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ÍNDICE

MEDITERRANEAN IMMIGRATION IN THE POST-ARAB SPRING: (DE)CONSTRUCTING MYTHS OF LARGE-MASS MIGRATIONS

SUSANA DE SOUSA FERREIRA*

RESUMEN

Esta comunicación explora cómo la ola democrática árabe afecta(ó) a los flujos migratorios dentro de la región mediterránea y pretende deconstruir la percepción común de la "invasión de inmigrantes" en Europa. El aumento de la instabilidad de la región mediterránea ha puesto de manifiesto la presión migratoria y provocó dos crisis masivas de refugiados en el sur del Mediterráneo, Libia y Siria. Las tensiones políticas y sociales de la Primavera Árabe han sacudido las economías de estos Estados y han cambiado los patrones de migración y desafiado la seguridad regional. Sin embargo, la Primavera Árabe no provocó una entrada masiva de migración a Europa. Por el contrario, la población afectada buscó refugio en su mayoría en los países vecinos (movilidad Sur-Sur). Centrándose en los países de la región MENA, es nuestro objetivo deconstruir estas percepciones de los flujos de gran escala con respecto a las migraciones mediterráneas y analizar cómo el proceso de securitización está cambiando la gestión de las fronteras de Europa.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Mediterráneo, Inmigración, Primavera Árabe, Seguridad, Refugiados

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ABSTRACT

This communication explores how the Arab democratic wave affect(ed) the migratory fluxes within the Mediterranean region and aims to deconstruct the common perception of "immigrant invasion" in Europe. The increased instability of the Mediterranean region has highlighted the migratory pressure and triggered two massive refugee crises in Southern Mediterranean, Libya and Syria. The political and social tensions of the Arab Spring have shaken these states economies and have changed migration patterns and challenged regional security. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring did not cause a massive influx of migration to Europe. On the contrary, the population affected looked for shelter mostly in neighbouring countries (South-South mobility). Focusing in the MENA countries, it is our aim to deconstruct these perceptions of large-scale fluxes regarding Mediterranean migrations and analyse how the securitisation process is changing the European border management.

KEYWORDS: Mediterranean, Immigration, Arab Spring, Security, Refugees

1. INTRODUCTION

The political and social uprisings that have swept the Arab world since the beginning of 2011 have led to significant political and socio-economic changes in the Mediterranean's southern shore, questioning the future of the region. The "Arab awakening" challenged the old authoritarian systems and demanded the pursuit of the values of freedom, democratic governance, justice and human dignity (Ferreira, 2014, p. 64).

This awakening movement, known as the Arab Spring, represents a turning point in Arab societies. Countries in the MENA[1] region are at different stages. The regimes in Tunisia and Egypt have been effectively overthrown; in Libya, Gaddafi lost his power and life in a war against Libyan rebels. Other cases are more ambiguous, such as Morocco and Jordan, where swift constitutional changes were made. However, the case of Syria is now the more obscure, with worsening humanitarian and security conditions, that "has so far led neither to a military victory by the rebels nor to a negotiated solution" (Ottaway, 2013, 30).

The outcomes of these upheavals are still uncertain and rely on the choices of the people. The transitions underway are all taking different paths. These are long and complex processes, with different nuances in each country. As Vidal *et al.* (Vidal, Bourekba, & Rufalco, 2013, 91) put it "[a]fter the 'Spring' came the 'Islamist winters', after the 'Arab revolutions' came the so-called 'Arab regressions' (…)". If the new established regimes fail to achieve the demands requested by the people or if fundamentalist Islamist regimes are established a new dark moment may fall upon the region (take Egypt for example). Most of the new leaders are inexperienced and they will have to deal with a myriad of problems and demands in order to implement democratic states based on the values of justice, social cohesion and respect for human rights.

The MENA region has always been characterised by its political instability and insecurity. The Arab Spring and its aftermath challenge both regional and international security. The political instability of the

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[1] MENA – acronym for Middle East and North Africa.

region affects its neighbouring countries as well as its partners (economic and political partnerships). Yet, it created a unique political opportunity namely for Euro-Mediterranean relations.

The instability felt in the region affects its economies and many economic sectors have disintegrated. The region, which already had high unemployment rates, now faces a huge unemployment challenge in terms of job creation, vulnerable work positions and low salaries.

Moreover, the upheavals have highlighted challenges concerning migrations. Some of the factors that set off the conflicts – unemployment and social inequalities – are also at the core of Southern Mediterranean migratory movements. Moreover, the instability felt in the region triggered two massive refugee crises (Libya and Syria). As the uprisings unfolded, the EU's migration policy agenda came under the spotlight. The Arab Spring increased fears of large-scale migrations to Europe and exacerbated the feeling of insecurity among Europeans. A clear example of this feeling of insecurity regarding Mediterranean migrations is the "Lampedusa crisis" in 2011, which gave place to a clash between the Italian government and the EU on the fight against irregular migrations and raised questions about the EU's migratory framework (including the Schengen *acquis* and the European free-movement).

But did the Arab Spring lead to large-scale migratory fluxes from the MENA region to the EU? Was there an "immigrant invasion" from the South, as reported by the media? It is our aim to explore how the Arab democratic wave affect(ed) the migratory fluxes within the Mediterranean region and to deconstruct the common perception of "immigrant invasion" in Europe. Focusing in the MENA countries, we aim to deconstruct these perceptions of large-scale fluxes regarding Mediterranean migrations and analyse how the securitisation process is changing the European border management.

2. OVERVIEW

The Mediterranean is a space of confluence and gaps. Cultural, religious and economic factors explain the asymmetries between the two shores. Despite the fact that there is an increasing convergence of the

medium levels of the Human Development Index (HDI) within the Mediterranean (Table 1 and 2), internal inequalities are still a reality.

Table 1: Mediterranean Human Development Index in the Mediterranean and its components

Countries	Human Development Index (HDI)	Life expectancy at birth	Mean years of scholing	Expected years of scholing	Gross national income (GNI) per capita	GNI per capita rank minus HDI rank	Nonincome HDI
	Value	(years)	(years)	(years)	(2005 PPP $)		Value
	2012	2012	2010[a]	2011[b]	2012	2012	2012
Albania	0.749	77.1	10.4	11.4	7,822	21	0.807
Algeria	0.713	74.7	6.5	14.5	8,103	-6	0.746
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.735	75.8	8.3	13.4	7,713	13	0.787
Croatia	0.805	76.8	9.8	14.1	15,419	4	0.837
Cyprus	0.848	79.8	9.8	14.9	23,825	4	0.869
Egypt	0.662	73.5	6.4	12.1	5,401	-6	0.702
France	0.893	81.7	10.6	16.1	30,277	4	0.919
Greece	0.860	80.0	10.1	16.3	20,511	13	0.899
Israel	0.900	81.9	11.9	15.7	26,224	13	0.942
Italy	0.881	82.0	10.1	16.2	26,158	5	0.911
Jordan	0.700	73.5	8.6	12.7	5,272	8	0.766
Lebanon	0.745	72.8	7.9	13.9	12,364	-5	0.762
Libya	0,769	75.0	7.3	16.2	13,765	-8	0.791
Malta	0.847	79.8	9.9	15.1	21,184	9	0.876
Montenegro	0,791	74.8	10.5	15.0	10,471	24	0.850
Morocco	0.591	72.4	4.4	10.4	4,384	-13	0.608
Palestine	0.670	73.0	8.0	13.5	3,359	20	0.761
Portugal	0.816	79.7	7.7	16.0	19.907	0	0.835
Serbia	0.769	74.7	10.2	13.6	9,533	16	0.823
Slovenia	0.892	79.5	11.7	16.9	23,999	12	0.936
Spain	0.885	81.6	10.4	16.4	25,947	8	0.919
Syria	0.648	76.0	5.7	11.7	4,674	-2	0.692
Tunisia	0.712	74.7	6.5	14.5	8,103	-6	0.746
Turkey	0.722	74.2	6.5	12.9	13,710	-32	0.720

a. Data refer to 2010 or the most recent year available
b. Data refer to 2011 or the most recent year available.

Source: UNDP, 2013, 144-147.

Table 2: Mediterranean countries in the world HDI ranking, 2012

Level of Human Development	Countries	Ranking
Very High Human Development	Israel	16
	France	20
	Slovenia	21
	Spain	23
	Italy	25
	Greece	29
	Cyprus	31
	Malta	32
	Portugal	43
	Croatia	47
High Human Development	Montenegro	52
	Serbia	64
	Libya	64
	Albania	70
	Lebanon	72
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	81
	Turkey	90
	Algeria	93
	Tunisia	94
Medium Human Development	Jordan	100
	Palestine	110
	Egypt	112
	Morocco	130

Source: UNDP, 2013, 143.

In terms of population, in the coming decades, the North will continue to lose relative demographic importance, with an ageing Europe and loss of active manpower. The South will experience positive changes, with youth bulges and excess of manpower. Thus, migrations play an important role in the demographic balance between both shores. The South-North migratory dynamics in the Mediterranean have two main consequences: to give a new demographic dynamism to the

Northern shore, as well as to those countries facing a population reduction; and reduce the fast increase of population in the South (Rodrigues & Ferreira, 2011, 7).

Southern Mediterranean states do not have the capacity to absorb in their labour market all the labour force available nor have the necessary resources (economic and logistic) to create more jobs, this is source of discontentment among the youth and fuse to social and political tension. Moreover, salaries are very low and there is a lack of opportunities for qualified young people. Fargues (2012, 28) considers that this situation "sets the stage for widespread frustration among the young, which in turn may lead to resignation, rebellion or emigration" (Appendix 1, Table 6).

Economic, demographic and political imbalances boost migratory movements in the region. Both shores have different life standards which deepens the gap between them and makes some regions more attractive. Thus, "the dream of emigration is very extended among youngsters in North Africa" (Láuzara, 2012, 19).

Migration patterns in the Mediterranean region have always been very diverse and dynamic. We can distinguish three different migratory complexes in the Mediterranean: the African Mediterranean, where motivations to migrate are mainly economic – Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt have traditionally been countries of emigration, while Libya has been a country of immigration (for economic migrants and refugees); the Asian Mediterranean, where migrations are primarily driven by political vicissitudes, for example the conflict in the Middle East and the Turkish question; and, the European Mediterranean, with both economic and political motivations, besides from France, country with a long traditional Mediterranean migratory history, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Romania became new countries of immigration in the past decades (Rodrigues & Ferreira, 2011, 17).

The instability created by the Arab Spring has accentuated the cleavages between both shores and created new challenges. The Arab world is facing a turning point focusing more on the individual's freedoms, which sets the stage for a paradigm shift. The protests that started in Tunisia by the end of 2010 originated a new political cycle in the Arab world. Láuzara (2012, 15-21) identifies the catalysts of these

movements that swept the Arab world: the delegitimization of governments; socio-economic motives, low economic growth, inadequate salaries, high unemployment rates, and the demographic structure of the population; and the role of social media in society.

These movements for change have led to the displacement of millions, enhancing human mobility in the region, and creating higher migratory pressure in the Mediterranean basin. Nevertheless, as we will see, the migratory pressure was mostly South-South (between countries in the region) and not South-North (from North Africa to the EU), as portrayed by the media and many policymakers.

3. MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATIONS AND NORTH-SOUTH MOBILITY

The Mediterranean countries play an important role in the context of international migrations. Two of the major migratory systems converge in this cross-point: Africa, a region of huge mobility and Europe, one of the most sought host regions.

The Mediterranean has a complex migratory network with South-North mobility (from the Maghreb to Europe), South-South mobility (from Libya to Tunisia and Egypt and from the Maghreb countries to the Persian Gulf) and East-West mobility (from the Balkans and Turkey to Western Europe). Migrations from Southern Mediterranean to Europe have mainly been triggered by feelings of frustration between young people, due to lack of opportunities (unemployment, low payments, and authoritarian regimes, among others) (Rodrigues & Ferreira, 2011, 9-10).

Countries at the Mediterranean shore are often simultaneously countries of origin, transit and destination, which can change depending on the different fluxes and routes taken. South-South mobility is mainly triggered by economic motivations and political conflicts.

By the end of 2010 around 4,5 million immigrants were living in Arab Mediterranean countries, both in regular and in irregular situations. South-South mobility has occurred mostly between migrant workers (mainly to the countries which are oil producers). Countries in the MENA region are an important destination for millions of workers. Libya had, until recently, been the largest migrant-receiver in the region,

although the situation of its migrants had never been stable. Take Egypt for instance, with a recent migratory history and that had always had Libya as its main country of destination.

The political and social tensions of the Arab Spring have shaken these states economies and have changed migratory patterns and challenged regional security. The increased volatility of the region has accentuated the migratory pressure.

3.1 Migratory fluxes in the Mediterranean basin during the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring has increased fears of large-scale migrations to Europe and exacerbated the feeling of insecurity among Europeans, due to its geographical proximity. Immigration as a threat to the Mediterranean results from the feeling of insecurity regarding migratory flows from North Africa, particularly from the Maghreb, and often challenges human security, as migrants risk their own lives in the search for a better one (Ferreira, 2014, 74).

According to official data from CARIM[2], since the year 2000 there has been an increase in the number of migrants from North Africa to Europe. Morocco has been the largest contributor, especially in Spain, where between 2000 and 2013 there has been an increase of Moroccans from 154,280 to 643,240. Still, the largest migrant group from the Mediterranean in Europe are Turks (Rodrigues & Ferreira, 2011, 13).

The political and social unrest in Tunisia and Libya were responsible for fluctuations in the size and composition of the migratory movements in the Central Mediterranean Route in 2011 (Figure 1). From 2010 to 2011 there was a rise in detections of irregular border-crossing at the EU's external borders of 35%, from 104,000 to 141,000 detections. This increase was mainly felt in the Central Mediterranean area (from 5,000 detections in 2010 to 64,000 in 2011) (FRONTEX, 2012b).

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[2] CARIM – acronym for Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration.

Figure 1: Detections of irregular border crossing by main irregular routes



Source: FRONTEX, 2012b, 17.

According to Frontex's (2012a, 4) data most immigrants detected irregularly crossing EU's border were Tunisians (20%), Afghans (16%) and Pakistanis (11%). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that "[t]he flow of Tunisian migrants who crossed the border illegally appeared to be mostly economically-driven, with most migrants heading to France as their final destination" (FRONTEX, 2012a, 16). Thus, the departures of most Tunisians were not to flee the destabilisation, rather to cease "an opportunity to realise pre-existing ambitions" (Perrin, 2011, 284).

Moreover, most sub-Saharan immigrants detected in the islands of Lampedusa, Sicily and Malta had been expelled by Gaddafi's regime in Libya (FRONTEX, 2012a, 15). Nevertheless, it should be noted that this high increase of irregular detections in the Central Mediterranean route was mostly due to a window of opportunity created by the regional instability, which allowed other migrants (Afghans, Algerians and other Sub-Saharan Africans) to easily use the same routes. In fact, in 2004 both Tunisia and Libya had revised their migratory legislation and signed "agreements with European countries such as Italy to control maritime borders and readmit nationals departing their coasts" (Perrin, 2011, 283), reinforcing their borders. Thus, with the outbreak of the conflicts there was a relaxation in border controls leaving an opportunity for hundreds to

leave the country and others to use this migratory channel. As Perrin (2011, 284) points out, "these departures confirm that the policy of containment fosters the development of criminality related to the organisation of irregular migration and increases migratory movement focussing on opportune places at specific point in time".

In 2011, the fluxes originated in the MENA region towards Europe were mainly from Tunisia and Libya. As the IOM (2011, p. 50) highlights, "[n]o significant outflows were reported from other countries in the region, including Egypt", taking into account other countries where the upheavals took place.

In this same period, the Libyan crisis placed a great pressure to its neighbours' borders (Figure 2). According to the IOM[3] (2011, 50), as of June 2011, "[m]ajor cross-border movements were recorded at the border with Tunisia and Egypt, with 256,000 and 184,000 arrivals, respectively". Most of these movements were of Libyan nationals, who seek shelter in neighbouring countries:

With the outbreak of war, the vast majority of people fleeing Libya has taken the land route into Tunisia or Egypt in the hope of returning to their countries. The collective departures reveal the extreme diversity of the migrant population in Libya, as well as the complexity and great heterogeneity of the 'Africans' present (Perrin, 2011, 285).

Besides this South-South mobility from citizens escaping the conflicts of the Arab Spring, there was a return movement from migrant workers back to their countries of origin (in Asia and Africa). As reported by the IOM (2011, 50), "[n]eighbouring Chad and Niger, for instance, saw 70,000 and 80,000 nationals, respectively, return home from Egypt and Tunisia, on their own or with the support of IOM, within the first three months of the Libyan crisis".

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[3] IOM – acronym for International Organization for Migrations.

Figure 2: Departures from Libya in 2011 (IOM data from end of June 2011)



Source: IEMed, 2011, 388.

In 2012, Frontex registered a decrease in irregular border-crossings, to almost half the number reported in 2011 (73,000 detections). Most migrants irregularly staying in the EU were from Afghanistan and Morocco (FRONTEX, 2013, 6). The agency highlights that "[d]espite a short-term increase of 10% between 2011 and 2012, the overall trend of detections of facilitators of irregular migration has been falling since 2008, totalling about 7 700 in 2012" (FRONTEX, 2013, 6). Nevertheless, the volatility of the region was still assessed as of high risk in terms of irregular border-crossings, especially in the Central Mediterranean route, due to the political instability felt in the region.

In 2013 there was another sharp increase in detections of irregular border-crossing, from approximately 73,000 detections in 2012 to 107,000 in 2013, still not reaching the values of 2011 (Figure 3). Frontex points two main causes to this increase in 2013: a large increase in irregular border-crossings by Syrians, applying for asylum; and a steady flow of migrants departing from North Africa (Libya and Egypt) (FRONTEX, 2014, 7).

Figure 3: Detections of illegal border-crossing by main migration route (2011-2013)



Source: Frontex, 2014, 15.

Migrants crossing European's borders irregularly came mainly from Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan and Albania. These four nationalities accounted for 52% of the detections (55,400) and Syrians alone represented 25% of the total (25,500 detections) (FRONTEX, 2014, 7). These numbers reflect the instability felt in Syria.

The conflict in Syria that started in March 2011, led to a first exodus of refugees to the Turkish border in June 2011 (De Elvira Carrascal, 2014, 181). The on-going civil war has already displaced a considerable part of the population. By April 2013, UNHCR[4] accounted 1,387,806 national Syrians who had fled their country and reached neighbouring countries: Jordan (32%), Lebanon (31.2%), Turkey (22.6%), Iraq (9.8%), Egypt (3.6%) and other North African countries (0.7%). Still, "it is worth mentioning that these outflows increased strikingly in the last 6 months: 23 October 2012, registered refugees were 'only' 281,144, confirming a further recent escalation of violence in Syria and a consequent aggravation of the refuge crisis" (MPC, 2013, 1) By May 2014, there were 2,719,391 registered Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2014).

[4] UNHCR – acronym for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

In the Central Mediterranean route, Libya has been a crucial point for boats' facilitators who have taken advantage of reduced government controls. Moreover, there was also an increase in departures from Egypt (FRONTEX, 2014, 8). In the Apulia and Calabria route, "most of the detections in Calabria are associated with migrants who departed from Turkey or Egypt and sailed across the Aegean Sea towards Italy" (FRONTEX, 2014, 39). Most of these immigrants were Syrians and many reached Europe's shores by boat.

Many immigrants risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean by boat and tragically 2013 was a period with several major boat accidents, resulting in massive deaths at sea (Figure 4). The wide media coverage of these human tragedies attracted political and public attention to the question of irregular migrations in the Mediterranean (FRONTEX, 2014, 32-33)

Figure 4: Detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU's land and sea borders (2008-2013)



Source: Frontex, 2014, 12.

Despite all efforts in controlling and contending South-North mobility, the Mediterranean will continue to be a crossing point for migration (both regular and irregular). The persistent instability of the region and the on-going conflict in Syria, will continue to promote "departures of sub-Saharan migrants from Libya across the Central Mediterranean route to reach Italy and arrivals of Syrians crossing the border illegally to apply for asylum in the EU" (FRONTEX, 2014, 63). Moreover, Frontex points out the importance of Turkey as a gate to Europe (via air border). The airport of Istambul is an important point "for irregular migrants travelling by air route to several Member States, with

continuous increase in passenger flows for the past few years and airline carriers' expansion towards Africa and the Middle East" (FRONTEX, 2014, 64).

The ability of the new regimes to create strong (democratic) governments and to cease control of their own borders and public policies will influence future migratory dynamics in the Mediterranean. MENA countries may continue to be used both as transit countries and crossing points for potential migrants from different origins (FRONTEX, 2014, 64).

3.2. Deconstructing myths of large-scale migrations

The Arab Spring and the fluctuations in the migratory movements in the Mediterranean since early 2011 fuelled the security and often xenophobe discourse in EU's Member States and European media. The term "invasion" was often used by European media to refer to these movements. But did the Arab Spring lead to large-scale migratory fluxes from the MENA region to the EU? Was there a "human tsunami", as Berlusconi called it (Corriere Della Sera, 2011, April 1), from the South?

Over the past decade, migration has increasingly attracted media attention and became a matter of high politics in the international agenda. The media play an important role in influencing and reflecting public opinion and have the capacity to act as "both an agenda setter and driver on immigration issues, and a mirror reflecting debates going on in public and policy circles" (Papademetriou & Heuser, 2009). Accurate reporting is thus a responsibility of both media and policymakers. As the IOM highlights,

> Distorted communication about migration can trigger a vicious cycle that leads to misinformation being perpetuated through government policy, the mass media, the public at large and vice versa, which can, in turn, skew discourse at all levels. Policies and political discourse play a major role in shaping the image of migrants in host societies. One of the biggest challenges in this regard is what and how governments communicate about migrants and migration policy to the wider public (IOM, 2011, p. 4).

During the Arab Spring, European policymakers and national media "promoted the perception the crisis in North Africa would result in

much more irregular migration to Europe" (IOM, 2011, 50). In reality, most movements took place inside the region (South-South mobility), and only a small proportion crossed the Mediterranean.

How data and figures are presented and treated by stakeholders, influences perceptions. Taken out of context the data presented above may seem somewhat overwhelming. However, these figures must be read in the bigger picture, in the context of European migrations as whole.

As stated above, the increase in the Central Mediterranean route in 2011 was due to the vulnerability of the countries experiencing conflicts (such as Tunisia), which became points of transit and departure for other international migrants. We must consider that a great share of Southern Mediterranean countries are corridors for regular and irregular routes for sub-Saharan population and East-Asians. When comparing data from previous years we notice an increase in irregular migrations to Europe in the period following 2011. However, as we will demonstrate, this increase is not so relevant when compared with previous data and overall migrations to Europe.

Europe is the main host region for international migrants, followed by Asia. In 2013, 72 million international migrants resided in Europe, representing 9.8% of Europe's residents (ESA, 2013). Europe is the most attractive continent in the world for international migrations. Traditionally immigrants seek mostly Western and Northern Europe and only recently did Southern European countries become attractive (such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece).

The financial crisis that started in 2008 led to the adoption of more restrictive immigration policies by EU Member States. Most countries lowered their quotas for immigrant entrances and some even adopted zero-entrance policies (Switzerland, Spain and Ireland). Thus, closing all channels to legal migration and naturally opening "the doors to irregular migration, even in the absence of attractive opportunities in the countries of destination" (Abdelfattah, 2011, 4). This translated in a reduction of migratory flows from 2010 onwards (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Inflows of third-country nationals to the EU



Source: European Commission, 2014.

When analysing data from inflows of foreign population from Southern Mediterranean countries to those Member States part of the OECD[5], we realise that there have been slight variations in terms of flows in the last decade (from 2000 to 2011), with more significant variations within the flows of countries of origin. These flows had their peak in 2004, reaching a total of 294,074. In this same year one of the greatest flows of Moroccans to Europe was registered (140,162), only surpassed in 2008 when 161,225 Moroccans entered Europe. Comparing these flows with total inflows of third-country nationals to the EU per year, allows us to realise that this is a small proportion of the total fluxes. Nevertheless, in 2011, when the political uprisings started, there was a decrease in the total flows from Southern Mediterranean countries in comparison to 2010, from 241,870 to 239,692 (Table 3).

[5] OECD – acronym for Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.

Table 3: Inflows of foreign population by nationality in EU OCDE's countries

Countries	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Algeria	21,288	24,334	31,53	35,823	37,336	33,944	35,065	33,785	33,234	29,678	28,518	30,05
Egypt	9,102	5,515	6,814	9,521	14,508	12,187	12,512	10,93	11,298	14,22	16,128	17,87
Israel	2,47	3,429	2,731	2,853	2,699	2,43	3,084	2,639	2,912	3,003	3,21	3,187
Jordan	2,509	1,961	1,126	1,196	1,354	1,193	1,229	1,164	1,297	1,532	1,667	3,828
Lebanon	4,784	4,624	4,807	4,488	4,073	3,685	4,754	4,222	4,404	4,277	4,294	4,247
Libya	3,171	1,222	1,235	1,214	1,109	0,986	1,259	1,022	1,118	1,273	1,529	1,595
Morocco	88,17	90,177	92,284	111,535	140,162	136,213	129,123	134,636	161,225	122,302	111,021	99,234
Palestine	0,035	0,025	0,005	0,016	0,011	0,015	0,054	0,042	0,093	0,248	0,274	0,173
Syria	5,636	5,106	4,993	4,35	4,074	3,851	3,765	3,506	3,996	4,697	6,053	8,701
Tunisia	13,152	14,7	16,154	19,428	19,14	16,418	16,356	15,914	18,081	16,743	20,097	21,123
Turkey	74,14	81,856	88,27	78,723	69,608	62,78	52,332	48,403	50,469	49,81	49,079	49,684
Total	224,457	232,949	249,949	269,147	294,074	273,702	259,533	256,263	288,127	247,783	241,870	239,692

Source: OECD, 2014.

Despite the fact that the largest immigrant community in the EU is from Turkey, in the first decade of the 21st century there was a significant increase in migratory flows from Morocco, this being the main country of origin from immigrants from the Southern shore of the Mediterranean (Table 4 and see table 3 above). When analysing the stock of foreign population in EU OECD's countries, it is also interesting to notice that the year of 2009 is the one registering a larger stock of Southern Mediterranean nationals, due to the higher inflow of Moroccans in 2008.

When considering the countries mostly affected by the Arab Spring, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya, we realise that there was an increase in the inflows from nationals of these countries, in some cases more significant than in others. Yet, this is not the case in terms of migrant stocks, since in all cases but one (Syria) there was a reduction of the stock from 2010 to 2011. From the data analysis it is also interesting to register that most of these migrants choose Germany as their final destination, followed by France, Italy and Spain.

Despite the fact that the data available by the OECD in terms of migrant stocks and flows from Southern Mediterranean countries only covers the first year of the Arab Spring, 2011, it is possible to assume from Frontex's data, that these movements did not reach any higher proportions.

Table 4: Stock of foreign population by nationality in EU OCDE's countries

Countries	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Algeria	56,815	67,178	75,112	81,235	88,889	90,542	572,228	573,625	576,675	579,037	113,482	107,206
Egypt	51,368	58,061	62,495	73,965	77,891	80,506	101,465	108,729	139,6	130,449	136,459	38,203
Israel	13,83	15,752	16,462	17,986	16,545	16,745	17,237	17,79	19,97	21,194	20,891	18,577
Jordan	15,149	15,415	15,468	15,56	13,886	14,374	14,216	13,905	15,339	15,356	15,421	15,051
Lebanon	62,264	61,305	59,088	57,921	51,616	49,561	63,139	63,639	63,945	61,912	50,901	43,767
Libya	3,717	4,417	5,343	5,352	5,154	5,487	18,529	16,345	24,825	31,984	31,766	30,765
Morocco	589,655	653,052	765,072	842,84	969,178	1043,288	1546,288	1628,065	1722,38	1783,394	1386,012	950,627
Palestine	1,298	2,675	3,568	4,415	4,65	3,733	3,417	7,29	5,651	5,614	4,32	3,207
Syria	38,742	43,047	45,916	47,271	43,419	43,707	42,942	46,629	55,947	60,453	53,74	56,937
Tunisia	75,744	84,286	90,863	100,454	108,218	114,327	266,134	269,508	276,3	280,836	141,307	41,951
Turkey	2366,997	2322,594	2276,3	2247,332	2112,217	2093,191	2312,658	2272,964	2246,025	2214,545	1978,503	1924,179
Total	3275,579	3327,782	3415,687	3494,331	3491,663	3555,461	4958,253	5018,489	5146,657	5184,774	3932,802	3230,47

Source: OECD, 2014.

Irregular migrations are a small percentage of overall migrations to Europe. Yet, these movements are often conceived as an element of insecurity. Moreover, irregular migrations are often associated with organised crime, namely trafficking networks. Media and political discourses often portrait irregular migrations as a threat to states' sovereignty. States' control over national borders and who crosses their borders is imperilled by the entrance of irregular fluxes of immigrants. Thus, in extreme discourses, irregular migrations are frequently portrayed as a threat to states' security. However, this idea is often a misconception. This perception of "invasion" can be deconstructed by real data and numbers, as in fact it is usually an insignificant percentage of total immigration.

Considering detections of irregular border-crossings in the Mediterranean routes alone, we notice a significant increase in all routes in the year 2011 (Table 5 and Figure 6). The Central Mediterranean route, that crosses Libya and Tunisia, had the greatest boost in this period, from 1,662 detections in 2010 to 59,002 in 2011. Nevertheless, these data must be framed within the overall European migratory movements, where they represent a small proportion of all movements.

Table 5: Detections of irregular border-crossing in 2009-2013, by route and top three nationalities

Routes	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Western Mediterranean Route	**6,642**	**5,003**	**8,448**	**6,397**	**6,383**
by land	1,639	1,567	3,345	2,839	4,229
Not specified	503	1,108	2,610	1,728	3,329
Algeria	464	459	735	967	900
Morocco	672	0	0	144	0
by sea	5,003	3,436	5,103	3,558	2,609
Algeria	3,190	1,242	1,037	1,048	536
Mali	3	20	87	194	467
Morocco	254	300	775	364	282
Central Mediterranean Route	**10,236**	**1,662**	**59,002**	**10,379**	**40,304**
Eritrea	1,084	55	641	1,889	9,926
Syria	18	0	92	109	9,591
Somalia	3,143	82	1,400	3,394	4,497
Apulia and Calabria Route	**807**	**2,788**	**5,259**	**4,772**	**4,994**
Syria	22	191	191	472	1,912
Pakistan	1	53	992	1,156	956
Egypt	0	168	962	424	746
Eastern Mediterranean Route	**6,642**	**5,003**	**8,448**	**6,397**	**6,838**
by land	11,127	49,513	55,558	32,854	12,968
Syria	354	495	1,216	6,216	7,366
Afghanistan	639	21,389	19,308	7,973	2,049
Algeria	211	6,335	3,393	2,316	493
by sea	28,848	6,175	1,467	4,370	11,831
Syria	184	139	76	906	5,361
Afghanistan	11,758	1,373	310	1,593	4,080
Eritrea	1,093	445	11	50	552
Total Mediterranean Routes	**24,327**	**14,456**	**81,157**	**27,954**	**58,519**

Source: FRONTEX, 2014, 31.

To sum up, during the Arab Spring, citizens fleeing conflicts mainly looked for shelter in neighbouring countries, putting an even higher pressure in the region, or, in some cases, returned to their countries of origin. South-North mobility was a small proportion of these movements and did not take the dimensions forecasted by policymakers and stakeholders. Still Mediterranean South-North migrations are and will always be a reality, due to the existing differences between both shores.

Figure 6: Detections of irregular border-crossing in 2013, with percentage change on 2012, by route and top nationality detected



Source: FRONTEX, 2014, 33.

4. MANAGING EUROPE'S SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN BORDER

The uprisings in Europe's neighbourhood challenge European security and its capacity to find its voice in times of crisis. At the same time it points out the need to rethink the EU's approach to the Mediterranean region.

The Arab Spring questioned Europe's ability to deal with crisis in its neighbourhood and to further develop its relations with MENA countries. However, as Perrin (2011, 283) pointed out "[b]reaking out in a period when Europe is marked by heightened nationalism and a strong political manipulation of xenophobia, the Arab revolts are nurturing European prejudices rather than reducing them". Thus, unfunded projections of massive arrivals to Southern European countries, especially Italy, Malta and Greece, had a particularly receptive audience and bolstered fears of insecurity among Europeans.

Despite an array of spheres of dialogue in terms of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation[6], priority divergences between both shores of the Mediterranean have led to ups and downs, conditioning its relations. Rather than promoting political reform and human rights, Member States' main focus has been in securing EU's borders, in containing migration and combating terrorism. So, EU's relations with its Southern neighbours is mainly focused in security questions and migration control and containment (Láuzara, 2012, 49).

The imbalance between the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean places a high pressure on the EU in terms of migration. Thus, European Members States' goal is to contain migration on the other side of the Mediterranean. To do so, the EU is reinforcing its external borders and externalising its migration policy, cooperating with countries of origin and transit in controlling their own borders and promoting mobility partnerships. Thus, cooperation with Southern Mediterranean neighbours has mainly focused on migration control and "has consisted in the gradual involvement of Eastern European and

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6 Take for instance the Union for the Mediterranean, the Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the 5+5 Dialogue, among others.

Southern Mediterranean neighbours in securing the EU's external borders" (Cassarino & Lavenex, 2012, 284).

Nevertheless, "(…) relations with third countries in North Africa in the sphere of migration, i.e. the so-called external dimension of migration policy, have long been fraught with tension" (Paoletti, 2011, 292). This transfer of location of migration controls is intertwined with the consolidation of a single European external border and the securing of this border, considered by some as the development of "Fortress Europe".

Despite EU's emphasis in promoting synergies between migration and development and endorsing the link between democracy-building and development with third countries (take for instance the adoption of "A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of a European Neighbourhood Policy" in May 2011), developments have taken place mainly in terms of control measures, i.e. Frontex joint operations, increasing Frontex's budget, the implementation of EUROSUR, and so on. However, in terms of migration management the EU did not come up with new approaches to face the challenges of the Arab Spring.

The EU is pressuring Southern transit countries to control and contain migrants and even to sign readmission agreements. Thus, Paoletti (2011, 293) claims that "(…) the attempt by European countries to move their borders southward is understood as a further example of the expansion of EU normative power".

The Mobility Partnerships launched with partner countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt), supported the mobility of students and researchers, through scholarships. These platforms of migration dialogue and cooperation between the EU and individual third countries should promote legal migration and fight irregular movements (Cassarino & Lavenex, 2012, 285).

In terms of humanitarian help, even though the refugee flows from Libya did not pose a true challenge to Europe, rather to its neighbouring countries, Member States were encouraged to facilitate humanitarian aid and asylum (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012, 10).

Asymmetries between both shores of the Mediterranean will continue to pressure South-North mobility. Thus, the EU should focus on managing and promoting circular migrations, developing mechanisms to regulate migrations that do not jeopardize human security, and concentrate on the positive effects of migrations. Nevertheless, this should be the result of multilateral decisions and not unilateral ones.

5. FINAL REMARKS

The Arab Spring set in motion an assortment of political and social changes in the Arab world. The future is still uncertain, but difficulties will definitely continue to come along the way. This uncertainty raises fears in Europe "(…) as to the potential threats and risks that might arise as a result of the transformation of the southern police states" (Amirah-Fernández & Lecha, 2011, 4-5). Fears of large-scale migrations from the Maghreb to Europe, of regional conflicts, or even of radical parties taking over the new regimes.

The geography of Mediterranean migrations is very dynamic and in constant change. The Mediterranean routes are very fluctuant in terms of fluxes, mainly conditioned by political and social stability. In the beginning of the Arab Spring, there was an increase in fluxes from the Central Mediterranean route, especially from Tunisia and Libya, mainly due to a window of opportunity created by the internal tensions and conflicts that led to a loose of border controls. Thus, attracting migrants from other routes, who ceased this opportunity to cross the Mediterranean.

Moreover, these fluxes should be read within the wider frame of European migrations and not as isolated movements and within a time framework. In this sense, and when compared with previous data, these inflations do not represent large-scale fluxes. It should be stressed that the majority of migratory movements concerning the Arab Spring took place in the region, overloading neighbouring countries.

The policies adopted by the EU towards the Mediterranean region have long been criticised for its lack of political will to achieve its objectives and for often being one-sided. The measures adopted so far illustrate the 'business as usual' approach (Carrera, Hertog, & Parkin,

2012, 23). The EU should cease the moment to rethink and reframe its Mediterranean policy and contribute to the region's stability and prosperity. A new Euro-Mediterranean agenda should take into account the populations' demands. Therefore, dialogue and bilateral cooperation is essential for a genuine partnership. The dialogue on migration should examine the broader picture and move beyond a mainstream approach. The discourse should be reframed, taking into account demographic, social and economic variables.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring the future is still unforeseeable and the outcomes are still unpredictable. A successful transformation of the southern Mediterranean countries depends on the new development models adopted. The creation of an integrated system, that co-relates the political, economic, social and environmental circles, is fundamental.

The Arab Spring has offered momentum for the EU to rethink its strategy towards the Mediterranean, whether it ceases it and reconfigures its approach towards the Mediterranean, or whether it keeps doing 'business as usual' is up to Member States' willingness to change and promote stability in its southern neighbourhood. Only a sustainable cooperative approach will promote a stable neighbourhood, essential to European security.

APPENDIX 1

Table 6: International capital flows and migration

Countries	Financial flows						Human mobility						
	Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	Net official development assistance received (% of GNI)	Private capital flows (% of GDP)	Remittances		Total reserves minus gold (% of GDP)	Migration			International inbound tourism	International telephone traffic		
				Inflows	Outflows		Stock of emigrants (% of population)	Stock of immigrants	Net migration rate (per 1,000 people)	(thousands)	Incoming	Outgoing
	2007-2011	2010	2007-2011	2010	2010	2007-2011	2010	2010	2005/2010	2010	2005-2010	2005-2010
Albania	9.4	2.9	6.7	9.75	0.20	18.5	45.4	2.8	-3.0	2,417	224.3	23.6
Algeria	1.4	0.1	1.1	1.26	0.03	96.9	3.4	0.7	-0.8	1,912	36.5	17.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.4	3.0	2.4	11.44	0.33	22.9	38.9	0.7	-0.5	365	213.8	49.6
Croatia	2.3	0.3	3.8	2.16	0.27	22.7	17.1	15.9	0.5	9,111	224.1	90.9
Cyprus	1.0	-	35.1	0.63	1.75	2.0	17.0	17.5	8.3	2,173	314.7	555.4
Egypt	2.9	0.3	7.2	3.53	0.12	6.5	4.4	0.3	-0.9	14,051	55.4	7.8
France	1.5	-0.5	10.8	0.61	0.21	1.8	2.8	10.7	1.6	77,148	182.1	192.1
Greece	0.6	-	-7.8	0.50	0.65	0.4	10.8	10.1	2.7	15,007	96.1	201.3
Israel	4.7	-	-0.2	0.65	1.72	30.8	14.0	40.4	7.8	2,803	-	-
Italy	1.5	-0.2	-3.4	0.33	0.60	2.2	5.8	7.4	6.7	43,626	-	152.0
Jordan	6.4	3.6	6.0	13.78	1.87	39.8	11.3	45.9	7.0	4,557	95.8	6.8
Lebanon	11.0	1.2	2.1	19.38	9.58	80.0	15.6	17.8	-0.6	2,168	318.4	87.3
Libya	2.2	0.1	-5.0	0.03	-	-	1.7	10.4	-0.7	34	-	-
Malta	12.2	-	-42.2	0.58	0.56	5.6	26.2	3.8	2.4	1,332	-	144.0
Montenegro	18.5	2-0	-	7.32	0.67	8.6	0.0	6.8	-0.8	1,088	-	-
Morocco	2.5	1.1	2.0	7.07	0.07	19.5	9.3	0.2	-4.3	9,288	114.1	14.5
Palestine	-	-	-	-	-	-	68.4	43.6	-4.7	522	-	-
Portugal	4.3	-0.3	-3.8	1.56	0.62	0.8	20.8	8.6	2.8	6,756	173.9	111.2
Serbia	6.0	1.8	10.6	8.72	0.18	33.0	2.0	5.3	0.0	683	104.4	32.1
Slovenia	2.2	-	6.8	0.66	0.34	1.7	6.5	8.1	2.2	1,869	88.2	112.0
Spain	1.7	-	-3.2	0.76	0.88	2.2	3.0	15.2	10.1	52,677	-	118.9
Syria	2.5	0.2	2.2	2.78	0.36	32.9	4.2	9.8	-0.6	8,546	-	23.4
Tunisia	3.2	1.3	3.0	4.45	0.03	21.4	6.3	0.3	-0.4	6,903	58.0	16.1
Turkey	2.1	0.1	4.6	0.12	0.02	10.1	5.6	1.0	-0.1	27,000	57.8	43.4

Source: UNDP, 2013, 182-185.

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