Therefore, q is not r-grainedly identical to pq, for some r. (C6, 8)

Which is to say that phenomenal q stands in no identity relation to physical pq, at least at a certain level of grain r. And this is entirely consistent with the reductive physicalist who maintains that there is a real, underlying relation which the coarse-grained (C7*) fails to track: e.g., an s-grained identity, for s > r.

The brunt of the paper is occupied with a defense of the underlying semantic changes, the new premise (2*), and the plausibility of fine-grained reductive physicalism (in particular, fine-grained phenomenal properties or states). In the first instance, I lean on existing views in modal semantics (Garson 2006) and the concept of “levels of abstraction” (Floridi 2011), to pin down a formal notion of “grain.” In the second instance, I lean on the representational theory of mind (Fodor 1975), introspective judgment, and empirical research favoring the limitations of conceivability and its cognates (Shepard & Metzler 1971; see also Nickerson & Adams 1979). Finally, in the third instance, I appeal to intuitions about the “homogeneity,” “spread-outness” (Robinson 2004), “non-gappiness,” or “intrinsicality” of phenomenal experience (see also Lockwood 2015), and the apparent existence of “phenomenal continuua” (see Raffman 2012), to defend the plausibility of fine-grained phenomenal properties or states and their attendant reductive theories. The paper closes by considering and replying to an objection from Sellars (1962).

Not harmful delusions – an interpretation

Jorge Gonçalves (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)

The aim of this article is to identify a characteristic of delusions: that which makes them pathological. It may appear a bit strange at first because one believes that delusions are just a pathological alteration of the mind. However, some authors have shown that although pathological delusions are the most studied, not all delusions have necessarily harmful consequences for the delirious subject or for others. Hence, it seems pertinent to question what makes delusions a pathological state. Although delusions are associated with several syndromes here I take mainly as a reference delusions that are related to the “Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders” in the DSM 5 where they are described as “false beliefs”. Some authors think that delusions are in fact false beliefs and others that delusions are not beliefs but experiences. I also think that delusions are experiences and argue in favour of the Gallagher’s Multiple Realities (MR) model of delusions which is based on the phenomenology of Schütz. According to Schütz, everyday reality is not the only reality in which consciousness can be found. Developing an idea of William James, which states that in the Universe there are several "sub-universes", Schütz maintains that there are several realities which he calls "finite provinces of sense", each having a different cognitive style, to which a specific tension of consciousness belongs, a specific epoché, a prevailing form of spontaneity, a specific form of self-experience, a specific form of socialization, and a specific perspective of time. Gallagher develops the idea of Schütz and includes delusions as a reality along with other alternative realities as dream, fiction or science. However, I think the MR model is not incompatible with the “belief model” because beliefs could exist within the experience of delusional reality. After the exposition of the MR model I would try to explain why within this model one can understand that not all delusions are harmful for the subject or the others. The subject can enter into a different reality – such as
someone who is reading a novel and leaves the reality of the world around them – but this does not always have harmful consequences. Not because the subject ceases to carry the delusion into everyday reality, but because the content of this delusion could have positive consequences or at least not harmful consequences. In this way, one can explain, for example, some “mystical” delusions or some artistic creative delusions which seems not to have negative consequences even if there is confusion between everyday reality and delusion reality (according to MR model).

Philosophy’s deepest questions: Self awareness and cognition

Judite Zamith-Cruz (University of Minho)

“Nothing in the world has ever been discovered (computers, simulations population with conscious beings…) as objects comparable to the abstract self. Nowadays, the self may be seen as the content of an “internal model of a transparent self” (Metzinger, 2009), relative to the body in the environment. Self in process, in all likelihood, and we will never find out whether or not we are simulations ourselves.

However it is probably only a matter of time before we really create virtual beings inside computers. Super smart machines may be even conscious ones.

It is widely accepted that our brain gives rise to consciousness, and the “I” is a by-product of consciousness itself.

But the modern break in the mind-building was given when Hayek, approached Scotsman Hume, stated that “much of what we believe we know about the outside world is effectively a self-knowledge”(Hayek, 1952b, pp. 6-7). Without undoing conjectures, Hayek developed what we still do not understand well by physics or by philosophy (Bostrom, 2003): "How do I know I exist?"  “You don’t now, because could someone - or something - else do it!"

However the “I” experience comes from what source? Some clues come from neuropsychological condition such as Cotard’s syndrome: the brain has anomalies associated to the awareness of the body and its emotional state.

There has never been an explanation for consciousness as for life, with evolutionary theories. Somewhere in the course of evolution, our brains became representing the world around us. Perhaps the feeling of self (the dust of the soul) is more important than its evolution.

The philosopher Thomas Metzinger thinks that is a robust experience that comes to mind: “I exist”. The (illusory) experience is provided by the organ that makes us to imagine phenomenal selves, theories, love or paint. Are there only mental occurrences? With this illusion lived the idealistic Berkeley (1685-1753) who, with Kant (1724-1804), provided an odd form of existence to the mind and to mental phenomena ("It's all in your head."). For his part, Hume (1711-1776) did not want to startle and want to change our philosophies and scientific approaches. He merely forced the self to brush away the nonexistent, volatile forever, like a bundle of sensations. The impression faded from consciousness, like the pain caused by the "hot" burning iron. As with Hegel (1770-1831) one glimpses what some scientists claims to be self-consciousness: a distorted perception, a trick of the mind.

How can physical networks of neurons produce experiences that appear to fall outside the material world? We propose to discuss consciousness as a mirage or an echo, and that hard problem of consciousness completely disappears in its entirety. But if reality is real it relies on the minds and consciousnesses of observers, with very skilled brains at representing possibly objects as having immaterial properties (the mirage of consciousness) even extended to stars and black holes. All is said by an observer who is not neutral.