

A Work Project presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master's degree in
Economics from the Nova School of Business and Economics.

**EUROPEANS' REACTIONS TO IMMIGRANTS:
IT'S (NOT ONLY) THE ECONOMY, STUPID!**

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Abstract

Survey data shows that Europeans are divided concerning immigration. This project aims at shedding light on this heterogeneity. Using data from the European Social Survey, we first explore differences regarding the impact of immigration on the economy of a country and on its quality of life. We further enrich our analysis by adding another important layer: the cultural and economic background of the immigrant. We study attitudes towards immigration both within and between 19 European countries, using individual and country-level explanatory variables. We find that citizens tend to be more averse towards immigrants coming from different ethnical backgrounds and from poor countries outside Europe. Moreover, at an individual level, socio-demographic explanatory variables are found significant to explain attitudes towards immigration, as well as individual economic factors, political factors and values and culture. There are also important country-level explanatory factors, such as education levels, average population age, share of foreign-born population, and social net benefits.

Keywords: Immigration Attitudes, Public Opinion, European Migration Policy.

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1. Introduction


In recent years, migration has become one of the most debated subjects in the European Union, especially with the increasing inflows of refugees and illegal migrants to the continent, which had its peak in the year of 2015. This numerous, and often not legal, immigration flows, showed to the decision makers, and to Europeans in general, that policies in Europe regarding asylum, external borders and migration are incomplete and many challenges are yet to be solved.

In order to address these issues, the EU started a process of reforms in order to redesign its migration policies along 4 pillars: “reducing the incentives for irregular migration by addressing its root causes, improving returns and dismantling smuggling and trafficking networks; saving lives and securing the external borders; establishing a strong EU asylum policy; and providing more legal pathways for asylum-seekers and more efficient legal channels for regular migrants.” (“The migration issue” – European Parliament). However, progress was hampered by a lack of agreement of the way forward with divisions within and across countries.

Despite migration being considered a natural process of open economies, it can pose challenges when it is growing constantly and with sudden peaks. Indeed, with the increase of irregular and illegal immigration flows, debates surged to the daily lives of European citizens as some perceived these flows as detrimental to their employment conditions, cultural identity, and safety. With the goal of achieving integration of immigrants, both European and from outside, and formulating a prosperous and sustainable migration policy it is important to study the factors that influence population’s attitudes in relation to immigrants.

Starting with immigration in general, Chart 1 describes the share of people in each country who claim that immigrants, make the country a worse place to live. The opinions are strongly divided: pooling the citizens from the different European countries, 49% have a negative view on migrants. This hides considerable country-level heterogeneity, with some countries having a


majority with positive opinions and others with negative ones. Countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Austria have a large share of the population believing that immigration makes the country a worse place to live. This is consistent with negative reactions to refugees and migration policies, that included the building of a fence along Hungary’s border with Serbia, forcing people to look for alternative paths to enter in Europe (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2015). On the other side, Ireland, Norway, Netherlands, and Switzerland have a more positive opinion about it, with less than 30% of the respondents against inflows of people. Considering dispersion within countries, there is a tendency for the standard deviation to be close to 50%, meaning that opinions are strongly divided between citizens.



This paper sheds light on this heterogeneity, studying what factors drive Europeans’ opinions about immigration. We start studying opinion about overall immigration, this is, people coming from abroad to live in the countries studied, and their impact in the economy and in the country. After, a distinction is done between three types of immigration: population coming from countries with similar ethnic and racial characteristics as Europeans, population coming from countries with different ethnic and racial characteristics and population from non-European poor countries. Charts 2 and 3 show that these cultural and economic factors play an important role in the perceptions of Europeans. While there is a positive association between support for the different


types of migration across countries, attitudes are more negative concerning those with different ethnicity or from poorer non-European countries. Thus, exploring this distinction across migrant flows allows us to analyse the factors that explain attitudes towards immigration across different ethnic and cultural groups. Usually, there is a tendency for people to be more negative about immigrants characterized by a different ethnicity than the mean (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2005), and thus these data allows us to test for this hypothesis. Moreover, some economists found that, on average, Europeans tend to be more averse to poor immigrants and especially from those coming from outside of the continent (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). We explore both differences across and within countries, by relying on country- and individual-level variables.

Chart 2: Scatterplot against different immigration



SOURCE: AUTHOR'S OWN COMPUTATIONS BASED ON ESS DATA

Chart 3: Scatterplot against different immigration



SOURCE: AUTHOR'S OWN COMPUTATIONS USING ESS DATA

Regarding individual explanatory variables, our results show that, even though economic factors, such as a higher income, are significant to explain attitudes towards immigrants, there are other aspects that matter, including socio-demographic characteristics, political interests, values and culture of respondents. We found that those who are more educated, that belong to minorities, that had an international working experience, that trust in other people, that feel attached to Europe, or that are satisfied with their country's health services, tend to be more pro-immigration. Our study shows different results, when focusing on individuals that live in the countryside, that are older, that value tradition, right wing political parties and their own country.

At a macro level, we found that countries with higher GDP per capita, inequality and education tend to have a more favourable opinion regarding immigration impact on the economy and quality of life. Countries with a higher share of old population tend to be less open towards immigrants that are poor, non-Europeans and with different ethnicities. Moreover, countries with a higher share of foreign-born population and of social benefits have a positive opinion towards immigrants, while higher share of refugees and of international students worsen overall opinion.

The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the immigration tendencies in Europe, section 3 revises the literature, section 4 describes the model used, section 5 describes the data used, section 6 presents our results and section 7 contains the conclusion.

2. Immigration in Europe: an historical perspective

Since the beginning of humanity, Europe has been a very important place of migration flows. Until the World Wars, especially due to mercantile reasons and colonial expansions, the region was characterized by higher emigration than immigration (de Haas, 2018). After the war, this trend changed: Northern and Western countries, highly industrialized, received huge numbers of workers, especially from the Southern European countries, Turkey, and Morocco.

During the second half of the 20th century, there was an increasing liberalization of the European labour markets, which resulted in more flows of immigration both within the continent and coming from old African and Asian colonies, including both lower skilled poorer workers and highly educated individuals. Despite of general perceptions, immigrants do not only move from underprivileged countries to wealthy ones. Often, higher educated people tend to emigrate too, aspiring for better opportunities (de Haas, 2018). Since late 20th century, migration flows have suffered some changes. Countries such as Poland, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria became a source of immigration and emigration to the Southwestern countries, and countries like Ireland, Italy and Spain started to attract labour force from North and West Africa and Latin America.

The beginning of the new century was characterized by flows of high skilled workers, including women, and undocumented and irregular migration, such as overstaying tourists and seasonal migrations coming from South Asia, China, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa and Ukraine (EPSC, 2017). With the worlds' financial and economic crisis of 2008, some of the European countries who suffered the most with it – Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland - saw their emigration rates increasing towards Northern countries (de Haas, 2018).

Nowadays, Europe is still facing an increase in the number of refugees, with 2015 standing out as the peak. In the same year, migration debates became dominated by Syrian and other refugees entering in Europe from Turkey and Greece, adding the 'boat migration' flows coming from Northern Africa, often characterized by a huge violation of human rights. Since Europe is relatively close to these problematic countries and has a positive reputation about peace, stability, and openness it is a popular destiny among those who crave for refuge and relief (EPSC, 2017).

Nowadays, human capital is a crucial resource in achieving higher productivity. As an effect of globalization, countries are competing to attract talent and high skilled young recently graduates. However, Europe is facing a decrease in skilled labour force since many graduates are choosing to live in India, China and US. To solve problems of a shrinking and old population, the continent must invest in attracting young graduates, to ensure a sustainable growing economy.

3. Literature Review

Before analysing the literature about immigration fears, it is informative to review what was found regarding immigration impacts, to check if there's a reasonable justification for these fears.

i. Impact of migration flows on Europe

In terms of labour market, there is no conclusive evidence that immigration increases unemployment. However, some authors do find that immigration is expected to bring wages

down, affecting more lower education workers and earlier incoming migrants, since immigrants can perform easily their activities and this effect is stronger during economic downturns (Okkerse, 2008; Ruhs, Martin, and Vargas-Silva, Carlos, 2020; Pekkala Kerr and Kerr 2011). Some studies state that migration contributes to the money circulation between countries (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). These effects can be defined as a “win-win-win outcome”: immigrants satisfy their mobility goals and ambitions; receiving countries attract labour, increasing their productivity; and origin countries increase their earnings from abroad. Moreover, immigration may help with problems of a shrinking working age population, even though, some studies conclude that for it to solve population ageing, inflows should increase exponentially (EPSC, 2017, Coleman, 2008).

To conclude, migration can increase pressures in public goods and services such as housing, health care, and social benefits. Some studies highlight the fact that immigrants, and especially refugees, tend to receive more social benefits than natives (Pekkala Kerr and Kerr, 2011). These problems increased with the financial world crisis and with the increasing flows of asylum seekers. For example, in 2016, the number of refugees in Europe was approximately 59,000, while 9,000 of them chose Athens, in a country with 21% unemployment, as their final destiny (EPSC, 2017).

ii. Public attitudes

Public attitudes are often one of the main drivers of policymaking, at the same time as a result of how political actors respond to current challenges. There are several economic and non-economic aspects that explain population’s attitudes towards immigration, including labour market and welfare concerns, as well as cultural values, political preferences, and media influence.

Socio-demographic factors

Starting with **education**, higher skilled individuals are, on average, more positive to immigration (Gorodzeisky and Moshe Semyonov, 2015; Christian Dustmann and Ian P. Preston, 2007). This happens because more educated people do not feel their jobs threatened by lower

skilled immigrants. Also, incoming workers tend to work in the activities that native population seem to reject (de Haas, 2018). On the other side, lower educated individuals tend to prefer more-restrictionist immigration policies (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Heath and Richards, 2016, Catherine de Vries & Isabell Hoffmann, 2016), since they fear their jobs to be stolen by immigrants, who are often willing to accept lower wages, implying less costs to the companies. Some authors find that negative perceptions are more common among **older** people and people who live in the **city** (Catherine de Vries & Isabell Hoffmann, 2016). On the contrary, some prove that **rural** residents fear more immigration (Gorodzeisky and Moshe Semyonov, 2015). This last tendency is justified with two main reasonings: firstly, people living in the cities are, on average, more educated and work on more professional activities than rural populations (Maxwell, 2019); others highlight the fact that rural immigrants tend to be poorer, less educated and more ethnically diverse, which can create higher aversion among rural populations that have a tendency to be more traditionalist and to have strong national preferences (Schaefer and Mattingly, 2016). Considering **gender**, even though evidence is not consistent, some authors show that male population tend to be more reluctant to immigration (Butkus, Maciulyte-Sniukiene and Matuzeviciute, 2016). The justification is that there is a tendency for a higher share of women to be working in the public sector and in positions that are less exposed to competition (Hjerm, 2009; OECD, 2015).

Individual Economic factors

The **threat of competition** included in the reasons for immigration fears, has origin in two aspects: structure and context of society, including economic conditions and individual characteristics, such as socioeconomic status, cultural values, or political orientation. Thus, some authors (Gorodzeisky and Moshe Semyonov, 2015; Thalhammer et al., 2001; Butkus, Maciulyte-Sniukiene and Matuzeviciute, 2016) conclude that anti-immigration sentiments are higher when

people are more socially and economically vulnerable, such as, when they are **unemployed** and when they do not have enough **income**, revealing evidence for fears of competition.

Political factors

The massive levels of immigration and asylum seekers that Europe received influenced a growing feeling of instability among Europeans. While Angela Merkle's policy, "Culture of welcome", that integrates refugees, had a huge support, some extreme right parties and anti-immigration movements arised and became popular (Arno Tausch, 2016). Thus, some authors extended their analysis, including **political ideologies** and often found that extreme right-wing supporters tend to be more averse towards immigration and globalization (Catherine de Vries & Isabell Hoffmann, 2016). This might be due to the fact that right-wing supporters are often more patriotic, nationalistic and conservative (Mayda, 2005, Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).

Values and culture

Evidence has been showing that individuals tend to be more averse towards immigrants with different ethnical backgrounds, and that is often justified by **racial intolerance or cultural concerns** (Christian Dustmann and Ian P. Preston, 2007; Mayda, 2005; Gorodzeisky and Moshe Semyonov, 2015). These also include **security concerns** and the idea that immigrants are more likely to be involved in criminal activity (Butkus, Maciulyte-Sniukiene and Matuzeviciute, 2016). Thus, some individuals see foreigners as a threat towards national identity, values, and traditions.

Country level factors

Usually, countries with a higher level of per-capita-GDP are, on average, less open to immigration (Mayda, 2005), as well as countries with more refugees and racial minorities, due to fears of competition (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2015). Some authors conclude (using Gini coefficient) that higher inequality is often associated with more restrictive immigration policies. The intuition is that, as the share of citizens with lower earnings is higher, fears of competition

become stronger (Timmer and Williamson, 1998). Furthermore, it is often found that welfare concerns (social benefits) have a negative impact on attitudes towards immigration (Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston, 2007; Malchow-Moller, Munch, Schroll and Skaksen, 2008). Some studies conclude that higher contact with immigrants, given for example by the share of foreign-born population, may have more attenuated preferences, suggesting that the integration of foreigners in the society can be enriching. (Catherine de Vries & Isabell Hoffmann, 2016; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Card Dustmann and Preston, 2005).

4. The model

In order to study what drives these so-called fears of immigration among the European countries, we use a two-steps country-fixed effects regression as follows:

$$Y_{ic} = c + \beta_1 X_{ic} + \alpha_c + \mu_{ic} \quad (1)$$

$$\hat{\alpha}_c = c + \beta_2 Z_c + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

In the first step regression, Y_{ic} is a set of 5 dependent variables (Table 1) which were converted to binary variables, taking the value of 1 if the respondent has a positive opinion about immigration and 0 otherwise. These are individuals (i) from 19 countries (c). X_{ic} constitutes the individual-level independent variables, described in Table 2, and are divided in four main groups, in line with the literature: Socio-demographics, Individual Economic factors, Political factors and Values and Culture. α_c stands for country fixed effects, as our model is designed to capture additional country level heterogeneity not driven by individual-level composition of countries. We include country clustered standard errors, stated by μ_{ic} , since we are studying what affects groups of observations uniformly within countries. Figure 8 of our appendix includes the Hausman Test used to decide whether to use fixed or random effects in our model. As our p-value is 0, we reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that a fixed-effect model is the most appropriated.

In the second step, we analyse additional country-level variables ($-Z_c$), as described in Table 1. In regression (2) we focus on the differences across countries, so our dependent variables are the country fixed effects extracted from regression (1), using robust standard errors, ε .

5. Data

5.1 Individual-level variables

This paper uses the individual-level survey data from the 9th Round of the European Social Survey (ESS9-2018 Edition 1.2). The data are collected among European countries every two years, since 2001, and explores opinions, behaviours, and beliefs among citizens. The dataset used on this paper was released in January 2020 and contains information about 19 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Switzerland and UK. We depart from 36,015 respondents which provided their opinions about topics, such as immigration, politics, values, culture, and their socio-demographic and economic characteristics. This information allows us to capture immigration preferences at the same time as individual characteristics that can explain these opinions by using econometric models.

5.1.1. Europeans' Opinion towards immigration

This study focuses on five dependent variables that describe the opinion of respondents towards different kinds of immigration and different impacts on the country where they live (Table 1). In the first section, we explore the perceived impact on the country's economy and on quality of life. To assess this, we explore answers to two questions:

- (1) "Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?" – Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if respondents

answered a value between 6 and 10 (good for the economy) and 0 if they answered a number equal or below 4 (bad for the economy).

- (2) “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” – Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents answered a value between 6 and 10 (better place to live) and 0 if they answered equal or below 4 (worse place to live).

In the second section, we assess if the cultural similarities or poverty impacts Europeans attitudes towards immigration. In order to do so, we explore three questions:

- (3) “To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]’s people to come and live here?” – Converted into a dummy variable taking equal to 1 if respondents answered, “Allow many to come and live here” or “Allow some” and 0 if they answered, “Allow a few” or “Allow none”.
- (4) “How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?”
- (5) “How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?”

This distinction is enriching as it allows us to analyse how opinion changes in relation to different populations. Same ethnic groups perceived by Europeans may include, intra-European population movements, enjoying freedom of movement rights. Analysis of immigrants with different ethnic backgrounds and Non-European poor immigrants, has the goal of studying issues of multiculturalism and conflicts between different ethnicities. These were introduced with the old European colonies and, currently, the discussion is often related to Muslim and Islamic origins. In the third section, we add to our model interactions between our individual level variables.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables

VARIABLES	“Is immigration good or bad for country’s economy?”	“Is your country made a better or a worse place to live by immigration?”	“Country should allow immigrant with same ethnicity as majority?”	“Country should allow immigrant with different ethnicity as majority?”	“Country should allow immigrant from poor non-European countries?”
N° Observations	26929	24863	34939	34928	34888
Mean	0.56	0.50	0.70	0.53	0.49
Standard Deviations	0.50	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.50

Source: Author’s own computations based on ESS data.

5.1.2. Individual-level Independent Variables

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables

VARIABLES	Number of Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation
<u>Socio-Demographic Factors</u>			
Age			
30-60	35848	0.48	0.50
60-100	35848	0.36	0.48
Male	36015	0.47	0.50
Years of Education Completed			
10-12 years (Secondary Level Education)	35510	0.33	0.47
>= 13 years (Tertiary Level Education)	35510	0.50	0.50
Domicile			
Suburbs of a big city	35994	0.11	0.31
Town/small city	35994	0.31	0.46
Country Village or farm in countryside	35994	0.38	0.49
Belonging to an ethnical minority	35759	0.06	0.24
<u>Individual Economic factors</u>			
Income Level			
Medium	28712	0.43	0.49
High	28712	0.26	0.44
Ever worked abroad	32812	0.06	0.25
Ever unemployed for more than 3 months	35781	0.27	0.45
Living comfortably with current household income	35465	0.77	0.42
<u>Political Factors</u>			
Time per week watching news about politics			
30-60 minutes	35628	0.23	0.42
60-90 minutes	35628	0.24	0.42
>90 minutes	35628	0.29	0.45
Preference for a right-wing political party	20547	0.53	0.50
<u>Values and Culture</u>			
Individual feels safe in his/her neighbourhood	35688	0.80	0.40
Individual thinks “Most People can be trusted”	28981	0.56	0.50
Emotionally attached to Europe	29434	0.70	0.46
Emotionally attached to own Country	33388	0.92	0.28
Agree with “Important to follow traditions and customs”	35367	0.75	0.43
Positive Opinion about country current health services	31291	0.65	0.48

Source: Author’s own computations based on ESS data.

Table 2 describes our individual independent variables, divided by four categories, and Table 3 includes the average of the independent variables for each value of the dependent variables, as well as the results for the t-tests of whether the difference between the two averages is statistically significant. It can be noticed that people with a more negative opinion about immigration tend to be, on average, older, suggesting a negative relation between the variables. Moreover, there is a tendency for a higher level of education, on average, among those who fear less immigration, as well as a higher income, a higher feeling of safety, a higher time spent watching news, a higher level of people trust, a higher feeling of attachment to Europe, a higher feeling of comfortability towards income, a better opinion about health system in the country and a higher tendency to belong to an ethnical minority or to have had a work experience abroad. On the other size, respondents that are more averse to immigration

tend to have preferences for country’s tradition and for right-wing political parties, suggesting negative coefficients. Considering respondents that feel attached to their own county, they seem to reject more immigrants with different ethnic characteristics and from poor countries outside of

Europe. Concerning the variable “domicile”, people voting against immigration tend to have an average value approaching 3, thus, containing a higher share of people living in a small town or in the countryside. Focusing on the p-values, we can see that these differences are significant, except for the variable “male”.

Table 3: Mean of Independent Variables, for each level of dependent variables and respective significance tests

VARIABLES	“Is immigration good or bad for country’s economy?”			“Is your country made a better or a worse place to live by immigration?”			“Country should allow immigrant with same ethnicity as majority?”			“Country should allow immigrant with different ethnicity as majority?”			“Country should allow immigrant from poor non-European countries?”		
	0	1	P-value	0	1	P-value	0	1	P-value	0	1	P-value	0	1	p-value
Age	39.50	36.93	0.00	40.14	36.55	0.00	40.09	37.40	0.00	40.46	36.18	0.00	40.42	35.88	0.00
Years of Education completed	8.99	10.60	0.00	9.12	10.53	0.00	8.85	10.24	0.00	9.12	10.46	0.00	9.22	10.44	0.00
Male	0.46	0.50	0.00	0.48	0.48	0.57	0.48	0.47	0.81	0.47	0.47	0.99	0.48	0.47	0.15
Respondent’s domicile	2.97	2.89	0.00	2.98	2.87	0.00	2.95	2.92	0.00	2.97	2.89	0.00	2.95	2.91	0.00
Belonging to a Minority	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.05	0.07	0.00
Household income level	1.83	2.06	0.00	1.84	2.04	0.00	1.80	2.00	0.00	1.85	2.03	0.00	1.87	2.02	0.00
Ever worked abroad	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.06	0.07	0.00	0.06	0.07	0.00
Ever unemployed	0.29	0.26	0.00	0.28	0.27	0.04	0.27	0.28	0.06	0.27	0.28	0.00	0.26	0.29	0.00
Feeling comfortable with current income	0.70	0.84	0.00	0.70	0.84	0.00	0.69	0.82	0.00	0.71	0.84	0.00	0.72	0.84	0.00
Time spent watching news about politics	1.85	1.93	0.00	1.85	1.95	0.00	1.85	1.90	0.00	1.86	1.91	0.00	1.87	1.91	0.00
Preference for a right-wing party	0.60	0.47	0.00	0.62	0.45	0.00	0.62	0.49	0.00	0.64	0.44	0.00	0.63	0.42	0.00
Feeling safe in own neighbourhood	0.72	0.86	0.00	0.72	0.86	0.00	0.73	0.83	0.00	0.75	0.84	0.00	0.76	0.84	0.00
Think “Most people can be trusted”	0.40	0.71	0.00	0.42	0.71	0.00	0.44	0.63	0.00	0.47	0.66	0.00	0.49	0.66	0.00
Feeling attached to Europe	0.56	0.81	0.00	0.56	0.82	0.00	0.59	0.75	0.00	0.63	0.76	0.00	0.64	0.77	0.00
Felling attached to own country	0.89	0.93	0.00	0.90	0.92	0.00	0.90	0.92	0.00	0.92	0.91	0.01	0.92	0.91	0.01
Think “Country should follow tradition and customs”	0.79	0.70	0.00	0.80	0.70	0.00	0.80	0.73	0.00	0.80	0.71	0.00	0.80	0.70	0.00
Satisfied with current health services of own country	0.53	0.74	0.00	0.55	0.74	0.00	0.56	0.69	0.00	0.58	0.71	0.00	0.59	0.70	0.00

Note: p-value refer to the t-test of whether values of the dependent variables are significantly the same. Ho: diff=mean(0)-mean(1)=0

Source: Author’s own computations based on ESS data.

5.2 Country-level Independent variables

To conduct the country-level analysis, we rely on macro-level independent variables extracted from the Eurostat (the EU statistical office), World Bank and UNESCO, depicted on Table 4. Gini coefficient represents the distribution of disposable income among the population and ranges from 0 to 100, where 100 means maximal inequality. Social Benefits as a percentage of GDP include data on expenditure and receipts of social protection benefits and pension beneficiaries. We also include the percentage of the country’s population aged over 75 and share of population between 25 and 64 who attained at least secondary level education. As previously mentioned, countries are competing to attract talented and high skilled young graduates, to create more

productivity and competitiveness and solve problems of population ageing. Thus, we found interesting to study the impact of international students hosted in natives' opinions about immigration, contributing to the existent literature. Our variable includes the global tertiary level students' inflows in 2017 and we expect it to have a positive impact.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics of Country-Level independent variables

VARIABLES	Number of Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	Expected sign
ln(GDP per capita)	19	10.24	0.70	8.72	11.16	+
Gini Coefficient	19	29.18	4.12	23.40	39.60	-
Refugees/Population	19	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	+/-
Foreign Born Population Share	19	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.29	+
Students hosted/Population	19	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.012	+
Social Benefits as % GDP	19	22.00	4.48	14.59	30.14	+/-
Old Population share	19	0.09	0.01	0.06	0.12	-
Secondary Level Attainment	19	83.61	6.96	61.70	93.90	+

Source: Author's own computations based on ESS data.

6. Results

6.1 Individual Level Results

Table 5 describes the results for the first step of our analysis, including coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis and the results of the significance tests, with * meaning that results are significant with a 10%, ** 5% and ***1% confidence levels.

i. Impact of immigration on the country's economy and quality of life

Starting with education, in line with the literature, there is evidence that, on average, a higher level of instruction is associated to a better opinion about immigration. Our results are stronger when analysing differences between superior and lower education, being robust to all our dependent variables and significant with a 1% confidence level. Focusing on the perceived impact of immigration on the country's economy, middle and highly educated individuals are, respectively 4 p.p. and 15 p.p. more positive than lower educated individuals. Regarding variable "domicile", there is a tendency for people that live in the countryside to reject more influxes of people than respondents from big cities. Our results show that rural respondents are, on average,

respectively, 3 p.p. and 25 p.p. more likely to believe that immigration worsen the economy and make the country a worse place to live. Focusing on individuals belonging to an ethnical minority, we found evidence that they are, respectively, 7 p.p. and 43 p.p. more likely to have a positive opinion about the effects of immigration in the economy and in the quality of life.

Moreover, we found with a 1% confidence that rich individuals have, on average, 4 p.p. and 33 p.p. higher chance of perceiving a positive impact of immigration on the country's economy and quality of life, respectively. Those who live comfortable with their household current income, are 4 p.p. and 28 p.p. more likely to think the same, following the hypothesis of economic self-interest. However, we did not find significant effects of our unemployment variable.

As predicted, there was also found a positive relationship regarding respondents that had a working experience abroad, that feel safe, that believe that most people can be trusted and that have a positive opinion regarding health services in their countries. This last result shows evidence of self-interest towards public services, since those who have a negative opinion regarding health services tend to be less open towards immigration. All these results are significant with a 1% confidence level. Moreover, we found that individuals that follow news about politics and current affairs are more pro-immigration. Respondents that spend more than 90 minutes per week watching news, are 8 p.p. and 46 p.p. more likely to argue that immigration has a positive impact on the economy and life quality, on average, *ceteris paribus*. Right-wing supporters are 10 p.p. and 58 p.p. less likely to perceive the same positive impacts, when compared to left-wing supporters. The correspondent coefficients for respondents who argue it is important to follow traditions are 6 p.p. and 80 p.p. Many authors relate these right-wing voters with preferences for a strong national identity. Our results show that respondents that feel attached to their country are, on average, 4 p.p. and 27 p.p. less likely to think immigration improves country's economy and life quality. However, respondents that feel attached to Europe are more pro-immigration. To conclude, in this section, the impact of age and gender was not significant.

ii. Results of opinions towards different origins and cultures of immigrants

Distinguishing three types of immigrants, some results change, and respondents' level of aversion tends to be larger towards immigrants with different ethnicities and from non-European poor countries. This effect contradicts labour market competition theories since these groups tend to have less skills than European respondents of European Social Survey.

Considering immigrants with different ethnicity, individuals aged over 60 years old are 11 p.p. more likely than people below 30 to argue that country should reject these populations. One reason is generational change, meaning that older people did not always experienced such a globalized world as the one of today (Winkler, 2015). The respective coefficient towards immigrants with same ethnicity is -0.0375, meaning lower fears towards a group that might have similar religion, interests, and customs. As we saw previously, migration flows in Europe were not always so diverse as today, in terms of culture and origins. Considering gender, our results show that, on average, men are, respectively, 2 p.p., 3 p.p. and 4 p.p. less likely to accept inflows of people with same ethnical background, different ethnical background and from poor countries outside of Europe, with a 1% confidence level. Focusing on individual's domicile, we found significant evidence that rural respondents are, on average 5 p.p., less likely to accept immigrants with different ethnic background from poor countries outside of Europe. These results show significance evidence of socio-demographic factors.

Regarding individuals that feel attached to own country, they are 6 p.p. and 7 p.p., less likely to accept immigrants with different ethnicities and from poor non-European countries. This result is significant with 1% confidence level and shows that inflows of people with different income and traditions, might be perceived to deteriorate country's culture. One explanation is called "social identity theory", and states that some people effort to achieve a positive social identity, that comes from comparisons between the group they belong and outside groups. This might lead

to discrimination towards the “outside” group. For example, the belief that immigration increases crime may be an idea among natives, in order to prejudice opinions towards that group and increase the gap between natives and immigrants (Tajfel, 1982).

Table 5: Individual-level results

VARIABLES	“Is immigration good or bad for country’s Economy?”	“Is your country made a better or a worse place to live by immigration?”	“Country should allow immigrants with same ethnicity as majority?”	“Country should allow immigrants with different ethnicity as majority?”	“Country should allow immigrants from poor non-European countries?”
Socio-Demographic Factors					
30-60 years old (=0 if <30)	-0.00532 (0.0151)	-0.0549 (0.0713)	-0.0375*** (0.0132)	-0.0822*** (0.0144)	-0.0581*** (0.0148)
>60 years old (=0 if <30)	0.00621 (0.0163)	-0.0228 (0.0770)	-0.0364** (0.0143)	-0.113*** (0.0156)	-0.107*** (0.0160)
Male	0.00659 (0.00950)	0.0738 (0.0452)	-0.0217*** (0.00837)	-0.0341*** (0.00914)	-0.0362*** (0.00937)
10-12 years of education completed (=0 if <10)	0.0449*** (0.0165)	0.220*** (0.0780)	0.0263* (0.0144)	0.0150 (0.0157)	0.0300* (0.0161)
>=13 years of education completed (=0 if >10)	0.153*** (0.0161)	0.731*** (0.0761)	0.117*** (0.0141)	0.126*** (0.0154)	0.129*** (0.0157)
Suburbs or outskirts of big city (=0 if “Big city”)	0.0329** (0.0165)	0.127 (0.0791)	0.0297** (0.0147)	0.0248 (0.0160)	0.0181 (0.0164)
Town or small city (=0 if “Big city”)	-0.0110 (0.0133)	-0.170*** (0.0634)	0.000458 (0.0118)	-0.0356*** (0.0128)	-0.0190 (0.0131)
Country village or farm in countryside (=0 if “Big city”)	-0.0259** (0.0131)	-0.252*** (0.0626)	-0.0126 (0.0116)	-0.0481*** (0.0126)	-0.0457*** (0.0129)
Belonging to an ethnical minority (=0 if “Big city”)	0.0664*** (0.0213)	0.434*** (0.102)	-0.0117 (0.0190)	0.00480 (0.0207)	0.0294 (0.0211)
Individual Economic factors					
Medium Income (=0 if Low Income)	0.0233* (0.0123)	0.108* (0.0584)	0.0317*** (0.0108)	0.0353*** (0.0118)	0.0188 (0.0121)
High income (=0 if Low Income)	0.0374*** (0.0143)	0.274*** (0.0680)	0.0484*** (0.0126)	0.0535*** (0.0137)	0.0278** (0.0141)
Ever worked abroad (=0 if not)	0.0494*** (0.0181)	0.326*** (0.0882)	0.0238 (0.0163)	0.0145 (0.0179)	0.0117 (0.0183)
Ever unemployed for more than three months (=0 if not)	-0.00690 (0.0107)	-0.0335 (0.0510)	0.0105 (0.00945)	0.000388 (0.0103)	0.00619 (0.0106)
Individual lives comfortably with current household income (=0 if individual thinks his household income is not enough)	0.0446*** (0.0144)	0.275*** (0.0681)	0.0187 (0.0126)	0.0229* (0.0138)	0.0243* (0.0141)
Political Factors					
30-60 minutes per week watching news about politics (=0 if <30)	0.0710*** (0.0143)	0.308*** (0.0677)	0.0248** (0.0125)	0.0183 (0.0137)	0.0150 (0.0140)
60-90 minutes per week watching news about politics (=0 if <30)	0.0643*** (0.0146)	0.306*** (0.0690)	0.0457*** (0.0128)	0.0476*** (0.0140)	0.0420*** (0.0143)
>90 minutes per week watching news about politics (=0 if <30)	0.0791*** (0.0143)	0.458*** (0.0682)	0.0672*** (0.0126)	0.0669*** (0.0138)	0.0386*** (0.0141)
Preference for a right-wing political party (=0 if Left-wing)	-0.0969*** (0.00969)	-0.586*** (0.0458)	-0.0510*** (0.00849)	-0.146*** (0.00927)	-0.163*** (0.00949)
Values and Cultural Factors					
Individual feels safe in his neighbourhood (=0 if not)	0.0947*** (0.0141)	0.510*** (0.0661)	0.0619*** (0.0122)	0.0768*** (0.0134)	0.0681*** (0.0137)
Think “Most people can be trusted” (=0 if “you can’t be too careful dealing with people”)	0.154*** (0.0111)	0.801*** (0.0521)	0.0514*** (0.00964)	0.0945*** (0.0105)	0.0818*** (0.0108)
Emotionally attached to Europe (=0 if not attached)	0.194*** (0.0123)	1.080*** (0.0579)	0.112*** (0.0107)	0.115*** (0.0117)	0.116*** (0.0120)
Emotionally attached to own country (=0 if not attached)	-0.0355* (0.0190)	-0.265*** (0.0911)	-0.00437 (0.0168)	-0.0594*** (0.0184)	-0.0670*** (0.0188)
“Important to follow traditions and customs” (=0 if respondent does not agree with the sentence)	-0.0569*** (0.0107)	-0.378*** (0.0510)	-0.0455*** (0.00947)	-0.0661*** (0.0103)	-0.0659*** (0.0106)
Positive opinion about country current health services (=0 negative opinion)	0.111*** (0.0120)	0.492*** (0.0569)	0.0354*** (0.0105)	0.0520*** (0.0115)	0.0252*** (0.0118)
Constant	0.157*** (0.0313)	3.245*** (0.150)	0.510*** (0.0277)	0.478*** (0.0303)	0.478*** (0.0310)
Observations	7,687	9,373	9,427	9,420	9,418
R-squared	0.175	0.182	0.071	0.120	0.110
Number of countries	19	19	19	19	19

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s own computations based on ESS data.

6.2. Country Level Results

i. Impact of immigration on the country's economy and quality of life

Regarding perception about the impact of immigration on the economy, Table 6 shows that countries with higher GDP per capita are predicted to have a better opinion than poorer countries, in line with the literature and with a 5% significance level. Moreover, a higher share of secondary education attainment is associated with a better perceived impact of immigration on the economy. Concerning the Gini Coefficient, contrary to what was predicted, a higher level of country's inequality is associated with better opinions about the impact of immigration on the economy and on the country's quality of life. We also found that a higher share of old population is associated with a worse opinion regarding impact of immigration in quality of life, with 5% confidence.

ii. Results of opinions towards different origins and cultures of immigrants

When focusing on the differences between types of immigrants, more variables are found to be significant and the percentage of the reality that is explained by our model, given by the coefficient of determination seems to be twice as high. However, in this part of our analysis we only have 19 observations for each variable, so the results should be carefully interpreted.

Starting with GDP per capita, the impact was found to be positive, but only concerning immigrants with different ethnicity and from poor countries outside of Europe. We can relate this result with the recent tendencies in Europe: richer countries, such as Germany, are doing many efforts to integrate refugees. When trying to identify the impact of a higher contact with immigration, our results reach different conclusions. While a higher share of foreign-born population is associated with, on average, better overall opinions towards immigrations, our results seem to be the contrary, focusing on a higher share of refugees and international students. Previously mentioned result, contrary of what we predicted, might include economic reasons behind: as we are considering university students, lower skilled natives might fear the competition

that they might bring in terms of jobs and wages. However, not only economic reasons matter to influence public opinions, as shown by increasing fears when the share of refugees is higher, showing evidence of political, cultural, or even racist concerns. These might be confirmed with the fact that a more educated population tend to be more positive towards immigrants with same ethnicities, showing that origin of immigration matters more than individual economic reasons. Concerning Social Benefits, it seems to improve opinions about immigration, while a higher share of old people seems to increase aversion towards immigrants with different ethnicities and income.

Table 6: Country-level results

VARIABLES	“Is immigration good or bad for country’s economy?”	“Is your country made a better or a worse place to live by immigration?”	“Country should allow immigrant with same ethnicity as majority?”	“Country should allow immigrant with different ethnicity as majority?”	“Country should allow immigrant from poor non-European countries?”
ln(GDP per capita)	0.116** (0.0433)	0.0674 (0.0400)	-0.000590 (0.0310)	0.0771** (0.0325)	0.0932** (0.0356)
Gini Coefficient of disposable income	0.0214** (0.00700)	0.0191* (0.00884)	0.0130** (0.00578)	0.0229*** (0.00522)	0.0198*** (0.00612)
Number of refugees/Population	-0.646 (5.196)	-5.084 (7.791)	-8.503** (3.237)	-13.31*** (3.412)	-11.26** (4.301)
Foreign born population/Population	0.0461 (0.661)	0.612 (0.802)	1.878*** (0.440)	2.077*** (0.490)	1.898*** (0.517)
Foreign students hosted/population	3.272 (8.952)	-8.692 (14.91)	-25.33*** (5.671)	-35.12*** (5.249)	-38.25*** (6.655)
Net Social Benefits as a % of GDP	0.00315 (0.00612)	0.0113 (0.00655)	0.0154*** (0.00391)	0.0226*** (0.00459)	0.0203*** (0.00459)
Share of population over 75 years	-2.032 (1.618)	-6.671** (2.469)	-1.358 (1.020)	-4.136*** (1.147)	-4.180*** (1.282)
At least upper secondary educational attainment, age group 25-64	0.00612* (0.00332)	0.00292 (0.00392)	0.00654*** (0.00196)	0.00397 (0.00355)	0.00131 (0.00286)
Constant	-2.236** (0.816)	-1.184 (0.806)	-1.240** (0.439)	-2.000** (0.654)	-1.774** (0.707)
Observations	19	19	19	19	19
R-squared	0.440	0.416	0.812	0.838	0.824

Source: Author’s own computations based on Eurostat, World Bank and UNICEF data.

6.3. Individual Results including interaction terms

We further explore our individual-level variables, including interaction terms between them, as presented in Table 7. We first interact variables age and preferences for a right/left-wing party. Our motivation lies in two main reasonings: there is a theory that political preference changes with age, since people tend to become more conservative when they become older. Our second

theory relies on generational change and their different life experiences. As we can see in figure 1 in the appendix, there is a tendency for older people to be more conservative, so we will test the hypothesis that preferences for immigration within right-wing supporters tend to change with age.

Our results show that right-wing supporters aged over than 60 years old are, on average, 27 p.p. more likely to fear immigrants from poor non-European countries, when compared to young left-wing supporters (our reference group). This result is significant, as shown in Table 10. Comparatively, older left-wing supporters and younger right-wing supporters are, respectively, 14 p.p. and 20 p.p. more likely to reject these immigrants. However, when we focus on the impact of immigration on the economy, younger right-wing respondents are more likely (16 p.p.) to believe it is negative than older right-wing supporters (10 p.p.), comparing to the reference group. Thus, our results are not enough to show a consistent joint effect of age and political preference.

Afterwards, and given that we showed above that those more attached to tradition tend to believe immigrants undermine country's culture, we test if this effect is mediated by support for European integration, i.e. if it is mitigated among traditionalist individuals who favour European integration (for instance, because for those people, the concept of "tradition" is related to European diversity). We found that, although individuals that value tradition and do not feel attached to Europe are more likely to be against immigration, those who value tradition and feel attached to Europe are 4.45 p.p. more likely to accept immigrants with similar ethnicities, when compared to respondents which are not traditional neither attached to Europe. This result is significant and seems to make sense, since these immigrants have similar values, culture, and traditions as respondents.

Table 7: Individual-Level Results including interaction terms

VARIABLES	“Is immigration good or bad for country’s Economy?”	“Is your country made a better or a worse place to live by immigration?”	“Country should allow immigrants with same ethnicity as majority?”	“Country should allow immigrants with different ethnicity as majority?”	“Country should allow immigrants from poor non-European countries?”
30-60 years old (=0 if <30)	-0.0248 (0.0208)	-0.0627*** (0.0222)	-0.0390** (0.0185)	-0.0732*** (0.0201)	-0.0654*** (0.0206)
>60 years old (=0 if <30)	-0.0476** (0.0223)	-0.0947*** (0.0238)	-0.0582*** (0.0197)	-0.125*** (0.0215)	-0.142*** (0.0220)
Preference for a right-wing political party (=0 if Left-wing)	-0.158*** (0.0266)	-0.156*** (0.0283)	-0.0695*** (0.0233)	-0.147*** (0.0254)	-0.196*** (0.0261)
30-60 years old*right (Interaction)	0.0410 (0.0293)	0.00393 (0.0311)	0.00430 (0.0257)	-0.0172 (0.0281)	0.0152 (0.0288)
>60 years old*right (Interaction)	0.106*** (0.0305)	0.0380 (0.0323)	0.0417 (0.0267)	0.0222 (0.0291)	0.0664** (0.0298)
Emotionally attached to Europe (=0 if not attached)	0.171*** (0.0209)	0.208*** (0.0222)	0.0790*** (0.0185)	0.0991*** (0.0202)	0.111*** (0.0207)
“Important to follow traditions and customs” (=0 if respondent does not agree with the sentence)	-0.0820*** (0.0212)	-0.0876*** (0.0221)	-0.0802*** (0.0186)	-0.0827*** (0.0203)	-0.0704*** (0.0208)
Important to follow tradition*Feel attached to Europe (Interaction)	0.0329 (0.0239)	0.0403 (0.0251)	0.0457** (0.0210)	0.0217 (0.0230)	0.00602 (0.0235)
Constant	0.201*** (0.0352)	0.274*** (0.0372)	0.540*** (0.0311)	0.487*** (0.0340)	0.497*** (0.0347)
Observations	7,687	7,004	9,427	9,420	9,418
R-squared	0.177	0.217	0.072	0.121	0.111
Number of countries	19	19	19	19	19

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Although we included all the explanatory variables as previously, we did not to include them in the Table, for presentational purposes.

Source: Author’s own computations based on ESS data.

7. Conclusion

Recent migration trends in the EU were characterized by an unprecedented large number of inflows of refugees and asylum seekers, for which member states were not prepared. While some countries saw this as a humanitarian problem and called for generosity in integrating these suffering people, others looked at the situation as a problem that should be avoided.

This project aims at shedding light on the heterogeneity of Europeans’ opinions concerning immigration. We first explore differences regarding the impact of immigration on the economy and quality of life of the countries. We further enrich our analysis by adding the cultural and

economic background of the immigrant. Understanding these differences is essential to define policies that fit well with Europeans' opinions, in order to ensure a sustainable migration system. We use individual and country-level data from the ESS, Eurostat, World Bank and UNICEF, covering 19 countries for the year 2018.

Our first result is that there is a divide among Europeans towards migration, both within and across countries. Second, our data shows higher aversion levels towards immigrants with different ethnicities and from poor non-European countries. These two results are in line with expectations.

To complement this, we take a step forward aiming at understanding heterogeneity in individual perceptions both within and across countries.

At an individual level, we explore four main categories of explanatory factors: socio demographic, economic, political, and culture and values. We found evidence that age, being a man, and living in the countryside have, on average, a negative impact in opinions about immigration, especially towards immigrants with different ethnic backgrounds and from poor countries outside of Europe. Also, income and education are associated with better opinions, following labour market theories. Highly skilled individuals are expected to work in positions that require more knowledge, so they are not predicted to fear the competition that immigration might bring. Also, they tend to favour immigrants, regardless their origins, showing evidence of non-economic reasons. Some argue that higher education is associated with a lower level of racism and favourable opinions towards cultural diversity. Interestingly, individuals belonging to minorities seem to be pro-immigration and this might be due to the fact that they tend to identify themselves less with the nation where they live. However, our results show higher fears for immigration among respondents who prefer right-wing political parties, who feel emotionally attached to their country and who state that it is important to follow tradition. Interestingly, their opinions towards immigrants with similar ethnicities improve. We found positive effects of time

spent watching news about politics, individuals who trust in most people, who feel safe and emotionally attached to Europe and who have a positive opinion about their country's health services.

At a country-level, opinions are more divided, with tendency to higher pro-immigration feelings towards foreigners with similar ethnicities. We found positive effects of GDP per capita, income inequality, net social benefits, and education. Share of old population has a negative impact, but only considering different types of immigration. Focusing on contact between natives and immigrants, our results show that these effects might be positive, if we consider the share of foreign-born population, but they can also be negative, as shown by the share of refugees and international students. Again, we find that not only economic fears matter to explain attitudes towards different groups coming into Europe. The fact that a more educated population tend to be more pro-immigration, but only towards groups with same ethnic backgrounds shows that origin of immigration matters more than individual economic reasons.

While our results are informative, they present some limitations. Firstly, we study the first release of the ESS Round 9 data, which includes less countries than usual, so we could not include Portugal in our analysis. Secondly, the country-level analysis is hampered by the low number of observations. Thus, the results of this section, as well as their significance should be interpreted carefully. Moreover, even though it is interesting to explore opinions towards immigrants from poor non-European countries, we do not have information regarding immigrants from poor European countries neither from rich countries outside of Europe. Finally, our results are associations and we cannot claim any causality.

Many authors study the impact of contact between natives and immigrants; although we use the share of foreign-born population, further research could include this variable at an individual level, since it can have a determinant influence on attitudes. Other studies find that people tend

to overestimate the numbers of immigrants in their country, as well as to trust more in their personal experiences than in economic impacts found (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Heather Rolfe, 2018). This happened during the EU referendum in UK, since one of the main factors explaining the “leave” vote was the negative economic impact perceived by the public even when research concluded the contrary. Future research could focus on these tendencies.

Furthermore, we cannot ignore the current situation we are living, and future research should try to capture the impact that coronavirus will probably have on immigration flows and attitudes towards immigrants. As most of the countries are currently closing borders between each other, even inside of the European Union, it might have increased the nationality feelings amongst citizens as well as it is harder for immigrants to plan their movements and to take risks.

Finally, we saw that information and education have a significant effect influencing attitudes towards immigration. Therefore, it would be positive for governments to invest in good quality information, to better influence reactions of Europeans towards this topic. In order to reduce economic fears, policymakers might invest in assistance or job creation programmes to the most affected society groups. Moreover, as Chancellor Merkel is demanding, Europe should effort to design coordinated and unified policies to respond to the migration issue. With all the countries contributing, the situation can become more balanced, avoiding the pressures that the Southern countries have been suffering, which are also a source of revolts among the citizens. Highlighting that this crisis presents a long-term vision for Europe, massive arrivals will require efforts in preparing Europeans for a societal change. But the potential advantages can be equally astounding. According to some authors, European Union of the future has potential to become a multi-cultural continent prepared to respond to humanitarian issues in a balanced and effective way.

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Appendix

Table 8: Variables' description

	Variable	Title	Font
Dependent Variables			
	imeco	"Immigration good or bad for country's economy': Dummy variable equal to 1 if "good for economy" and 0 if "bad for the economy"	ESS Round 9
	imgb	"Immigrants make country worse or better place to live": Dummy variable equal to 1 if "Better place to live" and 0 if "worse place to live"	ESS Round 9
	sametn	"Country should allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority to enter": Dummy variable equal to 1 if "Allow many/some" and 0 if "Allow a few/none"	ESS Round 9
	dfetn	"Country should allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group as majority to enter": Dummy variable equal to 1 if "Allow many/some" and 0 if "Allow a few/none"	ESS Round 9
	impoor	"Country should allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe to enter": Dummy variable equal to 1 if "Allow many/some" and 0 if "Allow a few/none"	ESS Round 9
Independent Variables			
Socio-demographics	age1	Age of respondents divided into 3 groups: below than 30 years old, between 30 and 60 years old and older than 60.	ESS Round 9
	male	Gender: dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent is a man and 0 if respondent is a woman	ESS Round 9
	educomp	"Years of full-time education completed": low education level (until 9 years); intermediate (10 to 12); high education level (more than 13)	ESS Round 9
	Domicile	Categorical variable - Respondent's description: equal to 1 if respondent lives in a big city; 2 if respondent lives in the suburbs of a big city; 3 if respondent lives in a town/small city; 4 if respondent lives in a country village or in a farm in the countryside.	ESS Round 9
	minority	Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual belongs to a minority ethnic group in the country and 0 otherwise	ESS Round 9
Individual economic factors	totinc	Household's total net income, all sources, divided in 3 groups: poor (including the deciles 1, 2, 3), medium income (4, 5, 6 and 7), and rich (8, 9, 10)	ESS Round 9
	workabroad	Paid work in another country for a period more than 6 months in the last 10 years: Dummy variable equal to 1 if "yes" and 0 otherwise	ESS Round 9
	everunemp	Ever unemployed and seeking for work for a period more than 3 months: dummy variable equal to 1 if "yes" and 0 otherwise	ESS Round 9
	feelinc	Feeling about household income: dummy variable equal to 1 if "living comfortably with present income" and "coping on present income" and 0 if "Difficult/very difficult on present income"	ESS Round 9
Political factors	newspolitic	Total minutes spent per day watching, reading, or listening news about politics and current affairs. Divided into 4 groups: until 30 minutes, between 30 and 60 minutes, between 60 and 90 minutes and more than 90 minutes.	ESS Round 9
	right	Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents identify themselves with right-wing political ideologies and equal to 0 if respondents identify themselves with left-wing political ideologies	ESS Round 9
Values and Culture	safety	Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark: dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent answers, "Very safe" or "safe" and 0 if "unsafe" or "very unsafe"	ESS Round 9
	peopletrust	Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual thinks most people can be trusted and to 0 if individual thinks you can't be too careful	ESS Round 9
	attachedc	Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent feels emotionally attached to his/her country and 0 otherwise	ESS Round 9
	attache	Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent feels emotionally attached to Europe and 0 otherwise	ESS Round 9

	tradition	Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent thinks it is important to follow traditions and customs and equal to 0 otherwise	ESS Round 9
	stathealth	Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual responds that state of health services in the country is good and 0 if bad	ESS Round 9
Macro independent variables	ln(GDP per capita)	Gross domestic product at market prices, Current prices, euro per capita (2018)	Eurostat
	Gini Coefficient	Gini coefficient of disposable income among the population	Eurostat
	refugee	refugee population by country divided by the country's population (2018)	Worldbank
	foreign	foreign born population (2018) divided by the country's population - covers all people who have ever migrated from their country of birth to their current country of residence.	Eurostat
	instudent	inbound internationally mobile tertiary students, by country (2017)	UNESCO institute for statistics
	SocialBenefits	Social Benefits as a percentage of GDP includes data on expenditure and receipts of social protection benefits as well as pension beneficiaries. (2016)	Eurostat
	OldPop	Percentage of the country's population who is aged over 75 years old (2018)	Eurostat
	Education	Share of population between 25 and 64 years old who attained at least secondary level of education	Eurostat

Table 9: Stata Output for the Hausman Test for fixed effects

. hausman fe re

	Coefficients		(b-B) Difference	sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) S.E.
	(b) fe	(B) re		
30bn.age1	-.0053237	-.0184526	.0131289	.
60.age1	.0062117	-.0081676	.0143793	.
1.male	.0065871	.0142927	-.0077056	.
10bn.educomp	.0449305	.0290044	.0159261	.
13.educomp	.152702	.1597131	-.0070111	.0019805
2bn.domicile	.03293	.074343	-.041413	.
3.domicile	-.0109777	.0171007	-.0280784	.
4.domicile	-.0259275	.0041663	-.0300938	.
1.minority	.0664303	.0816563	-.0152259	.
2bn.totinc	.023275	.0139669	.0093081	.
3.totinc	.0374396	.0310811	.0063585	.
1.workabroad	.0493967	.0502573	-.0008605	.
1.everunemp	-.0068999	-.0017093	-.0051906	.
1.feelinc	.044585	.0909676	-.0463826	.0016712
30bn.newsp~c	.0710116	.0759288	-.0049172	.
60.newspol~c	.0643478	.086939	-.0225912	.
90.newspol~c	.0791135	.0968208	-.0177073	.0007843
1.right	-.0969127	-.1083926	.0114799	.
1.safety	.0946934	.0923666	.0023268	.
1.peopletr~t	.1537794	.1750023	-.0212228	.0010467
1.attachede	.1943693	.1874402	.0069291	.
1.attachedc	-.0355448	-.0408277	.0052829	.
1.tradition	-.0569408	-.0649928	.0080521	.
1.stathealth	.1108223	.1145401	-.0037178	.0040189

b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic

chi2(24) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
= 191.54
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)

Figure 1: Aggregated Data on Voting Behaviour at different Ages in the European Union
(Europe Elects, 2019)




Table 14: Stata Output for the 1st Regression “Immigration is good or bad for country’s economy”

```

Fixed-effects (within) regression      Number of obs   =    7687
Group variable: country              Number of groups =     19

R-sq:  within = 0.1750                Obs per group:  min =     99
      between = 0.6617                    avg   =   404.6
      overall  = 0.2251                    max   =    763

                                     F(24,7644)      =    67.55
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.1662                Prob > F       =    0.0000
    
```

	imeco	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
age1							
30-60 years old		-.0053237	.0150655	-0.35	0.724	-.0348562	.0242089
>60 years old		.0062117	.0163162	0.38	0.703	-.0257726	.038196
male							
male		.0065871	.009502	0.69	0.488	-.0120394	.0252136
educomp							
10-12 years of education completed		.0449305	.016536	2.72	0.007	.0125154	.0773456
>= 13 years of education completed		.152702	.0161361	9.46	0.000	.1210707	.1843332
domicile							
Suburbs or outskirts of big city		.03293	.0165211	1.99	0.046	.0005441	.0653159
Town or small city		-.0109777	.013315	-0.82	0.410	-.0370787	.0151233
Country village or farm in countryside		-.0259275	.0130981	-1.98	0.048	-.0516033	-.0002516
minority							
Belongs to an ethnical minority		.0664303	.021336	3.11	0.002	.024606	.1082547
totinc							
Medium Income		.023275	.0123362	1.89	0.059	-.0009074	.0474574
High Income		.0374396	.0143025	2.62	0.009	.0094028	.0654764
workabroad							
Ever worked abroad		.0493967	.0180884	2.73	0.006	.0139385	.084855
everunemp							
Ever Unemployed for more than 3 months		-.0068999	.0107348	-0.64	0.520	-.0279431	.0141433
feelinc							
Individual lives comfortably with his household income		.044585	.0143761	3.10	0.002	.0164039	.0727662
newspolitic							
30-60 minutes per week watching news about politics		.0710116	.0142817	4.97	0.000	.0430156	.0990076
60-90 minutes per week watching news about politics		.0643478	.014586	4.41	0.000	.0357553	.0929403
>90 minutes per week watching news about politics		.0791135	.014341	5.52	0.000	.0510011	.1072258
right							
Preference for a right wing political party		-.0969127	.0096916	-10.00	0.000	-.1159108	-.0779146
safety							
Individual feels safe in his neighbourhood		.0946934	.0140684	6.73	0.000	.0671154	.1222714
peopletrust							
Think 'Most people can be trusted'		.1537794	.0111237	13.82	0.000	.131974	.1755849
attachee							
Emotionally attached to Europe		.1943693	.0123369	15.76	0.000	.1701856	.2185531
attachedc							
Emotionally attached to own country		-.0355448	.0190069	-1.87	0.062	-.0728035	.0017139
tradition							
'Important to follow traditions and customs'		-.0569408	.0106665	-5.34	0.000	-.0778501	-.0360315
stathealth							
Positive opinion about country health services		.1108223	.0119693	9.26	0.000	.0873592	.1342855
_cons		.1572056	.0313101	5.02	0.000	.0958292	.2185819
sigma_u							
sigma_e		.12217836					
rho		.40120804					
		.08486605				(fraction of variance due to u_i)	

```

F test that all u_i=0:      F(18, 7644) =    28.20      Prob > F = 0.0000
    
```

Table 15: Stata Output for the 2nd Regression “Immigration makes country better/worse place to live”

```

Fixed-effects (within) regression      Number of obs   =    7004
Group variable: country              Number of groups =     19

R-sq:  within = 0.2160                Obs per group:  min =    106
      between = 0.4387                  avg   =    368.6
      overall  = 0.2456                  max   =     669

                                     F(24,6961)     =    79.93
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.0766                Prob > F       =    0.0000
    
```

	imgb	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
age1							
30-60 years old		-.0613746	.0159367	-3.85	0.000	-.0926154	-.0301337
>60 years old		-.0747623	.0171882	-4.35	0.000	-.1084564	-.0410682
male							
male		-.0478327	.0100432	-4.76	0.000	-.0675204	-.028145
educomp							
10-12 years of education completed		.0184319	.017427	1.06	0.290	-.0157303	.0525942
>= 13 years of education completed		.1144039	.017109	6.69	0.000	.080865	.1479428
domicile							
Suburbs or outskirts of big city		-.0186868	.0175578	-1.06	0.287	-.0531055	.0157319
Town or small city		-.0345556	.0140586	-2.46	0.014	-.0621147	-.0069964
Country village or farm in countryside		-.066431	.0138892	-4.78	0.000	-.093658	-.039204
minority							
Belongs to an ethnical minority		.0907089	.0221486	4.10	0.000	.0472909	.1341269
totinc							
Medium Income		.014051	.0128811	1.09	0.275	-.0111998	.0393018
High Income		.0148762	.014975	0.99	0.321	-.0144794	.0442319
workabroad							
Ever worked abroad		.0594368	.0192473	3.09	0.002	.0217062	.0971675
everunemp							
Ever Unemployed for more than 3 months		-.0053522	.0113265	-0.47	0.637	-.0275556	.0168512
feelinc							
Individual lives comfortably with his household income		.0515223	.0148306	3.47	0.001	.0224497	.0805948
newspolitic							
30-60 minutes per week watching news about politics		.0463479	.0151666	3.06	0.002	.0166168	.076079
60-90 minutes per week watching news about politics		.0676377	.0154157	4.39	0.000	.0374183	.0978571
>90 minutes per week watching news about politics		.080478	.0151985	5.30	0.000	.0506844	.1102717
right							
Preference for a right wing political party		-.1388161	.0102426	-13.55	0.000	-.1588948	-.1187375
safety							
Individual feels safe in his neighbourhood		.1089657	.0144612	7.54	0.000	.0806173	.1373141
peopletrust							
Think 'Most people can be trusted'		.1714322	.0116118	14.76	0.000	.1486696	.1941949
attachee							
Emotionally attached to Europe		.2370689	.0127371	18.61	0.000	.2121003	.2620376
attachedc							
Emotionally attached to own country		-.0777085	.0198511	-3.91	0.000	-.1166226	-.0387943
tradition							
'Important to follow traditions and customs'		-.0571845	.0113888	-5.02	0.000	-.0795099	-.034859
stathealth							
Positive opinion about country health services		.121664	.0125706	9.68	0.000	.0970217	.1463062
_cons		.2474489	.0329612	7.51	0.000	.1828349	.3120629
sigma_u							
		.1398904					
sigma_e							
		.40527727					
rho							
		.10645975	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

F test that all u_i=0: F(18, 6961) = 38.06 Prob > F = 0.0000

Table 16: Stata Output for the 3rd Regression “Country should allow immigrants with same ethnicity to come?”

```

Fixed-effects (within) regression      Number of obs   =   9427
Group variable: country                Number of groups =    19

R-sq:  within = 0.0708                Obs per group:  min =   137
      between = 0.4548                    avg   =   496.2
      overall  = 0.0959                    max   =   897

                                          F(24,9384)     =   29.78
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.1344                  Prob > F       =   0.0000
    
```

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<hr/>						
sametn						
age1						
30-60 years old	-.0375394	.0132138	-2.84	0.005	-.0634414	-.0116374
>60 years old	-.0364215	.014262	-2.55	0.011	-.0643782	-.0084648
male						
male	-.0216791	.0083731	-2.59	0.010	-.0380921	-.005266
educomp						
10-12 years of education completed	.0262804	.0143945	1.83	0.068	-.001936	.0544967
>= 13 years of education completed	.1172203	.0140587	8.34	0.000	.0896623	.1447783
domicile						
Suburbs or outskirts of big city	.0296689	.0146745	2.02	0.043	.0009037	.058434
Town or small city	.0004579	.0117512	0.04	0.969	-.022577	.0234927
Country village or farm in countryside	-.0126132	.0115726	-1.09	0.276	-.035298	.0100716
minority						
Belongs to an ethnical minority	-.0116687	.0190077	-0.61	0.539	-.0489279	.0255904
totinc						
Medium Income	.0317387	.0108106	2.94	0.003	.0105475	.0529299
High Income	.0484222	.0125882	3.85	0.000	.0237466	.0730979
workabroad						
Ever worked abroad	.0238058	.0163344	1.46	0.145	-.0082131	.0558248
everunemp						
Ever Unemployed for more than 3 months	.0104949	.0094485	1.11	0.267	-.0080263	.0290161
feelinc						
Individual lives comfortably with his household income	.018718	.0125865	1.49	0.137	-.0059543	.0433902
newspolitic						
30-60 minutes per week watching news about politics	.0247852	.0125209	1.98	0.048	.0002415	.0493289
60-90 minutes per week watching news about politics	.0457225	.0127851	3.58	0.000	.0206609	.0707841
>90 minutes per week watching news about politics	.06724	.0126216	5.33	0.000	.0424989	.091981
right						
Preference for a right wing political party	-.0509579	.0084914	-6.00	0.000	-.067603	-.0343129
safety						
Individual feels safe in his neighbourhood	.0619085	.0122364	5.06	0.000	.0379225	.0858944
peopletrust						
Think 'Most people can be trusted'	.0514098	.0096363	5.34	0.000	.0325206	.0702989
attachede						
Emotionally attached to Europe	.1123276	.0107081	10.49	0.000	.0913374	.1333177
attacheddc						
Emotionally attached to own country	-.0043735	.0168455	-0.26	0.795	-.0373944	.0286473
tradition						
'Important to follow traditions and customs'	-.0454529	.0094705	-4.80	0.000	-.0640171	-.0268888
stathealth						
Positive opinion about country health services	.0353566	.0105384	3.36	0.001	.0146991	.0560141
_cons	.5101422	.0277441	18.39	0.000	.4557578	.5645266
sigma_u	.10998801					
sigma_e	.39119588					
rho	.07325892	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

```

F test that all u_i=0:      F(18, 9384) =   32.81      Prob > F = 0.0000
    
```

Table 17: Stata Output for the 4th Regression “Country should allow immigrants with different ethnicity to come?”

```

Fixed-effects (within) regression      Number of obs   =   9420
Group variable: country                Number of groups =    19

R-sq:  within = 0.1201                  Obs per group:  min =   136
      between = 0.6111                    avg =   495.8
      overall = 0.1612                    max =    896

                                          F(24,9377)     =   53.31
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.1872                  Prob > F       =   0.0000
    
```

	dfetn	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
age1							
30-60 years old		-.0822161	.0144234	-5.70	0.000	-.1104892	-.053943
>60 years old		-.1125066	.0155747	-7.22	0.000	-.1430364	-.0819768
male							
male		-.0340935	.0091422	-3.73	0.000	-.0520143	-.0161727
educomp							
10-12 years of education completed		.0149585	.0157127	0.95	0.341	-.0158418	.0457588
>= 13 years of education completed		.1261646	.0153503	8.22	0.000	.0960746	.1562546
domicile							
Suburbs or outskirts of big city		.0247643	.0160295	1.54	0.122	-.006657	.0561856
Town or small city		-.0355805	.0128297	-2.77	0.006	-.0607295	-.0104316
Country village or farm in countryside		-.0480957	.0126375	-3.81	0.000	-.072868	-.0233234
minority							
Belongs to an ethnical minority		.0047974	.0207363	0.23	0.817	-.0358502	.045445
totinc							
Medium Income		.0353232	.0118116	2.99	0.003	.0121699	.0584766
High Income		.053543	.0137486	3.89	0.000	.0265928	.0804932
workabroad							
Ever worked abroad		.0145477	.0178588	0.81	0.415	-.0204593	.0495548
everunemp							
Ever Unemployed for more than 3 months		.0003878	.0103251	0.04	0.970	-.0198516	.0206272
feelinc							
Individual lives comfortably with his household income		.0229071	.0137593	1.66	0.096	-.0040641	.0498783
newspolitic							
30-60 minutes per week watching news about politics		.0183258	.013674	1.34	0.180	-.0084782	.0451298
60-90 minutes per week watching news about politics		.0475571	.0139644	3.41	0.001	.0201838	.0749305
>90 minutes per week watching news about politics		.0669028	.0137827	4.85	0.000	.0398858	.0939199
right							
Preference for a right wing political party		-.1464256	.0092704	-15.80	0.000	-.1645975	-.1282536
safety							
Individual feels safe in his neighbourhood		.076774	.0133778	5.74	0.000	.0505505	.1029975
peopletrust							
Think 'Most people can be trusted'		.0944793	.0105237	8.98	0.000	.0738506	.115108
attache							
Emotionally attached to Europe		.115257	.0116834	9.87	0.000	.092355	.1381591
attachedc							
Emotionally attached to own country		-.0594137	.0183879	-3.23	0.001	-.095458	-.0233695
tradition							
'Important to follow traditions and customs'		-.0660807	.0103355	-6.39	0.000	-.0863404	-.0458209
stathealth							
Positive opinion about country health services		.0519906	.0115018	4.52	0.000	.0294446	.0745366
_cons		.4775193	.0303002	15.76	0.000	.4181242	.5369143
sigma_u							
sigma_u		.15660699					
sigma_e		.42699046					
rho		.11856975				(fraction of variance due to u_i)	

```

F test that all u_i=0:      F(18, 9377) =   53.21      Prob > F = 0.0000
    
```

Table 18: Stata Output for the 5th Regression “Country should allow immigrants from poor non-European countries to come?”

```

Fixed-effects (within) regression      Number of obs   =    9418
Group variable: country              Number of groups =     19

R-sq:  within = 0.1103                Obs per group:  min =    139
      between = 0.5553                  avg   =    495.7
      overall  = 0.1422                  max   =     894

                                         F(24,9375)     =    48.41
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.1603                 Prob > F       =    0.0000
    
```

	impoor	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
age1							
30-60 years old		-.0580844	.0147784	-3.93	0.000	-.0870532	-.0291156
>60 years old		-.1070161	.0159539	-6.71	0.000	-.1382892	-.0757429
male							
male		-.0361721	.0093653	-3.86	0.000	-.0545301	-.0178142
educomp							
10-12 years of education completed		.0300411	.01607	1.87	0.062	-.0014596	.0615417
>= 13 years of education completed		.1289121	.0156989	8.21	0.000	.0981388	.1596853
domicile							
Suburbs or outskirts of big city		.018055	.0164076	1.10	0.271	-.0141074	.0502174
Town or small city		-.0189961	.0131368	-1.45	0.148	-.0447472	.006755
Country village or farm in countryside		-.0457482	.0129414	-3.54	0.000	-.0711162	-.0203802
minority							
Belongs to an ethnical minority		.0294316	.0211455	1.39	0.164	-.0120181	.0708813
totinc							
Medium Income		.0187973	.0120906	1.55	0.120	-.0049029	.0424974
High Income		.0278376	.0140737	1.98	0.048	.0002501	.0554251
workabroad							
Ever worked abroad		.011708	.0182983	0.64	0.522	-.0241606	.0475766
everunemp							
Ever Unemployed for more than 3 months		.0061933	.0105685	0.59	0.558	-.0145233	.02691
feelinc							
Individual lives comfortably with his household income		.024303	.0140825	1.73	0.084	-.0033018	.0519079
newspolitic							
30-60 minutes per week watching news about politics		.0149639	.0140077	1.07	0.285	-.0124943	.0424221
60-90 minutes per week watching news about politics		.0420377	.0142947	2.94	0.003	.014017	.0700585
>90 minutes per week watching news about politics		.0385709	.0141273	2.73	0.006	.0108783	.0662636
right							
Preference for a right wing political party		-.1626017	.0094897	-17.13	0.000	-.1812036	-.1439998
safety							
Individual feels safe in his neighbourhood		.0681487	.0136906	4.98	0.000	.0413122	.0949852
peopletrust							
Think 'Most people can be trusted'		.0818184	.0107741	7.59	0.000	.0606987	.102938
attachee							
Emotionally attached to Europe		.1156228	.0119526	9.67	0.000	.0921932	.1390524
attachedc							
Emotionally attached to own country		-.0670037	.0187995	-3.56	0.000	-.1038548	-.0301526
tradition							
'Important to follow traditions and customs'		-.0658809	.0105928	-6.22	0.000	-.0866452	-.0451166
stathealth							
Positive opinion about country health services		.0251613	.0117849	2.14	0.033	.0020603	.0482622
_cons		.4783241	.0309567	15.45	0.000	.4176423	.5390058
sigma_u							
		.1633262					
sigma_e							
		.43712108					
rho							
		.12250476				(fraction of variance due to u_i)	

F test that all u_i=0: F(18, 9375) = 55.02 Prob > F = 0.0000

Table 19: Stata Output for the 2nd step 1st Regression “Immigration is good or bad for country’s economy”

Linear regression

Number of obs = 19
 F(8, 10) = 3.15
 Prob > F = 0.0464
 R-squared = 0.4402
 Root MSE = .1234

feimecol	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ln_gdp	.1164658	.0432719	2.69	0.023	.02005	.2128816
ginicoef	.0213699	.0070009	3.05	0.012	.0057708	.0369689
refugees	-.6458901	5.195892	-0.12	0.904	-12.22306	10.93128
forborn	.0460724	.6612871	0.07	0.946	-1.427367	1.519512
sthosed	3.271627	8.951888	0.37	0.722	-16.67442	23.21768
socbenef	.003148	.0061156	0.51	0.618	-.0104785	.0167745
shareold	-2.031822	1.61753	-1.26	0.238	-5.635904	1.572259
education	.0061213	.0033239	1.84	0.095	-.0012849	.0135276
_cons	-2.236025	.816353	-2.74	0.021	-4.054973	-.4170771

Table 20: Stata Output for the 2nd step 2nd Regression “Immigration makes country better/worse place to live”

Linear regression

Number of obs = 19
 F(8, 10) = 4.95
 Prob > F = 0.0108
 R-squared = 0.4157
 Root MSE = .14335

feimgbl	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ln_gdp	.0673762	.039976	1.69	0.123	-.0216959	.1564484
ginicoef	.019125	.0088382	2.16	0.056	-.0005677	.0388177
refugees	-5.084114	7.790896	-0.65	0.529	-22.44331	12.27508
forborn	.6118561	.8016861	0.76	0.463	-1.174412	2.398124
sthosed	-8.692071	14.91435	-0.58	0.573	-41.92331	24.53917
socbenef	.0112983	.0065541	1.72	0.115	-.0033051	.0259017
shareold	-6.670855	2.468929	-2.70	0.022	-12.17197	-1.169739
education	.0029241	.0039206	0.75	0.473	-.0058114	.0116597
_cons	-1.183613	.8057819	-1.47	0.173	-2.979007	.6117805

Table 21: Stata Output for the 2nd step 3rd Regression “Country should allow immigrants with same ethnicity to come?”

Linear regression

Number of obs = 19
 F(8, 10) = 6.32
 Prob > F = 0.0044
 R-squared = 0.8125
 Root MSE = .06404

fesametnl	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ln_gdp	-.0005896	.0310314	-0.02	0.985	-.0697319	.0685528
ginicoef	.0130095	.0057827	2.25	0.048	.0001249	.0258941
refugees	-8.502608	3.236763	-2.63	0.025	-15.71457	-1.29065
forborn	1.878258	.4404108	4.26	0.002	.8969619	2.859555
sthosed	-25.32538	5.670973	-4.47	0.001	-37.96109	-12.68966
socbenef	.0153902	.0039076	3.94	0.003	.0066836	.0240968
shareold	-1.358327	1.020306	-1.33	0.213	-3.63171	.9150551
education	.0065355	.0019592	3.34	0.008	.0021701	.0109008
_cons	-1.239978	.43896	-2.82	0.018	-2.218042	-.2619141

Table 22: Stata Output for the 2nd step 4th Regression “Country should allow immigrants with different ethnicity to come?”

Linear regression

Number of obs = 19
 F(8, 10) = 40.53
 Prob > F = 0.0000
 R-squared = 0.8383
 Root MSE = .08473

fedfetnl	Robust		t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.				
lnlndp	.0770917	.0324783	2.37	0.039	.0047255	.1494579
ginicoef	.0228704	.0052189	4.38	0.001	.0112419	.0344988
refugees	-13.31113	3.412198	-3.90	0.003	-20.91398	-5.708279
forborn	2.076514	.4897467	4.24	0.002	.9852905	3.167738
sthstod	-35.12475	5.24874	-6.69	0.000	-46.81967	-23.42983
socbenef	.0225945	.004594	4.92	0.001	.0123584	.0328306
shareold	-4.1357	1.146917	-3.61	0.005	-6.69119	-1.58021
education	.0039682	.0035464	1.12	0.289	-.0039338	.0118701
_cons	-2.000206	.6537254	-3.06	0.012	-3.456797	-.5436148

Table 23: Stata Output for the 2nd step 5th Regression “Country should allow immigrants from poor non-European countries to come?”

Linear regression

Number of obs = 19
 F(8, 10) = 23.75
 Prob > F = 0.0000
 R-squared = 0.8245
 Root MSE = .09158

feimpoorl	Robust		t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.				
lnlndp	.0932087	.0355779	2.62	0.026	.0139362	.1724811
ginicoef	.0198105	.0061156	3.24	0.009	.0061841	.033437
refugees	-11.26473	4.301369	-2.62	0.026	-20.84878	-1.680685
forborn	1.897833	.516596	3.67	0.004	.7467852	3.048881
sthstod	-38.24928	6.655125	-5.75	0.000	-53.07782	-23.42073
socbenef	.0203318	.0045892	4.43	0.001	.0101065	.0305571
shareold	-4.179626	1.281724	-3.26	0.009	-7.035484	-1.323768
education	.0013054	.002859	0.46	0.658	-.0050649	.0076757
_cons	-1.7743	.7069532	-2.51	0.031	-3.34949	-.1991102