

The American Way of War

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Resumo

A dissertação aqui apresentada, através da análise de conteúdo, visa não só compreender e explicar como é percebida a figura do presidente dos Estados Unidos da América, mas também se propõe compreender quais são as características e os recursos de um líder carismático. Ao fazê-lo, procura compreender como os presidentes fazem uso da retórica, da moral e dos valores para construir o apoio político e orientar a agenda política, particularmente no domínio do conflito e da política externa. Assim, estuda não só a forma americana de guerra, mas também a sua raiz, os seus padrões, se é que existem, e a sua relação com os decisores políticos. Num esforço para dar uma melhor compreensão não só da cultura militar e política americana, mas também da futura política externa americana. Em última análise, esta investigação afirma a guerra como um instrumento político que tem repercussões para os decisores políticos que têm de lidar com as lutas diplomáticas nascidas de conflitos. O impacto das campanhas militares do passado é susceptível de fazer com que os futuros presidentes se afastem da intervenção militar. No entanto, estabelece como os presidentes afirmam de facto uma orientação do público e da agenda política, mesmo que o impacto da sua retórica possa por vezes ser apenas temporário.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: relações internacionais, discurso, modo americano de guerra, cultura estratégica, cultura política, política externa

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Abstract

The dissertation here presented, through content analysis not only aims to understand and explain how the figure of the president of the United States is perceived but it also proposes itself to understand what the traits and resources of a charismatic leader are. In doing so it seeks to understand how presidents make use of rhetoric moral and values to build political support and guide the policy agenda particularly in the realm of conflict and foreign policy. Thus, it studies not only the American way of war but its root, its patterns, if any such exist, and its relation to policymakers. In an effort to give a better understanding of not only American military and political culture, but future American foreign policy. Ultimately this research asserts war as a political instrument which has repercussions for policymakers who must deal with the diplomatic struggles born out of conflict. The impact of past campaigns is likely to be one that will make future presidents shy away from military intervention. Nevertheless, it establishes how presidents have establish a de facto guiding of the public and policy agenda, even if the impact of their rhetoric can sometimes be only temporary.

KEYWORDS: international relations, speechmaking, American way of war, strategic culture, political culture, foreign policy

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Introduction

This research seeks to understand and explain how the figure of the president of the United States is perceived. Although it will not be possible to undertake a deep analysis of this, it nevertheless proposes to understand what makes up a charismatic leader and what tools are at their disposal. It seeks to understand how American presidents use rhetoric, morals, and values. Rhetoric, morals, and values, which are intrinsic to all Americans, using them to not only build a political base of support for their policies but essentially be able to convince the public opinion about the need for the United States' involvement in a conflict. Thus, it will start by contextualizing the American way of war and its evolution to establish its validity and determine the relationship between it and policymakers. Marc Milner argues that in understanding the American way of war, we must put it in a broader international context. American military history must have more information from literature, debates, and shared experiences of others, not only America's enemies but also allies (Milner, 2007). Although Americans may not agree with or like foreign opinions, such a debate needs outside perspectives. Milner explains «...» the problem of culture and war as a dialogue between the nation's discourse on war and the practices of its army. That conception is much too narrow. The dialogue must be between the nation's discourse on who and what Americans are and how they fight. » (Milner, 2007, p. 1151). It is that which this research aims to understand.

A study of the American way of war aims to determine what patterns or if any patterns exist in the way the U.S. has used military force against its enemies. Moreover, it argues that some beliefs concerning the American way of war, such as its apolitical nature and lack of strategic traits or its reputation for using overwhelming force in achieving decisive outcomes, do not hold up to scrutiny (Echevarria II, 2014). Echevarria II argues that « American uses of force were typically driven more by political considerations than military ones, and the amount of force employed was rarely overwhelming or decisive. » (Echevarria II A.J., *Reconsidering the American Way of War*, 2014, p. 9). A path to understanding the American way of war must start in 1973 with the publication of Russel Weigley's classic and seminal work, *The American Way of War: A history of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy* (Echevarria II, 2012). Although published more than 30 years ago, Weigley's work remains a point of

departure for every discussion about the American approach to armed conflict (Echevarria II, 2010). Weigley, in his examination of past uses of force by the United States military, through figures from George Washington to Robert McNamara, concluded that except in the early days of the nation, the American way of participating in a conflict characterized itself by the desire to achieve victory through attrition or annihilation (Echevarria II, 2010).

Nevertheless, this research seeks to understand what is at the root of the American way of war because analyzing its origins and prospects can allow us to comprehend better current American military and political culture and perhaps future American foreign policy actions. As Echevarria II explains:

Interest in the American way of war may well have begun in earnest in 1973 with Weigley's landmark work. However, it remains strong today primarily because of the desire to understand how the United States, the world's sole superpower, might use military force in the future. This is essential information not only for Americans but also for their allies and prospective coalition partners. It is reasonable to believe that the way Americans practiced conflict in the past will resemble how they will use it in the future. (Echevarria II A. J., *Reconsidering the American Way of War*, 2014, p. 186)

Meanwhile, John Grenier posits that the future of the American soldier will involve modern challenges and suggests that relevant lessons abound in the study of early American military history. He tried to understand the evolution of an early American way of war that condoned violence against enemy noncombatants. Grenier urges military leaders to look at how the U.S. has waged war, even if they seem brutal and out of character. (Grenier, 2005). Furthermore, this research seeks to understand how the American way of war limits or increases the options of a policymaker when trying to convince public opinion of the importance of a conflict. As Echevarria II explains:

Such a history offers valuable insights for any scholar or practitioner, particularly regarding the many considerations that have gone into American decisions to use force. However, this knowledge does not permit us to predict the American way of war in the next decade or even in the next half-decade.

That does not diminish the value of the knowledge—only the uses it can be put. (Echevarria II A. J., *Reconsidering the American Way of War*, 2014, p. 201)

Thus, this research will endeavor to understand the importance of rhetorical devices in presidential speech and how those rhetorical devices perpetuate American values, and how those values feedback into rhetorical use. Within this theme of values, it also vies to understand how Americans have perceived their internal violence and how that crucial view has influenced foreign policy, particularly the concept of no duty to retreat. However, research here will mainly focus on the uses of rhetoric, morals, and American values only as a way to corroborate a set of values for the American people. Vying to understand how ultimately those values capture the American public into being guided or not by the presidency's views on policy, particularly foreign policy. Through this analysis of rhetoric and values, this research will also try to ascertain the differences between party lines ~~in~~ ^{through} those values. Finally, this research aims to show not only the expression of these values but the contrast between partisan representation in their expression, to what parts they appeal, and how they appeal.

This research will thus mainly focus on analyzing the language of leadership, rhetoric, morals, and how expressive those values are. In addition, this language of leadership will be related to rhetorical use to understand how the president of the United States perpetuates the United States as an international liberator and construes an image of the country and the way it fights its wars. Ultimately its goal is to construct a workable narrative from the literature gathered. One that will, in consummation, explain the relationship between the American way of war, its reflection in the decision-making speech of America, the people, and how the expression of values by the top decision-makers in America stirs the American people into action.

1. The American Way of War

American culture has celebrated the big wars (i.e., Civil War and WWII) in several media. However, as it happens, those are the USA's only experiences with total war, which has led some historians to speak of an American way of war, characterized as a war that results in total victory. However, there might be a less known part within the American way of war, or perhaps a different one entirely, a tradition of fighting in peacetime engagements with a relatively small number of professional soldiers pursuing limited objectives through limited means (Boot, 2014).

The American way of war refers to persistent patterns in how Americans have thought about and practiced war (Echevarria II, 2010). More precisely, Echevarria II explains that it is the sum of the predominant ideas and expectations of military and political leaders about war and their roles. In turn, those ideas contribute to the inferences of those same leaders in strategic planning, budgeting, and the development of operational concepts and Doctrine (Echevarria II, 2010). Thus, the American way of war interests academics and policymakers. Echevarria II further considers it necessary to peel away the rhetoric of the age of Weigley's work since he considers that both the so-called RMA and Counterinsurgency "revolutions" misrepresent the American way of war for more than a decade. (Echevarria II, 2010)

Since its publication, work about the American way of war has raised several questions: first, was the question if Weigley's analysis focusing mainly on significant wars captured its nature; second, if the American way of war with its characteristics was in any way unique to the U.S.; and third, if a "new" way of war emerged as part of the information revolution within the last decade of the twentieth century. Finally, according to Echevarria II, the last question is whether the American way of war was about war or, as the author believes, more of a way of battle (Echevarria II, 2010).~

The study of the American approach to war began in the 1970s with Russell Weigley's work, which set out to examine how conflicts were thought about and practiced by the U.S. Military throughout its history. Weigley spawned a debate about definitions of the American way of war, concluding that, except in the early days of the Republic, the American way of war focused on the desire for a total or an overwhelming victory, either through attrition or annihilation of an adversary (Echevarria II, 2004). Whether one agrees that war is cultural or

about politics, it becomes clear that any armed forces are raised, equipped, organized, supplied, and commanded by distinct social groups (Milner, 2007).

Oppositely, the U.S. military and its political leaders saw the destruction of an opponent's military forces and the occupation of their capital as marking the end of a conflict and the beginning of post-war negotiations. Thus, Americans considered war an alternative to bargaining rather than part of an ongoing bargaining process, as in the Clausewitzian view (Echevarria II, 2004). Such was the view of Caspar Weinberger, who essentially rejected force as part of diplomacy and saw it instead as a substitute for it. He unreservedly rejected the Clausewitzian view of war as a continuation of politics by other means and abjured the sequence of agreement, negotiation, threat, coercive diplomacy, and war. Casper's views formed the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, carried into George H. W. Bush's administration by General Powell, who had served as Weinberger's military aide (Record, 2007).

Echevarria II, however, disregards the critique that Americans have failed to acknowledge the importance of Clausewitz's thesis that war is a continuation of policy by other means. He argues that Clausewitz's view was simplistic by reducing policy to a representative of all interests of a community, which it never is. Even if embodied in a head of state, it is contested and is usually divisive and antagonizing (Echevarria II, 2012). Jeffrey Record further explains that war is far from the only use of military power as the mere presence of force or its threatened use can effectively deter and forestall its actual use. To view force as a substitute for diplomacy is to look at military victory as an object of war rather than as an achievement of political ends (Record, 2007).

Weigley declared in his work that American military strategy had essentially narrowed to annihilation after the Civil War. As the United States rose in economic status, it became easier to opt for a strategy of annihilation. The aftermath of this was, according to Weigley, the impairment of the evolution of attrition strategies, which led to American military strategy becoming unidimensional and lopsided. That was part of the problem with the Vietnam conflict, along with what, in his view, was the ending of the era of rationally using military force to achieve the aims of policy (Echevarria II, 2012). Weigley's work furnishes the reader with enough evidence to conclude what he did not. One such conclusion is that the American conceptualization of war seldom went past the winning of battles, overlooking the relation between victory in battle and achieving strategic objectives (Echevarria II, 2010).

Weigley's interpretation has stood the test of time; there have been several counterarguments throughout the history of the theme. Some that deserve mention are Max Boot's *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* which contends that Americans have more than one way of war (Echevarria II, 2004) or Brian Linn, who pointed out the shortcomings in Weigley's argument, particularly in what concerns the language and the errors of military terminology and a tendency to simplify the complex American military thinking. For example, Linn contends that Weigley confused the terms attrition and annihilation when describing the former as pursuing a complete subversion of an opponent's military power (Echevarria II, 2010). Boot emphasizes throughout his work that U.S. involvement in "small wars" is not a novelty, giving examples such as the Boxer Rebellion, the Philippine Insurrection, and contemporary interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Moreover, he contends that U.S. participation in such minor conflicts is far more prevalent than participation in major ones and considers it essential when speaking of an American way of warfare (Echevarria II, 2004).

Boot explains that small war is purposefully a vague term. He argues that perhaps the best way to define such conflicts is by explaining which they are not: Not major conventional conflicts, such as the War of Independence, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, or the Gulf War. Nor are these under the spectrum of mere displays of force (Boot, 2014). These small wars, he argues, were fought not to attain decisive victory over an opponent but for reasons related to punishment, protection, pacification, and even benefiting from profiteering (Echevarria II, 2004). Boot also maintains that the small wars, which he names "imperial wars," contributed heavily to the rise of the U.S. to its status as a superpower, even if not involving vital interests directly. Boot calls for recognizing this small war tradition and insists that the American military adopt it to prepare for present and future conflicts (Echevarria II, 2010).

Military theorists classify small wars as irregular, guerrilla, partisan, unconventional or special operations. The U.S., in particular, puts such conflicts under low-intensity conflicts (Grenier, 2005). Nevertheless, while important, such criticisms do not erode Weigley's thesis that Americans saw the dominant purpose of war as the destruction of an opponent's armed might rather than the Clausewitzian view of political objectives through violent means (Echevarria II, 2010).

John Grenier contends that Weigley's work, although undoubtedly seminal and influential, overlooks the early part of the American military tradition of which attacking non-combatant populations is a fundamental part. Further, he explains that Weigley's synthesis of American military history rested on two products of post-Napoleonic German scholarship. On the one hand, Weigley contended that Clausewitz's *On War* defined the general parameters of American military culture using Clausewitz's two categorizations of war. One is a war that seeks to overthrow the enemy, and two is a war that seeks limited military victory. Thus, Weigley seemingly concluded that American military history falls in that framework. (Grenier, 2005)

On the other hand, he also derived much of his thesis from Hans Delbruck. The latter suggested two kinds of military strategy: annihilation and attrition. Weigley argues that most modern American military strategists have preferred wars of annihilation and decisive battles (Grenier, 2005). His synthesis of Clausewitz and Delbruck led Weigley to see American military history as focusing on destroying an enemy by annihilating its military power (Grenier, 2005).

Furthermore, since the 1980s, historians such as Grenier have given more attention to the period Weigley did not address, the era before the Revolutionary War (Echevarria II, 2010). Grenier contends that at its genesis, the countries' military past is much more connected to ad hoc organizations and guerrilla warfare. The colonists' main conflicts were against Indians on the American frontier, a conflict where they did not have any infrastructural support, which meant that guerrilla warfare reigned supreme. Grenier further contends that the use of this type of warfare did not extinguish itself during the colonial era, stating that a series of more minor and brutal wars ran side by side with the War of Independence. Even after the country's establishment, the first military operations were primarily conflicts against Native Americans on the frontier on which the U.S. Army participated only occasionally and reluctantly (Grenier, 2005).

Early Americans understood that war involved disrupting enemy troops, supplies, and support networks; the gathering of intelligence through both scouting and the taking of prisoners; ambushes; patrolling and serving as a flanking unit for friendly parties; operating as an advanced or rear guard for regular forces; and, most importantly, destroying enemy villages and fields and the killing and intimidation of enemy non-combatants (Grenier, 2005).

Grenier attempts to address the differences and complexities between the relationship between unlimited war and small wars within the American tradition. He classifies unlimited war

as centered on destroying an enemy's will and resistance via all available means, especially by focusing attacks on civilian populations and the infrastructure to support them (Grenier, 2005). Grenier contends that two features limit the range and explanatory power of Weigley's thesis. First, it is disjunctive by establishing a demarcation between the wars before and after 1846. Second, his tendency to focus on regular armies rather than the actions and attitudes of nonprofessional soldiers is limiting to his argument (Grenier, 2005).

For the first 200 years of its existence, the U.S. mainly relied on arts of war abhorred by professional soldiers today. Weigley seems to have left out this trait in his analysis. Grenier states that Weigley saw professional military behavior and organization as normative (Grenier, 2005). According to Grenier, a war against non-combatant populations and agricultural resources conclusively defined U.S. military heritage. Grenier explains that Weigley's interpretation essentially skips essential developments in American military historiography, and historians have been unable to move far beyond it and advance a synthesis capable of placing the early war-making in the broader context of American military tradition (Grenier, 2005).

Even Max Boot's interpretation only discusses small wars after the birth of the Federal government. The early colonists would not think twice about resorting to unlimited and irregular forms of warfare. Such strategies were later despised when practiced by U.S. Enemies, and that hatred would materialize in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, a byproduct of such a conflict, the Vietnam War. By embedding both Clausewitz's revulsion for indiscriminate violence and Delbruck's focus on national war, Weigley discounted how early Americans waged war as abnormal and undeserving of any serious consideration. Thus Weigley, like other military theorists before him, created what Grenier classifies as an artificial dichotomy between regular and irregular warfare. For Weigley, the U.S. Army had only a path of Clausewitzian - Delbruckian evolution that began in the mid-nineteenth century and ultimately manifested in WWII (Grenier, 2005).

Weigley's interpretation also provides the intellectual foundation for what Colin Powell pled throughout his career since he became the top military aide to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Together they produced what became known as the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine (Boot, 2014), which, summarizing, says wars should be fought only when there are vital interests, clear political objectives, and popular support present. It further emphasizes the use of overwhelming force and that the political leadership must have a sound exit strategy for bringing

the troops home (Echevarria II, 2004). Designed to avoid the so-called "quagmires," the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine contributes to the delimitation of how and why political leaders employ military force. (Echevarria II, 2004)

Boot's interpretation is in contrast and counters the principles of the Powell Doctrine, rarely involving any of its tenets. However, Boot's and Weigley's interpretations agree on overlooking strategic success. Such a view stems from a bifurcation in strategic thinking that Echevarria II reminds us is not unique to Americans. Military professionals have a preference for winning battles and campaigns, while policymakers favor overcoming diplomatic struggles that come and influence, or are affected by, the actual fighting. (Echevarria II, 2004)

In the early 2000s, the old and new American war methods became popular among defense policymakers and scholars. Although much of the literature during this period mischaracterized Weigley's thesis, the idea that there had been a traditional way of war became a contrast against which the "new" style was defined (Echevarria II, 2004)

A new way of war was born out of the Gulf War and decisively consolidated in Kosovo, marked by strategic bombing and precision weaponry. Tami Davis Biddle shows the nature and controversy of such tactics in *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing 1914-1945*:

Controversy and emotional intensity have always surrounded the concept of long-range or "strategic" bombing. The concept implies that aircraft carrying bombs to an enemy's "vital centers" can undermine its ability and will to fight. (Biddle T. D., 2002, p. 3).

Echevarria II thus argues that Weigley's American Way of War had political and historical validity. It was not only a seminal work for any readers of American history; but also a call for policymakers and military strategists to increase their thinking at a time when nuclear and traditional weaponry was, as Weigley claimed, bringing the rational use of force to an end. Thus, interest in the American way of war rose sharply after the Gulf War (1990–91) and the interventions in Bosnia (1995–96) and Kosovo (1999). The increase in speculations about a revolution in military affairs (RMA) bases itself on the union of precision strikes and information technologies. This military revolution became associated with an entirely new American way of waging war (Echevarria II, 2014)

With the quick success of military operations in Afghanistan and the remarkable achievements in the first stages of the Iraq campaign, this new way of war seemed to have crystalized itself more clearly (Echevarria II, 2010). After the Iraq war lost its initial momentum, preoccupations turned to what had gone wrong with the American way of war. (Echevarria II, 2012) The Bush administration had portrayed Saddam as a madman nearing nuclear capabilities. However, the objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) would not be limited to the disarmament and deposing of Saddam Hussein. It envisioned the implantation of a stable democracy as a model for the Middle East. What remains clear is that OIF violated the critical tenets of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine (Record, 2007).

Now too, literature sought to find what had gone wrong specifically with the American way of war. However, it also led to the assumption that the American catastrophe in Iraq seemed to again avenge the restrictive clauses on the use of force doctrine propounded by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and General Colin Powell in the 1980s and early 1990s. General Powell had vowed an avoidance of another Vietnam in his youth. He stated that many in his generation had promised that once they were the decision-makers, they would not acquiesce again. Powell would not acquiesce to what he named "half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons"; according to him, the American people did not understand or support it. He affirmed that maintaining that promise was the way of not letting the sacrifices of Vietnam be in vain (Record, 2007).

However, according to Max Boot, it is easy to overlook the successful use of limited force: such operations are apt to be ignored by the public, whereas failure is much more fascinating. Even leaving aside covert operations in support of insurgencies and foreign governments trying to stop the insurgency, there has been no small number of successes of peacetime operations by U.S. troops. None of these fit the all-or-nothing paradigm, and few operations short of total war, such as WWII, would satisfy the Weinberger-Powell doctrine checklist. Ultimately, Max Boot contends that if strictly applied, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine is a recipe for inaction (Boot, 2014).

The Doctrine, as explained before, called for the last-resort application of overwhelming force on behalf of vital interests and clearly defined and achievable political-military objectives. It insisted on reasonable assurance of enduring public and congressional support. In the case of Iraq, the force employed was insufficient. According to Record, it was applied for exceptionally

ambitious objectives, resulting in unexpectedly grisly amplifying hostilities and a consequent loss of domestic political support (Record, 2007).

However, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine connects to the RMA, which purported the connectivity of information technology to advanced weaponry. Initially, it was not clear whether the failure of the new American way of war in Iraq belonged to it or related to the general U.S. approach to war. According to Echevarria II, there were two plausible basic answers to this question. (Echevarria, 2012). The first one pointed to the RMA as the core of the issue. However, such a view was divisive among scholars, with some arguing that the transformation had gone too far. In contrast, others felt it had not gone far enough because the several Service cultures had resisted it. Rumsfeld and General Franks briefed Congress in the Summer of 2003 about this new American war model resultant of the RMA, which appeared to rely on American airpower primacy and seemingly guaranteed quick results with minimal cost in both friendly casualties and collateral damage (Echevarria II, 2010). Be that as it may, the concept of "surgical war" (minimizing both American casualties and collateral damage) was at its front and center. That was the case in the Balkans in the 1990s (Biddle S., 2002).

When described the intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s goes against the core thesis of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. In 1992 right after the election of Bill Clinton, Powell authored an article for Foreign Affairs where he cautioned against repeating the mistakes of Vietnam in the former Yugoslavia. If the U.S. intervened, its objectives should be clear and achievable. He further claimed that the George H. W. Bush administration had called off the Gulf War precisely when its objectives had been immediately achieved (Record, 2007).

Weinberger had announced his Doctrine in the aftermath of the disastrous intervention in Lebanon by the Reagan administration (which he had opposed) and amid rising concerns over the possible increase of U.S. involvement in El Salvador. More broadly, Weinberger's famous National Press Club speech in 1984 reflected a growing consensus within the U.S. military leadership and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the strategic and political instruction of the Vietnam War. These boiled down to six "tests" to use before the United States could commit force to any conflict (Record, 2007):

The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interests or allies. If we decide that it is necessary to put

combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. If we decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size and composition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance [that] we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort. Record, 2007 p.81)

Realistically, after the end of the Cold War and after the ordeal of Vietnam, the Gulf War was the distinct model for an American way of war. The United States was supposed to go in big on behalf of limited and achievable objectives; it should win quickly and cheaply; and depart the scene with a clear exit strategy and a sounder entry (Record, 2007).

It is evident that during Desert Storm, both Powell and other senior generals overestimated Iraqi capabilities. As a result, they insisted that no offensive operation would be approved unless there was a deployment of five hundred thousand troops. President Bush approved the troop request, and the flight took off following the ideas of the post-Vietnam Army, using massive, overwhelming firepower to pulverize the enemy and minimize U.S. casualties. Unfortunately, the Vietnam mindset characterized by an excessive caution of quagmires was still very much alive in the war's aftermath (Boot, 2014).

At Powell's urging, President Bush decided to end combat after 100 hours, allowing the escape of the Iraqi Republican Guard and Saddam to hold on to power. However, when his son became president, Saddam was still destabilizing the region (Boot, 2014).

A more in-depth look at the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine reveals intrinsic weaknesses:

1. There is an absence of a definition of vital interests. Record maintains that what furthers this flaw is the apparent addiction of Presidents to sell all wars as vital.
2. One of the characteristics of great power is a greater readiness to fight for less-than-vital interests.
3. While clear military and political aims are indispensable, they do not guarantee success: war aims are frequently hostage to the track of the conflict.
4. Only rarely do states have prewar exit strategies implemented, or if there are multiple war aims, not all are successful.

5. There are cases in which war should be an early tool rather than a last resort. Record maintains that one of the lessons of the 1930s is that early military action is preferable against a mighty enemy who is both politically edacious and militarily unstoppable.
6. The assurance of public support at the onset of an overseas military intervention can weaken or disappear entirely due to defeat or military stalemate.

Public support for Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq was strong initially but declined over time as casualties occurred with no recognizable progress (Record, 2007). Boot argues that Desert Storm had turned into a Persian Gulf Hungary, a replay of 1956 when the U.S. encouraged a rebellion against the Soviets and left them hanging (Boot, 2014). according to Record, the Army has, throughout U.S. history, consistently abrogated the counterinsurgency mission. For example, it was rebuffed in Vietnam, seemingly dropping any interest in such missions after that war (Record, 2007). Echevarria II notes that the bias for major conflicts would leave America handicapped in a newly emerging security environment after the Cold War. Counterinsurgency wars and their high political nature, mainly, were the object of the Pentagon's aversion, and this aversion is rooted in the American way of war (Echevarria II, 2014).

Weigley's work was the definitive version of American strategic thinking. Although inaccurate according to Echevarria II, its argument on settling strategies of annihilation after the Civil War was nevertheless judiciously appealing. As early as the mid-1970s, this interpretation influenced both the academic and the defense community, offering a convincing explanation for what went wrong in Vietnam. Moreover, any contended that the complexity of U.S. involvement in Vietnam required a less cumbersome approach than a strategy of annihilation. Echevarria II, 2014).

For the Clinton administration, any action resorted to a cloaking within a multinational coalition that would lend legitimacy and distribute the responsibility among several actors. At the same time, public scrutiny got limited through the control of information. (Biddle S., 2002). n November 1992, Powell and the rest of the senior brass gave the go on the humanitarian mission to feed Somalia. The generals had gone along mostly because they saw it as a diversion from involvement in former Yugoslavia which they viewed as another hopeless quagmire. The mission was simple, deliver supplies and leave, or so it seemed. However, it was quickly apparent that merely delivering food was not enough. Biddle S., 2002). Thus, at one level, Somalia seemed to reinforce the validity of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine (Boot, 2014).

Finally, in 1995, after some three hundred thousand people died, NATO forces got into the conflict. Of course, any senior U.S. generals and admirals were quick to oppose this limited use of force. However, it took no more than a few air sorties to lead the conflict to the negotiating table but even after the Dayton Peace Accords, U.S. troops still had the most restrictive rules of engagement. The mission got relegated if the dictates of force protection ever clashed with the job at hand. Thus, U.S. troops would forego any constabulary role or civil administration tasks, showing the Army remained reluctant to get into a quagmire (Boot, 2014).

Record explains further that hesitation, indecision, and casualty-phobia were trademarks of the Clinton administration's approach to using force, with force protection becoming a focus to the point of overtaking every other mission. The "Vietnam Syndrome" was still very much alive in an administration whose first reference of experience in foreign policy was the Gulf War. These traits were notably absent in the Iraq interventions of George W. Bush. Record, 2007). Much of the decision-making based itself on fears of "mission creep" and "gradual escalation" catchphrases that have become predominant in military discourse since Vietnam. However, Boot explains that irony in Somalia was the opposite of what it had been during the Gulf War. In the Gulf War, fear of a small war prevented a big war from having a satisfactory conclusion; in Somalia, fear of a big war prevented a minor conflict from being conducted effectively. He argues that these are the opposite sides of the coin in the Vietnam Syndrome and that they are still part of U.S. military thinking decades after the fall of Saigon (Boot, 2014). Thus, the challenge for American strategists during the conflict was to stop both Serbian aggression and ethnic cleansing in a way that could be considered low in liability for political leaders, not aggravating Serbian reprisals and not jeopardizing U.N. or NATO participation. To that end, there was an increasing emphasis on minimizing collateral damage. As a result, American contributions to both Operation Deliberate Force and Operation Allied Force were mainly in the form of air power (Echevarria II, 2014).

However, as Echevarria II points out, in the early 1990s, defense analysts such as Eliot Cohen were already pointing out the potency of U.S. air power. However, Cohen also warned that air power was hardly the answer to all strategic dilemmas (Echevarria II, 2010). In a similar fashion to Weigley and Boot, Cohen perceived the traditional American approach to war as being marked by aggressiveness and desire to take the fight to the enemy, a quest for a decisive battle, a categorical aversion to diplomatic interference, and a clear-cut want of clear political objectives (Echevarria II, 2010).

Cohen's warning, however, did little to hamper the eagerness of air power enthusiasts, with some briefings already circulating in the Pentagon at the time that asserted air power as both U.S.'s asymmetric advantage and the future of warfare. He appeared to limit the new American way of war to a single service for a time (II, *The American Way of War*, 2010). The traditional American way of war correlated to the industrial age and a military culture resistant to change. The new one was presumed to reflect the new information age and increasing openness of usage as a tool for quick strikes and limited interventions to forswear any long-term comital of U.S. forces. Echevarria II, 2014)

The idea of this new way of war was mainly based on the assertion of coercive diplomacy to force U.S. opponents to comply. The fundamental principles underpinning this theory of coercion and other air power theories connected to the objective of disseminating terror amongst the population. This idea was applied in the Gulf War and, more recently, in the aptly named "shock and awe" campaign in the Iraq War (Echevarria II, 2014).

However, according to Biddle, air power has throughout history inflicted far more significant damage than in 1999 without any coercion. He gives examples of the strategic bombing campaigns in Germany and Japan during WWII, which did not generate significant pressure on either Hitler or Tojo to end the war. The strategic bombing had also laid waste to North Korean cities without any results.

However, as Tami Davis Biddle explains, in the decades after Vietnam, a certain conservatism in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) led to the search for the applicability of an air power doctrine to particular circumstances. In the end, however, there was no adequate understanding of the link between strategic bombing and desired political outcomes (Biddle T. D., 2002). Biddle goes further, explaining that even during WWII, the idea of the strategic bombing:

It involved political and military concerns about the steadfastness and political reliability of civilians (mainly urban dwellers) in modern, increasingly "total" war and concerns about the structure of modern economies and their susceptibility to disruption. Arguments about enemy vulnerability gave validity to air force claims for existence and continued (or increased) autonomy; they gave weight to assertions about air power as a coercive tool in war. Suppose modern states were, in fact, highly vulnerable to long-range bombardment—which took war directly to industry, political leaders, and populations. Then it made sense

to maintain an organization that might either deter wars or wins them in what promised to be a direct, expeditious way (Biddle T. D., 2002, pp. 7-8).

Since World War II and during Vietnam, strategic bombing has become a crucial point in U.S. warfare, as seen in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia. This air primacy has led theorists to claim that a new model of strategic bombing, which focuses on pinpoint attacks on leadership, political control, and civilian economic targets, offers coercive leverage otherwise unobtainable. His new combination of technology and ideas is what the RMA is to some experts. Biddle T. D., 2002) However, Echevarria II argues that the RMA was the wrong approach to transforming the U.S. military after the Cold War. The certainty of the revolutionaries was unsuitable for an unfolding security environment described as increasingly uncertain, ambiguous, volatile, and complex (Echevarria II, 2012)

U.S. aircraft conducted a strategic bombing campaign in Kosovo in the 1990s, with the 2001-02 campaign in Afghanistan being a clear descendant and reaction to the model unveiled in the Balkans. Stephen Biddle explains that such a strategy has chances of working in a handful of states that are modern enough to be vulnerable to such infrastructural attacks. It puts other tribal or subnational enemies out of the equation. Biddle S., 2002)

Thus, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo only emphasized the need for closer integration of the U.S. Military services. Documents such as Joint Vision 2010 (1996) and 2020 (2000) being outliners towards greater interconnectivity amongst the U.S. military services and around four interrelated concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection, all encompassed a focused objective of full-spectrum dominance (Echevarria II, 2014).

In 2003 Boot expounded the virtues of the new American way of war shortly after the end of major combat operations in Iraq. In an article published by Foreign Affairs in 2003, Boot became one of the heralds of a new way of war based on his thesis about the prevalence of small wars in U.S. history. A way of war that shuns the traditional, industrial-age dependence in favor of information age traits, particularly jointness. Traits close to the way of war later got favored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Echevarria II, 2004), which had already considered these new capabilities sometime before Boot's announcement in 2003.

By January 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense was already officially welcoming this as the basis for transforming the U.S. military into a force adequate to the challenges of the new millennium (Echevarria II, 2010). However, Echevarria II warns that this new way of war ultimately risks missing the same points as both the Weigley and Boot versions of the traditional one because it also tends to confuse winning campaigns on small-scale actions with winning wars. (Echevarria II, 2004). The concept of overwhelming and decisive force and the warning of continually reassessing the relationship between objective and committed force. These fundamental tenets of the Weinberger- Powell Doctrine got ignored by the Bush Administration, who believed that small, "transformed" forces would be the solution to America's presence in Iraq (Record, 2007).

Echevarria II explains, according to Colin Gray, the American way of war has twelve characteristics: it is apolitical; it disregards how military operations affect post-conflict peace; it is astrategic; it is ahistorical; learning little from history; such underpinning relates to faith in the idea that all crises are problems to be solved; and that those same problems are solvable; it is culturally ignorant being not only insufficiently self-critical but also lacking knowledge of other cultures; it is technologically dependent; it relies on firepower rather than other techniques; it believes in fighting wars in what Echevarria II explains Gray names "a big way"; it is too focused on regular warfare as opposed to irregular (i.e., guerrilla warfare); it is impatient, wanting results immediately; it is logistically excellent, in the sense that troops have good supplement whatever theater they are in; and finally it is sensitive to casualties (Echevarria II, 2010). Echevarria II points out that most of the traits criticized in the American way of war are traits of any other European style of warfare (Echevarria II, 2010).

However, he maintained that those values were more evident in Western forces than its adversaries and not those military cultures altogether mirrored their parent cultures and civil societies (Echevarria II, 2010). Western militaries are also known to disregard political aims and substitute military strategy for other forms. They are also technocentric since the industrial revolution (Echevarria II, 2012). Although similarities would point to a general Western way of war; ultimately, the dissimilarities between the American and European or any way of war are the different combinations of political, geographical, cultural, and other factors (Echevarria II, 2014)

All contemporary Western militaries are highly sensitive to casualties, which does not coincide with the apolitical trait. Thus, the American way of war seems to share qualities with

what might be called a larger Western way of war (Echevarria II, 2010). War has been used by the U.S. as a political instrument not only to advance foreign policy but also to promote domestic agendas, the success and failure on the battlefield affecting how both international rivals and partners dealt with one another. U.S. policymakers used these results to leverage and strengthen their parties' standings at home and weaken opponents. Thus, showing how the U.S. used military force to protect or promote its interests at home and abroad (Echevarria II, 2014)

However, as both campaigns in Afghanistan and the Balkans have shown, the fighting depended highly on the existence of local ground forces willing and able to fight in a complementary role. The main obstacle was that in most areas where the U.S. military could predict a conflict, these forces were likely willing but not always capable (Echevarria II, 2014). In Afghanistan, ousting the Taliban was a means, not an end. When it came to realize the payoff, the U.S. military drew back from the dirty work of cave-to-cave fighting, relying on local proxies instead, much as it delegated the ground fighting against Serbia in 1999 to the Kosovo Liberation Army (Biddle S., 2002). Boot contends that the U.S. Army's no-risk policy significantly disrupted establishing any durable peace in Bosnia, Afghanistan, or even Iraq. Such detachment impaired the Army's ability to interact with the locals, gather intelligence and spread goodwill which Boot argues are prerequisites for successful occupation (Boot, 2014).

Post-Iraq, there will most likely be a renewed focus on training and equipping foreigners and PMCs to do the ground fighting, much like it happened during both Bosnia and even Iraq. During the Nixon administration, any endangered allies needed to pull their weight and bear the burden of ground combat and security, with the U.S. playing only minor naval and air roles. Ground force requirements will be considerably less than prewar requirements; the main reason for such disappeared after the fall of the Soviet Union. Record explains that heavy ground presence would be of little use against enemies such as China or Iranian nuclear development; such conflicts will almost surely have naval, air, and (if on the ground) special operations forces (Record, 2007).

Conclusively, the targeting of infrastructure serves little purpose in places with no significance. Biddle also argues that the new way of war will also lead the U.S. to condone small numbers of ground forces to direct air strikes. Ultimately, he points to the similarities between Afghanistan and Kosovo by highlighting that the war began with a high-tech air campaign with minimal U.S. ground presence in both conflicts. Biddle argues that one of the most salient features

of the Afghanistan campaign was the effort to limit U.S. casualties even at the cost of effectiveness (Biddle S., 2002). Boot argues that casualties may even lead to increased support for a military operation to ensure that "sacrifice was not in vain" (Boot, 2014).

The Gulf War and Somalia shaped the use of force for the rest of the 1990s. American apprehensions were again on display in Haiti, where the USS Harlan County was turned away by a small mob threatening repeated incidents in Somalia. According to Boot, this shows what happens when a superpower is hesitant – it makes its next mission more challenging to accomplish. During this mission, the Green Berets were increasingly frustrated that they could not "take care of the bad guys ." his reluctance to deploy force could only be accountable to the fear of casualties (Boot, 2014).

The approach to war demonstrated in Kosovo and Bosnia also brings to the forefront some difficult moral questions when considering who will suffer. Although it strives to avoid collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties, it does not shy away from targeting a population's electrical power, transportation, jobs, and livelihoods. He further questions the validity of such an approach against the mid-size rogue states, such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Indeed, Clinton's defense planners seemed to believe in the power of "coercion on the cheap" (Biddle S., 2002). Air power can win wars at minimal cost; that has become conventional wisdom for many commentators. However, to what extent the surrender of Slobodan Milosevic's concession is attributable to the new way of war or the NATO bombing, Biddle argues, is still debatable (Biddle S., 2002).

In addition, several reviewers pointed out that American interventions have often required the U.S. to play a more prominent occupier role, as in the Philippines, Haiti, or Nicaragua several times over several years, to maintain any enduring stability. Even after long occupations, stability would cause, most times, collapse soon after the departure of American forces. s Echevarria II points out; that it was unclear whether the benefits of such interventions were worth the costs. By January 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had officially embraced the new air-centric warfare model, intending to explore U.S. air primacy to achieve quick results with minimal casualties and collateral damage. Echevarria II, 2014). Boot contends that such an extreme concern with casualties can backfire. If enemies know that casualties will lead the U.S. to abandon an operation, they will likely target U.S. forces. Political and military leaders prefer this sanitized,

high-tech warfare, stating that the American people do not tolerate casualties, and support evaporates as soon as they start (Boot, 2014).

The specter of Vietnam still looms large, making the U.S. wary of commitments to a guerrilla quagmire. Biddle concludes that one of the most important implications for the new way of war in the post-9/11 world is that the Kosovo model showed the difficulties of coalition warfare. He argues that deference to allied views would be unlikely in the future. Something exemplified during the 2003 Iraq war with the United States taking a seemingly unilateral position (Biddle S., 2002).

To most people, the outcome of the Korean War is an adequate substitute for victory, especially if total victory meant war against China and Russia. Nevertheless, a generation of officers still vowed: Never Again! Boot, 2014). Record questions if the Iraq war will in some way exert an effect on the American use of force. If it evolves into what could be called an "Iraq syndrome," he believes it will cause significant debate over the circumstances and justifications for American use of force in the future. As a result, greater caution and restraint will likely be strongly favored (Record, 2007).

Echevarria maintains that the American way of war has never been apolitical. He asserts that it was mainly due to political reasons that, in Iraq, U.S. policy tried too hard to keep the war it wanted rather than winning the one at hand. The testy nature of U.S. politics led American policy to curb its more eager goals and limit achievements. Echevarria II, 2012). He further explains in *Reconsidering the American Way of War U.S. Military Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan* that one of the most important factors that drove the use of force by the U.S. was an administration's eagerness to reduce its political risk. The use of overwhelming force rarely reduced risk, with political leaders focusing on committing sufficient force, which was in effect a subjective call from each administration (Echevarria II, 2014) Presidents and their staff consider several levels of internal and external factors when deciding the degree of acceptable risk of a conflict. Such factors included:

- the administration's sense of itself,
- the strength of its directives,
- the expectations towards the efficacy of military force, and
- the confidence had in its ability to fight a war while advancing other policies.

Thus, Echevarria II concludes that the chief characteristics of the American way of war and its evolution got settled by the significant stress and dialectics of American politics. The American way of war was and still is, in the end, political (Echevarria II, 2014). The experience that the U.S. takes from the Iraq war could likely lead to future administrations paying more attention to the inadvertent consequences of the use of force compared to those paid by the George W. Bush administration. However, Record also advises that policymakers must be wary of morphing caution into timidity (Record, 2007). The impacts of the Iraq war will likely extend deep into the American establishment, far surpassing a simple reduction of neoconservative influence on foreign policy. Record believes that a return to a "realist" approach ala Nixon will be the outcome. Interests will be the primary concern on any issue that might need any threatened or actual use of force; the Iraq war will thus cast a shadow on the future of any administration's contemplation of major war. Presidents will find a much more hostile environment when selling military action that could again put the U.S. in a foreign internal war (Record, 2007).

Record explains that a similar sentiment in Vietnam and Korea, known as the "Iraq syndrome," seems to be developing. It will have significant consequences for U.S. foreign policy post-Iraq. He predicts that there will be more skepticism about whether the sizeable defense budget is necessary and beneficial, whether it must rid the world of evil, and whether international cooperation is of limited value. The U.S. might even become more inclined to seek said cooperation and even show more significant signs of humility (Record, 2007).

The American way of war was also not astrategic, with strategic and operational practice fusing over time. However, this does not mean that strategy got superseded by operational art. Rather than military strategy simply became more diffuse. Since the scope of modern war requires several generals and admirals to assume responsibility for specific sectors and functions within regionally defined areas and theaters. It led to a disjointed military strategy that saw each service pursuing separate agendas – something that happened to a degree in several U.S. conflicts (Echevarria II, 2014). Echevarria II further argues that it is not so much the strategic aspect that is the problem of the American way of war but the fact that it is contradictory: it reflects the tensions inherent in American politics. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the dialectical tensions resulted in what he calls a strategic correction⁴⁹. nonetheless, the U.S. is not always so fortunate, but the existence of ensuing tensions suggests that there is a strategy, even if a poor one (Echevarria II, 2012). American policy, Echevarria II argues, expected too much from its way of war. (Echevarria II, 2012). Further observation concludes that American campaign planners lend themselves too much

to the concept of decisive operations. He posits that if such operations were truly decisive, there would be little need for studies concerning post-conflict operations and cessation of conflicts (Echevarria II, 2014)

The nucleus of the American way of war is still a way of battle; Echevarria II explains that this is because decisive operations are at the core of the outset of a war, which it expects to win by winning battles. Even though battles are the primary medium of exchange between belligerents, the link between victory in battle and overall campaign success is not as instantaneous as U.S. Doctrine tends to assume. Echevarria II, 2014). The U. S's current battle focus extends across services and even across cultures, as it would be in evidence in most Western militaries. Within the U.S. specifically, Echevarria II argues that the tradition of preserving civilian authority over the military has partly perpetuated this by separating diplomacy and the conduct of war into different categories (Echevarria II, 2010).

The focus of defense planning is still on an approach established on capabilities and ultimately about the hardware required to move, shoot, and communicate on battlefields dispersed throughout the globe; in sum, it is about winning battles in the information age. However, Echevarria II explains that the U.S. military must think beyond this ability to win battles in the information age and focus on turning combat success into advantageous strategic outcomes. Echevarria II, 2004). Further, it would require at least two other things to happen. First, more than just authority, civilian expertise must broaden to the operational sphere – the communication between policymakers and military commanders must stay unimpeded and continued. Moreover, policymakers must increase their knowledge about (and be comfortable with) a vaster array of military operations. Second, military commanders must give a more in-depth study into the different political objectives war has had to accomplish over the years and build interest and academic study into those objectives (military science). Reflected in the principles of war and most of the Doctrine of the U.S. military right now is a way of battle, which Echevarria II classifies as untenable. He argues that the U.S. Army had little influence over the other branches, namely the Navy or Airforce; it was essentially the latter's airpower concepts that ultimately carved the "new" way of war (Echevarria II, 2010).

There are positive signs with talk of reforming the interagency process and institutionalizing a "whole of government" approach (Echevarria II, 2012). Several recent studies have tentatively outlined what steps to take to improve U.S. performance in post-conflict

operations. From creating a task-specific force to revamping the capabilities-based approach into an approach with a more intensive focus on achieving strategic outcomes, as previously explained, recognizing the value of such suggestions and implementing them is still at a considerable distance (Echevarria II, 2004). The conclusion is that what is wrong with the American way of war is the same as any other way of war: policy aims, and substantial capabilities, were misaligned in an initial phase which led to an expansion of capabilities and revision of aims; ultimately, the American way of war has fared somewhat better and indeed no worse than its European counterparts. Even in the most recent challenging conflicts, it proved capable and adaptable – whether such adaptations were timely is another matter entirely. Echevarria II points to the expectations of what the new American way of war could do and what it is were too many and too high. Such expectations rose sharply after the Cold war and again after 9/11; those expectations matched with a political will that was impatient to act. (Echevarria II, 2012). Ultimately, Echevarria II interprets the American way of war as taking three different but inherently related turns. The first one began in the mid-1970s and continues until now, marked by the general acceptance and criticism of Weigley's work. The second one occurred between the mid-1990s and early 2004 and contrasted the "old" way.

Of war with a "new" one which identified with the unfolding RMA and the transformation of the U.S. military. The third one began in the late spring of 2004 as this new way of war (too tailored towards conventional warfare) appeared to have become hampered in Iraq (Echevarria II, 2014), Something that Echevarria points out in *The American Way of War*:

Unfortunately, the campaign in Iraq was all too typical in perhaps the most crucial respect: it was about the battle, or fighting, taking down one's opponent, rather than establishing the necessary conditions for achieving one's political objectives (II A. J., *The American Way of War*, 2010, pp. 851- 852).

As the campaign in Iraq unfolded, it was clear that the announcement of a new way of war was premature. Boot, who was one of the first to announce it, later retracted his claims. y autumn of 2003, Major General (Ret.) Edward Atkeson was already advising that it was time to include security operations into the fold of the long-praised new American way of war. He was not alone in his advice, and neither did it fall on deaf ears, with the Defense Department's transformation office commissioned to look into the possibility of creating a force that would have the specific mission of security and stabilization. However, the practicality of the recommendations would soon come under heavy criticism (Echevarria II, 2010). In turn, this led to a tendency to link the

American way of war to the concept of strategic culture to contend that the cause for its failure was rooted in American values or expectations about the use of force (Echevarria II, 2014).

Echevarria II explains that a way of war implies a war focus which means it must have a holistic view of the conflict, a view that must consider how political, social, economic, and military activities contribute or detract from the accomplishment of preferred ends. Thus, under such a view, the purpose of conflict is to achieve policy aims beyond the implicit goal of defeating an opponent. A war focus considers the defeat of an enemy merely a means to an end; the way and extent by which an enemy gets overcome must facilitate the achievement of the desired political ends. The holistic view of war must attribute sufficient importance to the military defeat of an opponent; otherwise, it would not be holistic, and in Echevarria II's opinion, it would not enjoy success in the long run. Echevarria II, 2010)

A battle focus, in comparison, concentrates on the enemy's military defeat, employing tactics optimized toward destroying its physical and psychological abilities. After the defeat of the enemy, the task of war ends. The fulfillment of any larger policy objectives is not an objective within the scope of war understood as such, even if realizing such objectives might require continued use of force. Thus, Echevarria II further explains that although a battle focus does not go far enough. Reporting that a look at the past recent conflicts, especially those under the category of the war on terror, requires political, economic, and social reconstruction (Nation-Building). The difference is whether an approach considers the arrangement of Doctrine and organizations to achieve policy success or military victory. Echevarria II, 2010)

As to the American view of counterinsurgency, Record wonders if the U.S. Army will remain interested in such missions. Even though there was a strategic correction during the conflict, with a small number of veterans embracing the mission and developing a new and revised field manual on counterinsurgency, there are no explicit assurances that the Army will keep an institutional interest beyond the end of the Iraq War. Record further states that there is a case in that U.S. strategic culture is so hostile to counterinsurgency that maybe it should deliberately avoid such conflicts altogether. Whether a future President or secretary will proclaim a more restrictive doctrine for the use of force remains to be seen. However, such a doctrine would do well to look back on the clauses of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine 54 and recent U.S. military history and strategic culture (Record, 2007). It has become clear that the American body politic has a decided aversion to costly and indecisive conflicts. Therefore Record maintains that

these will be the wars of choice for America's enemies. The author concludes that any massive and decisive use of force is rare except against weaker or less intelligent opponents. Such mobilization is near impossible in a world of limited objectives and politically charged conflicts and in a global environment where nonstate actors regularly exercise irregular warfare to negate the effectiveness of conventional military supremacy (Record, 2007).

2. Political Culture and Beliefs

The political culture of the United States is marked by both Lockean liberalism and a Lockean consensus where the typical member of the political system has a limited capacity for political rationality and where the interaction with that same political system is characterized by one's values: more specifically, the symbolism and values used to interpret occurrences within that system. Devine posits that it is culture that connects values and forms of government and that that connection makes cultural values an important part of regime maintenance. Culture is understood as a total way of life, formed by principles, norms, rules, institutions, artifacts, and symbols; and it is within this process that we must understand how this affects social process. However, Devine asserts that, although culture shapes, it does not determine behavior. Ultimately it acts on the psyche and affects people's perception or assessment of reality. In sum, it forms a belief set which in turn shapes perception and behavior (Fig.1) (Devine, 1972).




Figure 1.

Devine argues that there is a consensual political culture within the United States which is rooted within the idea of the Lockean republic and adapted to America by Madison and the Founding Fathers which has remained unchanged. This liberal tradition is common to both liberals and conservatives, and it is preminent for its lack of any feudal or traditional social structure. In the United States, the imposition of this new order did not signify the destruction of a previous one and thus it was able to avoid the characteristically communal divisions of the

European continent which threatened social and political stability. Thus, there was a solid basis for the establishment of a common regime and the raising of a common polity. The United States is distinguished in its lack of weight from having a previous feudal structure and its society is a result of the melding of the environmental factor and the political traditions brought in by settlers shaped by Lockean values. This order kept some parts of its English patrimony such as law and philosophy, but it also shed others such as monarchy and aristocracy and gave birth to the constitution which was transferred throughout generations. Thus, both the political culture and the values were consistent with the regime established (Devine, 1972).

One must understand that the political ideology of the United States is marked by events such as the covenant signed aboard the Mayflower, where a group of Pilgrims started the American experiment of self-government seventy years before Locke and forty before Rousseau; and that while the United States is not the origin of those principles, it certainly was the first to assert that government derives its power from the people and not the contrary. There are thus values that have shaped not only American thought but its political system as well, and they represent the most basic assumptions of American views of life. These values form a perception, a screen through which the polity not only views but evaluates opinions, beliefs and more. Free and Cantril posit that perception is a mere way through which the individual looks at things and compares them to their hopes and their expectations of the future, these are also based in each one's judgement of past experiences (Cantril, 1968).

Devine explains that all cultures are resistant to change, that change only occurs when there is a major disturbance to the status quo and that resistance will occur whether those values be successful or not. Nevertheless, it is accepted that the stronger the attack, the harder one will cling to their social values, and that a consequence of that is that those values will have greater influence. Political culture is thus how one adjusts toward the political system – it is not only the values but the emotions and perceptions of how government should be conducted. It deals with the beliefs, norms, rules, artifacts, symbols, and value standards which are important bodies and ultimately form a value system which can influence political behavior. The most basic of these objects is the nation itself while the attitude towards that object and its value basis is what is called national identity (Devine, 1972).

National identity then is the personal identification between one member and the political system, and it is through it that the individual can both orient himself politically and identify himself with groups of others, focusing on horizontal member to member interactions.

Thus, the sense of a communal identity comes from the mutual identification of members with each other within the political system, meaning how members identify themselves with others within the same political system, focusing on vertical member to political system relations. Devine argues that these are both ways of relating to a political community and are crucial components of identity within the system of political culture (Devine, 1972).

American political culture has many symbolic devices, from the unique architectural style to the formalized language, to romanticized distortions of concepts and people, these all have the goal of attaching the regime to the people. All the monuments, documents, flags, icons, and heroes are intended to create commitment to the basic divisions of the political system (Devine, 1972). Identification with one's nation state is one of the most crucial aspects of political culture because it legitimizes the activities of the political elite and allows them to have the commitment and support of their followers to help the system survive across various crisis and processes of rapid social change. Devine posits that, although force is a factor in creating identity support, for the Lockean tradition at work in the United States it is illegitimate for both system creation and maintenance. Thus, the value system is an alternative to force, as American national identity is a developmental process that goes back to traditions in colonial America which created a consensus in the support of national identity (Devine, 1972).

Cantril explains that American beliefs are deep seated in a sense of liberalism and a repudiation of intrusion by the state upon the individual. American society is an environment distinctly marked by the individual and the ideal of the individual as self-reliant, where individual initiative and private ventures are seen as good which in turn leads to the sanctification of private property. Poverty is seen as more than a simple lack of material goods but as a character flaw. Nevertheless, paradoxically, the government keeps a degree of interference, mainly in protecting the weak. Cantril explains that these are the marks of traditional American ideology (Cantril, 1968).

Devine argues that the distrust of centralized government inherited from the Lockean tradition was strong and that in the colonies there was no real, widespread desire for union. He explains that such a sentiment was overcome by environmental pressures which required a union to exist, he further argues that without the Articles of Confederation, such a union might not have existed at all, as the Constitution would not have been accepted, explaining that this process was a necessary transition for overcoming the fear of a central government. The Constitution was itself the most important symbol for the identity of the regime, with its place in the United States probably unmatched in any other society (Devine, 1972).

Liberal tradition is at the core of American political culture and Locke's republican principles are at its foundation since its inception. Even though American policy outputs might have changed, the basic values behind it have remained the same. American culture views values as both empirically and traditionally given, and attributes to them a more profound meaning than merely constructs of simple rationality. Liberal tradition has thus put the focus of any discussion mainly on liberal values and terms. Devine asserts that liberty and equality are the background for the conflict operating within the United States. Liberal tradition, which has Lockean values adapted to the American reality has led to a different form of both assessment and utilization of facts and application to the unique environment of the United States which is summed up in early documents of the republic such as the Constitution and the Federalist Papers. American political culture since then has survived unchanged. (Devine, 1972).

Devine presents the constituents of the main political system and divides them in four distinct items: Identity, which is the basic community element and the base upon which to attach the political system; symbols, which are a structure of support

for the basic political cultures which are given value by the culture; rules and norms which are in sum, the political constitution, the norms of each regime or more colloquially "the rules of the game"; and finally beliefs, which are the crucial standards and ambitions of the members of the political system (fig.2). Devine also asserts that to be a culture, these systems must have an historical nature, meaning, they must be transferrable from generation to generation with the strength of said culture hinging on this process which Devine calls political socialization (Devine, 1972).

As such, regime maintenance depends on the generational transference of symbols and values and political culture is required to provide a connection between the regime and authority levels. Devine thus posits that the legitimization of new authority occurs through what he describes as "rites of passage", such as the oath of office, the appearance of former office holders and elaborate inauguration ceremonies. These have the purpose of preserving regime legitimacy and, due to the power of symbology, even the opposition must submit to the new authority (Devine, 1972).




Figure 2.

However, knowing these processes does not mean one can have a guaranteed determination of public opinion. Devine asserts that system persistence is only a form of analysis of complex social entities and both system persistence and regime maintenance are only basic processes of political systems. Another way of dividing the political system would be in three other items (fig.3): community, regime, and authority, which Devine clarifies are but another way of looking at the behavior of the political system. Community meaning the members which are also part of the common political structure and is seen as fundamental; regime which is also seen as fundamental but has other objects (rules and norms); and authority which represents the daily policy interactions that while affecting regime maintenance are not classified as fundamental due to not affecting regime maintenance directly (Devine, 1972).




Figure 3.

Devine expounds that culture is but a subsystem of the environmental system which using concepts such as stress, input, demand, support output and feedback can almost be rendered understandable. Thus, political culture is essentially both examined, and a given. By this order of thought, it is understood that only wants or demands which survive the screen of public opinion can influence political activity (fig 4.) (Devine, 1972).




Figure 4.

Free and Cantril assert that the initial liberal outlook of the United States was later taken by conservatives to defend an already liberal status quo, and this has made American ideology traditionally conservative. Most American beliefs have survived at an ideological level even if the objective environment has changed. In sum, American society has changed since its inception and essentially the only common factors remain those of topography, climate, and human nature. This change in environment was due to the industrial revolution that transformed a mainly agrarian society into an urban industrial complex that saw the introduction of a new liberalism promoted by the likes of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Frank D. Roosevelt. This new liberalism pressed for the betterment of society through a higher degree of involvement by the government, marked by a certain degree of paternalism following the citizen from cradle to grave and, although demanding no interference from the government, the public still agreed to the introduction of Federal Programs (Cantril, 1968). Thus, it is understood that values end up shaping the wants that are rendered into political demands and those that are deemed appropriate for political regulation. This process is presented by Devine, by being separated into two types of support: determined support, which is understood as coercion, structural change, and satisfaction; and diffuse support, which can either be positive or negative, with positive being translated into higher regime stability, and negative into instability. Diffuse support is also divided into overt and covert support and can either be positive or neutral (Devine, 1972).

However, Free and Cantril assert that, despite the ideology of the society that believes in the myth of opportunity and where those who do not work are seen as valueless and purposeless due to an empirical belief (a remainder of the Puritan belief in the virtue of work and it is just reward), the operational seems to be higher placed, since the government does not leave people in abject poverty and this is accepted by society at large. This shows the high

rate of adaptability of the American experiment of self-government and the more practical adaptations for the emerging aspirations of its citizens are the reason Americans have not yet become dissatisfied with their political ideology. Free and Cantril explain that this ideology has become a part of each citizen and will not be discarded unless the frustration is deep and prolonged, only then would despair with the state of things lead to a search of more adequate beliefs and new rally symbols (Cantril, 1968).

Symbols and values have importance to the individual because they help understand and shape; while to the political system, they serve those same functions while emphasizing community, regime, and authority screening. In the United States symbolism increases in proportion to power, from local to state to federal government. This is particularly true for institutions which deal with one's life or freedom, such as the courts with the zenith of symbolism being the Supreme Court of the United States (Devine, 1972).

As Devine asserts, no one system can endure unless it seeks to build a decent reservoir of support which could be described as patriotism, love of country and loyalty. It is upon those which the system counts regardless of the development or frustration of desires that members of said system might experience. Devine further explains that diffuse support allows for decisions that even though might not benefit some groups are nevertheless accepted because of members seeing the regime as legitimate and just. Without this the regime would be unable to maintain itself without relying on extensive coercion (Devine, 1972).

It is this distinctively American pragmatism that makes the American system function as it does. Free and Cantril explain that values are deeply felt and are the main driving force of American ideology. It is because of said pragmatic and humanitarian value system that beliefs are paradoxical between a conservative ideology and liberal programs. Free and Cantril explain that an effective leader must formulate and communicate overall goals but more than that he must be able to plausibly demonstrate to a majority of his citizens that the way by which he means to achieve his objectives is realistic, while at the same time persuading them that the means do not conflict with their basic ideological assumptions (Cantril, 1968). Devine explains that the concept of political culture in a political system is focused upon the values which are fundamental for its members and the effect that those values might have on its processes, particularly coping with stress to the system. For the American system, Devine asserts that if political culture is supported, so is the regime – which shows a higher degree of interrelation between member values, political culture, demands and support. Thus, the more values are accepted the more they shape and are held on

to, and the more they reduce the stress on the system. In the United States the regime strives to manipulate outputs to not only control members but to help maintain stability. The value system within the regime creates a consensus which ends up having a shaping influence on public policy, which in turn helps maintain the democratic regime and the persistence of its community. Thus, a space is created whereupon the belief system is a regime which is then translated to a level of support of legitimacy. Fundamentals are no more than the acceptance of regime legitimacy (Devine, 1972).

It is through its capacity for not only renewal but also modernization that the American political system has kept from being outdated and devalued. Free and Cantril explain that a viable government is both fluid and flexible, and capable of providing guidance and of serving as a repository of accepted values. Thus, the American system has been able to persist due to its flexibility, by providing form and flow which are crucial to any stability within change. Free and Cantril also pose that it is due to this paradoxical paradigm that the government has not been in any way vigorously obstructed or opposed to (Cantril, 1968).

Devine affirms that basic values are what mold the social process while cultural values shape the political process, whether seen as fundamental or as political culture. Nevertheless, Devine presents data that suggests that there is a limited rationality for the American citizen, meaning that the masses might not be refined enough to hold a consistent system of values (fig.5). Devine asserts that, to citizens, political expertise is not worth an effort due to their multirole and he shows that from 1952 to 1968 two thirds of Americans felt government was too complicated to be understood (Devine, 1972).

Familiarity with the Bill of Rights

Question: What do you know of the Bill of Rights? (NORC)

	1944	1946
Never heard of it, not sure if had	23%	31%
Had heard, but could not identify it	39	36
Confused, unsatisfactory, or incorrect	15	12
Reasonable accurate idea of content	23	21

Sources: Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer, 1944), p.283;ibid. (Winter 1946-1947), p.604
The Political Culture of The United States, Donald J. Devine, p. 37

Figure 5.

Free and Cantril also show that one third of Americans were politically uninformed in 1964: when asked what the primary concern of the country was, number one was keeping the country out of war – strengthening the UN only came in twenty-first place. Nevertheless, international concerns still ranked higher than national ones in 1964. Withal, although most Americans know the overall objectives of the country on the international scene, they do not know enough about the mechanics of Foreign Policy (Cantril, 1968).

However, Devine explains that even if there is a general feeling of entering unknown territory, most Americans do not feel neglected and still feel that they have some degree of control. That control is present in the vote and how the people influence government through elections (fig.6). This shows that the public still believes they have the power to influence broad policy, rather than detailed legislation. Choice is reduced to the vote and simplified into approval or disapproval within the structural boundaries of the system. Thus, the public not only sets the limits to political authority but also believe in their power to do so. Devine asserts that elections offer choice within the various competing elites and allow the system members to both evaluate performance and reject, which are compelling means of control (Devine, 1972).




Figure 6.

Free and Cantril were able to show that the masses were not informed enough: Americans were still turned to national problems and afflictions, notwithstanding their position change from one of isolationism to one of leadership within a complex international scene. Free and Cantril explain that this shift led Americans to face all manner of problems ranging from Civil Rights issues to automation and world leadership; problems that required modern solutions and a higher degree of engagement with the international community (Cantril, 1968).

Devine explains that within political culture both values and the influences upon them are important and therefore one must consider, economic, psychological, and social factors within the political system. Changes in these factors within United States history, however, have focused upon economic factors, which creates a strong relation between economy and regime maintenance. Devine asserts that, although not deterministic, economic success ends

up playing a role in regime maintenance by also contributing to reducing stress on the regime. Ultimately the United States' economic system provides a major foundation for its political regime and according to Devine it would provide such a foundation whatever the form of said regime. Another factor of regime maintenance is the physical environment, and Devine posits that the richness of natural resources presented an opportunity for regime maintenance, while also having a separating ocean from the problems of the European continent. Devine posits that this paradigm developed a psychological effect in the American mind (Devine, 1972).

Many of the physical aspects of the United States relate to Locke: the richness of the land was, for the settlers, case in point for most Lockean ideas. An original state of nature, a civil contract and the frontier which was the example of the exercise of the right to emigration. The frontiersman was the premier example of the free man who was subject only to God, the peak of the national man who used reason to shape his environment. Locke had provided this ideal when he asserted that man had a natural liberty to be free from any superior power on earth, not to be bound under the will of legislative authority of any man but to have only the law of nature to rule (Devine, 1972).

The frontier as posited by Turner was attributed to it the prime causes for the development of an American identity. The early history of the United States was mostly the story of the colonization of the West with the existence of free land, its continuous recession and advancing of settlement explaining American development. That frontier spirit, Devine argues, interacted with the social structure, and influenced political culture, even though it was not the primary influence. Devine asserts that differences tend to generate greater identification with national identity. The frontier made Americans think they were different, thus aiding identification with the nation. Even if the frontier was not a main identifying factor, it was a way to emphasize differences and contrast the old and the new world (Devine, 1972). The awareness of the contrast between early American and European society; the adoption of the constitution as a communal symbol; and the reinforcement techniques of historiographers who devised a unique and self-sufficient nation to be easily identifiable by creating a history filled with deeds, glories, and a supposed national destiny – all these traits were meant to create a strong sense of national identity (Devine, 1972). Economic abundance and an environment which was prone to manipulation provided the foundations for the self-government experiment which was well expounded by the Lockean thesis. Still, even if economical, physical, and psychological factors provide a setting there is nevertheless a limit to their ability to what they can explain, as political values are also result of social phenomena (Devine, 1972).

American values are summed up in Lockean liberal philosophy and are still central aspects of the American value system, where man is seen as free but still limited by the value tradition and where government was seen as a means for man to preserve himself from the insecurities of the state of nature. However, this was limited to protecting his life, liberty, and property through the powers of popular consent, established laws, impartial judges and a limited but effective executive. Thus, any government that tries to exceed these boundaries is deemed illegitimate and gives the people the right to break the social contract (Devine, 1972). Devine asserts that these aspects are so central that they make appearances via symbols used by presidents in inaugural addresses, which nevertheless shows a remarkable stability to this liberal tradition. Symbols in America have varied throughout its history, union symbols that were used before the civil war have all but disappeared completely, "America" which was broadly in use during the socialist change of the 1930's has been used less and less in other periods. Despite that, according to Devine, the rules of the game, the Constitution, self-government and the basic belief in God, freedom, the past and confidence in the future have been used throughout the history of the country, with a reading of some of the addresses of its leaders showing few changes throughout time. Devine also argues that as symbolism gets increasingly more formal it also better hides the unpleasant aspects of power which society or the individual want to ignore but which seem necessary for regime maintenance, especially in regimes based upon consent (Devine, 1972).

Values within American political culture are those which are felt to be compatible with the national environment and are seen as a gift given by the Founding Fathers which equipped the nation with what is regarded as a perfect and complete political theory, suiting the country's every need. It is the high acceptance rate of this political culture and satisfaction with its operational results which has driven the belief that these values are so good that they are the only ones compatible with the survival of the system. It is through this process that the political system is thus highly capable of dealing with stress, through the protection from its political value screen (fig.7). Severe stress, wars, depression, or others can simply be ignored as they are not consistent with the values of the regime. Devine concludes that the Lockean values




Figure 7.

which constitute the liberal tradition are what allow for this ability. If these values are widely accepted, then the regime will also be able to cope with stress. The more accepted the values, the more they contribute to regime maintenance. Devine also argues that whatever differences there may be in these values within the United States, from an outsider perspective are too small to be noticeable. (Devine, 1972).

The idea of culture suggests then that those values must be generally accepted, and this translates to a substantial majority agreement on the fundamentals of that culture, while those with no opinion or disagreement are asserted by Devine to be counted in conjunction to those who support the regime in a “silence is consent” kind of way. Devine asserts that for political culture to be operational, there must thus be a substantial majority (at least a 20% difference, according to the author) which supports its fundamentals. Although Devine admits there is room for objections, this seems to be the best formulated response (Devine, 1972).

Interactions must be institutionalized to become a structural part of the social system, as values are structural, they must meet the criteria. If political value is to have meaning it has to be able to persist to shape the political process. Policy making must go through the cultural screen and after that it fluctuates widely throughout time. This, Devine asserts, is the arena in which different ideologies at the authority level are resolved. Thus, while the policy system attitude seems to fluctuate, the cultural system attitude remains stable: even though not all stable attitudes are cultural, only stable ones can integrate the political culture (Devine, 1972).

Devine then questions how alike people can be and if common characteristics are simply tendencies. Devine defines national character as enduring personality traits which are common to all the adult members of a society. Such a polling operation guided by this concept can overcome the limitations of individual direct observation even in a heterogeneous environment as the United States. Devine posits, however, that an attempt to define a single coherent political culture or national character is too ambitious. He asserts that it is evident that American life has become expressed in a variety of ways and that any real effort to define Americans, to label more than three hundred million people to correspond to a pre-ordained type, would oversimplify any data. An analysis within such parameters has a real risk of becoming a superficial stereotyping of nations. (Devine, 1972).

Tocqueville once argued that it was the manners of Americans more than the physical circumstances that allowed them to support a democratic government. To him, the physical circumstances were less efficient than the laws and those same laws were highly subordinate

to the manners of the people. Devine asserts that physical circumstances correspond to environmental, the laws to authority and the structure and manners to political culture. Madison also once questioned what restrained abuses on the part of the government within the United States, concluding that crucial to the whole system was the nature of just and constitutional laws and the vigilance and spirit of the American democratic regime. Both Tocqueville and Madison then suggest that the values which are intrinsically in Americans provide an explanation for the maintenance of the regime (Devine, 1972).

American political culture is founded in Lockean values and is distributed along the major social groupings of the United States which also explains the types of demands and supports which are processed by the political system. The high levels of support of the political culture within the United States helps conform the demands to the liberal tradition, such shaping leads to the maintenance of cultural values i.e., political culture and this in turn helps maintain the regime (Devine, 1972).

A liberal regime is dependent upon the diffusion of a communal identity (fig.8) to foster trust in political actors, the Lockean contract would not happen unless such trust was fostered. Locke emphasized the need for trust in the development of liberal political systems. Devine asserts that a country which has a liberal tradition needs to have more trust than those which do not. The trait of associational activity is an important one within the United States, from almshouses and charities to volunteer fire departments and mutual aids societies for savings. This trait does not disappear, even with subsequent immigration, as immigrants are quick to accept these values (Devine, 1972).




Figure.8

Both the sense of national identity and community identity have been found by Devine to be diffused among the members of the American political system and each have an important and separate culture shaping influence. Devine maintains that identity support does provide a modicum of explanation for the persistence of the American political system when faced with stress. Devine concludes that for a Lockean political culture such findings about the identity system are especially relevant as the type of identity described is highly compatible with the liberal tradition of the United States (Devine, 1972).

Such leads to a discussion about the symbols of the regime, which are important in the formation of both an identity and the interpretation of the rule and belief systems. Symbols are meant to facilitate the communication of complex realities. The symbol system although not having any intrinsic content, expresses the other three systems in terms of artifacts (fig.9) (Devine, 1972).




Figure 9.

There is an attachment to liberal symbols which is manifested in a culture consensus. Devine argues that symbols, by simplifying complex ideas whatever forms they take (language, myth, or artifact) provide a foundation for understanding outside stimuli. Symbols, according to Devine, are also what effectively clarify communication, with language being one example of a basic symbol. Nevertheless, symbols can also have a more limiting role. By creating a symbol system, one might create blockages which end up shaping and screen certain perceptions. It is thus understood that even though symbols allow for the understanding of certain stimuli, they also block or shape others (Devine, 1972). Devine maintains that the full set of symbols of a society will shape all the references for that society, and that a support for symbols may additionally provide a more stable foundation for the rational support of a regime. Symbols ultimately act in concept formation and perceptual screening, but they may also aid in emotional and rational attachments which help maintain social systems (Devine, 1972).

Symbols can be vague and through their vagueness they provide an object which can be agreed upon without the need for the preciseness of specific affirmation of support; thus, as symbols become increasingly more supported, they become means of support for continued social interaction. Devine posits that symbols have the characteristics of cultural values, by influencing over long periods they can shape and function as supports, but most importantly they appear to screen and facilitate emotional attachment when other stimuli are identified with them at the same time, symbols disguise when stimuli are not related to them (Devine, 1972).

The political role of symbols has long been recognized, since Plato to the Founding Fathers, who also viewed them as important. Political symbols have the function of labeling, identifying, and screening, and when supported they focus attention on the values and goals of the community and regime. If they have strong support, they provide an additional layer of commitment to the values and goals. Without such support, Devine argues, regime maintenance would be unlikely. Most system members need symbols to be able to assure the values of the political system (Devine, 1972). Without the support of communal and regime symbols, the political system would see itself forced to rely on rational commitment and coercion, which Devine posits would be insufficient for a liberal tradition regime as the one of the United States which must play down coercion. However, Devine explains that this system is restricted to only exacerbating those myths and symbols which are politically relevant, with such symbols being important in streamlining political objects for its members (Devine, 1972).

During its infancy and the lack of unifying symbols the nation made use of George Washington and his unifying figure to legitimize the new regime. After the establishment of the United States, additional symbols were needed to represent and reinforce the ideals of the Constitution and it was through such things as the revival architecture of its capital, the naming of the Senate, and due to a lack of symbology, the flag and the national anthem and other patriotic songs were used as the representations of the newly birthed union. Thus, those symbols became an embodiment of the nation and were reinforced at the local level through visible points in the community, namely, the church and the courthouse. Both God and the State contributed to order by use of symbolism known to the average American (Devine, 1972). The Nation's symbols were then condensed into a single holiday, the fourth of July which became the expression of homage to the nation. Devine explains that the celebration of the adoption of the Declaration of Independence had a stronger impact on the new nation as idea symbols have a higher development rate and are not bound by geographical space. In comparison, the Constitution with its legalistic tone would be unsuitable for such celebrations.

The Declaration was perceived as being above the force of law and as such was not charged with any aversion of political power (Devine, 1972).

The Constitution was law and as such subject to interpretation while being mainly exceptional rhetoric, it did however become a unifying symbol in the Post-Civil War era whereby its power of settling the nature of the regime, it was elevated to a unity symbol. The Constitution is thus an important regime component of the political culture, and more than a symbol it is taken as the zenith of the Rule system within the United States and as a repository of values that is widely accepted (Devine, 1972).

However, symbols have both the power to unite and to divide, and unless there is consensus among members, there is the constant threat of dissolution. Devine asserts that in the case of the United States, although political parties are symbols and structures of conflict, that conflict takes place between parties as authority symbols, while parallel to it there is a consensus throughout both the community and regime symbols which define the limits of the lower-level party conflict (Devine, 1972). At a regime level, unity clearly outweighs division. Devine asserts that by studying verbal symbols from presidential inaugural addresses, there is evidence to show that no matter the changes, the verbal symbols remained the same in the first fourteen years of the country. Such symbols were not only commonly held, but also held as culture values which helped maintain the early foundation of the system. Symbols had a role of aiding identity and emotional attachment to the early liberal regime (Devine, 1972). Symbols do not simply represent the nation: they also embody beliefs and within the liberal tradition; some symbols have a higher degree of importance since they relate to certain values such as achievement and liberty (Devine, 1972).

Devine argues that while icons and heroes also serve this same purpose, icons have limited usefulness in the United States. The most common are Uncle Sam or Lady Liberty, however, Devine believes that the closest to icons within United States history are the frontiersmen of old such as Daniel Boone, Buffalo Bill and Kit Carson which represent the nation's important values such as liberty, strength, virtue, and hard work (Devine, 1972). In the United States heroes originate usually in political and more limitedly in military aspects. Devine posits that Presidents provide major symbol system emphasis which is advocated by Locke to be the normal within a republic. More than George Washington, Abraham Lincoln has more credentials as a mythical hero, with a status that was elevated in the age of reason to a demigod. This shows that even scientific and sophisticated individuals value symbols. The symbology of the common man from the log cabin is an easy symbol for the common American

to identify with. Thus, Lincoln's myth provides something understandable for the common American which makes government more meaningful and frequent reference to both Washington and Lincoln shows their power on the American psyche. Devine maintains that the figure of the American President is required through constitutional provisions to be a policy advocate, which has forced the president to rely upon persuasion – the advent of mass media only intensified this. Which leads to the conclusion that, although rationality is not completely gone, a president tends to rely on charisma and rhetoric more than other authorities. Devine asserts that the president of the United States has the power to literally destroy the world but the symbol of the president of the common man is at work particularly when the world is reminded that he has such power (Devine, 1972).

3. Violence in America

In order to fully understand the use of force, it is approval and operationalization within U.S. democracy and if there is a connection between the American way of war and American values and their deployment in speech, it is necessary to understand how Americans perceive their own internal violence, as well as how that same violence connects to American values. Examples of this are the theme of no duty to retreat (Brown, 1991). In the history of the U.S., violence, be it small or major, has had a well seen effect on the course of political events, a kind of violence that was decidedly marked by racial and ethnic hatreds, resulting in major historical consequences (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

Hofstadter explains that educated Americans, although fully aware of the country's foreign wars and the legacy of the Civil War, tend to disregard internal violence. He argues that the subject has been repressed within the national consciousness going as far as to claim that the country suffers from "historical amnesia", and the historians are not the only ones affected, since, despite the violence of WWII and the Korean war, the internal life of the U.S. has mainly been violence free and it is this experience of a whole generation which has led to this apparent memory loss (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970). In truth as Hofstadter explains "While we may find violence undesirable, we can hardly find it unnatural." (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 18). However, the fact remains that there is an overall lack of memory where violence is concerned in U.S. history, where most excesses have been buried memories within it ⁵⁷. Violence has become a daily topic, and many find it disturbing that these outbreaks have coincided with economic booms. As Hofstadter explains, although richer, Americans have not found a way to buy themselves out of it. There is nothing new to violence within U.S. society, what has changed throughout the years is the public opinion and the awareness of it (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970). As Hofstadter explains:

Today we are not only aware of our own violence; we are frightened by it. We are now quite ready to see that there is far more violence in our national heritage than our proud, sometimes smug, national self-image admits of. Our violence frightens us, as it frightens others, because in our singular position uncontrolled domestic violence coincides with unparalleled national power, and thus takes on a special significance for the world. (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 17)

Hofstadter however concludes that it might be preferable to have occasional and limited violence as an alternative to unlimited repression by the state, asserting that in a democratic state ⁵⁸ a deep and wide legitimation of authority is vital in order to not have its power often challenged or that when it is challenged it can be dealt with by a successful show of force without escalation or repeated violence (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

Among the forgotten developments of violence within the United States, there is the theme of no duty to retreat and how it developed within the U.S. But as Hofstadter explains «We do not yet know much about the patterns of American violence, and even our awareness of its past frequency is almost certain to be expanded as new areas of historical inquiry are opened» (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 16). In the end Hofstadter reminds us that «...» it is important not to succumb to the conventional and maudlin anti-Americanism of our era, and not to be parochial even in self-denigration. For good or ill, violence has been a common agent of historical change almost everywhere «...» (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 18).

No duty to retreat is the Americanization of the idea that comes from ancient English common law which required the individual who was victim of an assault to retreat to the wall at his back before killing in self-defense in circumstances where there was fear of death or grave injury. In America however there was a gradual legal evolution which led to the development that one had the right to stand their ground if they were without fault. Whereas English law required one to forego violence in favor of fleeing the scene, the significant development and difference of American culture was that by the early twentieth century, duty to retreat was “inapplicable to American conditions” (Brown, 1991). No duty to retreat was proclaimed as federal law in the United States by the Supreme Court in 1921, however it had become common practice far before, with the origins of standing one's ground tracing back to the American Revolution. Brown explains that the evolution of no duty to retreat was parallel and paramount with the rise of the independent United States (Brown, 1991). As the settling of America moved westward towards the Appalachians and to the Pacific Coast, states saw their highest courts repudiate the duty to retreat. State supreme court judges frequently cited the decisions of other judges to support their own opinions, leading to a domino effect where self-defense was effectively advocated (Brown, 1991).

In a minority of American states duty to retreat survived, however after the end of the

nineteenth century, most states had favored the American theme of no duty to retreat: killing in self-defense, one was legally justified to standing one's ground. No duty to retreat in America was a result of the combination of Eastern legal authorities and Western judges who transformed English law from one upholding cowardice into an American law that fit the bravery of the "true man" (Brown, 1991).

Hofstadter provides an explanation for the difference between American and English prospects of violence which clarifies the concept of no duty to retreat in America:

Americans however they may deplore and fear violence, are not so deeply shocked by it as the English are. Our entertainment and our serious writing are suffused with violence to a notorious degree; it is endemic in our history. Americans, apparently taking it as a part of the stream of life's events, do not as a rule very promptly rise in large numbers and in lawful ways to protest, oppose, or control it (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 18).

Still, the presence of civil violence in the United States until contemporary times is, as Hofstadter put it, «...» quite out of keeping with our image of ourselves as one of the worlds most advanced political cultures. » (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 20). No duty to retreat has become second nature to Americans and has had a broad and significant impact upon society, foreign relations, and even military conduct. Richard Maxwell Brown defends that «Neglected by previous scholars, no duty to retreat is much more than a legal technicality. It is an expression of a characteristically American approach to life. » (Brown, 1991, p. 7). It is an obvious and crucial part of the American identity, much like the outdated and outmoded gun control laws that have certainly helped both developments (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

Legal experts absorbed the doctrines of Foster and East and began introducing them in their authoritative and influential textbooks. These textbooks bolstered Western judges who believed that the duty to retreat was inappropriate. However, even if the no duty to retreat was supported in law books, the courts were the decisive arenas for the adoption of it (Brown, 1991).

Two of the most influential stipulations of no duty to retreat came in 1876 and 1877 respectively in *Erwin v. State* in Ohio in 1876 and in the May 1877 case of *Runyan v. State* in Indiana. In *Erwin v. State*, Judge George W. McIlvaine gave their decision. McIlvaine emphasized that a "true man" as there should be, no other kind, was free to stand his ground against any assailants, regardless of consequences. The Ohio's true man theme had barely been digested when in Indiana, the supreme court of the state found that the no duty to retreat

was "contrary to the tendency of the American mind" (Brown, 1991).

That was the viewpoint central to the court's decision in May 1877 in the *Runyan v. State* case. William E. Niblack represented the frontier background and heritage which according to Brown gave the doctrine of no duty to retreat its emotional fervor and depth. Niblack asserted that the right of self-defense is founded on the laws of nature and could not be surpassed by any law of society. Furthermore, he resorted to both law and American values to support his decision that Runyan as a victim of assault was free to pursue his assailant until he was out of danger (Brown, 1991). Niblack asserted that the duty to retreat was legal cowardice, and that cowardice was an un-American act. As Hofstadter put it:

«...» before the era of the gangster hero it was the frontier that gave this country one of its central images of justified violence and some of its archetypal heroes of violence. Yet it is worth emphasizing that over the course of our history only a small portion of the total American population - and always a decreasing portion - has ever seen or been on a frontier. Again, all frontiers do not automatically produce similar patterns of violence, as a comparison of American with Canadian and Australian behavior would show» ((Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 25).

Examining the history of violence in the United States one is impressed by how superficial the "melting pot" image is and how easily it was applied to its history. Americans already had a considerable history of violence in the colonial period and thanks to that when it entered the revolutionary era, the people already had a habit of moving into forcible action.

However, the United States has endured extraordinary violence in its history without developing a revolutionary tradition and while maintaining a long record of political stability. Apart from the Civil War, political development has taken place in relatively free conditions with a strong and stable constitution, free elections and working parliamentary institutions. Thus, in an environment where a vast ethnically diverse continental area is joined in one polity, the coexistence of stability and violence forms a paradox, for usually violence is connected to political instability (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970). Hofstadter ultimately concludes that American violence has mainly been initiated from a "conservative" bias. That violence has been unleashed against abolitionists, Catholics, radicals, workers, labor unions, Black people, Asians among other ethnic or ideological minorities; it was used to protect the Southern white protestant man, or simply an established middle-class's way of life and morals. That could provide an explanation as to why little violence has been used against state authority and why it is quickly and easily forgotten from the annals of history (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

It was in the South, where the doctrine to retreat fared better, particularly in the Lone Star state of Texas, where sociologist Henry P. Lundsgaarde revealed that the duty to retreat issue is directly linked to the high incidence of homicide in the state's history. It is probable that no state surpassed Texas in its permissiveness to kill in defense of property with many legal provisions allowing for justifiable homicide. The "Texas rule" ultimately earned the blessing of the United States court in 1921. A pivotal figure in the final decision was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who served on the Supreme Court favored self-defense, and his decision was also furthered by the fact that he had experience as a Civil War soldier (Brown, 1991).

Holmes and the Supreme Court finally summarized their decision by stating that «...» if a man reasonably believes that he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm from his assailant he may stand his ground and that if he kills him, he has not exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense."» (Brown, 1991, p. 45). Although seemingly contradictory to the values of civility and tolerance that were hallmarks of a liberal doctrine of civil liberties, to Holmes there was no such contradiction. To him, the right to stand one's ground and kill in self-defense was as great a liberty as freedom of speech (Brown, 1991). The views on self-defense only helped the culture of violence within the United States evolve into its own aspects. Concepts such as lynching and vigilantism as Hofstadter explains have almost no parallels and could be regarded as distinctively American institutions (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

Vigilantism was defended by the likes of Theodore Roosevelt who saw it as an expression of American hardihood. He thought of it as well intentioned and sometimes a benign extension of the law. Hofstadter ponders what he would have thought of the vigilantism of groups such as the Ku Klux Klan whose members conduct themselves in the name of patriotism, order, and moral decency (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970). Much like Theodore Roosevelt who looked upon vigilantism as a part of the law so too did President Dwight D. Eisenhower look up to the social philosophy of standing one's ground (Brown, 1991).

No one had stated the philosophy better than him when, in a nationally televised speech in 1953, he expressed the ethos of no duty to retreat by informing his audience that as a boy he had been raised to praise the code of Abilene, Texas, his hometown. That code was the code of renowned gunfighter Wild Bill Hickok (Brown, 1991). Eisenhower believed in that code which he declared was to «"meet anyone face to face with whom you disagree"; "if you met him face to face and took the same risk he did you could get away with almost anything as long as the bullet was in the front"» (Brown, 1991, p. 48). Which leads to Hofstadter's conclusion that:

Every aspect of violence in our country, from riots to presidential assassinations, has been exacerbated by the fact that ours is a gun culture - a thing without parallel among the industrial nations of the world. In some measure our gun culture owes its origins to the needs of an agrarian society and to the dangers and terrors of the frontier, but for us the central question must be why it has survived into an age in which only about five percent of the population makes its living from farming and from which the frontier has long since gone (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 39).

President Eisenhower was not the only one to be fascinated by the culture of the West and its gunfighters (Brown, 1991). There were thousands of gunfighters involved in thousands of gunfights. Gunfighting was hardly a social institution that was restricted to famous men but was a much-felt presence of life in the West. Men lived according to a Western code of conduct, an array of values that programmed them to use their guns, most often in allegiance to the ideal of no duty to retreat (Brown, 1991).

Hofstadter explains that this gunfighting culture comes from an ideology that has been prevalent since colonial times. It is based in the conviction that a standing army, along with the tyrants who may command them are among the greatest dangers to free government, while an armed populace is a safeguard of freedom. This was the political doctrine that was engraved into the Second Amendment, with its mandate that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms are not infringed" - though simultaneously it also made it perfectly clear that such a right was not an individual prerogative but was linked to the need for a regulated militia (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970). Gunfighters were exemplars of the gun culture in the West and the easiness of presence of guns in American society. They were crucial figures whose often decisive factor was the ability to solve conflicted situations through gunplay (Brown, 1991).

The conflict between the urban, industrial, and corporate forces of incorporation and the still agrarian society. These social, economic, and political factors were superb for the development of antagonists who were prone to resolve any conflict with no duty to retreat violence. The rural mind still had a notion of homestead ethic and enduring body of values which centered on the belief on a right to hold a family size farm and after the civil war many saw the crisis as an alarming trend of land consolidation which threatened their way of life (Brown, 1991).

Thus, the United States has long since displayed the same juxtaposition of weakened police and military establishments and a heavily armed population. Hofstadter argues that it is a testimony to public confidence and the loyalty of citizens. Citizens mostly used their weapons against each other and not against civil authority. However, that notion which is now fed by a powerful gun lobby indifferent to public safety that a citizen needs a gun to protect himself is still very powerful in the United States (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

As Brown explains, the rural reaches emphasized individual self-reliance and self-redress of wrongs. There was also a predominant view of outlaw activity as something tolerated with a free and easy attitude as culprits-maintained customs of personal courtesy and respect for others and as such there was little esteem for law and order as such (Brown, 1991). Which brings us back to the conclusion of Hofstadter that American violence has mainly been initiated from a “conservative” bias. Even if there is a culture where violence and guns are normalized, Americans have always been sure that there will never be a direct challenge to the power of government or any attempts to subvert the American way of life. As Hofstadter puts it: « It is unfortunate if the citizens insist on attacking each other from time to time with lethal weapons, but past experience shows that such disorders will not shake the government. Bloodletting is republican high spirits in action. The tree of liberty has to be watered by the blood of tyrants and martyrs. » (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 42)

Thus, the disorder and violence of outlaws was met with successful violence of vigilantes and local law enforcement. In American history, myth has all but robbed the true social significance of the American as gunfighter through the enticement of entertainment and escape which was only heightened by a popular appetite for more stories of myth and legend (Brown, 1991).

In the end, Western gunfighters were buried beneath "fake lore" (Brown, 1991). Even so, there is still a degree of reality behind the myth: as Brown explains, movies and literature

«...» illustrate both the distortions of myth and the home truths of the reality of the American as gunfighter. The myth of the gunfighter is, then, the highly selective, almost abstractly stylized representation of an important reality. At the core of both the myth and reality of the American as gunfighter is the theme of no duty to retreat as an energizer of violent behavior. » (Brown, 1991, p. 57).

As Hofstadter explains, the American tolerance for violence may have been founded on a hidden sympathy for it. D.H Lawrence held the belief that the crucial American traits were being hard, isolate, stoic, and a killer (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970). Traits best expressed by the archetype gunfighter provided by Owen Wister in 1902's *The Virginian*. The final showdown between the hero and the villain is the mythic face to face walkdown to which Dwight Eisenhower was referring to in his speech (Brown, 1991). However, Hofstadter also believes that the tolerance for violence is based in a confidence that almost any mess was seemingly always under control and even if a few people died in the meantime, which was just how the world was. In a way, perhaps Americans expected violence to take care of itself too, like most things which are supposed to get better (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

Brown posits that the factor of values is crucial regarding American violence and that it is central to understanding the doctrine of no duty to retreat. No duty to retreat is an expression of both American values as well as American behavior. And pivotal to this analysis is the frequent dilemma of American society with its values of freedom, equality, and democracy in one hand and its affront of violence which undermines the values of peace and civility with an all too frequent behavior of violence. This was noted by figures such as Abraham Lincoln, who alerted by violence in the 1830s made it the theme of a notable public address where he concluded that the greatest threat to the political institutions of America was not from some foreign power but from the internal flaw of violence – ultimately it is the nemesis of the values Americans cherish (Brown, 1991).

One of the essential difficulties in justifying violence is that its success is also an ingredient for its justification. As Hofstadter posits it is no doubt tempting to think that one can terminate some evil with a single surgical of violence; however, the difficulty lies in being certain before the event that it will indeed be terminated and not exacerbated or succeeded by some equal or greater evil and that the violence will be limited in both time and in casualties, that the reaction will not be more harmful than the procedure. For this, Hofstadter concludes,

all politicians, revolutionary or others must work with the math of human misfortune (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

A second issue that Brown points out is the extent to which violence is incorporated into the value system. He argues that there are elements which are often not acknowledged which encourage and sustain violence, a sort of underground model of American values which provide sanction for actions ordinarily considered shameful and wrong. In 1906 a legal scholar was mortified by the pervasiveness of lynching and vigilantism which he attributed to an "unwritten law of American justice" and a "jurisprudence of lawlessness", he concluded that certain maxims guided action more than the moral reprimands of public leaders (Brown, 1991). In contemporary America, although this "jurisprudence of lawlessness" might be out of date, the truth is that, buttressed by the doctrine of no duty to retreat, the killer in what is regarded as a fair fight often wins the approval of the jury. Brown concludes that sometimes the official value system which is sanctioned by the leaders of society and the illicit value system of the people converge to give birth to the widespread approval of violence (Brown, 1991).

Hofstadter asserts that violence is an official reality, for no society exists that does not devise sanctions for violence which are used to advocate just wars and necessary police actions. However, the frequency and way this official violence is used is of noteworthy importance to the legitimation of the civic order. Liberal democratic states are always in danger of wearing away their legitimacy should their uses of violence at home and abroad be repetitive and when the need for that violence is completely unpersuasive to a big part of its people. In the end what anyone sees as a just war or needed police action depends on his situation and politics; however, Hofstadter reminds that only a few pacifists would defend the idea that just wars are conceivable, and only a few utopian anarchists would deny that under certain circumstances authorities have to use force to keep order. The right of revolution is an established and sanctified rationale for violence, and it can hardly be banished from a country like America which was born out of revolution. One of the nation's most sacred texts prescribes the circumstances where revolutionary resistance is deemed legitimate (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

In the U.S. violence has a role in redemption, as Hofstadter explains it is both useful and therapeutic, in a certain way, indispensable. He posits that it is only natural for the victims of violence or under the constant threat of violence to arrive at the conclusion that they might restore their dignity by resorting to violence themselves. However, violence as a restorative power (if it can even have such power), Hofstadter argues, must also depend on its success. In the end its unsuccessful use – defeat and further humiliations – may only intensify the original

problem. That is the reason its existential mystique, which attempts to bypass tactical probabilities is unusable. The claims of therapy or sanctification through violence rest upon a capricious assumption that it will be successful. Hofstadter argues that ultimately that there is no gratifying refuge from political calculation in psychology or metaphysics (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

Frederick Jackson Turner concluded that the American intellect owed much to the frontier, traits such as the coarseness and strength, acuteness, and inquisitiveness a practical mind, the focus on the material, dominant individualism, and the exuberance of freedom. These traits were not only present in the frontier but said to develop elsewhere due to the existence of said frontier. However, Turner has been but one of many to emphasize American individualism. Studies by recent sociologists have found that in the American mind all values are influenced by the focus on the individual. The notion of individual self-determination is key to American values as well as the desire to master situations and to manipulate the world around them. Such traits are of course in keeping with the notion and the psychology of standing one's ground without a duty to retreat (Brown, 1991).

There are many examples of this American attitude of no duty to retreat in the early history of American foreign affairs, some specifically involve the concept while others are more general in relation to the idea of standing one's ground. In 1845's message to congress, President James K. Polk laid out the uncompromising policy of the United States that would ultimately culminate in the Mexican American War of 1846-48. In it, Polk expressed an attitude of no duty to retreat, the administration's specific order to General Zachary Taylor to lead his army into disputed territory near Rio Grande and stay there no matter what happened was conclusively an order for Taylor to stand his ground and not retreat, no matter the cost. Taylor's men would later be attacked in their position which lead to the American declaration of war on Mexico. Earlier in private correspondence, Polk had expressed his no duty to retreat determination that if diplomacy would not uphold the Texan claim, then no Mexican Army would occupy it. The outcome of such behavior was the accretion of California and the remainder of the Southwest into the country (Brown, 1991). Lincoln would turn to no duty to retreat when in the great national crisis of 1860-61 he faced the dilemma of whether to support or evacuate the army at Fort Sumter or surrender to the surrounding Confederate forces, Lincoln was fearful of being perceived as weak in his will to preserve the union and in order to combat any public perception of weakness he chose a no duty to retreat policy of resupplying the forces at Fort Sumter. The Confederacy responded by opening fire on the fort. (Brown, 1991).

To be able to justify the use of violence as means of accomplishment of humane and progressive ends, Hofstadter states that one must know at least two things: one, the amount of violence necessary to achieve the end in sight; and second, that the human costs of such violence will be where the repercussions of it stop. There are certainly those who believe to have such foresight, however the credulity in the benefits of violence is rarely based upon when and how it will be justified or upon any seriously thought-out estimates of its role in the past or the future (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

The concept of no duty to retreat that was unwittingly defended by Eisenhower in his address is, according to Brown, strongly engraved into American foreign affairs and military values as well as civilian life. Belief in the concept digs into the core of what it means to be an American. No duty to retreat is also closely related to the trait of courage when Eisenhower mentioned Wild Bill Hickok in his eponymous speech in 1953, he did so as a way of confronting the character assassination that had become commonplace during McCarthyism. Eisenhower made an analogy of the constitutional right of every American to meet his accuser face to face. His display of no duty to retreat courage was the proper countermeasure to the destructive charges brought by the hysterical atmosphere agitated by Senator McCarthy's irresponsible crusade (Brown, 1991).

During the Cold War, Harry Truman's successors, Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy vied to maintain the policy of "containment" that had been initiated by Truman's administration. Perhaps the most eloquent moment was Kennedy's statement of the spirit of standing one's ground worldwide. In his 1961 speech addressing America in his inaugural address, he declared "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty" (Brown, 1991). The policy which was designed to contain Soviet power was in Brown's assertion a diplomatic embodiment of the concept of no duty to retreat. There would be no American retreat from Western Europe where it remains today. The Berlin blockade of 1948 was met not by retreat but by the standing determination to stay and supply it through a successful airlift conducted by the U.S. Air Force. Containment, however, was not restricted to military action. The Marshall Plan was a giant program which vied to aid the reconstruction of post-WWII Europe and divert any collapse into the Russian sphere of influence. Ultimately, containment policy in Europe was crowned with what Brown considers the keystone in the no duty to retreat response to Russian power: NATO, established in 1949, was an organization through which the United States coalesced countries to bind themselves in defense against the

Eastern aggressor (Brown, 1991).

That same policy of containment and standing one's ground was exported to the Far East with the rise of Communist China, North Korea, and the increasing Russian presence in eastern Siberia. The concept of no duty to retreat was put to the test with the breakout of the Korean War. Brown asserts that Truman's attitude was nowhere better exemplified than in his personal reaction to the events, as from the very beginning, his was an attitude of standing one's ground. On June 25, 1950, when on his way to an emergency meeting, Truman announced to key aides "By God, I am going to let them have it!" (Brown, 1991).

Truman's leading biographer, Robert J. Donovan, explained that although Truman was not a belligerent man, he tended to defend himself when attacked or put on the defensive. Thus, American no duty to retreat policy was modeled on the principle of a regional alliance against communism and it was during the Eisenhower administration that it took form with the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), modeled after NATO. Yet, the best example of American no duty to retreat in Southeast Asia would be President Lyndon B. Johnson's policy for intervention in the Vietnamese Civil War (Brown, 1991). Johnson was a Texan with a family background that was deeply rooted in the pioneer epoch of Texas and naturally he held strongly to concepts of no duty to retreat, standing one's ground and "I'll die before I'll run". Johnson would later remark about the conflict in his biography, stating "I made it clear from the day I took office [in 1963], that I was not a peace at any price man and that we would remain strong, prepared at all times to defend ourselves and our friends". By committing American ground and air forces to Vietnam in the spring of 1965, Johnson was very much reflecting his Texan and American heritage of no duty to retreat. By fully

Americanizing the conflict, Johnson was very much in keeping with the attitude of a nineteenth century Ranger from the Lone Star state's frontier era (Brown, 1991).

Hofstadter asserts that violence is pervasive in human experience and has been especially in American history, and no matter how it may repel, it must be seen as an instrument of common use. The creed that its supporters put forth is a simple but forceful one nonetheless: that violence has been universal and by changing things when nothing else does it is therefore necessary. Although world history does seem to have plentiful cases where the only way to solve a situation was through violence which is then followed by a period of peaceful and gradual improvement; it is nonetheless possible to argue, although difficult to prove, that violence was a prerequisite for the peace that followed it. However, the problem is that within the myriad of cases where violence has decided issues, it has decided them in ways that are less than palatable for most. Thus, Hofstadter posits that the American experience of large-scale violent resolution of paramount crises is mixed (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

Summarizing, violence must be used in circumstances where the public is either wholly indifferent or uninformed or in situations where the relevant public opinion is biased in favor of the user. Furthermore, if the situation is remarkably brutal then it must be kept a local matter and its perpetrators must hope to somehow screen it out of the attention of the larger polity. Ultimately, Hofstadter maintains that the conditions for the success of violence have only become more difficult in the televised age where the most important is to set the stage so the violent action can be pinned wholly on adversaries. Hofstadter states that « If violence works, it does not follow that nothing, but violence works.» ((Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 54)

Brown asserts that the theme of no duty to retreat is not particular to Americans, in many other nations it is side by side with military doctrine and the condemnation of surrender or flight from an enemy in battle. However, he argues that American military aphorisms of no retreat have extended into civilian life. Ronald Reagan's presidency revitalized the mood of no duty to retreat in the country, with the aggressive operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Reagan administration's foreign policy focused on standing its ground against what were perceived as the enemies of the United States. Centerpiece to Reagan's widely popular no duty to retreat policy was the Star Wars Program, with a futuristic mix of cutting-edge technology and aggressive self-defense that was to be carried even into the heights of space (Brown, 1991).

Furthermore, although there was a consensus against military action in Nicaragua, public opinion would approve many of the actions of the Reagan administration which in Brown's opinion represented a no duty to retreat spirit. In general, the Reagan's administration spirit of no duty to retreat was one of its most admired aspects since the Eisenhower and Roosevelt administrations. (Brown, 1991).

However, since the Reagan administrations revered proponent for no duty to retreat, there have been significant changes in the political and national situation and mood. In the final years of his administration, Reagan would drop his bellicose language of the Soviet Union as an empire of evil as he together with leader Mikhail Gorbachev made significant progress towards disarmament and worked towards a rapprochement of the two superpowers. Nevertheless, no duty to retreat is still very much alive as could be seen in the American Intervention in Panama in 1989 which had strong popular approval and in the Gulf War in the 1990's in which President Bush drew a line in the sand to not be surpassed by Iraq in the American defense of Kuwait. This concept and Bush's own invasion policy were clearly no duty to retreat concepts (Brown, 1991).

However, the 1990's also brought to light the high economic costs of military ventures, especially those not resulting in quick victory, the rising of public sentiment against high casualties and a doubtful national mood regarding drawn out military presence in a region that boded poorly for commitments in the style of Korea and Vietnam. Apart from the difficult choices in international relations and military policy such as those of the Gulf War, the United States was also pulled by a strong revulsion against military intervention after the Vietnam War which is described by Brown as the epitome of the concept of standing one's ground, these factors may have created a strong undertow against the long dominance of no duty to retreat (Brown, 1991). However, Brown warns not to prematurely throw no duty to retreat into the "dustbin of history" as he remarks that it is an attribute that is deeply embedded into the American national character and that if its end ever comes, it will be gradual and long. As Brown explains «Indeed, it appears that all Americans of whatever ideological persuasion, race, or sex are united, at least, by a militant temper tightly bound to the spirit of no duty to retreat. » (Brown, 1991, p. 184).

Even if the demographic revolution in the U.S. with its enormous immigration waves from third world nations threatens to change the landscape and dethrone the traditional host of society of Anglo Americans, Brown posits that dissolution may not even occur. Brown argues that most immigrants are finding the idea of no duty to retreat to be a compatible concept in

their process of adjustment to American society, just like their predecessors from Europe. He asserts that unity and diversity have been the grand banners of American history. Lastly, he argues that with the rise of domestic crime and the threat of international terrorism this same unity and spirit of no duty to retreat might be exacerbated among Americans of every ethnicity (Brown, 1991).

Ultimately when discussing violence in the U.S., one must consider its role in American history as a whole. Hofstadter argues that it is difficult to pinpoint a long period of time in which the country was well governed, however, the U.S. political system has been on the whole a resilient and well-seasoned one and that by looking at its strength through history one has to believe there will be talent to grapple with its hardships. Nevertheless, future generations might be able to cope with them but never solve them completely. As Hofstadter puts it « The nation seems to slouch onward into its uncertain future much like some inarticulate beast, too much attained by wounds and ailments to be robust but too strong and resourceful to succumb. » ((Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 60).

Violence has been a staple of American history and it was repeatedly used often with purpose, perhaps acknowledging that fact is a much-needed ingredient to portray a realistic national self-image. Hofstadter defines violence in the United States as «...» the pathology of a nation growing at a speed that defied control, governed by ineffective leadership, impatient with authority, bedeviled by its internal heterogeneity and above all cursed by an ancient and gloomy wrong that many of its people had even come to cherish as a right. » ((Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 692). Hofstadter contends that only those who have failed use the meta politics of divine judgement as a last resort and that the appeal to human judgement must be the premier resort for any who expect to succeed (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

In the end using Hofstadter's own words, we must think that « This is a country in which the whole is likely to be better than the sum of its parts. » ((Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970), p. 44) even if sometimes it seems as if American experience seems to be connected only by a belief that each generation has that there is nothing to be learned from the past (Wallace & Hofstadter (Ed), 1970).

4. Presidential Speechmaking

The success of presidential discourse is seen when presidents manage to use their rhetorical platform to "go public" and gain favor for their policies or by communicating in such way that allows them to sway mass media environments to get their messages transmitted to the public. It is particularly powerful because it demands action: by constructing their argument a certain way, presidents increase their odds of having what they say become practice (Coe, 2007). It is interesting to look at how American presidents have made use of rhetoric, how they position themselves in the political sphere through it. Although it may seem trivial to devote attention to words and how they are used, words are powerful tools in the political arena by being able to inspire, persuade, engage, and mobilize. With them, minds are changed, and most forces put into motion. In U.S. politics it is understood that the president's words are more prominent than any other figure's and speaking in public is one of the most important roles of the modern "rhetorical presidency," as Coe explains, the president must be constantly ready to fulfill his role (Coe, 2007). Presidents have increasingly used symbols of hope and opportunity in their speeches to scapegoat others or rhetorically defend their positions (Zhang, 2009).

As Coe explains in *The Language of Freedom in the American Presidency, 1933-2006*, the symbolic importance of language in the political realm is its symbolic nature which modern presidents have taken advantage of to make abstract and symbolic terminology a common presence in their discourse. Symbols have an ideological importance and play deeply upon societal beliefs which operate below the level of conscious thought. A discourse which is filled with familiar political symbols is valuable due to its high ambiguity and adaptability. Symbols have different meanings to different people, and it is this variability that empowers symbols to reassure people of divergent backgrounds, interests, and concerns. However, this same variability also means that political symbols have potential for misuse (Coe, 2007). Since 9/11 the public has looked for more in the figure of the president, with Americans longing for the rhetoric of Ronald Reagan or JFK. A president should nevertheless draw the line between campaign politics and governing principles, replacing the rhetoric that got them to the White House with one that justifies their policies and actions (Zhang, 2009). It is through rhetoric that American presidents can not only portray themselves as leaders but also as staunch defenders of the American moral and religious values (Zhang, 2009). As Slack further explains:

American presidents are more than simply proponents of partisan values. We expect

them to advocate morality and to be moral individuals. Although it is true that in too

many instances' presidents fall short of the mark⁹¹, we nevertheless want them to strive in this direction and to demonstrate specific acts of morality. This seems especially true when society finds itself in moral turbulence. (Slack, 2002, p. 133)

Zhang in his review of *The Moral Rhetoric of American Presidents* explains that one of the many factors that encourage presidents to engage in high and moral rhetoric is that there is an audience beyond the crowd they address (Zhang, 2009). As Conger explains, in order effectively communicate their vision leaders must often be not only strategists but effective rhetoricians who are able to energize through their words. The era of managing by dictate is over, it is replaced by an era of managing by inspiration. (Conger, 1991).

As speechmakers, presidents will portray themselves as leaders and try to create a sense of union of the polity, by portraying it as possessing a genuinely consensual public opinion and common interest. Presidents will have a symbolic identification with the nation and refrain from mentioning any party or group conflict so as to create a sense of commonality and union, it is through these tactics that presidents manage to change the attitudes of the public through communication, with presidential major addresses not only increasing their popularity but also directing the focus of public concern to key national issues. Popular presidents see an increase in their support whenever their proposals, actions and speeches are picked up and reported in the media. Summarily, presidents craft themselves as the voice of the people and thus solicit national support, nevertheless, despite the national spirit and oneness offered by the president as the voice of the people, there are clear indicators that presidential speechmaking influences key public groups differently, meaning that the president has differences in popularity among different groups. There is considerable variability in presidential approval stemming from the response of several socioeconomic groups to inflation, unemployment, international crises, national policies, and political scandals (Ragsdale, 1987). Cohen explains that popular presidents possibly have more impact over public opinion than unpopular ones, as credence increases due to popularity, it increases the leverage over public opinion (Cohen, 1995).

Conger breaks down what is understood as a language of leadership into two parts: firstly, defining the mission or naming objectives clearly or "framing," what is concretely the leader's message? Secondly is the leader's ability to use symbolic language at his disposal to be able to craft an emotional powerful message in a process that Conger names "rhetorical

crafting.” The message is to give a sense of direction while the rhetoric is to heighten its appeal and determine if it will be memorable enough to influence decision making. Conger believes that even if one is not proficient, anyone can learn these skills. By framing the mission effectively, the leader ensures that there is an emotional impact and a sense of confidence and excitement about the future. To create such a meaningful frame, values and beliefs are an essential component which help reinforce commitment and provide guidance. The selection of those values is therefore crucial since they are what empowers the vision's acceptance and accomplishment. By selecting and augmenting certain values and beliefs, the leader generates a frame of the events, problems and or issues as they relate to their vision (Conger, 1991).

Cohen uses the State of the Union address to identify the broader outlines of the president's agenda, explaining that the address has evolved over time. Cohen explains that the address has become part of the institution and a routine activity of the presidency. In his research, Cohen addresses the fact that there exists a large compendium documenting the president's capability of leading public opinion and those texts fall into two set categories: one looks at how presidents manipulate popularity ratings through political drama, such as speeches or traveling to foreign nations, suggesting that presidents get a short-lived popularity boost from such activities; the second analyses the ability to lead public opinion. However even if both show the limits to the presidential leadership, they hardly exhaust its avenues (Cohen, 1995). Cohen finally explains that the three major policy concerns of modern presidents are the economy, foreign, and civil rights policy. Cohen distinguishes between what he names required policies and discretionary policies, and explains that, in terms of agenda priority, required areas see consistent and easier entry into the agenda than discretionary policies, the latter competing for the remainder of the available space. Foreign affairs and the economy for example are often cited as required agenda items, while all others, including civil rights, are discretionary. The required areas enter the agenda with varying emphasis, as Cohen explains, while discretionary areas may fight for entry into the agenda, they can sometimes receive attention and emphasis when deemed vital to the nation (Cohen, 1995).

Foreign affairs and the economy always reach the agenda with foreign policy occupying at least ten percent of the president's attention, on average accounting for forty percent of it. Economic policy on the other hand is not so dominant but still manages to occupy at least five percent of the space in the address, on average occupying one quarter of it. Cohen explains that sometimes economics or foreign policy might dominate the agenda. Foreign policy held sixty percent or more of the space on addresses six times (1958,1961,1962,1963,1966,1980), while

the economy held over one-half of the agenda twice (1973, 1981). Thus, together foreign policy and the economy are almost two-thirds of the President's State of the Union address. Cohen also explains that Civil Rights as a discretionary area only manages to occupy a significant portion of the agenda three times (1968,1976,1989), nevertheless it never received more than twenty percent in any one address; compared to economic or foreign policy which either hit or surpass the fifty percent mark. Cohen also asserts that occasionally, civil rights fail to enter the agenda, nevertheless it still occupies, on average, six percent of the address (Cohen, 1995).

The limitations of presidential rhetoric nevertheless are visible such as when Theodore Roosevelt's attempt to improve the class conflict in the U.S failed or when Jimmy Carter's rhetoric only increased his political vulnerability by making him seem unpatriotic. Regardless, there is still great political advantage in rhetoric which is a clear competitive mechanism which presidents use to push down on their opponents (Zhang, 2009). The influence a president might have over the policy agenda is a function of his resources but also of the public's receptivity to the president's persuasion. Some of these resources are constant and associated with the office rather than the individual, such as access to the mass public, prestige of office, status, public attention, and interest; while others might be more associated with the individual such as experience, preparation, language and persuasion skills and other political skills (Cohen, 1995).

For example, it is common fact that often the public will rally around the president when military force is used abroad, which has led to the view that often, presidents will willfully exacerbate such issues to distract from foreign problems (Lian et al, June 1993). Also, as Bligh et al. explain, it is during times of crisis that there is an increased opportunity for the emergence of charismatic leadership. By using the 9/11 crisis as an object, their research shows that not only did the president's rhetoric become more charismatic, but his media portrayal also reflected an increase in charismatic rhetoric, which suggests increased receptivity to a higher charismatic leadership after the crisis (Bligh et al, 2004). Cohen also reinforces this same fact, because the public is more psychologically reliant on the president (Cohen, 1995).

Presidents have often made use of military force to raise their approval, divert attention from other problems and bolster party chances in national elections. That a president is more likely to become involved in a military dispute when his popularity within his own party is low is an academic view which is echoed in the media. Nevertheless, by analyzing one hundred

and two cases, Lian et al. explain that publicized uses of force do not make a significant impact upon the president's standing. Withal, their research does show that this rallying effect is greater during a crisis and when the action is extensively featured in the media and when the president enjoys bipartisan support, his initial popularity is low, and the country is not engaged in or fatigued by war (Lian et al, June 1993). Before the events of 9/11 there were concerns about George W. Bush's leadership skills and many questioned his ability to rise to the challenge following the attacks. He was not seen as the strong charismatic leader in which people would place their faith during a national crisis. During the first nine months of his presidency there were a number of doubts concerning the perils of following a president with a higher charismatic appeal, foreign policy issues and election vote-counting. Furthermore, the media often characterized him as oratorically challenged and frequently focused on his difficult relationship with the English language. Before 9/11, fifty one percent of Americans approved of his job performance, whereas after the attacks, his approval ratings soared to a high eighty six percent, the highest ever measured jump in over sixty years of polling history by the Gallup organization (Bligh et al, 2004).

It is common knowledge that the president can expect a boost of popularity during an international crisis, with recent research showing that presidents can cynically exploit this effect for partisan purposes. During Desert Shield, it was suggested that President George H. Bush sought to divert attention from the budget deficit and the savings and loan scandal by waging conflict in Iraq and certainly the 18-point gain in President Bush's approval rating seems to confirm the benefits of military action even as his popularity slumped later in the year. In August 1992, with the president behind Governor Clinton in the polls, the New York Times reported on a planned military confrontation in Iraq to coincide with the Republican national convention. Lian et al. explain that although leaders must be attentive to public opinion, if both staying in office and serving the people are goals, it is increasingly disturbing to imagine that those leaders might manipulate the public by using or creating an international crisis for partisan gains – the ethical issues of Watergate or the Iran-Contra scandal are minor in comparison (Lian et al, June 1993). Lian et al. explain that an international crisis increases the president's popular standing, which leads to wonder if this only happens when the president is shown as firm or as being able to deal with the crisis with no inconvenience to the public. Nevertheless, they assert that it is not necessary to add such criteria. Lian et al. assert that there are three criteria when identifying events which create a rallying effect. First, it must be international as only events which confront the nation as a whole are more likely to generate a

rally. Second, it must involve the country and the president directly. Third, it must be specific, dramatic, and focused as those events which transpire slowly tend to be excluded due to their high demands on public attentiveness (Lian et al, June 1993).

Thus, studies seem to agree that international crises seem to bode well for the president. Other research has focused on the effect of the use force on the president's popularity. Uses of force short of war, "political" uses of force, do seem to satisfy the three criteria. While the United States has used its forces in a variety of ways since the end of WWII, mostly it was to serve political interests and purposes, with U.S. forces deliberately attempting to influence specific behaviors in another nation without engaging in continuous violence. In their research Lian et al. confine the definition of major use of force to those who involve a strategic nuclear unit, two or more aircraft carrier groups, more than a battalion of ground forces, or one or more combat wings. There was only weak support for the rally hypothesis, the president's popularity only increased in 7 of the 20 cases randomly selected. A rally is thus understood to be neither an automatic event nor a long lived one, nevertheless, research does show that congressional support for a president, especially in the senate increased following a use of force (Lian et al, June 1993).

High approval ratings create political capital which can spell the success or failure of a president's legislative program as well as his foreign policy. Lian et al. explain that even though many are convinced that presidents are quick to exploit the responsiveness of the public to American involvement in military confrontation to boost their numbers, the reality is that presidents are influenced by both partisan and foreign policy motives linked to national interest; which would broaden the meaning of "political" uses of force (Lian et al, June 1993). Although researchers assume that the use of force rallies public opinion, some argue that the president is interested in maintaining the status quo which brought him to power and thus is expected to use force in order to increase his popularity in his own party. Some results support this view with the involvement of the United States in military conflicts being closely associated with lower levels of partisan support, more than with the president's standing with the general public. Nevertheless, it is evidenced that uses of force are likely to boost popularity. Lian et al thus assert that there is a tendency to rally in times of crises and that perhaps prompted presidents to use military force in order to achieve partisan objectives (Lian et al, June 1993).

They nevertheless conclude through Ostrom and Job that it is «...» not possible to tell empirically whether force leads to approval or vice versa «...» (Lian et al, June 1993, p.

283). They explain that research is not accurate enough, asserting that the popularity of a president raised in only thirty-eight of the one hundred and two cases studied. Even within partisan lines it only rose thirty-eight times out of one hundred. Even though the United States has been a frequent user of force, it can be argued that the tendency to rally has only become more pronounced due to the nation's multiple commitments. Multiple deployments within a short time are indicative of a more dangerous international environment and thus heighten the public's response (Lian et al, June 1993).

Overall, however, no rally effect was found, the absence of a rally effect when force has been used is surprising. Lian et al. explain that two conditions seem to be necessary to create a rally. First, the American public must be aware; and second, it must be truly consequential to the United States' interests. The first requirement is common sense as the public would be unable to respond to what it does not know. By checking their one hundred and two studied cases and comparing them to the New York Times and its index, Lian et al. assert that there is indeed a small increase in the president's popularity among all respondents and for partisan members. Next, Lian et al. examined uses of force which occurred during a foreign policy crisis in order to ensure that such events were truly consequential, a necessary condition to prompt a rally. Situations in which there was a threat to basic values, a significant time of response and a high probability of involvement in military hostilities were used. Yet even among the thirty-six uses of force during a specific crisis, the tendency to rally even within partisan lines was still quite limited: the president's approval rating increased only one percent among both general public and party, and the greater mean was offset by an increase in variability of response from the public (Lian et al, June 1993).

Lian et al. agree that media coverage and the existence of an international crisis do affect public response. Nevertheless, they explain that even though the rally effects of cases which are presumed to be well known and reported is expected, as these evoke a greater response (but have also a higher variability) of any subset cases the benefit is still small (Lian et al, June 1993). According to them, «It is likely that the effect of the use of force on the president's popularity is inversely related to his popularity before the event: Very popular presidents would not have much room for improvement, and unpopular presidents would not have far to fall. » (Lian et al, June 1993, p. 288).

Through Ostrom and Job's research, they suggest that the public is averse to the use of force when the country engages in conflict and for a period of time in the aftermath. They explain that an ongoing conflict is a reminder of the high price of the use of force, and also, the

public fears overextension. There is a disillusionment with military options which has as a basis the widespread belief in Vietnam Syndrome. It indeed seemed plausible that a president was able to influence rally effects by drawing media attention to his use of force, either by stating it himself or have one his advisors do so, which showed a remarkable degree of ability to not only control information but influence public perception. Nevertheless, Lian et al. conclude that a rally effect is negatively related to a president's prior popularity. By expecting that the bigger the crisis (with a challenge to U.S. values, time pressure and danger of military conflict), the higher the unifying effect, a president could boost their popularity and have the public more inclined to forget partisan feelings and support the president. Nevertheless, Lian et al. maintain that the severity of an international crisis does not affect support, suggesting that the public may be unknowledgeable to make distinctions of such events. It is thus not surprising that the president is unable to use the rally effect as a function of his success in achieving U.S. objectives, as his ability to profit from uses of force during a crisis is also limited by other powerful, independent groups (Lian et al, June 1993).

By testing for the rally effect when the uses of force were reported either in a headline or the front page of the New York Times, when they occurred during a foreign policy crisis for the United States, there was little rally effect to be found, the mean increase in popularity was already three percent and greater effects were offset by the variability of the public's response. Through the use of regression analysis, Lian et al. confirmed that there was a favorable response to a use of force when the country is involved in a crisis and the president's actions are ostensibly reported. Additionally, the rally effect is not significantly influenced by the outcome of a crisis, by gradations in severity or by the administration's efforts to focus attention on a president's actions (Lian et al, June 1993). Lian et al. thus conclude that presidents should not expect political advantage by using force abroad as the public is able to discriminate severe threats from less serious events. The president's power to manipulate international events is also limited by other powerful institutions (i.e., the press and leaders of the opposition). Lian et al. ultimately question if Americans do prefer peaceful accomplishments to use of force, as there seems to be a greater reason to accept the liberal position regarding the pacific virtue of democracy if use of force is not popular. Interpretations of motives behind the uses of force seem to rest on weak foundations. Lian et al. assert that greater confidence in democratic institutions is more justified if Americans, despite the power of the United States and its successes in achieving its objectives during a crisis, are reluctant to exercise military force (Lian et al, June 1993).

It is the uncertainty in a crisis that leads the public to show greater appreciation to the type of leadership often associated with charismatic, transformational leaders. By accepting a leader's interpretation of events and believing in their ability to solve the issue at hand, followers are relieved of the psychological stress and loss of control generated by the crisis. Thus, Bligh et al. argue that the more charismatic forms of leadership are seen as a collective coping mechanism that followers seek to restore their own, by linking themselves to a dominant and effective leader. A crisis may drive followers to project qualities onto a person to satisfy this need. This desire to identify exceptional qualities in a leader indicates that those qualities may be sometimes attributed (Bligh et al, 2004). In 2002, Bush sounded patriotic and inspirational as he named his “axis of evil”, it was such rhetoric that elevated his authority and promoted him as a staunch defender of moral values just right after 9/11 (Zhang, 2009).

The 9/11 attacks represented an attack on the American public and its way of life and effectively shattered illusions of American invulnerability and safety. By understanding political leadership as the connection between the president and the American citizenry, it is understandable how the range of emotions after a crisis can have a devastating effect on not only the collective national identity but in individual self-concepts (Bligh et al, 2004). President Bush would reflect upon the attack in his "Enduring Freedom" speech where he noted that the United States was, more than defending its own freedom, defending freedom worldwide. This indicates a clear sense of attack upon the American way of life. Just as Bush would later remark, that day, American freedom came under attack. However, that unease brought by the attacks had presented a window of opportunity where the president was able to act in stronger, more decisive, and meaningful ways (Bligh et al, 2004).

Freedom is one of the most if not the most important value in American ideology and the most familiar symbol of American political culture. As previously stated, there is in the United States a narrative of freedom that has been constant throughout the history of the American presidency. Coe exemplifies with George W. Bush's second inaugural address where Bush used terms such as “the unfinished work of American freedom, “the promise of liberty” or referred to God as the “author of liberty.” However, Coe asserts that within this broad narrative the political ideology and the context in which presidents spoke led to differences in the way they defined freedom and how they used it to define the nation. Freedom has been the symbol of revolutions and the foundation of the great social movements. Symbolic images such as the Liberty Bell, Statue of Liberty or the Liberty Ships are but few of the examples of the impact of freedom in America's idealized stories of the past. But although freedom is both an

important part of the American imagination and one of the most cherished values of the nation, historically, it is not something that all Americans have experienced (Coe, 2007). Given the cultural importance and resonance of freedom (or liberty) in American culture, it is hardly surprising that it has such a central role in political discourse. American presidents have made wide use of freedom as a general prominent theme in presidential discourse as a rhetorical device. It is clear from examining the use of what Coe calls the "language of freedom" that freedom's role is that of a metaphor which has its strategic strengths and limitations and has theoretical and political implications when applied to discourse (Coe, 2007).

These "ideographs" such as freedom, justice, or equality, as Coe explains, have inherent historical and cultural significance, and thus makes them more likely to resonate with the audience. It is this same resonance which presents a problem, as Coe fears that this will lead presidents to increasingly invoke them at the expense of more complete and considered debate. This would certainly maim the overall quality of political discourse and although presidential rhetoric's direct persuasive power is not as powerful as one might think, it is still clear that presidents hold a significant role in defining the political reality. Since political rhetoric creates the arena of political reality where political thought and action happen, a reality which is too premised on ambiguous symbols risks limiting the ability of citizens to meaningfully engage the political environment. Coe also contends that even though it might be difficult to say that freedom is the primary symbol of the United States, it is nevertheless supported by political psychologists that most attitudes in the United States are based upon only a few core values, one of which is freedom. Rhetoric expressing these values helps Americans decide who they are and how they function as a community. Thus, by examining the use of freedom on presidential discourse, it is possible to not only understand presidential strategy and rhetoric usage but further deepen the understanding of America's discursive construction and therefore the American people as well (Coe, 2007).

By analyzing sixty-four State of the Union addresses and eleven Inaugurals between 1933 and 2006, Coe was able to unveil a common presidential narrative which consists of three things: America's cause, defining friends and foes, and justifying policy. First, presidents present a foundational description of America's role, its importance to freedom. Then they mobilize a foundational understanding of freedom to shape the political environment, not only by using it as a criterion to differentiate friends and foes but also by using it as a rationale for political decisions. Coe explains that modern presidents have consistently presented the United States as the global leader of the cause of freedom. He explains this as a unique responsibility

which demands that the nation forward world freedom and defend it any cost, and although others may aid the United States in this mission, it is ultimately their responsibility to ensure the prosperity of freedom. Coe exemplifies with Kennedy's words in his 1962 State of the Union in which he affirmed: " Our nation is commissioned by history to be either an observer of freedom's failure or the cause of its success". Coe ultimately explains that the unique relationship of America with freedom is based on the notion that Americans have a deep belief in the idea of freedom itself and it is this foundational belief which modern presidents use to affirm that what sets the United States apart is its commitment to freedom above all else. Gerald R. Ford explained this position in his 1976 State of the Union by saying: "One peak stands highest in the ranges of human history. One example shines forth of a people uniting to produce abundance and to share the good life fairly and with freedom...That union is the United States of America." (Coe, 2007)

In presidential discourse, America's uniqueness is the way it treasures its freedom and because its commitment to it sets aside all other American values. This is the "cause of freedom" presidents regularly claim the United States is destined to lead, which has been described as a difficult burden and a brilliant fulfilment of American destiny. A destiny that Kennedy termed in his 1962 State of the Union as "the burden and the glory of freedom" or Jimmy Carter who explained how America's relationship with freedom compels the nation to shoulder its burden by saying "Ours was the first society to openly define itself in terms of both spirituality and of human liberty. It is that unique self-definition which has given us an exceptional appeal, but it also imposes on us a special obligation". George H. Bush would in his 1991 State of the Union ask Americans to "let future generations understand the burden and the blessings of freedom"; and, in 2002, George W. Bush described the war on terror by stating that "History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight". Thus, modern presidents have consistently positioned the United States as the leader of the cause of freedom, which Coe explains is a unique responsibility which the nation must take willingly and without question (Coe, 2007).

Modern presidents have relied on this foundational definition of America as the leader of the cause of freedom and as the nation destined to sacrifice for liberty to determine who is worthy of joining their cause. Presidents have made a consistent use of the values of freedom and liberty to determine friends and foes, furthermore, they have presented freedom as the quintessential American value which provides it rhetorical value to be able to unite both the public and the government. No American politician can deny the cause of freedom and the

universal call for consensus behind it also makes it difficult for other political actors to challenge. This push makes clear that America's friends are those who support freedom. Coe demonstrates this by showing that in his inaugural address Bill Clinton pledged U.S support to those on the side of freedom by stating: "Our hopes, our hearts, our hands, are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom." This notion of unity in the "Free World" being necessary for the success of the cause of freedom has been emphasized repeatedly by presidents (Coe, 2007). This push for unity behind freedom points to strategic value of this narrative which is able to call for unity with other nations, even though that does not mean equality. Other nations are in a subordinate position as they are expected to follow the United States with those supporting freedom being positioned as friends and those opposing, or presented as an opposing it, as enemies. During Vietnam, in his 1965 State of the Union address, Johnson affirmed "Let the foes of freedom take no comfort from this. For in concert with other nations, we shall help men defend their freedom" (Coe, 2007).

Presidents have also used hostility to freedom to define those who oppose the United States⁹³. Reagan made such a point in his inaugural address: "As for the enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for it." In a similar manner, during World War II, Roosevelt warned in his 1941 State of the Union address of the freedoms that would be limited by America's enemies: "No realistic American can expect from a dictator's peace international generosity, or return of true independence, or world disarmament, or freedom of expression, or freedom of religion" (Coe, 2007). By describing and using the "cause of freedom" to identify friend and foe, presidents have used freedom as primary rationale for policy decisions. George H. Bush said in his 1990 State of the Union that American policy is based on the shining principle of freedom. Several other presidents have also compared the pros and cons of freedom. In such comparisons, freedom is usually characterized as something of a significant cost, a cost which America is willing to pay, because freedom is worth the high price. Coe concludes that «The cost of freedom is whatever policy the president is attempting to justify at the time. » (Coe, 2007, p. 381).

Johnson used freedom to justify wartime sacrifices when in 1966 in his State of the Union he said "Tonight, as so many nights before, the American nation is asked to sacrifice the

blood of its children and the fruits of its labor for the love of its freedom". Nevertheless, these sacrifices are not only related to military action, but Eisenhower also made such a point in his inaugural address, "Love of liberty means the guarding of every resource that makes freedom possible - from the sanctity of our families and the wealth of our soil to the genius of our scientists." (Coe, 2007). Summarily, presidential discourse has constantly asserted that, because of its leadership role in the cause of freedom, it is compelled to do anything a particular administration deems necessary to forward that cause. As Kennedy said in his inaugural address "Let every nation know...that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty." (Coe, 2007).

Coe explains that while presidents have thus used freedom to justify their policies, they have also used several methods to refer and use freedom, and that these form the broad narrative they tell America. A narrative that asserts a unique relationship to freedom which guides who the nation supports or opposes and that political leaders use as a foundation for common justification of policy (Coe, 2007). Presidents have crafted their discourse to meet certain ends, and as such they take care into understanding their audiences. Because they have to address major concerns of the audience, their use of freedom will vary upon what their audience views as the key problems of the nation. Presidents may use freedom differently when the primary concern is the economy, or when the public focuses on U.S military action in foreign soil. This language of freedom may also vary due to political ideology. Coe asserts that conservatives see the world differently than liberals and these differences create a variation in the way presidents not only conceptualize but also use freedom (Coe, 2007).

Coe explains that as political symbols have variable meanings, presidents' definitions of freedom vary based on their particular political ideologies and strategic aims, as such, Coe has posited five ways in which presidents define freedom. By going through repeated readings of several speeches, these categories emerged as the most common ways to define freedom and offer an honest representation of presidential definitions of freedom: first is foundational, which is when presidents present freedom as an essential value to the nation, a value in which it was built upon or a value that has been consistently cherished and represented. Second is universal, which is when presidents have presented it as a value of universal appeal and something that everyone desires, needs, deserves, and benefits from. Third is exceptional, by presenting America or American freedom as exceptional and distinguishing it from another entity, idea, or value. Fourth is religious, such as when presidents have used freedom in a religious context, by mentioning it when discussing religion or invoking religious symbolism.

And fifth, as God given, which is when presidents link freedom and religions by going a step further and presenting it as something which was granted, guided, or sanctioned by a supreme being (Coe, 2007).

Coe explains that presidents have on average used free or freedom 3.3 times per one thousand words and liberty or liberties only 0.41 times per one thousand words, this preference reflects the fact that freedom is the more ambiguous term with liberty having significant connotations of constitutionally protected rights, such as in "civil liberties". Thus, it is a narrower symbol, appearing fewer times in presidential speechmaking. Coe's research also indicates that presidents were more than four times as likely to describe freedom as a universal value when public concern was focused on foreign affairs (about 6.7 percent of uses) than when the focus was domestic issues (1.6 percent). Data also indicated that presidents are more than four times more likely to use that definition at least once within a given address when the context was foreign (42.9 percent of addresses) rather than domestic (9.1 percent). As such, when attention is focused abroad presidents tend to define freedom as a universal value, important to everyone, not just Americans. This helps them illustrate the United States' crucial role in the world, that of ensuring the survival of freedom (Coe, 2007). Coe also asserts that in contrast presidents were twice as likely to use freedom as part of nation-affirming language when the context was domestic rather than foreign (22.4 percent of uses compared to 11.3 percent of uses). Presidents also made declarative statements about American in 18.9 percent of their uses in domestic contexts, comparing to 13.9 percent of uses in foreign contexts. When the American public is primarily focused on domestic concerns, presidents are more likely to use freedom to define America, a goal that Coe describes as understandable given that one of the president's roles during such times is to reassure the public. This is something done in part by emphasizing America's relationship to its core symbol (Coe, 2007).

Coe's data suggests that freedom being used to define America is a regular occurrence in presidential discourse, further suggesting that such occurrences are present in over sixty

percent of the speeches studied. Data also suggests that what increases with context is the amount of language in a given address, rather than if they will include it in a particular address (i.e., presidents employ national language more often in domestic contexts). As such, presidential use of freedom has been important even if the effects were not widespread across variables. Like context, political ideology has also influenced the use of freedom, specifically, Republicans have used it more often than democrats. Coe shows that Republicans averaged at 4.6 uses of freedom per one thousand words while democrats only 3.0. Furthermore, Republicans have used it an average of 19.4 times per address in contrast to Democrats' 11.5. In addition to these differences, Republicans and Democrats have also differentiated themselves in how they employ the terms (Coe, 2007).

There were significant differences among data from Coe's research indicating that when Democrats made use of freedom, they were more likely to claim it as a foundational value, a universal value or claim it as exceptional. 4.3 percent of Democrats' uses of freedom positioned it as a foundational value, three times more than Republicans' 1.5 percent. Democrats were also three times more likely to define it as a universal value (8.1 percent for Democrats to 2.7 by Republicans). Democrats have also more frequently presented freedom as exceptional (13.4 to 8.7 percent of uses). Democrats have placed greater emphasis upon defining freedom, however both parties defined freedom at least once in roughly the same percentage of their addresses. Which suggests that both Democrats and Republicans have made these a part of their discourse, but Democrats have emphasized this perspective substantially more (Coe, 2007).

Studies of charisma tend to emphasize the strong emotional and affective ties between leaders and followers while studies of greatness emphasize achievement. Nevertheless, leaders who share strong emotional ties with their followers are not always the ones who effect great change. As Emrich et al. explain most popular presidents are the ones whose achievements, affiliations, and power motivations, mirrored the motivations of their times, whereas the greatest presidents are the ones who possessed a higher power motivation. Emrich et al. thus conclude that greatness and charisma do not fully overlap (Emrich et al, 2001).

Greatness, like charisma, is a broad construct, with traits such as age, education, appearance, religion, occupation, and prior political experience being unrelated to it, with character and personality being critical requisites instead. The role of the symbolic spokesman of the nation rivals that of the foreign policy planner and domestic initiator with what matters being the ability to set the national agenda and pointing the public in that direction through imagery and rhetoric which is a first step in guaranteeing that particular president a place in

history. Nevertheless, Emrich et al. also conclude that no president was deemed great unless his rhetoric was followed by solid achievements (Emrich et al, 2001).

As Cohen explains, by being in control of the agenda, the president can secure success with congress, especially with issues he likes being able to curb unliked ones, by using this power to strategically secure wins in congress boost his popularity (Cohen, 1995). This prompts a further understanding of what exactly is charismatic leadership and what it entails. Shamir et al. look into the relationship between rhetoric and charismatic leadership, explaining that for most, a charismatic leader is an effective orator. Leader rhetoric has an important role in generating both attributions of charisma from observers and in recruiting followers by increasing their identification with both the leader and the mission at hand (Shamir et al, 1994). Emrich et al. explain that followers are unable to act upon messages which they do not hear, thus the first challenge of any leader is to be able to construct a message which will attract and sustain followers' attention. Emrich et al. explain that people who are more vivid in appearance, manner, or speech are more salient and are thus more likely to attract attention. Hence, such people are seen as being more casually prominent and as making things happen rather than having things happen to them. As image-based rhetoric is vivid and evokes images, a leader who is able to use this will attract more attention and thus be perceived as more influential and able to project a more dynamic and powerful presence (Emrich et al, 2001).

Nonetheless, Shamir et al. explain that there is no viable single answer as to why rhetoric is related to charisma, nor what makes a speech more charismatic (producing emotional and motivational effects on followers). This is because research mostly focuses on the style of speech and not on content. Studies focus on oratorical devices such as repetition, alliteration, the use of metaphors and nonverbal aspects such as tone of voice and eye contact (Shamir et al, 1994). Emrich et al. also show in their research the link between charisma and image-based rhetoric, asserting that presidents who engaged in this in significant speeches have rated higher in a scale of both charisma and greatness, which further suggests that the successful articulation of a leader's vision highly depends on their capabilities, particularly their ability to create a verbal picture to their followers. As they explain « The ability to articulate a compelling vision of a bright future is the sine qua non of charisma and greatness, two key outcomes for leaders. » (Emrich et al, 2001, p. 527) Shamir et al. explain which contents of a leader's speeches are more likely to produce charismatic effects and explain that in their theory, charismatic appeal is based largely in an ability to arouse emotions and to persuade through

oratory. They explain that charismatic leadership achieves effect by implicating the self-concepts of followers (Shamir et al, 1994). Thus:

The theory rests on the following assumptions about the self-concept and its motivational implications: (1) Humans are not only pragmatic and goal-oriented but also self-expressive. (2) People are motivated to maintain and enhance their self-esteem and self-worth. (3) People are also motivated to retain and increase their sense of self-consistency. (4) Self-concepts are composed, in part, of identities which are organized in a hierarchy of salience, and identity-salience is reflected in behavior. (5) Being hopeful in the sense of having faith in a better future is an intrinsically satisfying condition, and therefore humans may be motivated by faith (Shamir, 1994, p. 27).

Shamir et al. propose five different processes through which charismatic leaders might have motivational effects on their followers. First, by increasing intrinsic value of effort expended in the pursuit of goals (i.e., emphasizing things such as the need to stand up) by implicating a higher sense of value and of self.) Second, by increasing the self-efficacy of followers and collective efficacy by boosting followers' self-esteem and self-worth. Third, increasing the intrinsic value of goal accomplishment by articulating a vision or a mission which implicates the self-concept of followers and by increasing the meaningfulness of goals by showing consistency with the collective's past and its future. Fourth, instilling faith in a better future. One of the theory's assumptions is that faith in a better future is a satisfying condition, thus making people follow leaders who would instill such faith in them that cannot be translated into proximal goals. And finally, fifth, a charismatic leader increases their follower's commitment by increasing the importance of certain identities and values, by linking behaviors and goals to those same identities and to a mission which will reflect them. Thus, followers are motivated by the creation of a personal commitment (Shamir, 1994).

People look for consistency, a sense of congruence and continuity between past, present, and future, and charismatic leaders, with their references to history and traditions, not only increase the importance of collective identity but also link actions in the present to the future of that history and create a sense of development and evolution which contributes to more meaningfulness of the actions and goals of followers. Leaders are thus able to create a sense of progress which helps raise the hopes of followers who view mentioned historical figures as role models for behaviors and values such as sacrifice, endurance, patience, and courage. Thus, charismatic leaders will make references to collective identity to link goals with required efforts to that identity (Shamir, 1994). However, Shamir et al. explain that it is not enough to

emphasize collective identities to be charismatic: a leader must be able to identify similarities in background, experience and values between him and potential followers, to be able to demonstrate himself as a representative of the people and a potential role model. This lays the path for the identification of potential followers with the leader and for emulation of his beliefs and acceptance of his mission. Charismatic leaders will often make numerous references to values and moral justifications to be able to raise the importance of those values and demonstrate consistency between the leader's goals and actions and follower's values (Shamir, 1994). As Cohen explains:

If the president's "reality" does not accord with people's "experienced realities," the public may not be highly receptive to presidential influence attempts. Thus, presidential leadership is not guaranteed, but the president possesses resources and opportunities to influence the public's agenda (Cohen, 1995, p. 90).

Charisma has been defined as a magical ability, personality characteristic or powerful aura, regardless, charismatic leaders are able to inspire their followers to go beyond the call of duty by appealing to their emotions and motives rather than controlling their access to material rewards and resources. Greatness is also a trait that is part of a successful leadership, the general prestige and reputation of a leader's performance, which omits everything before or after. Much is known about both charisma and greatness, however there is not much on how leaders present their visions in a compelling way which will evoke attributions of charisma and greatness from their followers (Emrich et al, 2001). Notwithstanding, it is possible to summarize a leader's role: he must be a skillful craftsman, able to communicate their mission in a way which will generate appeal. He must not only detect opportunities in his environment but describe them as to maximize their general significance. Conger highlights the important link between language and leadership, explaining that an effective political leader must be able to sell themselves and their mission, a process which hinges highly on effective language skills (Conger, 1991). Conger exemplifies with Martin Luther King and his I Have a Dream speech.

Reverend King clearly framed the mission around certain values. Although his speech concerned the struggle of the Black man in America, King framed his mission around values that would have meaning to all Americans. King chose to reach out by framing Black struggle in values that were central to all, making his appeal more effective by drawing lines from the song "America", which all sung as school children, or by quoting Lincoln and the Declaration of Independence itself. By framing the movement's values in correlation to the nation's values King was able to increase the significance of Black struggle to all Americans and thus maximize its potential acceptance (Conger, 1991). As Conger concludes:

«...»framing is the leader's interpretation of his or her organization's purpose with accompanying values and beliefs. It is an opportunity for leaders to construct an appealing and motivating force for change and transformation in their organizations. But framing is only the first step. For while the leader's message is critical, the process by which it is communicated appears to be just as significant. We know from research in political science that it is not uncommon for two leaders to present the same message and yet receive different responses. The style of verbal communications is a critical distinguishing factor in whether the message will be remembered and endorsed. This is where the art of rhetoric enters the language of leadership. » (Conger, 1991, p. 38).

Furthermore, Zhang exemplifies through his review of *The Moral Rhetoric of American Presidents* that a president will often use their moral appeals not only to defend their position but to enhance existing authority, using moral discourse to refute critics and elevate their own arguments regarding policy. Summarily, using moral argumentation and rhetoric to defend and deflect threats to their leadership and/or affirm their independence (Zhang, 2009). Not only that but by being the apparent keeper of morals and values makes it so that « "the symbolic importance of presidential morality" increases tremendously "as a way of keeping ideals alive and holding social disintegration at bay." » (Slack, 2002). As Conger explains:

«...» we think of values as the states of being or modes of conduct that are worthy of promotion and protection, then value amplification is simply the process of identifying and elevating certain values as basic to the overall mission. We know from research on transformational leadership that at the core of effective leadership is the creation of values which inspire, provide meaning for, and instill a sense of purpose in an organization's members. When describing the organization's mission, a skillful leader will select values or stories that illustrate values that have strong appeal to subordinates and justify their activities in highly acceptable ways (Conger, 1991, p. 34).

Conger explains that belief amplification is the second technique through which leaders frame their objectives: while values refer to goals that they wish to attain or promote; beliefs are ideas about which factors support or stymie the achievement of those desired values. Conger separates belief into four categories important for framing: the mission importance, its need, stereotypes of the antagonists to the mission, and the efficacy to succeed. First, beliefs about the importance of the mission are the primary focus, and leaders sometimes maximize impact by describing or exaggerating the current situation as intolerable and frame their own vision as the only viable or the most attractive outcome. Second, why the mission, why these objectives, what is the need for their existence. Third, stereotyping antagonists to one's objectives is important to generate commitment and cohesion – often leaders will provide models of what they are not and define themselves by contrast, creating a moral and right "we" in contrast to a wrong "them" (Conger, 1991; Iancu et al, 2013). Finally, the efficacy in seeing one's objectives realized. Beliefs in efficacy are extremely important as they build confidence in the entire endeavor, a leader will draw analogies to earlier successes to confirm the likelihood of success (Conger, 1991). Conger also highlights the importance of the ability of a leader to gear their language to different audiences, as just as much as metaphor, the level of language is equally important. The ability to speak colloquially is significantly appealing. Franklin D. Roosevelt employed folk imagery and a colloquial discourse to give a sense of the person on the street, in his fireside chats he frequently made analogies to sports and tailored his talks to the common man. As Conger explains further, the high-status individual is expected to use a certain style of language but when he subverts this expectation, a special positive response is created by generating a sense of equality which can produce a sense of affection and admiration (Conger, 1991).

Thus, it is by crafting and creating an inspirational vision that leaders can achieve success, with frames being the snapshots that leaders have of the purpose. Furthermore, they also provide a map for action, by simply framing a message in his vision a leader is capable of influencing perceptions and outcomes (Conger, 1991). «Summarily, “When describing an organization's mission or situation, a leader is essentially framing it to interpret reality for followers. » (Conger, 1991, p. 32). Lincoln and Kennedy were both able to use rhetoric to enhance their political authority, adapting their rhetoric to their circumstances and engaging the public appropriately and morally, or spiritually infusing enough moral and religious language to make themselves sound presidential, rather than intellectual (Zhang, 2009).

Visionary behavior is being able to articulate an ideological goal while emphasizing its fundamental values, with the use of rhetoric being critical to the charismatic leader's vision. These values are emphasized using biblical imagery, metaphors, folk tales, rhyme, and repetition to create a "rhetorical spellbinding" which can inspire followers. Furthermore, charismatic leaders tend to engage in more inclusive language which accommodates multiple interpretations. This shows the link between leaders' use of rhetorical techniques and perceptions of their charisma (Emrich et al, 2001). The focus on a president's ability to establish his vision and to persuade the people to collaborate with him in enacting it reveals the skillful use of imagery and rhetoric which is critical to presidents to persuade the public. Imagery is understood as how a word arouses a sensory experience within the listener. Emrich et al. exemplify with Martin Luther King Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech in which he repeatedly proclaimed those words. If he had traded it for "I have an idea", would the impact of the speech be the same? When Churchill proclaimed "blood, toil, tears and sweat", which has suffered from the Mandela effect of being remembered as "blood sweat and tears" would the impact be the same if he had used other words to rally Britons during WW2 (Emrich et al, 2001)?

Leaders who make use of words which evoke pictures, sounds, smells, tastes, and othersensations can tap directly into the life experiences of followers than those who only appeal to their intellects. By engaging their senses and not simply their minds, leaders can give a higher sense of reality to their messages and thus appeal to followers. This premise has been studied in artistic and literary domains and although they may be far from leadership all three have the common objective of cultivating a following by offering a sense of new, different, and better (Emrich et al, 2001). According to Emrich et al.'s research, they found that it is novelty which is a critical determinant on whether art can stand the test of time and that image-based content which is vivid tends to increase the novelty while more abstract the contrary. Image based words in similar fashion cast sensory experiences, while concept-based words tend to appeal to logical interpretations (Emrich et al, 2001). Emrich et al. assert that a leader who uses concrete, image-based rhetoric can craft a message which will be easier to process and comprehend by followers, by contrast a leader who uses abstract, concept-based rhetoric risks delivering a message which will be easily forgotten and possibly incomprehensible. Easiness of processing is also important because people use their sense of how easy or difficult a message is to understand to gauge not only the quality of the message but the competence of the leader. People tend to value messages which are easier to comprehend, and they value leaders who craft such messages making ease of processing

important not only for comprehension but for evaluation of the message's quality and the leader's competence (Emrich et al, 2001).

Although followers may hear and comprehend the leader's message, if that message does not resonate at a deeper and emotional level then there will be less will to act on it. Thus, any leader needs to deliver a message which appeals to emotions. Here, once again, the image-based rhetorician has an advantage because imagery and emotion are inherently linked. Words which evoke images are associated with emotional events, people and other stimuli as people tend to imbed images in their descriptions of emotional events (Emrich et al, 2001). As Emrich et al. explain, «People judge words that easily and readily arouse a mental image as having greater "intensity of emotional meaning" and experience stronger emotional responses to messages that are more imagery evoking. » (Emrich et al, 2001, p. 533). Emrich et al. explain that once followers have not only heard and comprehended but resonated emotionally to a leader's message, the leader must ensure that they both remember and elaborate key points of the message so that when it is time for action, the desired action will be the most likely action. Emrich et al. explain that the image-based rhetorician can produce a superior memory for verbal material. When a follower not only hears, comprehends but is also motivated to store in memory a leader's message, they argue that an image-based message will be stored with more accuracy and in richer detail than a concept-based message. Thus, when it comes to action, followers have a greater degree of success in retrieving the image-based message and will have a richer, more detailed, and more instructive guide for action (Emrich et al, 2001).

Emrich et al. explain that all critical processes described by them will intervene in the relationship between image-based rhetoric and both charisma and greatness. This suggests that the more image-based rhetoric a leader uses, the more charismatic they will be perceived. Emrich et al. conclude that if image-based rhetoric is used to call followers to action at a critical moment, then such processes may increase the willingness of followers to act which in turn facilitates the enactment of the leader's vision. It is in such a way that image-based rhetoric may also be linked to assessments of greatness. By engaging in two studies, one which examined presidents' inaugural addresses and one which examined their most significant speeches, Emrich et al. put forth four hypotheses. First, that the higher the proportion of image-based rhetoric in a president's speech, the higher his charisma ratings. Second, the higher this proportion in a president's speech, the more favorable historians assessments of his greatness. Third, the lower the proportion of concept-based rhetoric, the higher his charisma rating and fourth, the lower the proportion of concept-based rhetoric the more favorable historian's

assessments of his greatness (Emrich et al, 2001).

Emrich et al. explain that results were not significant for the hypothesis that presidents are more charismatic when engaging in less concept-based rhetoric, as for the hypothesis that presidents' who use less concept-based rhetoric in their pivotal speeches receive more favorable assessments of greatness. The correlations between concept-based rhetoric and measures of greatness are not significant. In inaugural addresses presidents articulate their visions, and by using more image-based words, they are deemed to be more charismatic. In pivotal speeches, there is an attempt by the president to enact their vision, such as Lincoln's to preserve the union in his "Gettysburg Address" or Franklin D. Roosevelt's attempt to generate military support for Great Britain with his "Arsenal of Democracy" speech. Presidents who use more image-based words attempt to enact their visions were judged more favorably in terms of both charisma and greatness (Emrich et al, 2001). Emrich et al. show that:

The proportion of imaged based words that presidents used in their inaugural addresses and pivotal speeches explained, on average, 15 percent of the variance in ratings of their charisma. «...» The proportion of image-based words that they used in their pivotal speeches explained 22 percent of the variance in historians' assessments of their greatness. Together, the key findings of these two studies and their possible interpretations provide a better understanding of the links between image-based rhetoric and both charisma and greatness, as well as avenues for research «...» (Emrich et al, 2001, p. 548)

Nevertheless, one key finding was discrepant correlations between image-based rhetoric and greatness across both sets of speeches. Emrich et al. suggest two possibilities which account for these discrepancies. First, assessments of presidents' greatness may be associated to the use of image-based words only at great moments in history, where a leader may capture their followers' attention, facilitate comprehension, tap into their emotions, and imbed their message. If a leader can call followers to action but give no clear goals to pursue their vision, then followers are simply left with a favorable impression. An image-based message might elicit perceptions of charisma but fail to generate achievements needed for perceptions of greatness (Emrich et al, 2001). A second possibility refers to the

differences in presidential involvement across the two sets of speeches. Some presidents crafted their inaugural address while others employed speechwriters, whereas in contrast all presidents had active roles in crafting their pivotal speeches. Thus, such speeches might likely reflect their own beliefs, values, thinking, skills, and abilities more closely. Emrich et al. assert the negative relationships between concept-based rhetoric and both charisma and greatness failed to reach significance, asking if it ever reached any to begin with. Presidents who used more concept-based rhetoric tended to be rated as less charismatic, and although their findings could be due to chance, they might also signal a crucial dissociation between the role of concept-based rhetoric in leadership versus the artistic domains. By claiming that writers and leaders face the same challenge of being able to cultivate a following by offering novelty, Emrich et al. conclude that they might have overlooked an important difference between the two fields (Emrich et al, 2001).

To be effective, leaders must not only inspire but instruct. In this way, intellectual stimulation, or the ability to urge followers to adopt more critical and creative thought, is one of the four dimensions of transformational leadership. Followers may also regard concept-based rhetoric as benign supporting material in instructional messages if leaders are able to infuse enough image-based rhetoric to paint a verbal picture of their objectives. Of the two sets of speeches, Emrich et al. consider pivotal speeches to be the most instructional. Presidents must inspire and instruct to garner support, in contrast inaugural addresses are suasive messages crafted to showcase the elected president's vision. As such, presidents have no need for instruction. This difference between both sets of speeches can possibly account for the fact that concept-based rhetoric tended to be negatively associated with charisma measures in president's inaugural addresses but not in pivotal speeches (Emrich et al, 2001).

As Conger corroborates, a leader attains the greatest impact when his language is perceived as symbolic rather than literal, with leaders both appealing to emotions and ideals and using rhetorical techniques to increase said impact. These techniques tend to increase closeness between two subjects, often unlike each other, used for vividness, clarification or to interpret reality. A listener must be able to visualize and thus go through a mental process of deciphering the message at a visual, cognitive, and emotional level. Conger explains that there is a moment of puzzlement where the listener is deciphering the message which ensures stimulation and concentration on the speaker's message (Conger, 1991).

By bringing the control to the listener, a metaphor can convey powerful and uplifting messages, thus we see the importance of linking metaphors to the audience's concerns

and needs. Conger further asserts that there are streams of research upon the impact of metaphors and analogies. The field of speech communications hypothesizes that such devices excite the imagination of the listener and create consecutive moments of tension and release which serve to trigger a state of active thinking in the listener as they attempt to decipher what has been said. Furthermore, studies in social psychology explain that these rhetorical devices serve a more persuasive and effective way of communicating ideas. People tend to disregard statistical summaries as they are regarded as abstract and colorless, with face-to-face impacts having a substantial impact in decision making which leads to the conclusion that the importance of information is proportional to its vividness (Conger, 1991). Conger gives the example of stories which serve to vividly convey important values and behaviors. Stories and metaphors are regarded as the most potent as they invoke meanings and symbols which have a deep cultural root and therefore elicit stronger emotion from listeners. Thus, the listener cues into emotional associations: the word freedom, for example, invokes historical associations with the American revolution, and elicits myths and stories of the underdog triumphing over tyranny (Conger, 1991).

Important components within rhetoric are repetition, rhythm, balance, and alliteration. Conger asserts that certain rhythms can mesmerize an audience: Franklin D. Roosevelt frequently employed alliteration in his speeches; Martin Luther King was a master of repetition and rhythm as demonstrated on his I Have a Dream speech in which he repeats the words "Let freedom ring". By progressively increasing the tone with which he says those words, that repetition and rhythm, Conger explains, impact the audience in two ways. First a song-like crescendo which mesmerizes and builds emotional commitment to the message, capturing attention. Second, King imprints the critical message that the audience is to be free. Repetition ensures that a message can be recalled. Unlike writing, speech is harder to comprehend as once spoken the speaker's words are gone except if they can be recalled by the listener. Repetition ensures focus on key ideas and helps drive them home (Conger, 1991).

Shamir et al. present several propositions for the effects of leaders on their followers. Charismatic leaders engage by two principal methods, role modeling and frame alignment. Frame alignment meaning the linking of the individual's and the leader's interpretive orientations, which enable these individuals to both perceive and label occurrences in their life

and the world at large. By giving meaning to events through frame alignment in their speech leaders organize experience and guide action. They interpret the past and the present and link the present to the past by using history as a basis, articulating ideology clearly and often making use of labels and slogans. Charismatic leaders can provide a clear image of the future, exemplify certain identities and values, and ultimately suggest linkages among those and their vision of the future. Thus, Shamir et al. propose that the contents of charismatic leaders' speeches will contain the following: more references to collective history and continuity, more references to collective identity and fewer references to individual self-interest, more positive references to followers worth and efficacy, more references to their own similarity with their followers, more references to values and moral justifications and less references to tangible goals or instrumental justifications, more references to distal goals and the distant future and lastly, more references to hope and faith (Shamir, 1994).

Shamir et al. assume that people are motivated by faith because being hopeful is satisfying, thus, they propose that this is why leaders make many references to hope and faith in their speeches. These attempts to instill faith and raise hope are also reflected in the frequent references to dreams and dreaming, which imply the use of both hope and imagination (in allusions to the American Dream and Martin Luther King's I Have a Dream). Thus, such references not only raise follower hopes but they also serve to increase the importance of the followers' collective identity. References to faith, hope and dreams are further supplemented by the empowering of followers by the leader when expressing high expectations of them and confidence in their abilities (Shamir, 1994).

Moreover, it is through their rhetoric and by applying unities of time, place, and action in specific circumstances that presidents can employ political myths which compress past and present, giving a sense of continuity purpose and ownership; through this process, presidents construct a collective memory and national ethos and is through this sense of continuity that they are able to demonstrate that present actions are consistent with that same ethos. For example, it is understood that presidents use rhetorical devices to shape national character, in attempts to unify the polity during times of war. However, in times of peace, without a clear enemy, presidents will make use of past battlefields as places of recollection of past deeds to reinvigorate the collective sense of identity. Harlow explains that this identity is the same as a political culture which developed over time with the recognition of shared interests and

substance. Presidents will make use of this idea of the nation as an "imagined community" which is always conceived as deep and horizontal comradeship. Each president was able to use place to give meaning to their words and shape the contemporary American ethos. By using cultural values to associate places with values they attribute symbolic importance to those places and how they have affected identity and behavior, by limiting discourse and defining propriety. Harlow shows that recent research in both human geography and sociology shows that people develop attachment to distant, imaginary, or remembered places as well as those in proximity. Researchers have also explored how places of public memory can be used to forget, minimize, or reframe elements of collective identity (Harlow, 2016).

Harlow explains that memory and national ethos are both abstract concepts and thus they have minimal influence unless the rhetor gives them presence by using language to move realities which are distant to a place that is not only metaphorical and foremost in the audience's minds, but also geographically present, making actions seem to be in the present. As Harlow further explains this gives listeners «the illusion that the convictions and feelings the rhetor arouses within them have come not from him but from their innermost consciousness. » (Harlow, 2016, p. 48). To be able to integrate events, ideals, and attitudes from and about to influence the community's perceptions of its history, its present meaning, and its destiny, rhetors attempt to unify past and present by evoking the nostalgia of specific places. However, doing so is extremely difficult when "shared" experience of such places is not shared at all. Thus, rhetors might construct a collective identity by putting collective memories in what Harlow calls metaphorical "places" of discourse, which in turn invite members to cultivate loyalty and the ideals embodied in those places (Harlow, 2016). As Harlow explains «...» in the right time, place, and circumstance, rhetors can also build collective memory in and about places where defining events occurred. » (Harlow, 2016, p. 47).

To achieve unity of action the president must create a perception of dramatic sequence and structure by giving an account of historical events which is «...»intelligible as a sequence of human actions «...» (Harlow, 2016, p. 48). The leader identifies the audience with the characters in the narrative and when the audience can see themselves in the historical actions those events become intelligible. Harlow maintains that a few rhetorical devices such as emphasizing the parallelism between historic and symbolic action and claiming that said action is consistent with a collective character indicate the unity of action. Even if they take minor liberties with historical facts by firmly uniting actions with place and time, leaders can give presence to their rhetoric. The rhetor must also tell a story or a series of stories via which the audience is able to experience past, present, and future simultaneously to achieve the

unity of time. They may allude to political myths and emphasize the continuity of American character, they may also employ ideographs, metaphors, stories, and vivid description that collapse past into present or that reestablish real action in another time, focusing less on the historicity of the events and more on their significance to present or future identity (Harlow, 2016).

As Harlow explains, this process: «...» often relies on creating an eternal present through the vivid reconstruction of memory, sometimes even, of borrowed memory. » (Harlow, 2016, p. 49). To achieve unity of place the rhetor must be able to fuse the past importance of a location with its present significance, thus a material thing provides a direct physical contact which keeps memory from fading. Since a geographical place tends to be present and stable over time, it is thus able to anchor memories of an event for not only the collective but the individual as well, linking those who have not experienced the event directly to those who have. With time and action, rhetors use vivid sensory descriptions of surroundings, references to landmarks or monuments, and repeated use of metaphors about ground, earth, water as well as other geographical features (Harlow, 2016). Harlow explains that presidents have often used WWII as an event in which they can anchor public memory, using important locations to give speeches in which they are able to unify both individual and group experience into a collective identity. Through the medium of language presidents can give presence to such locations and use them as levers with which they can move the audience and inspire the embodiment of the national ethos represented in those places. Harlow gives the example of Normandy and the commemoration of the D-Day invasion, there are also other locations such as Pearl Harbor or Ground Zero in New York City. By calling upon the people to re-collect to these places the President can anchor memories in a tangible, physical location and by presenting vivid imagery they draw upon individuals' memories to create a public memory of events (Harlow, 2016). As Harlow explains further by stating:

Rhetors reinforce the significance of those events by negotiating a complete account of them, by supplying missing information, or by changing unacceptable characteristics, and then by making the physical place an anchor and cue for the memory. By slinging out specific objects, people, or locations in discourse, the rhetor links the physical place with a conceptual one and imparts those events “a presence that prevents them from being neglected.” Such locations effectively anchor memory to time and action, giving presence to events long past, and selecting a single moment as representative of the entire conflict. (Harlow, 2016, pp. 47-48)

Harlow explains that the group thus develops a collective memory which is portrayed by the president as a representative of all Americans. The president thus uses various memories, stories, representations, and imaginings of their audience and unifies them into a single understanding and interpretation of both the experience and the national ethos. As Harlow explains « A nation does not go to war just because it has the guns, but because doing so is an expression of something essential to the national character «...» (Harlow, 2016, p. 49). Harlow concludes that:

«...» when presidents call upon normative values of courage, loyalty, and self-sacrifice and then use those values to justify the historical events of war and to commemorate those events in the present, they reinforce the political myth in which Americans fight good wars well, contributing to the collective memory of the war and to the national character they represent. A fitting speech will persuade the audience to see the place as the presidents describe it and to believe in the political myth the presidents reinforce; the president, thus unifying time, place, and action in his rhetoric, gives presence to the political myths of America. » (Harlow, 2016, p. 49)

When the United States chooses to enter a conflict, the public must make sense of that action and prove that their participation had purpose. When the public loses this internal battle, they are left unsettled and because the figure of the president is uniquely powerful in the United States, the words they use to talk about a war shape the national memory of it (Harlow, 2016). Presidential rhetoric commemorates a war and depicts the fighting in a way that justifies the war and embodies national ethos. Harlow gives the example of Normandy, where the United States fulfilled its national ethos through offensive military action rather passivity. Presidents continually argued that America demonstrated an ethos of heroism in their celebrations, seventy years after the fact. Harlow explains that through presidential rhetoric, Normandy becomes part of the American epic one of its many political myths (Harlow, 2016).

Furthermore, as time passes, the connection between those "good wars" and the present and the rhetorical value of those battlefields increasingly diminishes as those who experience them fade from public memory. Harlow explains that as places change, they not only accumulate new associations, but they also change physically, and thus public memory also changes. Rhetors must then decide if they want to continue investing in those places, reinvesting them with presence, or allow for them to recede from public memory or actively dissociate the place from the national ethos by investing them in places of undesirable presence or by transferring the attachment to a place which can more easily be invested with presence (Harlow, 2016).

For a president to be successful, it is not enough to be good and do well, he must demonstrate his skills publicly through rhetoric and be able to rhetorically divert public attention from ongoing issues. More and more, a president must look good, do well and sound great. As the presidency is an important part of American political culture, presidents must be able to help create and shape public understanding of important issues. Ultimately, presidents must be able to address, highlight, or react to events directly with a solution or a rhetorical appeal at best (Zhang, 2009). This again implies the connection between rhetorical skills and charisma and greatness.

Conger believes there is more to appreciate in the power of the spoken word and its role in transformational leadership. According to them, the first step of such leadership is the formulation of an organizational vision which is meaningful. However, once that vision is formulated, Conger explains that the language of leadership plays a vital role in the acceptance and accomplishment of that vision, giving four guidelines which ensure a more impactful message. First, a leader must frame their mission around inherently appealing goals and draw upon values and beliefs which have positive and culturally important meanings. Second, when describing their goals, leaders must incorporate positive values which are held not only by them but by society at large and use stories to illustrate those values in action. Third, leaders must remember to highlight the previously mentioned key belief categories when framing their mission. Fourth, leaders should employ analogies, metaphors and stories when speaking. Furthermore, the message should be simple, focused, and repeated consistently. Leaders should ultimately allow their emotions to surface as they speak, by showing both real excitement and concern. Moreover, Conger explains that a speaker must be perceived as credible and as possessing a measure of expertise, otherwise the message is unlikely to be believed. Conger alerts ¹⁰⁷ that a leader should not attempt to appear knowledgeable in areas where their audience knows they are not (Conger, 1991).

Zhang explains in his review of *The Moral Rhetoric of American Presidents* that understanding the rise of religion in American politics is a valuable resource, asserting that its uses are calculated, deliberate and partisan, concluding that religious expressions and their influence have always been a part of American politics and presidential rhetoric (Zhang, 2009). Furthermore, due to the theocentric nature of American politics and culture, presidents underscore their morality with God-based values and images (Slack, 2002). This theocentric nature can be attributed to a long tradition of what is acknowledged by Coe et al. as “Civil Religion” which ensures that religion is constantly invoked in the president’s communications. Coe et al. also explain that it is due to this tradition that presidents will usually prefer a more abstract religious discourse. As Tocqueville had noticed, there is a highly religious atmosphere in the United States when compared to Europe and thus, the issues of Civil Religion became a tradition. Every individual and group had the obligation to carry God's will on earth. The concept of Civil Religion, as Iancu et al. explain, belonged to Rousseau, who emphasized within it the existence of God, the future, the reward and punishment of vice and the exclusion of religious intolerance. Civil Religion was a vital element for human progress, to be able to neutralize the power of egoism and greed and thus guide nations towards sympathy and love (Iancu et al, 2013). Moreover, the evolution of religious language in presidential communications was also affected by the rise of political mobilization by Christian conservatives in the 70’s, which has transformed not only presidential language but the role of the president, which among other roles must now also play a role of de facto religious leader by being «...» the high priest of the national faith «...» (Coe et al, 2013, p. 375). Within the United States, the boundaries of morality call for a public service which is theocentric but not theocratic, thus even though theocentric values might frame policy it is important to remember that public service serves under God and not alongside him (Slack, 2002). The importance of such moral symbolism is that it points the citizen towards the future. The use of theocentric expressions is also designed to establish a moral standard and give a moral message. Through the expression of religious values presidents not only set but renew a moral standard, which unfortunately they themselves often fail to meet (Slack, 2002).

Slack explains that apart from Washington's second address and Harrison's, most addresses contain at least one reference to God and are usually short affairs. Slack asserts that each president includes at least 3.5 sentences that refer to God based values in their inaugural address which would in total correspond to about five percent of the total sentences. Some like Washington take the time to acknowledge the unique blessings of the United States such as when he calls God "the great Author of every public and private good", while others

such as Franklin D. Roosevelt have also taken the time to remind the nation of its shared theocentric values. More recent presidents have also paid homage. Kennedy quotes Isaiah (58:6) and George H. Bush notes that his first function as president is prayer; his son George W. Bush employs the parable of the good Samaritan while also having the first address inclusive of Jews and Muslims. Others inaugural addresses are much less generous: Clinton would go on to give credit to the American people themselves rather than God, by acknowledging that diversity would be the godsend of the twenty-first century (Slack, 2002).

Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a common typology that is shared by all theistic religions and that Coe et al. apply here to the Christian faith. There are four important elements to this: God figures, sacred texts, manifestations of religion and people who adhere to said religion (followers and leaders). Within the Christian faith these would be, God, the Bible, manifestations of Christianity, both physical and metaphysical, and lastly, people who adhere to it. Theistic religions tend to center themselves around supernatural beings, of whom their followers have an archetypal image of. Christianity is the United States' dominant faith, Coe et al. reveal that roughly three in four Americans identify as Christians. Thus, it is not surprising that invocations of God would be a central component to presidential discourse, with The Bible playing a unique role in both the Christian faith and in presidential discourse. Nonetheless Coe et al. also present a quick shift that has happened among the public, which is that Judeo-Christian religions have all seen declines while those with faiths other than Christianity or no religion at all saw the most gains. The first group, consisting of Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus, saw a sixty five percent increase, while the second group, consisting of atheists, agnostics and others jumped by one hundred and twenty eight percent. By 2008 the group of those disinterested in religion was approximately sixteen percent of the public, being almost at level with mainline Protestants (Coe et al, 2013).

Coe et al. show that from the one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one communications included in their analysis of which forty-one were major addresses, a case-by-case analysis shows that presidents tend to use Christian discourse mostly outside of major addresses and are more inclined to emphasize such discourse in smaller venues and to more homogenous audiences than when speaking to the entire nation. Their research also shows that there is quite substantial variation among presidents, with some preferring certain types of Christian discourse. Coe et al. give the example of George W. Bush, whose religiosity was a cause for scrutiny during his tenure at the White House. Their data shows that Bush stood above other presidents when it came to manifestations of Christianity, he sharply downplayed the Bible, patterns that are likely due to the post 9/11 pluralistic context of the Bush era. The situation

presented an opportunity for Bush to discuss religion in very broad terms, often by positioning it in relation to Judaism or Islam, as well as to discuss faith, particularly, its ability to provide comfort in the aftermath of tragedy. References to the Bible in any explicit way were a feature right after the attacks but became less and less common as concerns about a "holy war" increased (Coe et al, 2013).

As Coe et al. explain, presidents have used far more abstract than concrete language in religious discourse and they also assert that presidents are willing to present their Christian discourse publicly. They further assert that presidents have made more than two Christian references per day on average, to put it into perspective they further explain that Liberty is mentioned roughly seventeen times per five thousand words, which implies that presidents have referenced this key American value only sixty one percent as often as they have used Christian discourse, at least in the addresses studied by them. Although it is not a perfect comparison it illustrates the prevalence of religious discourse in American politics and the importance of its tradition of Civil Religion (Coe et al, 2013). Expression of religious values is mainly a symbolic gesture which ultimately has little impact upon the actual deeds of specific presidents. Presidents make use of religious values in their addresses to remind the listener of broader and more moral objectives, with this in mind it is understandable that most of the biblical verses referenced seem to be selected due to their inclusion with approximately seventy five percent being references from the Torah or the Old Testament. This choice permits an assimilation of the Abrahamic religions into one moral equation, with theses references reinforcing a sense of moral community rather than furthering religious divisions (Slack, 2002).

This leads to the expectation of an abstract language from presidents when discussing religion. Coe et al. assert that presidents do indeed favor abstract expressions (e.g., discussion of God, faith, and prayer) over concrete ones (e.g., references to the bible, religious leaders, and denominations). Coe et al. explain that presidential rhetoric became more abstract during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Presidents seem to speak more but say less. Nevertheless, there are benefits for the employment of more abstract expressions. By using a more abstract language, presidents lower the risk of alienating voters. Furthermore, the concept of American Civil Religion is appealing, exactly due to its non-specificity. The more concrete language a president uses, the less likely it is to connect with his whole audience, risking alienating entire demographics. Due to this, recent presidents seem to have a clear incentive to keep their religious discourse more abstract (Coe et al, 2013).

As Coe et al. explain, abstract religious discourse is the norm. That idea is also

consistent with the idea presented in research that presidential discourse has become more abstract in the past century. This provides insight into how Civil Religion is preserved in political discourse in the United States. By making general references to God, faith, prayer, heaven and by reducing the references to more tangible and specific aspects of Christian faith, such as the Bible or religious denominations, presidents provide the sense that a broader part of the public is part of what Coe et al. denominate as the "national faith" (Coe et al, 2013).

Iancu et al. explain, religion is a major and complex force which can be considered an emotional proceeding in political discourse. Although politics are part of the public sphere, religion by contrast is part of a more individual and personal one and the two meet when politics has need of religion to emotionally influence listeners. This is since the objective of any political message is to affect thinking, beliefs, and behaviors of individuals. By manipulating emotions, politicians gain political power with which they can achieve their goals. In the discourses of American politicians religious elements are indispensable for perpetuating the belief that the United States is a country blessed by God, which thus has a divinely authorized leadership role. By invoking God and his blessing, presidents can develop themes of sacrifice, virtue, and the American example in the world with most frequently expressed values being those of liberty, equality, belief in God, patriotism, justice, personal responsibility, and peace. Presidents also tend to touch upon themes of civic virtue, nonpartisanship, national unity, general policy principles, cooperation with Congress, popular support, a providential supreme being, the American mission, political continuity, the president's role as defender of the union and the Constitution and federalism (Iancu et al, 2013).

Slack explains that in American culture, regardless of belief, the public's sense of morality is still highly connected and derives from the words of God. Although in this sense it is a much more universal God, capable of reflecting the values of all the Abrahamic religions. Slack asserts that this common denominator of major religions is the reason American public philosophy is largely theocentric rather than anthropocentric. It is a society that not only acknowledges the importance of God and God-based values but finds its morality in religious documents of the major Abrahamic religions, thus, it is not surprising that American presidents will try to subscribe such values in their speeches through values and imagery (Slack, 2002). As Slack further explains: «The nature of references differs substantially among the presidents. Some use direct biblical quotations while others paraphrase. Some remind the American public that all blessings come from God, while others minimize the importance of God in the success of the nation. » (Slack, 2002, p. 136).

Therefore, speeches which are a part of political traditions and represent a moment where the

leader presents their vision become a vehicle with which the leader might infuse religious elements to appeal and increase the vote, and his own notoriety (Iancu et al, 2013). This is what Coe et al. explain as the notion of Civil Religion, «...» as “a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals” through which a society “interprets its historical experience in light of transcendent reality” «...» (Coe et al, 2013, p. 377). Coe et al. further explain that Civil Religion in the United States presidency takes many forms, some overtly religious while others more of a worship of the nation itself rather than a deity. Which makes expressions of faith by the President deeply important because they influence public attitudes, being thus a central force in shaping American political culture (Coe et al, 2013). Presidents use religious politics in conjunction with traditional American values to not only attract public support and attack foes but to solidify power. The religious and moral rhetoric used by American presidents is mainly targeted towards the American masses (Zhang, 2009). Ceremonies such as the Inaugural Address or the State of the Union are now both expressions of the political climate and religious celebrations, which serve to put both nation and president under God. By calling upon God, presidents are subordinating themselves to a higher power (Slack, 2002). Although the relationship between religion and politics is a rather ambiguous one, it exists since perhaps the dawn of human culture, with Iancu et al. explaining that one of the most important moments for this relationship is when a state official is invested (Iancu et al, 2013).

Iancu et al. contend that, because they do not have much political significance, inaugural addresses are a ritualistic performance which tend to serve as "liturgies of civil religion". They are cultural performances which affect the behavior of both the nation and the future president. For example, Iancu et al. also contend that the cultural belief that Americans are a chosen people has influenced American policy. Ultimately, references to God in those speeches seem to have only ceremonial significance. One could easily argue that presidents must have religious discourse in their addresses unless they risk losing votes (Iancu et al, 2013).

Iancu et al. explain that in the United States many individuals seem to consider the Republican party as friendlier towards religion than the Democratic party, however, it is explained that Democrats and Republicans seem to differ in their use of religion only at the level of intensity (references and frequency) (Iancu et al, 2013). Slack also researches the differences in the use of religious language between the two parties and concludes that there is an impact and a moderately positive association between the references to God and speeches of Republican presidents. In accordance, the opposite presents itself when concerning the addresses of Democratic presidents (Slack, 2002). A survey conducted in 2012 shows that

thirty eight percent of Americans believe there are too many expressions of religious faith and prayer from political leaders, and although this has increased in both parties such views tend to be more widespread among Democrats (Iancu et al, 2013). Republicans tend to have more conservative policies and are more supportive of individual rights, small government, and freedom of business. Democrats by contrast have more liberal values and tend to sustain social programs which help disadvantaged groups. By considering those discrepancies, one expects that there should be significant differences among Democrats and Republicans in inaugural addresses from a religious standpoint, however, Iancu et al. show through their research that differences are minimal and are mostly confined to a matter of intensity rather than reference. Both groups refer to God within the text of the discourse and in a final traditional blessing message, however Republicans do tend to give divinity a more personal and intimate note by saying "the Maker of Heaven and earth" or "Heavenly Father". Additionally, both parties refer to different religions and tend to place emphasis on the importance of both mutual respect and acceptance. Still, Republicans differentiate themselves by enlarging the set of Holy elements, which include allusions to the Bible, prayer, or angel (Iancu et al, 2013). References to Christian values are similar between both groups and common features referenced are hope, help, love, care, dignity, generosity, or tolerance. Furthermore, while Democrats tend to value happiness, respect for life, gratefulness, humility, or honesty, Republicans by contrast value, obedience, kindness, forgiveness, compassion, truth, and mercy. Iancu et al. point out that the major difference between both parties is that democrats tend to stress the idea of responsibility opposed to the idea of opportunity stressed by Republicans. Democrats additionally tend to emphasize cooperation, understanding and loyalty (Iancu et al, 2013).

Still, the complex relationship between party affiliation and religious expression must be understood in its full context. The relationship is mixed for even though speeches with highest number of references to God are penned by Republicans many of inaugural addresses with the fewest God-based values are also written by Republicans. Nevertheless, looking at the percentage of religious sentences in each inaugural address it is possible to see that two of the top four inaugural addresses are written by Republicans, the greatest proportion of thirty five percent being found in the second address of Republican president Abraham Lincoln, while in George Washington's first address more than one in four sentences refer to God in some manner. The highest proportions nevertheless occur in twentieth century presidential inaugural addresses. More than 17 percent for Republican Dwight Eisenhower and twelve percent for Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt and Republican George W. Bush (Slack, 2002).

Tentative party affiliation is also accentuated by looking at presidential inaugural addresses which dedicate five to ten percent of sentences to God-based values. Slack finds six

Democratic presidents: Jefferson, Madison, Cleveland, Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter; and only four Republicans: Harding, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush. Although this might suggest that earlier presidents tended to profuse their speeches in theocentric references more than modern ones, a correlational analysis by Slack suggests the exact opposite. Recent presidents have a higher tendency to incorporate God-based images and values and although prior to 1953 this averaged only 2.68 sentences, since 1953 the typical presidential inaugural address includes 6.42 sentences which reference God in some way. Although there is a slight trend which favors Republicans, Slack explains that no party has a lock on the demonstration of moral conviction. Regardless of their party affiliation, presidents in the second half of the twentieth century make higher use of such values than their earlier counterparts and neither age, nor social or economic crises explain the differences among the speeches (Slack, 2002).

Coe et al. explain that presidents give attention to God and people with Bible mentions being the least common category. What becomes clear from Coe et al.'s research is that Christian discourse is clearly embedded in the American presidency. Coe et al. assert that since Ronald Reagan, presidents have included more than two Christian terms in their communications on average. Even though Bible mentions are less common, they still find their way into communications at least two to three times on average per month. Thus, there is no question that Christian discourse or religious discourse overall is a part of a president's rhetorical appeal (Coe et al, 2013).

The invocation of God in inaugural addresses is a tradition which dates to the birth of the republic. It goes back to Washington's first "So help me God" in 1789 and from that moment on, references to God appear in forty-two of fifty-four perorations within speeches with only Washington in his second inaugural address not mentioning divinity at all. Furthermore, Iancu et al. also explain that Jesus was never mentioned in inaugural addresses and references to divinity particularly at the end of the addresses have been substitutions for the term God with some examples being: Almighty Being, Great Author, Invisible Hand, Parent of the Human Race, or the Being who is supreme over all, the Infinite Power that rules the destinies of the universe, the Power whose providence mercifully protects our national infancy, and Him who has not yet forsaken this favored land. Iancu et al. thus explain that the relationship between religion and politics is symbolic, concluding that no matter the political belonging or the different addressing styles, American presidents tend to invoke Divinity and both Christian and Democratic values in a similar fashion even if their analysis shows a more pragmatic outlook of Democrats over Republicans. Nevertheless, both groups tend to name the

United States a universal leader and emphasize its commitment to maintain and perpetuate democracy (Iancu et al, 2013).

The use of more abstract language allows presidents to cross many of the divides which characterize American Christian communities, and it may also aid presidents by being less likely to create entanglements between religion and policy which are against America's tradition of church-state separation. This however does not mean that the public is not turned off by these public displays of faith, yet concrete religious language would have a greater risk of limiting public acceptance than would abstract language. As previously explained, the mobilization of Christian conservatives in the late 1970s led to a shift in American Civil Religion and in the role of the president, by encouraging not only Ronald Reagan but subsequent presidents to increase their public religiosity. Coe et al. in their research support said pattern and expect future presidents to use less religious discourse, only highlight said discourse in smaller venues rather than in major addresses and finally focus on more abstract language. Coe et al explain that those are the changes needed to be able to go through the changes in religious identification in America (Coe et al, 2013). As Zhang concludes:

«...» embracing the art of rhetoric helps presidents achieve their goals successfully. Presidents give Americans hope and determination. Presidents define, articulate, and inspire the public sense of national identity. They define who Americans are and are not with speeches. Presidents naturalize and legitimize such inclusion and exclusion largely through their rhetoric, which often focuses on the nature and definition of American identity. » (Zhang, 2009, p. 180)

This ultimately defines how the president can use rhetoric and circumstances to frame, influence, and manipulate American politics and policies, furthermore it shows how presidents are able to define and preach traditional American national ideals, values and events and phrase them in a presidential way. Zhang asserts that despite the changing demographics since independence, the presidential definitions of American national identity have not change that much and presidents continue to manipulate American nationalism with rhetoric which is simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, which makes presidential rhetoric both brilliant and limited (Zhang, 2009).

Shamir et al. explain that to achieve charismatic effects leaders must implicate the self-concepts of their followers and the motivation of self-expression, self-consistency, and the enhancement of self-esteem and self-worth, hypothesizing that in order to achieve such

motivational effects, leaders must emphasize specific content categories in their speeches. Shamir et al. conclude that the message and not only the "messaging" play a role in recruiting followers' self-related motivations, but charismatic leaders must also do more than arouse short-term emotions and enthusiasm among followers. Charismatic leaders must engage in "meaning making" and "framing" by appealing to followers' emotions and their intellect (Shamir, 1994). Shamir et al. ultimately explain that «the function of rhetoric is "adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas" and this is very difficult to achieve without some substance. » (Shamir, 1994, p. 41)

It is important that leaders understand their role as what Conger calls "meaning makers": leaders must be able to construct from reality a picture of greater possibilities. Effective persuasion is subtle and allows the leader to interpret reality and offer images which must seem irresistibly meaningful. The leader's choice of words, value, and beliefs to craft their reality must ensure commitment and confidence. Rhetorical techniques help convey ideas in powerful ways and ensure that strategic goals are well understood, convincing and spark excitement (Conger, 1991). As Conger puts it: «If you as a leader can make an appealing dream seem like tomorrow's reality, your subordinates will freely choose to follow you. » (Conger, 1991, p. 44)

Ragsdale explains that the impact of presidential addresses upon the public is also directly influenced by things such as inflation, unemployment, national events, inaugurations, and military involvement, with every president except Nixon being able to achieve inclusive nonpartisan approval by delivering a major national address. Thus, speeches tend to be inclusive and boost support among middle- and upper-income people. (Ragsdale, 1987). As Cohen explains in *Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda*:

Public receptivity is also important in understanding the president's ability to influence the mass public. On one level, the public is highly receptive to presidents. People are predisposed to accept presidential leadership on public policies; the public has a demand or appetite for presidential leadership. They often await presidential leadership on an issue and criticize presidents who fail to enter policy debate and discussion. The public has no such comparable demand for leadership from any other quarter (Cohen, 1995, p. 89).

Political communication is a central part of political marketing and is used to not only inform but to persuade and change attitudes, with speech acts actively creating specific situations in which they are more likely to persuade and thus legitimize political goals. Iancu et al. explain however, that nowadays, political communication focuses on the new meanings of the messages being created. Thus, considering that political communication is characterized by the intention of influencing one's political environment, political actors shape the information which is provided. A discourse is thus understood as an essential way of creating, defining, and preserving group identities (Iancu et al, 2013).

There are also barriers to the receptivity of the public since publics rarely are an overriding or daily concern for most people as private and personal concerns constrain the role and place of politics in people's lives. The president must also compete with other factors which might influence thinking about politics and policy, and while other politicians might not be strong competitors in this regard, factors such as pre-existing attitudes, the mass media, and real-life experiences effectively compete with the president for influence over public opinion. Cohen explains that the state of the economy and the presence of war will also affect public opinion, he explains that when the economy is faltering, people may feel more vulnerable economically and thus they focus more on the economy, by contrast people are notoriously uninformed and disinterested in international affairs, unless an event looms large enough to affect people's lives directly and profoundly. Cohen goes further stating, that no event is as large as war, thus when the United States engages in a major conflict, public concern should turn to international affairs. (Cohen, 1995).

Cohen's research results indicate that presidential attention, objective conditions, and prior public opinion affect public concern on all three policy areas (foreign policy, economy, civil rights), furthermore it shows that increased presidential emphasis on a policy area results in increased public attention to said area. Thus, one can believe that presidents must resort to solid arguments to be able to influence public opinion and mere rhetorical symbolism might not be enough. As mentioned earlier, the public is generally inattentive to politics and as such, to gain its attention, the president may have to signal that a policy problem is important. One way is to speak about it in solid terms. Thus, the president sees himself in a position where he must explain his position and with that provide more solid information to the public and reinforce that the policy area is important. By taking positions and providing reasons for them, the president thus spends more speech time on the topic which reinforces the importance of that policy area (Cohen, 1995). Nevertheless, presidential rhetoric is persuasive, as the

president stands above all in the political arena: he benefits from greater public prestige, attention, and responsibility, thus, as Cohen points out, "monopolizing the public space". (Cohen, 1995).

The impact of symbolic appeals may vary across the different issue areas, Cohen treats foreign and economic policy as required and differentiates them from the discretionary civil-rights area. Cohen explains that as the public already has a predisposition towards required policy areas and as such it does not take a significant effort to direct their attention towards these areas. Thus, Cohen asserts that symbolic appeals help direct public concern in the foreign and economic policy areas in contrast to discretionary areas to which the public is less attentive and thus take the president more solid argumentation in pointing their importance to the public (Cohen, 1995). As Cohen explains:

Popularity-weighted emphasis for foreign and civil rights policy shows very slight impact beyond non-weighted emphasis, while no impact was found for economic policy. In all, popularity does not seem to increase the president's ability to affect the public's agenda very much «...» (Cohen, 1995, p. 99)

Positional statements help provide clear indicators of presidential policy intentions, which Cohen remarks as an important type of substance in a speech which does not tend to offer policy or programmatic details (State of the Union). Due to the controversy of liberal-conservative divisions, Cohen explains, presidents will often go to greater lengths in justifying their position and undermining the opposition. Being so, the quality of information which reaches the public is stronger and clearer than for other types of statements. Nevertheless, Cohen asserts that the State of the Union varies considerably in this substantiveness, ranging from thirteen percent to almost fifty eight percent. Position taking also varies according to issue area, with fifty seven percent of civil-rights sentences, forty six percent economic-policy sentences and twenty-seven of foreign-policy sentences. On presidents, Cohen explains that the least substantive are Kennedy and George H. Bush who take positions on nineteen percent of their sentences (Cohen, 1995).

Cohen asserts that presidential rhetoric re-structures the public's agenda, and this occurs through presidential attention on some problems and inattention on others. Presidential attention tends to focus in some areas while distracting the public from others. Thus, the role of the president is that of an agenda gate keeper. Alternatively, presidential leadership effects

may be purely ephemeral¹¹². Cohen explains that the public is known for easily diverted attention and his analysis suggests that there is more than presidential rhetoric might be affecting the public agenda (Cohen, 1995). Furthermore, Cohen explains that the president's agenda might not be stable as there is influence by uncontrollable events and crises which push their way to the top of the president's agenda which makes it seem as if the president is often engaged in crisis reaction and management. As presidents address these unforeseen problems, the attention to items emphasized in the State of the Union address recedes and public opinion also focuses on these recent problems while concern for other problems dwindles. Even if presidents try to structure both debate and the agenda, Cohen argues that they cannot sustain their efforts due to the diversionary power of uncontrollable events and easily swayed public attentions (Cohen, 1995).

Cohen asserts that presidential leadership-effects decay for both economic and civil rights by the end of the year, yet they persist for foreign policy, arguing that the fluctuation of economic conditions however has more impact on what people think about the economy than year-old statements by the president, while Civil Rights replays the basic findings on economic policy. Like the economy, sudden events have a strong impact on public concern with Civil Rights, yet they are more volatile. Only in foreign policy does the presidential address of the past year affect public opinion (Cohen, 1995). Thus, the presidents are more able to structure the public agenda regarding foreign policy than either economic or civil rights policy. Cohen explains that therefore presidents tend to favor foreign policy, this also helps explain why presidents are more successful in this area than in others. They can restructure opinion about foreign policy matters, and this tends to persist for a considerable time unlike other areas where presidential leadership effects, while evident, are fading (Cohen, 1995).

Cohen concludes that presidents do influence the public's policy agenda. They do this by giving high-profile speeches dedicated to a policy problem and by consequence that issue will rise on the public agenda. The public responds to said emphasis according to different policy areas in what he calls a multi-policy speech such as the State of the Union address (Cohen, 1995). The president does not need to convince the public that an issue is important by offering any substantive positions: by merely mentioning it the public heightens its concern. Cohen further states that popular presidents are no more persuasive than unpopular ones, which suggests that the office of the presidency itself offers credibility, such that the public is attentive

to all presidents consider important. Nevertheless, the impact of the president in the public's agenda is ephemeral at best and decays quite rapidly (Cohen, 1995). There are efforts which need to happen to keep an issue long enough to institutionalize the problem to build a successful agenda through mobilization. Cohen finds that these efforts have feeble effect if any at all. Again, findings repeat except for foreign policy. Presidential policy emphasis sets the public's problem agenda, but not for long. This shows both the potential and limitations of presidential leadership of public opinion. As stated, presidents can grab the public's attention, but are unable to hold it exceptionally long. This can lead presidents to develop a false sense of power and influence due to the ease with which they are able to find listeners, failing to note how swiftly those listeners shift their attentions (Cohen, 1995).

Cohen advises presidents to "hit the ground running." Although public concern may recede quickly as other issues push to the top, results suggest that presidents should "keep on hitting until the policy process is played out". Presidential persistence should help enact domestic policy initiatives in part due to persistence helping keep public attention focused on the issues the president decides to emphasize. Presidential silence or attention to other policy issues might dissipate public attention on the original concern, this may however undercut the chances of the original concern resulting in policy (Cohen, 1995).

Conclusion

This research has concluded its purpose in asserting the importance of the American way of war for both academics and policymakers. As Echevarria II explains:

To date no way of war has had as much written about it or has been as influential or as controversial as the American one. That is likely to remain the case because the contemporary use of force is too important to too many people for the opposite to occur. For that reason, the phrase "American way of war" will probably remain strong currency within the defense circles for some time. (II A. J., *Reconsidering the American Way of War*, 2014, p. 13)

Ultimately, even though culture can be a seductive and convenient answer, Echevarria II asserts that it is more a way to circumvent the problem than cause or a solution. One must not give into cultural determinism: either the culture must change around the American way of war, or the country must avoid getting involved in conflicts such as Vietnam and Iraq. Perhaps, as Milner asserted, further comparative approaches will help shed light into the uniquely American approach to war.

It has been made clear through this research that war is used as political instrument for both foreign and domestic agendas, with success or failure on the battlefield affecting the U.S.'s dealings in the international community, while domestically policymakers have often used these results to strengthen their standings and weaken opponents. It is thus clear that in the context of war, policymakers will focus specifically on the diplomatic struggles which are born out of conflict. As established by Lian et al., although it is certainly convincing to believe that presidents are quick on the uptake of taking advantage of public responsiveness to the country's involvement in military confrontation to boost their numbers, the reality of it is that presidents are influenced by both partisan and foreign policy motives which are linked to national interest. Furthermore, it has been established that presidents have little to gain from a rally effect. Nevertheless, as Echevarria the II points out, the communication between the civilian government and the military institutions must remain unimpeded and continued. Policymakers must increase their knowledge and comfortability with a wider array of military operations, to succeed in emphasizing the importance of a conflict in the future and for the American way of war to be more than a way of battle. Regardless, as Echevarria II concludes:

Paradoxically, we can know a way of war only historically - by what it has done. Unfortunately, historical knowledge tells us little about what that way of war will be in the years ahead. The force reductions underway in the United States are already changing that style of fighting in important ways, creating a different set of shortcomings than those we had overcome just recently. By the next conflict there will be a newer American way of war, but the need to align, and realign, policy aims, and real capabilities is the one continuity that will require constant attention. (II A. J., What is Wrong With the American Way of War?, 2012, p. 114)

The impact of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns will, according to Record, extend into the political establishment and be more than simple neoconservative influence on foreign policy. It is likely that, as Record explains, future presidents will find it much more difficult to sell military action which would put the United States into another civil conflict where the United States has seemingly no interests. It is likely that a similar sentiment to Vietnam syndrome will develop and have consequences for foreign policy after these campaigns. With heightened skepticism as to the benefits of a sizeable defense budget, American duty and the values of international cooperation being emphasized in the future. As Record states developments might lead the U.S. to seek cooperation and show greater humility.

This research has further shown that even though most Americans know the overall position of the United States on the international stage they are less knowledgeable of the mechanics of foreign Policy, this is because as established, the public attention is swayed easily, and the public is not always focused on foreign issues. Most Americans are also knowledgeable of the history of violence of the United States and tend to disregard its internal maladies. Violence is established as a crucial part of the American identity, with no duty to retreat being a concept born out of violence. Through Brown we have laid out many examples of this attitude throughout the country's history. It is a concept which was defended by several American leaders and is engraved into many parts of American life (i.e., foreign affairs, military values, and civilian life). As Brown explains belief in no duty to retreat is deeply entrenched into what it means to be an American.

Presidents may use different values (i.e., freedom, religion, Lockean values) and may use them in different manners according to the issue in public attention. Discussing partisan differences, Republicans tend to be more conservative and have more conservative policies, being more prone to the ideological, they also tend to be less internationalist. They are more supportive of individual rights. Democrats in opposition to Republicans tend to be more liberal,

focusing on liberal values and are thus more internationalist. The crucial difference established by Cantril is the belief in progress of the individual, with Democrats being more in favor of this than Republicans. Furthermore, Democrats tend to stress the idea of responsibility as opposed to an idea of opportunity stressed by Republicans. Regarding values both parties have made these a part of their discourse being very little difference except in the way they employ the terms. Finally in terms of religiosity, the only differences seem to be at the level of intensity, with the view that there is too much religiosity in American speechmaking being more widespread among Democrats.

The role of the president as a spokesman of the nation is always at odds with their role of foreign policy planner and domestic initiator. Nevertheless, it has been established that even if sometimes temporary, presidential rhetoric and presidential speech does have the ability to set or at least focus the agenda and point the public into a desirable direction through imagery and rhetoric. As stated, the effects are longer lasting where foreign policy is concerned, with presidents favoring this area which further explains why presidents tend to be more successful in this area than in others.

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ANNEX



Joint Vision 2010



"The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow. Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationally based template for the evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future. It must become a benchmark for Service and Unified Command visions."

A stylized, handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, flowing 'J' followed by a series of loops and a final flourish.

John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



CJCS Vision

America's Military Preparing
for Tomorrow: *Quality People
Trained, Equipped and Ready
for Joint Operations*

~Persuasive in Peace

~Decisive in War

~Preeminent in Any
Form of Conflict

Contents

1. Introduction
3. Threads of Continuity
8. Dynamic Changes
17. Conduct of Joint Operations
32. Implementing Joint Vision
34. Conclusion



Joint Vision 2010

The conceptual
template for how
we will channel the
vitality of our
people and
leverage
technological
opportunities to
achieve new levels
of effectiveness in
joint warfighting



Joint Vision 2010

America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow

Introduction

Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for how America's Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. Focused on achieving dominance across the range of military operations through the application of new operational concepts, this template provides a common direction for our Services in developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs as they prepare to meet an uncertain and challenging future.

JV 2010 begins by addressing the expected continuities and changes in the strategic environment, including technology trends and their implications for our Armed Forces. It recognizes the crucial importance of our current high quality, highly

trained forces and provides the basis for their further enhancement by prescribing how we will fight in the early 21st century.

This vision of future warfighting embodies the improved intelligence and

command and control available in the information age and goes on to develop four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics.



Each of the operational concepts incorporates America's core strengths of high quality people and information-age technological advances, builds on proven competencies, and focuses the development of future joint capabilities. Together, the application of these four concepts by robust high quality forces will provide America with the capability to dominate an opponent across the range of military operations. This Full Spectrum Dominance will be the key characteristic we seek for our Armed Forces in the 21st century.

Joint Vision 2010 then examines the six critical elements required to transform the operational concepts into joint capabilities: people, leadership, doctrine, education and training, organizational structure, and

materiel. In its conclusion, JV 2010 assesses the challenges and opportunities in moving toward implementation of the vision.

This vision draws on our most fundamental source of strength—our people. People are the Armed Forces; at the end of the day, our success, in war or in peace, will rest ultimately on the men and women of the Armed Forces.

The skills and vitality of our people will also provide the driving force for shaping change. Channeling our strengths with this vision, we will move toward a common goal: a joint force—persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.

Threads of Continuity

As we build our forces to this joint vision, there will be strong threads of continuity with the contemporary strategic and operational environment. Among these threads are American goals and interests, as well as the missions, tasks, strategic concepts, and quality of our Armed Forces.

America's Goals and Interests

America's enduring goals include: protecting the lives and safety of Americans both at home and abroad;



maintaining the political freedom and national independence of the United States with its values, institutions, and territory intact; and providing for the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people.

These goals, in turn, generate American interests which must be protected and advanced. Our fundamental interests lie in enhancing US security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy abroad.

The United States has undertaken foreign and security policies aimed at securing these interests. Ensuring strong relations with our allies, protecting our rights of transit on the high seas, and enlarging the community of free market democracies are examples of policies we are likely to continue to pursue in the years ahead. On the whole, there is likely to be far more continuity than change in these interests and policies.



Missions, Tasks, and Strategic Concepts of the Armed Forces

To protect our vital national interests we will require strong armed forces, which are organized, trained, and equipped to fight and win against any adversary at any level of conflict. Concurrently, we must also be able to employ these forces in operations other than war to assist in the pursuit of other important interests.

The primary task of the Armed Forces will remain to deter conflict—but, should deterrence fail, to fight and win our nation's wars. In addition, we should expect to participate in a broad range of deterrent,

conflict prevention, and peacetime activities. Further, our history, strategy, and recent experience suggest that we will usually work in concert with our friends and allies in almost all operations.

America's strategic nuclear deterrent, along with appropriate national level detection and defensive capabilities will likely remain at the core of American national security. However, the bulk of our Armed Forces will be engaged in or training for worldwide military operations. In these operations, we will largely draw upon our conventional warfighting

capabilities—we will fight if we must—but will also use these same capabilities to deter, contain conflict, fight and win, or otherwise promote American interests and values.

To ensure we can accomplish these tasks, power projection, enabled by overseas presence, will likely remain the fundamental strategic concept of our future force. We will remain largely a force that is based in the continental United States (CONUS). However, our permanently stationed overseas forces, infrastructure and equipment, temporarily deployed forces, and the interaction between US and foreign militaries together demonstrate our commitments, strengthen our military capabilities, and enhance the organization of coalitions and multinational operations to deter or defeat aggression. Power projection from the United States, achieved through rapid strategic mobility, will enable the timely response

critical to our deterrent and warfighting capabilities.

Our overseas presence and highly mobile forces will both remain essential to future operations.

The Quality of Our Force

Currently, our Armed Forces are the best trained, best equipped, and most ready force in the world. The quality of our people is unequalled at all levels of the chain of command. Leaders in each of our Services are developed through well-conceived, intensive, and long-term programs. Our equipment is first-rate and it is sustainable in all operations. Together, our personnel, leadership, and

equipment are molded into exceptionally able forces through stressful training, which closely approximates wartime conditions and requirements.

Since the mid-1980s, this high quality has been the essence of the Armed Forces. Military operations are planned knowing that leaders truly understand the requirements, the equipment is operable and safe, and the men and women at the



cutting edge have the skills and character to execute their tasks successfully.

However, this quality force has been achieved only at great expense and effort. It has required the creation of institutions and procedures, sharpened over more than two decades of experience, to develop these Armed Forces in the most effective and efficient manner possible. These institutions and procedures, and the high quality forces they have produced, remain at the very center of Joint Vision 2010.

Attracting people with the intellectual tools, physical skills, and motivation to serve effectively in the military was foremost among the requirements for building a professional, robust, and ready force. In the late 1970s, over 15 percent of our enlistees scored in the lowest category for military qualification examinations. Today, less than 1 percent are in that category and over 90 percent of our enlistees have graduated from high school.

The combination of careful targeting of requirements, recruiting incentives, quality of life initiatives, and challenging opportunities has been very effective in attracting the personnel needed to sustain our quality force.

Retention of highly trained Service members in sufficient numbers has also been a key requirement, and we intend to sustain these efforts. Our first-term reenlistment rates have risen by 10 percent over the last fifteen years. Higher retention is the result of a committed effort by top leadership throughout the government toward raising career satisfaction, improving command climates, keeping pay competitive and benefits stable, maintaining time at home and deployed at an acceptable balance, and focusing on quality of life initiatives.

Another element of our success has been effective leadership development. From deliberate and intensive processes involving

institutional, on-the-job, and self-study methods, the men and women of our Armed Forces gain the skills, knowledge, and attitudes required to accomplish their required tasks across the range of military operations. These formal development processes are designed to balance timing, costs, and operational requirements, at each level of leadership. We will retain those innovative processes to ensure that we maintain the best possible leadership for our Armed Forces.

Realistic and stressful training has been the primary way to keep readiness high and prepare our men and women to face the challenges of combat. Such training, consisting of carefully balanced programs of individual, crew, and larger organizational training and assessments, is central to training the way we will fight. From individual or crew mission simulators, through full-blown field exercises at home or abroad, realistic, evaluated training is and

The Foundation of Joint Vision 2010



training and exercises have improved our interoperability and understanding of the strengths of each individual Service as well as allies and coalition partners. From the individual warfighter to large multinational forces, this systematic approach has enabled our men and women to hone their skills in practice many times before ever having to perform

Today, our highly trained, quality force has the tools to perform its warfighting tasks. Just 15 years ago, our forces were less well equipped, spare parts inventories were critically short, and sustainability was low. Since then, we have modernized our force and ensured that we procured the parts and provided the

Technologically superior equipment has been critical to the success of our forces in combat. This first-rate equipment, when combined with our top quality forces, has been a key element of our continuing operational successes. We must continue to ensure our soldiers, sailors, airmen,

marines are fully capable of fulfilling their required tasks with equipment that is engineered to provide superior mission performance as well as safety and reliability. We must maintain a careful balance between equipping and sustaining our forces and between tooth and tail in our force structure. We must also work to assure an efficient and effective support structure and resources for all of our forces.

Dynamic Changes

Accelerating rates of change will make the future environment more unpredictable and less stable, presenting our Armed Forces with a wide range of plausible futures. Whatever direction global change ultimately takes, it will affect how we think about and conduct joint and multinational operations in the 21st century. How we respond to dynamic changes concerning potential adversaries, technological advances and their implications, and the emerging importance for information superiority will dramatically impact how well our Armed Forces can perform its duties in 2010.

The Imperative of Jointness

America's Armed Forces are smaller than we have been in over 40 years, and we have decreased the percentage of our forces permanently stationed overseas. Faced with flat budgets and increasingly more costly readiness and modernization, we should not expect a return to the larger active forces of the Cold War period.

The American people will continue to expect us to win in any engagement, but they will also expect us to be more efficient in protecting lives and resources while accomplishing the

mission successfully.

Commanders will be expected to reduce the costs and adverse effects of military operations, from environmental disruption in training to collateral damage in combat. Risks and expenditures will be even more closely scrutinized than they are at present.


Simply to retain our effectiveness with less redundancy, we will need to wring every ounce of capability from every available source. That outcome can only be accomplished through a more seamless integration

of Service capabilities. To achieve this integration while conducting military operations we must be fully joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically. Future commanders must be able to visualize and create the “best fit” of available forces needed to produce the immediate effects and achieve the desired results.

Multinational Operations

It is not enough just to be joint, when conducting future operations. We must find the most effective methods for integrating and improving interoperability with allied and coalition partners. Although our Armed Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength, we expect to work in concert with allied and coalition forces in nearly all of our future operations, and increasingly, our procedures, programs, and planning must recognize this reality.





Potential Adversaries

There will continue to be states or groups that oppose or threaten American interests and values or those of our friends and allies. Our recognition of these threats and challenges will continue to drive our national security efforts.

Greater global interaction will strongly influence the nature

of future threats. Wider access to advanced technology along with modern weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the requisite skills to maintain and employ it, will increase the number of actors with sufficient military potential to upset existing regional balances of power.

Modern systems are sufficiently powerful that smaller numbers can dramatically alter the threats facing us. A number of potential adversaries may acquire the military hardware to make themselves distinctly more dangerous.

Our most vexing future adversary may be one who can use technology to make rapid improvements in its military capabilities that

provide asymmetrical counters to US military strengths, including information technologies. Alternatively, the high leverage associated with modern systems means that significant improvements in military capabilities can occur very rapidly, outrunning the pace of compensating political or military countermeasures.

The application of these technologies against us may also prove surprising. Our adversaries will have an independent will, some knowledge of our capabilities, and the desire to avoid our strengths and exploit vulnerabilities. We anticipate the probability of facing technological or operational surprise will increase in the period ahead.

In sum, the US must prepare to face a wider range of threats, emerging unpredictably, employing varying combinations of technology, and challenging us at varying levels of intensity.

Advancing Technology Trends

This era will be one of accelerating technological change. Critical advances will have enormous impact on all military forces. Successful adaptation of new and improved technologies may provide great increases in specific capabilities. Conversely, failure to understand and adapt could lead today's militaries into premature obsolescence and greatly increase the risks that such forces will be incapable of effective operations against forces with high technology.

Long-range precision capability, combined with a wide range of delivery systems, is emerging as a key factor in future warfare. Technological advances will continue the trend toward improved precision. Global positioning systems, high-energy research, electromagnetic technology, and enhanced stand-off capabilities will provide increased accuracy and a wider range of delivery options. These capabilities will increase the combat power available for use against selected objectives, resulting in enhanced economy of force and a higher tempo of operations.






The ability to produce a broader range of potential weapons effects, from less-lethal to hard target kill, from sensor-fused to directed energy weapons, will further enhance precision capability. Advances in target effects technologies will be integrated into existing

weapons and give commanders greater flexibility. These improvements will result in increasingly discrete and precise capabilities, which can achieve optimum results in both combat and other operations.

Advances in low observable technologies and the ability to mask friendly forces will also continue over the next 15 years. Signature reduction will enhance the ability to engage adversaries anywhere in the battlespace and improve the survivability of forces who employ it.



Stealth will strengthen the ability to accomplish surprise, reduce overall force requirements in many operations, and make forces less visible to an unsophisticated or disoriented adversary. Micro-miniaturization will also promote signature reduction and greatly increase the capabilities available for individuals and small units. Concurrently, multispectral sensing, automated target recognition, and other advances will enhance the detectability of targets across the battlespace, improving detection ranges, turning



night into day for some classes of operations, reducing the risk of fratricide and further accelerating operational tempo.

Improvements in information and systems integration technologies will also significantly impact future military operations by providing decision makers with accurate information in a timely manner. Information

technology will improve the ability to see, prioritize, assign, and assess information. The fusion of all-source intelligence with the fluid integration of sensors, platforms, command organizations, and logistic support centers will allow a greater number of operational tasks to be accomplished faster. Advances in computer processing, precise global positioning, and telecommunications will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and distribute relevant data to thousands of locations.

Forces harnessing the capabilities potentially available from this system of systems will gain dominant battlespace awareness, an interactive “picture” which will yield much more accurate assessments of friendly and enemy operations within the area of interest. Although this will not eliminate the fog of war, dominant battlespace awareness will improve situational awareness, decrease response time, and make the battlespace considerably more transparent to those who achieve it.

Implications of Technological Advances on Our Armed Forces

The combination of these technology trends will provide an order of magnitude improvement in lethality. Commanders will be able to attack targets successfully with fewer platforms and less ordnance while achieving objectives more rapidly and with reduced risk. Individual warfighters will be empowered as never before, with an array of detection, targeting, and communications equipment that will greatly magnify the power of small units. Strategically, this improvement will enable more rapid power projection and reduced logistics tails. Operationally, within the theater, these



More Lethal Battlespace:

Will increase the importance of

~Stealth

~Mobility

~Dispersion

~Pursuit of a Higher Operational Tempo

capabilities will mean a more rapid transition from deployment to full operational capability. As a result, we will improve our capability for rapid, worldwide deployment while becoming even more tactically mobile and lethal.

The implications of this increased lethality for overall force structure requirements are unclear. Given current technology, today's force structure is adequate to meet our full range of global needs, but barely so. While these prospective improvements in lethality clearly offer promise of reducing the number of platforms and the amount of ordnance required to destroy targets, many military missions will require occupation of the ground, and intensive physical presence. For these missions the promises of technology are less certain, especially in environments such as cities or jungles.

During all operations, advanced technology in the hands of an adversary will increase the importance of force protection at all echelons. Any efficiencies garnered by our offensive systems must be underwritten by appropriate redundancies to safeguard against unanticipated technological, strategic, or operational surprise.

Adaptations to this increasingly lethal battlespace will be warranted. These adaptations are likely to take the forms of increased stealth, mobility, dispersion and pursuit of a higher tempo of operations among elements within the battlespace.

To cope with more lethal systems and improved targeting, our forces will require stealth and other means of passive protection, along with mobility superior to the enemy's ability to retarget or react to our forces. Increased stealth will reduce an enemy's ability to target our forces. Increased dispersion and mobility are possible offensively because each platform or each individual warfighter carries higher

lethality and has greater reach. Defensively, dispersion and higher tempo complicate enemy targeting and reduce the effectiveness of area attack and area denial weaponry such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The capability to control the tempo of operations and, if necessary, sustain a tempo faster than the enemy's will also help enable our forces to seize and maintain the initiative during military operations.

Greater mobility and increased dispersion will, in turn, require additional communications and coordination capabilities since the synchronization of these dispersed elements will become even more important. Fortunately, the technology for this improved systems integration is at hand.

The implications of improved systems integration are both profound and complex. New technologies will allow increased capability at lower echelons to control more



lethal forces over larger areas, thus leveraging the skills and initiative of individuals and small units. These capabilities could empower a degree of independent maneuver, planning, and coordination at lower echelons, which were normally exercised by more senior commanders in the past. Concurrently, commanders at higher echelons will use these technologies to reduce the friction of war and to apply precise centralized control when and where appropriate.

Even for higher level commanders, the accelerated operational tempo and greater

integration requirements will likely create a more stressful, faster moving decision environment. Real-time information will likely drive parallel, not sequential, planning and real-time, not prearranged, decision making. The optimal balance between centralized and decentralized command and control will have to be carefully developed as systems are brought into the inventories.



Information Superiority

The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.

Emerging Importance of Information Superiority

Throughout history, gathering, exploiting, and protecting information have been critical in command, control, and intelligence. The unqualified importance of information will not change in 2010. What will differ is the increased access to information and improvements in the speed and accuracy of prioritizing and transferring data brought about by advances in technology. While the friction and the fog of war can never be eliminated, new technology promises to mitigate their impact.

Sustaining the responsive, high quality data processing and information needed for joint military operations will require more than just an edge over an adversary. We must have information superiority: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.

Information superiority will require both offensive and defensive information warfare (IW). Offensive information warfare will degrade or exploit an adversary's collection or use of information. It will include both traditional methods, such as a precision attack to destroy an adversary's command and control capability, as well as nontraditional methods such as electronic intrusion into an information and control network to convince, confuse, or deceive enemy military decision makers.

There should be no misunderstanding that our effort to achieve and maintain information superiority will also invite resourceful enemy attacks on our information systems. Defensive information warfare to protect our ability to conduct information operations will be one of our biggest challenges in the period ahead. Traditional defensive IW operations include physical security measures and encryption. Nontraditional actions will range from antivirus protection to innovative methods of secure data transmission. In addition, increased strategic level programs will be required in this critical area.



Conduct of Joint Operations

Our forces have been largely organized, trained, and equipped to defeat military forces of our potential adversaries. Direct combat against an enemy's armed forces is the most demanding and complex set of requirements we have faced. Other operations, from humanitarian assistance in peacetime through peace operations in a near hostile environment, have proved to be possible using forces optimized for wartime effectiveness.

Technological advances will magnify the advantages provided by our high quality force. The promise provided by these

technologies is best viewed from an operational perspective. In the past, our capabilities often required us to physically mass forces to neutralize enemy power. The time needed to build up and employ massed combat forces, including the platforms, weapons, and associated logistics, required to achieve success resulted in military operations that were largely sequential in nature and tactics which too often saw ground, maritime, and air forces massed in time and space.

By 2010, we should be able to change how we conduct the most intense joint operations. Instead of relying on massed forces and sequential operations, we will achieve massed effects in other ways. Information superiority and advances in technology will enable us to achieve the desired effects through the tailored application of joint combat power. Higher lethality weapons will allow us to conduct attacks concurrently that formerly required massed assets,

applied in a sequential manner. With precision targeting and longer range systems, commanders can achieve the necessary destruction or suppression of enemy forces with fewer systems, thereby reducing the need for time-consuming and risky massing of people and equipment. Improved command and control, based on fused, all-source, real-time intelligence will reduce the need to assemble maneuver formations days and hours in advance of attacks. Providing improved targeting information directly to the most effective weapon system will potentially reduce the traditional force requirements at the point of main effort.

All of this suggests that we will be increasingly able to accomplish the effects of mass—the necessary concentration of combat power at the decisive time and place—with less need to mass forces physically than in the past.

This will enhance our combat capabilities against opposing military forces. To be sure, this will not obviate the ultimate need for “boots on the ground” in many operations, nor will it relieve our Service men and women of the need to be physically present at the decisive points in battle or in other operations, or to be exposed to conditions of great danger and hardship.

However, in all operations technological advances and our use of information will give our warfighters at the individual, crew, and small unit levels major qualitative advantages over potential adversaries. Our forces will be able to sense dangers sooner. They will have increased awareness of the overall operational environment, including the situation of friendly forces, allowing them to make better decisions more rapidly. They will have an enhanced ability to produce a range of desired effects by bringing together the correct mix of

assets at the place and time most favorable to success. When tied to a more rapid resupply, reinforcement, and reengagement capability, they will be better able to provide the best response at less risk to themselves, based on the mission objectives and circumstances of the battlespace. Whether operating from dispersed locations or in close proximity to each other, the confidence of each individual warfighter or crew will be bolstered by enhanced connectivity to comrades, supporting elements, and higher commands.

In sum, by 2010 we should be able to enhance the capabilities of our forces through technology. This will, in turn, expand our greatest advantage: the adaptability, initiative, teamwork, and commitment of our people at every level.

To exploit the enormous potential of technology, we must develop in a systematic manner the full range of

Emerging Operational Concepts



required enhancements. This process must begin with a new conceptual framework for operations.

The basis for this framework is found in the improved command, control, and intelligence which can be assured by information superiority. These are the most straightforward applications

of much of the new technology; however, the full impact of these technologies is more profound. Enhanced command and control, and much improved intelligence, along with other applications of new technology will transform the traditional functions of maneuver, strike, protection, and logistics.

These transformations will be so powerful that they become, in effect, new operational concepts: dominant maneuver; precision engagement; full dimensional protection; and focused logistics. These operational concepts will provide our forces with a new conceptual framework.

New Operational Concepts


Dominant Maneuver

Dominant maneuver will be the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, and space forces to accomplish the assigned operational tasks. Dominant maneuver will allow our forces to gain a decisive advantage by controlling the breadth, depth, and height of the battlespace.

Through a combination of asymmetric leverage, achieved by our positional advantages, as well as decisive speed and tempo, dominant maneuver allows us to apply decisive force

to attack enemy centers of gravity at all levels and compels an adversary to either react from a position of disadvantage or quit.

Dominant maneuver will require forces that are adept at conducting sustained and synchronized operations from dispersed locations. They must be able to apply overwhelming force in the same medium and create



asymmetric advantages by attacking cross-dimensionally, such as air or sea against ground or ground and sea against air defenses. These forces must have the ability to outpace and outmaneuver the enemy. Current systems, enhanced by information superiority, will provide a clearer picture of enemy and friendly locations. Information superiority also will allow joint commanders to coordinate widely dispersed units, receive accurate feedback, and execute more demanding, higher precision requirements. Increasingly lethal direct and indirect fire systems, with longer ranges and more accurate targeting, will increase the punch of these forces as they maneuver.

The tailor-to-task organizational ability will provide the additional advantage of self protection—another key element for successfully achieving dominant maneuver. The combination of seamless operations with reduced “buildup time” and a smaller, more widely dispersed

footprint will make it much more difficult for an adversary to find and attack our forces. Other defensive measures, low observable technologies, signature reduction, and enhanced deception capabilities will provide similar advantages for protection and improve our chances for mission success.


Altogether, the organizational concept of dominant maneuver is a prescription for more agile, faster moving joint operations, which will combine air, land, and maritime forces more effectively to deliver decisive combat power.

Precision Engagement

Precision engagement will consist of a system of systems that enables our forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess our level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage with precision when required. Even from extended ranges, precision engagement will allow us to shape the battlespace, enhancing the protection of our forces.

Information operations will tie together high fidelity target acquisition, prioritized requirements, and command and control of joint forces within the battlespace. This combination will provide a greater assurance of delivering the desired effect, lessen the risk to our forces, and minimize collateral damage.

Precision engagement will build on current US advantages in delivery accuracy and low observable technologies. It will use a wide variety of means, including very accurate aerial deliveries or air drops, discriminate weapon strikes, and precise, all-weather stand-off capability. Enhanced jointness will ensure greater commonality between Service precision engagement



capabilities and provide future joint force commanders with a wider array of responsive, accurate, and flexible options.

Full-Dimensional Protection

We must also protect our own forces from the very technologies that we are exploiting. Unless we provide an adequate measure of protection for our forces, these new operational concepts will be highly vulnerable to disruption. We will achieve this required level of protection through the concept called full dimensional protection. The primary prerequisite for full-dimensional protection will be control of the battlespace to ensure our forces can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and engagement, while providing multi-layered defenses for our forces and facilities at all levels. Full-dimensional protection will enable the effective employment of our forces while degrading opportunities for the enemy. It will be essential, in most cases, for gaining and maintaining the initiative required to execute decisive operations. The concept will be proactive,

incorporating both offensive and defensive actions that may extend well into areas of enemy operations.


Full-dimensional protection will be built upon information superiority which will provide multidimensional awareness and assessment, as well as identification of all forces in the battlespace.

Information warfare will support this effort by protecting our information systems and processes, while denying an adversary the similar capabilities.

Upon this information base, we will employ a full array of active and passive measures at multiple echelons. Active measures will include battlespace control operations to guarantee the air, sea, space, and information superiority that is needed to gain the degree of control to accomplish the assigned tasks. Active measures will also include an integrated, in-depth theater air and missile defense that will exploit Service-unique capabilities to detect, identify, locate, track, and

deny enemy attacks on our joint forces.

Passive measures will include the inherent protection provided by information superiority and dispersal to increase our warning of attacks. Operational dispersion will further reduce risks to our forces. New sensors and information dissemination systems will be deployed to detect chemical or biological attack at great ranges and provide warning to specific units that may be affected.



Enhanced deception and camouflage measures, increased individual and collective protection, and a joint restoration capability against the effects of WMD are also key elements for achieving full dimensional protection.

Most importantly, these active and passive measures will be combined to provide a more seamless joint architecture for force protection, which will leverage the contributions of individual Services, systems, and echelons. The result will be improved freedom of action for friendly forces, and better protection at all echelons against precision attack, weapons of mass destruction, and other conventional or non-conventional systems.

Focused Logistics


Each of the preceding concepts relies on our ability to project power with the most capable forces, at the decisive time and place. To optimize all three concepts, logistics must be responsive, flexible, and precise.

Focused logistics will be the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations. It will be fully adaptive to the needs of our increasingly dispersed and mobile forces, providing support in hours or days versus weeks. Focused logistics will enable joint forces of the future to be more mobile, versatile, and projectable from anywhere in the world.

Logistic functions will incorporate information

technologies to transition from the rigid vertical organizations of the past. Modular and specifically tailored combat service support packages will evolve in response to wide-ranging contingency requirements. Service and Defense agencies will work jointly and integrate with the civilian sector, where required, to take advantage of advanced business practices, commercial economies, and global networks. Active and reserve combat service support capabilities, prepared for complete integration into joint operations, will provide logistic support and sustainment as long as necessary.

Information technologies will enhance airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning capabilities to lighten deployment loads, assist pinpoint logistics delivery systems, and extend the reach and longevity of systems currently in the




inventory. The combined impact of these improvements will be a smaller, more capable deployed force. It will require less continuous support with a smaller logistics footprint, decreasing the vulnerability of our logistics lines of communication.

Full Spectrum Dominance

Each of these new operational concepts will reinforce the others and will allow us to achieve massed effects in warfare from more dispersed forces. This synergy will greatly enhance our capabilities in high intensity conventional military operations.

However, the synergy of these four concepts transcends intense conventional warfighting. Without overspecialization, the development of these new operational concepts has great potential to fulfill more effectively the full range of tasks assigned to us. That is, taken together these four new concepts will enable us to dominate the full range of military operations from humanitarian assistance, through peace operations, up to and into the highest intensity conflict.

Full Spectrum Dominance



Information superiority will provide a commander with enhanced awareness of his area of responsibility, whether his objective is to close with and engage an adversary or render assistance in a humanitarian operation. Surveillance, reconnaissance and knowledge of the precise location of dispersed friendly forces with the ability to direct effectively their efforts are applicable for all military tasks.

Likewise, the tactical mobility required for dominant maneuver which enables our forces rapidly to move into position to overwhelm an enemy will also allow commanders to place forces in positions of control in counterdrug, counterterrorism, or peace-keeping operations. Precision engagement capabilities designed for warfighting tasks will also enable greater discrimination in

the application of force against an emerging threat during peace enforcement operations. Full-dimensional protection will allow freedom of action for our forces and limit their vulnerability during combat and noncombat operations. Focused logistics will ensure delivery of the precise amount and types of supplies required for our joint forces to succeed in combat or noncombat operations.

Although the positive implications for enhancing our capabilities across the range of military operations seem obvious, we cannot assume that all new concepts will be equally valuable in all operations. In intensive combat, target destruction may be essential in the early engagements of an operation, but extensive physical presence may later be necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. This presence may be required to fully neutralize enemy forces, deal with prisoners and potentially hostile populations, or otherwise assure that success in attacking targets is followed through to achieve the overall objectives of the operation. For noncombat operations, physical presence will likely be even more important. Thus, we must ensure that capturing the new technologies does not overspecialize the force; we must retain balanced and sustainable capabilities. We recognize that, regardless of how sophisticated technology becomes, the individual warfighter's judgment,



creativity, and adaptability in the face of highly dynamic situations will be essential to the success of future joint operations. The human element is especially important in situations where we cannot bring our technological capabilities fully to bear against opponents who seek to

nullify our technological superiority by various means. In these cases, our success will depend, as it has historically, upon the physical, intellectual, and moral strengths of the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine—especially their adaptability in the face of the unexpected.

Critical Considerations

To sustain the Armed Forces and instill these new operational concepts will require high quality people—the key ingredient for success. The judgment, creativity, and fortitude of our people will remain the key to success in future joint operations. Turning concepts into capabilities requires adapting our leadership, doctrine, education and training, organizations, and materiel to meet the high tempo, high technology demands posed by these new concepts.



Critical Considerations

- ~High Quality People
- ~Innovative Leadership
- ~Joint Doctrine
- ~Joint Education and Training
- ~Agile Organizations
- ~Enhanced Materiel

Dedicated, High Quality People

Thus, recruiting and retaining dedicated high quality people will remain our first priority. Only a force that has the courage, stamina, and intellectual ability to cope with the complexity and rapid pace of future joint operations will have the capability to achieve full spectrum dominance.

We cannot expect risk-free, push-button style operations in the future. Military operations will continue to demand extraordinary dedication and sacrifice under the most adverse conditions. Some military operations will require close combat on the ground, at sea, or in the air. The courage and heart of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will remain the foundation of all that our Armed Forces must do.

Innovative Leadership

The dynamic nature of joint operations in the 21st century battlespace will require a continued emphasis on developing strong leadership skills. While we must do everything possible to leverage the power of advanced technologies, there are inherent limitations. Confronting the inevitable friction and fog of war against a resourceful and strong minded adversary, the human dimension including innovative strategic and operational thinking and strong leadership will be essential to achieve decisive results. Effective leadership provides our greatest hedge against uncertainty.

We will build upon the enduring foundation of functional expertise, core values, and high ethical standards. Our future leaders at all levels of command must understand the interrelationships among military power, diplomacy, and economic pressure, as well as the role of various government agencies and non-governmental actors, in achieving our security objectives. They will require a sophisticated

understanding of historical context and communication skills to succeed in the future. The evolution of command structures, increased pace and scope of operations, and the continuing refinement of force structure and organizations will require leaders with a knowledge of the capabilities of all four services. Without sacrificing their basic service competencies, these future leaders must be schooled in joint operations from the beginning of their careers.

This leadership development must begin rigorous selection processes and extend beyond formal education and training. Hands-on experience in a variety of progressive assignments must stress innovation, dealing with ambiguity, and a sophisticated understanding of the military art. In short, our leaders must demonstrate the very highest levels of skill and versatility in ever more complex joint and multinational operations.

Joint Doctrine

As we change the way we fight, joint doctrine will remain the foundation that fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for joint military operations. Joint doctrine is a critical ingredient for success because the way in which leaders think and organize their forces will be as important as the technology we use to conduct future joint operations. Future joint doctrine must articulate the process required for successful joint planning but must be flexible enough to serve as a broad framework to guide our forces in joint and multinational operations. It is the key to enhanced jointness because it transforms technology, new ideas, and operational concepts into joint capabilities.

We will discover new ways to change the development process for joint doctrine. Thus, we must integrate “top-down” doctrine throughout the development cycle, while continuing to ensure that joint doctrine fully incorporates the strengths that each Service brings to joint warfare.





Joint Doctrine

Joint Doctrine
Serves as Common
Perspective

- ~Authoritative
Guidance for
Our Forces
- ~Provide Focus
for Systems
Application &
Technology

Fundamentally
Shapes the Way We
Plan, Think & Train for
Military Operations

- ~New Operational
Concepts Provide
the Foundation
for Evolution

Joint Education and Training

Our education and training programs must prepare joint warriors to meet the challenges of the future battlespace. These programs must emphasize employment of new technologies and achieving the operational concepts outlined in this vision. It is essential that our Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) programs provide our warfighters with an understanding of strategic concepts in the future environment where military force will be applied, as well as an in-depth understanding of individual Service systems and how the integration of these systems enhance joint operations.

The requirement for high quality, realistic, and stressful training that amplifies education and fully prepares our forces for joint operations is similarly important. We must emphasize integration of joint capabilities and develop skills that increase individual and organizational effectiveness. Our training must reflect emerging threats and include both information saturation and total interruption of information flow.

Enhanced modeling and simulation of the battlespace, when coupled to on the ground evaluation with real soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, can improve the realism of training, upgrade the levels of day-to-day readiness, and increase our opportunities to test innovative concepts and new strategies. Simulations must be interconnected globally—creating a near-real-time interactive simulation superhighway between our forces in every theater. Each CINC must be able to tap into this global network and connect forces worldwide that would be available for theater operations. This network will allow selected units in CONUS to train with forces located in an overseas theater without actually deploying there. Similarly, we will pursue improvements in our campaign modeling and analysis to exploit the concepts of this vision.



This global simulation network must include our Reserve and National Guard units, as well as selected multinational partners, to increase their readiness and interoperability.

Agile Organizations

In order to make optimum use of the technologies and operational concepts discussed earlier, we must carefully examine the traditional criteria governing span of control and organizational layers for the Services, commands, and Defense agencies. We will need organizations and processes that are agile enough to exploit emerging technologies and respond to diverse threats and enemy capabilities. As we move forward, we may require further reductions in supervision and centralized direction.

All organizations must become more responsive to contingencies, with less “startup” time between

deployment and employment. Because we rely on the total force to provide the full range of military capabilities, we also require responsive Reserve components that can rapidly integrate into joint organizations.

Increased organizational flexibility will enhance our responsiveness. We will seek organizations that can support flexible force packaging and work to smooth the process further.

Enhanced Materiel

Since most of the platforms expected to be in service in 2010 are already designed or operational, we will emphasize high leverage, leading edge technology enhancements to increase our capabilities. We will also place greater emphasis on common usage between Services and increase interoperability among the Services and multinational partners.

We will need a responsive research, development, and acquisition process to incorporate new technologies. This process must leverage technology and management innovations originating in the private sector through responsive access to commercial developments.

Implementing Joint Vision 2010

We must proceed with implementing Joint Vision 2010 in a way that captures the promise of these new concepts while sustaining our readiness and flexibility through every step of this evolution.

The implementation plan will involve CINCs, Services, and joint organizations. Each element must participate in developing and testing these new concepts and their overall integration. Modeling, demonstrations, simulations, technology wargames, and joint exercises will help assess and validate these concepts, as well as assist in developing new operational procedures and organizations.


The implementation process will integrate ongoing initiatives, such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments, and Advanced Capabilities Technology Demonstrations (ACTD), to promote the integrated development of operational capabilities.

Concurrently, joint education and doctrinal development must keep pace.

As we implement this vision, affordability of the technologies envisioned to achieve full spectrum dominance will be an important consideration. While we anticipate that some significant improvements in capability may be gained economically, for example through dual-use technologies for C⁴I, others will be more difficult to achieve within the budget realities that exist today and will exist into the next century. We anticipate the need to be selective in the technologies we choose, and thus expect continuing assessment and adjustments for affordability as well as for other lessons learned during the implementation process.

Achieving the full promise of this vision will largely depend on how well we structure our defense program. We will have to make hard choices to achieve the tradeoffs that will bring the best balance,

From Concepts to Capabilities



most capability, and greatest interoperability for the least cost. Ultimately, we will have to measure continuously the affordability of achieving full spectrum dominance against our overarching need to maintain the quality of our forces, their readiness, and the force structure needed to execute our operational tasks between now and the year 2010.

As we implement this vision, we must acknowledge that strong leadership, warfighting skill, and innovative thinking will be central to developing the detailed requirements and decision points. Our organizational climate must reward critical thinking, foster the competition of ideas, and reduce structural or cultural barriers to innovation. Both in peace

and war, the creative talents of our men and women provide us a critical advantage over those who would consider challenging us or our allies.



Joint Vision 2010

Focusing the
Strengths of Each
Individual Service
on Operational
Concepts That
Achieve Full
Spectrum
Dominance

Conclusion

Today, America's Armed Forces are the world standard for military excellence and joint warfighting. We will further strengthen our military capabilities by taking advantage of improved technology and the vitality and innovation of our people to prepare our forces for the 21st century.

Joint Vision 2010 creates the template to guide the transformation of these concepts into joint operational capabilities. It serves as the basis for focusing the strengths of each individual Service or component to exploit the full array of available capabilities and allow us to achieve full spectrum dominance. It will also guide the evolution of joint doctrine, education, and training to assure we will be able to achieve more seamless joint operations in the future.

As we pursue this vision, we must remain mindful of our responsibilities: to prevent

threats to our interests from emerging, deter those that do, and defeat those threats by military force if deterrence fails. In 2010, we will meet these responsibilities with high quality people and leaders, who are trained and ready for joint operations and able to exploit high technology equipment. Even during a time of unparalleled technological advances we will always rely on the courage, determination, and strength of America's men and women to ensure we are persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict.



Office of Primary Responsibility:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5126 Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-5126



Joint Vision

2020



Joint Vision
2010



CJCS Vision...

Dedicated individuals and innovative organizations transforming the joint force for the 21st Century to achieve full spectrum dominance:

- *Persuasive in Peace*
- *Decisive in War*
- *Preeminent in Any Form of Conflict*

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1. Introduction
4. Strategic Context
6. Full Spectrum Dominance
12. Conduct of Joint Operations
34. Implementation
36. Conclusion



Joint Vision 2020

America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow

The US military today is a force of superbly trained men and women who are ready to deliver victory for our Nation. In support of the objectives of our National Security Strategy, it is routinely employed to shape the international security environment and stands ready to respond across the full range of potential military operations. But the focus of this document is the third element of our strategic approach – the need to prepare now for an uncertain future.

Joint Vision 2020 builds upon and extends the conceptual template established by *Joint Vision 2010* to guide the continuing transformation of America's Armed Forces. The primary purpose of those forces has been and will be to fight and win the Nation's wars. The overall goal of the transformation described in this document is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in

war, preeminent in any form of conflict.

In 2020, the nation will face a wide range of interests, opportunities, and challenges and will require a military that can both win wars and contribute to peace. The global interests and responsibilities of the United States will endure, and there is no indication that threats to those interests and responsibilities or to our allies, will disappear. The strategic concepts of decisive force, power projection, overseas presence, and strategic agility will continue to govern our efforts to fulfill those responsibilities and meet the challenges of the future. This document describes the operational concepts necessary to do so.

If our Armed Forces are to be faster, more lethal, and more precise in 2020 than they are today, we must continue to invest in and develop new military capabilities. This vision describes the ongoing transformation to those new capabilities. As first explained in *JV 2010*,

and dependent upon realizing the potential of the information revolution, today's capabilities for maneuver, strike, logistics, and protection will become dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.

The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to operational success in the future. The integration of core competencies provided by the individual Services is essential to the joint team, and the employment of the capabilities of the Total Force (active, reserve, guard, and civilian members) increases the options for the

commander and complicates the choices of our opponents. To build the most effective force for 2020, we must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.

This vision is centered on the joint force in 2020. The date defines a general analytical focus rather than serving as a definitive estimate or deadline. The document does not describe counters to specific threats, nor does it enumerate weapon, communication, or other systems we will develop or purchase. Rather, its purpose is to describe in broad terms the human talent – the professional, well-trained,



and ready force – and operational capabilities that will be required for the joint force to succeed across the full range of military operations and accomplish its mission in 2020 and beyond. In describing those capabilities, the vision provides a vector for the wide-ranging program of exercises and experimentation being conducted by the Services and combatant commands and the continuing evolution of the joint force. Based on the joint vision implementation program, many capabilities will be operational well before 2020, while others will continue to be explored and developed through exercises and experimentation.

The overarching focus of this vision is full spectrum dominance – achieved through the interdependent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.

Attaining that goal requires the steady infusion of new technology and modernization and replacement of equipment. However, material superiority alone is not sufficient. Of greater importance is the development of doctrine, organizations, training and education, leaders, and people that effectively take advantage of the technology.

The evolution of these elements over the next two decades will be strongly influenced by two factors. First, the continued development and proliferation of information technologies will substantially change the

conduct of military operations. These changes in the information environment make information superiority a key enabler of the transformation of the operational capabilities of the joint force and the evolution of joint command and control. Second, the US Armed Forces will continue to rely on a capacity for intellectual and technical innovation. The pace of technological change, especially as it fuels changes in the strategic environment, will place a premium on our ability to foster innovation in our people and organizations across the entire range of joint operations. The overall vision of the capabilities we will require in 2020, as introduced above, rests on our assessment of the strategic context in which our forces will operate.

Strategic Context

Three aspects of the world of 2020 have significant implications for the US Armed Forces. First, the United States will continue to have global interests and be engaged with a variety of regional actors. Transportation, communications, and information technology will continue to evolve and foster expanded economic ties and awareness of international events. Our security and economic interests, as well as our political values, will provide the impetus for engagement with international partners. The joint force of 2020 must be prepared to “win” across the full range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations, as necessary, with government agencies and international organizations.

Second, potential adversaries will have access to the global commercial industrial base and much of the same technology as the US military. We will not necessarily sustain a wide technological advantage over our adversaries in all areas. Increased availability of commercial satellites, digital communications, and the public internet all give adversaries new

capabilities at a relatively low cost. We should not expect opponents in 2020 to fight with strictly “industrial age” tools. Our advantage must, therefore, come from leaders, people, doctrine, organizations, and training that enable us to take advantage of technology to achieve superior warfighting effectiveness.

Third, we should expect potential adversaries to adapt as our capabilities evolve. We have superior conventional warfighting capabilities and effective nuclear deterrence today, but this favorable military balance is not static. In the face of such strong capabilities, the appeal of asymmetric approaches and the focus on the development of niche capabilities will increase. By developing and using approaches that avoid US strengths and exploit potential vulnerabilities using significantly





different methods of operation, adversaries will attempt to create conditions that effectively delay, deter, or counter the application of US military capabilities.

The potential of such asymmetric approaches is perhaps the most serious danger the United States faces in the immediate future – and this danger includes long-range ballistic missiles and other direct threats to US citizens and territory. The asymmetric methods and objectives of an adversary are often far more important than the relative technological imbalance, and the psychological impact of an attack might far outweigh the actual physical damage inflicted. An adversary may pursue an asymmetric advantage on the tactical,

operational, or strategic level by identifying key vulnerabilities and devising asymmetric concepts and capabilities to strike or exploit them. To complicate matters, our adversaries may pursue a combination of asymmetries, or the United States may face a number of adversaries who, in combination, create an asymmetric threat. These asymmetric threats are dynamic and subject to change, and the US Armed Forces must maintain the capabilities necessary to deter, defend against, and defeat any adversary who chooses such an approach. To meet the challenges of the strategic environment in 2020, the joint force must be able to achieve full spectrum dominance.

Full Spectrum Dominance

The ultimate goal of our military force is to accomplish the objectives directed by the National Command Authorities. For the joint force of the future, this goal will be achieved through full spectrum dominance – the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations.

The full range of operations includes maintaining a posture of strategic deterrence. It includes theater engagement and presence activities. It includes conflict involving employment of strategic forces and weapons of mass destruction, major theater wars, regional conflicts, and smaller-scale contingencies. It also includes those ambiguous situations residing between peace and war, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, as well as noncombat humanitarian relief operations and support to domestic authorities.

The label full spectrum dominance implies that US forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains – space, sea, land, air, and information. Additionally, given the global nature of our interests and obligations, the

United States must maintain its overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power worldwide in order to achieve full spectrum dominance.

Achieving full spectrum dominance means the joint force will fulfill its primary purpose – victory in war, as well as achieving success across the full range of operations, but it does not mean that we will win without cost or difficulty. Conflict results in casualties despite our best efforts to minimize them, and will continue to do so when the force has achieved full spectrum dominance. Additionally, friction is inherent in military operations. The joint force of 2020 will seek to create a “frictional imbalance” in its favor by using the capabilities envisioned in this document, but the fundamental sources of friction cannot be eliminated. We will win – but we should not expect war in the future to be either easy or bloodless.

The requirement for global operations, the ability to counter adversaries who possess

Sources of Friction

- Effects of danger and exertion
- Existence of uncertainty and chance
- Unpredictable actions of other actors
- Frailties of machines and information
- Humans

weapons of mass destruction, and the need to shape ambiguous situations at the low end of the range of operations will present special challenges en route to achieving full spectrum dominance. Therefore, the process of creating the joint force of the future must be flexible – to react to changes in the strategic environment and the adaptations of potential enemies, to take advantage of new technologies, and to account for variations in the pace of change.

The source of that flexibility is the synergy of the core competencies of the individual Services, integrated into the joint team. These challenges will require a Total Force composed of well-educated, motivated, and competent people who can adapt to the many demands of future joint missions. The transformation of the joint force to reach full spectrum dominance rests upon information superiority as a key enabler and our capacity for innovation.



RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Military Operations		General US Goals	Examples
C O M B A T	War	Fight & Win	Large Scale Combat Operations Attack / Defend / Blockade
	N O N C O M B A T	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement Counterterrorism Show of Force / Raid / Strike Peacekeeping / NEO Nation Assistance Counterinsurgency
		Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities	Freedom of Navigation Counterdrug Humanitarian Assistance Protection of Shipping US Civil Support



INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

Information, information processing, and communications networks are at the core of every military activity. Throughout history, military leaders have regarded information superiority as a key enabler of victory. However, the ongoing “information revolution” is creating not only a quantitative, but a qualitative change in the information environment that by 2020 will result in profound changes in the conduct of military operations. In fact, advances in information capabilities are proceeding so rapidly that there is a risk of outstripping our ability to capture ideas, formulate operational concepts, and develop the capacity to assess results. While the goal of achieving information superiority will not change, the nature, scope, and “rules” of the quest are changing radically.

The qualitative change in the information environment extends the conceptual underpinnings of information superiority beyond the mere accumulation of more, or even better, information. The word “superiority” implies a state or condition of imbalance in one’s favor. Information superiority is transitory in nature and must be created and sustained by the joint force through the conduct of information operations. However, the creation of information superiority is not an end in itself.

Information superiority provides the joint force a competitive advantage only when it is

Information Superiority – the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. (JP1-02) Information superiority is achieved in a noncombat situation or one in which there are no clearly defined adversaries when friendly forces have the information necessary to achieve operational objectives.

Information Environment – the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, or disseminate information, including the information itself. (JP1-02)

effectively translated into superior knowledge and decisions. The joint force must be able to take advantage of superior information converted to superior knowledge to achieve “decision superiority” – better decisions arrived at and implemented faster than an opponent can react, or in a noncombat situation, at a tempo that allows the force to shape the situation or react to changes and accomplish its mission. Decision superiority does not automatically result from information superiority. Organizational and doctrinal adaptation, relevant training and experience, and the proper command and control mechanisms and tools are equally necessary.

The evolution of information technology will increasingly permit us to integrate the traditional forms of information operations with sophisticated all-source intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in a fully synchronized information campaign. The development of a concept labeled the global information grid will provide the network-centric environment required to achieve this goal. The grid will be the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and people to manage and provide information on demand to warfighters, policy

makers, and support personnel. It will enhance combat power and contribute to the success of noncombat military operations as well.

Realization of the full potential of these changes requires not only technological improvements, but the continued evolution of organizations and doctrine and the development of relevant training to sustain a comparative advantage in the information environment.

We must also remember that information superiority neither equates to perfect information, nor does it mean the elimination of the fog of war. Information



systems, processes, and operations add their own sources of friction and fog to the operational environment. Information superiority is fundamental to the transformation of the operational capabilities of the joint force. The joint force of 2020 will use superior information and knowledge to achieve decision superiority, to support advanced command and control capabilities, and to reach the full potential of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. The breadth and pace of this evolution demands flexibility and a readiness to innovate.

INNOVATION

Joint Vision 2010 identified technological innovation as a vital component of the transformation of the joint force. Throughout the industrial age, the United States has relied upon its capacity for technological innovation to succeed in military operations, and the need to do so will continue. It is important, however, to broaden our focus beyond technology and capture the importance of organizational and conceptual innovation as well.

Innovation, in its simplest form, is the combination of new “things” with new “ways” to carry out tasks. In reality, it may result from fielding completely new things, or the imaginative recombination of old things in new ways, or something in between. The ideas in *JV 2010* as carried forward in *JV 2020* are,

indeed, innovative and form a vision for integrating doctrine, tactics, training, supporting activities, and technology into new operational capabilities. The innovations that determine joint and Service capabilities will result from a general understanding of what future conflict and military operations will be like, and a view of what the combatant commands and Services must do in order to accomplish assigned missions.

An effective innovation process requires continuous learning – a means of interaction and exchange that evaluates goals, operational lessons, exercises, experiments, and simulations – and that must include feedback mechanisms. The Services and combatant commands must allow our highly trained and skilled professionals the opportunity to create new concepts and ideas that may lead to future breakthroughs. We must foster the innovations necessary to create the joint force of the future – not only with decisions regarding future versus present force structure and budgets, but also with a reasonable tolerance for errors and failures in the experimentation process. We must be concerned with efficient use of time and resources and create a process that gives us confidence that our results will produce battlefield success. However, an experimentation process with a low tolerance for error makes it unlikely that the force will identify and nurture the most relevant and productive aspects of new concepts, capabilities, and

technology. All individuals and organizations charged with experimentation in support of the evolution of our combat forces must ensure that our natural concern for husbanding resources and ultimately delivering successful results does not prevent us from pursuing innovations with dramatic if uncertain potential.

There is, of course, a high degree of uncertainty inherent in the pursuit of innovation. The key to coping with that uncertainty is bold leadership supported by as much information as possible. Leaders must assess the efficacy of new ideas, the potential drawbacks to new concepts, the capabilities of potential adversaries, the costs versus benefits of new technologies, and the organizational implications of new capabilities. They must make these assessments in the context of an evolving analysis of the economic, political, and technological factors of the anticipated security environment. Each of these assessments will have uncertainty associated with them. But the best innovations have often come from people who made decisions and achieved success despite uncertainties and limited information.

By creating innovation, the combatant commands and Services also create their best opportunities for coping with the increasing pace of change in the overall environment in which they function. Although changing technology is a primary driver of environmental change, it is not the only one. The search for innovation must encompass the entire context

of joint operations – which means the Armed Forces must explore changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities as well as technology. Ultimately, the goal is to develop reasonable approaches with enough flexibility to recover from errors and unforeseen circumstances.

Conduct of Joint Operations

The complexities of the future security environment demand that the United States be prepared to face a wide range of threats of varying levels of intensity. Success in countering these threats will require the skillful integration of the core competencies of the Services into a joint force tailored to the specific situation and objectives. Commanders must be afforded the opportunity to achieve the level of effectiveness and synergy necessary to conduct decisive operations across the entire range of military operations. When combat operations are required, they must have an overwhelming array of capabilities available to conduct offensive and defensive operations and against which an enemy must defend. Other complex contingencies such as humanitarian relief or peace operations will require a rapid, flexible response to achieve national objectives in the required timeframe. Some situations may require the capabilities of only one Service, but in most cases, a joint force comprised of both Active and Reserve Components will be employed.

The complexity of future operations also requires that, in addition to operating jointly, our forces have the capability to participate

effectively as one element of a unified national effort. This integrated approach brings to bear all the tools of statecraft to achieve our national objectives unilaterally when necessary, while making optimum use of the skills and resources provided by multinational military forces, regional and international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations when possible. Participation by the joint force in operations supporting civil authorities will also likely increase in importance due to emerging threats to the US homeland such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

PEOPLE

The core of the joint force of 2020 will continue to be an All Volunteer Force composed of individuals of exceptional dedication and



ability. Their quality will matter as never before as our Service members confront a diversity of missions and technological demands that call for adaptability, innovation, precise judgment, forward thinking, and multicultural understanding. The Nation will continue to depend on talented individuals of outstanding character, committed to an ethic of selfless service.

Our people will require a multitude of skills. The Services will play a critical role in



perfecting their individual specialties and the core competencies of each organization. In addition, every member of the Total Force must be prepared to apply that expertise to a wide range of missions as a member of the joint team. Our Service members must have the mental agility to transition from preparing for war to enforcing peace to actual combat, when

necessary. The joint force commander is thereby provided a powerful, synergistic force capable of dominating across the entire range of operations.

The missions of 2020 will demand Service members who can create and then take advantage of intellectual and technological innovations. Individuals will be challenged by significant responsibilities at tactical levels in the organization and must be capable of making decisions with both operational and strategic implications. Our vision of full spectrum dominance and the transformation of operational capabilities has significant implications for the training and education of our people. The tactics of information operations, the coordination of interagency and



multinational operations, as well as the complexity of the modern tools of war all require people who are both talented and trained to exacting standards. Rapid and dispersed operations will require men and women who are part of a cohesive team, yet are capable of

operating independently to meet the commander's intent. The evolution of new functional areas, such as space operations and information operations, will require development of appropriate career progression and leadership opportunities for specialists in those fields. The accumulation of training and experience will create a force ready to deploy rapidly to any point on the globe and operate effectively.

The joint force of 2020 will face a number of challenges in recruiting and retaining the outstanding people needed to meet these requirements. First, expanding civilian education and employment opportunities will reduce the number of candidates available for military service. We will continue to focus on our members' standard of living and a competitive compensation strategy to ensure we attract the quality individuals we need.

Second, the increasing percentage of members with dependents will require a commitment to family-oriented community support programs and as much stability as possible, as well as close monitoring of the impact of the operations tempo. Finally, our increased dependence on the Reserve Component will require us to address the concerns of our reserve members and their employers regarding the impact on civilian careers. The Department of Defense and Services must meet these challenges head-on.

Military operations will continue to demand extraordinary dedication and sacrifice under the most adverse conditions. Our Total Force, composed of professionals armed with courage, stamina, and intellect, will succeed despite the complexity and pace of future operations.



INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability is the foundation of effective joint, multinational, and interagency operations. The joint force has made significant progress toward achieving an optimum level of interoperability, but there must be a concerted effort toward continued improvement. Such improvements will include the refinement of joint doctrine as well as further development of common technologies and processes. Exercises, personnel exchanges, agreement on standardized operating procedures, individual training and education, and planning will further enhance and institutionalize these capabilities. Interoperability is a mandate for the joint force of 2020 – especially in terms of communications, common logistics items, and information sharing. Information systems and equipment that enable a common relevant operational picture must work from shared networks that can be accessed by any appropriately cleared participant.

Although technical interoperability is essential, it is not sufficient to ensure effective operations. There must be a suitable focus on procedural and organizational elements, and decision makers at all levels must understand each other's capabilities and constraints. Training and education, experience and exercises, cooperative planning, and skilled liaison at all levels of the joint force will not only overcome the barriers of organizational culture and differing priorities, but will teach members

of the joint team to appreciate the full range of Service capabilities available to them.

The future joint force will have the embedded technologies and adaptive organizational structures that will allow trained and experienced people to develop compatible processes and procedures, engage in collaborative planning, and adapt as necessary to specific crisis situations. These features are not only vital to the joint force, but to multinational and interagency operations as well.

Interoperability – the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (JP1-02)

Multinational Operations

Since our potential multinational partners will have varying levels of technology, a tailored approach to interoperability that accommodates a wide range of needs and capabilities is necessary. Our more technically advanced allies will have systems and equipment that are essentially compatible, enabling them to interface and share information in order to operate effectively with US forces at all levels. However, we must also be capable of operating with allies and coalition partners who may be technologically incompatible – especially at the tactical level. Additionally, many of our future partners will have significant specialized capabilities that



may be integrated into a common operating scheme. At the same time, the existence of these relationships does not imply access to information without constraints. We and our multinational partners will continue to use suitable judgment regarding the protection of sensitive information and information sources.

In all cases, effective command and

Multinational Operations – a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP1-02)

control is the primary means of successfully extending the joint vision to multinational operations. Technological developments that connect the information systems of partners will provide the links that lead to a common relevant operational picture and improve command and control. However, the sharing of information needed to maintain the tempo of integrated multinational operations also relies heavily on a shared understanding of operational procedures



and compatible organizations. The commander must have the ability to evaluate information in its multinational context. That context can only be appreciated if sufficient regional expertise and liaison capability are available on the commander's staff. A deep understanding of the cultural, political, military, and economic characteristics of a region must be established

and maintained. Developing this understanding is dependent upon shared training and education, especially with key partners, and may require organizational change as well. The overall effectiveness of multinational operations is, therefore, dependent on interoperability between organizations, processes, and technologies.



Interagency Operations

The primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of the participating organizations, many of whom guard their relative independence, freedom of action, and impartiality. Additionally, these organizations may lack the structure and resources to support



Interagency Coordination – within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies, non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.

(JP1-02)

extensive liaison cells or integrative technology. In this environment and in the absence of formal command relationships, the future joint force must be proactive in improving communications, planning, interoperability, and liaison with potential interagency participants. These factors are important in all aspects of interagency operations, but particularly in the context of direct threats to citizens and facilities in the US homeland.

Cohesive interagency action is vital to deterring, defending against, and responding to such attacks. The joint force must be prepared to support civilian authorities in a fully integrated effort to meet the needs of US citizens and accomplish the objectives specified by the National Command Authorities.

All organizations have unique information assets that can contribute to the common relevant operational picture and support unified action. They also have unique information requirements. Sharing information with appropriately cleared participants and integration of information from all sources are essential. Understanding each other's requirements and assets is also crucial. More

importantly, through training with potential interagency partners, experienced liaisons must be developed to support long-term relationships, collaborative planning in advance of crises, and compatible processes and procedures. As with our multinational partners, interoperability in all areas of interaction is essential to effective interagency operations.



OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

Dominant Maneuver

The joint force capable of dominant maneuver will possess unmatched speed and agility in positioning and repositioning tailored forces from widely dispersed locations to achieve operational objectives quickly and decisively. The employment of dominant maneuver may lead to achieving objectives directly, but can also facilitate employment of the other operational concepts. For example, dominant maneuver may be employed to dislodge enemy forces so they can be destroyed through precision engagement. At times, achieving positional advantage will be a function of operational maneuver over strategic distances. Overseas or US-based units will mass forces or effects directly to the operational theater. Information superiority will support the conduct of dominant maneuver by enabling adaptive and concurrent planning; coordination of widely dispersed units; gathering of timely feedback on the status, location, and activities of subordinate units; and anticipation of the course of events leading to mission accomplishment. The joint force will also be capable of planning and conducting dominant maneuver in cooperation with interagency and multinational partners with varying levels of commitment and capability.

The capability to rapidly mass force or forces and the effects of dispersed forces

Dominant Maneuver is the ability of joint forces to gain positional advantage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned military tasks. Widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, amphibious, special operations and space forces, capable of scaling and massing force or forces and the effects of fires as required for either combat or noncombat operations, will secure advantage across the range of military operations through the application of information, deception, engagement, mobility and counter-mobility capabilities.

allows the joint force commander to establish control of the battlespace at the proper time and place. In a conflict, this ability to attain positional advantage allows the commander to employ decisive combat power that will compel an adversary to react from a position of disadvantage, or quit. In other situations, it allows the force to occupy key positions to shape the course of events and minimize hostilities or react decisively if hostilities erupt. And in peacetime, it constitutes a credible capability that influences potential adversaries while reassuring friends and allies.



Beyond the actual physical presence of the force, dominant maneuver creates an impact in the minds of opponents and others in the operational area. That impact is a tool available to the joint force commander across the full range of military operations. In a conflict, for example, the presence or anticipated presence of a decisive force might well cause an enemy to surrender after minimal resistance. During a peacekeeping mission, it

may provide motivation for good-faith negotiations or prevent the instigation of civil disturbances. In order to achieve such an impact, the commander will use information operations as a force multiplier by making the available combat power apparent without the need to physically move elements of the force. The joint force commander will be able to take advantage of the potential and actual effects of dominant maneuver to gain the greatest benefit.

Precision Engagement

Simply put, precision engagement is effects-based engagement that is relevant to all types of operations. Its success depends on in-depth analysis to identify and locate critical nodes and targets. The pivotal characteristic of precision engagement is the linking of sensors, delivery systems, and effects. In the joint force of the future, this linkage will take place across Services and will incorporate the applicable capabilities of multinational and interagency partners when appropriate. The resulting system of systems will provide the commander the broadest possible range of capabilities in responding to any situation, including both kinetic and nonkinetic weapons capable of creating the desired lethal or nonlethal effects.

The concept of precision engagement extends beyond precisely striking a target with explosive ordnance. Information superiority will



Precision Engagement is the ability of joint forces to locate, surveil, discern, and track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate desired effects; assess results; and reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, throughout the full range of military operations.


enhance the capability of the joint force commander to understand the situation, determine the effects desired, select a course of action and the forces to execute it, accurately assess the effects of that action, and reengage as necessary while minimizing collateral



damage. During conflict, the commander will use precision engagement to obtain lethal and nonlethal effects in support of the objectives of the campaign. This action could include destroying a target using conventional forces, inserting a special operations team, or even the

execution of a comprehensive psychological operations mission. In other cases, precision engagement may be used to facilitate dominant maneuver and decisive close combat. The commander may also employ nonkinetic weapons, particularly in the arena of information operations where the targets might be key enemy leaders or troop formations, or the opinion of an adversary population.

In noncombat situations, precision engagement activities will, naturally, focus on nonlethal actions. These actions will be capable of defusing volatile situations, overcoming misinformation campaigns, or directing a flow of refugees to relief stations, for example. Regardless of its application in combat or noncombat operations, the capability to engage precisely allows the commander to shape the situation or battle space in order to achieve the desired effects while minimizing risk to friendly forces and contributing to the most effective use of resources.



Focused Logistics

Focused logistics will provide military capability by ensuring delivery of the right equipment, supplies, and personnel in the right quantities, to the right place, at the right time to support operational objectives. It will result from revolutionary improvements in information systems, innovation in organizational structures, reengineered processes, and advances in transportation technologies. This transformation has already begun with changes scheduled for the near term (see events highlighted in box at right) facilitating the ultimate realization of the full potential of focused logistics.

Focused logistics will effectively link all logistics functions and units through advanced information systems that integrate real-time total asset visibility with a common relevant operational picture. These systems will incorporate enhanced decision support tools that will improve analysis, planning, and anticipation of warfighter requirements. They will also provide a more seamless connection to

Focused Logistics Transformation Path

FY 01, implement systems to assess customer confidence from end to end of the logistics chain using customer wait time metric.

FY 02, implement time definite delivery capabilities using a simplified priority system driven by the customer's required delivery date.

FY 04, implement fixed and deployable automated identification technologies and information systems that provide accurate, actionable total asset visibility.

FY04 for early deploying forces and **FY 06** for the remaining forces, implement a web-based, shared data environment to ensure the joint warfighters' ability to make timely and confident logistics decisions.

Focused Logistics is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of military operations. This will be made possible through a real-time, web-based information system providing total asset visibility as part of a common relevant operational picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across Services and support agencies. Through transformational innovations to organizations and processes, focused logistics will provide the joint warfighter with support for all functions.

the commercial sector to take advantage of applicable advanced business practices and commercial economies. Combining these capabilities with innovative organizational structures and processes will result in



will be an improved link between operations and logistics resulting in precise time-definite delivery of assets to the warfighter. This substantially improved operational effectiveness and efficiency, combined with increasing

warfighter confidence in these new capabilities, will concurrently reduce sustainment requirements and the vulnerability of logistics lines of communication, while appropriately sizing and potentially reducing the logistics footprint. The capability for focused logistics will effectively support the joint force in combat and provide the primary operational

dramatically improved end-to-end management of the entire logistics system and provide precise real-time control of the logistics pipeline to support the joint force commander's priorities. The increased speed, capacity, and efficiency of advanced transportation systems will further improve deployment, distribution, and sustainment. Mutual support relationships and collaborative planning will enable optimum cooperation with multinational and interagency partners.



element in the delivery of humanitarian or disaster relief, or other activities across the range of military operations.

The result for the joint force of the future

Full Dimensional Protection

Our military forces must be capable of conducting decisive operations despite our adversaries' use of a wide range of weapons (including weapons of mass destruction), the conduct of information operations or terrorist attacks, or the presence of asymmetric threats during any phase of these operations. Our people and the other military and nonmilitary

assets needed for the successful conduct of operations must be protected wherever they are located – from deployment, to theater combat, to redeployment. Full dimensional protection exists when the joint force can decisively achieve its mission with an acceptable degree of risk in both the physical and information domains.

The capability for full dimensional protection incorporates a complete array of both combat and noncombat actions in offensive and defensive operations, enabled by information superiority. It will be based upon active and passive defensive measures, including theater

Full Dimensional Protection is the ability of the joint force to protect its personnel and other assets required to decisively execute assigned tasks. Full dimensional protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the domains of air, land, sea, space, and information across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk.



missile defenses and possibly limited missile defense of the United States; offensive countermeasures; security procedures; antiterrorism measures; enhanced intelligence collection and assessments; emergency preparedness; heightened security awareness; and proactive engagement strategies.

Additionally, it will extend beyond the immediate theater of operations to protect our reach-back, logistics, and key capabilities in other locations. There is a critical need for protection of the information content and systems vital for operational success, including increased vigilance in counterintelligence and information security. The joint force of 2020 will integrate protective capabilities from multinational and

interagency partners when available and will respond to their requirements when possible. Commanders will thoroughly assess and manage risk as they apply protective measures to specific operations, ensuring an appropriate level of safety, compatible with other mission objectives, is provided for all assets.

The joint force commander will thereby be provided an integrated architecture for protection, which will effectively manage risk to the joint force and other assets, and leverage the contributions of all echelons of our forces and those of our multinational and interagency partners. The result will be improved freedom of action for friendly forces and better protection at all echelons.



INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Information operations are essential to achieving full spectrum dominance. The joint force must be capable of conducting information operations, the purpose of which is to facilitate and protect US decision-making processes, and in a conflict, degrade those of an adversary. While activities and capabilities

employed to conduct information operations are traditional functions of military forces, the pace of change in the information environment dictates that we expand this view and explore broader information operations strategies and concepts. We must recognize that “nontraditional” adversaries who engage in



Information Operations – those actions taken to affect an adversary’s information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. (JP1-02) Information operations also include actions taken in a noncombat or ambiguous situation to protect one’s own information and information systems as well as those taken to influence target information and information systems.

“nontraditional” conflict are of particular importance in the information domain. The United States itself and US forces around the world are subject to information attacks on a continuous basis regardless of the level and degree of engagement in other domains of operation. The perpetrators of such attacks are not limited to the traditional concept of a uniformed military adversary. Additionally, the actions associated with information operations are wide-ranging – from physical destruction to psychological operations to computer network defense. The task of integrating information operations with other joint force operations is complicated by the need to understand the many variables involved (summarized in box).

engaged in humanitarian relief operations. Such operations will be synchronized with those of multinational and interagency partners as the situation dictates. New offensive capabilities such as computer network attack techniques are evolving. Activities such as information assurance, computer network defense, and counterdeception will defend decision-making processes by neutralizing an adversaries’ perception management and intelligence collection efforts, as well as direct attacks on our information systems. Because the ultimate target of information operations is the human decision maker, the joint force commander will have difficulty accurately assessing the effects of those operations. This

The Variables of Information Operations

- Multidimensional definition and meaning of “information” – target, weapon, resource, or domain of operations
- Level of action and desired effect – tactical, operational, strategic, or combination
- Objective of operations – providing information, perception management, battle field dominance, command and control warfare, systemic disruption, or systemic destruction
- Nature of situation – peace, crisis, or conflict

Our understanding of the interrelationships of these variables and their impact on military operations will determine the nature of information operations in 2020. The joint force commander will conduct information operations whether facing an adversary during a conflict or

problem of “battle damage assessment” for information operations is difficult and must be explored through exercises and rigorous experimentation.

The continuing evolution of information operations and the global information environ-

ment holds two significant implications. First, operations within the information domain will become as important as those conducted in the domains of sea, land, air, and space. Such operations will be inextricably linked to focused logistics, full dimensional protection, precision engagement, and dominant maneuver, as well as joint command and control. At the same time, information operations may evolve into a separate mission area requiring the Services to maintain appropriately designed organizations and trained specialists. Improvements in doctrine, organization, and technology may lead to decisive outcomes resulting primarily from information operations. As information operations continue to evolve, they, like other

military operations, will be conducted consistent with the norms of our society, our alliances with other democratic states, and full respect for the laws of armed conflict. Second, there is significant potential for asymmetric engagements in the information domain. The United States has enjoyed a distinct technological advantage in the information environment and will likely continue to do so. However, as potential adversaries reap the benefits of the information revolution, the comparative advantage for the US and its partners will become more difficult to maintain. Additionally, our ever-increasing dependence on information processes, systems, and technologies adds potential vulnerabilities that must be defended.



JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction over the joint force. It is necessary for the integration of the Services' core competencies into effective joint operations. The increasing importance of multinational and interagency aspects of the operations adds complexity and heightens the challenge of doing so. Command and control includes planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations, and is focused on the effective execution of the operational plan; but the central function is decision making.

Command and control is most effective when decision superiority exists. Decision

Command and Control – the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP1-02)



superiority results from superior information filtered through the commander's experience, knowledge, training, and judgment; the expertise of supporting staffs and other organizations; and the efficiency of associated

processes. While changes in the information environment have led some to focus solely on the contribution of information superiority to command and control, it is equally necessary to understand the complete realm of command and control decision making, the nature of organizational collaboration, and especially,

the "human in the loop."

In the joint force of the future, command and control will remain the primary integrating and coordinating function for operational capabilities and Service components. As the


nature of military operations evolves, there is a need to evaluate continually the nature of command and control organizations, mechanisms, systems, and tools. There are two major issues to address in this evaluation – command structures and processes, and the information systems and technologies that are best suited to support them. Encompassed within these two issues, examination of the following related ideas and desired capabilities will serve as a catalyst for changes in doctrine, organization, and training.

- Commanders will need a broad understanding of new operational capabilities and new (often highly automated) supporting tools in order to be capable of flexible, adaptive coordination and direction of both forces and sensors.
- The staffs that support commanders must be organized and trained to take advantage of new capabilities. Commanders and staffs must also be capable of command and control in the face of technology failure.
- Commanders will be able to formulate and disseminate intent based upon up-to-date knowledge of the situation existing in the battlespace.
- Joint force headquarters will be dispersed and survivable and capable of coordinating

dispersed units and operations. Subordinate headquarters will be small, agile, mobile, dispersed, and networked.

- Faster operations tempos, increased choices among weapons and effects, and greater weapons ranges will require continuous, simultaneous planning and execution at all levels.
- Expanding roles for multinational and interagency partners will require collaborative planning capabilities, technological compatibility/interoperability, and mechanisms for efficient information sharing.

Finally, as these and other changes take place over time, we must carefully examine three aspects of the human element of command and control. First, leaders of the joint force must analyze and understand the meaning of unit cohesion in the context of the small, widely dispersed units that are now envisioned. Second, decision makers at all levels must understand the implications of new technologies that operate continuously in all conditions when human beings are incapable of the same endurance. Third, as new information technologies, systems, and procedures make the same detailed information available at all levels of the chain of command, leaders must understand the implications for decision-making



the Services. The development of effective joint command and control for the future requires rigorous and wide-ranging experimentation, focused especially on organizational innovation and doctrinal change.

processes, the training of decision makers at all levels, and organizational patterns and procedures. The potential for overcentralization of control and the capacity for relatively junior leaders to make decisions with strategic impact are of particular importance.


It has often been said that command is an art and control is a science – a basic truth that will remain true. Our thinking about command and control must be conceptually based, rather than focused on technology or materiel. Joint command and control is a nexus – a point of connection. It serves as a focal point for humans and technology, our evolving operational capabilities, and the capabilities of

Implementation

Joint Vision 2010 has had a profound impact on the development of US military capabilities. By describing those capabilities necessary to achieve success in 2010, we set in motion three important efforts. First, *JV 2010* established a common framework and language for the Services to develop and explain their unique contributions to the joint force. Second, we created a process for the conduct of joint experimentation and training to test ideas against practice. Finally, we began a process to manage the transformation of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities necessary to make the vision a reality. *Joint Vision 2020* builds on this foundation of success and will sustain the momentum of these processes.

The foundation of jointness is the strength of individual Service competencies pulled together. Our objective in implementing the joint vision is the optimal integration of all joint forces and effects. To achieve that goal, the interdependence of the Services requires mutual trust and reliance among all warfighters and a significantly improved level of interoperability – especially in the areas of command and control and sustainment. This interdependence will ultimately result in a whole greater than the sum of its parts, and will contribute to achieving full spectrum dominance through all forces acting in concert. The synergy gained through the interdependence of the Services makes clear that jointness is more than interoperability. The joint force requires capabilities that are beyond the simple combination of Service capabilities, and joint

From Concepts to Capabilities



experimentation is the process by which those capabilities will be achieved.

To ensure unity of effort and continuity for joint concept development and experimentation, the Secretary of Defense designated the Commander in Chief,

Joint Forces Command as the Executive Agent for experimentation design, preparation, execution, and assessment. Annual campaign plans provide focus to this effort and continuity in experimentation. The results of this iterative experimentation

cycle are forwarded as comprehensive recommendations for changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities and lead to the co-evolution of all those elements. The experimentation and implementation process supporting the transformation of the joint force is also dependent upon Service and combatant command exercises and experimentation activities. The Service and combatant command visions support the joint vision by providing guidance for these individual efforts that are congruent with the Chairman's vision. Thus, in their own experimentation venues, the Services may develop recommendations with joint implications and will forward them to the appropriate joint experimentation activity.

To effect transforming and enduring changes to our joint military capabilities, the experimentation and implementation process must include construction of a wide range of scenarios and imaginative conflict simulations to explore the shape of future operations. Such

From Vision to Experimentation

- Joint Vision 2010 (1996)
- Concept for Future Joint Operations (1997)
- 21st Century Challenges and Desired Operational Capabilities (1997)
- Joint Warfighting Experimentation Program established, USACOM (JFCOM) as Executive Agent (1998)
- Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (1998)
- CJCSI 3170, Requirements Generation System (1999)
- JFCOM Joint Experimentation Campaign Plans (1999 and 2000)

intensive exploration of alternative concepts of operations can help the US military choose innovations that take the greatest advantage of combinations of new ideas and new technologies. The rapid pace of such changes will then drive further development of the experimentation and implementation process to field improved capabilities for the joint force.

The linchpin of progress from vision to experimentation to reality is joint training and education – because they are the keys to intellectual change. Without intellectual change, there is no real change in doctrine, organizations, or leaders. Thus, the implementation process is dependent upon incorporating concepts validated by experimentation into joint professional military education programs and joint exercises. In this way, individual Service members and units become a joint team capable of success across the full range of military operations.

Conclusion

This vision is firmly grounded in the view that the US military must be a joint force capable of full spectrum dominance. Its basis is four-fold: the global interests of the United States and the continuing existence of a wide range of potential threats to those interests; the centrality of information technology to the evolution of not only our own military, but also the capabilities of other actors around the globe; the premium a continuing broad range of military operations will place on the successful integration of multinational and interagency partners and the interoperability of processes, organizations, and systems; and our reliance on the joint force as the foundation of future US military operations.



Joint Vision 2020 builds on the foundation and maintains the momentum established with *Joint Vision 2010*. It confirms the direction of the ongoing transformation of operational capabilities, and emphasizes the importance of

further experimentation, exercises, analysis, and conceptual thought, especially in the arenas of information operations, joint command and control, and multinational and interagency operations.

This vision recognizes the importance of technology and technical innovation to the US military and its operations. At the same time, it emphasizes that technological innovation must



be accompanied by intellectual innovation leading to changes in organization and doctrine. Only then can we reach the full potential of the joint force – decisive capabilities across the full range of military operations. Such a vision depends upon the skill, experience, and training of the people comprising the Total Force and their leaders. The major innovations necessary to operate in the environment depicted herein can only be achieved through the recruitment, development, and retention of men and women with the courage, determination, and strength to ensure we are persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict.



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