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Economics from the Nova School of Business and Economics.

The Impact of Urbanisation on Political Preferences: Evidence from Mozambique

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Abstract:

Sub-Saharan Africa is urbanising faster than any other region in the world, with a significant impact on economic growth. However, there are forces against urbanisation. Ruling political parties with their traditional strongholds in the countryside resist rural-urban migration. Using baseline survey data of 3,648 migrants who moved to an urban area in Mozambique, I find evidence that migrants living in urban areas for a longer time change their voting behaviour in favour of opposition parties and become more critical of the current government. These findings assist policymakers to understand the political economy of urbanisation to implement more effective and politically viable policies.

Keywords:

Migration, Urbanisation, Political Preferences, Voting Behaviour, Sub-Saharan Africa, Mozambique

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1. Introduction

In Sub-Saharan Africa, urbanisation significantly impacts economic growth and structural change. Rural-urban migration has been growing rapidly over the last years having a significant focus on areas of urban peripheries where large numbers of households reside in informal settlements (Parienté, 2017). By 2050, the proportion of people living in urban areas is predicted to rise from 47% in 2000 to around 57%. It is expected that large cities in developing countries will account for more than 90% of population growth in the future (African Development Bank Group, 2012). Africa is urbanising faster than any other region in the world and by 2025, there will be 100 cities with a population of more than a million inhabitants, which presents the continent with insurmountable challenges (Hill and Muggah, 2018). Migration from rural areas to urbanities unfolds growth opportunities, including better access to jobs and financial services. Hourly salaries in urban areas are more than twice as high as in rural places. Moreover, access to education and healthcare is better developed in towns, which improves opportunities for social mobility (OECD, 2022).

Nonetheless, there are forces against urbanisation. Besides social inequality, informal settlements and pressure on urban infrastructure, rural-urban migration affects the political economy. Urban residents are often more critical of their governments which poses a challenge for ruling political parties and their voter stream. Therefore, many governments resist urbanisation for political reasons because their traditional strongholds are frequently in rural areas where it is simpler to regulate citizens' behaviour (Gutheil, 2022). Equally important, urbanisation is transforming the political geography of Africa, where towns are witnessing the formation of political movements in opposition (Paller, 2017). However, there is limited evidence on how migrants who recently moved from rural to urban areas on a national level affect political attitudes in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In this thesis, I provide evidence of how time spent in an urban area changes political outcomes of migrants who recently moved to an urban area in Sub-Saharan Africa. More precisely, I collected baseline survey data as part of an ongoing large-scale research project to evaluate how rural-urban migration and the duration of living in an urban area affect political preferences, including voting behaviour, trust and satisfaction levels with local and national governance. The location of this study is the city of Quelimane, Mozambique, in south-east Africa. As part of the data collection, 2,321 migrants and 1,109 residents were interviewed between September and December 2021 followed by further 1,327 migrants who were interviewed in an oversampling in September 2022. Migrants and residents were randomly allocated around the town and the baseline surveys covered topics such as demographics, integration, housing, financial aspects, political beliefs, as well as trust and satisfaction levels.

The main results show that migrants became less likely to vote for the ruling party FRELIMO (-1.4 percentage points) the longer they lived in Quelimane and less likely to vote for FRELIMO in a hypothetical election tomorrow (-0.7 percentage points). Rural-urban migrants received more job offers during the 2018 election campaigns from politicians in favour of a vote the longer they lived in Quelimane. Moreover, trust levels for the president of Mozambique (-3.7 percentage points), the provincial governor (-3.6 percentage points) and the mayor of Quelimane (-1.6 percentage points) decrease with a longer duration of stay in the urban area. With more time spent in Quelimane, migrants are 1.6 percentage points less likely, on average, to be satisfied with the political governance of Mozambique. However, I do not find evidence that the satisfaction with the opposition party mayor of Quelimane decreases with increasing length of stay in the urban area.

These findings align with the existing literature on migration and political power in Sub-Saharan Africa. Changes in political institutions in Africa since the 1990s led to a manipulation of rural areas and migration in order to acquire and maintain political power, as

described by Raleigh (2014). Other papers explain the relationship between rural-urban migration and democratisation (Davis and Henderson, 2003; Glaeser and Steinberg, 2017). Cheeseman (2022) recently added to this debate that Africa is undergoing a large socioeconomic shift towards urban areas where opposition parties perform significantly better as can be seen in Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe, similar to this paper in Mozambique. Other evidence from Zimbabwe (Pikovskaia, 2022) focuses on political participation and attitudes in regard to the authorities based on informal-sector organisations.

Regarding whether and how political preferences, trust and satisfaction levels of migrants alter as a result of moving to urban areas, surprisingly little empirical evidence is available in the economics literature. The effects of international migration are the main focus of evidence of changes in political choices brought about by migration in developing countries (Batista and Vicente, 2011). International migrants, who are frequently refugees, are the focus of the majority of research on policies to integrate migrants in industrialized countries (Hatton, 2016). The impact of migration in the countries of origin is primarily examined in the research on developing nations (Gautam, 2021; Gibson et al., 2011). Other literature regarding development economics focuses on emigration openness as a favourable impact on institutional development in the home country (Docquier et al., 2016).

Lastly, there is empirical evidence on internal seasonal migration, mainly in the context of agriculture, food insecurities or natural disasters. Following households in rural Bangladesh, Bryan et al. (2014) demonstrate that incentives to leave temporarily during the lean season produces significant seasonal mobility. Other papers provide evidence for seasonal migration in Ethiopia (Senbetie, 2022) and India (Nandy et al., 2021).

However, this paper goes beyond the aforementioned literature and focuses on recently arrived migrants in an urban environment on a national level to evaluate how voting

behaviour, trust, satisfaction and the opinion about the current government's management are affecting rural-urban migration. The lessons obtained from this paper may help policymakers in the future to better understand the political economy of urbanisation, which has an immense impact on the economic development of Sub-Saharan Africa.

2. Context

Mozambique, located in south-east Africa, is no exception with its rapid urbanisation, mainly linked to rural migration, pressure on public services and infrastructure, vulnerability to the effects of climate change and insecurities experienced in the northern province of Nampula, where terrorist attacks are on the rise due to the discovery of natural gas (IGC, 2022).¹ Nonetheless, around two-thirds of Mozambique's population, estimated at 33 million inhabitants, still live in rural areas (World Bank, 2023).

The town of Quelimane, where this study took place, is the administrative capital of the Zambezia province in central Mozambique and the country's sixth-largest city with a population of about 350,000 people. Quelimane consists of five administrative posts with 54 neighbourhoods. In total, there are more than 500 urban communities and each of these sectors is under the direction of a local leader or chief (INE, 2017).

The main political forces in Mozambique are the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM). In the 2019 presidential and legislative elections, FRELIMO triumphed by a landslide, winning a two-thirds majority in the national assembly. Moreover, FRELIMO won the provincial elections in the same year, which resulted in the appointment of governors in each of the nation's ten provinces. Previously in 2018, FRELIMO prevailed

¹ See Figure A1 in the appendix for the location of Mozambique.

largely in the last municipal elections, winning 44 out of 53 cities nationwide. RENAMO was able to win eight municipalities in the most populous provinces in the north and centre of Mozambique, one of them being the city of Quelimane, where the mayor Manuel de Araújo governs since his election in 2011 as a sprinkling of opposition-party mayors who have contested FRELIMO's power. In contrast, MDM asserted its dominance in the port city of Beira (World Bank, 2023). As European Union election observers noted, the overall election process in the 2019 elections was marred by unprecedented levels of irregularities, manipulation, intimidation and violence, which contributes to growing authoritarianism in Mozambique. Additionally, polarisation, which has been an ongoing political phenomenon in Mozambique since its independence in 1975, is increasing at a fast rate (Pitcher, 2020).

Altogether, the political system in Mozambique is characterised by a glaring imbalance between the ruling party FRELIMO and the opposition. FRELIMO holds a significant amount of political authority and the intimate ties between the party, the government and the corporate sector obstruct responsive administrative services as well as effective and transparent government action. FRELIMO relies on rural voters who live in poverty and are easy to manipulate through intimidation and clientelism. Mozambique is currently ranked 142nd out of 180 countries evaluated in the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International in 2022 (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2023).

3. Data

The data used in this paper are part of the ongoing large-scale research project “Integrating Rural Migrants in Cities – A Field Experiment in Mozambique” led by principal investigators Pedro C. Vicente, Alex Armand, Wayne Sandholtz and Frederica Mendonça. As part of a research internship with the knowledge centre NOVAFRICA in the second half of 2022, I

was involved in the data collection and the field work of the aforementioned research project, where the data for this paper was collected.²

Firstly, the mapping of Quelimane's urban communities was carried out between July and August 2021 by Armand et al. (2022) and the municipality of Quelimane as part of a larger initiative to integrate rural migrants who recently moved to the town. This was followed by the baseline household surveys where residents and migrants were interviewed. In total, 3,648 migrants were interviewed in two different time periods.³ The first 2,321 migrants were interviewed during the baseline survey between September and December 2021. These migrants arrived in Quelimane between August 2020 and December 2021. Additionally, at the end of 2022, an oversampling was conducted where further 1,327 migrants were interviewed. The decision to conduct an oversampling was taken after evaluating that a proportion of the interviewed baseline migrants did not stay for a long time in the city. Figure 1 shows the distribution of baseline interviews with migrants in Quelimane. Moreover, 1,109 residents were interviewed in the city, simultaneously to the baseline survey of the migrants between September and December 2021.


Regarding the data collection, randomisation played a vital part. With the assistance of a local team of enumerators, we used a random walk approach to locate a maximum of eight migrants in each of the 558 city blocks in order to implement the randomisation at the block level (neighbourhood subdivisions). As some blocks are barely populated, we averaged to interview 4.2 migrants per block in the initial baseline surveys. During the oversampling, this target was lowered to three migrants per block. In each block, the local enumerators were allocated to a random starting point in order to locate a suitable migrant for the survey. If no

² NOVAFRICA was created as a knowledge center by the Nova School of Business and Economics of the Universidade Nova de Lisboa in 2011 and it is given special attention to provide expertise on impact regarding economic development in Portuguese-speaking African countries including Mozambique.

³ Recent migrants are defined as people born outside of the city district of Quelimane and as people who are at least 18 years of age.

migrant was found close to the starting point, further detailed instructions were given to the enumerators to detect a migrant.⁴

Figure 1: Map of Quelimane with survey distribution



The baseline survey consists of different modules, starting with the localisation of the interviewee and the contact details. Module C collected demographic information about age, education, religion and the origin of each migrant and resident. The topic of migration is addressed in module D, which explored the reasons behind moving to Quelimane and family background, followed by module E, which collected data on the integration and adaption of newly arrived migrants in Quelimane. Of great importance for this paper is module L about the respondents' perception of politics and their voting behaviour, trust, satisfaction levels

⁴ See Figure A2 in the appendix for further instructions on how the random walk was performed during the fieldwork.

and management of the current government. Other modules included questions about housing, financial aspects, consumption and mobile money. For the oversampling, a condensed version of the baseline survey was used.

4. Estimation Strategy

The estimation strategy includes an OLS regression model that aims to assess the relationship between time spent in an urban area and the outcome variables, while controlling for potential confounding factors.

The specification appears as follows, using equation 1 below:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{time}_i + \beta_2 \text{migrants}_i + \beta_3 \text{interaction}_i + \beta_4 X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where y_i represents the outcome of interest for individual i . time_i captures the length of stay in the urban area, measured in months since the arrival in Quelimane. migrants_i indicates whether an individual is a migrant (1) or a resident (0) and interaction_i represents the interaction of the first two coefficients, i.e., time and migrants. Therefore, the interaction term allows for a differential effect of time on the outcome variables for migrants. X_i is a vector of control variables. On the one hand, it includes the following demographic characteristics: education, religion, sex, number of children and age⁵. On the other hand, it includes block dummies, corresponding to the 558 blocks in the city level of Quelimane. Lastly, ε_i indicates the error term which captures the unobserved factors. Standard errors are clustered at the block level.

My identification strategy relies on controlling for a wide range of observable factors in form of the aforementioned demographical variables. In order to capture the unobservable factors,

⁵ See Table 1 in the results section for detailed information on the demographics.

I use fixed effects at the block level for a high level of detail. Unfortunately, despite attempts, I did not succeed in finding strong instrumental variables when employing instrumental variable methods.⁶

5. Results

5.1. Summary Statistics

Table 1 reports the summary statistics from the estimation sample and provides information about the distribution of the variables in the dataset. For the variable time overall, which shows how many months an individual lived in Quelimane, 3,864 observations with a mean value of 26.1 are in the sample. All migrants arrived within the last 27 months and lived for more than 1 year in the city (15.1 months) until now. For residents, this number is evidently higher (177.4 months on average), meaning that interviewed residents lived for around 15 years in the city. The highest recorded value of time for residents is at 853 months, implying that one resident lives for more than 71 years in the city of Quelimane.

The demographics of migrants and residents vary significantly. On average, migrants have less education than residents: 25.6 percent of migrants finished secondary education, on the other hand, 41.3 percent of residents completed secondary education. Evaluating tertiary education, the disparity increases: only 2.3 percent of migrants completed some kind of tertiary education, on average, compared to 10.2 percent of interviewed residents. The dummy variable religion shows that Catholicism is the predominant religion of migrants and

⁶ Several variables of the survey data were employed as potential instrumental variables. In particular, I firstly evaluated the migrants' risk perception. One of the survey questions was: "Suppose you are offered two ways to earn some money. With option 1, you are guaranteed 4000 Meticaïs (currency of Mozambique) per month. With option 2, you have an equal opportunity to earn 2000 Meticaïs, or if you are lucky, you will earn 8000 Meticaïs. Which option would you choose?" Another potential instrument was the province where migrants were born. This dummy variable equaled the value 1 if migrants were in the Zambezia province and 0 if they were born in another province. As these variables are likely to be exogenous, I applied the first stage F-Statistics test, which resulted in values far below 10, signaling that the variables I chose are weak instruments.

residents. 63.8 percent of migrant respondents are male, whereas only 43.1 percent of residents consider themselves as male. On average, migrants of this sample have more than one child, while on the contrary, residents have more children with 2.3 on average. The highest number of children in the sample is at 11 children for migrants and 16 children for residents. Lastly, migrants are younger with an average age of 24.2 years, compared to an average age of 33.8 years for residents.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Variables	N	Mean	Std.Dev	Max
Time	Time Migrants	3602	15.064	6.538	27
	Time Residents	262	177.416	159.769	853
	Time Overall	3864	26.072	58.574	853
Migrants	Education	3629	2.326	1.584	7
	Catholic	3516	0.599	0.49	1
	Female	3607	0.362	0.481	1
	Children (in numbers)	3508	1.143	1.603	11
	Age (in years)	3583	24.193	7.832	99
Residents	Education	1108	3.164	1.88	7
	Catholic	1109	0.486	0.499	1
	Female	1109	0.569	0.495	1
	Children (in numbers)	1108	2.299	2.207	16
	Age (in years)	1105	33.797	14.379	96

Notes: The variable time measures the amount of time spent in Quelimane. Time is measured in months since the arrival in Quelimane. The demographic variables are measured in the following way: Education is measured from 0 to 7. It is 1 if some kind of primary education exists (0 = no education / 7 = higher education). Catholic is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the corresponding person is catholic. Female is another dummy variable which equals 1 when the interviewed person is female. Children and age are measured in numbers and in years respectively.

5.2. Politics

Table 2 presents the estimates for political outcomes based on the survey interviews. More precisely, the four dependent variables clientelism as job offer, clientelism as goods offer, voting FRELIMO in 2018 election and voting FRELIMO tomorrow are evaluated. In the first two columns, estimates for the variable clientelism as job offer show that migrants are provided more job offers (5.2 percentage points) with an increasing length of stay in Quelimane, significant at the 1 percentage level. Without the interaction term in column 1, the coefficient for migrants is positive (73.6 percentage points) and highly significant which suggests that migrants are more likely to report job offers during election campaigns compared to residents, holding all other variables constant. However, evaluating the coefficient for migrants in the second column with the interaction term, the estimates display negative and not significant results, revealing that the effect of being a migrant on job offers is no longer significant. Sequentially, this implies that the effect of being a migrant on clientelism as job offers during the election campaign depends on the length of stay in the urban area. Observing the variable time in the first row in regard to clientelism, holding all other variables constant, I do not find any statistically significant results. This observation is true for all other political outcomes as well and implies that residents, without taking the migrants into consideration, do not play a significant part for the main political results.

Columns 3 and 4 present the estimates for clientelism as goods offer, showing that an increasing time spent in Quelimane, by migrants, increases the likelihood of receiving goods offer such as money, food or gifts by 2.1 percentage points. Evaluating the effects of length of stay in Quelimane on voting for FRELIMO in columns 5 and 6, I find in that an increasing time spent in the urban area decreases the amount of votes for the ruling political party FRELIMO by 1.4 percentage points.

Table 2: Politics

	Clientelism as Job Offer		Clientelism as Goods Offer		Voting FRELIMO in 2018 election		Voting FRELIMO tomorrow	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Time	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Migrants	0.736*** (0.246)	-0.207 (0.267)	-1.019*** (0.260)	-1.385*** (0.293)	0.073 (0.244)	0.313 (0.274)	-0.010 (0.092)	0.125 (0.101)
Interaction		0.052*** (0.007)		0.021** (0.008)		-0.014* (0.008)		-0.007*** (0.003)
Education	0.087*** (0.028)	0.069** (0.027)	0.078*** (0.030)	0.071** (0.030)	0.023 (0.033)	0.029 (0.032)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)
Catholic	-0.073 (0.078)	-0.086 (0.074)	-0.000 (0.085)	-0.004 (0.085)	0.034 (0.101)	0.027 (0.099)	0.002 (0.028)	0.004 (0.028)
Female	-0.011 (0.082)	-0.045 (0.080)	-0.021 (0.084)	-0.035 (0.084)	-0.052 (0.105)	-0.013 (0.106)	-0.016 (0.032)	-0.005 (0.032)
Children	-0.015 (0.032)	0.005 (0.031)	-0.005 (0.031)	0.004 (0.031)	-0.000 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)
Age	0.011 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	0.011 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Cons	-0.638** (0.297)	-0.134 (0.300)	1.193*** (0.318)	1.383*** (0.324)	-0.146 (0.299)	-0.397 (0.321)	0.557*** (0.107)	0.453*** (0.113)
R-squared	0.189	0.233	0.234	0.240	0.072	0.089	0.127	0.134
Observations	2324	2324	2373	2373	571	571	1949	1949

Notes: Estimates are based on linear regressions which are clustered on the block level. The significance levels are shown in the following method: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The first two columns show the results for clientelism in form of job offers. Interviewees were asked how often they received job offers by local politicians in exchange for their vote during the 2018 elections. Columns (3) and (4) show a similar question but this time, interviewees were asked if they received any goods such as money, food or gifts in exchange for a vote in the election. Columns (5) and (6) show a dummy variable with the results for which political party interviewees voted for in the 2018 elections. This variable equals 1 if people voted for FRELIMO. Another dummy variable can be found in columns (7) and (8) where interviewees were asked for which party they would vote tomorrow. This variable equals 1 if people voted for FRELIMO.

To put things into perspective, this finding suggests that migrants who recently moved to an urban area, are increasingly voting for opposition parties. Turning to columns 7 and 8, I find evidence that migrants will less likely vote in a hypothetical vote tomorrow for FRELIMO (-0.7 percentage points) the longer their stay in the urban area is. These findings reveal that

rural-urban migration affects the political views of migrants towards the opposition, as less people vote for the ruling party. While residents do not impact any of the political outcomes, the interaction of time and migrants causes statistically significant shifts in voting behaviour and clientelism.

5.3. Trust

Table 3 reports the outcome effects on trust variables. The estimates of columns 1 and 2, analysing the level of trust in the Mozambican president, display that migrants who live for more time in Quelimane are less likely to trust the president by 3.7 percentage points. Evaluating trust measurements in regard to the provincial governor, I find evidence that more time spent in an urban area causes lower trust levels (-3.6 percentage points). Holding all other variables constant, I also observe lower trust (-1.5 percentage points) in the mayor of Quelimane when taking the interaction of time and migrants into account. Lastly, turning to trust in a market situation which is a non-political variable, I find significant evidence that migrants who already live for more time in Quelimane, reduce their trust in a market situation, on average, by 1.2 percentage points. Once again, the effect of time alone on the dependent variables provides no statistically significant results. Turning to the demographic control variables, being a female respondent has a negative significant effect (-11.3 percentage points) on trust in the mayor of Quelimane. Rural-urban migrants in my sample are predominantly male and considering that the ongoing large-scale research project with the support of the municipality of Quelimane helps to integrate migrants on the job market, this finding does not surprise.

In summary, all aforementioned results are highly significant at the 1 percent level and show that trust for politicians, regionally and nationally, decreases with a lengthier stay in an urban area. This indicates why incumbents in Sub-Saharan Africa might resist rural-urban migration

and why the political economy plays a crucial role in urbanisation. Note that trust levels in regard to the president and provincial governor, which are represented by the dominant, ruling party FRELIMO decrease more (-3.7 and -3.6 percentage points) than the trust levels in regard to the mayor of Quelimane (-1.5 percentage points) who runs for the opposition party RENAMO.

Table 3: Trust

	Trust in President		Trust in Provincial Governor		Trust in Mayor of Quelimane		Trust in Market Situation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Time	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Migrants	-0.119 (0.148)	0.568*** (0.162)	-0.215 (0.140)	0.436*** (0.154)	-0.039 (0.121)	0.228* (0.137)	0.021 (0.126)	0.236* (0.138)
Interaction		-0.037*** (0.004)		-0.036*** (0.004)		-0.015*** (0.004)		-0.012*** (0.004)
Education	-0.032* (0.018)	-0.018 (0.017)	-0.029 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.016)
Catholic	0.047 (0.046)	0.042 (0.044)	0.011 (0.047)	0.009 (0.045)	-0.036 (0.039)	-0.035 (0.039)	0.006 (0.042)	0.005 (0.042)
Female	-0.072 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.043)	-0.075 (0.047)	-0.033 (0.045)	-0.132*** (0.044)	-0.113** (0.044)	0.029 (0.039)	0.043 (0.039)
Children	0.031* (0.018)	0.014 (0.018)	0.033* (0.019)	0.021 (0.018)	0.031* (0.017)	0.025 (0.017)	0.005 (0.015)	0.001 (0.016)
Age	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Cons	0.971*** (0.181)	0.651*** (0.181)	0.640*** (0.171)	0.275 (0.173)	0.943*** (0.155)	0.792*** (0.156)	0.641*** (0.148)	0.521*** (0.150)
R-squared	0.111	0.157	0.112	0.155	0.118	0.126	0.142	0.147
Observations	3182	3182	2941	2941	3147	3147	3344	3344

Notes: Estimates are based on linear regressions and are clustered on block level. Significance levels are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Columns (1) and (2) show how much the interviewees trust in the president of Mozambique. The variable equals 1 if people feel little trust (0 = no trust / 3 = much trust. Columns (3) and (4) show the trust in the local governor, whereas columns (5) and (6) represent the trust level in the local municipality of Quelimane. In this variable, interviewees were asked the following question: "When a vendor sells you a kilogram of rice, how sure are you that he sold you the correct amount?". Measurements work similar to the preceding variables.

5.4. Satisfaction

Table 4: Satisfaction

	Satisfaction Political Governance Quelimane		Satisfaction Political Governance Mozambique	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Migrants	-0.397*** (0.106)	-0.429*** (0.122)	-0.120 (0.109)	0.176 (0.118)
Interaction		0.002 (0.004)		-0.016*** (0.003)
Education	-0.033** (0.016)	-0.034** (0.016)	-0.069*** (0.015)	-0.062*** (0.015)
Catholic	-0.045 (0.038)	-0.045 (0.038)	0.013 (0.039)	0.013 (0.039)
Female	-0.056 (0.045)	-0.058 (0.046)	-0.012 (0.041)	0.008 (0.041)
Children	0.018 (0.017)	0.019 (0.017)	0.014 (0.017)	0.007 (0.017)
Age	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Cons	0.872*** (0.135)	0.890*** (0.138)	0.257* (0.136)	0.090 (0.135)
R-squared	0.136	0.136	0.088	0.100
Observations	3083	3083	3194	3194

Notes: Estimates are based on OLS estimations which are clustered on block level. Significance levels are presented in the following: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The two satisfaction variables are defined by the following: The first dependent variable (Satisfaction Political Governance Quelimane) refers to the general satisfaction level of interviewees with the political governance in Quelimane: the variable is equal to 1 if people are little satisfied (0 = not satisfied / 3 = very satisfied). The second dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) explains the overall satisfaction of political governance for Mozambique (0 = not satisfied / 3 = very satisfied).

In this section, Table 4 reports the results for trust of local and national political administration. The interaction term of time and migrants does not result in a statistically significant estimate for the local political governance satisfaction. However, the migrants variable has negative and significant effects on the local political governance without (-39.7 percentage points) and with the interaction term (-42.9 percentage points). These estimates suggest that the length of living in Quelimane has no significant effect on the satisfaction of the political governance in Quelimane. Turning to the national political administration in columns 3 and 4, where respondents were asked about their satisfaction in regard to the political governance on national level on a scale from 0 to 3. For this dependent variable, I find statistically significant evidence that the interaction of time and migrants has negative effects of -1.6 percentage points on the satisfaction level, holding all other variables constant. Lastly, time alone without the interaction term has a negative value of 0.1 percentage points on the satisfaction of the political administration of Mozambique, statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Unsurprisingly, the level of education shows a negative correlation in regard to the political outcomes, implying that more educated respondents show lower satisfaction levels referring to the national and local political administration.

Hence, I find empirical evidence that migrants become less satisfied with more time lived in an urban area in regard to the political cabinet of Mozambique. However, for satisfaction in regard to the local political administration of Quelimane, I do not find significant decreases in levels. This indicates that lengthier stays in the urban area of Quelimane decrease satisfaction with the ruling dominant party FRELIMO on a national level. Nonetheless, on the local political level in Quelimane where the opposition party RENAMO is in office, no changes in satisfaction levels can be detected.

5.5. Management

In this last section, where the survey respondents' assessment of the current government is evaluated in factors including the economy and living conditions. I find no significant results in columns 1 and 2 on the perception of whether the economy of Mozambique develops in a satisfying direction. Turning to the assessment of improving the living conditions, the coefficients display a negative (-2 percentage points) and highly significant estimation of the interaction term of time and migrants on the incumbents management of improving the current living conditions. Finally, respondents were asked to what extent the incumbents take care of creating new jobs (columns 5 and 6). In particular, lengthier stays in Quelimane by migrants lead to lower levels of the assessment that the current administration take charge of a stable labour market (-2.1 percentage points). The coefficient of migrants without the interaction term is negative and not statistically relevant, however, including the interaction term, migrants have a positive and significant effect on the assessment of the current government (29.6 percentage points).

These findings suggest that the overall assessment of the incumbents management of the economy and the improving of living conditions is perceived negatively with lengthier stays in an urban area. As these results refer in table 5 to the national government, where FRELIMO is in power, I can conclude that the estimation of time spent in an urban environment has statistically relevant effects on the migrant's perception of the ruling party's management.

Table 5: Management

	Economic Development		Improving Living Conditions		Stable Job Market	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Time	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Migrants	-0.241 (0.154)	-0.204 (0.203)	-0.103 (0.154)	0.276* (0.161)	-0.091 (0.156)	0.296* (0.172)
Interaction		-0.002 (0.006)		-0.020*** (0.004)		-0.021*** (0.004)
Education	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.017)
Catholic	0.036 (0.051)	0.036 (0.051)	0.024 (0.041)	0.024 (0.041)	-0.008 (0.043)	-0.009 (0.042)
Female	-0.030 (0.053)	-0.029 (0.053)	-0.041 (0.041)	-0.015 (0.041)	-0.053 (0.044)	-0.027 (0.043)
Children	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.019)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.007 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.015)
Age	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Cons	2.745*** (0.201)	2.745*** (0.201)	2.162*** (0.176)	1.947*** (0.177)	1.996*** (0.176)	1.778*** (0.179)
R-squared	0.260	0.259	0.138	0.154	0.179	0.194
Observations	2121	2121	3224	3224	3189	3189

Notes: Estimates are based on linear regressions which are clustered on the block level. Significance levels are presented by: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The presented variables in this table are defined by the following. In the survey, interviewees were asked to what extent they think that the current government is managing the following sectors well or poor: Columns (1) and (2) representing the drive of the economy. This variable equals 1 if respondents feel very bad about it (1 = very bad / 5 = very good). Secondly, columns (3) and (4) shows how respondents react to the question how well the government improves the living conditions of the poor (1 = very bad / 5 = very good). In columns (5) and (6) respondents reacts to what extent the current government creates new jobs (1 = very bad / 5 = very good).

6. Conclusion

In this paper, I evaluated the impact of urbanisation on political preferences in Mozambique. In particular, this paper studies the length of stay by migrants who recently moved to the urban area of Quelimane and how it affects political views, trust as well as satisfaction levels,

and the assessment of the incumbent's administration. Taking baseline survey data of 3,648 migrants and 1,451 residents from the ongoing large-scale research project: “Integrating Rural Migrants in Cities – A Field Experiment in Mozambique” led by principal investigators Pedro C. Vicente, Alex Armand, Wayne Sandholtz, and Frederica Mendonça into consideration, I use a linear regression model to estimate the results.

I found evidence that a lengthier duration in Quelimane by rural migrants who recently moved to the town decreases votes for the ruling party FRELIMO by 1.4 percentage points. Migrants lose trust in the Mozambican president (-3.7 percentage points), in the provincial governor (-3.6 percentage points) and in the mayor of Quelimane (-1.5 percentage points), with more time spent in Quelimane. Moreover, satisfaction with the national political administration of Mozambique decreases with more time spent in an urban area. Nonetheless, I did not find evidence for lower satisfaction levels in regard to the political governance in Quelimane, ruled by the opposition party RENAMO with mayor Manuel de Araújo.

The results suggest that national rural-urban migration has significant effects on the political economy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Migrants who recently moved to an urban area turn towards the opposition parties and become less satisfied with the incumbent's political administration. Therefore, this examination is of importance to policymakers for several reasons. Firstly, the findings provided in this paper contribute to the limited empirical evidence on national rural-urban migration and its effects on the political economy, as ruling political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa have less control of their voters in urban areas where more opposition activities can be found. Secondly, dominant ruling parties in Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to resist urbanisation as inhabitants of urban areas lose trust in the political authority with high levels of corruption, clientelism and intimidation, which has a large impact for economic development.

Therefore, lessons learned from this paper aim to assist policymakers in implementing urbanisation policies that are effective and politically viable. More precisely, it is important to break the predominant power structures of the ruling political parties with good governance and transparency to establish a system of accountability and anti-corruption measures. Politically viable policy choices need active governments, as, thus far, urbanisation in Sub-Saharan Africa has been rather dysfunctional due to the immense political authority of the ruling party with its close ties to the government and the business sector.

Overall, more empirical evidence on shifts in political attitudes referring to rural-urban migration is needed to understand the political economy in Sub-Saharan Africa better, as the literature is still limited in that regard. Future research should cover the impact of migrants who recently moved to urban areas in order to comprehend better how urban environments change political preferences and satisfaction as well as trust levels.

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Appendix

The Impact of Urbanisation on Political Preferences: Evidence from Mozambique

Constantin Friedrich Nixdorff

Figure A1: Location of Mozambique



Figure A2: Random Walk Instructions for Field Work

