Accommodating and Confronting the Portuguese Dictatorship within NATO, 1970-1974

ABSTRACT:
During the early 1970s, NATO member states such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands repeatedly sought to use the Atlantic Alliance as a forum to confront Portuguese domestic and colonial policies. However, the larger members of the organisation – including the USA, the UK, France and West Germany – successfully blocked their efforts. While the former expressed concern over the challenges posed by the Lisbon regime to NATO’s credibility at home and abroad, the latter sought to preserve their interests and institutional cohesion in view of the challenges posed by détente. This fault line reflected core differences in the allies’ perspectives about both Portugal and NATO itself. Drawing on extensive multi-archival research, this article examines the motivations and actions of various member states on the North Atlantic Assembly and the NATO Council ministerial meetings. It reconsiders the international dimension of the Marcelo Caetano dictatorship and the connection between the Cold War framework and the process of Portuguese resistance to decolonisation in Africa.

KEYWORDS: Cold War, Colonialism, Decolonisation, Détente, NATO, Portugal
Introduction

In 1949, Portugal became one of the twelve original signatories of the North-Atlantic Treaty. The preamble of the treaty reaffirmed the NATO member states’ ‘faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’, as well their intention to ‘safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’. The Alliance conveniently disregarded the contradiction between this preamble and the Estado Novo regime in place in Portugal, which was a direct remnant of Europe’s fascist era. Portugal’s geostrategic assets, most notably the Azores and Madeira archipelagos in mid-Atlantic, were deemed invaluable in a Cold War context. However, in the early 1970s the limits of NATO’s ties to Lisbon were put to the test. The main challenge was not the regime’s authoritarian nature – Portugal was no longer the only non-democratic member of the Alliance, as a military junta had taken power in Greece in 1967. Instead, increasing tension arose over the Portuguese dictatorship’s wars against liberation movements in the African colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. This phase in the relations between Portugal and NATO, although immediately preceding the collapse of the Estado Novo through the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, remains under-researched. By analysing the final years of the Lisbon dictatorship, this article will challenge common narratives about the Estado Novo’s isolation and unbearable international pressure. It will demonstrate that despite growing distress within NATO over Portuguese policies, open confrontation was contained until the final stages of the dictatorship because for the most powerful members of the organisation the ongoing détente negotiations took priority over all other concerns.

Even without disregarding Portuguese agency in the revolutionary process that brought down the Estado Novo, there is a discernible international dimension associated with the dictatorship’s downfall. At the root of the military coup d’état which ushered the Carnation Revolution was the attrition caused by the guerrilla wars in Africa. During the final years of struggle, the liberation movements received support – in the form of logistical, military, financial and/or humanitarian aid – from independent African states, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites, Yugoslavia, Cuba, China, the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands, as well as non-governmental anti-colonialist organisations. Furthermore, by enabling – through the Azores airbase – the USA’s weapons airlift to Israel during the Middle East War of October 1973, Portugal became the target of a retaliatory Arab oil embargo which fuelled an energy crisis. This increased domestic inflation, economic uncertainty and, consequently, social unrest in early 1974.
Nevertheless, putting too much emphasis on international hostility towards the *Estado Novo* can be misleading. According to António José Telo’s systemic theory, international dissonance was a fundamental cause of the Lisbon dictatorship’s breakdown. Telo argues that the prolonged resistance to decolonisation caused a significant rift between Portugal and its Western allies, acknowledging that in the case of France and West Germany such concerns only fully surfaced in the early 1970s, after they had already provided massive supplies of materiel to be used by the Portuguese armed forces in Africa.\(^{15}\) He concludes that the 1974 regime change ultimately resulted from the ‘need to adjust the country to the evolution of the international system’.\(^{16}\) Despite proclamations of isolation, however, the reality was that in the final years of the *Estado Novo* Portugal was still a member of the United Nations (UN), fully integrated in the Western bloc, not only through NATO but through key multilateral institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Free Trade Association, having also signed a trade agreement with the European Economic Community in July 1972.\(^{17}\) Therefore, the West’s actual position towards Lisbon requires further consideration.

**The background of confrontation**

Disquiet over Portugal’s membership of the Atlantic Alliance dated at least as far back as the eruption of the Afro-Portuguese wars in the early 1960s. The Kennedy administration, having adopted a critical stance towards Lisbon’s refusal to decolonise, had considered tackling the issue through NATO. Washington was dissuaded by a combination of concerns over compromising ready access to the Azores airbase, lobbying by its French and British allies and the need to present a united Western front in face of the 1961 Berlin crisis.\(^{18}\) Equally critical of the colonial wars, the Norwegian and Canadian governments had even briefly drafted proposals to expel Portugal from the organisation. To aggravate matters, the dictatorship’s unofficial use of NATO-designated equipment in Africa had prompted the Eastern and Afro-Asian blocs in the UN to accuse the Alliance of complicity with Portuguese colonialism.\(^{19}\)

The beginning of the 1970s saw the allies engaging more and more with the matter of the Western bloc’s consistency on ethical issues. To some extent this can be explained by the political dynamics within specific member states. Pierre Trudeau’s governments in Canada adopted a strict interpretation of the Atlantic Alliance’s principles.\(^{20}\) In Italy, the Christian Democratic Party headed a government coalition (August 1970 - February 1972) including
liberals, social-democrats and, crucially, the Italian Socialist Party, which had only recently abandoned its anti-NATO stance.\textsuperscript{21} The left wing of the Italian Christian Democratic Party was likewise highly critical of a policy of passive acceptance of NATO’s positions.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, Danish politicians were particularly sensitive to accusations of support for Portugal’s refusal to decolonise – they carried a historical resentment over the domestic uproar in Denmark in 1952, when NATO had officially endorsed French resistance to decolonisation in Indochina.\textsuperscript{23} Denmark’s anti-militarist Radical Party scored one of its highest-ever electoral successes in 1968,\textsuperscript{24} joining a government coalition that – through its conservative-liberal foreign minister, Poul Hartling – openly criticised the Portuguese colonial wars in no uncertain terms.\textsuperscript{25}

By far the most vocal criticism of Lisbon’s colonialist designs came from the Norwegian Labour government and, later, from the Netherlands. Following a report from the Norwegian Committee on Foreign Affairs, in April 1971 the Oslo parliament (\textit{Storting}) mandated the foreign minister, Andreas Zeier Cappelen, to raise objections to Portuguese colonialism within NATO. As Cappelen explained to the British ambassador in Oslo, the government would have proceeded even without the \textit{Storting}’s recommendation. Cappelen, who had been tortured by Nazis during WWII, displayed a passionate commitment to human rights and conceived of NATO as more than a purely defensive alliance, stressing the importance that its members uphold international morality. The foreign minister also argued that in order to maintain public support for the organisation in Norway, every effort should be made for Lisbon to recognise the colonies’ right to self-determination.\textsuperscript{26} Oslo’s position was not atypical; although Norway consistently remained loyal to NATO’s main tenets, it had a tradition of voicing dissent over various \textit{Realpolitik} issues, such as arms control and membership extension.\textsuperscript{27} The Dutch case represented a more radical departure. Throughout the 1960s, the official position of the Netherlands – itself a colonial power – had been far from critical of the \textit{Estado Novo}. However, a strong anti-colonialist and anti-authoritarian social movement achieved a progressive impact on the agenda of the opposition labour party \textit{Partij van de Arbeid} (PvdA), which during the election campaign of 1972 proposed to the government withdrawing from NATO altogether if Portugal still remained a member in four years time.\textsuperscript{28} The PvdA-led coalition government formed on 11 May 1973 publicly announced the intention of firmly challenging the Portuguese and Greek dictatorships through the Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{29}

To a large degree, these politicians were reacting to public outrage in their countries against the war in Vietnam\textsuperscript{30} and to the challenge posed by the mobilisation of a new
generation which appeared to be less receptive to NATO’s aims. Post-May 1968, European youth was largely influenced by ‘third-worldism’, including a marked sensibility towards the devastating impact of Western colonialism in the Global South. Even domestic order was, arguably, at stake, as in the heated social upheaval of the times, causes such as the condemnation of the Estado Novo were accompanied by violent actions. In 1970 alone the Portuguese embassy in Brussels was repeatedly vandalised and petrol bombed. Similarly, bombs were thrown at the Belgian offices of the Portuguese airline TAP, which also received anonymous terrorist threats concerning its flights.

Besides ideological and domestic considerations, geopolitics also encouraged a renewed impulse to confront Lisbon. A watershed event took place on the night of 22/23 November 1970 when disguised Portuguese troops invaded Guinea-Conakry and attempted, unsuccessfully, to overthrow the Guinean president, Ahmed Sékou Touré, who was a declared supporter of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC). Lisbon officially attributed the turmoil exclusively to dissidents of the Conakry regime and did not admit Portuguese involvement even to its allies. However, the Portuguese operation was publicly denounced by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), whose members also strongly condemned the dictatorship’s NATO allies at the UN. Moreover, in response to the attack, Sékou Touré requested Soviet protection, allowing Moscow to send a naval task force to Guinea, in the middle of Africa’s Atlantic coast. The Portuguese invasion created an overwhelming backlash among the African bloc – which was an important and generally cohesive voting group in the UN – and it spread to the interior of the NATO Alliance. As Foreign Minister Cappelen acknowledged to the Storting in January 1972, publicly condemning Portugal was not just a way to put pressure on the Estado Novo dictatorship to change its policies; it also served to convince the African states that NATO did not support the Portuguese actions in their continent.

Yet not all NATO members shared the urge to intervene against Portugal through the Atlantic Alliance, even when seriously affected by these circumstances. British policymakers, who were trying to bring down the white-minority government led by Ian Smith in Rhodesia since its unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, felt particularly frustrated with the Portuguese colonial authorities. Despite the UN-imposed economic sanctions on the Smith administration, the authorities in Mozambique had continued to allow Rhodesian commerce access to their Indian Ocean ports. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Conakry invasion, the OAU focused the bulk of its criticism on the UK, the Federal Republic of
Germany (West Germany) and, to a lesser extent, the USA. The British foreign secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, became worried about the possibility of similar ventures against other African governments harbouring anti-Portuguese guerrilla movements, including Commonwealth members Zambia and Tanzania. Of all the NATO allies, none suffered a harsher backlash than West Germany, whose embassy was accused by the Guinean authorities of having directly aided the Portuguese attack. Conakry expelled the local West German community and imprisoned two West German citizens before finally breaking off diplomatic relations with Bonn in January 1971. In West Germany, the coalition government headed by Willy Brandt faced intense protests against its country’s association with the Portuguese dictatorship, namely against the military cooperation between the two states and the participation of West German firms, backed by Bonn’s state credit guarantees, in the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, in Mozambique. French companies were also involved in the Cahora Bassa project and while Paris did not face protests in the same scale as Bonn, it became a potential target for African criticism. Nevertheless, London, Bonn, Washington and Paris firmly rejected any discussion of Lisbon’s colonial policies in the context of NATO – and so did the organisation’s secretary-generals during this period, Manlio Brosio and Joseph Luns. This attitude was based, to various degrees, on four sets of reasons, namely bilateral interests, multilateral strategic considerations, commitment to NATO cohesion and the prevalent reading of the situation in Portugal and Africa.

Firstly, the USA, the UK, France and West Germany had, historically, developed direct ties to the Estado Novo regime, including economic and military bilateral interests which a hostile stance towards Lisbon ran the risk of compromising. At an economic level, these four countries were Portugal’s main foreign trading partners. In the early 1970s, West Germany was the largest exporter to Portugal, totalling up to 14.4-15.7% of Portugal’s imports. It was followed by the UK (11.4-13.6% of Portuguese imports), the Portuguese colonies (10.1-13.2%), the USA (6.9-8.9%) and France (6.6-7%). French and West German firms remained committed to the Cahora Bassa project, unlike their Swedish and Italian partners. The leading foreign investors in Portugal were, respectively, the USA, multinational conglomerates and West Germany.

On a military level, both the American and West German air forces used bases in Portuguese territory under precarious conditions, making them reliant on the dictatorship’s goodwill. The Lajes airbase in the Azores was highly valuable for the United States, having played a key role in the Congo and Berlin crises of the early 1960s. In 1962, as a tactic to
counter the Kennedy administration’s pro-Africanist leanings, Lisbon had refused to renew the formal base agreement with the Americans. Although the Portuguese authorities continued to allow the USA to use the Lajes, the arrangement was now on a ‘day-to-day’ basis. By the end of the decade, improvement in US airlift capability and the adoption of ‘prepositioning’ in NATO’s doctrine had reduced the American reliance on the Azores. Nevertheless, the Nixon administration sought to stabilise the arrangement and reached an agreement with Lisbon in December 1971 to extend the USA’s rights in the Lajes until February 1974. The 1973 war in the Middle East then served as a reminder of the airbase’s value and of the Estado Novo’s reliability, as Portugal – unlike most European states – granted over-flight and landing rights to the USA’s airlift to Israel, albeit somewhat hesitantly. In the case of West Germany, in the early 1960s Bonn had invested over 140 Million DM in the construction of a large base and adjacent residential neighbourhood near the Portuguese city of Beja, a project that West German media denounced as wasteful military megalomania. Set on taking advantage of the infrastructure which was already paid for, in May 1971 the Brandt government initiated an air force pilot training programme at the base. The programme relied heavily on a limited authorisation to use the Alcochete firing range, east of Lisbon, as well as on the dictatorship’s promise to build a new range near Beja. This dependency was only mitigated in August 1973, when Bonn, frustrated over the apparent Portuguese inability to provide the requested range, announced a significant reduction of its activities in the airbase. Although less steeped in controversy, since 1966 the island of Flores, in the Azores, housed a French base which served as an observation post and tracking station for France’s ballistic experiments.

Secondly, from a multilateral Cold War perspective, Portugal’s strategic potential, including that of its colonial possessions, remained appealing for the Atlantic Alliance. While the Estado Novo was reluctant to commit major forces to the defence of central Europe, it took part in Atlantic defence through the Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT). Its main contribution, however, was in the form of the possible usage of Portuguese ports, air and naval bases. With the increasing presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, it made sense for NATO to ensure the conditions for a rapid deployment in the European southwest. Furthermore, as detailed below, in 1972 Portugal’s Atlantic islands and African territories were included in NATO contingency planning. The Lisbon dictatorship was also perceived as one of the Alliance’s indirect links to Spain, which was bound to its neighbour by the 1939 Iberian Pact. Finally, because of Portugal’s geographic location, the country
represented – according to the political director of the West German Foreign Office – a ‘bridge between the USA and Europe, in a psychological sense’. Consequently, rather than welcoming the expulsion of Portugal from the organisation, the general predisposition actually involved some concern that Lisbon might leave voluntarily. After the precedent of France’s withdrawal from the Military Command in 1966, the dictatorship seemed to be carefully – and vocally – weighing the advantages and disadvantages of replacing the Alliance with selective bilateral military understandings if NATO failed to provide enough support to sustain Portuguese interests in Africa. Even before taking over as secretary-general, Joseph Luns declared publicly that ‘continued Portuguese membership [of ] NATO was vital in view [of the] deterioration [of the] international situation’ and that ‘NATO could not do without Portugal, while Portugal did not need NATO “equally badly”’.

Thirdly, and more importantly, disrupting NATO’s relations with the Lisbon regime on the basis of its controversial status could open the door for a similar process regarding NATO’s other contested dictatorships, namely Greece and Turkey in the aftermath of the Turkish military coup of 12 March 1971. While Portugal’s strategic relevance was arguably tangential, the significance of the southeastern flank should not be underestimated. The Nixon Administration worried that Mediterranean instability could seriously endanger the détente with the USSR. Greece bordered three communist states and its NATO membership was considered an element of dissuasion against both a possible Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia and an attack on the Mediterranean front through Bulgaria. Turkey guarded the eastern access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea and contributed 750,000 troops to the Atlantic Alliance. These two staunch NATO allies thus formed an essential barrier to Soviet expansion in the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, their cooperation helped safeguard vital interests in Cyprus, including a relay station and a key NATO communication station which carried air defence and command material, as well as important British sovereign bases. Ironically, the Estado Novo, which in the early 1950s had opposed the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the Alliance, ended up shielded by the notion that a backlash against Lisbon might spread to Athens and Ankara. This was not a farfetched possibility: in fact, since as far back as 1967 Washington and London had been leading diplomatic efforts to prevent the Danish, Norwegian and Dutch governments from seeking the suspension from NATO of the Greek regime of the Colonels.

The dangers of an escalation in internal debate over the NATO dictatorships exceeded the direct strategic implications of alienating or losing specific members of the organisation. For the central powers and the secretary-generals such a debate was, at best, a distraction
from the priority of discussing détente initiatives – such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) – and at worst, a threat to the Alliance’s cohesion, which was still recovering from the French partial withdrawal. Both Brosio and Luns were adamant that Cold War priorities should retain precedence over discussion about the dictatorships and proved willing to use elaborate tactics to contain intra-Alliance dispute.\textsuperscript{74} Allied foreign ministries took for granted that NATO had ‘enough problems already’\textsuperscript{75} and that, by paving the way for sanctions on other members, a Portuguese precedent could compromise not only the stability of the Alliance but its very existence.\textsuperscript{76} In the case of West Germany, this concern was coupled with the perceived need to demonstrate loyalty to the major Western powers in order to discredit fears of a West German pull towards neutralism due to Bonn’s then-policy of independent rapprochement with Eastern Europe (\textit{neue Ostpolitik}). Furthermore, the Brandt government’s political leeway was limited by the fact that the notion of reaching out to authoritarian regimes was at the very core of \textit{neue Ostpolitik}. Significantly, an aggressive approach towards the \textit{Estado Novo} on the basis of the oppression of Africans could risk undermining West Germany’s case for improving relations with its neighbouring state, East Germany, traditionally portrayed by Bonn as a ruthless oppressor of Germans.\textsuperscript{77}

Lastly, a thorough understanding of the attitude displayed by Lisbon’s allies needs to take into account their readings of the Portuguese context. In September 1968, Marcelo Caetano had replaced the \textit{Estado Novo}’s founding leader, António de Oliveira Salazar, after the latter had suffered a debilitating stroke. Caetano, who had historically advocated a reformist approach to the regime, including on the colonial front, inspired benevolent expectations in the British\textsuperscript{78} and West German\textsuperscript{79} diplomats. The new leader initially promoted relative economic and – to a lesser extent – political liberalisation, although he did not effectively part with the regime’s authoritarian structure and ideology. Faced with resistance by the powerful ultraconservative right (the ‘ultras’), disappointment from the parliamentary ‘liberal wing’ and protests by the persecuted leftist opposition, from late 1970 on Caetano gradually withdrew his most progressive initiatives and ushered in a renewed wave of repression.\textsuperscript{80} Nevertheless, even while growing disillusioned with the Portuguese leader, both Edward Heath’s conservative government in the UK and Willy Brandt’s social-liberal coalition in West Germany continued to view Caetano as the only chance for peaceful change in the colonies. They were convinced that international goodwill could empower both
Caetano and the most Europe-oriented faction of the regime, thus encouraging further reform or, at least, keeping the Africa-oriented ‘ultras’ from taking over completely.\textsuperscript{81}

More than the prospect of domestic evolution, it was the outlook on the colonial question which decisively contributed to the leniency evinced towards the \textit{Estado Novo}. There was no clear consensus over how to deal with Portugal within each government, or even within each foreign office.\textsuperscript{82} Yet the positions adopted regarding the discussion of Portuguese colonialism within NATO reflected a set of general attitudes by Lisbon’s allies, even if they did not represent the whole of these states’ policy towards the \textit{Estado Novo}. Although the foreign offices in London and Bonn favoured African independence, they insisted that Lisbon should manage decolonisation without being pushed and that this should be a gradual process in order to avoid a repeat of the Congo crisis of 1960-5. Moreover, each feared that an abrupt Portuguese withdrawal might spur either white-supremacist regimes, like Rhodesia, or anti-Western states led by Marxist-influenced liberation movements.\textsuperscript{83} In Washington, the Nixon administration embraced the pragmatic – yet questionable – assumption that Portuguese dominance of the colonies was a stabilising force in the region and that it was bound to continue for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{84} Paris also adopted a position of resignation. Although the French president, Georges Pompidou, recognised in the Lisbon dictatorship the hubris that had damned France in the Algerian war, he also seemed to accept that little could be done to dissuade a colonial power from holding on to its waning empire.\textsuperscript{85} Secretary-General Joseph Luns was a more extreme case. The conservative Luns – who served as Dutch foreign minister from 1952 until July 1971 – was notoriously sympathetic towards the \textit{Estado Novo}, having even been awarded the Portuguese Order of Christ distinction in 1968.\textsuperscript{86} He advocated NATO’s closer ties with Lisbon and justified this by telling the press, a month before taking over as secretary-general, that ‘Portugal sheds its blood for our freedom’, thus siding with the Portuguese argument that the colonial wars were being fought to prevent communist expansion.\textsuperscript{87} Luns became a popular target for activists in the Netherlands, where a 1971 poster had him smilingly referring to Portugal’s contribution to African civilisation under the bloody figure of a gunned down freedom fighter.\textsuperscript{88}

\textbf{The Portuguese question in the lower fora}

In practice, from 1970 on, the conflicting approaches towards the Caetano dictatorship found clear expression in different fora of NATO. Before examining the highest profile level, the NATO Council, one should consider the political atmosphere in the structure surrounding the North Atlantic Assembly, the Alliance’s largest consultative forum.
Moving up the organisation’s hierarchy, references to the Portuguese situation can be found in expert working groups, in the policy committees that proposed the Alliance’s overall strategic goals and, finally, in the North Atlantic Assembly itself, which was tasked with approving those goals before they went to the NATO Council.

The reports of the Expert Working Group on Africa – set up to assess, primarily, Communist penetration in that continent\(^89\) – showed a balance between concessions to the Portuguese line and to Lisbon’s critics. The latter managed to include a passage justifying Western non-military support to the liberation movements on the pretext of lessening those movements’ dependence on – and gratitude towards – the Soviet Bloc.\(^90\) The diplomatic and strategic damage caused by the 1970 attack on Conakry was highlighted, with the report’s text objectively pointing out that a UN Security Council mission had accepted the charges of Portugal’s involvement and that this accusation had been formally denied by Lisbon.\(^91\) The reports left out some of the most cynical interpretations of the Portuguese delegation, such as the notion that African ‘unity is basically verbal, a rigmarole involving attacks to colonialism, racism, imperialism and neo-colonialism, to which the African leaders more and more insistently resort as a way to deviate attention from their countries[’] acute racial, tribal, economic, social and political problems’.\(^92\) By contrast, clear Portuguese contributions to the reports can be read in the recurrent references to Caetano’s ongoing administrative reforms, as well as to the increasing economic development, social progress and absence of racial discrimination in the Portuguese territories. On a more subtle level, since 1972 the liberation movements were referred to as ‘liberation’ movements, with the inverted commas implicitly questioning their agenda.\(^93\)

Ultimately, the main positions of the Expert Working Group on Africa towards the Estado Novo fell into line with the stance of Lisbon’s closest allies. Without validating Portugal’s actions, the Group nonetheless prioritised allied solidarity when faced with African pressure to remove support for the Caetano regime. It recommended that NATO members ‘should make clear to African governments that while they sympathise with the aim of self-determination, they cannot, where their own essential national interests are involved, be expected to defer to the particularised view points of those African governments.’\(^94\) Calling for pragmatism, the Group condemned independent African states for endorsing the use of force by the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, as well as in South Africa and Rhodesia:
‘Change in Southern Africa cannot in the view of the Experts be expected to come quickly. The balance of forces as they exist today does not suggest that outside force can be expected rapidly to promote change. For the time being, the existence of white minority regimes must be accepted as a fact. [...] The dangers of espousing violent means to secure change are clear to the Expert Group. It is to be hoped that African Governments too can be persuaded to see those dangers.\(^95\)

The line between leniency and support was not always easy to determine, even among Lisbon’s key partners. In April 1971, the West German government sought to defuse its image of an ‘immoral’ arms dealer by multilateralising military sales through NATO. Bonn sounded out a few close allies about establishing a programme to provide joint military assistance to Portugal, as well as to Greece and Turkey. As explained by Chancellor Brandt, in order to avoid opposition on political grounds from the Danish and Norwegian governments, the programme could be implemented at the level of the Defence and Security Committee rather than the NATO Council, presumably because the former was more military-focused and less politically-driven.\(^96\) According to a British diplomat, while the American secretary of defense, Melvin Laird, approved the idea with ‘enthusiastic noises’, the reaction of the Italian prime minister, Emilio Colombo, was ‘cool and sceptical’. The British prime minister rejected the plan, which thus fell through. London did not wish to risk agitating the Scandinavians any more than it wished to agitate the Portuguese.\(^97\)

The British, however, did contribute decisively to one of Lisbon’s main victories during this period, namely that of seeing its colonial territories recognised as beneficial by the Alliance. A British delegate, Patrick Wall – known for his benevolent views on Portuguese colonialism\(^98\) – proposed that the UK and Portugal take the lead in safeguarding NATO interests in the face of Soviet expansion in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean.\(^99\) In September 1971, Wall founded the Sub-Committee on the Soviet Maritime Threat, soon joined by a Portuguese general, Luís Maria da Câmara Pino.\(^100\) This sub-committee dismissed the Alliance’s traditional reluctance to operate south of the Tropic of Cancer (i.e., outside of the area covered by the North-Atlantic Treaty) by claiming that ‘democracies – by their very nature – are not easily moved to strengthen their defence posture’.\(^101\) The sub-committee’s report, presented to the North Atlantic Assembly, argued that if the Soviet navy cut off the Mediterranean oil supply routes to the West, it would be necessary to protect alternative oil shipments travelling from the Persian Gulf around the Cape of Good Hope towards Europe. To this effect, Portugal ‘would be able to provide facilities in the Azores,
the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira and Sao Tomé, together with facilities on the African mainland, to help in assuming the protection of the Cape Route’. 102 Despite the Dutch delegation’s stringent opposition to the report, the proposal was adopted by 14 votes to 12, in November 1972. 103 It drew particular criticism in the increasingly anti-colonialist Netherlands, where critics objected to any collaboration with South Africa or the Portuguese colonies that could be perceived as political support. 104

While the Dutch were not the only delegates to condemn the Estado Novo in the North Atlantic Assembly, they were the most forceful in pushing for an explicit denunciation. When the assembly convened in Ottawa in September 1971, the Canadian secretary of state for external affairs, Mitchell Sharp, opened the inaugural session by praising the significance of representative democracies. Keeping a tactful tone, Sharp pointed out that public acceptance of NATO within its member nations was ‘threatened when member governments fail to live up to certain minimum standards in the conduct of their affairs, whether this be by abrogation of the democratic process, by adherence to a colonial policy or otherwise.’ The subsequent discussion on this topic, however, focused exclusively on the Greek regime, except for a brief reference to Portugal by the Dutch delegate Max van der Stoel, 105 a parliamentarian from the PvdA who had already made a name for himself as the Council of Europe’s rapporteur on human rights abuses in Greece. 106 The following year, van der Stoel wrote in the first draft of the Political Committee’s report a blunt reproach of NATO’s accommodating attitude towards the Lisbon regime:

‘As yet, NATO does not seem to appreciate the repugnance with which many people within its member countries, particularly in the democratic left, regard the situation in Greece and Portugal and the wars in Angola and Mozambique. [...] When governments set the lead in international cooperation we cannot expect the young to remain silent if they see things which they dislike happening in another member country of the Alliance. Your Rapporteur is not advocating a form of Western “Brezhnev doctrine”. Far from it. He is merely stressing that self-determination, free elections and the rule of law should be the governing principles of all our member states. [...] The Alliance cannot survive unless it is based on the voluntary acceptance of it by the peoples of its member states. It should be remembered that those who feel most strongly about these issues, the young, will be the political leaders of tomorrow.’ 107
Unsurprisingly, the strongest worded reaction to this document came from the Portuguese representative at the Political Committee, Alberto Franco Nogueira, who had been the Estado Novo’s foreign minister from 1961 to 1969 and was now one of the key voices of the Salazarist ‘ultras’. True to Lisbon’s official rhetoric, Nogueira claimed that it was inaccurate to speak of ‘wars’ in Angola and Mozambique – rather than counter-insurgency operations – and that the political systems of different allied countries were the business of those countries alone. While accepting the point about Portugal’s role in NATO’s image problem among young people, American, British and German delegates convinced van der Stoel to tone down the language in the cited passages. Regardless, the author of the political report of autumn 1973, the Dutch Peter Dankert, was even more vehement in his assessment. Arguing that in an age of détente NATO could no longer justify its existence to the general public solely on military grounds, Dankert highlighted the frequent public criticism based on the hypocritical ‘paradox of attacking the Soviet Union for its repressive policies whilst within the Alliance there are countries who deny liberty of expression, burn books and practice imprisonment without trial.’ Although once again the main target was Greece, the Estado Novo did not come off unscathed:

‘In the case of Portugal the report of the [Wiriyamu] massacres in Mozambique was a further blow to the public image of NATO. [...] Developing countries in Africa and elsewhere, in and outside the United Nations continuously attack Portuguese colonialism. These attacks increasingly imply that NATO or at least NATO countries by delivering arms enable Portugal, a small country, to continue its colonial policies. Further they fail to use their influence to persuade Portugal to respect the fundamental principles the Alliance declares it stands for. [...] Your Rapporteur feels that the reports about massacres in Mozambique would justify pressure on Portugal to accept an investigation by an independent group of experts, parliamentarians or others, to establish whether there is any truth in allegations concerning atrocities committed by an allied country in its overseas provinces. NATO, in the eyes of public opinion, has a price to pay for Portuguese membership. The logical consequence would be for Portugal to pay a price also.’

This report, together with Dankert’s draft resolution on human rights – which included a plea to the Council ‘to use its influence on Portugal to recognise the right to self-determination for its African colonies’ – was to generate Lisbon’s most comprehensive response. In the Political Committee, the Portuguese delegation accused Dankert of trying to
make Portugal a scapegoat for the public attitude towards NATO while ignoring the impact of enemy propaganda. The Portuguese claimed that the massacre reports were false, based on unproven evidence and spread by communists and African countries moved by ‘racial hatred’ against Lisbon’s ‘legitimate attempt to create a multiracial community’. Somewhat inconsistently, the delegation also stated that ‘if the reports were true, there were no wars where massacres did not take place’, adding that by Dankert’s logic, one could say ‘that the activities of the Americans at My Lai or those of the British in Northern Ireland [likewise] sullied the Alliance.’ In the assembly, the Portuguese representative recalled Portugal’s strategic contributions to NATO and defended the *Estado Novo’s* African policies. He also turned the hypocrisy argument on its head by criticising those who, in the name of détente, seemed unwilling to denounce atrocities in the Eastern Bloc yet found it ‘much easier to attack Portugal, a small country without great influence in international affairs.’

The October 1973 debates in the Political Committee and in the North Atlantic Assembly engaged with the Portuguese issue to an unusual extent, even if the topic did not dominate discussions. The views expressed in Dankert’s report were endorsed by delegates from the Netherlands and Norway. Because interventions were determined by personal politics and not just national interests, Dankert was also supported by two members of the West German delegation. Moreover, a Dane and two Dutch delegates proposed a further resolution specifically about the Portuguese overseas territories, urging Lisbon ‘to grant the peoples of Angola, Guinea-Bissao [sic] and Mozambique the right of self-determination in a peaceful way.’ By contrast, a third member of the German delegation stated that the ‘Assembly was not competent to deal with the problems of [the Portuguese colonies] because its terms of reference did not extend beyond the North Atlantic area.’ Arguing that in any case ‘the deviation from what other member countries considered full democratic government had existed in Portugal before the Alliance had been formed’, he quipped that ‘a wife or an ally should be accepted as they were unless new developments intervened.’ Shortly afterwards, a Belgian delegate added that it was a mistake not to recognise ‘that public opinion was always indifferent to military institutions during peace time’ and that such ‘indifference would not be reduced if new policies were carried out in Portugal and Greece.’

In the end, the Dutch initiatives were undermined by majority rule. The text of Dankert’s resolution on human rights was revised to remove direct references to specific member countries. It now obliquely asked the Council ‘to urge member governments that they make every endeavour to ensure that they maintain the principles for which the Alliance
stands’ and ‘to use its influence to promote a speedier and continuing process of self-
determination for such dependent territories as the members of the organisation may still
have.’ As for the resolution on the Portuguese overseas territories, it was voted down and
did not even make it to the North Atlantic Assembly.

The Portuguese question in the Council ministerial meetings

In terms of powerful actors and public visibility, the most relevant stage of
confrontation was NATO’s biannual Council meetings of foreign ministers – the ‘autumn
meetings’ in Brussels and the ‘spring meetings’ in rotating cities. In late 1970, NATO
Secretary-General Manlio Brosio and the Portuguese authorities agreed to hold the following
‘spring meeting’ in Lisbon, prompting Canadian and Italian diplomats to lobby to change the
venue. By the time the Alliance’s ministers gathered in Brussels, on 3-4 December 1970,
the UN Security Council was assessing the Portuguese involvement in the Conakry
invasion and it became even harder to overlook the implications of the proposed location
of the meeting in spring. On the first day of the autumn gathering, the Belgian foreign
minister, concerned about a domestic political backlash, hinted gently at the questionable
appropriateness of assembling in Portugal. The point was forcefully taken up by his
Canadian colleague, backed up by the Danish and Norwegian ministers, generating a vivid
discussion. That evening, Brosio arranged a conciliatory dinner with the most exercised
participants, namely the ministers from Portugal, Canada, Denmark, the USA, West
Germany and France. The Turkish foreign minister was also present since the Canadian and
Danish ministers sought to move the ‘spring meeting’ to (pre-coup) Ankara. They met again
the following morning and the Portuguese foreign minister, Rui Patrício, insisted on keeping
the original venue. He argued that what was at stake was not the Portuguese African policy,
but NATO’s willingness to cave in to external pressure. According to Patrício, there would
always be controversies – today the Portuguese dictatorship, tomorrow the Greek – and
showing weakness and lack of cohesion could destroy the Alliance. This position was firmly
endorsed by the American secretary of state, William Rogers, and by NATO’s secretary-
general, who managed to persuade most of the others. Thus, at a reunion dedicated to SALT
and MBFR, the NATO delegates ended up spending much of the time debating the city of
the next meeting, only to finally stick with the initial location.

While the two camps seemed well-defined, the size of the dispute was not yet clear.
After the December meeting, the Italian foreign minister, Aldo Moro, seemingly anxious
over his chances in Italy’s presidential elections, confessed to Brosio uneasiness over the
decision to hold the upcoming event in Lisbon. Brosio secretly passed this information along to the USA’s permanent representative to NATO, Robert Ellsworth, who shared it with his British counterpart. American and British diplomats agreed to look out for and, if necessary, counteract any moves to switch the meeting away from the Portuguese capital. In March 1971, Ellsworth approached Brosio with indications of Italian, Danish, Norwegian and Canadian opposition to the Lisbon venue and consulted with him over possible tactics to head off confrontation on this matter. Although Washington was soon able to obtain reassurances that none of the allies was actually considering a boycott of the meeting, tension increased once again after the Storting urged, on 22 April, Norwegian Foreign Minister Andreas Cappelen to address the issue of Portugal’s colonial policy at the event. The Portuguese privately let their closest allies know that if Cappelen forced a debate on this issue and the majority took his side, they would feel obliged to call for an immediate suspension of the meeting. Over the following weeks, Cappelen was pressed not to go ahead with the speech by American, British, French, German and Portuguese diplomats, as well as by secretary-general Brosio. Because the Norwegian minister did not appear deterred, two weeks before the meeting London engaged in a series of backstage demarches to dissuade the other members from supporting Cappelen at the Council table. London also investigated the rumour that the Dane Poul Hartling was planning a statement against the Greek dictatorship.

At the meeting itself, which took place on 3-4 June 1971, the confrontation was a lively yet minor episode. Without naming specific countries, Hartling’s intervention argued that in order to ensure popular support for NATO, its members should uphold the ideals of the preamble to the North-Atlantic Treaty, including the principles of democracy and self-determination. Cappelen made a similar point at the end of his speech, but in more concrete terms. Co-opting key expressions typically used to shield the NATO dictatorships from criticism – ‘cohesion’, ‘solidarity’ – he stressed that the Alliance’s ‘common security and cohesion’ depended on the sense of ‘solidarity’ generated by the ‘political and moral strength’ of individual members. Cappelen went on to lament that no meaningful progress had been made regarding ‘the restoration of democracy and human rights’ in Greece, before focusing at length on the Portuguese case:

‘It will be well known to this Council that my Government feels that the policies pursued by the Government of Portugal with regard to the territories of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique are not in conformity with the principles and
purposes of the UN Charter. The same view was recently expressed by representatives of all the political parties in Norway during a debate in our Parliament [...] We feel that the Portuguese policy in this matter is undermining support for NATO in our own countries and is hurting NATO's image in Africa as well as in other parts of the world because in the public mind, NATO itself is increasingly being associated with this policy. We are fully aware that the Government of Portugal holds the view that this matter falls within Portuguese domestic jurisdiction. Neither we nor the great majority of UN members can accept this view.

 [...] It is, Mr. Chairman, against this background and in the light of the basic principles which the North Atlantic Treaty stands for, that I appeal to our Portuguese Ally to reconsider its present policies in Africa."129

The Portuguese reply was predictably feisty. Foreign Minister Patrício accused the Norwegian minister of ignorance of the issue and of echoing ‘a campaign directed against Portugal by its worse enemies, who are also [the worse enemies] of the West’, thus playing into the communists’ hands. He further criticised Cappelen for ‘hurting the deepest feelings of the Portuguese people’, upsetting the working order of the Council meeting and undermining the key principle of solidarity within the Alliance. Patrício finished by mocking the Norwegian government for thinking that Portugal, after 10 years of determined struggle, would change its policy ‘with the sole purpose of satisfying the impertinent resolutions approved by the Oslo parliament.’ Except for the Greek delegate, who defended the honour of ‘démocratie à la grecque’, none of the ministers prolonged the discussion over this matter. Manlio Brosio, however, briefly reprimanded the Scandinavians at the end of the meeting, concluding: ‘I hope that the discussion which took place tonight will show how useless, futile and, I think, dangerous for the Alliance it is to allow this discussion to repeat itself. If we undermine our solidarity we run the risk of undermining the substance of our Alliance and in such a case it would be of little avail to try to save its image.’130

Not only did Norway’s effort fail to mobilise other allies, it was also unsuccessful as a public stunt to save NATO’s face. No reference was made to the Portugal discussion in the meeting’s press conference.131 Norwegian media did report on the incident extensively, but emphasised the shortcomings of Cappelen’s action.132 The Portuguese press left out Cappelen’s intervention while fully transcribing Patricio’s response – thus creating a puzzling narrative, according to the French ambassador – as well as Marcelo Caetano’s speech at the opening session.133 Moreover, the Alliance’s association with the Portuguese
wars was reasserted by outside critics. The OAU and the African liberation movements expressed indignation over the choice of the Lisbon venue, considering it a sign of NATO’s endorsement of Portugal’s activities in Africa.\textsuperscript{134} During the meeting itself, a Portuguese resistance group against the Estado Novo – Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA) – sought to disrupt the conference by bombing telegraph and telephone offices in Lisbon, as well as a power station in the suburb of Sacavém. As a result of the former, communications at NATO’s press centre were cut off for a few hours.\textsuperscript{135}

Besides the respectability it granted Portugal as a host, the Lisbon meeting set a lasting precedent against Council discussion over Portuguese colonial politics. The isolation of Norway’s interventionist approach was reinforced during the 1971 ‘autumn meeting’, in Brussels (9-10 December). At that meeting, when the new Danish foreign minister, K.B. Andersen, drew attention to a resolution of the North Atlantic Assembly about the lack of democratic principles in Greece, Cappelen supported him and briefly added that Oslo’s views on Lisbon’s African policies were also well known.\textsuperscript{136} Once again, only the Greek and Portuguese delegates reacted to Cappelen’s remark.\textsuperscript{137} In 1972, taking advantage of West Germany’s status as host of the ‘spring meeting’, West German diplomats were able to persuade their Scandinavian neighbours not to mention the colonial question at the Bonn event.\textsuperscript{138} By the ‘autumn meeting’ of 6-7 December 1972, neither Cappelen’s more cautious successor in the Oslo Foreign Office nor his Danish counterpart proved willing to raise the issue of Portugal, or even Greece.\textsuperscript{139} The general atmosphere had become one of resignation. Contemporary scholarly analysis confidently described NATO-Portuguese relations as clearly stabilised, concluding that if ‘Norway and Denmark are still officially questioning Portugal’s Africa policies, the other NATO members seem to have abandoned such a course’.\textsuperscript{140} While in office, Cappelen told the British ambassador that, despite the disapproval Oslo had faced from other allies over its tactics, he took consolation in the fact that at least the African resolutions in the UN were no longer attacking NATO as such for supporting Portuguese colonialism – the latest resolutions referred only to ‘some members of NATO’.\textsuperscript{141}

The activist camp gained a vigorous new ally with the PvdA’s victory in the 1973 Dutch elections, when Max van der Stoel became foreign minister in the ensuing coalition government. A strong believer in the Atlantic Alliance – earning him some criticism from his party’s left wing\textsuperscript{142} – van der Stoel immediately vowed to use NATO to act against the Lisbon regime.\textsuperscript{143} He took his first tentative steps at the ‘spring meeting’, in Copenhagen (14-15 June), much to the frustration of Secretary-General Joseph Luns.\textsuperscript{144} At the Council table,
van der Stoel’s intervention was restrained, arguing in abstract terms that if in the CSCE the West was to sincerely demand from the East a greater respect for freedom, than it was important for the Alliance members to ‘practice what we preach’. The Dutch minister also invoked the point about public opinion which he had previously presented in the North Atlantic Assembly. At this stage, however, van der Stoel preferred to voice his more specific criticism in private talks with the Greek and Portuguese foreign ministers, respectively. Indeed, according to the American report on the Council meeting, despite earlier concerns that Athens and Lisbon would prove a topic of divisive debate, ‘there appeared to be an understanding among the Benelux countries’ about keeping related interventions low-key so as not to disrupt the proceedings. Nevertheless, the renewed momentum of interventionism did not go unnoticed. When Washington expressed the wish to hold a NATO summit during the US president’s visit to Europe in late 1973, the political director of the West German Foreign Office advised the Americans against the idea, warning that the Dutch and the Scandinavians might oppose the attendance of the Portuguese and Greek leaders. When van der Stoel visited the UK on 27 June, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office made sure to prepare a defence against possible Dutch lobbying:

'We [the British Government] have made it clear to the Greek Government both in public and private that we should welcome the restoration of democratic processes there. We do not speak similarly to or about the Portuguese Government. If Mr. van der Stoel asks why not, the reply might be that Portugal was accepted as a fellow member of NATO in the full knowledge that it was not a democracy; the same is not true of Greece. [...] NATO is not, in our view, an appropriate forum to discuss either Portugal’s internal affairs or her African policies; such discussion would be most offensive to the Portuguese and threaten the cohesion of the Alliance.'

The ‘autumn meeting’ of 9-10 December 1973 – the last ministerial Council meeting before the fall of the Estado Novo – had the potential to generate the most acerbic confrontation about the Caetano dictatorship. On the one hand, with the Labour Party’s return to power in Oslo in October 1973, for once all three of the main adversaries of Lisbon within NATO – Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands – had simultaneous left/centre-left governments with a strong human rights agenda. On the other hand, the impending CSCE had reinvigorated the discourse about solidarity among the allies in order to keep a united front at
the negotiations with the Eastern bloc. In the end, the Athens Polytechnic uprising against the regime of the Colonels, violently repressed by the Greek authorities on 17 November, firmly stole the spotlight away from the *Estado Novo*. Under the pretext of drafting an idealist Declaration on Atlantic Relations for NATO’s 25th anniversary, the Scandinavian and Dutch ministers made lengthy speeches at the Council, revisiting their traditional arguments against undemocratic regimes within the Alliance. Yet their interventions were explicitly directed at Greece, with not a single direct reference to either Portugal or colonialism.\(^{150}\)

**Conclusion**

In the early 1970s, the unpopularity of the Portuguese dictatorship in the Third World and sectors of Western public opinion instigated occasional attempts to confront Lisbon’s policies in various NATO fora. Interventionism was most prominently championed by delegates from Norwegian, Danish and Dutch governments. Their critique focused mostly on Portugal’s colonial dimension, reflecting the notoriety of the *Estado Novo*’s wars in Africa and the lesser exposure of its repressive practices at home, especially in contrast with the more recent and internationally vilified regime of the Colonels in Greece. Interventionists defended a moral conception of NATO, which they regarded as more than a pragmatic military alliance. They invoked the ethical imperative of using the organisation’s soft power to press for a change in Portuguese policy as well as a more practical concern with redeeming NATO’s public image of guilt by association. However, due to difficulties in imposing this topic of debate within the Alliance, particularly at the highest levels, initiatives did not go beyond admonishment – often through indirect allusions – and into substantive discussion of tangible disciplinary measures. Lacking support for their cause from the other allies, not even Lisbon’s staunchest critics proved willing to effectively compromise NATO’s workings in the name of fighting Portuguese colonialism, especially at a time of sensitive negotiations about détente. Thus, even at the peak of intra-Alliance confrontation, the *Estado Novo* did not face serious institutional pressure.

The main agents of resistance to interventionism were Washington, London, Paris and Bonn, as well as the Alliance’s secretary-generals. These actors cited the principles of allied solidarity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. On a more concrete level, they called attention to Portugal’s strategic importance in responding to the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea as well as to the perceived dangers of infighting for the ongoing diplomatic dialogue with the Eastern bloc. Crucially, discussion over the Portuguese dictatorship, it was feared, would lead the way for further discussion over Greek
and Turkish authoritarian rule. Displaying a different perspective on NATO than that of the interventionists, the organisation’s core powers argued that undermining a member state could be a more damaging blow to the Alliance’s cohesion than the resentment such state might inspire in fellow members and their constituencies. To a certain degree, this fault line can be seen as reflecting the fact that, except for West Germany, these states had conservative governments consistently throughout this period, unlike the interventionists. As these were the Estado Novo’s closest allies, their position can also be traced back to bilateral relations and to a more accommodating attitude towards the Portuguese regime. In any case, as this article has argued, the disagreement did not stem exclusively from the conflict of realist interests, but also from ideological considerations and diverging perspectives, including the benevolent expectations generated by Marcelo Caetano’s reformist rhetoric among some of Lisbon’s key allies.

Ultimately, despite the Estado Novo’s controversial status in its final years, it continued to benefit from a generally accepting international framework. Safeguarded by the organisation’s most powerful members, the Caetano dictatorship remained firmly integrated in NATO, which may speak less for the sophistication of Portuguese diplomacy than for the leverage of its well-placed allies and the encompassing shadow of Cold War geopolitics. While Portugal may have been misaligned in the historical narrative of decolonisation, it was intrinsically aligned with Western dynamics through the very fact that it was a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance. This membership deemed discussion of Portuguese policies a challenge to NATO’s focus and the marginalisation of the Portuguese regime a threat to NATO’s unity. Therefore, rather than a strain on the Estado Novo, NATO served as a reminder that Lisbon’s main allies were not just willing to tolerate the Portuguese dictatorship, they were ready to protect it from major external interference.


Nuno Severiano Teixeira’s historical overview of Portugal-NATO relations barely addresses this period and, when it does, focuses essentially on Lisbon’s relationship with Washington. – Nuno Severiano Teixeira, ‘Portugal e a NATO: 1949-1989’, Análise Social, 133/4 (1995), 803-18. Curiously, a more recent special issue by a leading Portuguese IR journal celebrating NATO’s 60th anniversary (Relações Internacionais, 21, (March 2009)) featured articles on NATO’s reaction both to the first seven years of Portuguese colonial warfare (Pedro Manuel Santos, ‘Portugal e a NATO. A política colonial do Estado Novo e os aliados (1961-1968)’) and to the Carnation Revolution (Pedro Aires Oliveira, ‘O Flanco Sul sob tensão. A NATO e a Revolução portuguesa, 1974-1975’), but nothing about the intervening period.

The importance of the colonial wars is explicit in the programme of the movement which undertook the military coup, transcribed in Avelino Rodrigues, Cesário Borga & Mário Cardoso, O Movimento dos Capitães e o 25 de Abril – 229 Dias para Derrubar o Fascismo (Lisbon: Moraes Editores, 1974), 104-9. For a closer look at the origins of this movement, see also Inácio Rezola, ‘As Forças Armadas, os Capitães e a Crise Final do Regime’ in Fernando Rosas & Pedro Aires Oliveira (eds) A Transição Falhada. O Marcelismo e o Fim do Estado Novo (Braga: Círculo de Leitores, 2004), 339-72.


13 There is still no comprehensive study of the numerous organisations which supported the liberation movements. Statements by some of these groups can be found in Centro de Intervenção para o Desenvolvimento Amílcar Cabral (CIDAC) in Lisbon, BAC0290A/a.


16 Ibid, p.174. On this topic, Telo has also suggested that the contact with the USA in the context of NATO instigated a mentality shift in the Portuguese military elites in favour of technological progress and higher efficiency which gradually spilled over into civil society (António José Telo, *Portugal e a NATO: o reencontro a tradição atlântica* (Lisbon: Edições Cosmos, 1996), 329-34). By portraying the Atlantic Alliance as a source of ‘modernity’ (p.333) and ‘subversive’ attitudes towards the regime (p.329), Telo concluded that NATO steered Portugal ‘from the Estado Novo to democracy’ (p.344). Such a thesis runs the risk of downplaying the impact of the exposure to colonial warfare in the radicalisation of the armed forces. For a deeper insight into this process, see Douglas L. Wheeler, ‘The Military and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1926-1974: “The Honor of the Army”’ and Lawrence S. Graham, ‘The Military in Politics: The Politicization of the Portuguese Armed Forces’, both in Lawrence S. Graham & Harry Makler (eds), *Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and its Antecedents* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 191-219 and 221-56.


24


22 Primo Vannicelli, *Italy, NATO and the European Community: The interplay of foreign policy and domestic politics* (Center for International Affairs Harvard University, 1974), 26-7.


25 Telegrams from the Portuguese Embassy in Copenhagen, 09.01.1971 and 18.01.1971 – AHD, PEA M682 Pr.330,30


34 For a detailed account of the operation, see António Luís Marinho, Operação Mar Verde: Um Documento para a História (Lisbon: Temas & Debates, 2006).


36 Telegram from the FCO to the British Embassy in Bonn, 05.02.1971, TNA, FCO45/509.


38 Historian Christopher Coker described this as ‘Perhaps NATO’s most embarrassing moment in Africa’ – Coker, NATO, Warsaw Pact and Africa, 56.


40 Dispatch from the West German Embassy in Oslo, 17.01.1972, PAAA, B31/428.


42 Telegram from the FCO to the British Embassy in Bonn, 05.02.1971, TNA, FCO45/509.

43 Ibid.


46 For Bonn’s official account of this process, see the report ‘The Guinea Affair’, July 1971, PAAA, B34/866.


51 Middlemas, Cabo Basso, 68-9, 81-2.


54 Ibid, p.36.


56 Schneidman, Washington, 122,123.


60 ‘Teilrückzug aus Portugal’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 18.08.1973; Speaking Notes of State Secretary Fingerhut for his visit to Lisbon, 20.03.1973, BA-MA, BW1/248536.

61 Luc Crollen, Portugal, the U.S. and NATO (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1973), 65.

62 Publications close to NATO military and civilian top-ranking officers such as General Military Review and NATO’s fifteen Nations carried numerous articles in Portugal’s defence. – Ibid, p.134.

63 Ibid, 63-5; On Portugal’s significance for IBERLANT, see ‘IBERLANT Wacht Über Wichtige Schnittpunkte der Schifffahrtswege’, NATO-Briefe, no.5/1971, BA-MA, BW1/66544.
As argued by an article from Handelsblatt (Düsseldorf), 01.08.1968, cited in a dispatch from the Portuguese Embassy in Bonn, 22.08.1968, AHD-MNE, PEA M337-A) Pr332,30.

Coker, ‘NATO in Africa’, 158.


Memo from the West German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt – AA), 17.08.1973, PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv101.436.


Telegrame from the Portuguese Embassy in Hague, 18.06.1970, AHD-MNE, PEA M651, Pr341,10.


Liland, NATO’s Non-Policy, p.175.

Brief No.8 for the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December 1970, TNA, FCO41/638; Maragkou, ‘Favouritism in NATO’s Southeastern flank’, 352-5.


Dispatch from the FCO, 24.03.1971, TNA, FCO45/859.

Memo from the AA, 17.08.1973, PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv101.436.

For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Rui Lopes, West Germany and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1968-1974: Between Cold War and Colonialism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).


Telegram from the West German Embassy in Lisbon, 26.09.1968, PAAA, B26/408.

For an overview of the Caetano leadership, see Fernando Rosas, ‘O Marcelismo ou a Falência da Política de Transição no Estado Novo’, in José Maria Brandão de Brito (ed), Do Marcelismo ao Fim do Império, (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1999), 15-59.
Memo from the AA, 17.08.1973, PAAA, B26, Zwischenarchiv101.436; Note from D.C. Thomas (Southern European Department) on the dispatch from the FCO, 01.12.1970, TNA, FCO45/509. See also Oliveira, *Despojos da Aliança*, 376-88.


Meeting between President Pompidou and Rui Patrício, 22.01.1971, CHAN/APR, 5AG2/1016; Meeting between President Pompidou and Willy Brandt, 26.01.1971, CHAN/APR, 5AG2/1010; AAPD 1971, Doc.32.


Dispatch from the British Embassy in the Hague, 22.07.1971, TNA, FCO41/808.


‘The Situation in Africa South of the Sahara’, 03.04.1971, NATO, C-M(71)30.

Reports of the Working Expert Group in NATO, C-M(70)46, (71)30, (72)21, (72)51, (73)41 and (73)91.


AAPD 1971, Doc. 121.

Letter from Lord Bridges, 04.05.1971, TNA, FCO41/818.

Oliveira, Despojos da Aliança, 316.


Note on the informal meeting of the members of the Military Committee’s proposed Sub-Committee on the Soviet Maritime Threat, 28.09.1971, NATO-PA, 92, MC2 MC/NP-MC/SMT 1972.


Ibid.

Note from Franco Nogueira to Marcelo Caetano, 27.11.1972, Torre do Tombo, Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais, Arquivo Marcelo Caetano, Cx.40, no52.


Atlantic Political Problems, November 1972, NATO-PA, 93, PC 1972.

Minutes of the meeting of the Political Committee, 21.11.1972, NATO-PA, 93, PC 1972.


Dispatch from Thomas Brimelow, 19.01.1971, and the reply from Edward Peck, 20.01.1971, TNA, FCO41/806.

Telegram from the FCO, 03.03.1971, Telegram from US State Department, 25.02.1971, TNA, FCO41/806.

Telegram from the British Embassy in Washington, 04.03.1971, TNA, FCO41/806.

AAPD 1971, Doc.197.

Telegram from the British Embassy in Lisbon, 12.05.1971, TNA, FCO41/806.

AAPD 1971, Doc.197; Telegram from British Delegation to NATO, 17.05.1971, Dispatch ‘Discussion of Greece and Portuguese African policies in NATO’, 20.05.1971, Paper from the Portuguese Ambassador in London, 21.05.1971, Telegram from the FCO, 21.05.1971, Telegram from the British Embassy in Oslo, 18.05.1971, Telegram from US State Department, 25.05.1971, TNA, FCO41/807.

Telegram from the FCO, 21.05.1971, and following, in TNA, FCO41/807.

Verbatim Record of the Council Meeting, 03.06.1971, NATO, C-VR(71)30-PART2_BIL.

Ibid.

Ibid. See also Pedaliu, ‘Discordant Note’, 112-3.


Dispatch from the British Embassy in Oslo, 21.06.1971, TNA, FCO41/808.


Telegram from the British Embassy in Lusaka, 03.06.1971, TNA, FCO41/808. See also the Nigerian press clippings in the same folder.
Dispatch from the French Embassy in Lisbon, 21.06.1971, AD/MAE, 1928INVA3507; Telegram from the West German Embassy in Lisbon, 07.06.1971, PAAA, B26/444; Telegram from the British Embassy in Lisbon, 03.06.1971, TNA, FCO41/808; Crollen, Portugal, US and NATO, 136.

Summary Record of the Council meeting, 10.12.1971, NATO, C-R(71)69-PART2_ENG.

Telegram from the British Delegation to NATO, 10.12.1971, TNA, FCO41/809.

AAPD 1972, Doc. 159; Summary Record of the Council Meeting, 30.05.1972, NATO, C-R(72)25.

Verbatim Record of the Council Meeting, 07.12.1972, NATO, C-VR(72)60.


Telegram from the British Embassy in Oslo, 12.04.1972, TNA, FCO41/969.

Personality note on Max van der Stoel, TNA, PREM15/1799.


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