/download/Projektinformation/Energieeffizienz/EUKI/Deutsch/Modul2/Mathieu\\_Daloze\\_EU\\_financing\\_instruments\\_for\\_the\\_Renovation\\_Wave\\_CBT\\_Mod2\\_21032024\\_DE.pdf](https://www.duh.de/fileadmin/user_upload/download/Projektinformation/Energieeffizienz/EUKI/Deutsch/Modul2/Mathieu_Daloze_EU_financing_instruments_for_the_Renovation_Wave_CBT_Mod2_21032024_DE.pdf).
- EC. 2014. “Copenhagen – European Green Capital 2014.” European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment. 2014. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/38d79463-cc75-4a7a-b160-d837d49b8224>.
- . 2018a. *REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Report on the Functioning of the European Carbon Market*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:842:FIN>.
- . 2018b. “REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS State of the Energy Union Report 2023 (Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action).” 2018. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A650%3AFIN&qid=1698237100377>.
- . 2020a. “Changing How We Produce and Consume: New Circular Economy Action Plan Shows the Way to a Climate-Neutral, Competitive Economy of Empowered Consumers,” March, 2.
- . 2020b. “Circular Economy Action Plan - European Commission.” 2020. [https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy-action-plan\\_en](https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy-action-plan_en).
- . 2020c. *COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards Greater Security and Sustainability*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0474>.
- . 2020d. “IMMC.COM%282020%29474%20final.ENG.Xhtml.1\_EN\_ACT\_part1\_v4.Docx.” 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0474>.

- . 2020e. *The Role of Rare Earth Elements in Wind Energy and Electric Mobility: An Analysis of Future Supply/Demand Balances*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/303258>.
- . 2020f. “Urbanisation in Europe.” 2020. [https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/foresight/topic/continuing-urbanisation/urbanisation-europe\\_en](https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/foresight/topic/continuing-urbanisation/urbanisation-europe_en).
- . 2021a. “Commission Proposal for a European Green Bond Standard - European Commission.” July 6, 2021. [https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/commission-proposal-european-green-bond-standard\\_en](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/commission-proposal-european-green-bond-standard_en).
- . 2021b. “Delivering the European Green Deal - European Commission.” July 14, 2021. [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/delivering-european-green-deal\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/delivering-european-green-deal_en).
- . 2021c. “Do No Significant Harm | Knowledge for Policy.” Do No Significant Harm. August 30, 2021. [https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/glossary-item/do-no-significant-harm\\_en](https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/glossary-item/do-no-significant-harm_en).
- . 2021d. “EU Adaptation Strategy - European Commission.” 2021. [https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/adaptation-climate-change/eu-adaptation-strategy\\_en](https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/adaptation-climate-change/eu-adaptation-strategy_en).
- . 2021e. “FAQ: What Is the EU Taxonomy and How Will It Work in Practice? - European Commission.”
- . 2021f. “Recovery and Resilience Facility - European Commission.” February 12, 2021. [https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en).
- . 2022a. *Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the Energy Performance of Buildings (Recast) (Text with EEA Relevance)*. OJ L. Vol. 2024/1275. <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/1791/oj>.
- . 2022b. “Final Report on Social Taxonomy.”
- . 2022c. “Increasing Fragmentation of Globalisation.” 2022. [https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/foresight/increasing-fragmentation-globalisation\\_en](https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/foresight/increasing-fragmentation-globalisation_en).
- . 2022d. “OVERVIEW| Modular and Industrialised Solutions for Building Renovation | BUILD UP.” 2022. <https://build-up.ec.europa.eu/en/resources-and-tools/articles/overview-modular-and-industrialised-solutions-building-renovation>.
- . 2023a. “Actions to Accelerate the Roll-out of Electricity Grids.” Text. European Commission - European Commission. November 28, 2023. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_23\\_6044](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6044).
- . 2023b. “COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Grids, the Missing Link - An EU Action Plan for Grids.” COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Grids, the Missing Link - An EU Action Plan for Grids. November 28, 2023. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2023%3A757%3AFIN>.
- . 2023c. “Demographic Change in Europe.” 2023. <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3112>.
- . 2023d. “European Chips Act.” 2023. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda\\_23\\_4519](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_4519).

- . 2023e. “Supply Chain Risks in the EU’s Clean Energy Technologies - European Commission.” 2023. [https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/supply-chain-risks-eus-clean-energy-technologies\\_en](https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/supply-chain-risks-eus-clean-energy-technologies_en).
- . 2023f. “The Impact of Demographic Change in a Changing Environment.” [https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-01/Demography\\_report\\_2022\\_0.pdf](https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-01/Demography_report_2022_0.pdf).
- . 2024a. “Acceleration Areas for Renewables - European Commission.” Acceleration Areas for Renewables. 2024. [https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/scientific-tools-databases/energy-and-industry-geography-lab-eigl/acceleration-areas-renewables\\_en](https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/scientific-tools-databases/energy-and-industry-geography-lab-eigl/acceleration-areas-renewables_en).
- . 2024b. “Affordable Housing Initiative - European Commission.” 2024. [https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/proximity-and-social-economy/social-economy-eu/affordable-housing-initiative\\_en](https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/proximity-and-social-economy/social-economy-eu/affordable-housing-initiative_en).
- . 2024c. “Allocation to Modernise the Energy Sector - European Commission.” 2024. [https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/free-allocation/allocation-modernise-energy-sector\\_en](https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/free-allocation/allocation-modernise-energy-sector_en).
- . 2024d. “Auctioning of Allowances - European Commission.” Auctioning of Allowances. 2024. [https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/auctioning-allowances\\_en](https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/auctioning-allowances_en).
- . 2024e. “Building Renovation Passports: Consumer’s Journey to a Better Home | BUILD UP.” 2024. <https://build-up.ec.europa.eu/en/resources-and-tools/publications/building-renovation-passports-consumers-journey-better-home>.
- . 2024f. “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism - European Commission.” 2024. [https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism\\_en](https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en).
- . 2024g. “Commission Adopts Guidance to EU Countries on Implementing the Revised Directives on Renewable Energy and on Energy Efficiency - European Commission.” Commission Adopts Guidance to EU Countries on Implementing the Revised Directives on Renewable Energy and on Energy Efficiency. September 2, 2024. [https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-adopts-guidance-eu-countries-implementing-revised-directives-renewable-energy-and-energy-2024-09-02\\_en](https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-adopts-guidance-eu-countries-implementing-revised-directives-renewable-energy-and-energy-2024-09-02_en).
- . 2024h. “Commission Takes Action to Ensure Complete and Timely.” Text. European Commission - European Commission. September 26, 2024. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf\\_24\\_4661](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_24_4661).
- . 2024i. “CONSTRUCTION-BUILDING INFORMATION MODELLING | Interoperable Europe Portal.” 2024. <https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/collection/rolling-plan-ict-standardisation/construction-building-information-modelling>.
- . 2024j. “Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence - European Commission.” Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence. 2024. [https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/doing-business-eu/sustainability-due-diligence-responsible-business/corporate-sustainability-due-diligence\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/doing-business-eu/sustainability-due-diligence-responsible-business/corporate-sustainability-due-diligence_en).
- . 2024k. “Corporate Sustainability Reporting - European Commission.” Corporate Sustainability Reporting. 2024. [https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/corporate-sustainability-reporting\\_en](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/corporate-sustainability-reporting_en).
- . 2024l. “Critical Raw Materials Act.” 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/critical-raw-materials/>.
- . 2024m. “Critical Raw Materials Act - European Commission.” 2024. [https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act\\_en](https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act_en).
- . 2024n. “Do We Have Sufficient Skills for the Energy Transition in the Changing Labour Market? - European Commission.” November 22, 2024. <https://joint-research->

- centre.ec.europa.eu/jrc-news-and-updates/do-we-have-sufficient-skills-energy-transition-changing-labour-market-2024-01-16\_en.
- . 2024o. “Electricity 2024: Analysis and Forecast to 2026 - European Commission.” 2024. [https://managenergy.ec.europa.eu/publications/electricity-2024-analysis-and-forecast-2026\\_en](https://managenergy.ec.europa.eu/publications/electricity-2024-analysis-and-forecast-2026_en).
- . 2024p. “Energy Efficiency Directive.” Energy Efficiency Directive. 2024. [https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficiency-targets-directive-and-rules/energy-efficiency-directive\\_en](https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficiency-targets-directive-and-rules/energy-efficiency-directive_en).
- . 2024q. “Energy Performance Certificates: Boosting the Market for Energy Efficient Buildings | BUILD UP.” 2024. <https://build-up.ec.europa.eu/en/resources-and-tools/articles/energy-performance-certificates-boosting-market-energy-efficient>.
- . 2024r. “Energy Performance of Buildings Directive.” 2024. [https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficient-buildings/energy-performance-buildings-directive\\_en](https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficient-buildings/energy-performance-buildings-directive_en).
- . 2024s. “EU Competitiveness: Looking Ahead - European Commission.” 2024. [https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en).
- . 2024t. “EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities - European Commission.” 2024. [https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/tools-and-standards/eu-taxonomy-sustainable-activities\\_en](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/tools-and-standards/eu-taxonomy-sustainable-activities_en).
- . 2024u. “EU Taxonomy Navigator.” Text. 2024. <https://ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance-taxonomy/>.
- . 2024v. “Finance and the Green Deal - European Commission.” Finance and the Green Deal. 2024. [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/finance-and-green-deal\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/finance-and-green-deal_en).
- . 2024w. “Fit for 55: Reducing Emissions from Transport, Buildings, Agriculture and Waste.” Revision of the Effort Sharing Regulation Explained. January 27, 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/fit-for-55-effort-sharing-regulation/>.
- . 2024x. “Free Allocation - European Commission.” Free Allocation. 2024. [https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/free-allocation\\_en](https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/free-allocation_en).
- . 2024y. “Market Stability Reserve - European Commission.” 2024. [https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/market-stability-reserve\\_en](https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/market-stability-reserve_en).
- . 2024z. “New Rules Fostering Sustainable and Responsible Corporate Behaviour Enter into Force - European Commission.” 2024. [https://commission.europa.eu/news/new-rules-fostering-sustainable-and-responsible-corporate-behaviour-enter-force-2024-07-25\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/news/new-rules-fostering-sustainable-and-responsible-corporate-behaviour-enter-force-2024-07-25_en).
- . 2024aa. “Pact on Migration and Asylum - European Commission.” May 21, 2024. [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en).
- . 2024ab. *Public Opinion in the European Union*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2775/83097>.
- . 2024ac. “Renovation Wave.” 2024. [https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficient-buildings/renovation-wave\\_en](https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficient-buildings/renovation-wave_en).
- . 2024ad. “Smart Grids and Meters.” Smart Grids and Meters. 2024. [https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/smart-grids-and-meters\\_en](https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/smart-grids-and-meters_en).
- . 2024ae. “Statement by the Chair of the Platform on Sustainable Finance: Facilitating Access to Sustainable Finance for SMEs.” <https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/d25c1431-79c6-4846-99e6->

- 3441e88b924f\_en?filename=240527-statement-eu-platform-on-sustainable-finance-chair\_en.pdf.
- . 2024af. “Sustainability-Related Disclosure in the Financial Services Sector - European Commission.” 2024. [https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/disclosures/sustainability-related-disclosure-financial-services-sector\\_en](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/disclosures/sustainability-related-disclosure-financial-services-sector_en).
- . 2024ag. “The European Green Deal - European Commission.” 2024. [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en).
- . 2024ah. “The Just Transition Mechanism - European Commission.” The Just Transition Mechanism: Making Sure No One Is Left Behind. 2024. [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/finance-and-green-deal/just-transition-mechanism\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/finance-and-green-deal/just-transition-mechanism_en).
- . 2024ai. “The Revised Energy Performance of Buildings Directive: A Catalyst for the Twin Transition in European Cities | Intelligent Cities Challenge.” 2024. <https://www.intelligentcitieschallenge.eu/news/revised-energy-performance-buildings-directive-catalyst-twin-transition-european-cities>.
- . n.d. “2030 Climate Targets.” Accessed October 10, 2024. [https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/2030-climate-targets\\_en#:~:text=In%202023%2C%20the%20EU%20adopted,climate%2Dneutral%20continent%20by%202050](https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/2030-climate-targets_en#:~:text=In%202023%2C%20the%20EU%20adopted,climate%2Dneutral%20continent%20by%202050).
- EC Directorate General for Communication. 2022. *REPowerEU, Joint European Action for More Affordable, Secure and Sustainable Energy*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2775/076377>.
- EC Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 2022. *The Possible Implications of the Green Transition for the EU Labour Market*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2765/583043>.
- EC Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion and ECORYS. 2016. *Study on Obstacles to Recognition of Skills and Qualifications: Executive Summary*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/351242>.
- EC Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs. 2023. *Study on the Critical Raw Materials for the EU 2023: Final Report*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2873/725585>.
- EC, European Commission-Joint Research. 2020g. “Handbook of Sustainable Urban Development Strategies.” European Commission. 2020. <https://urban.ec.europa.eu/strategies/handbook-sud/>.
- EC Joint Research Centre. 2019. *Achieving the Cost-Effective Energy Transformation of Europe’s Buildings: Combinations of Insulation and Heating & Cooling Technologies Renovations: Methods and Data*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/278207>.
- ECB. 2019. “The Economic Implications of Rising Protectionism: A Euro Area and Global Perspective,” no. 3. [https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/articles/2019/html/ecb.ebart201903\\_01~e589a502e5.en.html](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/articles/2019/html/ecb.ebart201903_01~e589a502e5.en.html).
- Economidou, M., V. Todeschi, P. Bertoldi, D. D’Agostino, P. Zangheri, and L. Castellazzi. 2020. “Review of 50 Years of EU Energy Efficiency Policies for Buildings.” *Energy and Buildings* 225 (October):110322. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2020.110322>.
- Edmond, Charlotte. 2023. “What Is Urban Mining and How Does It Help the Planet?” World Economic Forum. November 22, 2023. <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/11/urban-mining-circular-economy-ewaste/>.

- EEA. 2022. “The EU Emissions Trading System in 2021: Trends and Projections.” Briefing. European Environment Agency. 2022. <https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/the-eu-emissions-trading-system-2/the-eu-emissions-trading-system>.
- . 2023. “Investments in the Sustainability Transition: Leveraging Green Industrial Policy against Emerging Constraints.” Briefing. European Environment Agency. November 7, 2023. <https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/investments-into-the-sustainability-transition/investments-in-the-sustainability-transition>.
- . 2024a. “Data.” 2024. <https://climate-energy.eea.europa.eu/topics/energy-1/renewable-energy/data>.
- . 2024b. “Economic Losses from Weather- and Climate-Related Extremes in Europe.” October 14, 2024. <https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/economic-losses-from-climate-related>.
- . 2024c. “Share of Energy Consumption from Renewable Sources in Europe.” October 31, 2024. <https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/share-of-energy-consumption-from>.
- . 2024d. “Trends and Projections in Europe 2024.” October 31, 2024. <https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/publications/trends-and-projections-in-europe-2024>.
- EEB. 2022. “Position Paper on the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 2010/31/EU Proposal.” April 5, 2022. <https://eeb.org/library/position-paper-on-the-energy-performance-of-buildings-directive-2010-31-eu-proposal/>.
- EFRAG. 2024. “SMEs | EFRAG.” 2024. <https://www.efrag.org/en/sustainability-reporting/esrs-workstreams/smes>.
- EIGL. 2024. “Energy and Industry Geography Lab.” 2024. <https://energy-industry-geolab.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>.
- ELA. 2023. “Labour Shortages and Surpluses in Europe 2023 | European Labour Authority.” 2023. <https://www.ela.europa.eu/en/publications/labour-shortages-and-surpluses-europe-2023>.
- Elhaffar, China, Fabien Durif, Dilip Soman, and Laurette Dubé. 2023. “Green ... but at What Cost? A Typology and Scale Development of Perceived Green Costs,” October. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959652623035606>.
- ESMA. 2023. “Final Report on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards under the Prospectus Regulation.” 2023. <https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/final-report-draft-regulatory-technical-standards-under-prospectus-regulation>.
- EU. 2015. “Population 2030 Demographic Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Development Planning.” <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/trends/Population2030.pdf>.
- . 2020. “The EU’s New Circular Economy Action Plan Is Out!” European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform. March 10, 2020. <https://circulareconomy.europa.eu/platform/en/news-and-events/all-news/eus-new-circular-economy-action-plan-out>.
- . 2022a. “European Union Directives | EUR-Lex.” March 16, 2022. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-union-directives.html>.
- . 2022b. “European Union Regulations | EUR-Lex.” March 16, 2022. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-union-regulations.html>.
- . 2022c. “Framework Operation #12 for Innovation & Digitalisation Guarantee - European Union.” 2022. [https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-operations-0/investeu-operations-list/framework-operation-12-innovation-digitalisation-guarantee\\_en](https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-operations-0/investeu-operations-list/framework-operation-12-innovation-digitalisation-guarantee_en).

- . 2022d. “Social and Environmental Impacts of Mining Activities in the EU | Think Tank | European Parliament.” March 31, 2022.  
[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/IPOL\\_STU\(2022\)729156](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/IPOL_STU(2022)729156).
- . 2023a. “Fit for 55: How the EU Plans to Boost Renewable Energy.” 2023.  
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/fit-for-55-how-the-eu-plans-to-boost-renewable-energy/>.
- . 2023b. “Fit for 55: How the EU Will Become More Energy-Efficient.” 2023.  
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/fit-for-55-how-the-eu-will-become-more-energy-efficient/>.
- . 2023c. “Fit for 55: Making Buildings in the EU Greener.” 2023.  
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/fit-for-55-making-buildings-in-the-eu-greener/>.
- . 2024a. “About the InvestEU Fund - European Union.” About the InvestEU Fund. 2024. [https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-programme/investeu-fund/about-investeu-fund\\_en](https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-programme/investeu-fund/about-investeu-fund_en).
- . 2024b. “Access to EU Finance - European Commission.” Access to EU Finance. 2024. [https://youreurope.europa.eu/business/finance-funding/getting-funding/access-finance/en/financial-intermediaries?shs\\_term\\_node\\_tid\\_depth=1478](https://youreurope.europa.eu/business/finance-funding/getting-funding/access-finance/en/financial-intermediaries?shs_term_node_tid_depth=1478).
- . 2024c. “EU Green Capital & EU Green Leaf Awards.” European Commission. 2024. [https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/urban-environment/european-green-capital-award\\_en](https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/urban-environment/european-green-capital-award_en).
- . 2024d. “Fit for 55 - The EU’s Plan for a Green Transition.” Fit for 55 - The EU’s Plan for a Green Transition. April 12, 2024.  
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55/>.
- . 2024e. “Questions and Answers - European Union.” 2024.  
[https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-programme/questions-and-answers\\_en](https://investeu.europa.eu/investeu-programme/questions-and-answers_en).
- . n.d. “Attitudes of Europeans towards the Environment.” Accessed November 4, 2024. <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3173>.
- Eurofound. 2024. “Challenges for the EU over the next Five Years.” October 9, 2024.  
<https://eurofound.shorthandstories.com/social-challenges-facing-the-new-european-commission/>.
- European Parliament. 2021. “Post Covid-19 Value Chains: Options for Reshoring Production Back to Europe in a Globalised Economy.”  
[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653626/EXPO\\_STU\(2021\)653626\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653626/EXPO_STU(2021)653626_EN.pdf).
- European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training. 2018. *Skills Forecast: Trends and Challenges to 2030*. LU: Publications Office.  
<https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2801/4492>.
- European Commission. Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 2022. *Housing Market Developments in the Euro Area: Focus on Housing Affordability*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2765/74242>.
- European Court of Auditors. 2020. *The EU’s Emissions Trading System : Free Allocation of Allowances Needed Better Targeting*. Special Report No ... (European Court of Auditors. Online). LU: Publications Office.  
<https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2865/487419>.
- . 2024. *The Recognition of Professional Qualifications in the EU : An Essential Mechanism, but Used Sparsely and Inconsistently*. Special Report No ... (European Court of Auditors. Online). LU: Publications Office.  
<https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2865/51076>.

- European Economic and Social Committee and Riga Technical University. 2022. *Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS) in the Residential Sector*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2864/99718>.
- European Labour Authority and Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini. 2024. *Report on Labour Shortages and Surpluses 2023*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2883/973861>.
- European Parliament. 2020. "Exploring Migration Causes: Why People Migrate." July 1, 2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20200624STO81906/exploring-migration-causes-why-people-migrate>.
- . 2024. "Carriages Preview | Legislative Train Schedule." European Parliament. September 1, 2024. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/package-fit-for-55>.
- European Parliament & Council. 2021. *Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 Establishing the Framework for Achieving Climate Neutrality and Amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 ('European Climate Law')*. OJ L 243. Vol. 2021/1119. <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj>.
- eurostat. 2024a. "Circular Economy Monitoring Framework." Monitoring Framework. 2024. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/scoreboards/circular-economy/>.
- . 2024b. "EU Labour Market - Quarterly Statistics." EU Labour Market - Quarterly Statistics. September 2024. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU\\_labour\\_market\\_-\\_quarterly\\_statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_labour_market_-_quarterly_statistics).
- . 2024c. "First-Time Asylum Applications up 20% in 2023." March 25, 2024. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240325-1>.
- . 2024d. "Gross Wages and Salaries Index - Construction Index by NACE Rev. 2 Activity - Quarterly Data." eurostat. [https://doi.org/10.2908/EI\\_ISBU\\_Q](https://doi.org/10.2908/EI_ISBU_Q).
- . 2024e. "Job Vacancy Statistics." 2024. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Job\\_vacancy\\_statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Job_vacancy_statistics).
- . 2024f. "Migration and Migrant Population Statistics." Eurostat. March 2024. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration\\_and\\_migrant\\_population\\_statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics).
- . 2024g. "Residence Permits - Statistics on First Permits Issued during the Year." Residence Permits - Statistics on First Permits Issued during the Year. September 12, 2024. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Residence\\_permits\\_-\\_statistics\\_on\\_first\\_permits\\_issued\\_during\\_the\\_year](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Residence_permits_-_statistics_on_first_permits_issued_during_the_year).
- Evers, Katuric, and van der Wouden. 2024. "Urbanization in Europe 2000–2018: Amount, Density, and Form." *Urbanization in Europe*. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382101978\\_Urbanization\\_in\\_Europe\\_2000-2018\\_Amount\\_Density\\_and\\_Form](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382101978_Urbanization_in_Europe_2000-2018_Amount_Density_and_Form).
- EY. 2024. "How to Navigate EU Taxonomy's Complex Rules." How to Navigate EU Taxonomy's Complex Rules. September 10, 2024. [https://www.ey.com/en\\_gl/insights/assurance/eu-taxonomy-report](https://www.ey.com/en_gl/insights/assurance/eu-taxonomy-report).
- Fajgelbaum, and Khandelwal. 2021. "The Economic Impacts of the US-China Trade War." [https://www.nber.org/system/files/working\\_papers/w29315/w29315.pdf](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w29315/w29315.pdf).
- Farsangi, Noroozinejad, T.Y. Yang, Noori Mohammad, and Pejman Sharafi. 2024. "Modern Methods of Construction (MMC): A Solution for the Global Housing Crisis." 2024. <https://www.structuremag.org/article/modern-methods-of-construction-mmc-a-solution-for-the-global-housing-crisis/>.

- Fernández-Guillamón, Ana, Emilio Gómez-Lázaro, and Angel Molina-García. 2020. “Extensive Frequency Response and Inertia Analysis under High Renewable Energy Source Integration Scenarios: Application to the European Interconnected Power System.” <https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2011.01749>.
- Fleiter, Tobias. 2019. “Innovationen ermöglichen fast vollständige Dekarbonisierung des Industriesektors.” Fraunhofer-Institut für System- und Innovationsforschung ISI. March 25, 2019. <https://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/de/presse/2019/presseinfo-08-2019-dekarbonisierung-industrie.html>.
- Florida, Richard. 2017. “The New Urban Crisis: How Our Cities Are Increasing Inequality, Deepening Segregation, and Failing the Middle Class—and What We Can Do about It.” [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327796430\\_Richard\\_Florida\\_The\\_new\\_urban\\_crisis\\_how\\_our\\_cities\\_are\\_increasing\\_inequality\\_deepening\\_segregation\\_and\\_failing\\_the\\_middle\\_class-and\\_what\\_we\\_can\\_do\\_about\\_it\\_Basic\\_Books\\_2017\\_USD\\_2000\\_352pp\\_ISBN\\_978-0-](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327796430_Richard_Florida_The_new_urban_crisis_how_our_cities_are_increasing_inequality_deepening_segregation_and_failing_the_middle_class-and_what_we_can_do_about_it_Basic_Books_2017_USD_2000_352pp_ISBN_978-0-)
- Fonseca, Victor. 2023. “What Is Embodied Carbon in the Real Estate Sector and Why Does It Matter?” March 1, 2023. <https://www.gresb.com/nl-en/what-is-embodied-carbon-in-the-real-estate-sector-and-why-does-it-matter/>.
- Fortune BI. 2024. “Europe Modular Construction Market Growth Analysis [2030].” 2024. <https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/europe-modular-construction-market-107747>.
- FTI Consulting. 2024. “Navigating EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence | FTI.” Navigating EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence. June 28, 2024. <https://www.fticonsulting.com/netherlands/insights/articles/navigating-eu-corporate-sustainability-due-diligence-directive>.
- Fuchs, Mischke, Woetzel, and Strube. 2019. “Modular Construction: From Projects to Products | McKinsey.” 2019. <https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-insights/modular-construction-from-projects-to-products>.
- Garusinghe, Garusinghe Dewa Ayesha Udari, Balasooriya Arachchige Kanchana Shiromi Perera, and Umesha Sasanthi Weerapperuma. 2023. “Integrating Circular Economy Principles in Modular Construction to Enhance Sustainability.” *Sustainability* 15 (15): 11730. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su151511730>.
- Gasparella, Andrea, Derck Koolen, and Andreas Zucker. 2023. “The Merit Order and Price-Setting Dynamics in European Electricity Markets.” JRC Publications Repository. August 31, 2023. <https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC134300>.
- Geels, Frank. 2012. “The Impact of the Financial–Economic Crisis on Sustainability Transitions: Financial Investment, Governance and Public Discourse,” December. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S221042241200069X>.
- Gil-Ozoudeh, Ifechukwu, Obinna Iwuanyanwu, Azubuike Okwandu, and Chidiebere Ike. 2024. “The Impact of Green Building Certifications on Market Value and Occupant Satisfaction,” August. [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://fe-pbl.com/index.php/ijmer/article/view/1466/1709&ved=2ahUKEwj2zKi9rcGJAxVDMYQIHT5\\_Kj4QFnoECBQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw105Kxd0KLM\\_69cOJ62\\_iri](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://fe-pbl.com/index.php/ijmer/article/view/1466/1709&ved=2ahUKEwj2zKi9rcGJAxVDMYQIHT5_Kj4QFnoECBQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw105Kxd0KLM_69cOJ62_iri).
- Global Solar Atlas. 2023. “Global Solar Atlas.” 2023. <https://globalsolaratlas.info/download/portugal>.
- GLOBSEC. 2024. “GLOBSEC on China Export Ban.” GLOBSEC - A Global Think Tank: Ideas Shaping the World. 2024. <https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/press-releases/globsec-china-export-ban>.

- Godet, Michel. 1991. *De l'anticipation à l'action: manuel de prospective et de stratégie*. Paris: Dunod.
- Goldman Sachs. 2024. "Trade Routes Realigned: From Integration to Fragmentation." 2024. <https://am.gs.com/en-fi/advisors/insights/article/2024/trade-routes-realigned-from-integration-to-fragmentation>.
- Goodwin, Paul, and George Wright. 2001. *Decision Analysis for Management Judgment*. 3. ed., Repr. Chichester: Wiley.
- Grainger, Guy. 2022. "For Net-Zero Cities, We Need to Retrofit Our Older Buildings. Here's What's Needed." World Economic Forum. November 8, 2022. <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2022/11/net-zero-cities-retrofit-older-buildings-cop27/>.
- Hacke, Muller, and Dutschke. 2019. "Cohousing - Social Impacts and Major Implementation Challenges" 28 (1): 233–39.
- Hadjichambis, Andreas, Eleni Sinakou, Demetra Paraskeva-Hadjichambi, and Anastasia Adamou. 2022. "Green Cities for Environmental Citizenship: A Systematic Literature Review of Empirical Research from 31 Green Cities of the World," December. <https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/23/16223>.
- Hafez, Fatma S., Bahaaeddin Sa'di, M. Safa-Gamal, Y. H. Taufiq-Yap, Moath Alrifay, Mehdi Seyedmahmoudian, Alex Stojcevski, Ben Horan, and Saad Mekhilef. 2023. "Energy Efficiency in Sustainable Buildings: A Systematic Review with Taxonomy, Challenges, Motivations, Methodological Aspects, Recommendations, and Pathways for Future Research." *Energy Strategy Reviews* 45 (January):101013. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2022.101013>.
- Hajlasz. 2023. "Unlocking the Potential of Waste Heat Recovery | McKinsey." 2023. <https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/waste-not-unlocking-the-potential-of-waste-heat-recovery>.
- Hajlasz, Marcin, Stefan Helmcke, Friederike Liebach, Thorsten Schleyer, and Ken Somers. 2023. "Unlocking the Potential of Waste Heat Recovery | McKinsey." Waste Not: Unlocking the Potential of Waste Heat Recovery. November 30, 2023. <https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/waste-not-unlocking-the-potential-of-waste-heat-recovery>.
- Hancock, Alice, and Rachel Millard. 2024. "EU Carbon Market Expansion to Raise Diesel Prices." *Financial Times*, July 1, 2024.
- Hanna, Richard, Philip Heptonstall, and Robert Gross. 2024. "Job Creation in a Low Carbon Transition to Renewables and Energy Efficiency: A Review of International Evidence." *Sustainability Science* 19 (1): 125–50. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-023-01440-y>.
- Hayes, Adam. 2024. "Barriers to Entry: Understanding What Limits Competition." Barriers to Entry: Understanding What Limits Competition. April 1, 2024. <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/barrierstoentry.asp>.
- Heijden, Kees van der. 1996. *Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation*. 2nd ed. Chichester: Wiley.
- Hendrich, Aline, and Benjamin Reuter. 2020. "Verfügbarkeit kritischer Rohstoffe für Elektrofahrzeuge." *ATZechnik* 15 (4): 60–63. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s35658-020-0185-3>.
- Hernández, Héctor, Felipe Ossio, and Michael Silva. 2023. "Assessment of Sustainability and Efficiency Metrics in Modern Methods of Construction: A Case Study Using a Life Cycle Assessment Approach." *Sustainability* 15 (7): 6267. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su15076267>.

- Herrmann, Dr. Constantin, and Roberta Zimmermann. 2024. “Circular Economy Meets Life Cycle Assessment: How to Apply Circular Thinking to Product Design and Business Practices in the Context of LCA.” *Sphera* (blog). 2024. <https://sphera.com/resources/events/circular-economy-meets-life-cycle-assessment-how-to-apply-circular-thinking-to-product-design-and-business-practices-in-the-context-of-lca/>.
- Herzog, Christoph. 2024. “Bundesrat: CSRD Als Gefahr Für Die Transformation?” September 23, 2024. [https://www.haufe.de/sustainability/debatte/csrd-empfehlungen-der-bundesrats-ausschuesse\\_575768\\_632524.html](https://www.haufe.de/sustainability/debatte/csrd-empfehlungen-der-bundesrats-ausschuesse_575768_632524.html).
- Hibri, Ramsey El. 2024. “How to Finance Sustainable Real Estate Projects with Green Bonds.” August 27, 2024. <https://sustainablecapitalgroup.com/blog/leveraging-green-bonds-for-real-estate-projects/>.
- Hu, Chun, Chuanjian Wu, and Le Yu. 2023. “Challenges and Opportunities of Digital Transformation in Enterprises.” *Clausius Scientific Press, Canada* 5 (12). <https://doi.org/10.23977/acem.2023.051201>.
- Huber, Robert A., Tomas Maltby, Kacper Szulecki, and Stefan Četković. 2021. “Is Populism a Challenge to European Energy and Climate Policy? Empirical Evidence across Varieties of Populism.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 28 (7): 998–1017. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1918214>.
- Hubspot. 2024. “Transforming Empty Office Buildings.” Transforming Empty Office Buildings. May 24, 2024. <https://www.walltechinc.com/blog/transforming-empty-office-buildings>.
- Hwang, and Sampson. 2014. “Divergent Pathways of Gentrification: Racial Inequality and the Social Order of Renewal in Chicago Neighborhoods.” 79 (4): 726–51.
- IEA. 2021. “What Is behind Soaring Energy Prices and What Happens next? – Analysis.” IEA. October 12, 2021. <https://www.iea.org/commentaries/what-is-behind-soaring-energy-prices-and-what-happens-next>.
- . 2023. “Clean Energy Supply Chains Vulnerabilities – Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 – Analysis.” IEA. 2023. <https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023/clean-energy-supply-chains-vulnerabilities>.
- . n.d. “Asset Values – Multiple Benefits of Energy Efficiency – Analysis.” IEA. Accessed November 21, 2024. <https://www.iea.org/reports/multiple-benefits-of-energy-efficiency/asset-values>.
- IEEP. 2021. “Biomass in the EU Green Deal: Towards Consensus on Sustainable Use of Biomass for EU Bioenergy?” *IEEP AISBL* (blog). 2021. <https://ieep.eu/publications/biomass-in-the-eu-green-deal-towards-consensus-on-sustainable-use-of-biomass-for-eu-bioenergy/>.
- . 2024. “Sourcing Critical Raw Materials through Trade and Cooperation Frameworks.” *IEEP AISBL* (blog). 2024. <https://ieep.eu/publications/sourcing-critical-raw-materials-through-trade-and-cooperation-frameworks/>.
- Ilina, Alexandra. 2024. “Energiewende vs. Fachkräftemangel: Sanierungsquote Viel Zu Gering.” June 21, 2024. <https://www.ingenieur.de/karriere/arbeitsleben/arbeitgeber/linkedin-analyse-fachkraeftemangel-gefaehrdet-globale-klimaziele/>.
- IMF. 2023. “The Long-Lasting Economic Shock of War.” 2023.
- Independence. 2023. “The Pros and Cons of Prefab Homes.” *The Independence* (blog). July 17, 2023. <https://www.theindependence.co.uk/home/pros-and-cons-of-prefab-homes/>.
- International Organization for Migration. n.d. “Reducing Global Inequalities.” Accessed October 10, 2024. <https://www.iom.int/reducing-global-inequalities>.

- Investopedia. 2023. “The Effect of Supply and Demand on the Housing Market.” Investopedia. July 16, 2023. <https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040215/how-does-law-supply-and-demand-affect-housing-market.asp>.
- Jalonen, Harri. 2011. “The Uncertainty of Innovation: A Systematic Review of the Literature.” *Journal of Management Research* 4 (1). <https://doi.org/10.5296/jmr.v4i1.1039>.
- Jansen, Jannik. 2023. “When Europe Talks Climate, It Needs to Think Jobs.” *Policy Brief* (blog). December 6, 2023. <https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/skilled-workers-in-the-green-transition>.
- Jarvis, Scanlon, Arrigoitia, and Stevenson. 2016. “Co-Housing: Shared Futures.” [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327573445\\_Co-housing\\_Shared\\_Futures](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327573445_Co-housing_Shared_Futures).
- Jon Henley. 2023. “Many Europeans Want Climate Action – but Less so If It Changes Their Lifestyle, Shows Poll.” *The Guardian*, May 2, 2023, sec. Environment. <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/may/02/many-europeans-want-climate-action-but-less-so-if-it-changes-their-lifestyle-shows-poll>.
- J.P. Morgan. 2023. “SFDR Explained | J.P. Morgan Asset Management.” SFDR Explained. September 25, 2023. <https://am.jpmorgan.com/ch/en/asset-management/institutional/investment-strategies/sustainable-investing/understanding-SFDR/>.
- Kahn, Herman. 1962. “Thinking About the Unthinkable.” *Naval War College Review* 15 (8). <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol15/iss8/7>.
- Karachalios, George, and Vaios Kotsios. 2023. “Green Skills in the European Labour Markets.” *HAPSc Policy Briefs Series* 4 (1): 111–26. <https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.35190>.
- Kearney. 2020. “Why Today’s Pricing Is Sabotaging Sustainability.” September 11, 2020. <https://www.kearney.com/industry/consumer-retail/article/-/insights/why-todays-pricing-is-sabotaging-sustainability>.
- Khan, Ayaz Ahmad, Mehdi Amirkhani, and Igor Martek. 2024. “Overcoming Deterrents to Modular Construction in Affordable Housing: A Systematic Review.” *Sustainability* 16 (17): 7611. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su16177611>.
- Khan, Khalid, Adnan Khurshid, and Javier Cifuentes-Faura. 2023. “Is Geopolitics a New Risk to Environmental Policy in the European Union?,” August. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301479723016560>.
- Knuth, Peter. 2023. “Energiewende trotz Fachkräftemangel geht nur mit den richtigen Prozessen.” *pv magazine* (blog). July 31, 2023. <https://www.pv-magazine.de/2023/07/31/energiewende-trotz-fachkraeftemangel-geht-nur-mit-den-richtigen-prozessen/>.
- Kohler, Bruno. 2024. “Fachkräftemangel im Bauhauptgewerbe: Flexibilität, Engagement und Schlagfertigkeit als Erfolgsfaktoren im Simmental.” In *Fachkräftemangel und Maßnahmen-Champions*, edited by Hendrik Budliger, 213–25. Demografie und Wirtschaft. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-45364-0\\_13](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-45364-0_13).
- Kohlmann, Thomas. 2022. “Wie abhängig ist Taiwan von China? – DW – 05.08.2022.” *dw.com*. August 5, 2022. <https://www.dw.com/de/wie-abh%C3%A4ngig-ist-taiwan-von-china/a-62719805>.
- Kollmus, Anja, and Julian Agyeman. 2010. “Mind the Gap: Why Do People Act Environmentally and What Are the Barriers to pro-Environmental Behavior?,” July. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13504620220145401>.
- Kowalski, Przemyslaw, and Clarisse Legendre. 2023. “Raw Materials Critical for the Green Transition,” no. 269. <https://doi.org/10.1787/c6bb598b-en>.

- KPMG. 2015. “Sustainable Insight: Gearing up for Green Bonds,” 16.
- . 2022. “Russia-Ukraine War Impact on Supply Chains and Inflation.” 2022. <https://kpmg.com/us/en/articles/2022/russia-ukraine-war-impact-supply-chains-inflation.html>.
- . 2024. “Supply Chain Stability Index.” 2024. <https://kpmg.com/us/en/articles/2023/supply-chain-stability-index.html#:~:text=Supply%20Chain%20Stability%20Index%20provides,variables%20that%20drive%20each%20factor>.
- Krupp, Steven, Paul J. H. Schoemaker, and David J. Teece. 2014. *Winning the Long Game: How Strategic Leaders Shape the Future*. First edition. New York: Public Affairs.
- Kuptsch, and Pang. 2006. “1143 Competing for Global Talen.”
- Lee, Tien, Ezra Markowitz, Peter Howe, and Chia-ying Ko. 2015. “Predictors of Public Climate Change Awareness and Risk Perception around the World.” [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282535453\\_Predictors\\_of\\_public\\_climate\\_change\\_awareness\\_and\\_risk\\_perception\\_around\\_the\\_world](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282535453_Predictors_of_public_climate_change_awareness_and_risk_perception_around_the_world).
- Lewicka, Ewa, Katarzyna Guzik, and Krzysztof Galos. 2021. “On the Possibilities of Critical Raw Materials Production from the EU’s Primary Sources.” *Resources* 10 (5): 50. <https://doi.org/10.3390/resources10050050>.
- Lilliestam, Johan, Anthony Patt, and Germán Bersalli. 2021. “The Effect of Carbon Pricing on Technological Change for Full Energy Decarbonization: A Review of Empirical Ex-post Evidence.” *WIREs Climate Change* 12 (1): e681. <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.681>.
- Liu, Sitian, and Yichen Su. 2021. “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Demand for Density: Evidence from the U.S. Housing Market.” *Economics Letters* 207 (July). <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176521002871>.
- Loorbach, Derk, Niki Frantzeskaki, and Flor Avelino. 2017. “Sustainability Transitions Research: Transforming Science and Practice for Societal Change.” *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, November, 599–626. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-102014-021340>.
- Lopes, Madalena. n.d. “From Retirement to Political Dissent: The Effect of Pension Reforms on Voting Patterns in Europe’s Populist, Extremist and Eurosceptic Parties.” [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://the-sis.eur.nl/pub/66787/MadalenaLopes\\_660194ml.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwiRkuKY2OaJAXXXr4QIHdqKdQFnoECBQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3JaYOKbyWCXKH5HiPdfA-T](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://the-sis.eur.nl/pub/66787/MadalenaLopes_660194ml.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwiRkuKY2OaJAXXXr4QIHdqKdQFnoECBQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3JaYOKbyWCXKH5HiPdfA-T).
- Lu, Zheng, Michael Hauschild, Lisbeth M. Ottosen, Teklit Gebregiorgis Ambaye, Pierluigi Zerbino, Davide Aloini, and Ana T. Lima. 2024. “Climate Mitigation Potential of Biobased Insulation Materials: A Comprehensive Review and Categorization.” *Journal of Cleaner Production* 470 (September):143356. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.143356>.
- Luderer, Gunnar, Silvia Madeddu, Leon Merfort, Falko Ueckerdt, Michaja Pehl, Robert Pietzcker, Marianna Rottoli, et al. 2021. “Impact of Declining Renewable Energy Costs on Electrification in Low-Emission Scenarios.” *Nature Energy* 7 (1): 32–42. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-021-00937-z>.
- Luvisi, Andrea, and Giacomo Lorenzini. 2014. “RFID-Plants in the Smart City: Applications and Outlook for Urban Green Management,” August. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1618866714000764>.
- Magacho, Guilherme, Etienne Espagne, and Antoine Godin. 2024. “Impacts of the CBAM on EU Trade Partners: Consequences for Developing Countries.” *Climate Policy* 24 (2): 243–59. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2023.2200758>.

- Marques, Isabel, João Leitão, Alba Carvalho, and Dina Pereira. 2021. “Public Administration and Values Oriented to Sustainability: A Systematic Approach to the Literature.” *Sustainability* 13 (5): 2566. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su13052566>.
- Mazzeschi, Marco. 2016. “The EU Policy to Attract Highly Skilled Workers: Status of Implementation of Blue Card Directive.” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2877178>.
- McClure, Olivia. 2024. “PropTech: Everything You Need to Know.” October 24, 2024. <https://builtin.com/articles/proptech#:~:text=The%20early%202000s%20served%20as%20establishing%20themselves%20as%20proptech%20frontrunners>.
- McGregor, Sue. 2012. “A Look inside Creating Home Economics Futures: The Next 100 Years.” *International Journal of Home Economics*. [https://consultmgregor.com/documents/research/inside\\_next\\_100\\_years\\_home\\_ec\\_book\\_as\\_published.pdf](https://consultmgregor.com/documents/research/inside_next_100_years_home_ec_book_as_published.pdf).
- McKinsey. 2019. “Modular Construction: From Projects to Products | McKinsey.” 2019. <https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-insights/modular-construction-from-projects-to-products>.
- . 2023. “Empty Spaces and Hybrid Places: The Pandemic’s Lasting Impact on Real Estate.” McKinsey Global Institute. July 13, 2023. <https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/empty-spaces-and-hybrid-places>.
- . 2024. “What Is Digital Transformation?” *McKinsey&Company*, August 7, 2024. <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/mckinsey-explainers/what-is-digital-transformation>.
- Merle et al. 2022. “EU Social Taxonomy Proposal: Simpler and Meaningful but Half-Way through | Our Center of Expertise.” 2022. <https://gsh.cib.natixis.com/our-center-of-expertise/articles/eu-social-taxonomy-proposal-simpler-and-meaningful-but-half-way-through>.
- Messmer, Simon. 2024. “Harnessing GenAI and Digital Innovation to Combat Labor Shortages in the Energy Sector.” September 6, 2024. <https://www.futurice.com/blog/genai-digital-innovation-labor-shortages-energy-sector>.
- Michielin, Davide. 2023. “From Waste to Resource: The Rise of Urban Mining.” *Foresight* (blog). April 28, 2023. <https://www.climateforesight.eu/articles/raw-materials-urban-mining/>.
- Minderhoud, Paul. 2022. “Regulation of EU Labour Migration: At a Crossroads after the New Pact on Migration and Asylum?” *Utrecht Law Review* 17 (4): 31–44. <https://doi.org/10.36633/ulr.749>.
- Mischos, Stavros, Eleanna Dalagdi, and Dimitrios Vrakas. 2023. “Intelligent Energy Management Systems: A Review.” *Artificial Intelligence Review* 56 (10): 11635–74. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10462-023-10441-3>.
- Misser, François. 2023. “China-Besuch von Kongos Präsident: Wie China die DR Kongo ausbeutet.” *Die Tageszeitung: taz*, May 24, 2023. <https://taz.de/China-Besuch-von-Kongos-Praesident/!5933434/>.
- MOME. 2024a. “Acessibilidade – MOME.” 2024. <https://mome.pt/aderir-copia/>.
- . 2024b. “MOME.” 2024. <https://mome.pt/>.
- . 2024c. “Professional Management of Housing Cooperatives - Creating Sustainable Housing Solutions | MOME.” Company Presentation. Porto: MOME.
- Morawski, Jaroslaw. 2022. “Impact of Working from Home on European Office Rents and Vacancy Rates.” *Zeitschrift Für Immobilienökonomie* 8 (2): 173–88. <https://doi.org/10.1365/s41056-022-00057-z>.

- Moring, Andreas, and Christin Inholte. 2022. "Nachhaltigkeit in der Immobilienwirtschaft." In *Nachhaltigkeit und Digitalisierung in der Immobilienwirtschaft*, by Andreas Moring and Christin Inholte, 73–130. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37047-3\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37047-3_3).
- mpa. n.d. "Recycling Concrete." Concrete Centre. Accessed November 21, 2024. <https://www.concretecentre.com/Performance-Sustainability/Circular-economy/End-of-life-recycling.aspx>.
- Mudde and Kaltwasser. 2018. "Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda" 51 (13): 1667–93.
- Naydenov, Kliment, and Dimitar Atanasov. 2022. "Green City—Future Sustainable Development and Smart Growth." [https://www.academia.edu/102423465/Green\\_city\\_future\\_sustainable\\_development\\_and\\_smart\\_growth](https://www.academia.edu/102423465/Green_city_future_sustainable_development_and_smart_growth).
- Nayeon, Kim, and Lee Kyungtag. 2023. "Environmental Consciousness, Purchase Intention, and Actual Purchase Behavior of Eco-Friendly Products: The Moderating Impact of Situational Context," March. <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10093960/>.
- NDR. 2023. "Windenergie der Nordsee: Niedersachsen sieht großes Potenzial." Windenergie der Nordsee: Niedersachsen sieht großes Potenzial. April 25, 2023. <https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/niedersachsen/Windenergie-der-Nordsee-Niedersachsen-sieht-grosses-Potenzial,windkraft1352.html>.
- Nobletz, Capucine, Romain Svartzman, and Simon Dikau. 2024. "The EU's Dependency on Critical Materials."
- Normative. 2024. "The Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), Explained." Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), Explained. October 25, 2024. <https://normative.io/insight/csr-d-explained/>.
- Oberzaucher, Bernd. n.d. "Digitalization as a Megatrend." Accessed October 15, 2024. <https://www.andritz.com/spectrum-en/latest-issues/issue-39/digitalization-as-a-megatrend>.
- OECD. 2018. "Assessing the Role of Migration in European Labour Force Growth by 2030." [https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2018/05/assessing-the-role-of-migration-in-european-labour-force-growth-by-2030\\_1816c2c3/6953a8ba-en.pdf](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2018/05/assessing-the-role-of-migration-in-european-labour-force-growth-by-2030_1816c2c3/6953a8ba-en.pdf).
- . 2024. "Demographic Change in Cities: Trends, Challenges and Insights from G7 Economies," 8.
- O'Herron, Devin. 2024. "CBAM Creates New Supply Chain Hurdles for Companies Exporting to EU." *Corporate Compliance Insights* (blog). October 1, 2024. <https://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/cbam-supply-chain-hurdles-eu/>.
- O'Neill, Gilmarie, Matthew Ball, Yujing Liu, Mojtaba Noghabaei, and Kevin Han. 2020. "Toward Automated Virtual Assembly for Prefabricated Construction: Construction Sequencing through Simulated BIM." arXiv. <https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2003.06695>.
- Ouda, Enaam, and Mahmoud Haggag. 2024. "Automation in Modular Construction Manufacturing: A Comparative Analysis of Assembly Processes." *Sustainability* 16 (21): 9238. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su16219238>.
- Ozorhon, Beliz, and Kutluhan Oral. 2017. "Drivers of Innovation in Construction Projects." *Journal of Construction Engineering and Management* 143 (4): 04016118. [https://doi.org/10.1061/\(ASCE\)CO.1943-7862.0001234](https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001234).
- Pallardy, Carrie. 2024. "What Is a Green Loan?" Investopedia. August 26, 2024. <https://www.investopedia.com/what-is-a-green-loan-8696296>.

- Peterson, Garry D., Graeme S. Cumming, and Stephen R. Carpenter. 2003. "Scenario Planning: A Tool for Conservation in an Uncertain World." *Conservation Biology* 17 (2): 358–66. <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1523-1739.2003.01491.x>.
- Phadnis, Shardul S., Yossi Sheffi, and Chris Caplice. 2022. "Scenario Planning: A Tool for Organizational Learning and Foresight." In *Strategic Planning for Dynamic Supply Chains*, by Shardul S. Phadnis, Yossi Sheffi, and Chris Caplice, 45–61. Palgrave Executive Essentials. Cham: Springer International Publishing. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91810-1\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91810-1_3).
- Pickles, Sonja. 2023. "Europe's Flawed Approach to Critical Minerals | Heinrich Böll Stiftung." 2023. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/eu-critical-raw-materials-act-will-not-add-value-for-local-communities-by-sophia-pickles-2023-12/german>.
- Pirgaip, Burak, Mehmet Baha Karan, and Seçil Sayın Kutluca. 2024. "Do Green Bonds Improve the Stock and Environmental Performance of Energy Firms? International Evidence." In *The ESG Framework and the Energy Industry*, edited by James Thewissen, Özgür Arslan-Ayaydin, Wim Westerman, and André Dorsman, 159–83. Cham: Springer International Publishing. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48457-5\\_9](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48457-5_9).
- Pless, Shanti, Ankur Podder, Zoe Kaufman, Noah Klammer, Conor Dennehy, Naveen Kumar Muthumanickam, Stacey Rothgeb, et al. 2022. "The Energy in Modular (EMOD) Buildings Method: A Guide to Energy-Efficient Design for Industrialized Construction of Modular Buildings." NREL/TP-5500-82447, 1875070, MainId:83220. <https://doi.org/10.2172/1875070>.
- Porter, Michael E. 1989. "How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy." In *Readings in Strategic Management*, edited by David Asch and Cliff Bowman, 133–43. London: Macmillan Education UK. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20317-8\\_10](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20317-8_10).
- Praveen, V. 2024. "The Rise of ESG Reporting and the Challenges of CSRD Compliance." July 4, 2024. <https://ecodrisil.com/the-challenges-of-csrd-compliance/>.
- PwC. 2016. "Five Megatrends And Their Implications for Global Defense & Security." <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/government-public-services/assets/five-megatrends-implications.pdf>.
- . 2023a. "Emerging Trends in Real Estate: Europe 2024." PwC. <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/financial-services/real-estate/emerging-trends-real-estate/europe-2024.html>.
- . 2023b. "Vertikale Verdichtung: Lebensraum Stadt nachhaltig und zukunftsfähig gestalten." Vertikale Verdichtung: Lebensraum Stadt nachhaltig und zukunftsfähig gestalten. August 2023. <https://www.pwc.de/de/real-estate/vertikale-verdichtung-lebensraum-stadt-nachhaltig-und-zukunftsfahig-gestalten.html>.
- . 2024a. "Consumers Willing to Pay 9.7% Sustainability Premium, Even as Cost-of-Living and Inflationary Concerns Weigh: PwC 2024 Voice of the Consumer Survey." PwC. 2024. <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/news-room/press-releases/2024/pwc-2024-voice-of-consumer-survey.html>.
- . 2024b. "Megatrends Five Global Shifts Reshaping the World We Live In." <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/megatrends.html>.
- . 2024c. "Sustainability Workforce Reporting: Human Resources Plays a Crucial Role." PwC. October 15, 2024. <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/workforce/sustainability-workforce-reporting.html>.
- . 2024d. "The Challenges of Implementing the EU Taxonomy - Practical Advice." The Challenges of Implementing the EU Taxonomy - Practical Advice. November 14,

2024. <https://www.pwc.ch/en/insights/sustainability/challenges-of-implementing-eu-taxonomy-practical-advice.html>.
- PwC, and ULI. 2024. “Emerging Trends in Real Estate 2025.” 2024. <https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/financial-services/asset-wealth-management/real-estate/emerging-trends-in-real-estate.html>.
- Qiu, Han, Dora Xia, and James Yetman. 2024. “Deconstructing Global Trade: The Role of Geopolitical Alignment.” *BIS Quarterly Review*. [https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r\\_qt2409c.pdf](https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2409c.pdf).
- Raja, Pradeep, Vignesh Murugan, Sindhu Ravichandran, Laxmidhar Behera, Rhoda Afriyie Mensah, Satthiyaraju Mani, AnanthaKumar Kasi, et al. 2023. “A Review of Sustainable Bio-Based Insulation Materials for Energy-Efficient Buildings.” *Macromolecular Materials and Engineering* 308 (10): 2300086. <https://doi.org/10.1002/mame.202300086>.
- Ramírez, Rafael, and Angela Wilkinson. 2016. *Strategic Reframing: The Oxford Scenario Planning Approach*. First edition. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Remoy, and Van der Voordt. 2014. “Adaptive Reuse of Office Buildings: Opportunities and Risks of Conversion into Housing.” [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260982569\\_Adaptive\\_reuse\\_of\\_office\\_buildings\\_Opportunities\\_and\\_risks\\_of\\_conversion\\_into\\_housing](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260982569_Adaptive_reuse_of_office_buildings_Opportunities_and_risks_of_conversion_into_housing).
- Riaz, Umar. 2024. “Generative AI Is Transforming Commercial Real Estate.” 2024. [https://www.ey.com/en\\_us/insights/real-estate-hospitality-construction/generative-ai-in-real-estate](https://www.ey.com/en_us/insights/real-estate-hospitality-construction/generative-ai-in-real-estate).
- RICS. 2024. “The Future of Real Estate Valuations: The Impact of ESG | Views from a European Expert Group.” RICS. <https://www.rics.org/content/dam/ricsglobal/documents/latest-news/WBEF-ESG-and-valuation-2024.pdf>.
- Ridao, Ángel Ramos, Ernesto Hontoria García, Begoña Moreno Escobar, and Montserrat Zamorano Toro. 2007. “Solar Energy in Andalusia (Spain): Present State and Prospects for the Future.” *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 11 (1): 148–61. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2004.12.007>.
- Riverse. 2024. “Biobased Construction Materials | Riverse.” 2024. <https://www.riverse.io/methodologies/biobased-construction-materials>.
- Roelofsen, Occo, Ken Somers, Eveline Speelman, and Maaïke Witteveen. 2020. “How Electrification Can Help Industrial Companies Cut Costs | McKinsey.” How Electrification Can Help Industrial Companies Cut Costs. May 28, 2020. <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-and-natural-gas/our-insights/plugging-in-what-electrification-can-do-for-industry>.
- Sanders. 2023. “Global Economy 2023: COVID-19 Turned Global Supply Chains Upside Down.” 2023. <https://theconversation.com/global-economy-2023-covid-19-turned-global-supply-chains-upside-down-3-ways-the-pandemic-forced-companies-to-rethink-and-transform-how-they-source-their-products-196764>.
- Santander, Banco. 2022. “Tipos y Materiales de Viviendas Prefabricadas.” Banco Santander. May 25, 2022. <https://www.bancosantander.es/en/blog/tendencias/tipos-viviendas-prefabricadas>.
- Sante, Maurice van. n.d. “EU Construction Sector Suffers Multiple Setbacks.” ING Think. Accessed November 21, 2024. <https://think.ing.com/articles/eu-construction-sector-suffers-multiple-setbacks/>.
- Schain, Martin. 2018. “Shifting Tides: Radical-Right Populism and Immigration Policy in Europe and the United States.” *Migration Policy Institute*, August.

- <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Schain-PopulismUSandEurope-Final-Web.pdf>.
- Schneider, Henrique. 2024. "What Will the EU Accomplish with the CBAM? – GIS Reports." January 10, 2024. <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/cbam-eu/>.
- Schoemaker, Paul. 1995. "Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking." *Sloan Management Review* 36 (January):25–40.
- Schuhmann. 2024. "EU Funding for Construction: RRF and Cohesion Policy." Schuman Associates. May 23, 2024. <https://www.schumanassociates.com/newsroom/eu-funding-for-construction-rrf-and-cohesion-policy>.
- Schuldt, Johann. 2023. "European Green Directives: Seeking Clarity for the Real Estate Market | Insights | Greenberg Traurig LLP." 2023. <https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2023/4/european-green-directives-seeking-clarity-for-the-real-estate-market>.
- Schwartz, Peter. 1991. *The Art of the Long View: Scenario Planning*. New York: Doubleday.
- . 1996. "The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World." In . <https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:106811624>.
- Seaman, John. 2024. "Critical Raw Materials, Economic Statecraft and Europe's Dependence on China." *The International Spectator* 0 (0): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2024.2379980>.
- Seaton, Hugh, Samad Sepasgozar, Anil Sawhney, and Christina Savian. 2022. "Digital Twins from Design to Handover of Constructed Assets." Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.rics.org/content/dam/ricsglobal/documents/research/digital-twins-from-design-to-handover-of-constructed->.
- Segal, Troy. 2024. "Green Bond: Types, How to Buy, and FAQs." Investopedia. April 27, 2024. <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/green-bond.asp>.
- Selvaraj, Rajalakshmi. 2023. "Smart Building Energy Management and Monitoring System Based on Artificial Intelligence in Smart City," *Sustainable Energy Technologies and Assessments*, 56 (February). <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2213138823000838>.
- Semuels, Alana. 2024. "How Automation Is Helping Companies Prep for Labor Shortages." TIME. December 3, 2024. <https://time.com/7173990/industrial-renaissance-time100-talk/>.
- Sepasgozar, Samad. 2020. "Digital Twin and Web-Based Virtual Gaming Technologies for Online Education: A Case of Construction Management and Engineering" 10 (13). <https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/13/4678>.
- Setaki, Foteini, and Arjan van Timmeren. 2022. "Disruptive Technologies for a Circular Building Industry." *Building and Environment* 223 (September):109394. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.buildenv.2022.109394>.
- Seveke, Valentina. 2023. "Maintaining Property Value: How to Turn ESG from Risk into Opportunity." GRESB. September 25, 2023. <https://www.gresb.com/nl-en/maintaining-property-value-how-to-turn-esg-from-risk-into-opportunity/>.
- Si, Wentao, Chen Jiang, and Lin Meng. 2022. "The Relationship between Environmental Awareness, Habitat Quality, and Community Residents' Pro-Environmental Behavior—Mediated Effects Model Analysis Based on Social Capital," October. <https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/19/20/13253>.
- Siemens. 2024. "Automotive Industry Efficiency Boost." fw\_Inspiring. Siemens.Com Global Website. 2024. <https://www.siemens.com/global/en/company/stories/industry/digital-enterprise-services/faurecia-automotive-energy-efficiency-es.html>.

- Silva, Ana Filipa, M. Isabel Sánchez-Hernández, and Luísa Cagica Carvalho. 2023. “Local Public Administration in the Process of Implementing Sustainable Development Goals.” *Sustainability* 15 (21): 15263. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su152115263>.
- Singh, Jugindar, and Goh Ji. 2023. “Digitalization And Its Impact on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs): An Exploratory Study of Challenges and Proposed Solutions” 5 (4): 238–55. <https://doi.org/10.55057/ijbtm.2023.5.4.22>.
- Siniak, Nikolai, Tom Kauko, Sergey Shavrov, and Ninoslav Marina. 2020. “The Impact of PropTech on Real Estate Industry Growth.” <https://doi.org/10.1088/1757-899X/869/6/062041>.
- Smiley, Kevin, Yu-an Chen, and Wanyun Shoo. 2021. “Being Green in a Green Capital: Assessing Drivers of pro-Environmental Behaviors in Copenhagen” 122 (December). <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0264275121004376>.
- Smith. 2023. “Gentrification Pros and Cons: A Double-Edged Sword.” *Robert f Smith* (blog). 2023. <https://robertsmith.com/blog/gentrification-pros-and-cons/>.
- Sreenivasalu, Harikishore. 2024. “Council Post: A New Era Of Transparency: How Mandatory ESG Reporting Will Reshape Business.” *Forbes*. July 10, 2024. <https://www.forbes.com/councils/forbestechcouncil/2024/07/10/a-new-era-of-transparency-how-mandatory-esg-reporting-will-reshape-business/>.
- Statista. 2023. “Share of Urban Population Worldwide in 2023.” 2023. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/270860/urbanization-by-continent/>.
- . 2024a. “EU-ETS Phase-out & CBAM Phase-in Pathway 2025-2034.” EU-ETS Phase-out & CBAM Phase-in Pathway 2025-2034. May 8, 2024. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1401673/eu-ets-free-allowance-cbam-pathway/>.
- . 2024b. “Geopolitical Risk Index 2024.” Statista. October 7, 2024. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1445888/geopolitical-risk-index/>.
- . 2024c. “Real Estate - EU-27 | Statista Market Forecast.” Statista. 2024. <https://www.statista.com/outlook/fmo/real-estate/eu-27>.
- . 2024d. “Real Estate in Europe: Major Challenges 2025.” Statista. 2024. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/376877/europe-real-estate-investment-direct-issues-impacting-effect/>.
- Staupe, Jörg. 2024. “Habecks Plan für die Zukunft: Riesige Batterien unter Wasser.” Habecks Plan für die Zukunft: Riesige Batterien unter Wasser. September 20, 2024. <https://www.fr.de/politik/wasser-spreicher-riesige-batterie-robot-habeck-unter-93305624.html>.
- Steding, Daniel. 2019. “Coliving: An Emerging Term without a Common Definition.” <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1371948/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.
- Stephen, Mike, and Kehinde Odubade. 2024. “The Future of Remote Work: Trends, Challenges, and Opportunities.” *Journal of Cell Communication and Signaling*, June. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/381111612\\_The\\_Future\\_of\\_Remote\\_Work\\_Trends\\_Challenges\\_and\\_Opportunities](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/381111612_The_Future_of_Remote_Work_Trends_Challenges_and_Opportunities).
- Streltes, argarita. 2024. “EU Green Bond Standard | Deloitte UK.” 2024. <https://www.deloitte.com/uk/en/Industries/financial-services/blogs/eu-green-bond-standard.html>.
- Sudarsan, J. S., and Hindavi Gavali. 2024. “Application of BIM in Conjunction with Circular Economy Principles for Sustainable Construction.” *Environment, Development and Sustainability* 26 (3): 7455–68. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-023-03015-4>.
- Taiwan News. 2024. “European Parliament Denounces China’s Use of UN 2758 against Taiwan | Taiwan News | Oct. 25, 2024 20:56.” October 25, 2024. <https://taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5958398>.

- Tang, Llewellyn, Chao Chen, Shu Tang, and Zhuoqian Wu. 2017. "Building Information Modeling and Building Performance Optimization," July, 311–20.
- TEG. 2023. "Taxonomy: Final Report of the Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance." 2023. <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/metadata/publications/taxonomy-final-report-of-the-technical-expert-group-on-sustainable-finance>.
- The Economist. 2023. "Global Fertility Has Collapsed, with Profound Economic Consequences." <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/06/01/global-fertility-has-collapsed-with-profound-economic-consequences>.
- The Guardian. 2023. "Success of Geert Wilders' Far-Right PVV Raises Fears for Dutch Climate Policies." *The Guardian*, 2023. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/26/geert-wilders-far-right-pvv-dutch-climate-policy>.
- Tulier, and Allen. 2019. "Gentrification." <https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/gentrification>.
- ULI Portugal. 2024. "Our Leaders - Europe." ULI Portugal. 2024. <https://portugal.uli.org/about/our-leaders/>.
- Umweltbundesamt. 2018. *Energieerzeugung aus Abfällen Stand und Potenziale in Deutschland bis 2030*. Umweltbundesamt. <https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/publikationen/energieerzeugung-aus-abfaellen-stand-potenziale-in>.
- UN. 2014. "Urban and Rural Population of the World, 1950-2050." 2014. <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf>.
- . 2020. "WORLD SOCIAL REPORT 2020 INEQUALITY IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD." <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2020/02/World-Social-Report2020-FullReport.pdf>.
- . n.d.-a. "Global Issues: Climate Change." Accessed October 2, 2024. <https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/climate-change>.
- . n.d.-b. "New Globalization Report: Three Mega-Trends Expected to Impact Our Future." Accessed October 15, 2024. <https://www.un.org/es/desa/new-globalization-report-three-mega-trends-expected-impact-our-future>.
- Unal, Umut, Bernd Hayo, and Isil Erol. 2024. "The Effect of Immigration on Housing Prices: Evidence from 382 German Districts," May. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-024-09988-x>.
- UNEP. 2023a. "Building Materials And The Climate: Constructing A New Future." September 12, 2023. <https://www.unep.org/resources/report/building-materials-and-climate-constructing-new-future>.
- . 2023b. "Building Materials And The Climate: Constructing A New Future | UNEP - UN Environment Programme." December 9, 2023. <https://www.unep.org/resources/report/building-materials-and-climate-constructing-new-future>.
- . 2023c. "Emissions Gap Report 2023." United Nations. <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/43922/EGR2023.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>.
- UN-habitat. 2021. "Urban Regeneration as a Tool for Inclusive and Sustainable Recovery." Expert Group Meeting. [https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2022/05/report\\_egm\\_urban\\_regeneration.pdf](https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2022/05/report_egm_urban_regeneration.pdf).
- Uske, Karolina. 2024. "PropTech Market Trends: The Future Of Real Estate Technology." *Curiosum* (blog). January 17, 2024. <https://curiosum.com/blog/proptech-market-trends-the-future-of-real-estate-technology>.

- Van Holsteyn, Joop, and Galen Irwin. 2024. "The Dutch Parliamentary Elections of November 2023," September. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402382.2024.2397629#abstract>.
- V&E. 2024. "Overview of Policy Barriers to Recycling of Critical Raw Materials | Insights | Vinson & Elkins LLP." 2024. <https://www.velaw.com/insights/overview-of-policy-barriers-to-recycling-of-critical-raw-materials/>.
- Venditti, Bruno. 2024. "Visualizing the EU's Critical Minerals Gap by 2030." Elements by Visual Capitalist. October 23, 2024. <https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-eus-critical-minerals-gap-by-2030/>.
- Vincze, Enikő, and Betavatz. 2024. "Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Brussels Office | The Impact of EU Policies on Housing and Urban Development." April 17, 2024. <https://rosalux.eu/en/2024/english-the-impact-of-eu-policies-on-housing-and-urban-development/>.
- Vlaskamp, Martijn C. 2025. "Looking for Resource Sovereignty in a Fragmenting Global Order: The EU's Response to Critical Raw Materials Challenges." In *EU Foreign Policy in a Fragmenting International Order*, edited by Oriol Costa, Eduard Soler i Lecha, and Martijn C. Vlaskamp, 147–75. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64060-5\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64060-5_6).
- Wack, Pierre. 1985. "Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead." *Harvard Business Review*, 1985. <https://hbr.org/1985/09/scenarios-uncharted-waters-ahead>.
- Walacik, Marek, and Aneta Chmielewska. 2024. "Real Estate Industry Sustainable Solution (Environmental, Social, and Governance) Significance Assessment—AI-Powered Algorithm Implementation." *Sustainability* 16 (3): 1079. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su16031079>.
- Wang, Bin, Yukun Liu, Jing Qian, and Sharon Parker. 2020. "Achieving Effective Remote Working During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Work Design Perspective," October. <https://iaap-journals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/apps.12290>.
- WEF. 2016. "Shaping the Future of Construction: A Breakthrough in Mindset and Technology." World Economic Forum. 2016. <https://www.weforum.org/publications/shaping-the-future-of-construction-a-breakthrough-in-mindset-and-technology/>.
- . 2021a. "How Can We Protect People from Climate Change's 4 Greatest Threats?" November 12, 2021. <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2021/11/protecting-people-from-changing-climate-case-for-resilience/>.
- . 2021b. "The Global Eco-Wakening: How Consumers Are Driving Sustainability." 2021. <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2021/05/eco-wakening-consumers-driving-sustainability/>.
- . 2022. "This Chart Shows the Impact Rising Urbanization Will Have on the World." 2022. <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2022/04/global-urbanization-material-consumption/>.
- Wikantiyoso, Respati, and Pinto Tutuko. 2013. "Planning Review: Green City Design Approach for Global Warming Anticipatory Surabaya's Development Plan," August. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258173274\\_Planning\\_Review\\_Green\\_City\\_Design\\_Approach\\_for\\_Global\\_Warming\\_Anticipatory\\_Surabaya's\\_Development\\_Plan](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258173274_Planning_Review_Green_City_Design_Approach_for_Global_Warming_Anticipatory_Surabaya's_Development_Plan).
- WindEurope. 2024. "Grid Access Challenges for Wind Farms in Europe." June 24, 2024. <https://windeurope.org/intelligence-platform/product/grid-access-challenges-for-wind-farms-in-europe/#overview>.
- WNA. 2024. "Nuclear Power in the European Union - World Nuclear Association." 2024. <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/european-union>.

- WNE. 2022. "Extended Operation of Two Belgian Reactors Approved." World Nuclear News. 2022. <https://world-nuclear-news.org/articles/extended-operation-of-two-belgian-reactors-approve>.
- Wright, George, and George Cairns. 2011. *Scenario Thinking*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306899>.
- WSJ. 2023. "Rohstoffvorkommen: So lange dauert es bis zum Minenbau!" wallstreetONLINE. June 20, 2023. <https://www.wallstreet-online.de/nachricht/17060472-rohstoffvorkommen-lange-dauert-minenbau>.
- Wulf, Dr Torsten, Christian Brands, and Philip Meissner. 2010. "A Scenario-Based Approach to Strategic Planning," May.
- Xiaomin, and Chuanglin. 2023. "How Does Urbanization Affect Energy Carbon Emissions under the Background of Carbon Neutrality?" 327. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301479722024513>.
- Xiatong, Zhang. 2024. "The EU and China Are Destined for a Protracted Trade War." EUobserver. July 10, 2024. <https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/aredfedbb0>.
- Xu, Yingying, and Yinglun Zhu. 2024. "Are Carbon Costs Transmitting to the Building Materials Industry?" *Frontiers in Environmental Science* 12 (October):1463060. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2024.1463060>.
- Yüksel, Ihsan. 2012. "Developing a Multi-Criteria Decision Making Model for PESTEL Analysis." *International Journal of Business and Management* 7 (24): p52. <https://doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v7n24p52>.
- Zhang. 2015. "The Trends, Promises and Challenges of Urbanisation in the World." [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284930169\\_The\\_Trends\\_Promises\\_and\\_Challenges\\_of\\_Urbanisation\\_in\\_the\\_World](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284930169_The_Trends_Promises_and_Challenges_of_Urbanisation_in_the_World).
- Zhao, Xuesong, Jieyi Pan, and Yongtao Song. 2018. "Dependence on Supplier, Supplier Trust and Green Supplier Integration: The Moderating Role of Contract Management Difficulty." *Sustainability* 10 (5): 1673. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su10051673>.
- Zonta, Michela. 2024. "Fact Sheet: Using Modular Building To Increase Affordable Housing Stock." *Center for American Progress* (blog). March 13, 2024. <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/fact-sheet-using-modular-building-to-increase-affordable-housing-stock/>.
- Zuk, Bierbaum, Chapple, and Gorska. 2017. "Gentrification, Displacement, and the Role of Public Investment" 33 (1): 31–44.

### 13 Appendix




Figure 13 - European Real Estate Valuation Balance | Source: Own Creation based on Statista 2024c





Figure 14 - European Real Estate Transaction Volume | Source: Own Creation based on Statista 2024c



**INDUSTRY RIVALRY – HIGH**

Competition for prime assets (well located / ESG compliant / stable demand) in capital cities and central markets remains fierce between developers and investors: Safe investments with high demand to better meet their ESG requirements (good location, ESG-compliant). Rivalry is also increasing in niche segments such as student apartments or co-living. The conversion of old buildings to ESG conformity is also having an impact on competition.

**BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS – HIGH**

Currently, suppliers have a strong bargaining position due to shortages of building materials and skilled labor. This shortage increases construction costs and gives suppliers more power over developers due to a one-sided dependency. Further pressure on developers to utilize sustainable building materials and technologies strengthens the position of suppliers, since such materials are often more expensive and scarcer.

**BARGAINING POWER OF CUSTOMERS – MODERATE**

Tenants' negotiating power is limited in urban areas, as the supply of affordable housing is scarce and rents continue to rise. Investors waiting for favorable opportunities (especially in "wait and see" mode) typically have a stronger position as they have capital and can wait for favorable market conditions. Private buyers have a mixed negotiating position. On the one hand, high interest rates limit the access to financing, reducing demand. However, this is outbalanced by high demand for residential property in many cities.

**THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS – LOW to MODERATE**

Development of real estate in attractive locations or for ESG-compliant projects requires significant investment. New market entrants face difficulties in gaining access to sufficient capital, which represents a significant barrier. Local market knowledge and existing networks create additional challenges for newcomers who have to compete with established players. ESG compliance is increasingly becoming mandatory, which increases complexity for new market participants. Within the niche markets, entry barriers are lower than in the traditional real estate segments.

**THREAT OF SUBSTITUTES – LOW to MODERATE**

Forms of housing like co-living, serviced apartments and specialized housing solutions such as student residences or senior housing offer customers alternatives to conventional rental apartments and are becoming increasingly popular. Furthermore, investors are also seeing alternative forms of investment such as infrastructure projects and sustainable energy solutions as a substitute for traditional real estate assets.

Figure 15 - European Real Estate Industry 2024 Porters 5 Forces | Source: Own Creation based on Deloitte 2024b; PwC 2023a; CBRE 2024b




Figure 16 - Lifecycle Cooperatives MOME | Source: Own Creation based on MOME 2024c

**Components of acquisition costs – Article 17 of Decree – Law No. 502/99**




Figure 17 - Costs Housing Cooperatives Portugal | Source: Own Creation based on MOME 2024c




Figure 18 - Business Model Canvas | Source: Own Creation based on MOME 2024c




Figure 19 - Defined Climate Goals EU | Source: Own Creation based on EC 2024s




Figure 20 - Urban and Rural Population of the World, 1950-2050 | Source: UN 2014




Figure 21 - Urban Population in 2023 | Source: Own Creation based on EC 2024s

PESTLE	Uncertainty	Level of impact (1-10)	Level of uncertainty (1-10)	Configuration 1	Configuration 2
Political	Institutional Stability & Unity of the EU	9	5,5	Strong and cohesive EU	Fragmented EU with national interests diverging
	Political Right Shift of Member States	6	7	Moderate right influence	Dominant right-wing influence
	Geopolitical Situation	9,5	9,5	Stable international relations	High geopolitical instability
Economical	Economic Situation	8	4	Upturn with economic growth	Economic downturn
	Financing Conditions & Inflation	6	5	Favorable with low interest rates and stable inflation	Unfavorable with high inflation and interest rates
	Supply Chain Stability	9	9	Resilient supply chains	Vulnerable supply chains disrupted by crises
Social	Societal Acceptance	6	6	Widespread public support for sustainability	Public skepticism and opposition
	Qualified Workforce Availability	8,5	8,5	Sufficient supply of skilled workers	Shortages of qualified workers
	Mass Migration Patterns	5	5	Uncontrolled migration	Managed and stagnated migration
Technological	Technological Innovation	5,5	8	Rapid innovation in sustainable technologies	Slow pace of technological innovation
Legal	Project Backlog	7	7,5	Highly bureaucratic procedures with excessive compliance costs	Streamlined regulatory frameworks with reduced bureaucracy
Environmental	Climate Change Intensity	8	5	Severe climate disruptions	Moderate climate impacts

Figure 22 – Uncertainty Ranking / Source: Own Creation

Raw Material	Phase	Import Dependency	Supplying Countries	Usage in Renewable Tech.
Magnesium	Refining	100%	China (93%)	Lightweight Structures Electric Vehicles Batteries
Heavy Rare Earths	Refining	100%	China (98%)	Permanent Magnets Electric Vehicles Energy Efficient Lighting
Light Rare Earths	Refining	100%	China (99%)	Permanent Magnets Alloys Catalysts
Platinum Group Metals	Refining	100%	South Africa (N/A) Russia (N/A)	Hydrogen Fuel Cells Energy Storage Catalysts
Lithium	Refining	100%	Chile (78%)	Electric Vehicles Energy Storage Energy Grids
Niobium	Refining	100%	Brazil (85%) Canada (13%)	High-Strength Steels Photovoltaics Supercapacitors
Tantalum	Extraction	99%	Congo DR. (36%) Rwanda (30%) Brazil (13%)	Capacitors Thin-Film Photovoltaics Turbine Electronics
Natural Graphite	Extraction	95%	China (47%) Brazil (12%) Norway (8%)	Electric Vehicles Energy Storage Fuel Cells
Cobalt	Extraction	86%	Congo DR. (68%)	Electric Vehicles Stationary Energy Storage Hydrogen Production

Figure 23 - Selected CRMs with Highest Import Dependency / Source: Own Creation based on Blengini et al. 2020; EC 2020c



Figure 24 - Photovoltaic Power Potential Portugal | Source: Global Solar Atlas 2023

Energy and Industry Geography Lab




Figure 25 - Natura 2000 & Biodiversity Areas Alentejo Region | Source: EIGL 2024

### Geopolitical Risk Index | 2000 – 2030




Figure 26 - Geopolitical Risk Index | Source: Own Creation based on Statista 2024b

### Supply Chain Stability Index | 2008 – 2024




Figure 27 - Supply Chain Stability Index | Source: Own Creation based on KPMG 2024

### Job Vacancy Rate EU | 2011 – 2030




Figure 28 - JVR EU | Source: Own Creation based on eurostat 2024e

*Employment Rate EU | 2009 – 2030*




Figure 29 - Employment EU | Source: Own Creation based on eurostat 2024b

*First Residence Permits issued (Employment) | 2014 – 2030*




Figure 30 - Permits (Employment) EU | Source: Own Creation based on eurostat 2024g

*Personnel Cost Index Construction EU | 2015 – 2030*




Figure 31 - Personnel Cost Index Construction EU | Source: Own Creation based on eurostat 2024d




Figure 32 - Renewables Energy Share EU / Source: Own Creation based on EEA 2024b

## Appendix 1

### Interview Summaries

#### Interview 1: Assessing and Validating Uncertainties

**Date:** 09.10.2024

**Participants:** Professor Antonio Vicente, Joshua Jungblut, Moritz Fischer

**Disclaimer:** The interview with Prof. Antonio Vicente was held in English and was kicked off by a short introduction round of all participants, which is not part of this summarized transcript. Prof. Vicente accepted the proposal to record the meeting. Direct quotations were only inserted after his permission had been obtained.

**Summary:** The initial meeting with Professor Vicente was conducted with the objective of assessing and validating the initial uncertainties identified as being of particular importance. In response to the uncertainty surrounding the National Implementation, Professor Vicente asserted that it was less uncertain than the project team had initially estimated. He clarified that the Fit for 55 measures have already been legislated, and that there is a minimal theoretical and even more limited practical possibility of stopping or reversing them. The only exceptions would be in the adaptation of these measures using technical standards and delaying specific dates. Subsequently, Prof. Vicente guided the team to the central issue, namely, the

implementation of measures. He proceeded to emphasize the pivotal role of accessibility to technologies and the availability of labor in influencing the implementation process. When questioned about access to technology, he used the example of Europe's dependence on renewable technologies, especially from China, to highlight its impact. In cases of complete dependency, failure would have a detrimental impact on the EU's green transition. With regard to geopolitical stability, Professor Vicente recommended an increased uncertainty, given that recent developments have shown that these dependencies have become an effective means of exerting pressure and have become part of sanctions.

### **Main Conclusions:**

- The role of political influence is relatively limited, given that the measures in question are already incorporated into legislation and there is no evidence of significant political decision-makers seeking to halt or even reverse them.
- It is possible to adapt some individual measures by adding or removing technical standards, and to slow down the process by pressuring delays.
- The primary source of uncertainty is the implementation process.
- The most significant influencing factor is access to these technologies, which can be affected by geopolitical conflicts.
- The availability of labor is another crucial factor (discussed in detail in second session)

### **Interview 2 – Assessing and Validating Uncertainties**

**Date:** 24.10.2024

**Participants:** Tanja Schindler, Joshua Jungblut, Moritz Fischer, Theofanis Orfanidis

**Disclaimer:** The unstructured interview with Tanja Schindler was conducted by the project team in German. It began with a short round of introductions, a reiteration of the topic of the

paper, and the motivation of the project team to write a paper in the area of strategic foresight, which is not included in the summary. Tanja Schindler agreed to record the meeting.

**Summary:** The interview began with the project team asking her for her assessment of the biggest drivers of change in relation to our focal issue by 2030. Ms. Schindler highlighted the bureaucratic hurdles within the EU and between Member States. She gave an example from her own experience to illustrate her point: she recently wanted to hire a person from the Netherlands for her company in Germany, but it was not easy for her to do so. If the person is not willing to move to the company's country, a branch has to be opened in the person's home country. In a broader sense, she believes that there needs to be a united Europe that allows for cooperation to manage the green transition. The project team then presented Ms. Schindler with a list of uncertainties based on desk research and previous expert input. Ms. Schindler was asked to give her assessment of the list and to provide input on points where she disagreed with or wanted to highlight. Thus, she mitigated the uncertainty of the political shift to the right in Europe, which the team considered to be very significant, in terms of the chosen focus and time horizon. She attributed the polarization of society primarily to populism and poor communication by current politicians. The impact of new right-wing governments by 2030 would be limited primarily due to the lengthy decision-making processes in Brussels. In addition, she said, social engagement and awareness among younger generations is at an all-time high, reducing the level of uncertainty associated with it. The project team would have initially identified this as a potential KU. Ms. Schindler also highlighted the importance of knowledge transfer within the EU, which she linked to her initial assessment of labor mobility in Europe. The high youth unemployment rates in the south can be an important lever if cross-border mobility could be facilitated. Equally important is the recognition of professional qualifications and diplomas, both for EU Member States and for third-country nationals seeking work in the EU. Finally, she considered access to technologies such as solar panels to be more important than technological innovation,

especially with the chosen time horizon. In her view, innovations will not be scalable and therefore not market-ready enough to have a high impact on achieving the goals.

**Main Conclusions:**

- The mobility of workers within and into the EU is an important success factor for the green transition, but bureaucratic hurdles pose an obstacle.
- Polarization of society and a shift to the right have only a limited impact on the Fit for 55 goals by 2030 due to the inertia of processes and populism.
- Young generations are showing great willingness and commitment to green change.
- Access to key technologies is more important than new innovations by 2030.

**Interview 3 – Assessing and Validating Uncertainties**

**Date:** 28.10.2024

**Participants:** Antonios Sfakiotakis, Joshua Jungblut, Moritz Fischer, Theofanis Orfanidis

**Disclaimer:** The unstructured interview was conducted by the project team in English. The conversation began with an introduction to the topic of the paper and a brief round of introductions, which are not included in the summary. Mr. Sfakiotakis agreed to the recording of the interview, but it was also made clear that his statements were his personal expert opinion and not the official position of his employer, the EU.

**Summary:** The project team has shared the selection of uncertainties and the associated rating (level of impact/uncertainty) with Mr. Sfakiotakis and asked him to provide his opinion on selected points where he does not agree with the rating or would like to highlight his opinion. The first topic addressed was the institutional stability of the EU and the potential shift to the right in the Member States. The interviewee elaborated that the long-term orientation of EU policies such as the Fit for 55 is very unlikely to be derailed by political changes among the members. Even potential leadership changes such as Marine Le Pen in France or the rising

influence of the AfD in Germany are very unlikely to result in significant deviations by 2030 due to institutional inertia at the country and EU level and long-term commitments by European industries in the area of sustainability. Industries have already made substantial investments in a low-carbon future, which makes abrupt policy reversals economically infeasible. Another key issue was global competition. The EU is heavily dependent on other global powers such as the US and China for energy and raw materials. The interviewee emphasized that decoupling from China should be avoided and instead a de-risking of dependencies should be undertaken in order to strengthen the global competitiveness of European industries as much as possible. He also highlighted the potential supply chain risks in the future for CRMs in the EU, which could escalate due to potential upcoming crises such as the one in Taiwan. It was emphasized that this is particularly concerning due to the importance of these materials for the green transition. The expert considered social acceptance of climate policies to be higher than ever, which has been further strengthened by the increasing frequency of extreme weather events. He also identified the shortage of skilled workers as a serious factor in achieving the climate goals by 2030. He linked this to broader education challenges, as reflected in declining PISA scores, and the urgent need to re-skill the existing workforce. Finally, he sees factors such as the economic situation or financing conditions as predictable with robust forecasting tools and therefore with low uncertainty.

### **Main Conclusions:**

- EU climate policy remains resilient to political changes in the Member States due to long-term industrial commitments.
- Global supply dependencies exist and need to be de-risked to ensure raw material security.
- Social acceptance is very high today and contributes to support for climate targets.

- A shortage of skilled workforce is coming into focus by 2030 and requires both changes in education and reskilling.
- Economic factors are easy to predict and are therefore less uncertain.

#### **Interview 4: Assessing and Validating Uncertainties 2<sup>nd</sup> Session**

**Date:** 30.10.2024

**Participants:** Professor Antonio Vicente, Moritz Fischer, Theofanis Orfanidis

**Disclaimer:** Prof. Vicente accepted the proposal to record the meeting. Direct quotations were only inserted after his permission had been obtained.

**Summary:** The second meeting with Professor Vicente served the purpose of validating the final KUs. Accordingly, the project team presented the idea of merging supply chain stability, related to renewable technologies and critical raw materials, with geopolitical stability. Professor Vicente approved this concept and advised that we consider increasing the impact and uncertainty of this factor in comparison to other uncertainties. Simultaneously, he underscored the significance of accurate framing. For instance, the conflict in Sudan had a negligible impact on global supply chains, whereas the war in Ukraine resulted in a complete transformation of the European energy landscape. He agreed with the idea of framing the uncertainty very specifically to China and other important suppliers due to the dependencies on renewable energy technologies and CRM. Professor Vicente expressed reservations about the concept of a potential social acceptance KU. He justified this by noting that public acceptance of such changes occurs over many years and is therefore not especially uncertain. Furthermore, he observed that acceptance of climate-friendly policies remains high, as evidenced by the Eurobarometer survey. In addition, social acceptance could not be viewed in binary terms, which would have made mapping on the scenario matrix more difficult. Conversely, he advocated the prioritization of workforce availability as the second KU. Professor Vicente

highlighted that, despite the EU's advancement in renewable technology, the existing workforce may not be sufficient to implement these technologies on a wide scale. In response to a question regarding the uncertainty associated with this factor, he highlighted the potential for the skills gap to widen further, but also for it to narrow again if the planned visa and recognition programs are implemented successfully and promptly. Furthermore, he underscored the education protectionism that persists within EU countries, emphasizing the necessity of addressing this barrier to successfully admit qualified and specialized workers across the EU.

**Main Conclusions:**

- Validation of the first KU: Supply Chain Stability.
- Supply Chain Stability must be specifically framed to ensure high impact and uncertainty.
- Rejection of the KU social acceptance due to insufficient uncertainty.
- Validation of the second KU: Skilled Workforce Availability.
- Confirmation of sufficient uncertainty, as skills gap can be both increased and reduced through the right measures.
- Highlighted educational protectionism as a key barrier in workforce availability.

**Interview 5:** Challenge and validation of the four developed scenarios

**Date:** 04.11.2024

**Participants:** Christiane Conrads, Moritz Fischer, Theofanis Orfanidis & Joshua Jungblut

**Disclaimer:** The interview with Christiane Conrads was held in German and was kicked off by an extensive introduction round of all participants, which is not part of this summarized transcript. She accepted the proposal to record the interview, orally agreed on the students' wish to cite her statements and asked for the final version of the work project to be sent to her.

Conrads was taking notes on the scenarios and shared her comprehensive feedback after hearing the four scenarios.

**Summary:** The project team started off explaining the purpose of the work project, its focal issue, time horizon and the main ideas and concepts behind strategic foresight, scenario planning and the *Intuitive Logics School* approach that will be applied for the scenario exercise. Subsequently, the scenario matrix was shown to Christiane Conrads while explaining the framing and the implications of the two KUs to better understand the four underlying scenarios. The project team also added that all scenarios follow the same structure: They begin with an analysis of the contextual factors, where the implementation of the EU's sustainability directives and regulations is analyzed and end with an analysis of the transactional factors, where the impact of these measures is concretely applied to the real estate sector.

Then, Joshua Jungblut started off presenting the '*Efficiency Gambit*' (formerly: '*Disruptive Efficiency*') scenario. Moritz Fischer continued presenting the '*Voltage Revolution*' (formerly: '*Green Symphony*') scenario and Theofanis Orfanidis concluded presenting the '*Digital Backbone*' (formerly: '*Green Gridlock*') and '*Fading Horizon*' (formerly: '*Green Struggle*') scenarios.

Christiane Conrads thanked the team members for sharing their insights, ideas and assumptions with her and expressed her deep interest in knowing more about the European Commission's go-to areas, which she had not heard of beforehand. Thus, the team shared an article published by the official website of the EC in the chat. She stated that she very much liked the approach of splitting the analysis into contextual and transactional factors, which helps to break down the topic and add value by reducing complexity. She agreed with selection of the KUs, highlighting the dependence and interplay between CRMs (necessary for green technology) and geopolitical risks. She also reinforced the importance of reskilling the existing workforce for the transition, for instance from brown industries to green industries. Finally, she got back to the logic chains

presented in the different scenarios, highlighting the importance of this exercise for the future of the Real Estate sector, yet recommended the team to consider the following topics and ideas.

**Main conclusions:**

- Energy monitoring, facility management, the use of digital devices such as smart meters, building management, etc. are also very important pillars of the transition, yet oftentimes neglected in the discussion. However, the number of workers who can install, operate and maintain it is still too small.
- When talking about using alternative/transition fuels in response to the lack of skilled workers for expanding renewables (sources of energy), one must keep in mind that also in these areas many people are close to retirement. Therefore, countries such as Germany are considering recalling recently retired pensioners to stabilize energy supply. However, this will only happen at a high price.
- Reducing energy consumption and decarbonizing buildings dominate debates and regulation. As positive as this development is in view of climate change and the industry's contribution to it, it ignores many other relevant aspects of sustainability. One of these issues is the loss of biodiversity and the critical situation of many ecosystems. Depending on the scope of your work project, this is something to think about as well.

## Appendix 2

### Workshop Summary (27.11.2024)

#### Participants:

Last name:	First name:	Institution:	Role:
Antunes	Francisco	MOME	Executive President
Barbosa	Sofia	MOME	Production Manager
Braz	João	MOME	Head of Knowledge & ESG Initiatives
Brito	Susana	MOME	Financial Manager
Cox	Elena	Nova SBE	Project Team
Fischer	Moritz	Nova SBE	Project Team
Fontes	Maria	MOME	Marketing & Design Manager
Fratila	Andrei	Nova SBE	Project Team
Jungblut	Joshua	Nova SBE	Project Team
Orfanidis	Theo	Nova SBE	Project Team
Pimentel	Nuno	MOME	General Manager

*Table 1 - Workshop Participants / Source: Own Creation*

**Summary:** On November 27, a joint workshop was held with partner company MOME to examine the four scenarios developed and their implications for the company. The goal of the workshop was to examine both external and internal factors for each scenario and to develop strategies using the TOWS framework (Threats, Opportunities, Weaknesses, Strengths) as a central analysis tool.

The session began with an introduction to scenario planning, outlining its purpose and methodology. Each scenario was then discussed individually, focusing on potential developments at the EU level related to the implementation of specific environmental policies, driven by the two KUs that could affect the future of the industry.

Participants were actively involved in applying the TOWS framework to each scenario in an engaging, collaborative format. First, key strengths and weaknesses within each scenario were identified, and then the discussion moved on to analyzing the threats and opportunities arising

from wider environmental changes. To facilitate collaboration and capture all participant inputs effectively, a Miro board was used throughout the session.

This structured approach provided a clear understanding of how each scenario differed and highlighted the unique challenges, opportunities and strategic considerations inherent in each possible future.

### Miro Board:




Figure 33 - Workshop Miro Board 1/2 | Source: Own Creation




Figure 34 - Workshop Miro Board 2/2 | Source: Own Creation

### Appendix 3

#### Uncertainties Description

Uncertainty	Level of Impact (1-10)	Level of Uncertainty (1-10)	Justification
<b>Institutional Stability &amp; Unity of the EU</b>	<b>Score: 9</b> <i>Acute impact</i>	<b>Score: 5.5</b> <i>Neither likely nor unlikely to predict</i>	Critical for the enforcement of sustainability measures, as cohesion ensures consistent & unified policy application across Member States ( <b>acute impact</b> ). Yet, growing political & economic pressures (e.g., Brexit, internal divides) create <b>moderate uncertainty</b> regarding long-term unity and its role in addressing climate & sustainability goals.
<b>Political Right Shift of Member States</b>	<b>Score: 6</b> <i>Moderate impact</i>	<b>Score: 7</b> <i>Uncertain to predict</i>	A shift towards right-wing parties can reduce the prioritization of sustainability in policy agendas. However, for the selected time horizon (2030), most measures are already being transposed & implemented and thus too costly to overturn ( <b>moderate impact</b> ). The variability in electoral

			outcomes across the EU introduces <b>significant uncertainty</b> about the long-term prioritization of sustainability.
<b>Geopolitical Situation</b>	<b>Score: 9.5</b> <i>Acute impact</i>	<b>Score: 9.5</b> <i>Extremely uncertain to predict</i>	Global conflicts, trade tensions, and energy dependency (e.g., reliance on non-EU fossil fuels) directly affect the EU's ability to implement the green transition ( <b>high impact</b> ). High geopolitical volatility, such as outbreaking wars or sanctions, exacerbate the unpredictability ( <b>high uncertainty</b> ).
<b>Economic Situation</b>	<b>Score: 8</b> <i>High impact</i>	<b>Score: 4</b> <i>Somewhat likely to predict</i>	Economic growth or recession influences the funding available for sustainability projects and the political will to enforce them ( <b>high impact</b> ). Given that economists regularly publish forecasts on GDP and other metrics, <b>uncertainty is moderate</b> .
<b>Financing Conditions &amp; Inflation</b>	<b>Score: 6</b> <i>Moderate impact</i>	<b>Score: 5</b> <i>Neither likely nor unlikely to predict</i>	Inflation and rising interest rates affect the affordability of green technologies and the financial feasibility of large-scale sustainability initiatives ( <b>high impact</b> ). The uncertainty stems from fluctuating global economic conditions and monetary policies, however, can also be roughly forecasted by economists ( <b>moderate uncertainty</b> ).
<b>Supply Chain Stability</b>	<b>Score: 9</b> <i>Acute impact</i>	<b>Score: 9</b> <i>Extremely uncertain to predict</i>	The implementation of sustainability measures relies on stable supply chains for renewable energy technologies and materials that are also needed for automation ( <b>acute impact</b> ). Disruptions from geopolitical tensions, disputes, pandemics, or trade wars introduce <b>high uncertainty</b> .
<b>Societal Acceptance</b>	<b>Score: 6</b> <i>Moderate impact</i>	<b>Score: 6</b> <i>Uncertain to predict</i>	Public engagement and support for sustainability measures can accelerate their implementation and increase their success ( <b>moderate impact</b> ). However, societal acceptance for trade-offs is increasing according to the latest Eurobarometer, leading to <b>moderate uncertainty</b> .
<b>Qualified Workforce Availability</b>	<b>Score: 8.5</b> <i>Acute impact</i>	<b>Score: 8.5</b> <i>Extremely uncertain to predict</i>	A skilled workforce is crucial for executing technological and challenging infrastructural transformations required by sustainability goals ( <b>acute impact</b> ).

			The <b>high uncertainty</b> reflects the mismatch between current workforce qualifications and the rapidly evolving demands of green industries, as well as the gap to fill between increasing number of jobs while the working age population is steadily decreasing.
<b>Mass Migration Patterns</b>	<b>Score: 5</b> <i>Moderate impact</i>	<b>Score: 5</b> <i>Neither likely nor unlikely to predict</i>	Mass migration influences infrastructure and resource allocation, but its direct influence on the implementation of sustainability measures is relatively lower ( <b>moderate impact</b> ). <b>Uncertainty</b> is <b>moderate</b> , as migration patterns depend on unpredictable factors. However, migration is certainly going to increase by 2030 given the geopolitical and climatic circumstances.
<b>Technological Innovation</b>	<b>Score: 5.5</b> <i>Moderate impact</i>	<b>Score: 8</b> <i>Uncertain to predict</i>	Breakthroughs in technology can accelerate sustainability projects, but the required technology for the achievement of the EU’s goals for 2030 does already exist and solely needs to be comprehensively implemented ( <b>moderate impact</b> ). Reliance on innovation for the future, coupled with high investments in R&D introduce <b>high uncertainty</b> due to the unpredictability of the progress made until 2030.
<b>Project Backlog</b>	<b>Score: 7</b> <i>High impact</i>	<b>Score: 7.5</b> <i>Uncertain to predict</i>	Delays in infrastructure- and energy transition projects hinder progress towards sustainability goals ( <b>high impact</b> ). <b>High uncertainty</b> arises from the unsolved problem how to tackle bureaucratic inefficiencies and labor shortages.
<b>Climate Change Intensity</b>	<b>Score: 8</b> <i>High impact</i>	<b>Score: 5</b> <i>Neither likely nor unlikely to predict</i>	Climate change poses significant risks to ecosystems and economies, which is why the EU will need to allocate significant funds to the consequences of potential climate catastrophes ( <b>high impact</b> ). <b>Uncertainty</b> is <b>moderate</b> as the long-term trends are well-established, though specific regional effects remain variable.

Table 2 - Uncertainties | Source: Own Creation

## **Appendix 4**

### **InvestEU Criteria:**

*Elimination of potential market failures or investment gaps:* The project to be financed must solve an existing problem for which funding is required. MOME fulfils this requirement, as affordable and sustainable housing has been identified as a clear gap in Portugal.

*Contribution to EU policy objectives:* With its focus on energy-efficient construction, MOME corresponds to one of the classified priorities.

*Economic viability:* MOME must be able to demonstrate that the project is financially sustainable through transparent cost structures.

*Transparency and reporting:* MOME must transparently document and disclose the use of funds. Detailed project reporting is also required.

*Taxonomy compliance:* MOME is already taxonomy compliant.