Party-group relations in new southern European democracies in the crisis era

Marco Lisi

To cite this article: Marco Lisi (2019) Party-group relations in new southern European democracies in the crisis era, Mediterranean Politics, 24:5, 592-604, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2018.1428147

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2018.1428147

Published online: 26 Feb 2018.
The relationship between parties and interest group has been at the core of the evolution of party types (Allern & Bale, 2012; Duverger, 1972; Panebianco, 1988). It is widely agreed that both parties and interest groups matter for the quality of democratic regimes and that their collaboration is ‘a cornerstone of democratic governance’ (Aarts, 1995; Allern & Bale, 2012; Lawson, 1980; Römmele et al., 2005; Poguntke, 2006). Their interaction is crucial not only because they channel groups’ preferences and provide political alternatives, but also because historically many political parties have emerged from interest groups. The origin, development and transformation of party–group relations have stimulated research on this topic from distinct theoretical and methodological approaches. Yet, quite surprisingly, the empirical literature has not followed the steps taken by theoretical insights. This is especially true for new southern European democracies. It is still unclear whether the arguments based on more advanced democracies also apply to ‘third-wave’ democracies and to what extent party–group linkages have followed the same pattern.

The goal of this introduction is twofold. On the one hand, we aim to briefly review the literature on party–group interactions, focusing in particular on southern Europe.¹ On the other, we provide the rationale and the common themes that emerge from the contributions included in this themed issue.

Reassessing party–group relations: theory and evidence

Political parties and groups represent distinct channels of representation, but they also cooperate in the electoral, institutional and societal arenas. This shared dependence on mutual resources is precisely what provides the means for interest group–party linkages. With a few exceptions (Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017; Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013), this relationship has been investigated
mainly from the party side, emphasizing the decline in the links between parties and interest groups. This has generally been seen as a further indicator of the ‘retrenchment’ of parties from civil society. The increasing distance between political parties and interest organizations – together with decreasing levels of party membership and a more heterogeneous support base – has been interpreted as a sign of the so-called party crisis, specifically with regard to the loss of their intermediation function (Biezen et al., 2012; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Katz, 1990). While mass parties have been traditionally considered as a ‘network of organizations’ (Duverger, 1954), catch-all or cartel parties have been particularly reluctant to establish formal ties to interest organizations.

Recent trends in party development suggest a significant growth in the parties’ detachment from civil society, while institutional resources have become increasingly important (Katz & Mair, 1995). Empirical evidence indicates that the anchorage of political parties with regard to trade unions – as well as business associations – has weakened (Poguntke, 2002; Selle, 1997; Thomas, 2001). Consequently, these works suggest that the organizational crisis facing contemporary parties has led to a decline in the formal overlap between parties and groups and to increasing autonomy, thus contributing to the loosening of their mutual ties (Allern & Bale, 2012; Biezen & Poguntke, 2014). Perhaps the most striking example of ‘de-linking’ is the Italian Democratic Party under Matteo Renzi’s leadership, which has repeatedly challenged trade unions’ position and opposed their main demands (Carrieri, 2016).

A number of studies have shown that civil society in southern Europe is relatively weak compared to advanced Western democracy, namely with regard to political and civic participation (van Deth et al., 2007; Morales, 2009; Vázquez-García, 2009). However, it has also been noted that there is a significant variation among new Mediterranean democracies (Branco et al., 2012; Schmitter, 1995). These historical legacies have fundamental implications at two distinct levels. On the one hand, they are associated to the weak capacity of citizen mobilization; on the other, this structural weakness encouraged interaction between parties and groups more at the institutional level rather than in the civil society arena.

Survey studies help us to better understand the strength of political parties and group organizations across European countries. Considering the European Social Survey (2002–2014), we find substantial differences in the organizational membership of the main actors of intermediation (Table 1). Trade unions are still the most popular organization among collective actors, while citizens prefer to work in associations than joining political parties. Party membership has been declining over the last decades (van Biezen et al., 2012; Ignazi 2017), and this is a generalized trend that affects all contemporary democracies. Likewise, it can also be seen a reduction of trade union density. Most countries included in the ESS show a significant decline in trade union membership. More interestingly, there are considerable divergences among European countries. Confirming previous findings, southern European countries display low figures of civil society
mobilization, below the European average. The differences between advanced Western countries and new Mediterranean democracies are always statistical significant (t-tests), especially for trade unions ($\eta^2 = .33$) and associational work ($\eta^2 = .22$). Portugal ranks particularly low, showing levels very similar to Eastern European countries. On the other hand, Spain displays a high level of mobilization of civil society, both in terms of work in associations and trade union membership.

A recent comparative analysis based on party statutes pointed out that few parties have today affiliated non-party organizations. As for the first decade of the twenty-first century, only 10 out of 122 parties (8.4 per cent) surveyed in the framework of the Political Party Data Base (PPDB) have formal links to trade unions, while the connections with other groups are even more uncommon.

Table 1. The strength of civil society: southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (2002–2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Work association</th>
<th>Trade union membership</th>
<th>Party membership</th>
<th>Time (association)</th>
<th>Time (trade unions)</th>
<th>Time (political parties)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>−.30**</td>
<td>−.09</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>−.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>−.11</td>
<td>−.32***</td>
<td>−.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>−.16***</td>
<td>−.52***</td>
<td>−.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>−.07***</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>−.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>−.72***</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>−.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>−.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>−.04</td>
<td>−.25***</td>
<td>−.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>−.31</td>
<td>−.55</td>
<td>−.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>−.10</td>
<td>−.57***</td>
<td>−.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>−.71***</td>
<td>−.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>−.20</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>−.77*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>−.35**</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>−.16</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>−.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>−.03</td>
<td>−.20**</td>
<td>−.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>−.27**</td>
<td>−.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>−1.07***</td>
<td>−.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>−.83***</td>
<td>−.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td>−.16</td>
<td>−.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>−.56***</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Table entries in the first three columns are average scores for the period 2002–2014. (2) Table entries in last three columns are unstandardized regression coefficients. (3) Southern Europe includes Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.  
* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$. 
This is a general pattern to which southern European parties are no exception. However, it is worth recalling that there are significant cross-national and within country variations (Allern, 2010; Thomas, 2001). Moreover, as noted in a number of studies (Allern et al., 2007; Christiansen, 2012), the timing of ‘de-linking’ is distinct for different parties.

Against this background, the focus on southern European countries allows us to explore the impact of the recent economic crisis on party–group relations, in particular the possibility that political and social actors have adapted their orientations towards closer links. The increasing polarization fostered by the implementation of austerity measures and by the emergence of extreme-populist parties may contribute to forging new alliances between parties and organized groups. As demonstrated by recent research on radical left parties (Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013), not all parties have increased their distance from civil society, and the relations with unions have been one of the main concerns of the left’s response to the crisis. The crisis in mainstream parties and the increasing dissatisfaction of voters have expanded the electoral market, eroding and destabilizing previous loyalties. In addition, at the societal level, the crisis itself has triggered the mobilization of civil society against the incumbent government, giving new and old parties incentives to reprioritize or to reconsider their links with civil society.

The mobilization of civil society that has emerged in this period has also experienced an important qualitative shift due to the diffusion of new digital media. Social media in particular have been an important tool for the mobilization of the recent waves of protest, from the Arab spring to the Indignados Movement (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Therefore, this transformation has contributed to turn obsolete bureaucratic organization and to rethink the functional role of intermediary organizations. Poguntke (2002) also stressed that direct linkages with voters are likely to be increasingly more frequent. As the number of unattached voters is increasing in contemporary democracies, the media-centred campaigns, personalization and populist appeals have now become key elements of the mobilization tools of political parties. As the case of ‘new’ movement parties show (della Porta et al., 2017b), collective actors are more prone to target citizens directly, rejecting group intermediation. This means that direct linkages between citizens and political actors are likely to increase to the detriment of the role of intermediation played by political parties and interest organizations.

The relationship between parties and groups in new southern European countries is also shaped by the transition from a materialist to a post-materialist society and the growing importance of cognitive mobilization. The diffusion of new ICTs and post-materialist values has prompted the emergence of ‘post-modern’ type of linkages with the prevalence of post-bureaucratic organizations (Bimber, 2003). These actors have a narrower focus and are based on lightweight organizational structures, aiming at enhancing more horizontal and participative ties. A recent study shows that the sociopolitical climate influences the
development of cognitive mobilization (Alaminos & Penalva, 2012). In particular, political crises seem to raise the level of mobilization, mainly in younger cohorts. New and anti-establishment parties that have emerged in Mediterranean countries during the Eurozone crisis have widely relied on the support of young people, especially activists already connected with issue groups or movements (della Porta et al., 2017b).

In her pioneer study, van Biezen (2003: 147) points out that parties in new southern European democracies are no longer emerging as strong movements of society, but rather as agents of the state. In this context, parties have no real presence on the ground and have an institutional, rather than societal origin. The social basis of political parties is, therefore, created a posteriori, usually through expansive electoral mobilization (rather than partisan mobilization), leading to low levels of party affiliation and partisan linkages with society (Gunther & Montero, 2001; Morlino, 1998). As for the relationship between parties and interest groups, this tends to consist of a direct linkage with society and is of a pragmatic (vs. ideological) nature. From the organizational point of view, most studies confirm the lack of a structured relationship (Puhle, 2001; Schmitter, 1992). In particular, the research conducted by Morlino (1998) emphasizes the weak links between business groups and parties, the politicization but growing autonomy of trade unions, and the lack of interactions between professional association and political parties. But in several cases – especially for left-wing parties – the ideological affinity has led to the establishment of a ‘group dependence model’ in which groups (mainly trade unions) are seen as ‘transmission belts’ (Charalambous & Lamprianou, 2016; Mavrogordatos, 2009; Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013).

A peculiarity of Mediterranean countries relies on the tradition of clientelism that permeates both civil society and the functioning of political institutions. LaPalombara (1964) pioneered the study of the political exchange between interest groups and institutional actors by examining the Italian case. This research distinguished two different forms of clientelism. On the one hand, a clientela relationship emerges when

an interest group, for whatever reasons, succeeds in becoming, in the eyes of a given administrative agency, the natural expression and representative of a given social sector which, in turn, constitutes the natural target or reference point for the administrative activity of the administrative agency. (LaPalombara, 1964: 262)

On the other, ties of parentela involve a relatively close and integral relationship between certain associational interest group and the dominant party. Although these patterns have been generally associated to pre-industrial societies and have lost the importance of old times, new Mediterranean countries are not totally immune to this sort of practices. Morlino (1998) has argued that clientelism was an important vehicle of party dominance through the subordination of civil society vis-à-vis parties in Italy, Greece and Spain. The Spanish case was
partially different as the relation between parties and group associations was characterized by neutrality.

Clientelism and patronage practices in southern European countries have been often associated to cultural legacies, such as the lack of civic traditions and the weakness of social capital (Sapelli, 1995). However, party politics is also important, not only in terms of organizational structure, but also with respect to parties’ electoral bases (Di Mascio et al., 2010; Morlino, 1998). On the one hand, parties have used state resources to strengthen members’ loyalty and party structures. On the other, public policies have often targeted specific constituencies in order to achieve electoral benefits and to boost electoral performance (Hopkin, 2001). High level of clientelism – i.e., the recruitment, promotions and transfers in the central spheres of public administration – has been found a common characteristic of new Mediterranean states (Papadopoulos, 1997; Sotiropoulos, 2004). There is also evidence of low level clientelism, based on the instrumental allocation of resources for the development of loyalties by rank-and-file and by party sympathizers. Recent research based on an expert survey has provided interesting findings. First, there is a significant variation in terms of patronage among southern European countries, with Greece at the top of the list and Portugal ranked 10th and below the European average (Kopecky & Mair, 2015). Second, party patronage is used both as a form of policy control and as a mechanism of electoral reward at the bottom of civil society. Both logics may be important incentives for establishing or enhancing informal links between parties and interest groups, thus reinforcing their mutual strategic cooperation, especially in a context of growing external pressures.

The research on party–group linkage in single case studies has contributed to further qualifying earlier findings. The Spanish case, for instance, seems to partially diverge from other countries given parties’ increasing attention to the establishment of social organizations (Verge, 2012). Finally, party–group relations have important implications for the mobilization of civil society and for increasing party support through clientelism (Jalali et al., 2012; Charalambous & Christophorou, 2016). In other words, pragmatist relations have strengthened patronage practices with an exchange of material benefits between parties and groups.

This themed issue asks where the study of party–group connections in southern Europe has been, and where it is going. Underlying this question is whether parties in Greece, Portugal and Spain still perform the varied functions traditionally ascribed to them in modern democracies, or whether new interlocutors between citizens and institutions outside the traditional party model might be on the horizon. In light of the deep changes wrought by the Eurozone crisis, parties may have become less than optimal agents of representation, thus competing with ‘new political structures more suitable for the economic and technological realities of twenty-first century politics’ (Lawson & Merkl, 1988: 3). On the other hand, times of crisis may stimulate the resistance capacity of civil
society through the strengthening of party–group connections (Fung, 2003), as in the case of left-wing parties and trade unions against neoliberal and austerity policies, or the empowerment of NGO organizations in Greece (Clarke et al., 2015). This is particularly the case of new democracies in southern Europe, where the organized society can rely on a tradition of protest and contestation towards the establishment (Charalambous & Lamprianou, 2016). A new type of response in the context of the 2008 economic crisis may thus emerge in new southern European countries, not only in terms of consolidating (and strengthening) existing connections between parties and groups, but also innovating the nature of their mutual links. The examination of the quantitative and qualitative change in party–group relations provides valuable insights on the performance of party democracy, in particular whether (and how) parties perform their intermediation role, thus ensuring responsiveness and accountability.

The case of new southern European democracies: key themes and approaches

The main goal of this themed issue is to analyse the relationship between parties and interest groups in Greece, Portugal and Spain before and after the crisis. These cases have been selected not only because they are among the European countries most affected by the crisis, but also because they present different patterns in terms of the recent evolution of party–group linkage. While Greece and Spain have seen the emergence of new actors that are reshaping party system format and dynamics, Portugal has remained relatively stable. In the former Mediterranean countries, new alliances between parties and groups have emerged, and there have been considerable strains in the intermediation function performed by collective actors. On the other hand, the Portuguese case displays more resilience and (apparently) party–group interactions have not undergone critical transformations. This diversity suggests that the crisis has not led to a convergence and standardization of party–group relations. Indeed, across our cases, we find as much continuity as change, and one overall objective of this research is to unveil these distinct trajectories and the main drivers that account for different types of linkages between parties and groups.

The original articles included in this issue allow us to make a detailed analysis of the recent evolution of party–group linkages in new southern European countries. Two of our studies look at change over time focusing on country studies. The first of these – Sotiropoulos’ study of the links between interest groups and parties in Greece – suggests an overall decline in the intensity of these links. However, a more nuanced picture appears when we look at the dynamics of civil society and the emergence of new actors. The second study deals with the Portuguese case and confirms the variety of party–group relationships and the differences between right- and left-wing parties. The rise of new parties in Spain during the crisis and their relationship to interest groups is the object of
the third article. Barberà et al.’s contribution confirms the importance of the genetic model in shaping party–group ties and it also provides new data for testing alternative explanations, such as intra-party agencies and the role of political leaders.

One of the key themes emerging from the contributions is the importance that legitimacy plays in shaping party–group relations. In line with previous studies (Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017; Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013), it is worth conceptualizing party–group linkage not only in terms of organizational ties, but also through the attitudinal dimension. Declining levels of citizens’ trust towards the main political intermediators is a crucial catalyst for increasing the distance between parties and groups. The crisis has further eroded the image of the main political actors and this hinders the reactivation of the links between parties and organized society (della Porta et al., 2017a). On the other hand, the legitimacy crisis experienced by the main actors of intermediation may boost a dealignment in party–group connections, thus altering the collaboration between groups and their partisan allies. In Greece, for example, the widespread distrust towards parties and trade unions emerged well before the crisis, but it has increased abruptly over the last years. In this case, analogously to what happened in Portugal during the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the result is the marginalization of these actors from the institutional arena during the period of external intervention. We believe this is a neglected aspect in the literature and a line of future research worth pursuing. In particular, it would be interesting to collect more data about interest group orientations, as well as public opinion attitudes towards actors of intermediation.

The decline in legitimacy levels is connected to another topic that permeates most of the contributions included in this themed issue, that is the competition between new actors from organized civil society and mainstream parties. We know that one of the effects of the economic crisis is to increase party system fragmentation, party dealignment, as well as the conflicts within mainstream parties (Bosco & Verney, 2016, 2017; Freire et al., 2015). Parties like PSOE, Syriza or Pasok have experienced splits or a lack of unity on important policy issues, especially related to European matters. On the other hand, civil society has shown a new cycle of activism through (more or less) spontaneous forms of mobilization, thus reinvigorating the role of traditional actors (e.g., trade unions) or giving rise to new social movements. This means that the competition between political parties and other actors of intermediation has become more intense, especially with regard to their representative functions and their role as gatekeepers. As noted in the Spanish case, the failure of parties is a window of opportunity for interest groups to play a more important role in the electoral and institutional arena. As in other southern European countries hit by the economic crisis (Cyprus, Italy), political actors have embraced more open relations and organized groups have challenged the position of parties in influencing the political agenda and the policy-making process (Katsourides, 2013; Carrieri, 2016). This
argument is a particular challenge for the party-based model of democracy that has characterized southern Europe (Diamandouros & Gunther, 2001; Morlino, 1998). As a consequence, the collection of essays included in this special issue questions whether southern European democracies are abandoning the principles of party government by incorporating a new type of governance and decision-making process. The emergence of a populist discourse and the ‘resistance’ strategy adopted by some political actors may eventually lead to the emergence of a kind of ‘advocacy democracy’ (Avner, 2002) in which the proactive role of organized groups aims to change the established rules (or block reforms), thus overcoming traditional structures of intermediation. This scenario is even more plausible with the implementation of neoliberal policies and arrangements, which erode the corporatist elements of the traditional system of intermediation that characterizes southern Europe. The contributions included in this issue help assess whether the crisis has influenced the asymmetry in party–group relations that Schmitter (1995: 313, 314) found during democratic consolidation.

Finally, a third common theme emerging from the various contributions is related to the evolution of party–group linkages and the emergence of new types of relationship. While traditional parties have displayed a generalized trend towards the adoption of ‘de-linking’ strategies, new actors have tried to establish more informal, more flexible and more pragmatist ties. The possibility of sharing resources through new communication technologies and of opening recruitment patterns through horizontal mechanisms is a key element that helps blur the functional and organizational distinction between parties and interest groups. Nevertheless, the emergence of a new pattern in the party–group linkage does not mean that the integration/strong partisan model (Thomas, 2001) has disappeared. On the contrary, in the Greek and Portuguese case, this model, typically associated to the communist party family (Tsakatika and Lisi, 2013), still co-exists with new types of linkages. As a consequence, the analysis of southern European democracies shows an increasing variety of party–group linkages. This seems to challenge the conventional wisdom of a general decline in party–group relations, thus allowing us to re-qualify our knowledge regarding the timing and patterns of party–group interactions.

An overall assessment on the impact of the crisis on party–group connections may be too premature, especially in those southern European characterized by an ongoing process of party system change. The studies included in this themed issue provide a first attempt to evaluate the major patterns of continuities and discontinuities by distinguishing the intensity and the variety of the relations between parties and groups. Regarding the first dimension, the growing distance between parties and groups implies that ad hoc links are the centre point of today’s collaboration between them. On the other hand, an increasing party system fragmentation and a higher degree of volatility have opened the structure of political opportunities with the emergence of new responses. Yet, this innovation has had limited effects and has been limited to the new actors,
whereas we observe continuity in the relations between traditional – mainly leftist – parties and organized groups.

Overall, the articles make a valuable contribution to an under-researched topic, innovating the theoretical insights on the relation between parties and interest groups and bringing to the fore new data on southern European countries. However, several avenues remain that are worth pursuing in future research. First, the new modes of interaction unveiled by empirical research call for a reconceptualization of party–group linkage, which needs to take into account recent trends in party politics – e.g., personalization, membership decline, decreasing legitimacy – as well as the structure of opportunities provided by the economic and political crisis. Second, we also need to look at the strategy of interest groups and their attitudes towards political parties in greater depth. We argue that the dialogue between party and interest group scholars is a fruitful way to deepen and innovate our knowledge in this field. Third, the variety of party–group relations emphasizes the need to find explanatory mechanisms and elaborate causal arguments that may elucidate the distinct trajectories. Finally, understanding what the impact of party–group relations is on participation, representation and the process of policy-making is a promising agenda for future research.

Note
1. The focus is limited to four specific types of organization: business interests, cause groups, labour organizations, as well as the main professional associations.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank all colleagues who contributed to this themed issue, as well as the reviewers and the editors of Mediterranean Politics for their valuable suggestions. This work was supported by the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia – FCT) via the project PTDC/IVC-CPO/1864/2014.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCID
Marco Lisi http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9833-0347

References


