Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ecologia Humana e Problemas Sociais Contemporâneos, realizada sob a orientação científica do Doutor Paulo Machado, Professor Auxiliar da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

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Summary

In this dissertation the concepts of sustainable city development and socio-ethnic segregation have been linked to determine what role 'diversity' and mixed neighbourhoods play in the achievement of sustainable cities. Segregation can be seen as a natural development (as mentioned by Chicago School) that cannot and should not be disturbed by the local government, but it can also be considered as a social problem that requires specific policies to stop the negative consequences caused by segregation. One of the aspects of sustainable city development, namely 'diversity' has been explored and the policy that connects to that sustainable goal, namely the policy of mixing. A discussion on the effectiveness of this policy on decreasing levels of segregation and on increasing social capital follows. The chapter on socio-ethnic segregation in Portugal has provided an example of the influence of the government on the creation of segregation and how local governments can also work on solutions. A case study of a segregated neighbourhood in Lisbon, the Bairro da Boavista, shows how the segregated neighbourhoods in Lisbon emerged and what the local government has done to improve their living situation. A data analyses of the Boavista neighbourhood has been made in order to determine how segregated its residents live.

Sumário

Nesta dissertação, os conceitos de desenvolvimento sustentável da cidade e da segregação sócio-étnica foram associados para determinar qual o papel da 'diversidade' e dos bairros socialmente miscigenados na produção de cidades sustentáveis. A segregação pode ser visto como um desenvolvimento natural (no sentido empregue pela Escola de Chicago) que não pode nem deve ser perturbado pela autarquia, mas também pode ser considerado como um problema social que requer políticas específicas para interromper os efeitos negativos causados pela segregação. Um dos aspetos do desenvolvimento sustentável da cidade, ou seja, a sua diversidade, tem sido explorado e a política que se conecta a esse objetivo sustentável, ou seja, a política de miscigenação. Na dissertação discute-se a eficácia desta política na redução dos níveis de segregação e no aumento do capital social. O capítulo sobre a segregação sócio-étnica em Portugal fornece um exemplo da influência do governo na criação de segregação e como os governos locais também podem trabalhar em soluções. Um estudo de caso de um bairro segregado em Lisboa, o Bairro da Boavista, mostra como os bairros segregados em Lisboa surgiram e o que o governo local tem feito para melhorar a sua situação de vida. A análise dos dados do Bairro da Boavista foi realizada, a fim de determinar diferenças internas e diante da envolvente externa, de modo a perceber-se o significado e alcance da segregação aí existente.

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Introduction

As most of the world's population is living in urban areas, the main economic, social and environmental processes that affect human societies take place in cities. Urbanisation is now commonly considered as one of the most important social processes (Barredo and Demicheli, 2003: 297). According to the United Nations' projections, cited by Cohen (2005: 24), almost all of the world's population growth over the next 30 years will be in urban areas. In the 50-year period between 1975 and 2025, the global level of urbanisation will have increased from 37,7 percent to 61,1 percent and the total population living in cities will have risen from 1.58 billion to 5.06 billion (Burgess, 2000: 11).

Urbanization has become a world phenomenon. Map 1 shows us that in large world areas (North America, South America, Europe, Oceania, several African countries, as well as Asian countries) the levels of urbanization are above 75 percent (i.e. more than ¾ of the human population live in cities). The size and spread of large human agglomerations are also increasing. Mega cities (with 10 million or more inhabitants, which is a recent urban phenomenon that started less than fifty years ago) are now present in all continents (except Oceania).

Map 1 - Percentage of urban population and agglomerations by size class, 2011



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: *World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision*. New York 2012

In statistical terms, urbanisation is an increasing proportion of a population living in settlements defined as urban centres. However, as Orum (2005) suggests "*one might say that the process of urbanization is a focal point for many sociological concerns; the urban area serves, in effect, as a major stage on which social change plays itself out. If one takes a dim view of such change, then urbanization tends to be criticized for the evils it unleashes. Yet if one takes a positive view of social change, then urbanization is claimed to produce many benefits*" (Orum, 2005: 854).

Map 2 indicates that the annual growth rates of urban agglomerations will slow down, comparing with the period of 1970 till 2011. Many urban agglomerations have already reached a population of 1 million or more or have become mega cities with 10 or more million inhabitants.

Map 2 - Growth rates of urban agglomerations, 2011-2025



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: *World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision*. New York 2012

Urbanisation causes several problems such as: water and air pollution, traffic congestion and less available land for food production. Rapid urbanisation rates in developing countries make it difficult for city governments to provide basic services for their rapidly growing amount of citizens. That is why governments across the world have entered the 21st century with a growing recognition that cities should be given much more attention in

development strategies than has been done so far. Therefore, international commitment to sustainable urban development and poverty reduction has grown (Mougeot, 2005: 1).

From the urban ecology perspective, the questions about balance between human needs and natural resources, the processes of adaptation and competition through which social groups adjusted both to one another and to the environment are crucial. Urban ecology can be understood as a sub discipline of the ecological perspective that underlines social and environmental balance as a requisite for social life.

As one of the aspects of sustainable urban development is to create more social justice in cities, segregation, social polarisation and social exclusion are not exclusively topics discussed within the ecological paradigm, but are also central concepts in today's urban debates. Cities in the western world are a reflection of the socio-spatial outcomes of polarisation, segregation and exclusion processes. The socio-spatial make up of a city is formed according to the character and intensity of the social processes. These social processes depend upon a wider range of factors and developments of which the economic structure is seen as one of the most powerful forces behind social segregation in urban areas. Besides the class division that is based on the economic welfare of different groups in society, in many cities there are also significant racial, ethnic and/or immigrant groups that live segregated from the native population (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2013: 1-3).

In this thesis the concepts of sustainable city development and socio-ethnic segregation will be studied from the human ecological perspective. Some of the questions to be answered are:

- What makes a city a sustainable settlement?
- What can be done to achieve sustainability?
- What is socio-ethnic segregation exactly and what are the factors that cause the emergence of socio-ethnic segregation?
- Is segregation always a problem or can it also be positive for the segregated groups?
- If it is a problem that requires policy, what type of policy measures can be implemented to decrease segregation levels?

In this thesis the concepts of sustainable city development and socio-ethnic segregation will not be studied separately, but will be linked to each other to see whether diversity and mixed neighbourhoods are really needed in order to achieve sustainable cities or if segregation is a natural development that does not require specific policies.

To answer these questions a greater understanding is necessary concerning the concepts sustainable city development and socio-ethnic segregation. Chapter 1 provides a theoretical framework on these concepts and how sustainable city development and socio-ethnic segregation are linked to each other. The first section of Chapter 1 provides a historical overview of the emergence of the concept ´sustainable development´ in general, followed by a discussion on the positive and negative aspects of the concept. In the second section of the next Chapter the concept of socio-ethnic segregation will be explained. Also, the different factors that are the cause for segregation to emerge will be shown. The last section provides a discussion on different urban policy models to obtain sustainable city development. The urban model that focuses most on ´diversity´ and thus mixing different socio-ethnic groups in cities will be discussed more extensively.

Chapter 2 is about sustainable neighbourhoods. The policy of mixing people from different social and ethnic groups will be discussed and the question will be proposed whether segregation is a negative development which should be discouraged or whether it is a natural phenomenon that is not necessarily negative and therefore does not require policy measures. In the second section of this chapter the importance of social capital for economic growth is discussed and whether the creation of strong neighbourhood networks by residents is beneficial for them or not. Also, the importance of strong communities for environmental sustainability in a city is shown. Section 2.3 discusses the role of the government in the creation of social capital and social distance.

Chapter 3 is about socio-ethnic segregation in Portugal. The first section of this chapter provides a historical overview of the emergence of segregated neighbourhoods in Portugal and Lisbon in particular. Also the causes for the existence of segregated neighbourhoods in Lisbon will be shown. This section also describes the different policy measures that have been implemented to fight the segregation problem. Section 3.2 is about the Boavista neighbourhood in Lisbon. It provides a historical overview of the construction of this social housing neighbourhood and how a neighbourhood culture has been created through time. Section 3.3 is a characterization of the Boavista neighbourhood which consists of a data analysis which is mostly socio-demographic. By comparing the numbers of different variables of the Boavista neighbourhood with its surrounding areas, the degree of segregation of the Boavista neighbourhood could be determined. Also a comparison between the 32 different sub-sections in the neighbourhood has been made to determine whether the Boavista neighbourhood is hetero- or homogeneous.

The fourth chapter is about the municipal company GEBALIS and the project that they implemented in the Boavista neighbourhood in 2013. The first two sections of this chapter provide a theoretical framework on participation in democracy and development and citizen empowerment. With this theoretical framework and debate a context is created in order to be able to evaluate the Eco-City project of GEBALIS. Section 4.3 provides a description of the company and the type of work that they do in the city of Lisbon. After this description the Eco-City project will be explained and comments and general recommendations will be given so that GEBALIS can design better projects in the future. These comments and general recommendations are being provided according to the principles discussed in the previous chapters and are a result from my own reflections during my internship at GEBALIS.

1. Sustainable City Development and Socio-Ethnic Segregation: A Theoretical Framework

In this chapter some key aspects of the debates on sustainable development and socio-ethnic segregation will be presented. In the last decades awareness on the limits of the use of natural resources has grown. The question is if economies can continue to grow while natural resources are finite. Answers to this question of different scholars will be compared in the first section of this chapter. The concept 'sustainable development' is a much discussed concept without a clear definition. Can this concept be used then or is it too vague to work with?

One of the major issues in cities always has been immigration and the formation of segregated areas. As sustainable city development is becoming more important in urban planning the issue of inequality in cities has gained more attention. Therefore the second section provides an explanation of the concept 'socio-ethnic' segregation. But what causes socio-ethnic segregation? Do people from the same economic class or ethnic group want to live together or do political or economic constraints play a bigger role?

The third section makes a link between the two concepts of 'sustainable development' and 'socio-ethnic segregation' as different urban models for sustainable city development will be shown and the urban model that focusses on the aspect of diversity will be discussed in particular.

1.1 The emergence of the concept 'sustainable development'

The report *Our Common Future* of the United Nations 'World Commission on Environment and Development' (WCED)[1] is taken as a starting point for most current discussions on the concept of sustainable development and the definition they developed of the concept is considered to be the first one (Mebratu, 1998: 494; Naess, 2001: 503; Robinson, 2004: 370). In *Our Common Future* sustainable development is defined as "*development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs*". There are limits to the use of natural resources, so the more technological developed

[1] The WCED was created in 1983 and was headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Prime Minister of Norway (therefore the report is often called the 'Brundtland Report'). It was created to unite countries that were at different stages of economic and social development in order for them to propose long-term strategies for economic growth and sustainable development without harming the environment. This to make sure that wealth would be better distributed and to make sure that future generations could also make use of natural resources (WCED, 1987).

parts of the world cannot continue to exploit the environment in the extend that it is done at the moment (WCED, 1987).

The Brundtland Report emphasizes on the fact that there is more economic growth and development, but both are unequally distributed. They perceive economic growth not as a threat, but as a positive force that is able to decrease the gap between rich and poor. In their report they provide ideas for a future in which economic prosperity and the developments that derive from this growth will be distributed in a better way (WCED, 1987). "*Sustainable development is not a fixed state of harmony, but rather a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs*" (WCED, 1987).

Although the Brundtland Report made the concept of sustainable development important in politics, long before the Report was publicized there were already authors that wrote about the limits of growth because of unsustainable practices that exhaust the planets natural recourses. Malthus (1766 – 1834) is considered to be the first to foresee the limits to growth caused by resource scarcity. In 1798, he wrote a classic work called *An Essay on the Principle of Population*. In this work he warned for the danger of the continuing population growth by stating that the human population grows faster than the amount of food we can produce, so if population growth continued to grow the way it did there would be a famine catastrophe. Therefore in his opinion population growth should be controlled (Gilbert *in* Malthus, 1993: 8-12).

According to Ambirajan (1976), the "*rapid acceptance of the Malthusian population theory by the British middle class in the nineteenth century has many implications for British economic history, many of which have come under close scrutiny of economic historians and historians of economic thought*" (page 5). According to other authors, the neo-Malthusian discourse has been deployed as a form of bio-political governance during the twentieth century, especially in the post-World War II period (Schlosser, 2009). This is to underline the influence of Malthus' thought in politics and economy until our days.

More recently, two other works, *The Limits to Growth* (1972) and *Small is Beautiful* (1979), were influential in the growing discourse on sustainable development. In *Limits to Growth*, Meadows *et al.* express some of the concerns that Malthus already showed. *The Limits to Growth* provides a study on the combination of exponential growth and finite natural recourses. In their 'world model' Meadows *et al.* investigated five major trends of global concern, namely; accelerating industrialization, rapid population growth, widespread

malnutrition, depletion of non-renewable natural resources and a deteriorating environment. They concluded that if these trends remain the same, the limit to growth will be reached within a hundred years. In order to prevent this, they suggest that the birth rate should be controlled and the economy should not grow either, but instead search for equilibrium[2] (Meadows *et al.*, 1972).

The term 'degrowth' emerged in the 1970s and reflects a more radical point of view than the scholars of *The Limits to Growth* showed in their report. Degrowth advocates think zero growth is not enough and state that it should be reduced. They critique the current neoliberal system that has caused a greater gap between rich and poor countries. In their view, less production and less consumption in combination with population growth control is the solution. Daly (2010) explains that 'sustainable growth' is an oxymoron as it is contradictive with 'sustainable development'. The economy is linked to the ecosystem and as its resources are finite, the economy cannot grow limitless. The ecosystem changes/develops but does not grow; therefore the economy can develop sustainably but cannot grow sustainably (Daly, 2010: 12). "*To delude ourselves into believing that growth is still possible and desirable if we label it 'sustainable' or colour it 'green' will just delay the inevitable transition and make it more painful*" (Daly, 2010: 12).

In *Small is Beautiful*, Schumacher (1979) also criticizes the capitalist society that is obsessed with mass production and unlimited growth without thinking of future generations, pollution of the environment or the poor. He emphasizes that we should think more about people instead of money. "*Materialism does not fit into this world, because it contains within itself no limiting principle, while the environment in which it is placed is strictly limited*" (Schumacher, 1979). Different scholars thus had different opinions on how sustainable development can be reached, varying from increasing economic growth to distribute the wealth to the poor, to stabilize economic growth and try to find and equilibrium, to less economic growth by abandoning the current capitalist economic system.

The influence of the concept has increased significantly in national and international policy development, and is nowadays the most important element of policy documents of governments, international agencies, and business organizations (Mebratu, 1998: 502; Parris and Kates, 2003: 560). After the Brundtland Report one of the most important conferences that continued the line of thinking of the WCED was the UN Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the *Rio Conference* or the *Earth Summit* in 1992. Each UN

[2] For an update and expansion of the original study see: *Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update* (Meadows, D., J. Randers and D. Meadows, 2004).

member country was expected to come up with an action plan for sustainable development for their country. The Rio Conference led to the production of major international documents such as the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, and conventions on desertification, biodiversity, and climate change (Mebratu, 1998: 502).

This growing attention for sustainable development led to more discourse on the concept and this resulted in a great variety of definitions and interpretations by different people and organizations[3] (Mebratu, 1998: 494; Robinson, 2004: 373). Proponents of sustainable development differ in opinion of what is to be sustained, what is to be developed, how to link environment and development and for how long. Opinions on what should be sustained vary from; nature, life support systems or the community. Nature, for example, can be seen as a source to sustain the lives of human beings or as something with an intrinsic value that does not serve to sustain human beings. There are also different opinions on what should be developed, namely the economy, people or society (Parris and Kates, 2003: 560)

Mebratu (1998) explains that the lack of a solid concept is caused by the fact that every interest group has developed its own definition according to their interests. "*Strengthening the logical coherency within the concept by overcoming the influence of institutional and group interest is a prerequisite for developing our understanding of the concept and achieving a sustainable world*" (Mebratu, 1998: 518). Daly (2010) also thinks that no solid definition has been developed because of political interests as he suggests that politicians intentionally keep the concept vague. According to Daly, stating that sustainable growth is possible is a way for politicians to justify ongoing economic growth without limits (Daly, 2010: 268).

Robinson (2004) does not think the vagueness of the concept is a problem as he states that "*The lack of definitional precision of the term sustainable development may represent an important political opportunity*". "*Diplomats are familiar with the need to leave key terms undefined in negotiation processes and in much the same way the term sustainable development may profit from what might be called constructive ambiguity as it does not exclude those whose views were not expressed in that definition*" (Robinson, 2004: 374).

[3] Because of the many definitions that are developed for the concept of '*sustainable development*' and the resemblance with the basis of the concept that they show with the definition of the Brundtland Report, in this paper only the definition of the WCED is given. The WCED underlines the strong linkage between poverty alleviation, environmental improvement, and social equitability through sustainable economic growth (Mebratu, 1998: 501-502). In their research on different definitions of sustainable development, Parris and Kates conclude that "*Some combination of development, environment and equity or economy, society, and environment are found in most attempts to describe it*" (Parris and Kates, 2003: 560).

One of the problems is that the term sustainable development is also being used for non-sustainable practices or products. Governments and business companies can claim that their activities or products are sustainable, but how can we measure it and what criteria should be used to evaluate those claims (Robinson, 2004: 374)? In their work Parris and Kates (2003) compared twelve efforts that characterize and measure sustainable development and show the great diversity of approaches to definition, motivation, process, and technical methodology that are being used. There is no universally accepted set of dates to measure sustainable development and because of the great variety that is being used at the moment it is difficult to measure sustainable development and as a consequence it is difficult to make proper decision-making, management and research for sustainable practices (Parris and Kates, 2003: 562-566, 569).

According to Robinson (2004), the most serious level of concern for the concept of sustainable development is the critique that it creates unrealistic expectations. Is it really possible, as the Brundtland Commission proposed, to increase world industrial output by 5 to10 fold in a way that is environmentally sustainable? There are environmental scientists that state that we are really reaching the limits of growth and the industry cannot grow any further (see for example, the May, 2000 statement of 61 Academies of Science around the world entitled ‘‘Transition to Sustainability: The Contribution of Science and Technology’’), however there is great uncertainty about the nearness of ecological or social limits to growth and the degree to which these can be affected by political or social changes and/or technological changes (Robinson, 2004: 375).

Then there is another form of critique that is related to the ´degrowth´ movement as it critiques the political and economic characteristics of modern Western culture. It argues that sustainable development does not really change the underlying problems that are necessary to resolve in order to ever reach real social and political changes, which is the existing distribution of power in the world. We should think more on how we treat the environment and be one with nature, instead of focusing on economic and materialistic growth (Robinson, 2004).

As cities have become the centres of major consumers and distributors of these materialistic goods and services, the concept of ´sustainable cities´ has become more important. In the Brundtland Report a whole chapter is dedicated to “The Urban Challenge”. The authors show that rapid urbanization has caused problems for city governments, especially in developing countries, to provide basic services such as housing, sanitation and education for the growing populations in their cities. The high concentration of industry in

cities has caused more air, water, noise and solid waste pollution. The lack of basic sanitary services and environmental pollution has caused an increased number of people to suffer from diseases (WCED, 1987).

The concept of sustainable city development is basically the same as the general concept of sustainable development as the same three corners of the sustainable development triangle (the economy, the environment, and equity) are part of sustainable city development (see Figure 1, below). These three elements lead to three different perspectives on city development/planning. The economic development planner sees the city as a space where production, consumption and distribution of goods and services take place. The economic planner sees the city as a place where competition takes place for markets and new industries. The environmental planner sees the city as a place where resources are consumed and where waste is produced. In their view the city is competing with nature for natural resources and causes pollution and waste which harm nature. The equity planner sees the city as a place of conflict between different social groups over the distribution of resources, services and opportunities (Campbell, 1996: 298; Basiago, 1999: 148).

Figure 1 – Triangle of the sustainable development and correlate challenges



Campbell (1996) explains these three fundamental conflicting interests, but how at the same time they need each other. The first conflict, the one between economic growth and

equity, is visible for example in the property conflict. It is contradictory that property (such as housing or land) is a private commodity, but at the same time is an area where the government can intervene to make sure lower social classes are provided with proper housing (such as public housing). This is a conflict between private interest and the public good (Campbell, 1996: 298). Marcuse (1998) also recognizes this conflict by stating that "*housing and urban development are conflict-laden arenas: what benefits one hurts another. A landlord's profits are at a tenant's expense; high-rise construction casts shadows on neighbouring land uses; accessibility for one is pollution for another; security for some is taken to mean exclusion of others*" (Marcuse, 1998: 105). Therefore Marcuse concludes that sustainability for housing and urban development is an illusion. "*It suggests all humanity has a similar interest in "sustainable housing" or "sustainable urban development"; that if we all simply recognized our common interests everything would be fine, we could end poverty, exploitation, segregation, inadequate housing, congestion, ugliness, abandonment and homelessness. Yet, in these areas, the idea of universal acceptance of meaningful goals is a chimera*" (Marcuse, 1998: 104-105).

The conflict between business and nature is another example of the different elements of the triangle that need each other. On the one hand, business exploits nature, but on the other hand it needs the conservation of nature to make sure that resources are available for present and future demands. The development conflict is also difficult to solve. How can people from the lower classes of society be provided with better economic opportunities if environmental protection implies diminished economic growth? If a city wants to create more green parks for example there will be less space for shops, fabrics or companies which create employment (Campbell, 1996: 299-300).

These urban planning decisions are more and more made in the context of 'urban sustainability'. As is the case for the concept of sustainable development, there are also many interpretations of 'sustainable city development'. There are lots of different characteristics named that a city should have to be considered sustainable. In urban theory no consensus exists as to how sustainable city development should be reached (Basiago, 1999: 148; Naess, 2001; 503; Chiesura, 2003: 130; Neuman, 2005: 16-17).

In his literature research, Jabareen (2006) compared different urban forms[4] for sustainable city development and also concludes that there is a lack of agreement about the

[4] "Urban form is a composite of characteristics related to land use patterns, transportation system, and urban design. Form is a result of aggregations of more or less repetitive elements. Urban form, then, is a result of the bringing together of many elements-concepts: the urban pattern. Urban patterns are made up largely of a

most desirable urban form for sustainable cities. Jabareen finds a similar difficulty that has been described for sustainable development in general, and that is the measurement. "*There is no common conceptual framework that allows us to compare these approaches, planning propositions, and policies. For example, there is a lack of theory that helps us to evaluate whether a given urban form contributes to sustainability or to compare different forms according to their contribution to the sustainable development objectives and agenda*" (Jabareen, 2006: 39).

Although there is a lack of a framework to measure sustainable urban planning, it is needed as the concept can be misused. Naess warns for the problems of the uncontrollability of the proper use of the term 'sustainable development' in urban planning. "*Today, a manifold range of strategies and projects are promoted with the claim that they are derived from the very concept of sustainable development. It has become politically impossible not to be a supporter of a sustainable development, so there is a clear danger that the concept will be watered out*" (Naess, 2001: 504).

1.2 The emergence of socio-ethnic segregation

"*The customary academic definition of residential segregation is that a particular ethnic group is completely unsegregated when its members are distributed uniformly, relative to the remainder of the population. Any deviation from such uniformity represents a situation characterized by segregation*" (Boal *in* Herbert and Johnston, 1978: 67). Spatial segregation exists on different levels; it can exist between cities and the suburbs, between neighbourhoods in cities or even between housing units within neighbourhoods. Musterd *et al.* (1999) explain the difference between spatial segregation and spatial concentration. "*Usually a concentration refers to the situation in which one population category is clearly over-represented in an area, relative to their share in the city as a whole. Then concentration also implies segregation. However, sometimes the concept of concentration is also used to express a situation of `dominance' of one population category in an area. Strictly, that dominance need not imply segregation, since the population category under consideration may be equally dominant in all areas*" (Musterd *et.al.*, 1999: 576).

limited number of relatively undifferentiated types of elements that repeat and combine. Hence, these patterns have strong similarities and can be grouped conceptually into what are called concepts. Specifically, elements of concepts might be street patterns, block size and form, street design, typical lot configuration, layout of parks and public spaces, and so on" (Jabareen, 2006: 39).

Boal (1978) explains how social and ethnic segregation can be two distinct phenomena, but how they can also co-exist at the same time. An ethnic group can be disproportionally represented in a certain social class. Taeuber (1968) and Berry (1971) have calculated that if blacks, in Cleveland and Chicago, would be distributed in the city on the basis of their economic characteristics, their segregation would still be very high. This shows that blacks are overrepresented in the lower socio-economic classes, thus their segregation can be just because of their socio-economic status. Lee (1973) showed the same for segregation of West Indians in London as this group would also still be segregated on the basis of socioeconomic factors. However, a certain ethnic group does not always have to be overrepresented in the lower socio-economic classes; it can be dispersed over different socio-economic classes. When immigrants arrive to a city, they tend to become part of the lower socio-economic classes. The segregation of this group is then based on the fact that they are relatively poorer than the host society. Social class differentiation from the host society will then be the basis for segregation. Thus, segregation of an ethnic group can be attributed predominantly to socioeconomic factors or to ethnic factors (Boal *in* Herbert and Johnston, 1978: 72).

But what is ethnicity exactly? What makes a group an ethnic group? Isajiw (1993) explains the four major perspectives on the construction of ethnicity. These are: ethnicity conceived as a primordial phenomenon, ethnicity conceived as an epiphenomenon, ethnicity conceived as a situational phenomenon and ethnicity conceived as a purely subjective phenomenon. The primordialist approach is the oldest in sociological and anthropological literature. According to this approach, ethnicity is something given, something that you receive at birth. It is more or less fixed and permanent which means that you are born with a certain ethnicity and this cannot change in time. According to the epiphenomenon approach, immigrants that arrive in a new country or city usually come to work in the periphery which consists of marginal jobs. This is a contrast with the centre, which consists of the upper classes with better jobs. The concentration of immigrants in the periphery causes them to develop their own solidarity and maintain their culture. Ethnicity thus is something created and maintained by an uneven economy, or a product of economic exploitation (Isajiw, 1993: 2).

The logic of the situational approach is based on rational choice theory. According to this approach, ethnicity is something which may be relevant in some situations but not in others. People can choose to be a part of an ethnic group if they think this is in their advantage. Forming a strong ethnic group can have political advantages for example as a

group can make a stronger statement to demand certain rights and public goods. Isajiw critiques the situational approach "*no doubt the situational theories point to an important function which ethnic identity and ethnic groups can serve, but in terms of basic conceptions of what ethnicity is, they confuse function, or use, of the phenomenon with its nature*" (Isajiw, 1993: 3). The subjective approach sees ethnicity as a social-psychological phenomenon and something that is created by perception. A person obtains its ethnicity by the way it perceives itself and is perceived by others. Ethnicity is formed by a contradiction between "us" and "them" (Isajiw, 1993: 3).

According to Isajiw, some objective characteristics of ethnic groups[5] can be named. It includes the presence of at least some community institutions or organizations, the fact of having descendants and ancestors, as focus of cultural transmission and identity formation and the fact that there is a "script" for cultural behaviour, in the form of customs, rituals and preconceptions which provides the content to culture and its transmission and is manifested in behaviour patterns. The subjective dimension of ethnic groups consists of ethnic boundaries. These are social-psychological boundaries and refer to the fact of group-inclusion and exclusion (Isajiw, 1993: 6). Sanders (2002) explains that "*ethnic boundaries are better understood as social mediums through which association transpires rather than as territorial demarcations*" (Sanders, 2002: 327).

There are two types of ethnic boundaries, those from within the ethnic group (internal) and those from without the ethnic group (external). In many ways the dynamics of interethnic relations depends on the relationship between these two boundaries. The internal boundary is the area of self-inclusion in the group. They overlap with the process of self-identity. They articulate with the feelings of sympathy and loyalty toward members of the same ethnic group. The external boundaries mark the exclusion of membership. In a multi-ethnic society different ethnic groups live together and compete with each other. The internal boundaries of one ethnic group automatically mark the exclusion of another ethnic group. Persons will be identified by others and will be put in a certain ethnic category by them and this identification by others can stimulate self-identification and may cause new forms of social organization. Another important factor in group identification is how they are perceived and identified by

[5] "*The meaning of the concept of ethnicity depends on the meaning of several other concepts, particularly those of ethnic group and ethnic identity. The concept of ethnic group is the most basic, from which the others are derivative. It refers to ethnicity as the collective phenomenon. Ethnic identity refers to ethnicity as an individually experienced phenomenon. Ethnicity itself is an abstract concept which includes an implicit reference to both collective and individual aspects of the phenomenon*" (Isajiw, 1993: 5). In this dissertation only the group aspect of ethnicity will be described as the ethnic minorities and the neighbourhood culture will be studied from the group perspective.

the power-holding, policy-making and influence-exerting institutions. Thus, the external ethnic boundaries would be reflected in the reasons and rationales behind specific immigration policies, cultural policies, and the like (Isajiw: 1993: 6-7).

Sanders also recognizes this changeability of ethnic boundaries between different ethnic groups when he states that "*the ways in which insiders and outsiders go about characterizing a group, and thereby positioning it and its members in the larger society, are responsive to the social and historical context within which intergroup interactions take place. Consequently, ethnic identities are fluid across time and social contexts, sometimes even to the point of "ethnic switching". The public presentation of ethnic identity is also situational, which reveals the plural or hybrid character of modern ethnicity*" (Sanders, 2002: 328). He states that cultural traits of ethnic groups respond to ecological circumstances and thus also to the circumstances created in society by the government. Ethnic distinctions therefore sometimes coincide with territorial segregation in the host society and with social constructions of racial identity. Sanders explains how he thinks that segregation contributes to greater intergroup distinctions which can cause ignorance of one another or even stereotyping and if the segregating pattern is being obtained for a longer time, it can play an important role in the maintenance of ethnic boundaries (Sanders, 2002: 328).

In the previous section it has been shown that the term ghetto is being used in the United States to describe areas where the population belongs to the same ethnic, religious, or racial group. This strict concept of ´ghetto´ has been discussed by Peach (1996), who distinguishes between the ´real´ ghetto (majority of the population belongs to one ethnic, religious or racial group) and a ´lighter´ form of ghetto, which corresponds to an area where a certain population group is concentrated and over-represented, but does not form the statistical majority (Peach, 1996: 217). Malheiros (2000) makes a distinction between ´active´ and ´passive´ segregation. Active segregation is when people choose to live segregated by free choice; passive segregation implies that external constraints made people of certain groups live together. If segregation is not a free choice, it has a negative connotation. According to Malheiros, researchers and politicians should take into account whether spatial structures are the result of individual and voluntary choice or the result of constraints. The first type is linked to the concept of `congregation', whereas the second type should be referred to as segregation. Clearly, these processes are two sides of one picture. The expression of choice of some may imply a reduction of choice of others (Malheiros, 2000: 577).

These social processes and segregated areas in cities have been studied from different perspectives. The Chicago School adherents were the first to specialize in urban sociology and developed influential theories that are being used up till this day. In 1925 Park and Burgess published a book of essays entitled: *The City: Suggestions for Investigation of Human Behaviour in the Urban Environment*. They elaborated a theory of urban ecology which proposed that cities were environments like those in nature. From this point of view, the 'concentric zone theory' was developed which explains the evolution of the formation of different social areas in cities. Human ecologists viewed slum areas as temporary residences for new immigrant groups that were integrating in urban life. Disadvantaged neighbourhoods were seen as initial stages on a ladder. Immigrants were expected to climb the ladder and move to different zones as they assimilated to the city life and society (Sampson and Morenoff *in* Brooks-Gunn *et al*., 1997: 3).

Critique on classical ecology is that it is too simplistic and that it neglects other factors that influence urban life such as social, political and cultural dimensions (Sampson and Morenoff *in* Brooks-Gunn *et al*., 1997: 6; Van Kempen and Ozuekren, 1997; Marcuse *in* Varady, 2005: 37). The ideas of the Chicago School were based on American cities and society and were developed in a specific time-period and under a specific system, namely the free-market economy. During this period, government interventions such as social security and housing subsidies were not common. As governments in Europe have been intervening more in the housing market, the applicability of the human ecology theories to analyse the European situation was questioned (Van Kempen and Ozuekren, 1997).

As the Chicago School had little attention for the individual and their free choice and restrictions, another approach was developed that focused on the preferences of the individual. This behavioural approach uses characteristics of households (with age and composition of the households as the most important characteristics) to determine where people live. Critique on this approach is that it is too much focused on choices instead of the restrictions (for example financial restrictions) that people have to choose a place to live. The ethnic-cultural approach can be seen as a special variant of the behavioural approach. According to this approach, preferences in living situation differ because of cultural differences. This approach pays more attention to the restrictions individuals have in choosing where to live for example because of discrimination and racism (Bolt and Van Kempen *in* Van Kempen *et.al*., 2000: 27).

Tesser *et al.* (1995) found that in the Netherlands the extent of segregation within cities mainly has to do with the type of buildings in the neighbourhoods instead of free choice.

The fact that segregation on lower spatial scales is barely higher than at the district level, Tesser *et al.* (1995) conclude that voluntary segregation (concentration) hardly plays a role (Tesser *et al*., 1995: 76). Deurloo and Musterd (1997), however, draw the opposite conclusion. They find a strong separation between Turks and Moroccans at the micro level in Amsterdam, while these groups at higher levels live mixedly. That would seem to indicate that they live segregated voluntarily at the micro level (Musterd and Deurloo, 1997).

Dagevos (2009) finds a combination of choice and constraint factors for spatial concentration of immigrants in the Netherlands. First, their low social-economic position forms a constraint in the housing market. It means that immigrants have less opportunity to buy a house and therefore they are bound to the rental sector with more apartments in concentration neighbourhoods. Second, immigrants tend to live shorter periods of time in one place in combination with an urgent need to move to, makes them more dependent on housing in concentration neighbourhoods[6]. The fact that they have less knowledge about the housing allocation also seems to play a role. The third factor is the ethnic-specific preferences of immigrants. Although Dagevos found that in general there is a strong preference to live mixedly, immigrants feel comfortable to live with people of their own culture. Dagevos found a feeling of resistance amongst immigrants to live in a white neighbourhood as they fear to be treated differently and not feel comfortable in a neighbourhood with only native Dutch people. Fourth, native Dutch people move quicker from a concentration neighbourhood then immigrants do (Dagevos, 2009: 5-9).

Other studies in the Netherlands however show no evidence that migrants prefer to live together. Research amongst Turks shows that they think it is important to live with people from their own culture and to have special ethnic services, but it does not determine in which neighbourhood they are going to live (Van Kempen and Bolt, 1997). Another research amongst Turks and Moroccans shows that they prefer not to live with people of their own country. They prefer to live in more mixed neighbourhoods. Migrants that have the financial means prefer to move to the suburbs (Bovens and Trappenburg, 2004: 4). Clark (1992) finds

[6] Spatial concentration can be defined as the degree of clustering of people with similar characteristics in a certain place. These characteristics can be the socio-economic status or ethnicity. The concentration of immigrants in certain neighbourhoods automatically means that different groups live spatially segregated from each other. Spatial segregation exists when people from a certain group with common characteristics is not evenly distributed over the urban space. Both concepts describe the same phenomenon, however in a different way. A higher concentration of immigrants does not mean that this automatically leads to a higher degree of segregation. For example, if the growth of the number of immigrants takes place in neighbourhoods that already have high numbers of immigrants, concentration and segregation increases. If the concentration of immigrants, however, increases evenly in neighbourhoods where many immigrants live and in neighbourhoods with lower numbers of immigrants, they live more spreaded across the city which means that segregation decreases and concentration increases (Dagevos, 2009: 3).

that Whites and Asians in the United States have stronger preferences for neighbourhoods populated by their own race than do Hispanics and Blacks and that this is to most important explanation for their place of residence (Clark, 1992).

There has thus been a debate on the influence of choice (the behavioural approach) versus the influence of constraint (the neo-Marxist- and neo-Weberian School). The neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian School think that the structure of supply of housing and the accessibility determine the social and spatial layout of the city. People with more resources have greater access to better housing (Van Kempen and Ozuekren, 1997). The supply factors relate to the role of governments and institutions. First, discrimination by local governments and the private renting sector can cause segregation. Minorities can be discriminated during different stages in the process of finding a rental apartment or buying a home. The access can be denied, their choices can be limited or the rent can be raised for them. Realtors may show fewer apartments to minorities or they can tell them that no apartments are available at the moment. They also may provide less assistance, impose higher costs for their services or only show apartments in particular neighbourhoods (Schwartz, 2012: 253). Second, the housing policy of the State influences the supply of social housing through the amount of subsidies for the lower-incomes for housing and the available budget for the building and maintenance of social housing (Van Kempen and Ozuekren, 1997).

The creation of the ghettos in the United States is an example of how big the influence of the State can be in creating segregated areas in cities and how far discriminatory practices can go. The term 'ghetto' was first used to describe the immigrant neighbourhoods of American cities at the turn of the nineteenth century when large numbers of East European Jews settled in the congested city centres. The term ‘ghetto’ quickly lost the exclusive association with Jews and was being used to describe immigrant neighbourhoods in general. Since the last decades the ghetto was associated with the congested and unhealthy living conditions of the inner city and with a lack of services (Ward, 1982: 1).

The black ghettos in the United States were formed as the first large-scale black migration from the rural south to the urban north took place. This migration was a result of heavy demand for labour in the industrial cities of the North, particularly during the two world wars. Also agricultural changes such as the automatic cotton picker caused blacks to migrate from the South to the North (Cutler *et al.*, 1999: 462-469). In this period not only blacks from the rural south migrated to the northern cities, millions of eastern and southern Europeans arrived as well and after 1920 a growing number of Mexicans arrived. The Europeans and Mexicans were able to assimilate to American city life, while the black

population continued to be oppressed as was the case in the time of slavery (Massey and Denton, 1993: 18).

According to Massey and Denton (1993), the urban ghetto represents the key institutional arrangement that ensured the continued subordination of blacks in the United States (Massey and Denton, 1993:18). Marcuse shares this opinion and thinks that the black ghetto was created by the State and the State forced blacks to live there. "*It was economically useful for some white people to keep a division between whites and blacks, so they continued the racist patterns that were already established in the time of slavery. No group desires low status, it is imposed on them. Thus, divisions by status require, implicitly or explicitly, the use of force and in a civilized society such force is (at least in theory) a monopoly of the state*" (Marcuse *in* Varady, 2005: 23).

The discriminatory policies and practices that prevented blacks to integrate into society show the role of the State in the creation of the ghetto. Racial zoning, neighbourhood associations, restrictive covenants and redlining are some examples of the methods that were used to segregate blacks. In 1910, Baltimore enacted the first 'racial zoning' ordinance and within several years the practice was widespread in the United States. Zoning was used to prevent blacks and whites from living in the same neighbourhood. It became a mechanism for protecting ´white´ property by excluding blacks (Silver, 1997: 1). The racial zoning movement was strongly opposed in 1917, when the U.S. Supreme Court declared a Louisville, Kentucky racial zoning ordinance unconstitutional. Despite the Court's judgment, Southern cities continued to search for legal means to use the zoning practice to keep blacks out of white neighbourhoods (Silver, 1997: 1-2).

Throughout the early 1900s, and well beyond 1917, racial zoning and its objectives remained an important practice of many American planners. Despite attempts to maintain the practice, the court continued to forbid it. But these court rulings came too late for the already segregated neighbourhoods in American cities. Racial zoning helped to create the racially segregated social geography of most contemporary American cities. Other factors such as income, age and type of housing, real estate practices, and culture also contributed to the highly segregated neighbourhoods in contemporary Southern cities, but the racial zoning movement intentionally created public policies that were successful in dividing black and white people. Although racial zoning was not legal for a long period of time, Silver emphasizes on the fact that it continued to influence public projects for community development up till the 1960s (Silver, 1997: 3-4).

After the 1920s more subtle methods such as neighbourhood "improvement associations" were created to maintain separate racial neighbourhoods. These associations lobbied city councils for zoning restrictions, they wanted that hotels and houses that attracted black people would be closed, they wanted more public investments in their white neighbourhoods so the property values would increase and would be too expensive for blacks, they collected money for funds to buy the houses from blacks in white neighbourhoods so the neighbourhood would stay white, they threatened boycotts of real estate agents who sold homes to blacks and they offered cash bonuses to black renters who agreed to leave the neighbourhood. The most important function of these neighbourhood associations was to implement restrictive covenants and restrictions on interracial sales (Maly, 2005: 10).

Race restrictive covenants were the most important means used by the emerging real estate industry to create and maintain racially segregated neighbourhoods. The idea behind restrictive covenants was that racial separation of residences was necessary to maintain property values, real estate profits and neighbourhood stability. From the beginning of the 20th century, real estate firms and community builders began heavy promotion of racially restrictive covenants through professional organizations. Restrictive covenants were declared unenforceable in 1948 by the Supreme Court (Gotham, 2000: 623).

Discriminatory practices were also present at the Federal Housing Association as they gave their personnel the assignment not to provide mortgages for homes that were not located in racially homogenous white neighbourhoods and covered with a restrictive covenant. This practice of the denial of mortgages to owners of property in certain areas based primarily on the race of the residents is called 'redlining'. Redlining paralyzed the housing market, lowered property values and further encouraged the abandonment of houses. As abandonment increased, less people came to live in certain neighbourhoods and this caused drug dealing and other illegal activities to take place in those abandoned houses. In the United States, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 was passed to fight this practice. It prohibited redlining when the criteria for redlining are based on race, religion, gender, familial status, disability, or ethnic origin (Gotham, 2000: 625-626).

However, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 did not make an end to segregation. The peak period for segregation in the United States was 1970. In that year, the average black in urban America lived in a neighbourhood that was 68 percent black. From 1970 to 1990, segregation fell throughout the country. By 1990 the average black lived in a neighbourhood that was 56 percent black (Cutler *et al.*, 1999: 456, 495). Thus, in the 1990s residential segregation was

still at an extreme high, which is described by Massey and Denton as "*hyper segregation*" and "*American Apartheid*" (Massey and Denton, 1993).

So why does this racial apartheid still exist when segregation practices are illegal? Cutler *et al.* (1999) conclude that in the mid-20th century, segregation reflected collective actions on the part of whites opposing integration, while the blacks were not in favour of segregation. Whites still prefer to live with other whites more than blacks prefer to live in white areas. "*Decentralized racism operating through the price mechanism has replaced centralized, legally enforced racism, and racial differences in housing persist*" (Cutler *et al.*, 1999: 496).

Zhang (1999) explains how decentralized racism in the housing market works: "*Since the 1960s, the force sustaining residential segregation has changed. After the removal of the discriminatory barriers, blacks could move to anywhere within their price range. What many whites did then was to run away whenever blacks came. Today, many whites are willing, and are able, to pay a premium to live in a predominantly white neighbourhood. Equivalent housing in white areas commands a higher rent. By bidding up the price of housing, many white neighbourhoods again effectively shut out blacks, because blacks are unwilling, or unable, to pay high prices to enter into white neighbourhoods*" (Zhang, 1999).

According to Feagin (1999) the roots of segregation lie in the racist oppression and discrimination by whites over nearly four centuries. "*Systemic white racism has long involved the control of space and territory in the United States and nowadays informal racism in the real estate sector still plays a role*"[7] (Feagin, 1999: 81). Denton (1999) argues that the Fair Housing Act was not enough. "*It is tempting to conclude from the segregation scores that the Fair Housing Act did not work. But the better conclusion may be that the Fair Housing Act was nowhere near enough to combat the institutionalized social structure of segregation in the nation's largest cities*" (Denton, 1999: 110-112).

Although discrimination in the housing market still plays a role in the United States (see: Yinger, 1998; Schwartz, 2012)[8] as well as in Europe (see: Ahmed and Hammarstedt,

[7] For example, a major federal research project performed 3,800 test audits in 24 large metropolitan areas. The study estimates that black testers that wanted to rent an apartment were discriminated by landlords 53 percent of the time and black testers that wanted to buy a house were discriminated by real estate sales people 59 percent of the time (Feagin, 1999: 82).

[8] Both Yinger (1998) and Schwartz (2012) find that Blacks and Hispanics are most discriminated in the housing market. For the Housing Discrimination Study 2000, 2.400 Black-White pairs and 1.600 Hispanic-White pairs with comparable housing needs approached real estate agents to see if they would be treated differently. Blacks and Hispanics experience discrimination in most if not all aspects of their interactions with real estate agents and "*the numbers of discrimination are unacceptably high*" (Schwartz, 2012: 257-262). For an overview of all test results see Schwartz, 2012: 261, 262.

2008; Castles and Kosack, 2010: 33-35)[9], the debate about social inequality in cities became more focused on the structural approach. Households operate within the societal, demographic, economic and political context of their countries, regions and cities. But not only the context of the country has influence on the living situation of people, structural global economic processes and also structural differences between welfare states are considered as the main forces behind social and spatial segregation. Globalisation is supposed to have important effects upon the social division within cities and life within neighbourhoods, especially in so-called `global' or world cities. Globalization and international migration up till now has caused an increase in inequality (Musterd *et al.*, 1999: 578-579).

Queiroz Ribeiro (2003) explains how globalization and neo-liberal policies have increased the level of residential segregation in cities. Due to the liberalization of the housing market, housing prices have become the central mechanism of population distribution within cities. As the income gap between citizens grew, the wealthier citizens came to live in exclusive neighbourhoods with houses just for the higher incomes. Crime problems and the sense of insecurity caused by segregation only reinforced the division between rich and poor neighbourhoods. The privatization of urban services has also increased unequal access to services and an unequal quality in services for the richer and poorer neighbourhoods (Queiroz Ribeiro, 2003: 33-34).

Musterd *et al.* (1999) emphasize on the fact that although the polarising effects of globalization cannot be denied, the welfare state has played an important role in Western European states to reduce the effects of globalization. Through subsidies and benefits in the fields of housing, health and unemployment for example, the great differences between rich and poor (as can be observed in the United States for example due to a weaker welfare state) could be avoided (Musterd *et al.* 1999: 579; Musterd, 2005: 341).

Generally, levels of segregation, both ethnic and socio-economic segregation are lower in cities in European countries than in cities in the United States. In Europe there is more variation in the populations that live in segregated neighbourhoods[10], while the ghettos of the United States are mainly occupied by black residents only. In Europe only a few mono-ethnic

[9] In their online research on discrimination in the rental market in Sweden, Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) found that the Arabic/Muslim male received fewer calls back, enquiries, and showings than the Swedish male (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008).

[10] As there are nearly no ghettos in Europe, the segregated European neighborhoods are called 'concentration-neighborhoods', these are neighborhoods of which more than thirty percent of the habitants is a migrant (Kloosterman and Rath, 1996: 1).

areas can be found and the size of the concentration in these areas is lower in general than the mono-ethnic areas in American cities. Thus, levels of ethnic segregation tend to be higher in the United States than in Europe. However, if you take away the black population from the statistics and look at the segregation levels of other ethnic groups, the differences are much smaller and are even comparable with the levels of segregation in Europe (Malheiros, 2002; Musterd, 2005: 332).

As the emergence and level of segregation in the United States is different from Europe, there is more interest in the diversity of segregation patterns. Nowadays, scholars no longer explain segregation from one perspective, but find that different aspects all influence socio-ethnic segregation at the same time (see: Musterd *et al.*, 1999; Musterd, 2005; Dagevos, 2009). Also differences across ethnic groups and across European cities are being studied (see: Peach, 1996; Malheiros, 2002; Musterd, 2005). In his study, Musterd (2005) compares the causes and levels of socio-ethnic segregation in different cities in Europe and concludes that a multi-dimensional approach is needed. "*Trying to understand urban inequality through economic restructuring and globalization processes only is not enough. These processes also occur in Europe where inequality levels are much lower than in the United States. I suggest considering at least three additional dimensions: (1) the deeply rooted cultural factors, which are associated with language, religion and associated institutions and support systems and discriminatory factors; (2) the historically grown social, ethnic, and economic structures that provide certain paths for development seem to be relevant; and (3) the way the welfare state has been shaped*" (Musterd, 2005: 342).

For instance, when we look at segregation levels in Belgium it becomes clear why a multi-dimensional approach is needed to explain the causes and levels of segregation. In general, strong welfare states have lower segregation levels. Belgium has a low level of income inequality and has a strong welfare-state, with a lot of redistribution. Belgian cities also house relatively poor guest workers, just as Germany and the Netherlands do. However, Antwerp and Brussels have high levels of ethnic and social inequality compared to other cities in Europe. According to Musterd, this can be explained by a difference in state policy and the housing market. Political attitudes towards immigrants are important, and European countries have very different immigrant policies. In France, immigrants were not put in separate categories and assimilation to France culture and society was strongly supported. In Belgium on the other hand, until recently immigrants did not have any voting rights, not even at the local level. This is one factor that produced a sharper division between immigrants and citizens who had these rights. Another very important factor for relatively high levels of

segregation is the housing market. The Belgium housing market is almost completely free-market oriented with little intervention of the government. Belgian cities have less social housing compared to other European cities. A residual rental sector and a partly marginal owner-occupier sector function as resorts for the guest worker immigrant population (Musterd, 2005: 340).

Malheiros (2002) explains the differences between spatial organization in Northern and Southern Europe. He also concludes that it is a combination of factors that causes segregation in Southern Europe to be different from Northern Europe. First, immigration features are different. In Southern Europe, levels of immigration are lower and there is a greater variety of nationalities within the immigration group which causes less clustering. Also, more immigrants come to work in the informal sector where they earn lower salaries. This makes them rely more on the informal housing sector. Second, the organization of the urban centres is different from Northern Europe. Due to the late development of industrial capitalism and of a formal urban planning culture, the cities of the South have experienced less segregation caused by the State. Because there was less urban regulation, the cities of the South have more ´disorganised´ patterns in both urban and social terms. The lack of urban control enabled the development of clandestine housing and slums, especially in the peripheries of large cities. Immigrants came to live in the informal housing sector, because of their low salaries and legal barriers to get access to social housing (Malheiros, 2002: 114-115).

1.3 Sustainable solutions for socio-ethnic segregation

According to the human ecological perspective, the most important reason to study the phenomenon of socio-ethnic segregation is the problems that it causes, namely in terms of social and environmental unbalance. In the American debate, researchers share the opinion that segregation has negative consequences. Higher crime rates, gangs, drug-use, restricted access to jobs, greater health risks[11], less access to public services, lower quality of education and a lack of positive role models are being related to high levels of segregation[12] (Massey *et*

[11] Racial disparities in health are large and persistent in time. African Americans/blacks have an elevated death rate for 8 of the 10 leading causes of death. Age-adjusted all-cause mortality for African Americans was one and a half times as high as that of whites in 1998, identical to what it was in 1950. Also, the black/white ratios of mortality from coronary heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and cirrhosis of the liver were larger in the late 1990s than in 1950. In the case of infant mortality, the black/white ratio even increased from 1.6 in 1950 to 2.4 in 1998 (Williams and Collins, 2001: 405).

[12] Orfield and Lee (2005) conclude that racial segregation and poverty both negatively influence the quality of education. Half of the nation's African American and Latino students are dropping out of high school. The

al., 1987; Sampson and Wilson, 1995; Orfield and Lee, 2005; Williams and Collins, 2001). The deprivation of the segregated neighbourhood would have a reinforcing negative effect on the behaviour of its habitants. Several studies show how the environment affects individuals and how it causes higher levels of criminality for example (see: Massey and Denton, 1993; Sampson and Wilson, 1995).

The European debate differs in this aspect from the United States as it does not focus on gangs, drugs and other crime related issues. In Europe the debate is focused on participation. High levels of segregation would make people participate less in society, in the fields of the labour market, education, politics and culture. The ethnic and social composition of a neighbourhood would have an influence on the opportunities for these people in society (Musterd, 2005: 342-343). Musterd (2005) states that it is difficult to show the influence of segregation on social mobility[13] in Europe due to a lack of large-scale longitudinal research, which is required to test impacts over time. Only for The Netherlands, Sweden and Finland enough data are available to draw some conclusions. Ostendorf *et al.* (2001) studied the ´neighbourhood effect´ on poverty in segregated neighbourhoods in Amsterdam. A policy of mixing lower-quality housing and higher-quality housing in order to mix different social classes in the same neighbourhood did not have a strong influence on poverty reduction (Ostendorf *et al.*, 2001: 374-380). The outcomes of this study are just a beginning in the research on neighbourhood effects on individuals as the policy requires an analysis over a longer period of time and the study only includes a limited number of ´poor´ persons. Therefore, Musterd (2005) states that: "*the outcomes of the study, however, should not be interpreted as a definitive statement that the social environment has no impact on individuals. On the contrary, there may be a serious effect that could have been neutralized as a result of the area-based policy interventions, which target concentrations of poverty with special programs*" (Musterd, 2005: 344).

Musterd refers to studies performed in Sweden where indeed consistent neighbourhood effects were found. About this difference between The Netherlands and Sweden, Musterd concludes that: "*A simple explanation cannot be provided. Both Sweden and the Netherlands have to be labelled as strong welfare states in which state intervention in*

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most severe problems are in segregated high poverty schools. In 2002, in almost a third of the high schools with more than 50 percent minority students, only less than half of the class graduated. Among schools that were 90 percent or more white, only one in fifty schools had these low graduation numbers (Orfield and Lee, 2005: 6).

[13] Social mobility is the change that a person can make from one social position to another. The change to another (higher) social position is perceived as an improvement in the quality of life (Menezes and Almeida, 2006: 20).

social spheres is rather well developed. Yet, there may be crucial circumstances that differ. Perhaps the Dutch authorities have been able to intervene more efficiently in the more vulnerable areas compared to what the Swedish authorities could do. Another hypothesis is that the more urban and densely populated Dutch society offers fewer obstacles for commuting. Spatial mismatch, i.e., spatial barriers to get unemployed people in contact with work opportunities, might explain some of the differences. We should also keep in mind that the Swedish society has been much more egalitarian than any other society in Europe for a very long time. Only recently have inequalities grown. This may also have led to a relatively strong labelling and stigmatization reaction in the Swedish context. Moreover, many immigrants are recent arrivals. Part of them may still have problems accessing the welfare state benefits and provisions. Some of them may also prefer a greater reliance on their own population category" (Musterd, 2005: 344).

In order to attack these negative so called "neighbourhood effects", specific urban policies are more and more being made in the context of 'urban sustainability'. As has been described in the first section of this chapter, there is a lack of agreement on how sustainable city development can be achieved and that is why there is an on-going discussion on what the best model is. An important element in the discussion on sustainable urban models has been the possible negative environmental consequences of sprawling[14] urban development which implies the loss of agricultural land around cities and more transport use. The 'compact city' model is an answer to this problem (Naess, 2001: 508; Neuman, 2005). Advocates of a compact city want the opposite of urban sprawl. The compact city is a city where more people live closer together in the city centre so they live closer to shops and their work. This makes them able to walk, bike and make use of public transport more often. This reduces their car use and the travel distance. In this way these cities are more energy efficient and less polluting[15] (Neuman, 2005: 12).

In his research on the sustainability of the compact city, Neuman (2005) found that the relation between compactness and sustainability can be negatively correlated, weakly related, or correlated in limited ways. So there are studies that show no relation or a weak relation

[14] Urban sprawl exists when people move away from the city center to the surrounding areas/suburbs. This is seen as a problem, mainly because the growing numbers of urban citizens take up more and more agricultural land that is needed for food production. It also creates social/income inequalities between the city center and the suburbs. Sprawl is caused by for example the attractiveness of cheap available land outside the city and advances in transportation. The spread of cities across the countryside began with the impetus of depopulating large, congested, polluted and crime-ridden industrial cities since the nineteenth century. Metropolitan growth was further increased by the worldwide rural to urban migration (Neuman, 2005: 15).

[15] For a discussion on the sustainability of compactness and urban sprawl see Neuman, 2005; Bouwman, 2000; Jenks et al. 1996; Hall, 2001 and Burchell *et al*. 1998.

between compactness and transportation use (see Bouwman, 2000), there are studies that show a positive effect of compactness on transportation use (see Jenks *et al.*, 1996) and other studies suggest a negative effect (see Hall, 2001). Studies in other areas, such as perceived welfare, health, well-being and energy use, also show opposing outcomes depending on the city or country where the investigation took place and on the research method. So it is not proven that increasing building densities will necessarily reduce travel and energy use in cities or that more people living closer to each other has a negative impact on their well-being (Neuman, 2005: 12-13). And is sprawl actually a problem? According to one of the most extensive studies on the subject, sprawl also can have positive as well as negative effects (Burchell *et al.*, 1998).

Another model focuses on local self-support of agricultural products within the city by establishing ecological cycles of water and sewage (Naess, 2001: 508). This 'Eco-City' model is divided in two main views. The first view suggests that growing one's own food, recycling liquid and solid wastes and using decentralized energy and water supplies is only possible in a low-density rural or semi-rural context. The city is seen as too crowded and sprawling is necessary. Rural qualities and values have to be brought back to the city in order to create a "green life". According to Kenworthy (2006), this view ignores the fact that cities, by their nature, are concentrations of people and diversity. The second view is less concerned with self-sufficiency and suggests that higher density and fewer sprawls will leave more land available for agriculture, gardens and city parks. Greater emphasis on community spaces should also mean more opportunity for locally managed systems for waste, energy and water[16] (Kenworthy, 2006: 71).

This last group of advocates of the Eco-City is more concerned with the liveability of cities. Proponents of more green spaces in cities argue that urban parks and open green spaces are essential for the quality of life of urban citizens. Chiesura (2003) states that these green spaces provide for important environmental services such as air and water purification, wind and noise filtering, or microclimate stabilization, but they also provide social and psychological services. A park experience may reduce stress and can give a sense of peacefulness and tranquillity (Chiesura, 2003: 129).

But when is a city a green city? Again the measurement forms a problem. Ecologists, public health experts, and economists approach this task in different ways. Ecologists focus on measuring changes in natural capital stocks over time. Public health researchers measure

[16] For critique on the Eco-City model see Kahn, 2006: 8, 26; Naess, 2001: 511.

the excess morbidity and mortality risk associated with diseases caused by pollution and economists examine urban home prices and wages to see whether people are paying high prices to live in a specific city, which means they think the city has a high quality of living. These methods of measuring the green city show different parts of it and the conclusions they lead to can often differ a lot. For example, a city with a small ecological footprint may be full with waste that causes diseases and a city with plenty of green parks may be generating enormous quantities of carbon dioxide and other gases that contribute to climate change (Kahn, 2006: 8, 26).

Naess (2001) is sceptical about the Eco-City model. The urban model that encourages sprawl and large green spaces in cities seem to neglect that the most important goals of sustainable urban development is reducing the energy use and conserving more natural and agricultural areas. He also states that there is not enough empirical evidence to prove that more gardening and composting possibilities in cities increase environmental awareness. And this is the most important change that has to occur if sustainable development will ever be effective. "*Those who claim that low-density, dispersed cities can be energy efficient and sustainable seem to presuppose rather profound changes in people's lifestyles. If the inhabitants consider high accessibility to a multitude of various functions as an important, positive trait of cities and are not willing to renounce this quality, the dispersed urban model can hardly be compatible with goals of reducing the amount of transport and the use of cars. Apart from being highly unrealistic as an answer to the environmental and sustainability problems of cities, it is open to the gravest doubt whether such an 'ecology without cities' would be environmentally sustainable, given the present size of the human population*" (Naess, 2001: 511).

The urban design model that focuses on ´diversity´[17] is the New Urbanism model. Advocates of New Urbanism think that mixed land use is favourable for neighbourhoods so people will live near their jobs and will be able to walk or bicycle to their work or the shops for example. Another focus is on the design of the neighbourhood which should reinforce the unique historical identity of the area. A strong goal of New Urbanism is supporting diversity. "*The preamble to the Charter of the New Urbanism states that the Congress for the New Urbanism views disinvestments in central cities, the spread of placeless sprawl, increasing*

[17] Diversity is considered to be essential for sustainability. Lack of diversity in a neighbourhood/city can cause more frequent car use which leads to increased air pollution and congestion, monotonous urban landscapes with less variation in housing types for all income groups which in turn causes more class and racial segregation. Diversity is "a multidimensional phenomenon" that promotes a greater variety of housing types, building densities, household sizes, ages, cultures, and incomes. Thus, diversity represents the social and cultural context of the urban form (Jabareen, 2006: 42).

separation by race and income, environmental deterioration, loss of agricultural lands and wilderness, and erosion of society's built heritage as one inter-related community-building challenge" (Day, 2003: 84). New Urbanists state that they promote the end of segregation between rich and poor. They do this by constructing different types of housing in different price ranges so the lower, middle and higher economic classes will all have the opportunity to live in the same neighbourhood (Day, 2003: 84-85).

Another important focus of New Urbanism is the construction of a community. Day criticizes this idea as she states that "*New Urbanism seeks to create and sustain community, without seriously questioning the underpinnings or the appropriateness of this goal. For New Urbanism, community is implicitly assumed as an outcome of placing diverse residents together in a well-designed neighbourhood...This striving for community overlooks the plurality of identities in many urban (and suburban) neighbourhoods where New Urbanism might be applied...In true "colour-blindness", New Urbanist design principles assume that, beyond disparities in income and resources, different groups of residents are essentially similar...Diversity is not regarded as an existing characteristic of communities. The assumption breaks down, however, when New Urbanism is applied to urban neighbourhoods in which diversity already exists*" (Day, 2003: 87).

Gottdiener and Hutchinson (2006) do not believe in the New Urbanist's physical determinism approach which assumes that people's behaviour can be controlled or created through physical design. "*Behaviour is determined by a complex relation of various social processes interacting in and with spatial forms rather than through the influence of the physical environment alone. In practice, planners and architects seem to ignore the social basis of behaviour and falsely believe that construction design by itself can bring about desired change, such as increasing the frequency of neighbourly interaction*" (Gottdiener and Hutchinson, 2006: 323). They consider the New Urbanism ideology as the most important example of the fallacy of physical determinism as they state that: "*residents of communities do not behave in certain ways simply because well-known architects direct them to do so. Neighbouring, in particular, may be facilitated by the presence of porches, but it is not the determining factor. Rather, people create neighbourhoods by establishing primary relations with neighbours*" (Gottdiener and Hutchinson, 2006: 324). They also state that the New Urbanist model for sustainable cities does not pay attention to the modern way of life as they note that: "*communities cannot be created merely by facilitating pedestrian traffic as many people are so dependent on their automobiles that they ignore the role of the sidewalk in their daily life*" (Gottdiener and Hutchinson, 2006: 325).

Day (2003) expresses critique on the New Urbanism model specifically in relation to neighbourhoods which are already diverse. Like Ostendorf *et al.* (2001) and Bolt (2004), she also states that physical renovations in the neighbourhood are not enough to help the underlying social and economic problems of the poor. They prefer to have better job opportunities, better quality of education and more safety on the streets (Day, 2003: 88). New Urbanism promotes mixed land-uses, more walkable neighbourhoods, and locally relevant architecture; however in neighbourhoods with diverse populations groups may have different opinions. Promoting urban design according to the local traditions and history is also difficult in a neighbourhood with people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Another problem with mixed land-use and housing types is that property values may rise when the neighbourhoods are upgraded and original residents and business may not be able to afford to stay (Day, 2003: 89-90).

Jabareen (2006) measured four different models (among them the Eco-City Model, New Urbanism and the Compact City model) in order to prove what model is best for sustainable urban development. Jabareen made a matrix (see Jabareen, 2006: 47) in which the results of the 'sustainability test' are visible. He tested the different urban form models on seven concepts through which sustainable city development can be achieved. These seven concepts are; compactness, sustainable transport, population density, mixed land use, diversity, passive solar design and greening[18] (Jabareen, 2006: 39-43). The model that scored best on achieving the seven concepts is the Compact City model with just one point difference to the Eco-City model. Jabareen concludes that "*different urban forms contribute differently to sustainability. Moreover, different planners and scholars may develop different combinations of design concepts to achieve sustainable development goals. They might come with different forms, where each form emphasizes different concepts. However, all should be forms that environmentally contribute beneficially to the planet for the present and future generations*" (Jabareen, 2006: 48).

Some go beyond the discussion on which urban planning model is best for sustainable city development. According to Neuman (2005) "*the question should not be whether compact cities are a sustainable form for urban planning, but the question that should be asked is whether the processes of building cities and the processes of living, consuming, and producing in cities are sustainable*" (Neuman, 2005: 22). "*The attempt to make cities more sustainable only by using urban form strategies is counterproductive*" (Neuman, 2005: 22).

[18] For more information on these seven concepts for sustainable city development see Jabareen, 2006: 39-43.

Naess (2001) questions the willingness of people to give up their luxuries to achieve environmental sustainability. "*In many cases, the authors seem to take for granted that the goals of sustainability are largely consistent with the prevailing lifestyles, consumption habits and perception of the environmental situation among the members of the local community. Some of the most important challenges of a sustainable development in developed countries concern the need to reduce environmentally harmful activities which, viewed in isolation, can make life for the individual citizen more convenient, more enjoyable, or more prestigious*". According to Naess, sustainable urban planning should be accompanied by raising environmental awareness and responsibility (Naess, 2001: 512-513).

2. Sustainable Neighbourhoods: Diversity, the Community and Social Capital

In this Chapter a possible solution for the problems caused by segregation in cities will be introduced, namely the policy of mixing. But is this policy of obligatory mixing necessary or is someone's decision on where to live a natural process that local governments should respect? The debate on the need (or not) to mix people from different social and ethnic classes in neighbourhoods will be shown, as well as the debate on the effectiveness of the different policy options for mixing.

It is thought that higher levels of social cohesiveness in mixed neighbourhoods contributes to more economic opportunities for people from lower social classes. Contact with people from higher social classes would influence them positively. The second section of this Chapter provides a discussion on the importance of social capital and whether mixing people from different backgrounds indeed contributes to higher levels of social capital and thereby economic prosperity.

In the last section the same question arises as in the first section of this Chapter. Is networking and creating a strong community a natural process that citizens do themselves or can local governments influence the creation of social capital in neighbourhoods? Should they implement mixing policies to decrease the social distance between different socio-economic groups?

2.1 Creating diverse neighbourhoods: the policy of mixing

In order to create more diverse neighbourhoods, the social mixity concept emerged as a possibility for government policy. The concept of social mixity implies the mixture of different socio-economic, ethnic, education levels, age groups, types of families and lifestyle groups in a certain territory, like a country, a region, a city or a neighbourhood. In the urban context, social mixity is considered to be a value that makes a full citizenship possible by sharing and living with others and finding equality in diversity.

Urban segregation and therefore a lack of social mixture are seen as a rejection of what the city is supposed to be. Within cities, social mixity can be understood as a political tool to avoid concentrations of poverty, discrimination, voluntary separation of certain groups in society and concentrations of violence. Social mixity is thus a concept that promotes social inclusion and goes beyond social mixture in just housing. It promotes inter-social

relationships of the above mentioned different groups in the service sector, commerce, in schools, in public services and other places of social interaction (Carvalho, 2005: 5-6; Menezes and Almeida, 2006: 9-10).

The adoption of the social mixity concept in urban politics is based on the belief that the higher the level of socio-ethnic segregation, the greater the negative social disadvantages are (Carvalho, 2005: 7). But despite the lack of solid proof that there is a ´neighbourhood effect´ in the European context, efforts to mix the population are seen as a solution for the problems caused by segregation (Carvalho, 2005: 8; Musterd, 2005: 340; Dagevos, 2009: 9-10). There are also scientists who state that concentration is not a problem (see, for example, Van Kempen and Ozuekren, 1997: Van Kempen *et.al.*, 2000; Musterd and Ostendorf, 2013). They state that as a result of modern communication and transportation possibilities, the place where people live does not have as much influence on social contacts and job opportunities as before. The clustering of migrants in neighbourhoods in big cities is something of all times and history shows that most of the migrants move upwards in society. Therefore, politicians should not intervene too much and they have to accept that spatial policy does not have a great effect on behaviour (Dagevos, 2009: 9; Bolt, 2009; Bolt *et. al.* 2010).

Although Dagevos (2009) finds that research in the Netherlands shows that the neighbourhood does not influence the socio-economic position of a person, he emphasizes on the fact that other research shows negative consequences of segregation which justify policy measures to end segregation. Clustering makes it more difficult for immigrants to integrate in Dutch society as they have more social contact with people of their own ethnicity. Immigrants in white neighbourhoods also identify themselves more often as 'Dutch' then immigrants who live in segregated neighbourhoods. In neighbourhoods with residents of lower socio-economic classes, with high numbers of immigrants and with a rapid change in the composition of the population, are more likely to become victims of crime and feel more unsafe than residents in richer white neighbourhoods with a stable population composition (Dagevos, 2009: 9-11).

The mixing of the population in a city can be done in different ways. Bolt (2009) distinguishes five types of housing policy measures to disperse residents, namely: scattered-site programmes, rental subsidy/housing vouchers, housing allocation procedures, mobility programmes and housing diversification. Scattered-site programmes promote the spreading of the construction of social housing in white, non-poor neighbourhoods. For example, in France, there is a law that obliges each municipality to have a certain share of social housing (Musterd, 2005: 340). Bolt notes that scattered-site programmes are small in scale; therefore the effect on the overall segregation in cities is limited. It is also difficult to construct social

housing in higher class neighbourhoods as municipalities are reluctant to cooperate, because they fear that it will have a negative effect on surrounding neighbourhoods and it can cause the native population to leave the neighbourhood (Bolt, 2009: 398). Carvalho (2005) notes that the costs of building social housing in wealthier neighbourhoods can be too high because of the high land prices and the costs of social programs to integrate the lower social classes in these new neighbourhoods (Carvalho, 2005: 25).

Rental subsidies are given to low income households so they have a greater choice in the housing market. In the United States rental subsidy is provided in the form of housing vouchers which can only be used in the private sector. In the Netherlands, rental subsidy can also be used in the social rented sector. Rental subsidies help decrease levels of segregation, although this policy was not invented for that purpose. Research in the United States has shown that the housing voucher system not only increases the renting options for low income households, but it also leads to a decline in segregation (Bolt, 2009: 399).

Several European cities (like Rotterdam, Birmingham, Berlin and Frankfurt) have implemented quota systems which made it possible to control the amount of ethnic minorities in neighbourhoods where they were already strongly represented (Bolt 2004). It seems that the mixture of people on an ethnic basis is a more sensitive subject than the mixing on basis of social class (Dagevos, 2009: 12). Politicians and governmental institutions in the Netherlands have stated in various policy documents that the dispersal of minority groups was ´unacceptable´ or ´illegal´ as it would be in contradiction with the policy of non-discrimination. Local policy makers, directors of corporations and officials expressed their concerns about the lack of opportunities to implement policies of ethnic distribution. Bovens and Trappenburg (2004) conclude that existing spatial segregation in the Netherlands is largely the consequence of policy, on the one hand policy with a different objective (namely the liberalization of the housing market) but also a conscious choice to ban and discourage any form of ethnic distribution (Bovens and Trappenburg, 2004: 4-7).

Despite the discouragement, Rotterdam is the city in the Netherlands which tried the hardest to implement a policy of dispersal. In 1972 dispersal was already introduced in Rotterdam. To avoid the 'unbalance' of the population composition, the proportion Mediterranean, Surinamese and Antilleans in the district could not exceed 5 percent. This percentage was chosen because the proportion of these groups in the city as a whole was almost 5 percent. In this way, Rotterdam tried to avoid tensions between minority groups and the native Dutch and to stimulate the integration of ethnic minorities (Bolt, 2009: 399).

One year later the policy was suspended by the government decree in 1974, partly because it would be in contradiction with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. However, this did not mean that Rotterdam stopped to consider spreading as a possible option to decrease problems with the integration of immigrants. In 1979, Rotterdam was trying to diversify the population through the policy of 'concentrated deconcentration'. A special 'spreading committee' was given the task to minimize migrant housing in neighbourhoods where the proportion of migrants was under 16 percent. Immigrants went to court and won the case, which again stopped the dispersal policy (Bolt, 2004: 2-3).

In 2003 the discussion on dispersal in Rotterdam started again as the director of the district Charlois stated that the concentration of disadvantaged migrants is increasing the problems. The reason for his cry of distress was the prediction by the Rotterdam Centre for Research and Statistics (COS) that the proportion of non-Western immigrants in 2017 would form nearly half of the urban population. Charlois currently can barely handle all the problems so in 2017 handling the problems will be even more difficult (Bolt, 2004: 7).

Studies in different European countries that implemented quota indicate that the policy does not seem to work. One important reason is that it often goes against the preferences of people and therefore evasion takes place. Moreover, this policy is difficult to maintain as vacancy occurs in less attractive areas where migrants of the lower socio-economic classes usually come to live (Dagevos, 2009: 15). According to Bolt (2004), the dispersal policy always implies restricted possibilities for immigrants in the housing market. Sometimes whole neighbourhoods are closed to them. In other cases, they have to wait longer for a house than the native citizens. Also, the number of affordable housing in better neighbourhoods is limited which makes it almost impossible to accommodate all lower economic households in these "better" neighbourhoods (Bolt, 2004: 7). In places where dispersal through housing allocation has been enforced for a longer period, no evidence can be found for positive effects on the integration of minorities. Moreover, quota systems have not proven very effective in reducing ethnic segregation, which is partly due the preference of native households to not move into ethnic concentration neighbourhoods (Bolt, 2009: 399).

Mobility programmes combine rental subsidies with mobility counselling. Moreover, participants are often required to move to a neighbourhood with a low proportion of ethnic minorities or a low proportion of poor households. This is a policy measure that mainly has been implemented in the United States. Poorer households came to live in better dwellings and safer neighbourhoods, but there is less evidence for the positive effects on their labour

market position and level of education (Bolt, 2009: 400). In England this strategy has been successful because of the intensive counselling that these households received in their search for a new place to live in white/higher income neighbourhoods (Dagevos, 2009: 16-18).

Dagevos (2009) distinguishes another policy option which promotes the attraction of native citizens and higher income households to deprived neighbourhoods through the construction of better quality houses which are attractive for the middle class for example. Dagevos (2009) shows that this policy is not very effective in mixing people from different ethnicities as mainly immigrant households who obtained a higher socio-economic position occupy these new houses and it does not attract natives from other neighbourhoods. Thus, the ethnic composition remains the same, while the socio-economic heterogeneity indeed increases (Dagevos, 2009: 15-16).

Housing diversification policies are implemented in several European countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, France and the UK. Bolt *et al.* (2010) conclude that "*these countries are united in their failure to bring about a significant drop in the level of ethnic segregation. Social class segregation also remains fairly resistant to policy interventions*" (Bolt *et al.*, 2010). In his comparative research on mixing policies in these countries, Bolt (2009) finds that although each country has its own way of combating segregation, there are strong similarities in the political discourse. "*Even in countries that used to be known for their adherence to multiculturalism, like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, minority ethnic residential segregation is seen as problematic, posing a substantial threat to the integration of minorities and the social cohesion of society. Secondly, the policy discourses on the reasons behind segregation are one-dimensional. Whereas spatial segregation is determined by a large number of factors, many of them are almost completely overlooked, particularly discrimination and self-segregation tendencies among the native majority. Thirdly, all countries strive for a 'balanced' population structure in urban neighbourhoods, but it is never made clear what exactly constitutes an ideal mix. Only in Germany do the cities indicate specific maximum percentages of foreigners within the framework of the quota policies, but these figures lack any scientific justification*" (Bolt, 2009: 404).

Bolt finds a gap between the political discourse and the possibilities to actually combat segregation when he states that "*the demographic reality of increasing numbers of ethnic minorities makes it harder and harder to create 'balanced' neighbourhoods, with Helsinki as a possible exception. Besides that, housing policies have a limited effect on ethnic concentration, not only because they contradict each other but also, and more importantly,*

because they fail to address the main causes of segregation. In Finland, there seems to be an increasing awareness of the limited possibilities to counteract segregation. It is almost an embarrassment that many policy-makers in countries with a much longer immigration history still have to learn that lesson" (Bolt, 2009: 404).

Ostendorf *et al.* (2001) agree with Bolt when he says that mixing policies fail to address the main causes for segregation as it only attacks the effects of social inequality and not its causes. Therefore, policies in the fields of education and the labour market would be more effective to help the poor in their social mobility (Ostendorf *et al.*, 2001: 380). As immigrants come to live in the less attractive areas in cities because of their low socio-economic position, immigrants can be supported in the improvement of their socio-economic position by focusing on education, jobs and learning the language. According to Dagevos a combination of all the mixing policies and policies that help immigrant to improve their socio-economic situation are necessary to do something about the negative consequences of segregation (Dagevos, 2009: 13-18).

Besides the possible lack of effectiveness of the mixing policies, the obligatory mixture of ethnic groups seems to disturb a certain natural process. Boal (1978) shows that changes in the residential situation of an immigrant that arrives to a city, is a more or less structured process. Boal (1978) explains that if the immigrant group does not differ much from the host society in cultural terms, a rapid dispersal into the urban spatial structure can be expected. Thus, if there is a big difference between the newly arrived ethnic group and the host society, there will be more spatial concentration. Sometimes, this concentration of newly arrived immigrants is a temporary stage in the integration process. When the newly formed concentrations are temporary they are called 'colonies'. The colony is an area in a city that serves as a port of entry for an ethnic group. It may be relatively short-lived or it can have a longer future. Usually the colony only exists for a longer period of time when there is an input of new ethnic group members (Boal *in* Herbert and Johnston, 1978: 73).

Van Kempen and Ozuekren (1997) believe that spatial segregation is not just a negative development. According to them, these colonies can contribute to the development and maintenance of social contacts. Living together with people from their own culture helps them to develop social networks that can help them create their own business for example[19].

[19] Bekkenutte (2009) refers to this positive aspect of ethnic concentration as the *´enclave theory´*. By mixing the population composition of the neighbourhood, support for ethnically specific markets will reduce and thereby also their economic opportunities. Self-employment of immigrants by starting their own business is seen as an important way of integration (Bekkenutte, 2009: 33). Kleinhans *et al.* (2000) found in their study among the residents of three newly restructured neighbourhoods in the Netherlands (Rotterdam, The Hague and

They admit that in this way the result may be that they get excluded from mainstream society, but in their opinion, this does not have to be a problem as they form part of a solid group in their neighbourhood (Van Kempen and Ozuekren, 1997: 1636).

When a colony exists for a long period of time it is called an 'enclave'[20]. Immigrants usually keep living in a colony when there are cohesion factors within the ethnic group and when there are external pressures from the host society that makes it difficult for them to integrate into the host society. In the United States for example, there are clusters of Jews that have transformed into enclaves. The free choice of living segregated from the native population can be explained by their upward social mobility in combination with their continued residential segregation. They have access to higher paid jobs, but choose to live in the segregated Jewish area (Boal *in* Herbert and Johnston, 1978: 82).

As has been discussed in Section 1.2, immigrants have preferences for mixing or non-mixing and these preferences can vary between different ethnic groups and countries. The preference of living together with residents of the same ethnic group can serve as a way to preserve their culture[21] and it may make them feel more comfortable in their own neighbourhood so they do not have to deal with the 'threats' and discrimination from the host society. Downs (1973) has emphasized on the importance of daily interactions with neighbours for the quality of urban life. According to Downs, for this to be most successful and least stressful, these interactions should be with people rather similar in lifestyle. Although Downs does not approve of residential discrimination on ethnic grounds, such an approach is probably an effective means of achieving these satisfactory interactions. Thus, some degree of ethnic homogeneity is desirable[22] (Boal *in* Herbert and Johnston, 1978: 90).

Groningen), that neighborhood stores hardly benefited from the arrival of middle and high income groups. In the district Morgenstond in The Hague, small-scale shopping facilities have suffered greatly under the mixing policy (Kleinhans *et al.* 2000).

[20] The difference between an enclave and a 'ghetto' is the voluntary or involuntary nature. An enclave is a maintained segregated area because the residents want to live together, while a ghetto is formed because external factors severely limit the possibilities of its residents to live in other neighbourhoods. It is not always easy to make the distinction between voluntary or involuntary segregated areas (Herbert and Johnston, 1978: 73, 80).

[21] In Chicago for example it has been suggested that Jewish parents favour residence in a neighbourhood with a high density of Jews to make it almost certain that their children will marry a Jewish partner (Boal *in* Herbert and Johnston, 1978: 65).

[22] Dagevos (2009) found that in the Netherlands the turning point for social contact between the native and immigrant population groups is around 50 percent. If there are 50 percent or more non-Western immigrants in the neighbourhood, contact between immigrants and native Dutch people decreases. The conclusion is thus that for optimal contact between immigrants and the native population not too much and not too little mixture is needed. When too much immigrants come to live in a neighbourhood too fast, the native population feels threatened and will be less in contact with immigrants (Dagevos, 2009: 10).

Marcuse (1998) and Cheshire (2006) also think that residential segregation in cities is a natural phenomenon and it is not desirable to disturb this process by mixing the population artificially. Marcuse explains that there will always be richer and poorer citizens in cities and their interests will remain different. Marcuse therefore thinks that sustainable development in housing is impossible; because what is sustainable and desirable for the lower social classes is not what the upper classes want (Marcuse, 1998: 104-105). Cheshire (2006) thinks that the competition for obtaining the best well-being in the city should not be changed by government intervention. "*The problem is, of course, that the impulse to plan mixed neighbourhoods ignores vital aspects of how cities actually work and the advantages they offer which are 'sold' through the market in housing. People derive welfare from living near to other complementary (usually similar) households. They also derive welfare from living near amenities, such as views or attractive parks, and being distanced from concentrations of industry*" (Cheshire, 2006: 1240-1241).

Musterd (2003) shows that highly skilled workers in different service sectors choose to live in different types of neighbourhoods. Workers in ICT, financial services and banking choose to concentrate in the suburbs of Amsterdam while skilled workers in the creative industries are selectively concentrated in central neighbourhoods (Musterd, 2003). Carvalho (2005) notes that it is not always possible to put people from different groups together in one neighbourhood as there can be tensions between these groups which makes their coexistence impossible (Carvalho, 2005: 7).

2.2 The role of social capital in sustainable community development

The idea that a mixed neighbourhood has a positive effect on the economic opportunities for residents of lower socio-economic classes emerged in the 19th century. The sociologist Émile Durkheim introduced the 'social capital theory'[23] which states that belonging to a group can have advantages for an individual as the group members provide a network, social support and knowledge (Bekkenutte, 2009: 21). The American sociologist Wilson (1987) describes how the weak position of the black underclass is reinforced by their social isolation. Poor residents of the ghetto are not part of a job network which makes it harder for them to get a job (Wilson, 1987: 60).

[23] "Social capital recognizes that the relationships of everyday life between neighbours, colleagues and friends, even casual acquaintances, have value for the individual and for society as a whole" (Gilchrist, 2009: 8). "Social capital can be defined as the set of norms, networks, and organizations through which people gain access to power and resources, and through which decision making and policy formulation occur" (Dale, 2005: 15).

From another point of view, Granovetter (1973) made a distinction between 'strong ties' and 'weak ties'. Close and intensive contact with family and friends are the strong ties and weak ties are the more superficial contacts with colleagues, acquaintances and neighbours for example. The weak ties are especially useful to increase ones economic position according to Granovetter. People who are searching for a job usually obtain information on job opportunities and education possibilities from people they have superficial contact with. The people in their network with which they have weak ties, are people from different social classes which have access to different kind of information than someone would obtain from strong ties from their own social class (Granovetter, 1973). Putnam (2000) continued the line of thinking of Granovetter and makes a distinction between 'bonding' and 'bridging'. Bonding capital is mainly present in poor, strong communities and provides trust and social support. Bridges provide the opportunity to improve the social position in society (Putnam, 2000).

The first systematic analysis of social capital that is being used in contemporary sociological discourse was produced by Pierre Bourdieu in 1980. Bourdieu sees society as a plurality of social fields. Bourdieu distinguishes different forms of capital that people can obtain, namely social, cultural and economic capital. These forms of capital define positions and possibilities of a person in any social field. Economic capital consists of the materialistic (money) possessions, but is also consists of other economic possessions that increase a persons' capacity in society. Cultural capital is obtained to a large extent in early childhood by the education it received. Cultural capital is also objectivized in cultural articles and it also exists institutionalized in cultural institutions and is expressed in terms of certificates, diplomas and examinations (Siisiäinen, 2000). According to Bourdieu social capital consists of two elements. The first is the social relationship that allows a person to have access to certain recourses because of that relationship, and second, the amount and quality of those recourses. He emphasized that these different forms of capital should all contribute to more economic capital (Portes, 1998: 4).

Another theory which assumes a positive impact on economic integration when the composition of the population is more mixed is the 'poverty culture' theory. The American anthropologist Oscar Lewis (1966) described the poverty culture concept for the first time in neighbourhoods with long-time unemployment and where perspectives on improvements in the living situation are little[24]. Wilson (1987) noticed during his research in the ghettos in

[24] For more information on the ´Culture of Poverty´ theory of Oscar Lewis, see section 3.2.

Chicago that residents had different values than the values of mainstream society. These values restrain people in the ghettos from developing themselves economically. If a great part of the residents in the neighbourhood depends on social welfare, this can become the norm. Instead of making an effort to get a job, these people conform to the norms of the neighbourhood and do not find it a problem to be dependent on social welfare. According to the poverty culture theory, positive role models in the neighbourhood can change the poverty culture and have a positive influence on the economic position of poor residents (Bekkenutte, 2009: 23).

The reason for the preoccupation with social capital was the rapid urbanisation process that started to take place in the first half of the 20th century. Urbanisation was perceived as a negative process as the traditional community ties and shared religious and moral values would be replaced with anonymity, individualism and competition. The Chicago School adherents especially were concerned with this new urban way of life. Growing inequality, rising crime rates, the growth of organised crime, long-term unemployment and underemployment particularly among young people, rising divorce rates and single parenthood are all considered signs of a disorganised society. Debates about the meaning of ´the community´ and ´the neighbourhood´ have continued ever since the Chicago School started to show concerns about city life (Forrest and Kearns, 2001: 2125, 2127). Nowadays, the most important reason for the renewed interest in the community and the neighbourhood is a concern with the negative consequences of socio-ethnic segregation. Forrest and Kearns (2001) note that "*these neighbourhoods are not only seen as a social problem in their own right, but also as a more pervasive threat to the moral order or social cohesion of cities. Moreover, there is often an implicit view that what separates the 'successful' neighbourhood from the 'unsuccessful' is the degree to which there is social cohesion, the underlying assumption being that disadvantaged neighbourhoods lack the necessary ingredients which foster social cohesion*" (Forrest and Kearns, 2001: 2133).

The question arises whether social capital is really declining and thus if we should be worried. Putnam published *´Bowling Alone: America´s Declining Social Capital´* in 1995 and the expansion of the original argument *´Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community´* in 2000. His work became extremely influential in development studies, both in the United States as internationally. Although his work has been very influential, his theory has also been criticized (see for example: Durlauf, 2000; DeFilippis, 2001).

Putnam argues that civil society in the United States is declining because Americans are becoming more disconnected from their families, neighbours, communities, and the republic. The growing decline in social capital threatens educational performance, safe neighbourhoods, equitable tax collection, democratic responsiveness, everyday honesty and health and happiness according to Putnam. He thus argues that social capital and civil society promote economic growth, but according to DeFilippis (2001) there is little theoretical or empirical support for this assertion (DeFilippis, 2001: 792). DeFilippis (2001) proposes the question how it can be that if civic engagement has been declining in the United States from the 1960´s, why the American elites have been doing so well financially in the last 35 years? "*Where is the economic impact of their disengagement*? *Affluent and professional Americans have enjoyed a virtually unprecedented period of prolonged prosperity, and the current gap in wealth between rich and poor is greater than it has been since before the Great Depression. Putnam´s theory just does not make sense in, let alone explain this reality*" (DeFilippis, 2001: 795).

Another question is whether the neighbourhood and local networks are still as important in a time in which modern technologies such as the internet expanded our opportunities to create networks outside the neighbourhood. Forrest and Kearns (2001) note that people may become disconnected from their neighbours, however globalisation can also have a positive effect. "*As the forces which bear down upon us seem to be increasingly remote, local social interaction and the familiar landmarks of the neighbourhood may take on greater significance as sources of comfort and security*" (Forrest and Kearns, 2001: 2129). Lin (1999) shows that informal networks are mainly used by people with a weak position in the labour market to get a job. The higher the difference in socio-economic position between the person that is looking for a job and the person in the informal network with a higher position, the more effective this help can be (Lin, 1999).

Forrest and Kearns (2001) state that the neighbourhood is still important for poorer residents, because of high unemployment, high levels of single parenthood and a high number of poor pensioner households. Because of their financial restrictions, residents of poor neighbourhoods spend more time in their local areas than residents of wealthier neighbourhoods do. They make a distinction between neighbourhood and neighbouring. In disadvantaged neighbourhoods, neighbouring may be of greater importance for the residents to be able to deal with the unattractive physical environment. In upper class areas, the physical aspect of the neighbourhood may be more important as these residents choose a

place to live according to the physical environment instead of the degree of social interaction (Forrest and Kearns, 2001: 2130, 2133).

Although it seems that social capital is important for poorer residents, DeFilippis (2001) argues that contemporary interest in social capital by community development theorists, funders, and practitioners is misguided and needs to be rethought. "*Social capital, as understood by Putnam and people influenced by his work, is a fundamentally flawed concept, because it fails to understand issues of power in the production of communities and because it is divorced from economic capital. Therefore, community development practice based on this understanding of social capital is, and will continue to be, similarly flawed*" (DeFilippis, 2001: 783). DeFilippis questions whether social capital can be increased for poor people in poor neighbourhoods, since social capital according to him is associated with wealth as wealthier people have access to higher quality networks[25]. "*Social capital, while being constituted by social networks and relationships, is never disconnected from capital*" (DeFilippis, 2001: 783).

Woolcock and Narayan (2000) provide examples for this way of thinking as they give several examples of developing countries where high levels of social solidarity do not necessarily lead to economic prosperity. In Kenya for example, a participatory poverty assessment found over 200.000 community groups in rural areas, but most were unconnected to outside resources and were unable to lift the poor out of poverty. In many Latin American countries indigenous groups are often characterized by high levels of social solidarity, but experience high levels of poverty, because they do not have the resources and access to power. These groups cannot overcome the effects of colonialism, corruption, geographical isolation, political exclusion and social polarization (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 7).

In addition to the fact that social capital is not a guarantee for economic development, strong social solidarity can even have negative effects. Portes (1998) enumerates four negative consequences of social capital. First, the same strong ties that bring benefits to members of a group can also exclude others. The traditional monopoly of Jewish merchants over the New York diamond trade and the dominance of Cubans over numerous sectors of the Miami economy are examples. Social capital generated by solidarity and trust provide these groups economic advance, but exclude others. The second negative effect of social capital is that it can prevent the success of business initiatives by members of the same group. Less

[25] The French sociologist Pierre Bordieu was already concerned with the difference in social capital for the upper and lower economic classes. His view was that social capital was a source and privilege that benefited the upper class, but had little relevance for the other sections of society except to exclude them from opportunities for advancement (Gilchrist, 2009: 9).

successful members of a group can impose demands on the more successful members and can be too dependent on them (Portes, 1998: 15-16).

Third, community or group participation necessarily creates demands for conformity. In a small town or village, all neighbours know each other. The level of social control is strong and also quite restrictive of personal freedoms, which is the reason why the young and the more independent-minded have always left (Portes, 1998: 16). Fourth, there can be communities which have built their solidarity on feelings of adversity from mainstream society. Members of poor communities, who work hard to get a better job to become part of the middle-class, can be seen as betrayers of the community. The result of these low norms is either that people conform to it in order to stay member of the group or it forces the more ambitious to escape from it (Portes, 1998: 17). Sometimes, the stronger the ties which bind ethnic and/or religious communities the greater the social, racial or religious conflict between them. Social cohesion thus can be about discrimination and exclusion and about a majority imposing its will or value system on a minority. Moreover, the assumed ingredients for social cohesion may be lacking in precisely those parts of the cities which are apparently successful and problem-free (Forrest and Kearns, 2001: 2134).

Despite the possible negative consequences of strong communities, there has been a resurgent interest in the idea of community among academics, policy makers and politicians. Communitarian thinking prescribes stable and well-integrated communities as a condition for progress and social inclusion, particularly when faced with complex and intractable problems. Gilchrist (2009) states that "*by promoting community involvement as a palliative (if not a cure) for ´disadvantage´, governments may be seeking to avoid demands for significant redistribution of resources and opportunities. Community life can be seen as a mechanism that arises to cope with lack of opportunity rather than one that creates opportunities*" (Gilchrist, 2009: 19).

Putnam´s research on levels of social capital shows a strong connection between social capital and economic growth, stable governance and social cohesion. This has attracted interest from agencies concerned with economic development and political stability (Gilchrist, 2009: 9-10). The World Bank has been especially focused on community empowerment and adult education programmes that build social capital in the developing world so communities are able to combat poverty in a sustainable way[26]. Most international programmes for poverty

[26] For more information on the relation between social capital and economic development see: Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 15-18.

eradication, for example sponsored by the World Bank or United Nations agencies, require forms of community participation as a means of building social capital[27] (Gilchrist, 2009: 10).

Thus, social capital is considered to be essential for sustainable community development[28]. According to Roseland (2000) "*we must explicitly aim to nurture and multiply social capital in order not only to preserve our stock of natural capital*[29] *but also to improve our economic and social well-being. Government and corporate decisions should be reviewed for their effects on both natural and social capital. Programs and policies need to be effected at every level to insure that natural and social capitals are considered properly*" (Roseland, 2000: 98).

But what is the relation between social capital and sustainable community development? Dale (2005) explains that networks are an important way to build empowerment, trust, cooperation and collective norms. Participation of communities in the decision-making process is essential for sustainable development issues. Dale acknowledges that it is becoming more difficult to establish common values for communities in cities as they have to deal with diverse cultures, interests, visions, priorities and needs. Also communities differ tremendously in their engagement in sustainable development issues, their capacity, their resources, and their understanding of sustainable development. Dale thinks communities should be stimulated to think about the meaning of their community and local governments should engage them in sustainable development issues (Dale, 2005: 14-15, 23, 26, 28).

Roseland recognises that there are also many obstacles to progress in this direction. "*We cannot realistically expect most people to choose sustainable options if they appear to be more difficult or expensive than unsustainable choices*" (Roseland, 2000: 115). In order to force citizens to think about sustainable behaviour, there has been a growing interest in using economic measures to influence behaviour of citizens in relation to the environment. Such instruments (taxes, charges, subsidies, tradable permits, deposit-refund schemes, performance bonds) are becoming more popular and are also seen as an option for pollution control and energy consumption (Roseland, 2000: 115).

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[27] For more information on citizen empowerment see: White 1996; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Hickey and Mohan 2004.

[28] A sustainable community seeks a better quality of life for all its residents while maintaining nature's ability to function over time by minimizing waste, preventing pollution, promoting efficiency and developing local resources to revitalize the local economy (Roseland, 2000: 99).

[29] Natural capital refers to any stock of natural assets that yields a flow of valuable goods and services into the future. For example, a forest, a fish stock or an aquifer can provide a harvest or flow that is potentially sustainable year after year. The forest or fish stock is "natural capital" and the sustainable harvest is "natural income." (Roseland, 2000: 78).

Chattanooga, Tennessee is an example of a city that has been successful in implementing the concept of sustainable community development. In 1969, it was the worst polluted city in the United States. In 1990 it was recognized as the city that made the greatest change. This change started in 1984 when the community was asked what they wanted their city to be like by the year 2000. The shared vision was to put affordable housing, public education, transportation alternatives, better urban design, parks and greenways and neighbourhood vitality at the top of the community's agenda. Trough successful collaboration between the government, companies and citizens the air was cleaned up and a city in decline was revitalized (Roseland, 2000: 112).

Curitiba, Brazil has received international praise as a city that works for its integrated transportation and land use planning, and for its waste management programs. In part, the city's success can be attributed to strong leadership as city officials focused on developing simple, flexible and affordable solutions that could be realized at the local level and adapted to changing conditions. Citizen participation was also an important element that contributed to the success. Jonas Rabinovitch, a long-time advisor to Curitiba Mayor Jaime Lerner, believes the lesson to be learned from Curitiba is that creativity can substitute for financial resources. Any city, rich or poor, can draw on the skills of its residents to tackle urban environmental problems. Roseland concludes that "all these examples confirm the importance of multiplying social capital as a key to moving toward sustainable communities" (Roseland, 2000: 114).

2.3 Government influence on social capital and social distance

There is a perspective on social capital which states that ´the community´ and civil society is mainly a product of the institutional environment. The perspectives discussed in the previous section can be labelled as the communitarian and the network perspective, which view social capital as a capacity of social groups to create their own networks. The institutional perspective argues that the level of social capital depends on the government. Another view argues that neither the state nor citizens alone are responsible for sustainable development; all parties that can contribute to sustainable development are responsible according to this view (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 11).

A study of the World Bank (1996) on the different aspects that determine the success of development projects, performed in India, Mexico, Russia, South Korea and Brazil, shows that communities, states and private companies cannot operate on their own and should all work together to obtain sustainable development. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) conclude

from this study that "of these different sectors, the state's role in facilitating positive developmental outcomes is the most problematic and important. This is so because the state is not only the ultimate provider of public goods (stable currencies, public health, universal education) and the final arbiter and enforcer of the rule of law (property rights, due process, freedom of speech and association), it is also the actor best situated to facilitating enduring alliances across the boundaries of class, ethnicity, race, gender, politics, and religion" (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 12-13).

Isham and Kaufmann (1999) explain that governments can have a great influence on sustainable communities. Indifferent governments will have a different effect on community life and development projects, than governments that respect civil liberties and are not corrupt (Isham and Kaufmann 1999). Gottdiener and Hutchinson (2006) show that governments have to deal with different interests from different groups and that because of this, governments make policy decisions that are not necessarily in the best interest of the citizens[30]. In their research based on eleven case studies of deprived neighbourhoods in nine EU countries, the European Commission concludes that there is evidence that relations between local public authorities and residents are often characterized by mistrust. Renewal programs that supposedly create new opportunities for socially excluded neighbourhoods can create new tensions because of the content of programs and the way in which authorities are implementing them (European Commission: 147).

The European Commission found that institutions often are unwilling to share information, power and resources. Also, institutions often do not have a full understanding of the problems in the neighbourhood and are not able to overcome this problem, because they are not capable of establishing relations with the residents of the neighbourhood. Another problem is that there is a lack of cooperation between professional organisations and residents and their organizations. Due to a lack of cooperation with local civil society, agencies have a tendency to look at the neighbourhood from their own sectorial perspective. The case studies

[30] According to pluralism theory, different interest groups influence local political decisions. These interest groups compete more or less equally to influence political decisions. While large corporations might influence decisions by contributing to political campaigns of politicians, labour unions also contribute to the politicians that represent their interests.The elite theory argues that there is always an influential select group that has a lot of control in a town. The government and the private sector work together to push development in specific directions, even when the community does not agree with these policies. According to the state managerlialism theory, local government itself possesses some autonomy from both the community and business interests. For example, since government agencies represent a principal sector of employment, the local state seeks to enlarge its power over the private sector just to generate jobs and justify expanding budgets. Leaders of local government are also aware that they must satisfy the majority of the population to remain in power. They may for example demand that developers make small but significant concessions to community interests before project plans can be approved (Gottdiener and Hutchinson, 2006: 236-238).

show a significant gap between the professionals working in the neighbourhood and residents. There seems to be a lack of knowledge of each other. In other reports mistrust was even reported. It can be discussed whether lack of communication is a symptom of residents mistrusting professionals, or whether residents' mistrust stems from a mistrust of the organisation which the professional represents. The language used by professionals can also create barriers for exchange of views about what the most important local problems are. These knowledge deficits mean that actions taken by the professionals do not always correspond to priorities and action that would have been preferred by the residents (European Commission: 159-160).

Thus, local authorities are considered responsible for a great part for the distance between government and residents, as well as for the distance between different resident groups. With mixing-policies, local governments try to increase contact (and thereby social capital) between different socio-ethnic groups. But how much of an influence can local governments be? Can the government by changing the spatial distance between residents of different socio-ethnic groups decrease the social distance that exists between them? To answer this question the relationship between the physical space and the social space has to be studied and to what extend social ties are predicated upon physical proximity.

The concept of ´social distance´ was invented by the German sociologist Simmel. He explained social relations as forms of distance. Social distance, according to Simmel, is created by geometric distance and metaphoric distance. The metaphoric distance is created in the minds of people as things, people or places only get a meaning when they interact. The physical distance that exists between people influences their social behaviour. Park (1924) took Simmel´s concept to study race consciousness. The terms 'race consciousness' and 'class consciousness,' describe a state of mind in which people become, often suddenly and unexpectedly conscious of the distances that separate, or seem to separate us, from classes and races whom we do not fully understand[31]. In 1925 Bogardus developed the ´Bogardus social distance scale´ which is most often used to measure social distance. The survey consists of seven questions to determine how much distance there is between different socio-ethnic groups. People have to respond whether they would have a person from another group as a

[31] Ethington (1997) criticizes the simplistic use of the concept by the Chicago School adherents when he states that: "Park and Burgess' facile reliance on instincts of difference, and simultaneous lack of attention to the geometry of social life basically erased Simmel's important contribution of having suggested that geometric distance may produce metaphoric distance. In the Park-Burgess model, precisely the reverse happens: people begin with an instinctual drive to "maintain social distance," and therefore chose different residential and productive space to occupy" (Enthington, 1997).

neighbour or if they would marry them for example[32] (Ethington, 1997). Social distance can be measured for characteristics such as race/ethnicity, economic resources, gender, life course stage, and social background (Hipp and Perrin, 2009: 3).

Hipp and Perrin found in their research that past theory and research suggests three reasons why social distance might be important for affecting interaction between residents: social distance can decrease the similarity in attitudes between two individuals; social distance can decrease the chances of creating a shared group identity and social distance between different social statuses creates role differences. Theoretical models have suggested five key determinants of social distance, those are: economic class, life course position; cultural values and attitudes; gender and racial/ethnic differences (Hipp and Perrin, 2009: 7-8). This means that when different socio-ethnic groups are mixed, the greater the social distance will be between them which makes it more difficult to create a strong community and social networks.

The question has been raised in the previous section whether the neighbourhood is still of great importance for the creation of networks due to modern technologies. The declining significance of place is causing the creation of "communities without locality", online communities make place for local neighbourhood contacts (Gottdiener and Hutchinson, 2006: 186). Although the internet and cell phones have created new ways of networking, Gottdiener and Hutchinson (2006) emphasize that "*cities and suburbs are not simply spaces where people organize their lives; they are also physical environments that are meaningful in different ways to different persons. People assign distinct meanings and associate specific emotions with places, such as their homes or the neighbourhood*" (Gottdiener and Hutchinson, 2006: 188).

Bow and Buys (2003) show how communities are tied to place. The ´Sense of Community´ concept explores how individuals interact with, are connected to and are influenced by their social setting. Place attachment occurs through a positive affective relationship between people and place because of people's satisfaction with and identification with a specific place. Place identity is a form of place attachment and shows the emotional connection that people have with a specific place. A stronger form of place attachment is place dependence, which occurs when people are bound to a certain place to reach their goals or certain activities. When people find the same qualities in a certain place or experience the same problems, this can play a role in maintaining group identities. The built and natural

[32] Ethington (1997) criticizes the Bogardus social distance scale for being too focused on measuring geometric distance while there is a lack of attention for the metaphoric distance (Ethington, 1997).

environment thus influences the sense of community that people feel (Bow and Buys, 2003: 3-5).

Another concept that shows the importance of place for communities is the concept of territory. Herbert and Johnston (1978) explain how the place where communities chose to live is a natural process that can serve as a protection mechanism from outside threats. "Just like animals, humans have the need to mark their territory. On the individual level, owning a home is an example of marking your own territory. Social groups also define their territories, gangs can mark their territory on the streets and the rich build high fences in front of their houses to be secured of privacy. Communities in neighbourhoods can also mark their territories to keep outsiders or newcomers away. Such territories allow social groups to retreat into their own 'social worlds' from which are excluded those with whom they wish no contact; in this way, the uncertainties of living amongst different social groups can be avoided" (Herbert and Johnston, 1978: 11). Carvalho (2005) makes a similar point when he notes that mixing population groups and thereby interrupting the natural residential process, causes serious social risks. Minority groups when mixed with dominant cultures, can lose their cultural references and their cultural identity which causes a loss in their sense of community (Carvalho, 2005: 7).

Hipp and Perrin (2009) studied the simultaneous effect of social distance and physical distance on the formation of neighbourhood ties and found that physical space indeed is important in the formation of social ties. As the New Urbanist movement proposes an increase in neighbourhood ties between residents of different socio-economic classes, Hipp and Perrin conducted a survey in a New Urbanist neighbourhood in the south of the United States. The first houses in the studied neighbourhood were built in 2001 and the city has approximately 50.000 residents. This New Urbanist neighbourhood consists of different kinds of housing units for different economic classes. Through a survey similar to the Bogardus Scale, they studied the formation of weak and strong ties. In order to make the connection between physical distance and social distance, they first measured the physical distance between the houses. According to the housing values, they made a distinction between different socio-economic statuses. They also measured differences between households along three key life course characteristics namely: age, marital status, and the presence of children in the home less than 18 years old. They concluded that residents choose those closest to them when choosing with whom to interact. This physical closeness is important for the creation of weak ties between neighbours, but is even more important for the formation of strong ties. Difference in age, marital status and having children are all important factors in the creation

of neighbourhood ties. The greater the differences in these life course stages, the greater the social distance. The most important conclusion of the survey is that differences in home values, reduces the formation of weak ties. Hipp and Perrin therefore state that "this effect of wealth inequality may also imply important policy implications for the New Urbanist perspective, as it suggests a need for more active efforts to bridge the gap between residents of different economic backgrounds" (Hipps and Perrin, 2009:20).

Veldboer (2010) draws more or less the same conclusion in his study on the urban renewal policies that have been implemented since 1997 in the Netherlands. These urban renewal policies have the aim to create more mixed neighbourhoods by replacing cheap social rental apartments with better quality rental apartments that will attract the middle class. It is hoped that greater economic diversity will make these neighbourhoods more liveable, stable and sustainable. Also in the Netherlands the basis for this policy is the assumption among policy-makers that income-mixing will create ties of commitment between the different social groups and those vulnerable groups will absorb the values and standards of the middle class.

However, after more than ten years of urban renewal policies to create more mixed neighbourhoods in the Netherlands, Veldboer concludes that the positive ideas of politicians when it comes to the social mixture of residents are not realistic. The most important conclusions from his study are that urban renewal projects (where middle-class groups enter lower-class areas) often realize their objectives for the neighbourhood, including improving the quality of life, reputation and security of the district. Another important finding is that interventions in deprived areas do not lead to large-scale disruption of social networks. On the other hand, the Dutch approach to urban renewal does not help residents to obtain a higher socio-economic status. Social problems do not immediately resolve themselves, they are only replaced to other areas. While residents tend to be satisfied with their new housing, they often remain disappointed with the social composition of their mixed neighbourhoods. Just like Hipps and Perrin concluded, in the Netherlands people are also more likely to interact with people from their own socio-economic and/or cultural background which would indicate that mixing policies are not very effective in decreasing social distance (Veldboer, 2010).

3. Socio-Ethnic Segregation in Portugal: A Case Study of a Sustainable Urban Development Project in a Bairro Social of Lisbon

In this Chapter socio-ethnic segregation in Portugal will be discussed. In the first section a greater understanding of this topic in Portugal can be obtained through a historical overview on the creation of segregated areas, mainly in the capital city of Lisbon. Initially only socially segregated areas existed, but with the arrival of immigrants from the former colonies ethnic segregation also became an urban issue in Portugal. Also the implemented policies by the government will be shown.

The second and third section is a case study of the Boavista neighbourhood in Lisbon. The Boavista neighbourhood is a deprived area in the city which was constructed during the dictatorship of Salazar. A historical overview of the construction of this *bairro social* will be provided and it will be shown what influence the dictatorship had on the neighbourhood culture in this social housing neighbourhood.

Section 3.3 consists of a data analysis. As segregation can only be determined by comparing an area with its direct surroundings, a comparison of the Boavista neighbourhood with five different scales has been made in order to validate the socio-ecological structure of the Boavista neighbourhood. Through the differences it can become evident whether the Boavista community is socially disadvantaged within its immediate environment or not. Not only will there be an analysis of data, also the psychological aspect of living in a segregated area will be discussed.

3.1 Socio-ethnic segregation in Portugal: historical overview and policy measures

In the 1930s and 1940s, families from the interior zones of the country, particularly from the Beira area, moved to the capital to improve their living situation. These rural residents moved to Lisbon where the industrialization process took place. Without the security of being able to grow their own food and without proper professional qualification, these people came to live in the peripheries of the city where they constructed their own homes which came to be known as "*bairros de lata*". These slums were located in the periphery of the city and formed a "ring" of poor housing around the city centre (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006: 4-5, 12).

During the first decades of the Salazar regime (1933-1974), there was little attention for the construction of housing. When houses were constructed it was always with a political and symbolic function. Its function was to show the capacity of the regime to create a happy

social and family life which reflected the values of the regime. Only very occasionally the housing conditions of the working classes were improved. As a result of this policy, in the late 1950s early 1960s, there was a huge housing shortage. By that time, the intensified capitalist forms of production in agriculture and industrialization in the cities caused an increased demographic pressure on urban centres, particularly on Lisbon. The growth of the capital city implied the growth of its suburbs as the population of Lisbon exceeded its limits and people began to move to the suburbs where more housing was available and rents were more affordable. At the same time, the slums also began a process of expansion outside the city. Not so much because there was no space left in the inner city, but because, among other factors, and in certain periods, the policy of the city council was to "cleanse" the city of such constructions. Part of the slums that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s were constructed exactly at the administrative boundaries of the city, which is no longer Lisbon (Cardoso and Perista, 1994: 100).

These types of neighbourhoods were usually constructed in unfavourable locations, such as valleys, slopes, and inaccessible areas, areas of streams or dumps which cause unhealthy living situations. According to Cardoso and Perista (1994), this shows that segregation was created intentionally by the government as poorer habitants were banned from the city centre. "The appropriation of this urban space shows that it was not a neutral process nor random, but is made on the basis of exclusion or near exclusion of certain groups from certain locations" (Cardoso and Perista, 1994: 102).

In the 1940s, the regime promoted the construction of the first *bairros sociais* (social housing neighbourhoods) in Lisbon to house families that were living in these unhealthy living-circumstances in the slums. The *bairros sociais* consisted not only of demountable houses, also infrastructure such as sanitation, streets, public illumination and social facilities including a school, market, public washing space and chapels were constructed for the families. The management of these neighbourhoods was provided by two committees: administrative and social work respectively with functions of management, supervision, regulation and social protection. These tasks were divided over three entities namely; the Municipality of Lisbon (responsible for the housing management), Legião Portuguesa (support of legal institutions) and the Santa Casa de Misericórdia de Lisboa (for social and financial support) (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006: 4-5, 12).

According to Cardoso and Perista, the location of the construction of the *bairros sociais* also shows that segregation has been created intentionally by the Estado Novo. The *bairros sociais* were created to locate the urban poor that were living in the slums, but instead

of integrating them into the rest of the city with different social classes and different ethnic groups, these neighbourhoods were constructed in locations in the periphery with poor access to the city centre (Cardoso and Perista, 1994: 102). The '*bairros da lata*' thus changed into more consolidated neighbourhoods that were placed more and more in the peripheral areas far away from the city centre, especially in the northern part of Lisbon. This process began in the 1960s, was accentuated after 1974 and continued through the 1980s. The majority of neighbourhoods which made the transition from slums to consolidated neighbourhoods with houses built by the government, were predominantly inhibited by people of African origin, especially Cape Verdeans (Cardoso and Perista, 1994: 101).

Until the mid-1960s, the arrival of immigrants to Lisbon was limited as regional needs for manpower were completely satisfied by the internal market. In the 1960s, the industrialization process intensified and the construction of the metropolitan area of Lisbon was amplified which caused an increase in demand for manpower, particularly men. Because of the colonial wars and high emigration numbers, there was a lack of young people for the jobs in industry and construction. Various civil construction and manufacturing companies started to employ unskilled Cape Verdean immigrants (Malheiros, 1998: 101). However, the Cape Verdean immigrants were only registered as foreigners after their country's independence in 1975 and thus, are not referred to in the official statistics (Fonseca, 1998: 191). In the 1960s only one percent of the populations in Portugal were foreigners. These were namely Spanish and other European citizens from the middle- and higher social classes that worked in Lisbon and the Estoril costal area, which is a prestigious area (Malheiros, 1998: 101-102).

Thus, long before the 1960's, especially from the second half of the 1940s, the waves of internal migration, from all parts of the country, contributed decisively to a profound transformation of the urban territory, in both metropolitan areas (Lisbon and Porto), giving rise to the phenomenon of urban residential segregation at a level that was unknown until that time, however this segregation did not yet express segregation of ethnicity or nationality. It can be stated that segregation in Portugal was based for a long time just on social and class differences that came to live in the same city because of the internal migration flows.

The de-colonisation process in 1974 and 1975 caused an arrival of refugees from Portuguese Speaking Countries in Africa (called the PALOPs in Portuguese) and some Indians and Pakistanis living in Mozambique. Although many of these refugees chose to keep Portuguese nationality, they played an important role in the development of new migration flows coming from those countries. They established informal networks so relatives, friends

and fellow-countrymen could settle easily in Portugal (Fonseca, 1998). Malheiros (1998) explains how the political revolution in 1974 and the process of decolonization of the Portuguese colonies in Africa changed the geographical and socio-professional composition of foreigners. The arrival of more than 500,000 people from the former colonies in the second half of the 1970s exerted strong pressure on the housing market, particularly in Lisbon, because more than 50% of the total number of immigrants eventually established residency in Lisbon. As the immigration process was unexpected and without preparation, the economic resources of the newcomer population did not allow, in many cases, the rental or purchase of housing in the private market. With the arrival of African immigrants from the ex-colonies, spatial segregation of different social classes became socio-ethnic segregation in the 1970s (Malheiros, 1998: 103, 105).

The process of internationalization of the Portuguese economy from the second half of the 1980s caused a growing presence of foreign-funded enterprises in the area of trade and services. More Capeverdians[33] arrived in this period and also more immigrants from other Portuguese Speaking Countries in Africa immigrated to Portugal. A growing number of Brazilians immigrated to Portugal in this period and between 1986 and 1991, Brazilians outstripped the growth rates of Capeverdian immigration. Although for Brazilians the main motive to immigrate was also work-related, it is essentially different from African migration, since incoming Brazilians have a much higher social and economic level than PALOP and Asian immigrants (Fonseca, 1998: 191-193).

The dynamics of the urban economy from the mid-1980s seems to have accentuated the already existing polarizing tendencies. The internationalization of the economy caused great differences in the area of employment and incorporated a racial dimension. The European, American and Brazilian immigrants that came to the city in this period had higher paid jobs, while the African immigrants were mainly low skilled workers in civil construction. There was not only a difference in salary between these two immigrant groups, but there was also a difference in the space where they came to live. The Africans came to live in industrialized areas in the periphery, while the Europeans, Americans and Brazilians came to live in the city centre. The urban policy in the 1980s had a strong focus on improvement of

[33] In the 1981 Census, the number of Africans living in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area registered by the local authorities already outstripped the number of Europeans (27,415 and 12,834, respectively). In 1986 the Capeverdians were the largest foreign community in the region, representing 42.3% of legal immigrants registered by Portugal's Customs and Immigration Service (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras) (Fonseca, 1998: 191).

luxurious houses in neighbourhoods which already had a good reputation which implies that not much was done to improve the living situation of the poor (Malheiros, 1998: 107-108).

There was also a strong focus on promoting home-ownership. In Southern European countries, owner-occupation has always been regarded as an important element of the welfare system. It serves as a key political-economic instrument which creates more employment and economic growth while at the same time it ensures political stability. Since the mid-1980s this housing policy was reinforced by the liberalisation process of the housing market and banking system. The liberalisation process included the abolition of rent control, the progressive convergence of controlled rents towards market rents and the privatisation of social housing, together with changes in housing and land policy instruments, credit and fiscal systems (low-rate mortgages and tax benefits for the principal residence), housing production and planning control over land. These changes have led to four major outcomes which deepened socio-ethnic segregation in the city of Lisbon. First, the expansion of home-ownership caused the rental sector to shrink sharply, particularly cheap accommodation in central areas. Second, the housing prices in the rental sector and the owner-occupied sector grew dramatically. Third, housing ownership became dependent on monetary recourses and savings, which only the middle-class and higher-classes have access to. Fourth, the erosion of self-build housing (both formal and informal). The rising housing prices and the erosion of self-build housing and cheap rent have caused a significant reduction of the affordable rental homes in the central areas. This has caused the low-income population and immigrants to move towards more peripheral areas (Arbaci and Malheiros, 2010: 231).

Another factor that contributed to the spatial segregation of different ethnic groups in Lisbon was the construction of important transportation and communication infrastructure after the mid-1980s. The Vasco da Gama Bridge, the railroad crossing on the April 25 Bridge, the CRIL beltway, the CREL beltway, the north-south axis and the expansion of the metropolitan network, increased the disparity between the areas served by these infrastructures and those that were not (Fonseca, 1998: 203).

Although the Portuguese economy entered a new depression cycle during the 1990s, with a growing decline in gross domestic product and a rise in unemployment, the number of foreign immigrants with residence permits in Portugal between 1991 and 1996 grew at a faster rate than in the previous 5 year period (51.7% and 31.0% respectively). Although part of that increase was the result of the 1992/1993 legalisation campaign, the huge number of legalisation requests (35,082) presented during the second period of legalisation between March 31 and December 11, 1996 clearly shows the migration pressure on Portugal and the

volume of illegal migration (Fonseca, 1998: 191-193). Between 1986 and 1996, the number of foreigners with a residence permit living in the districts of Lisbon and Setúbal grew 105.5% with Angolans and Guineans having the highest growth rates. They were followed by Brazilians and people from Saint Tome and Príncipe. In this period, the number of Asians, mainly Chinese, Indians and Pakistanis almost doubled. Also a growing number of Europeans (mainly from Eastern Europe) settled in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. By the end of 1996, the largest immigrant communities in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area were made up of citizens from the former African colonies, mainly from Cape Verde, followed at a great distance by people from the European Community and Brazil. Immigration to Portugal, and especially to the Lisbon region, is predominantly labour migration. Foreign immigrants are mainly young mails that have a work-activity rate that is higher than that of the Portuguese population (Fonseca, 1998: 194-195).

According to Malheiros and Vala (2004) the 1990s are crucial to understand the present political and socio-spatial position of foreigners and their offspring in Portugal, because in this period problems with immigration[34] became an important topic in politics. Also, political structures such as national and local immigrants' councils or the national High Commissioner for Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME) have been set up and policy measures for the regularisation of illegal immigrants and the promotion of equality of rights between nationals and foreigners in several fields (education, work, housing, health) have been developed in this period. The main policy discourse was to increase border control leading to small numbers of new entries that would be useful for the Portuguese labour market. The turn of the century has been marked by a sudden and very significant increase in the number of foreign citizens (177,774 in 1998; 350,503 in 2001)[35]. It was in this period that Eastern Europeans (in particular Ukrainians) became the greatest immigrant group. In less than five years Ukrainians have become the largest group of legal foreigners settled in the country, passing the old-established groups of Cape Verdeans, Angolans and Brazilians. A difference with these new immigrants is that they are more dispersed across the city, have higher qualification levels and do more different kinds of jobs. Despite these small advantages

[34] For more information on the problems between the native Portuguese population and minority immigration groups see: (Malheiros *et al.* 2007).

[35] The 1990s and the years of the turn of the millennium, marked the transition of Portugal from a country of emigration to a country of immigration. In this decade, 1991–2001, approximately 80 per cent of the growth of the resident population (which increased by about 5 per cent) was caused by net migration, which made the contribution of natural growth go to a secondary place. Whereas the total number of foreigners registered in the Census more or less doubled between 1991 and 2001, in the LMA their number almost tripled, resulting in a concentration of 55 per cent of all foreign citizens (Malheiros and Vala, 2004: 1969-1970).

in comparison to the first wave of immigrants (the arrival of Africans from the ex-colonies in the 1960s and the 19070s), the second wave of immigrants experience the same vulnerability because they do the same low-skilled jobs. With the sharpening of the economic situation after 2001, even the Eastern Europeans started to experience increasing unemployment, leading to a rising number of Ukrainian, Russian and Romanian homeless in the streets of Lisbon (Malheiros and Vala, 2004: 1066-1067, 1075).

Fonseca (1998) attributes the problems that immigrants encounter to a lack of urban planning when she states that "in Portugal, urban planning developed very late and without a consistent, global urban policy. Highly regulated, extremely rigid, and distant from those they were supposed to serve, these plans led to such chaos in the urban planning system that between 1944 and 1971 not a single general urbanisation plan was approved. As a closed system, distant from reality, they were urbanisation plans, instead of being orientation principles for urban growth and different land uses. This finally led to changing territorial dynamics that were opposite from those that were laid out in the plans. The development of illegal housing in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon is a practical example of the situation just described" (Fonseca, 1998: 210).

There were three main lines of urban planning in the 1990s. First, there has been slum clearance in the two metropolitan areas (Lisbon and Porto), through the development of the Special Re-housing Programme (PER)[36]. Although the global number of shanties experienced a reduction between 1991 and 2001 some of the social problems of these areas were transferred to the new public housing neighbourhoods which make it more difficult for residents to get out of poverty and integration in Portuguese society. Inappropriate socio-ethnic mixes and unfinished and poorly kept public spaces and facilities for example, have reproduced some of the problems that existed in the shanties. The problems that were maintained are amongst others; socio-spatial segregation, internal social tensions, absence of middle-class residents who might be of positive influence, lack of human resources (professional skills, school education) leading to constrained employment and social trajectories, over-representation of young people lacking back-up at home (in terms of discipline, school support). Malheiros states that the reallocation policies did not change socio-ethnic segregation levels. The quality of the houses in the *bairros sociais* improved, but

[36] "Re-housing Special Program (PER) allows families living in shacks located in the Lisbon and Porto Metropolitan Areas to benefit from subsidies and special credit conditions to buy a permanent residence of a suitable size for their families or make home improvements on a house they own in another area, as long as it is used as a permanent residence" (Fonseca, 1998: 209).

the concentration of lower social classes and ethnic groups in certain areas did not change at all (Malheiros, 1998: 107-108).

Another problem of the relocation programmes is the lack of participation of the residents. Systematically, the poor populations are deprived of the right to make their choices, particularly those residents of African origin. It appears that most of the population that is relocated does not truly feel that they have chosen to live in the neighbourhood where they reside. This dependence on someone else (in this case the local government) to satisfy a basic need such as accommodation as well as a certain absence of a sense of belonging in relation to place of residence, could be prevented if the city council of Lisbon would have allowed people to voice their neighbourhood of preference to live in. Relocation also means that people are disrupted from their neighbourhood and thereby the neighbourhood-culture that they have created together. This arbitrary mix of people caused a loss of contact with neighbours, which is important for sustainable development in a neighbourhood. Many resident associations stopped existing and others never came into existence. No alternative organizations emerged that motivated residents to participate in issues of concern for the neighbourhood such as the co-responsibility of recuperation, maintenance and cleaning the common spaces outside and inside of buildings for example (Cardoso and Perista, 1994: 108-110).

The second line of urban policy in relation to the poorer neighbourhoods is rehabilitation and legalisation of the former clandestine housing settlements. These areas with illegal allotments and construction processes lacked infrastructure and did not respect the urban regulations in terms of parcel density, alignments and distances between buildings. Throughout the last 20 years, local authorities have tried to promote the regeneration of these spaces, demanding the co-operation of the owner-residents for the execution of the local urban plans, which require corrections in the lot dimensions, provision of land for public space and equipment, and establishment of infrastructures. In the second half of the 1990s, legislation has been published to frame all processes of rehabilitation and legalization of clandestine housing areas within the context of equivalent rules (Malheiros and Vala, 2004: 1076).

The third line of intervention concerns the first effective experiences in terms of metropolitan rehabilitation, both in historic centres as well as in some peripheral downgraded neighbourhoods, benefiting from the funds coming from EU initiatives like URBAN and PRU (Urban Rehabilitation Programme). Most of these programmes tried to combine physical interventions in public space with material and non-material interventions in terms of

facilities, employment support, children's assistance, intercultural and other community events. Malheiros and Vala (2004) note some positive developments in the urban policies when they state that "*especially after the mid-1990s, more flexibility has been introduced in some programmes (e.g. PER), leading to more scattered re-housing options, such as the construction of small groups of blocks of public housing in the middle of neighbourhoods of private housing, or the possibility given to families living in shanties of finding their own re-housing options with the support of public funds below a certain ceiling (PER-families, introduced in 1996). These strategies counter the traditional segregation processes and contribute to the socio-spatial fragmentation of the metropolitan area, more notable in the second half of the 1990s*" (Malheiros and Vala, 2004: 1076).

The PER programme especially has had a positive impact on the housing conditions of the Africans from the PALOP countries as these groups were previously excluded from receiving help from this programme. The overall positive impact can be seen by the reduction in the percentages of people paying very low rents (normally associated with old and dilapidated flats in the city centre), the increase in the number of families buying their homes and the decrease in the number of overcrowded dwellings. Despite this positive development, Africans from the PALOP countries still have a disadvantage in comparison to the majority population. The PALOP citizens still showed, in 2001, the highest percentage of people living in slums and a very high proportion of overcrowded dwellings, only exceeded by the South Asian groups. This is in line with the socio-professional evolution of the South Asians, which shows a positive, but slow improvement only limited by in-group and external factors such as low educational levels, limited labour market opportunities and the prejudices of employees and landlords. The new immigrant groups (Malheiros and Vala, 2004: 1079-1080).

Malheiros and Vala (2004) conclude that segregation levels in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon have declined[37] due to the increasing fragmentation of urban space as well as urban sprawl. Not only did peri-urban sprawl produce less segregation, also the immigrants' growth in suburban areas developed under a more fragmented way than in the past. Angolan immigrants are the single exception and experienced suburban growth accompanied by an increase of spatial segregation. EU immigrants and the new immigrants from the Eastern European countries and Brazil show the association between peri-urban growth and a low level of spatial segregation. These groups have one of the lowest spatial segregation indexes

[37] The only exceptions to this trend are the Angolan immigrants who slightly increased their level of segregation. Eastern Europeans, other African nationalities, Pakistanis, and other Asians registered a significant decrease of their spatial concentration levels. Relative stability may be observed among the EU foreigners, San Tomese and Indian immigrants (Malheiros and Vala, 2004: 1080).

and have experienced a significant growth in the outer metropolitan ring. However, these new immigrant groups live in very different circumstances. The EU immigrants mainly live in private condominiums with good accessibility and environment quality, while the Eastern Europeans' and Brazilians' live in apartments to reduce living costs, which shows in their frequent option of sharing dwellings (Malheiros and Vala, 2004: 1080-1083).

Despite the overall reduction in segregation levels and improvement in housing conditions (especially for the PALOP groups)[38], Malheiros and Vala (2004) emphasise on the fact that the new immigrant groups are still overrepresented in slum-dwellings and show higher levels of segregation than the majority population[39]. Therefore they think that still a lot has to be improved when it comes to socio-ethnic segregation issues. They express their concerns when they state that "*the small reduction in the segregation levels of the PALOP citizens does not necessarily represent a positive trend in itself, because the dispersal trends mostly happened within the spatial context of the least prestigious and more densely populated areas of the inner suburbs. If the improvement of housing conditions is a positive achievement, re-housing processes and other public measures for regenerating degraded peripheral housing estates are still incomplete. They need sustainable continuity to support broad intervention in both social and urban fields*" (Malheiros and Vala, 2004: 1084).

Arbaci and Malheiros (2010) conclude that spatial dispersal and de-segregation are not necessarily the major solutions to resolve problems of social exclusion, because it does not improve poor housing conditions and social inclusion. They expect an increase in residential inequalities between social classes and different foreign groups (Arbaci and Malheiros, 2010: 228, 234). "The relatively limited evolution of the housing conditions of long-established immigrants, the high level of housing exploitation to which immigrants are exposed, and their difficult access to bank loans, lead us to assume that the present market-led housing dynamics are a driving mechanism for increased inequality in access to housing" (Arbaci and Malheiros, 2010: 251).

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[38] Despite the growing number of foreign citizens (especially from PALOP countries) in the home-ownership sector, their housing conditions were not equivalent to those of the indigenous population. In 1991, the percentage of PALOP citizens in shanties reached almost 25 per cent (while the percentage for the Portuguese population was 2 per cent) and approximately two-thirds of PALOP citizens were living in overcrowded dwellings. The absolute number of PALOP citizens living in shanties increased by 22 per cent between 1991 and 2001 (Arbaci and Malheiros, 2010: 248).

[39] The percentage of Brazilians and Eastern Europeans living in shanties has grown over the 1990s, but also their levels of residential over-crowding and shared dwellings have grown even reaching some of the highest values ever observed. Because they do not have great savings when they arrive to Portugal, they are almost exclusively destined for the rental market. "However, their limited presence in the cheap rental housing market shows the perversity of the system and discloses eventual processes of housing-market exploitation" (Arbaci and Maleiros, 2010: 249).

When taking a look at the latest available statistics, it can indeed be concluded that segregation levels of foreigners throughout the country are still high. Based on the Location Quotient of the foreign population living in Portugal[40], calculated based on data from the 2011, communities of foreigners are over-represented (QL> 1) in three sub-regions (NUTS III) namely; the Algarve Peninsula, Greater Lisbon and Setúbal (see Map 3). In other subregions an underrepresentation can be observed. So, the establishment of foreigners in Portugal is mainly taking place in the south, in the coastal area and in urban areas. This settlement pattern has very probably something to do with the employment opportunities in these five subregions, and in some cases historical reasons play a role (as for example is the case for the British community in Porto or the Americans in the Azores). The same conclusion on the localization of the foreign population in Portugal in 2011 can be strengthened by the observations in Table 1 of Chart 1, distinguishing between the communities of Western origin (Europeans, North Americans and Australians) and the remaining non-Western communities of foreigners. Referring to the discussion in Chapter 1 on the difference and overlap between social- and ethnic segregation, it can be stated that communities of Western origin have lower visibility in Portugal because of their socio-economic status and because of the smaller anthropomorphic differences and cultural ties between its members and the native population. This in contrast to the non-Western communities, mainly from South America, Africa and Asia, where the differences may become more exacerbated by anthropomorphic or ethnic reasons.

The data for 2011 (see Table 1) are quite illustrative for the very residual presence of foreigners in Portugal (according to the data in columns 8 and 9 of Table 1, only 36.1 ‰ of the population of the country is foreign) but there are several subregions where the ratio of foreigners is much lower, the ratio of western foreign residents as well as non-western foreign residents. Throughout the country, in more than 530 parishes (12.5%) do not live any foreigners, and in almost one third of the parishes (32.3%) do not reside non-Western foreigners.

[40] The location quotient (LQ) allows us to evaluate to what extent there is an over representation of the foreign population in a given territorial unit, compared to a broader context. The formula is: QL = rj (Xrj / Xr) / (Xpj / Xp)
 Xrj - population of group j in territorial unit r, Xr - Total population in territorial unit
 Xpj - population of group j in territorial unit p; Xp - Total population in territorial unit.

Map 3 - Localization quotient of foreign resident population in Portugal, NUT III, 2011



Source: INE (2012), Data from 2011 Census.

Table 1 - Total and percentage of Parishes with Western foreign residents and Non Western foreign residents according to Census 2011, by NUT III

	Number and percentage of Parishes	Without non western foreign residents		Without western foreign residents		Without foreign residents		Western foreign residents within total resident population	Non western foreign residents within total resident population
	col. 1	col. 2	col. 3	col. 4	col. 5	col. 6	col. 7	col. 8	col. 9
Total of Parishes by NUT III		%	n	%	n	%	n	‰	‰
PORTUGAL	4260	32,3%	1376	18,1%	773	12,5%	532	13,5	22,6
Grande Lisboa	153	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	18,3	62,7
Península de Setúbal	58	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	12,6	43,9
Algarve	84	4,8%	4	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	83,3	42,0
Alentejo Litoral	41	4,9%	2	2,4%	1	2,4%	1	35,1	20,5
Oeste	121	0,8%	1	0,8%	1	0,8%	1	18,3	19,2
Lezíria do Tejo	91	12,1%	11	2,2%	2	0,0%	0	16,7	17,7
Pinhal Litoral	66	1,5%	1	3,0%	2	0,0%	0	14,4	14,9
Baixo Vouga	114	2,6%	3	2,6%	3	1,8%	2	9,7	11,2
Baixo Mondego	119	14,3%	17	6,7%	8	1,7%	2	6,8	11,0
Grande Porto	130	4,6%	6	2,3%	3	0,8%	1	5,7	10,9
Alentejo Central	91	26,4%	24	7,7%	7	5,5%	5	10,6	9,6
R. A. Madeira	54	5,6%	3	1,9%	1	0,0%	0	9,7	9,4
Baixo Alentejo	83	27,7%	23	6,0%	5	4,8%	4	13,6	9,0
Médio Tejo	103	21,4%	22	3,9%	4	3,9%	4	11,3	8,8
Alto Alentejo	86	22,1%	19	8,1%	7	2,3%	2	13,4	8,2
Cávado	265	38,5%	102	20,4%	54	14,3%	38	7,4	7,9
Dão-Lafões	223	30,5%	68	19,7%	44	2,2%	5	6,5	7,7
Beira Interior Sul	58	41,4%	24	19,0%	11	10,3%	6	9,0	7,1
Minho-Lima	290	48,3%	140	16,2%	47	13,8%	40	8,3	6,7
Pinhal Interior Norte	115	33,0%	38	5,2%	6	4,3%	5	17,0	5,9
Alto Trás-os-Montes	398	63,1%	251	42,7%	170	33,4%	133	6,7	5,7
Entre Douro e Vouga	80	15,0%	12	12,5%	10	7,5%	6	5,3	5,7
R. A. Açores	156	23,7%	37	9,0%	14	5,8%	9	6,0	5,5
Cova da Beira	67	25,4%	17	13,4%	9	7,5%	5	5,7	5,2
Pinhal Interior Sul	43	44,2%	19	16,3%	7	9,3%	4	6,7	5,0
Douro	301	53,2%	160	37,9%	114	28,9%	87	5,8	4,8
Beira Interior Norte	239	69,0%	165	47,3%	113	37,2%	89	6,5	4,6
Ave	243	28,0%	68	10,3%	25	9,1%	22	5,0	4,1
Serra da Estrela	67	50,7%	34	38,8%	26	25,4%	17	6,5	3,3
Tâmega	321	32,7%	105	24,6%	79	13,7%	44	2,6	2,8

Note: the NUTS III are decreasingly ordered by the values of Col. 9

Source: INE (2012), Data from 2011 Census. Data processed by author.

As can be observed in Table 1, the differences are very significant between the subregions of Portugal, so it is possible to establish a pattern (see Chart 1), which reinforces the observation that has been made by studying Map 3, moreover it allows to add the

following three observations: first, three subregions (Greater Lisbon, the Setúbal Peninsula and Algarve) show values above average; the second observation is that in most subregions the number of Western foreign residents is greater than the number of non-Western foreign residents, which means that the effect of the (segregating) difference will be felt less and the last observation is that in the more urban subregions the number of non-Western foreigners exceeds that of Western foreigners, therefore it will be in the urban areas that segregation will be felt more.

Chart 1 - Western foreign residents and Non-Western foreign residents in Portugal according to data from Census 2011, by NUT III (per thousand value)



Source: INE (2012), Data from Census 2011. Data processed by author.

When calculating the averages by the data of NUT III, the 'proportion of Western foreign residents' (see Table 2) and the 'proportion of non-Western foreigner residents' (see Table 3), the differences become statistically significant.

Table 2 - Proportion of Western foreign residents (statistical measures)

NUTS III	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Range	Minimum	Maximum
açores	10,1968	156	16,52778	144,10	,00	144,10
alentejo central	13,8396	91	21,91333	192,30	,00	192,30
alentejo litoral	48,0317	41	56,71228	267,20	,00	267,20
algarve	102,8000	84	98,55276	540,30	2,00	542,30
alto alentejo	14,2105	86	12,39948	54,20	,00	54,20
alto trás os montes	5,1508	398	6,89350	39,20	,00	39,20
ave	4,5984	243	4,39272	28,00	,00	28,00
baixo alentejo	14,3771	83	14,87165	72,20	,00	72,20
baixo mondego	5,9193	119	4,45802	20,20	,00	20,20
baixo vouga	8,1096	114	6,28586	30,60	,00	30,60
beira interior norte	5,4310	239	8,67716	57,10	,00	57,10
beira interior sul	8,1431	58	7,85384	32,70	,00	32,70
cávado	4,3045	265	4,58009	29,60	,00	29,60
cova da beira	5,4716	67	5,21483	23,10	,00	23,10
dão-lafões	4,9870	223	4,94495	25,00	,00	25,00
douro	5,6126	301	21,41604	355,80	,00	355,80
entre douro e vouga	3,8625	80	3,23554	15,40	,00	15,40
grande lisboa	22,1373	153	14,44725	74,10	1,70	75,80
grande porto	5,1446	130	3,53674	23,30	,00	23,30
lezíria do tejo	12,7121	91	10,74401	74,10	,00	74,10
madeira	11,2278	54	14,95443	65,00	,00	65,00
médio tejo	10,2155	103	9,19323	44,50	,00	44,50
minho-lima	7,8410	290	8,35942	58,80	,00	58,80
oeste	18,8413	121	16,68162	147,90	,00	147,90
península de setúbal	17,0690	58	18,32305	101,40	2,40	103,80
pinhal interior norte	22,6400	115	21,92852	113,50	,00	113,50
pinhal interior sul	9,2907	43	14,00047	74,80	,00	74,80
pinhal litoral	11,2379	66	6,33386	32,40	,00	32,40
serra da estrela	6,2164	67	7,56843	32,10	,00	32,10
tâmega	2,5408	321	2,89410	16,40	,00	16,40
Total	10,4334	4260	23,61806	542,30	,00	542,30

Source: INE (2012), Data from Census 2011. Data processed by author.

Given these results, which were considered to be essential to analyse in order to know in which contexts (parishes) interaction between natives and foreigners takes place in Portugal. Assuming that the biggest difference exists between non-Western foreign residents than among Western foreign residents, what we see is that these are two distinct realities but with a statistically significant correlation between them: the greater the proportion of Western foreigners in the Portuguese parishes, also the greater is the proportion of non-Western foreigners ($r = 0,224$, $n = 4260$, $p = 0,000$).

Table 3 - Proportion of non-Western foreign residents (statistical measures)

NUTS III	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Range	Minimum	Maximum
açores	5,3776	156	9,47887	89,60	,00	89,60
alentejo central	6,4319	91	8,10226	43,40	,00	43,40
alentejo litoral	14,2317	41	15,24014	79,10	,00	79,10
algarve	25,9321	84	25,20144	142,00	,00	142,00
alto alentejo	6,0965	86	10,80520	92,20	,00	92,20
alto trás os montes	2,4636	398	5,04808	52,70	,00	52,70
ave	2,4893	243	3,16030	15,90	,00	15,90
baixo alentejo	6,4241	83	11,03276	81,60	,00	81,60
baixo mondego	6,7261	119	11,84343	87,60	,00	87,60
baixo vouga	8,3193	114	7,48721	42,90	,00	42,90
beira interior norte	2,2230	239	5,09894	45,50	,00	45,50
beira interior sul	2,7431	58	4,09669	23,20	,00	23,20
cávado	2,7106	265	4,74485	36,90	,00	36,90
cova da beira	4,6716	67	12,79067	103,80	,00	103,80
dão-lafões	3,9762	223	6,56782	46,70	,00	46,70
douro	2,8645	301	5,43528	42,60	,00	42,60
entre douro e vouga	3,9788	80	3,18671	16,70	,00	16,70
grande lisboa	65,5667	153	59,11079	478,50	6,80	485,30
grande porto	8,3300	130	10,30617	67,30	,00	67,30
lezíria do tejo	10,3341	91	13,23476	60,50	,00	60,50
madeira	7,8556	54	6,17077	41,10	,00	41,10
médio tejo	5,3301	103	6,16409	32,50	,00	32,50
minho-lima	3,8969	290	8,22532	79,70	,00	79,70
oeste	11,9190	121	14,36251	130,50	,00	130,50
península de setúbal	35,7500	58	32,90205	175,00	1,70	176,70
pinhal interior norte	3,3696	115	3,69452	16,20	,00	16,20
pinhal interior sul	2,8744	43	3,98952	15,90	,00	15,90
pinhal litoral	9,0061	66	9,45397	48,50	,00	48,50
serra da estrela	2,4955	67	3,83451	20,10	,00	20,10
tâmega	1,8891	321	2,65446	18,50	,00	18,50
Total	7,4929	4260	18,89819	485,30	,00	485,30

Source: INE (2012), Data from Census 2011. Data processed by author.

With regard to the geographic location of the foreign communities, the results presented above (see Table 1 and Chart 1) show that the presence of Western foreigners has a positive correlation with the population size of the parishes, however the correlation is less intense then the correlation, which is equally positive, that exists between the presence of non-Western foreigners and the population size of the parishes. However, it must be remembered that not in the whole country people experience a close proximity to foreigners, because in 23% of the parishes in Portugal there are no foreign residents (see Chart 2). On the

other hand, people in most of the parishes (54%) live in a reality where the proportion of non-Western foreign residents is superior to Western foreign residents, so in these parishes there is a greater visibility of cultural differences (see Chart 2).

Chart 2 - Western foreign residents and Non-Western foreign residents in Portugal according to data from Census 2011, by NUT III (per thousand value)



Source: INE, Results of Census 2011, 2012. Data processed by author.

However, the most important characteristic of Portugal is the relative scarcity of foreign residents, especially when compared with the reality of other European and Western countries. Because of this, the existence of large communities of foreigners, on the parish scale, is highly unlikely. This means that being a foreigner is almost always equivalent to living in a minority situation, regardless of whether a foreigner lives segregated or not. In Portugal massive concentrations of foreigners cannot be found, therefore there are no ghettos.

Indeed, as has been concluded before, in only three parishes in Portugal the total number of foreigners exceeds 50% of the resident population (see Table 4). These three parishes are, however, different from each other. In Lisbon the concentration of foreigners is found in a very central neighbourhood (Martim Moniz) where predominantly foreigners from Asian origin live, while the two parishes in the Algarve are inhabited mostly by communities of European foreign retirees.

Table 4 - Portuguese Parishes where the proportion of the total foreign residents is equal or greater than 500 per thousand, according to Census 2011

Parish	Municipality	Proportion of foreign residents
Santa Justa	Lisboa	546,0‰
Barão de São João	Lagos	526,5‰
Barão de S. Miguel	Sagres	545,8‰

3.2 The Boavista neighbourhood: a historical overview and the creation of a neighbourhood culture

The Bairro da Boavista (also known as Alto da Boa Vista) is located in the northeast of the city of Lisbon, on the outskirts of the parish of Benfica.

It was inaugurated on the 25th of October 1941 and was one of the first social housing neighbourhoods to be constructed in Lisbon. A total of 746 demountable houses were constructed in the Boavista neighbourhood. Most of these houses were constructed of cement and wood and consisted of one level. The construction of the Boavista neighbourhood took place in three phases. During the first phase (1939-1944), 488 houses were assembled. These houses were constructed of cement and wood, had one level and reduced dimensions. There were four housing blocks that were separated by narrow cobbled streets and without circulation of vehicles (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006: 7). Also two primary schools (one male and one female), a social centre with a breastfeeding room, nursery, office and kindergarten with paediatric consultations, a small market and a public washing space were constructed in the first phase (GEBALIS: 23).

During the second phase (1945-1960) another 220 cement houses were constructed in two new housing blocks. These houses were bigger as they were built to house larger families that were already living in Boavista and to house more families that were still living in unhealthy living conditions (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006: 8). When the Boavista neighbourhood was constructed, it was isolated from the rest of the city due to its localization and due to the fact that there was no public transport to the city centre which made it very difficult for the Boavista residents to be in contact with residents and the city life of the centre. In this second phase, urban development (public busses in the Boavista neighbourhood and the construction of industrial zones in the peripheral areas) brought some vitality to the neighbourhood (GEBALIS: 24).

Map 4 - Ortofotomap of Boavista – general overview (1). Boavista is located on the edge of Monsanto Hill (Northwest) and close to the border with Amadora municipality

Map 5 - Ortofotomap of Boavista – general overview (2). Boavista is located just in front of another social housing project (Bairro do Zambujal – Amadora Municipality), built during the later 80's

Map 6 - Boavista neigbourhood – main entrance (coming from Benfica).

Note: It is possible to recognise several buildings from different temporal phases. The square (praça) where people stay all day long is from the very beginning period of Boavista neighbourhood.

Map 7 - Boavista neighbourhood – the old (left) and the new (right) blocks in perspective

In the third phase (1961-1970), 38 brick houses were built, located next to the football field that the residents had built in the mid-1940s. This was the first construction in the *alvenaria* of the neighbourhood and was constructed to house families from outside the neighbourhood, particularly those displaced by the construction of the first bridge over the Tagus river (the 25th of April Bridge). The brick houses of the third stage, despite the improvement in the quality of construction, were still very small with poor sound- and waterproofing, with insufficient protection against cold and warm temperatures which provided unhealthy living conditions. There were no interior doors in the small houses, causing a lack of privacy (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa 2006: 9-10).

With the revolution in 1974, Portugal underwent a socio-political evolution which caused significant alterations in the rules, leading to the decrease of power by the local institutions as well as the ability to control the population. With the decrease of local control and intervention, the population of the *bairros sociais* become more autonomous, for functions previously carried out by the institutions. The provisional demountable houses served as accommodation for the poor for more than 50 years. Through time, families adapted the houses according to their needs. But with the end of the Estado Novo, new urban policies were focused on the eradication of these houses to replace them with new constructions and relocations. The complete eradication of these houses was completed in late 1996, in the framework of three programs of construction /relocation: The Urbanization Plan of Boavista (in the 1980s), the Plano de Intervençao a Médio Prazo (P.I.M.P.) (end of the 1980s and the 1990s) and the Programa Especial de Realojamento (P.E.R.) (in the 1990s) (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006: 12).

One part of the neighbourhood (the *zona de alvenaria*) still consists of the provisional, badly constructed, small houses. These 510 houses form the oldest part of the existing buildings as they were built in the 1970s. In April 1974, part of these houses were unoccupied or in the final stage of construction, which lead a lot of residents of the old neighbourhood, who were waiting to be relocated, to occupy these empty houses. This situation was legalised later. Most of these dwellings have been reconstructed by the families living in them to create more space by constructing a second level, a kitchen, bedroom, living room, sanitation facilities, garages and gardens which narrowed the roads. These extension works, carried out ad-hoc, were generating problems with the sewage system for example. Most of the families (60.2%) reside in these homes for over 30 years, practically since its construction in the 1970s. It thus can be concluded that families are attached to the *alvenaria* area and there are

strong family and neighbourhood networks, which correspond to feelings of belonging and identity with the neighbourhood (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006: 22, 25, 50).

Currently, the Boavista neighbourhood has a population of more or less 5.000 residents and consists of 61 land units, which corresponds to 1049 households, and 510 houses, so in total there are 1559 units. The houses built during the above mentioned projects showed some alterations in comparison with the construction of the houses during the Estado Novo. The quality of construction was better as was the quality of the materials. High-rise flats were built for the first time which have elevators. Small squares and green areas were created to improve the level of coexistence. The accessibility improved by the construction of new roads and more public transport. The social and patrimonial management of Boavista changed in 1997 from the municipality of Lisbon (the Department of Social Management of the Housing Stock) to the municipal company GEBALIS (Gestão de Bairros de Lisboa/Management of Municipal Districts of Lisbon) (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006: 17).

In their analysis on the Boavista neighbourhood the Municipality of Lisbon states that "The process of relocation that took place in this neighbourhood was not always peaceful, emphasizing that the population is characterized by being very demanding and fussy when it comes to the municipal services. They assume that they have the right to receive everything with their status of "children of the neighbourhood," manifesting large institutional dependence on the resolution of their problems" (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006: 51). This great dependence of the residents on the local government has been constructed historically as the Boavista neighbourhood was constructed in the outskirts of the city next to a big park (Parque de Monsanto). The *bairros sociais* were thus constructed in remote areas which created a certain social spirit in these neighbourhoods (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006: 20). During the Estado Novo, residents of the Boavista neighbourhood had little freedoms as they were controlled by fiscals of the regime. A woman that has lived for more than 50 years in the neighbourhood tells how they were only allowed to have flowers in their homes and gardens. Pets and fruit trees were prohibited, if they discovered that residents did have forbidden things in their homes they would be expelled immediately (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006: 21).

The quality of life of the working class and lower classes is dependent on the public services provided by the local government. The working class requires mass transportation for example and when the prices of these kind of services go up, working class families feel it the most. Jobless residents are even more dependent on the government as they receive subsidies

to survive. Because so much of their standard of living depends on city services, the working poor are often at odds with public administrators (Gottdiener and Hutchison, 2006: 146-147).

In Portugal this dependency is even stronger as the controlling structure that has been created during the Estado Novo has not been removed completely. The municipality still has the control over the social housing units in the *bairros sociais*. Residents are not allowed to make alterations in their homes and have to ask GEBALIS for everything that has to do with their houses. GEBALIS also has the right to enter the houses whenever they want without needing permission of the residents. It can be concluded that residents that live in social housing still do not have full freedom and are still dependent on the local government for improvements in their living situation.

Not only does the local government have a great influence on the living conditions of the habitants of the Boavista neighbourhood, according to Isajiw (see section 1.2) local government can also be held responsible for creating a certain ´neighbourhood culture´ by excluding the residents from the rest of the city. “Sociologically, the concepts of majority and minority refer not to numbers but to power. Often the concept of ethnicity is confused with that of minority and all ethnic groups are seen as minorities. By this, the majority groups become ethnicity less and it becomes difficult to understand what culture of the "general" society is all about, or if it is there at all, and consequently the meaning of interethnic relations becomes confusing. Majority ethnic groups are those who determine the character of the society's basic institutions, especially the main political, economic, and cultural institutions. The majority groups, because of their position of power, usually are at the top of the ethnic stratification system, and the status of other ethnic groups is assessed in relation to them. Majorities are the main definers of external ethnic boundaries and hence in a position to have the deciding voice regarding public policies and legislation regarding minorities” (Isajiw, 1993: 12-13).

Oscar Lewis named the characteristics he found in poor neighbourhoods, thus partially or fully created by the local government, as the ´culture of poverty´. He described the culture of poverty as “a way of life, remarkably stable and persistent, passed down from generation to generation along family lines. The culture of poverty has its own modalities and distinctive social and psychological consequences for its members. It is a dynamic factor which affects participation in the large national culture and becomes a subculture of its own (Lewis, 1964: 150). The principal characteristics of the poverty of culture can be divided in four main dimensions namely; the relationship between the subculture and the larger society, the nature of the slum community, the nature of the family and the attitudes, values and character

structure of the individual. Lewis states that "*the disengagement, the non-integration, of the poor with respect to the major institutions of society is a crucial element in the culture of poverty. It reflects the combined effect of a variety of factors including poverty, to begin with, but also segregation and discrimination, fear, suspicion and apathy and the development of alternative institutions and procedures in the slum community. A relief system that barely keeps people alive perpetuates rather than eliminates poverty and the pervading sense of hopelessness*" (Lewis, 1966: 21).

Lewis has made a list of 70 traits which characterize a poverty culture. Mistrust in government, strong feelings of powerlessness, marginality, and helplessness are included in this list. In the Boavista neighbourhood it can be concluded that by controlling the habitants, a neighbourhood culture (maybe even a culture of poverty) has been developed and part of it consists of feelings of mistrust of the local government. During my internship at the office of GEBALIS in the Boavista neighbourhood[41], habitants often accused the staff of GEBALIS for not caring about their housing conditions and that they are not willing to improve their living situation. Regularly habitants showed their frustrations and started arguments with the GEBALIS staff.

Another example of the bad relationship between the habitants of the Boavista neighbourhood and the local government is the workshop that was organized by GEBALIS to explain their plans to improve the neighbourhood. During the workshop about the Eco-City project (more information about this project will be provided in the fourth chapter), all the habitants that were present only assisted the part during which information was given about the reconstruction of the houses in the *zona de Alvenaria*. Habitants were only interested to know whether they would be moving to another house or not, because they did not show any interest in the rest of the projects.

Another time when mistrust of the local government became apparent was when the Boavista habitants of the *zona de Alvenaria* were asked to fill in a form on their relocation wishes. A lot of habitants did not hand in the form on time and when I accompanied a staff member of GEBALIS to collect the information door to door, most of the habitants were very sceptical about filling in the form. They made comments like ´I already filled out this form three times and never have we been relocated to a new house, why would I believe that it is going to happen this time?´. This shows that the habitants do not believe the promisses made

[41] GEBALIS has a district office in the neighbourhood in order to ensure an integrated and shared, as well as the maintenance of buildings and outdoor spaces (Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006: 17).

by GEBALIS on the improvement of their living conditions. In the next section other aspects of a possible ´culture of poverty´ in the Boavista neighbourhood will be shown and discussed.

3.3 The Boavista neighbourhood: a characterization by data analysis

The data on the Boavista neighbourhood of 2011 (INE, 2012) clearly show how segregated this neighbourhood is when compared to the parish (Benfica), to the city (Lisbon), to the urban metropolitan scale (Grande Lisboa), the administrative region (Lisbon) and the country (Portugal) – see Figure 2.

Figure 2 – The multi-level framework for the analysis of Boavista neighbourhood



In order to make this analysis, a model has been produced that contains 6 territorial levels susceptible for analysis through a set of indicators (cf. Figure 2). These indicators were constructed from the variables that are integrated in the file-synthesis of the 2011 Census, that is has an overview until the unit block (statistical subsection). A description of the composition of each of the indicators is shown in the last column of Table 5 (below). The full table with the used data can be found in the Appendix (not printed; only on CD).

The comparison of the Boavista neighbourhood with these five different scales has been made in order to validate the socio-ecological structure of the Boavista neighbourhood. The Boavista neighbourhood is always in direct confrontation with the surrounding social environment, which is the parish of Benfica. It can only be determined whether there is segregation or not by comparing an area with its direct surroundings. It is at this scale that the

differences are becoming evident and that it can be stated whether the Boavista community is socially disadvantaged within its immediate environment.

However, the town itself is very heterogeneous, so the description and understanding of the characteristics of Boavista, when put in relation to what they mean in the parish of Benfica, requires that the parish is understood in the wider context of the city. In order to determine whether there is segregation in this scale it has to be compared to the greater scale of the Metropolitan Area (Greater Lisbon) and so on. The Boavista neighbourhood is by definition characterized by its differences with the surrounding scale. Maybe the Boavista neighbourhood cannot be marked as segregated when compared with the country as a whole, because it has more similarities with the scale of Portugal. Segregation however is determined by its place. The place of the neighbourhood determines whether it is segregated or not. When a poor neighbourhood is surrounded by wealthier ones, it is a segregated neighbourhood. When a poor neighbourhood is surrounded only by other poor neighbourhood and the whole city consists of poor neighbourhoods, that neighbourhood is not segregated on the city scale.

Because of the importance of place to determine the level of segregation, with the following analysis of data of the Boavista neighbourhood in comparison to the data of other scales in the country, segregation will be put in its place. One of the biggest contrasts of the Boavista neighbourhood in comparison with the rest of the city when analysing the data on the type of buildings is that the neighbourhood can be characterized as a village within the city of Lisbon as 88,9 percent of the buildings in the Boavista neighbourhood consist of small buildings. This number is similar to the national average (which is 90,8 percent). In the city of Lisbon, only 37,5 percent of the buildings are small buildings and the municipality of Benfica also consists of more high constructions than the Boavista neighbourhood with 49,6 percent of small buildings.

That the Boavista neighbourhood can be characterized as a village in the city of Lisbon is also shown in the number of buildings that are exclusively for person households. With 99 percent of the buildings that are person households, the Boavista neighbourhood has a lot more houses in comparison to the rest of the city (78,6 percent) and the country (93,2 percent). Only 1 percent of the buildings are shops, schools and playing fields for example. These numbers show that the Boavista neighbourhood was built exclusively to house the poor and not to integrate them into the rest of the city by constructing similar facilities that exist in other neighbourhoods of the city. The fact that almost all the buildings (98,6 percent) in the Boavista neighbourhood were constructed after 1960, shows that this newly constructed neighbourhood was intentionally built to be different/segregated from the rest of the city.

Table 5 – The multi-level framework for the analysis of the Boavista neighbourhood

DIMENSION OF ANALYSIS	INDICATOR	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	PROCESS OF CALCULATION*
Building	Type of building_1	Volumetry	Expression, in percentage, of the number of small buildings (with 1 or 2 accommodations) in the set of existing buildings	H16/F16*100
	Type of building_2	Index of Family Households	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the buildings exclusively for family households and the total of classic buildings	L16/F16*100
	Type of building_3	Profile of the Buildings	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of buildings with 2 or 3 floors and the total number of classic buildings	P16/F16*100
	Type of building_4	Index of Buildings of an old age (ancientness)	Expression, in percentage, of the relations between the number of buildings built before 1960 and the total number of classic buildings	(T16+U16+V16)/F16*100
	Type of building_5	Type of Structure	Expression, in percentage, of the relations between the number of concrete buildings and the total number of classic buildings	AE16/F16*100

* References on the formula should be understood as the respective cells of the datasheet (see Appendix).

DIMENSION OF ANALYSIS	INDICATOR	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	PROCESS OF CALCULATION*
Occupation	Type of occupation_1	Person Households	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of accommodations of regular residence and the total number of regular accommodations	AI16/AH16*100
	Type of occupation_2	Size	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of accommodations of regular residence with a size of 50 m2 or less and the total number of regular accommodations	AL16/AI16*100
	Type of occupation_3	Functional Layout	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of accommodations of regular residence with 1 or 2 divisions and the total number of regular accommodations	AQ16/AI16*100
	Type of occupation_4	Occupancy Status	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between homeownership and the total number of regular accommodations	AV16/AI16*100
	Type of occupation_5	Density of Occupation by families	Expression, in percentage, of the number of families and the total number of residential accommodations	AX16/AI16
	Type of occupation_6	Density of Occupation by Individuals	Expression, in percentage, of the number of individuals that are residents and the total number of regular accommodations	BV16/AI16

* References on the formula should be understood as the respective cells of the datasheet (see Appendix).

DIMENSION OF ANALYSIS	INDICATOR	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	PROCESS OF CALCULATION*
Families	Type of family_1	Percentage of Small Families	Expression, in percentage, of the number of families that exist of 1 or 2 persons and the total number of families	AY16/AX16*100
	Type of family_2	Index of Family Dependence	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of families with individuals of 65 years and older and the number families with children of 15 years and younger	BC16/BD16*100
	Type of family_3	Unemployment Rate in the Family	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of families with 2 or more unemployed family members and the total number of families	(BH16)/AX16*100
Nucleus	Type of nucleus_1	Rate of non-married Children	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of nucleus with 2 non-married children and the total number of nucleus	BL16/BI16*100
	Type of nucleus_2	Rate of minors	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of nucleus with children of 15 years and younger and the number of nucleus	BO16/BI16*100

* References on the formula should be understood as the respective cells of the datasheet (see Appendix).

DIMENSION OF ANALYSIS	INDICATOR	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	PROCESS OF CALCULATION*
Human Occupation	Type of human occupation_1_men	Index temporary presence Men	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the total number of men that are present and the total number of men that are residents	BT16/BW16*100
	Type of human occupation_1_women	Index temporary presence Women	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the total number of women that are present and the total number of women that are residents	BU16/BX16*100
Social Structure	Type of social structure_1	Index of Youth (children and adolescents)	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of children between the age of 0 and 13 and the total number of residents	(CK16+CL16+CM16+CN16)/BV16*100
	Type of social structure_2	Index of Potentially Active Residents	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between residents of the age group 20-65 years old and the total number of residents	CQ16/BV16*100
	Type of social structure_3	Index of Aging	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between children in the age group of 0-13 years old and the residents of 64 years and older	(CK16+CL16+CM16)/CS16*100
	Type of social structure_4	Index of Trends	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between children in the age group of 0-4 years old and children between 5 and 9 years old	CK16/CL16*100

* References on the formula should be understood as the respective cells of the datasheet (see Appendix).

DIMENSION OF ANALYSIS	INDICATOR	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	PROCESS OF CALCULATION*
Social Structure (cont.)	Type of social structure_5	Index of Total Dependence	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the age groups of 0-19 years old and 64 years and older and the age group of 20-64 year olds	(CK16+CL16+CM16+CN16+CS16)/ CQ16 *100
	Type of social structure_6	Ratio of Minor Males	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of boys in the age group of 0-13 years old and the number of girls in the same age group	(CT16+CU16+CV16)/ (DC16+DD16+DE16) *100
	Type of social structure_7	Ratio of Adolescent Males	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of males in the age group of 15-24 years old and the number of females in the same age group	(CX16+CY16)/(DG16+DH16)*100
	Type of social structure_8	Ratio of non-elderly Males	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of males in the age group of 25-64 years old and the number of females in that age group	DA16/DJ16*100
	Type of social structure_9	Rate of illiteracy	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of residents that cannot read nor write and the total number of residents	DL16/BV16*100
	Type of social structure_10	Attendance rate of Obligatory Education	Expression, in percentage, of the number of residents between 5 and 19 years old who completed primary and secondary (high)school	(DM16+DN16+DO16+DP16)/ (CL16+CM16+CN16)*100

* References on the formula should be understood as the respective cells of the datasheet (see Appendix).

DIMENSION OF ANALYSIS	INDICATOR	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	PROCESS OF CALCULATION*
Social Structure (cont.)	Type of social structure_11	Index of Social Capital (level of education after high school)	Expression, in percentage, of the number of residents between 20 and 64 years old who are doing a study after high school	(DQ16+DR16)/CQ16*100
	Type of social structure_12	Index of Social Change	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of residents who completed a study after high school and the number of residents who cannot read nor write	(DW16+DX16)/DL16*100
	Type of social structure_13	Unemployment Rate	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of residents that are looking for their first job or a new job and the total number of residents who are looking for a job or are employed	(EA16+EB16)/ (EA16+EB16+EC16) *100
	Type of social structure_14	Index of Inactivity	Expression, in percentage, of the number of residents from 20 years and older who are economically inactive	EE16/(CQ16+CS16)*100
	Type of social structure_15	Rate of Labourers	Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of residents employed in the primary and secondary sector, and the number of residents that work in the primary, secondary and tertiary sector	(EG16+EF16)/ (EF16+EG16+EH16) *100

* References on the formula should be understood as the respective cells of the datasheet (see Appendix).

When we look at the number of accommodations of regular residence with a size of 50 m² or less, the Boavista neighbourhood (with 22,4 percent) also forms a contrast with the rest of the parish of Benfica (13,5 percent), the city of Lisbon (16,8 percent) the urban metropolitan scale (13,2 percent), the administrative region Lisbon (12,6 percent) and the country as a whole (9,9 percent). This means that in comparison to the rest of the city and country, Boavista consists of small houses, while the density of occupation of these small houses is not different from the density of occupation in the rest of the city and country. Another indicator that shows the marginal status of the residents of Boavista is the relation between homeownership and the total number of regular accommodations. Only 4 percent of the residents in the Boavista neighbourhood own their home, while in the surrounding neighbourhoods in the municipality of Benfica this number is 58,6 percent.

The characteristics of the families that live in the Boavista neighbourhood also differ from the types of families that live in the rest of the city. The percentage of small families in the city of Lisbon (67,5 percent) and in the parish Benfica (69,1 percent) form a contrast with the percentage of small families that live in Boavista. With 42,8 percent it can be concluded that relatively few small families live in the Boavista neighbourhood. Another sharp contrast can be found between the index of family dependence in Benfica and Boavista. While the relation between the number of families with individuals of 65 years and older and the number families with children of 15 years and younger in Benfica is 265,4 percent, the percentage in Boavista is 111,5 percent. One of the most important data that shows how segregated Boavista is from the rest of the city is the unemployment rate. In the Boavista neighbourhood 8,4 percent of the families have two or more unemployed family members, while this number varies between 1,3 and 1,8 percent in the parish of Benfica, the city of Lisbon, the administrative region Lisbon and Portugal as a whole. In the Boavista neighbourhood, families have more children of fifteen years and younger in comparison to the rest of the country. The difference is the biggest in comparison to Benfica and the city of Lisbon. There the rate of minors is 25 and 29,6 percent, while in Boavista this percentage is 37,2.

The social structure of the residents of the Boavista neighbourhood differs in some aspects from the rest of the city and country. They have more children between the age of 0 and 13, this percentage (25,6 percent) differs especially from the percentages in Benfica (15,2 percent) and the city of Lisbon (17,3 percent). There are more elderly people than younger people in the neighbourhood. The fact that there are more or less as much potentially active residents in the Boavista neighbourhood as there are in the rest of the country, while at the

same time they have to support more children and elderly people, means that the potentially active residents have to spend more money on sustaining their family members in comparison to other residents in Portugal. The search for a job is more difficult for residents that cannot read nor write and as the percentage of analphabets is much higher in Boavista, makes it even more difficult to sustain their families. The illiteracy rate of 8,1 percent is much higher than the illiteracy rate in Benfica (2,6 percent) and even much higher than the rate in Portugal which is 4,7 percent. Another indicator that shows the marginal position of residents in Boavista is the attendance rate of obligatory education. Less children in Boavista completed primary and high school (90,2 percent), than children in Benfica (93,1 percent), the city of Lisbon (93,1 percent) and Portugal (96,3 percent). After primary and high school, the difference in level of education becomes even higher as just 1,8 percent of the residents in Boavista do a study after high school, while 9,5 percent of the residents in Benfica and 9,7 percent of the residents in the city of Lisbon do a study after they finished high school. The extremely low percentage of social change (17,5 percent) in Boavista in comparison to Benfica (1023,8 percent) shows that there is very few educational development. As the residents in the rest of the city do obtain higher levels of education, the residents of the Boavista neighbourhood are very disadvantaged in comparison to them when they have to compete in the labour market. This disadvantage shows in the unemployment rate, which with 32,8 percent is much higher than the percentages in the rest of the country which vary between 11,8 and 13,3 percent.

Besides the comparison between the above mentioned different scales, it is also important to study territorial units that exceed minimum administrative divisions (of the city or town) and thus show another finer scale which is called a sub-section. The statistical sub-section results from a territorial demarcation created by the INE (National Institute of Statistics) and is described as *´the smallest homogeneous area, consisting of buildings or not, existing within the Section of Statistics, corresponding to the block in urban areas and a place or part in rural areas´* (Machado *et al.*: 2007). This small scale does not follow existing administrative borders, which makes it possible to discover the characteristics of the built environment where everyday life takes place. The homogenous character of the sub-section is thus defined from the inside of the section and not from the outside borders. The sub-sections provide information on the degree of cohesion within a neighbourhood. It is important to make a distinction between the different sub-sections in a neighbourhood to avoid generalisations. Talking about a neighbourhood as a whole, while maybe several parts are not segregated from the rest of the city, only reinforces the negative image that a segregated

neighbourhood already has. It is thus important to also highlight the positive aspects that may exist in certain parts of the segregated neighbourhood. Therefore, also the 32 subsections of which the Boavista neighbourhood consists will be studied.

The statistics on homogeneity and heterogeneity show that overall the Boavista neighbourhood can be marked as a heterogenic neighbourhood as 24 of the 33 indicators are heterogeneous and only 9 are homogeneous. Of the 5 indicators on the type of buildings in the neighbourhood, 4 indicators show that the neighbourhood consists of different type of buildings. The index of Aging Buildings even shows a heterogeneity of 335 percent. 4 Of the 6 indicators on the type of occupation are heterogeneous. The biggest difference between the 32 sub-sections in the dimension of analysis ´occupation´ is found in the occupancy status. The percentage of heterogeneity is 110 percent, which shows that there are great differences in homeownership in the different parts of the neighbourhood. The accommodations with a shortage of living space are also dispersed through the neighbourhood (66 percent heterogeneity) and there are 3 sub-sections which do not have accommodations with a shortage of living space. The type of families that live in the different sub-sections are also very different as the heterogeneity percentage of for example families with unemployed family members is 90 percent. There are 9 sub-sections that do not have unemployed family members, but there is one sub-section with a peak of 23,5 percent. The indicators on the type of social structure also show that the Boavista neighbourhood is very heterogeneous as only 3 of the 12 indicators are homogeneous. The demographic change at the bottom varies in the neighbourhood with 101 percent. There are sub-sections without young children and there is one sub-section with a peak of 500 percent. This means that there are sub-sections where only elderly people live and sub-sections with a lot of new-borns. The illiteracy rate, the number of residents between 20 and 64 years old who are doing a study after high school and the index of educational background change are also very heterogeneous (with 50, 200 and 160 percent). This means that the differences in educational level between the different sub-sections are high. The unemployment rate also varies greatly as two sub-sections have 0 percent unemployment and there is one sub-section with a peak of 53,8 percent. It thus can be concluded that the different sub-sections in the Boavista neighbourhood has parts which can be marked as segregated because they have high numbers of unemployment and low educational levels for example, but there are also parts with people that have better living conditions.

In order to understand the existing differences that can be observed at a micro scale (within the *bairro*, considering the unit blocks), we proceed with the development of a

geographical information system, supported by open source software (Quantum®). The database was built under the BGRI (INE), and supported the file-synthesis of the 2011 Census[42]. With this GIS was possible graphically represent some of the indicators previously constructed (see Table 5, above). This kind of graphic representation turns more evident the differences found within the *bairro*, reinforcing the idea that this is a neighborhood very heterogeneous in its interior.

When we look at the segregation issue from a psychological perspective, it can be argued that besides the above mentioned data that show the physical/demonstrable aspects of segregation, it also has a great impact on the mental wellbeing of segregated residents. The lower and devalued status that is attributed to the *bairros sociais* by society, deeply marks the subjective perception that these socially and economically vulnerable populations have of their own skills as social actors, that is, as creators of their own destiny. In this sense, their self-image is influenced by the external image and this confrontation with a devalued image by outsiders can provoke different attitudes such as acceptance, objection or refusal of the situation in their neighbourhood (Costa Pinto and Gonçalves, 2000: 103).

In the Boavista neighbourhood, 65 percent of the surveyed habitants think that the neighbourhood has a negative image, while 30,8 percent thinks that Boavista has a positive image. Costa Pinto and Gonçalves (2000) note that the majority of the correspondents in the five *bairros sociais* that they studied (70,4 percent) use a defense strategy to fight the stigma their neighborhood has when they say that they do not think their neighbourhood has a negative impact on their lives[43]. Only 20 percent of the correspondents in the five studied *bairros sociais* admit that their lives are negatively influenced by their place of residence. 86,7 percent of the correspondents in the Boavista neighbourhood state that their neighbourhood does not have a negative influence in their lives, which is the second-highest positive evaluation of the five studied neighbourhoods (Costa Pinto and Gonçalves, 2000: 103).

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[42] Very special thanks should be addressed to my colleague Óscar Antunes, who prepared the GIS and processed the data required. Without his support the maps presented in this dissertation would not be possible to present.

[43] Cardoso and Perista also note this phenomenon and think it is problematic that people in degredated areas of the city valorize their living situation as positive. They find that 60 percent of the autochthon population and 69 percent of the immigrants are satisfied with living in their *bairro social*. Family and relations with neighbors are positively valued by residents, particularly immigrants. This positive valuation by immigrants can be understood by considering the countries of origin of these people. Coming from poor countries, where the average standards of comfort are very poor, the frame of reference for many of these immigrants is their homeland and not the host society which is more developed and urbanized. Their new living situation in Portugal may be a lot better then what they were used to in their home country (Cardoso and Perista, 1994: 107).

Map 8 - Boavista neighbourhood – building volumetry

Dimension of analysis: Building

Indicator: Type of building_1

Title: Volumetry

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the number of small buildings (with 1 or 2 accommodations) in the set of existing buildings

Process of calculation: H16/F16*100 (see Appendix)

Map 9 - Boavista neighbourhood – occupancy status

Dimension of analysis: Occupatiom

Indicator: Type of occupation_4

Title: Occupancy status

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the relation between homeownership and the total number of regular accommodations

Process of calculation: AV16/AI16*100 (see Appendix)



Map 10 - Boavista neighbourhood – density of occupation by families

Dimension of analysis: Occupation

Indicator: Type of occupation_5

Title: Density of Occupation by families

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the number of families and the total number of residential accommodations

Process of calculation: AX16/AI16 (see Appendix)



Map 11 - Boavista neighbourhood – percentage of small families



Dimension of analysis: Families

Indicator: Type of family_1

Title: Percentage of Small Families

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the number of families that exist of 1 or 2 persons and the total number of families

Process of calculation: AY16/AX16*100 (see Appendix)

Map 12 - Boavista neighbourhood – Index of Family Dependence

Dimension of analysis: Families

Indicator: Type of family_2

Title: Index of Family Dependence

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of families with individuals of 65 years and older and the number families with children of 15 years and younger

Process of calculation: BC16/BD16*100 (see Appendix)



Map 13 - Boavista neighbourhood – Index of aging

Dimension of analysis: Social structure

Indicator: Type of social structure_3

Title: Index of Aging

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the relation between children in the age group of 0-13 years old and the residents of 64 years and older

Process of calculation: (CK16+CL16+CM16)/CS16*100 (see Appendix)



Map 14 - Boavista neighbourhood – Index of inactivity

Dimension of analysis: Social structure

Indicator: Type of social structure_14

Title: Index of Inactivity

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the number of residents from 20 years and older who are economically inactive

Process of calculation: EE16/(CQ16+CS16)*100 (see Appendix)



Map 15 - Boavista neighbourhood – Unemployment Rate

Dimension of analysis: Social structure

Indicator: Type of social structure_13

Title: Unemployment Rate

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of residents that are looking for their first job or a new job and the total number of residents who are looking for a job or are employed

Process of calculation: (EA16+EB16)/(EA16+EB16+EC16) *100 (see Appendix)



Map 16 - Boavista neighbourhood – Rate of Labourers



Dimension of analysis: Social structure

Indicator: Type of social structure_15

Title: Rate of Labourers

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of residents employed in the primary and secondary sector, and the number of residents that work in the primary, secondary and tertiary sector

Process of calculation: (EG16+EF16)/(EF16+EG16+EH16) *100 (see Appendix)

Map 17 - Boavista neighbourhood – Rate of illiteracy



Dimension of analysis: Social structure

Indicator: Type of social structure_9

Title: Rate of illiteracy

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of residents that cannot read nor write and the total number of residents

Process of calculation: DL16/BV16*100 (see Appendix)

Map 18 - Boavista neighbourhood – Index of Social Capital

Dimension of analysis: Social structure

Indicator: Type of social structure_11

Title: Index of Social Capital

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the number of residents between 20 and 64 years old who are doing a study after high school

Process of calculation: (DQ16+DR16)/CQ16*100 (see Appendix)

Map 19 - Boavista neighbourhood – Index of Social Change

Dimension of analysis: Social structure

Indicator: Type of social structure_12

Title: Index of Social Change

Description: Expression, in percentage, of the relation between the number of residents who completed a study after high school and the number of residents who cannot read nor write

Process of calculation: (DW16+DX16)/DL16*100 (see Appendix)



With the improvement of the quality of the houses and streets and the improved access to public transport, the aspects of localization and accessibility are no longer on the list of aspects that give the neighbourhood a bad image according to the residents. The positive factors that used to be contributed to the *bairros sociais* by its residents were social factors such as having family and friends in the neighbourhood[44]. The physical improvements in the *bairros sociais* has made the residents valorise these aspects more than social ones. The factors that contribute the most to the negative image of their neighbourhood according to the residents are; consuming and trafficking of drugs, the perception of a social composition (also the ethnic composition) that consists mainly of people of the lower social classes and the different lifestyles that cause conflict between different (ethnic) groups and the vandalization of public and semi-public spaces in the neighbourhood (Costa Pinto and Gonçalves, 2000: 104).

Valentine (2008) also discusses this negative aspect of close proximity between different social groups when she states that "it often generates or aggravates comparisons between different social groups in terms of perceived or actual access to resources and special treatment" (Valentine, 2008: 327). Contact with difference (in the neighbourhood or elsewhere) can cause frustration and generate different scales of resentment and anger/violence[45]. Simply putting people together to live in the same neighbourhood thus does not automatically contribute to increase feelings of respect towards each other[46]. Geographers have to think of other ways to bring people of different socio-ethnic groups closer. One of the ideas is to create spaces of interdependence. These are places (for example parks, theatre groups, sport clubs and so on) where organized group activities take place to bring people from different backgrounds together to be in real meaningful contact with each other instead of the superficial daily contact on the streets, shops or in the bus for example. That daily contact only consists of being polite and does not increase mutual understanding and respect, so geographers have to search for ways to bring people in the city together in a meaningful

[44] From inquiries conducted in 1989 and 1991 in *bairros sociais*, Cardoso and Perista (1994) obtained information which shows that the two most important reasons for living in a *bairro social* were almost equivalent, and these were; lack of money to buy a house in a better neighbourhood and to have family or friends in the neighbourhood (Cardoso and Perista, 1994: 107).

[45] For more information on conflicts in *bairros sociais* in Portugal see: Costa Pinto and Gonçalves, 2000 and Malheiros *et al*., 2007.

[46] This finding contradicts the ´contact hypothesis´ which was created by social psychologist Gordon Allport (1954). In his opinion the best way to reduce prejudice and promote social integration was to bring different groups together. The basis of his argument was that people are uncomfortable with the unknown and therefore feel anxious about contact with people who are different from them. He argued that contact with strangers from different groups is the best way to solve this issue, as knowledge about the other groups lessens feelings of anxiety (Valentine, 2008: 323-324).

way to really increase respect for each other's differences. Valentine is sceptical of these spaces of interdependence as she emphasizes on a negative aspect of these organised social encounters when she says that minority groups can feel so discriminated by the majority group, that they feel too uncomfortable to be with them and do the same activity. Another comment on this idea by Valentine is that she questions how this connectivity can be sustained in both space and time beyond these short moments (Valentine, 2008: 328-332).

Valentine argues that the extent to which everyday spatial practices and civilities truly represent the intercultural dialogue and exchange necessary for the kind of new urban citizenship, where people from different socio-ethnic groups who are strangers to one another are more in contact with each other, needs much closer consideration. "*Some of the writing about cosmopolitanism and new urban citizenship appears to be laced with a worrying romanticization of urban encounter and to implicitly reproduce a potentially naïve assumption that contact with ´others´ necessarily translates into respect for difference*" (Valentine, 2008: 325).

Maybe these spaces of interdependence are areas within the city where everybody is equal, but the reality is that people in their daily lives live in a certain neighbourhood which conditions them in a certain way. The question should be proposed whether equal and meaningful contact is possible between people who live in poorer/segregated neighbourhoods and people that live in wealthier ones? Does the location where people live in the city change their behaviour and therefore people of different neighbourhoods have different social values which makes equal interaction impossible? According to Gottdiener and Hutchinson (2006), today all areas of metropolitan regions are extremely diverse. "*Instead of discussing lifestyle differences as a function of urbanism, it makes increasingly more sense to adopt a metropolitan perspective and relate social differences to locational differences in the region. We suggest that lifestyles within the metropolitan region are explained best by a combination of compositional or social factors and the action of the environment*" (Gottdiener and Hutchison, 2006: 186). Behaviour in public depends on the proper expression, interpretation, and negotiation of signs between people interacting with one another and with the built environment. Social psychologists who have studied this interaction in public insist that all behaviour is interpreted according to the particular spatial context which means that behaviour is a combination of social and spatial factors. We decide how to interpret the behaviour of others, which is essential to determining our own behaviour, in part by interpreting space as a context for action. Thus, the spatial context has a very powerful role in the patterning of behaviour in public (Gottdiener and Hutchison, 2006: 192).

4. GEBALIS´ ´Eco-Bairro´ Project and General Recommendations

This chapter is about my experience during the internship that I did at GEBALIS. This is a municipal company responsible for physical and social projects in the deprived neighbourhoods of Lisbon. The first two sections provide a theoretical framework and key elements of the debate on the concepts of 'participatory democracy and participatory development' and 'citizen empowerment'. These concepts are discussed because nowadays they are considered as essential aspects of development projects. The theoretical framework is followed by a brief explanation about GEBALIS and a description of the 'Eco-City' project that GEBALIS implemented in the Boavista neighbourhood. The chapter concludes with general recommendations for GEBALIS so they can improve future projects.

4.1 Participation in Politics and Development: from top-down to bottom-up

Since the 1960s most societies with liberal democracies have been experiencing the increasing loss of confidence in governments and in governmental institutions by its citizens (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004; Nye, 1997). Consequences of the decline in trust in government can be a lack of the necessary resources enabling a democracy to function. If citizens do not trust government, they are less willing to pay taxes, enter the government and obey the laws. Without these critical recourses government cannot function well and citizens will be even less satisfied with its performance (Nye, 1997: 4).

Several causes for the decline in trust in government are mentioned, for example that the number of tasks of governments has increased and maybe that is why government is perceived as more inefficient. Other complaints are that it costs too much and that politicians spend too much money on the wrong things. There is more media attention for corruption and misbehaviour of politicians, but not just the media made citizens more critical. Another cause was the radical political activism of the 1960s, which began with the civil rights and anti-war movements in the United States which later spread to other countries in the form of student protests. The legitimacy of government was questioned by a critical generation. The bad economic situation after the oil crisis of 1973-74 resulted in slower growth, higher inflation and more unemployment in a lot of countries. Governments were confronted with rising demands from citizens and less recourses. Another explanation is the "World War II effect" The war showed that government works and expectations were maybe too high at that time

and are now normal. But this does not explain why trust in for example Japan also declined (Nye, 1997: 16).

To find a sound argument for the decline in trust worldwide the debate is currently focused on the question whether or not civic engagement and social capital are declining in Western societies and if this affects democracy. As has been shown in Chapter 2, Putnam is the strongest advocate of the 'decline of social capital' and states that this decline is not only a problem for social cohesion within a society but also has political consequences (Putnam, 2000). Critics of Putnam's thesis think it is a wrong, too traditional view that idealizes the 1950s when people had the time for a strong civic and engaged life.

However, there is a group that accepts that the traditional forms of social and civic participation have declined, but they think Putnam's decline thesis is too limited as it does not pay attention to the new forms of participation and interaction. They state that citizens are still as interested to participate in politics, but now they just do it in another way. Especially young people prefer not to participate in hierarchical and formal networks, but instead they would like to participate in more spontaneous and flexible mobilization efforts (like protests or the signing of petitions) that correspond with their life-style which nowadays is busier and faster (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004: 150-164).

Another group of critics also accepts the decline thesis, but thinks it is irrelevant for the future of democratic systems. In their opinion democracies can prosper without mass participation. Formal participation mechanisms and traditional political organization were necessary during the development phase of democracies, but now that democracies are established these traditional forms are no longer relevant. The decline of trust in government and in politics in general is not a threat to political stability and democracy, but it is an indication that the system has reached its final stage (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004: 150-164).

One solution to the whole problem is that citizens are not obliged to participate in the political system. States are losing power to economic actors in this globalizing world. International movements, e-mail networks or acts of political consumerism are new forms of political participation that can be very powerful and effective to put direct pressure on an organisation or multinational. It is clear that international economic actors have gained power over the years, but domestic issues regarding social policy, education or security are still taken by national governments (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004: 167). Citizens still hold their governments responsible for their social and economic well-being. The private sector will play a bigger role, but according to Nye this does not mean that the role of governments should be much smaller. A weak and ineffective government can be costly, because in a

global economy political stability attracts capital and education and research makes a country more capable and competitive. And because of international terrorism and nuclear weapons national defence is even more important nowadays (Nye, 1997: 4-5).

Research surveys (see: Nye 1997; Pharr, Putnam and Dalton 2000) in different countries show that there is no serious threat for democracy, even in countries where government is not performing so well. The majority still sees democracy as the ideal form of government. Maybe the dissatisfaction with governments and leaders does not mean that there is a crisis of democracy and that we should fear for other forms of government such as authoritarian rule, but the fact that representative democracy is not at risk does not mean that the current political system functions well and should not be changed. Satisfaction with representative democracy is declining, so maybe it is time for a new form of democracy.

Participatory democracy is a concept that re-emerged during the 1960s as a consequence of the political turmoil in these years and anticipated to the 'crisis of democracy'. Power and wealth are concentrated in a small elitist group while the great majority feels powerless as can be concluded from the general decline in voting numbers and lack of trust in government (Bachrach and Botwinick, 1992: 1). Citizen participation in politics would be more democratic, more effective and policies might be more connected to citizen preferences. Citizens might respect governments more for doing their job when they know how hard it is to make decisions and in that way the relationship between government and citizens can improve (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004: 56).

The objective of participatory democracy is not just to improve the democratic system by making it more democratic, but also to achieve a more equal distribution of power. Bachrach and Botwinick (1992) consider liberal democracy narrow and unequal as it does not stimulate self-growth and self-empowerment. Participatory democracy stimulates self-improvement by constantly thinking about what is best for society as a whole. Another aspect of political participation is that excluded classes (from power and wealth) can participate. Participatory democracy implies self-development of citizens, because they constantly explore what their interests are. In a liberal democracy it is believed that citizens know what they want and what is best for them and that political parties execute this. Participatory democracy puts emphasis on the fact that lower/excluded classes do not always have the means to obtain knowledge about the political parties and institutions (Bachrach and Botwinick, 1992: 1-12).

However, the inequality of representation also occurs in participatory democracy. Citizen participants are not paid for the time they invest in participating, so committees may

be dominated by citizens whose livelihoods are effected strongly by the decisions being made. Committees can be overrepresented by the top socioeconomic group, because they have the time to participate and in the developing world it is found that the low-income group does not participate much, because their main priority is working to provide for their families (Irvin and Stransbury, 2004: 59).

Another argument against participation is that it costs too much. With citizen participation the decision-making process takes longer, because citizens have to be educated about the problems and a lot of deliberation and discussions have to take place. On the other hand, decisions made through a participatory process can be more effective and therefore less expensive on the long run, because they are supported by society. A politician that is trained for his/her job can make a decision faster without participation of citizens because of his/her knowledge (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004: 58). That is why Dye and Zeigler (2008) believe that elitism is not harmful for the needs of the masses. They think that a small elite group should govern, because they have the knowledge and the skills to decide what is best for the country. They acknowledge that the elite can abuse their power, but eventually they will do what is best for the masses in order to maintain their support. If all people would get a say in politics it would be disastrous according to Dye and Zeigler (Dye and Zeigler, 2008: 1-8).

Irvin and Stansbury (2004) postulate that most citizens do not even want to participate and prefer to spend their time on other things and that top-down government is simply more efficient. Not in every country or society participatory democracy is necessary (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004: 58-59). Other disadvantages of political participation by the masses would be selfishness and narrow-minded decisions (Dye and Zeigler, 2008; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004: 60). And there is a risk that dissatisfaction of citizens can grow with participatory democracy. If politicians (after having consulted participatory committees) take decisions that do not have the support of citizens they can distrust governments even more (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004: 59).

As the dissatisfaction with representative democracy increased, the dissatisfaction with top-down development practices also increased and led to a debate in that area on the same concept, the one of participation. The idea that poor/oppressed people should unite and find a way to improve their own destinies was already developed in the 1950s and 1960s. But it gained popularity in the 1980s when critics began to complain about the large-scale, government-initiated development projects for education or health for example that did not perform well. The interest for small-scale development and local participation gained ground (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 4-5). The World Bank's lending for participatory projects has risen

from 3 billion dollars in 1996 to 7 billion dollars in 2003 (lending for an enabling environment for such projects has been included in these amounts of money) (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 2).

Advocates of participatory development (Chambers 1997; Peet and Watts 1996; Botes and Van Rensburg, 2000) state that large-scale development has been too much top-down and too much focused on 'modernity'. And modern meant western. In other words, to develop was to westernise. Development in the third world was simply copying the 'advanced' societies (Escobar, 1995: 3-4). Development should be anti-colonial, anti-modernization and more bottom-up. This means that people should be more involved in all stages of the project, during the design stage, monitoring and the evaluation. Consultation of the target population was no longer considered sufficient. This means that the relationship between the stakeholders changes, aid agencies now have to work together with the beneficiaries of a project or programme. People must become actors in their own development. Participatory development would be more just, democratic and empowering. Participatory projects would be more effective, efficient and sustainable (Schneider and Libercier, 1995: 7, 10, 11) and it would lead to better designed projects, better targeted benefits and less corruption (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 6).

Despite these above mentioned benefits there are obstacles and difficulties concerning community participation. According to Botes and Van Rensburg (2000) this does not mean that other approaches should be favoured instead of participation. Some of the problems they mention are for example the paternalistic role of development professionals. The majority of development projects are initiated by outsiders. These professional experts think they know what's best and have all the knowledge and their task is to communicate this knowledge to the communities who know less.

Another problem is selective participation. In many projects only the community representatives are consulted and these representatives can do this job for the wrong reasons. Often they try to obtain higher political positions for themselves as they work closely with governments. In many projects there is more attention for the financial and material side than the cultural participatory side. This is caused by the pressure that is put on development workers to show quick results. Participatory development is often time consuming and not cost-effective. A balance between the process and outcomes is very important. Some organizations focus too much on the participatory process and fail to deliver good outcomes. That can give the feeling amongst beneficiaries that there is a lot of talking and promises, but nothing is happening. Other organizations do not let the community participate and only focus

on the final results. Projects without the participatory process run the risk of doing something the communities do not want or cannot sustain themselves (Botes and Van Rensburg, 2000: 42-51).

Another comment against participatory development is that beneficiaries are not really interested in becoming involved or do not have the knowledge to decide what is best for them. Poor people would not be able to decide what is best for the community in the future and would be tempted to make decisions that resolve their problems on the short-term. This argument leads back to the idea that development practitioners know what is best for poor people. Botes and Van Rensburg think that the indigenous knowledge and skills should be more respected and used in development so that beneficiaries influence the direction of development initiatives. This contributes to the empowerment of the helped communities (Botes and Van Rensburg, 2000: 54).

Despite the difficulties that participatory development entails the concept gained ground as the focus shifted to the empowerment of the poor.

4.2 Citizen Empowerment

Empowerment is a concept that is used in different areas such as: psychology, education, community development, politics and economics. A general definition of empowerment is that is it a "multi-dimensional social process that helps people gain control over their own lives. It is a process that fosters power in people, for use in their own lives, their communities, and in their society, by acting on issues that they define as important" (Page and Czuba, 1999).

There is an increased focus on a 'rights-based approach' to development. Citizens have the right to be engaged in the matters that affect their lives. This more active and participatory form of citizenship is caused by a concern with; inclusion (of racial and ethnic minorities that were excluded), the involvement of multiple stakeholders in projects and the emphasis on more accountability of institutions and politicians (Gaventa, 2004: 150-151). According to Marshall (1997) citizenship consists of three rights: civil and legal rights (freedom of thought, speech, religious practice and property rights), political rights (the right to vote and hold office) and social rights (the right to participate in the economic and social well-being of the community). All people should enjoy a minimum level of these rights (minimum of education, income, health and housing) to be a 'full member of society'. Only with these minimum resources people can exercise their civil, social and political rights

(Marshall *in* Warf Higgins, 1999: 290). All citizens formally possess these rights but in reality not all citizens can realize their rights and that is why empowerment is needed to achieve these rights. Thus personal empowerment would be a result of full citizenship. "*The experience of participation strengthens personal empowerment. Citizenship embraces aspects of empowerment, and vice versa. Participation is integral to both concepts*" (Warf Higgins, 1999: 291).

Citizens would be able to obtain their rights and improve their living situation by participating in local politics. With more influence of public policies, citizens who were previously excluded from the decision-making process and economic welfare would be able to redistribute recourses from which they always have been excluded. The first empirical studies about the efficiency and redistributive effects of direct democratic systems have been carried out in Switzerland and the United States. They are consistent in indicating that direct democratic systems in the form of referenda, town-meetings and/or plebiscites have in general a more efficient, better performing, and more redistributive effect than representative systems. Several studies (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001; Santerre 1989 and 1993; Pommerehne 1983) show that expenses on public policy such as education or garbage collection in representative democracies are higher than in participatory democracies. This can be a consequence of citizen's larger participation in the decision-making process which makes them feel co-responsible for an effective tax application. Marquetti therefore concludes that "the results of these different studies are consistent with the idea that different forms of democratic organization can influence public expenses and has an impact on the redistribution, fiscal policy, and economic performance" (Marquetti, 2009: 101-102).

The concept of empowerment is seen as a means to raise influence in politics and in development. The concept is thus being used in political and in development discourse, but in the latter is became a central concept. Empowerment of the poor was the response of the World Bank and donors to the critiques on top-down development. The World Bank's 'World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty' focused on empowerment as a key priority of development policy (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 5-6). As a result of this new orientation in development thinking the World Bank, the Inter American Development Bank (IDB) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), elaborated practical guides for technical teams to use to stimulate community participation in the formation, implementation

and evaluation of development projects[47]. But after the critique on top-down development there also came critique on participatory development. This had to do with the failure of really empowering the poor. Up till now it has failed to achieve real social change, because the underlying structures of power and politics are not attacked enough. This did not lead to less support for participatory approaches; however it did lead to more discussion on the right form of participatory development (Hickey and Mohan, 2005: 237-238).

The most important argument against participatory development is that it is too much focused on 'the local' instead of the greater structures of injustice and oppression. Agents of participatory development often see participation as a technical method instead of a political methodology of empowerment (Hickey and Mohan, 2005: 241-242). Without changing the underlying structures of power that are involved in development practice it is easy for the ones in power to abuse their power. The level of commitment of many governments to community participation has often been limited. Community participation can also be used for the implementation of preconceived ideas instead of empowering the communities. In that case the participation process is to ascertain the outcome by gaining the acceptance for an already designed project (Botes and Van Rensburg, 2004: 42-43). Cooke and Kothari (2001) therefore come to the conclusion in *Participation: The New Tyranny* that participation in practice is not even close to the bottom-up approach that participation should be. The maintenance of existing power relations masked by the promise of participation and this masking is what they see as tyranny (Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 1-15).

According to Hickey and Mohan profound changes have to be made in order to make development more empowering. They agree with Wharf and Higgins that participation needs to be based on citizenship[48], only in that way can it really be transformative and empower the marginalized. "Citizenship offers a means of covering the convergence between participatory development and participatory governance" (Gaventa, 2002). Citizenship also helps to establish participation as a political right that can be used by excluded people. Participatory development is most likely to succeed if it forms part of a wider political project of empowerment, when the basis is securing citizenship rights and when it is seen as a process of social change instead of technocratic interventions (Hickey and Mohan, 2005). Gaventa also

[47] The World Bank published The World Bank Participatory Sourcebook, the IDB published the Recource Book on Participation and the UNDP published the Guidebook on Participation and a book called Who are the Question-makers: a Participatory Evaluation Handbook (Hickey and Mohan, 2005: 237-238).

[48] For Hickey and Mohan 'citizenship' constitutes not only a set of legal obligations and entitlements, but also the practice through which individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand and maintain existing rights (Hickey and Mohan, 2005: 254).

is in favour of the 'rights-based approach' and states that participatory approaches are more likely to be influential when they are based on participation as a right. This is more empowering than participation by invitation of governments and donors, because in that way the higher authorities simply 'give' the marginalized power and that means they decide how much power they are willing to share and therefore still remain in power (Gaventa, 2004: 154).

White therefore emphasizes on the fact that participation must be seen as political. There are always tensions such as who is involved, how and on whose terms. An NGO can be invited by a local government for example to take part in a meeting about a certain problem. If the NGO does not go they cannot hold the government accountable for a wrong decision, because they were not present in the meeting. If they do go and later do not agree with the decision, the government can use it against them by saying that they were indeed included in the decision-making process. While participation has the potential to challenge patterns of dominance, it may also be the means through which existing power relations are entrenched and reproduced. "*Sharing in participation does not necessarily mean sharing in power*" (White, 1996: 6). Its seeming transparency that appeals to 'the people' masks the fact that participation can take on multiple forms and serve many different interests. If participation means that the voiceless gain a voice than this should bring some conflict. White (1996) finds it suspicious that there is an absence of conflict in many 'participatory' programmes (White, 1996: 15).

4.3 The Eco-City Project: general recommendations for GEBALIS

GEBALIS was established in 1995 as a municipal enterprise aiming to promote social, patrimonial and financial management of neighbourhoods with social housing in Lisbon that were created through the PIMP and PER programme. GEBALIS is a private municipal company financed exclusively by public capital. GEBALIS´ mission is to improve the quality of life, social integration and autonomy of the resident population, a good management of the neighbourhoods under their responsibility and the creation of socially, economically and financially sustainable living units where its residents have a strong sense of belonging to the neighbourhood (Boletim Municipal CML, 2013: 959).

The responsibilities that are attributed to GEBALIS are amongst others; the local management of municipal social housing neighbourhoods that are under the responsibility of GEBALIS, maintenance of public spaces in those neighbourhoods, the collection of rents of

municipal housing and the registration of changes in ownership and update household statuses (Boletim Municipal CML, 2013: 961-962). These responsibilities are carried out in offices in the neighbourhoods called ´*gabinetes de bairro*´. In total, GEBALIS has 16 local offices distributed over 5 different areas in the city. Every local office provides support to a number of neighbourhoods ranging between 2 and 13 neighbourhoods depending on the size of the housing units and their needs. Each local office has a multidisciplinary technical team that deals with the problems experienced by local residents (Boletim Municipal CML, 2013: 959).

In 2011, the municipality of Lisbon has approved an internal restructuring which, among other objectives, aimed at changing the municipal administration culture into a more cooperative one. With this restructuring five territorial intervention units were created with competences in urban management. This change of culture in the municipal administration resulted in a change of the role of GEBALIS. It used to be the only company responsible for the social management in social housing neighbourhoods, but now it assumes more and more the role of a partner with other municipal companies and civil society groups in the different programmes and projects. In a bulletin of GEBALIS it is written that "with this administrational change, it seems like the time has come to abandon a somewhat patronizing and paternalistic vision of the company in relation to municipal districts" (free translation). GEBALIS now wants to focus on the local management of rental housing and to promote partnerships to increase social cohesion in these neighbourhoods and their inclusion in the rest of the city, opposed to the creation of ghettos (Boletim Municipal CML, 2013: 959).

In order to include the Boavista neighbourhood into the rest of the city, GEBALIS created a programme called ´Eco-Bairro Ambiente+´ (Eco-City more environment). This is a programme to increase the environmental and social sustainability in the neighbourhood. This programme was created because of two main reasons, these are; the bad housing conditions in terms of energy loss in several blocks of the most recent constructed houses and the uninhabitable state of the *zona de alvenaria*. GEBALIS obtained the opinion of residents through an inquiry (see: 1º Workshop, 2013: 3) and concluded that one of the most frequent complaints of the residents is the cold and humidity in their homes. To solve this problem, the facades will be better isolated and existing windows will be replaced so the houses will retain more heat. The houses in the *zona de alvenaria* will be demolished and replaced by new ones. For this last plan however, the funding has yet to be negotiated with the municipality of Lisbon and the IHRU so construction can begin in 2014.

In addition to these home improvements, other projects were planned to make the Boavista neighbourhood more eco-friendly. An eco-centre would be built as well as a

community centre, green public spaces, gardens where people could plant their own vegetables and a BMX trail. Also free wireless internet would be made accessible to all the houses in the neighbourhood. Equipment would be installed to make energy use in the community centre and the swimming pool more energy efficient. A “Pedi Bus” would be created which is a pedestrian form of transportation to provide a safer walking route for children as they would be accompanied by municipal technical specialists that would bring them to school, to their home, the swimming pool for example. Environmental awareness would be created by the “Esquilo” project which implies the creation of mixed teams composed of “authority agents” who are uniformed children and adults that walk through various parts in the neighbourhood to raise awareness for the preservation and maintenance of public spaces and that warn residents about inadequate behaviours. An eco-booklet would be distributed door-to-door so that residents could keep up with their expenditures on water, electricity and gas. In this way they would obtain a greater understanding of their energy use and would be stimulated to save on these expenditures and thereby use less energy. Another plan to make residents use less energy is the ´saving competition´. Small equipment was installed in six houses which show at all times how much energy is being spend. It is linked to an online programme where residents can see overviews in the form of graphics of their energy use. The household which uses the least energy wins. Also some sport activities for children were planned (1º Workshop, 2013: 1-18).

The launch of the Eco-City project began with a workshop (03-03-2013) in the local sports centre. The first part of the workshop was a general explanation of the project and after the first part, residents could go to different tables where information was being provided on the different projects that are part of the Eco-City project. The first problem of the Eco-City project is that no specific goals were presented. It is always important to establish the expected results and these should always be quantifiable. If a certain result of a project is directly measurable, the obtained results should be made measurable by defining an aspect that can indeed be measured. For example, if the intended result is 'increasing participation', it is necessary to define an operational scale for measuring the degree of participation (Herrero and Navarro, 2006: 22-23). All the plans of the Eco-City project serve to improve a specific problem, however it was not established how many residents they wanted to reach with the awareness campaigns for example or how many families they wanted to make a change in their energy use.

Besides the fact that the projects were designed without specific goals and determining the desired results, there is also a lack of planning since the amount of hours that will be spent

on each project and the needed materials to execute them, are not included in the planning. There is a very general planning stating in which month which project will be carried out, however GEBALIS did not follow this planning as it was still unclear whether a project could start or not because they did not known yet whether there was enough money to finance the projects. GEBALIS therefore has given residents who are living in poor conditions false hope that their situation will improve. They made promises that they did not keep and this is not good for the relation between the local government and the residents.

As has been explained in section 2.3, sustainable development can only be achieved when the local government respects the residents they work for and take their opinions and needs seriously. If there were a good relationship between GEBALIS and the residents of the Boavista neighbourhood, the Eco-City project could have been a greater success because with a good relationship and trust there would have been more cooperation. The lack of trust in GEBALIS became clear during the first workshop on the Eco-City project. During the workshop there were several tables where information about the different projects that were to be implemented. It turned out that the people who came had no interest in any other projects, beside the demolition of the houses in the *zona de alvenaria*. All residents went to the table which provided information on that project and only one young resident who is not from that part of the neighbourhood showed interest in the other plans. All the other residents were only concerned about their direct living situation and wanted to know whether they would be placed out of their home or not. This indicates that the residents in anticipation did not have any belief that the projects would be executed.

A very important aspect of social projects according to Herrero and Navarro (2006) is not to design them according to theory or utopia. *´On paper it works, but reality is not always as we imagined it when we wrote it´* (free translation) (Herrero and Navarro, 2006: 75). A social project always derives from a utopia, from a vision to improve the living situation for example in a segregated neighbourhood. However, for a project to work it has to face reality. The Eco-City project does not correspond to the reality of everyday life in the Boavista neighbourhood. GEBALIS designed a big project without having enough money to realise it. Not only is there not enough money to realise all the plans, the project is not designed according to the needs of the residents of the Boavista neighbourhood. When looking at the data on segregation it becomes clear that the residents of the Boavista neighbourhood have more important problems on their minds than thinking about the environment. Their most important/basic needs should be met first before they can be interested in preserving the environment and think about more efficient energy use. People in the Boavista neighbourhood

would really benefit from social programmes that would help them to get a job or would stimulate them to study more. This would maybe decrease the drug-trafficking problem that causes nuisance. When looking at the data on illiteracy it would be a good idea to start a literacy programme. The Eco-City project does have some great aspects though. Free wireless internet access for all the residents is very helpful for residents in the Boavista neighbourhood as this facilitates the search for jobs online for example. Although it was very difficult for GEBALIS to find six families that wanted the small equipment installed in their houses that make it easier to save energy, there was one family that was very willing to accept the instalment and showed great interest in the functioning of the equipment as they really wanted to spend less on electricity. Other families showed no interest at all when the equipment was installed and only asked questions about what GEBALIS was planning to do about the humidity and cold in their houses. By implementing a project that has no interest at all from the part of the residents shows that GEBALIS does not know very well what the residents need. As has been concluded from the data on segregation, the Boavista neighbourhood is very heterogeneous. Therefore it would be better if GEBALIS would have created a project that not only corresponds more to the basic needs, but that also takes into account the different needs in the different parts of the neighbourhood.

As has been shown in the previous sections of this chapter, nowadays development projects are not thinkable without participation of the target group. GEBALIS only did a small survey before starting the 'Eco-City' project. Residents of the Boavista neighbourhood who filled in the survey to express what in their opinion was the biggest problem in the neighbourhood could only choose between several problems that were picked out by GEBALIS. The surveyed group was too small to be representative, so the residents were not consulted in the design phase, neither were the residents involved during the execution of the project. In the future it would be better if GEBALIS designs participatory projects to create more trust in the local government and to implement projects that will be more supported by the residents and thereby will be more effective because they correspond better with the real needs of the Boavista residents. The Eco-City project would be a greater success in more affluent parts of the city, the Boavista neighbourhood needs other type of social projects first before its residents can be interested in environmental issues.

Conclusion

Since the emergence of segregated areas in cities, different theories have been created on the causes of socio-ethnic segregation. It can be concluded that it is quite difficult to name a single cause of segregation. Different ethnic groups have different preferences, some choose to live segregated and others would like to live more mixedly with the native population. It is also difficult to find out what specific constraint causes segregation of a certain group. Because of the difficulty to name one specific cause, nowadays scholars no longer explain segregation from one perspective, but find that different aspects such as the context of the country, structural global economic processes and the type of welfare state all influence socio-ethnic segregation at the same time. Although in the European context there is a lack of proof that neighbourhood effects exist, urban policy is more and more being made in the context of urban sustainability and the aspect of mixing populations from different social and ethnic groups has gained more attention.

The main question in the debate on the policy of mixing is whether obligatory dispersal should be a government policy or if it is a natural process that should not be changed artificially? The point of view of scholars that think that segregation is a natural process that should not be stopped by the government is based on the idea that segregation is not a problem. They state that as a result of modern communication and transportation possibilities, the place where people live does not have as much influence on social contacts and job opportunities as before. The clustering of migrants in neighbourhoods in big cities is something of all times and history shows that most of the migrants move upwards in society. Therefore, politicians should not intervene too much and they have to accept that spatial policy does not have a great effect on behaviour.

The point of view of scholars who think that segregation is indeed a problem that should be stopped by the government think that the negative consequences of segregation pose a threat on the well-being of the society as a whole. These scholars have a more traditionalist view of society where all socio-ethnic groups should be more equal to each other and should live together (mixedly) in strong communities. They think that it is not favourable for the society as a whole when certain groups are excluded from mainstream society and they want all citizens to participate in more or less the same way. They share the idea that mainly local authorities are responsible for the distance between government and residents, as well as for the distance between different resident groups. But how much of an influence can local governments be?

When looking at studies and thus at facts, it can be concluded that governments up till now have not been very successful in decreasing segregation and stimulating contact between different social and ethnic groups. This is mainly because these policies fail to address the main causes of segregation as it only attacks the effects of social inequality and not its causes. It would be better to help immigrants and people from lower economic classes with finding jobs, education programs, stimulating to learn the language etc. However, it should be noted that it seems that some mixing policies implemented up till now could have been more successful if the execution would have been better. So maybe more studies are needed to design and execute mixing policies in a better way and thus making them more effective.

But before these costly mixing policies, integration and anti-poverty measures are implemented it would be useful to first perform more studies on 'neighbourhood effects' in the European context in order to know how big of a problem segregation in Europe really is. Some studies indeed show that immigrants that live segregated from the native population do have more difficulties in integrating in their new country, it thus can be argued that mixing ethnic groups is needed for integration. But then the question arises what integration is exactly? Should immigrants assimilate to the culture of the new country or can different ethnic groups live segregated from each other in a multicultural society where it is not even necessary to speak the language for example? It all depends on ones point of view.

When looking at studies on social capital and social distance it can be concluded that mixing policies can have positive and negative effects. Mainly for people from the lower socio-economic classes creating a broader network that includes people from higher socio-economic classes can help them to get a job. The negative effects are related to the disruption of the natural environment and thereby naturally created community. It is proven that people are emotionally attached to the place where they live. Mixing thus removes the emotional aspect that is needed to create a sense of community. Indeed studies on social interaction between people from different socio-ethnic groups after a mixing policy was implemented, show that people still were more likely to interact with people from their own socio-economic and/or cultural background.

The example of the emergence of ghettos in the United States and the study that has been made in this dissertation on socio-ethnic segregation in Portugal, show that governments can be responsible for the creation of segregation in a city. These examples show that other factors also have contributed to the maintenance of segregation. In Portugal, the Salazar regime intentionally created the *bairros sociais*, however, the liberalisation of the housing market and banking system also had an important influence on levels of segregation in

Lisbon. From the Portuguese situation can be learned that the government also can have an influence on decreasing levels of segregation. To achieve this, a structural long-term and consistent urban planning policy is needed. Even though the number of shanties experienced a reduction in Portugal and several programmes helped to reduce levels of segregation, many of the social problems of these areas were only transferred to the new public housing neighbourhoods and levels of segregation of new immigrants are still higher than the native population up till this day. This shows that the underlying problems of socio-ethnic segregation do not automatically disappear with dispersal policies.

The question thus still remains whether governments should intervene or if segregation is a natural process that cannot and should not be stopped? Is it possible, just by simply putting all different kinds of people in the same neighbourhood, to create equity? Maybe it is unrealistic to think that governments can create an equal society by overlooking what makes us different. What is equity exactly and when is an equal society obtained? Maybe a clear answer should be formulated first before trying to create one. Is it a society where everybody has equal opportunities? The government is responsible for providing equal opportunities for everybody, but if people from a certain social and or ethnic group really feel equal to other groups is a more difficult task for the government.

The case study of the Boavista neighbourhood shows the great dependence of the poorer residents on the local government. By empowering poorer residents they will be in charge and responsible for their own development and no longer depend so much on the government. Participation seems to be the solution for truly equal societies, however the power issue remains a problem. Only if governments are willing to share their power and let citizens participate fully in their own development equality will be created. For now, sustainable development projects like the progressive 'Eco-City' project are not yet implementable in segregated/poorer neighbourhoods. Before people can think about topics concerning sustainable development and participate in these projects, first their basic needs should be met.

The underlying problems that cause segregation must be solved first. If anti-poverty programmes, language courses for newly arrived immigrants, and anti-discrimination policies are implemented first maybe segregated groups will feel more comfortable around other groups and want to mix voluntarily instead of being forced by the government. When looking at the overall effectiveness of mixing policies, it can be stated that there are certainly positive aspects, however considering the costs of mixing policies in relation to the effectiveness it can be concluded that only mixing is not enough. As long as poverty, social problems, integration

problems and discrimination still exist, all those expensive mixing policies will not be successful. People first have to feel equal before they will interact as equals.

Maybe it is human nature to distinguish ourselves from others and wanting to feel better than others. What if we do not want to be equal? The government can only do so much to create a sustainable society, but eventually it is people's own responsibility to achieve it. The balance between the three aspects of sustainable development will only be achieved when people find a balance between the three aspects within themselves.

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