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PhD Thesis

The Phenomenology of Aristotle in Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*:
*Ἀληθεύειν in the Development of the Concept of*

*Eigentlichkeit*

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ABSTRACT

In the existential analysis of Dasein, Heidegger’s phenomenology is driven by the presence of Aristotle’s phenomenological nature of thought and its phenomenological possibilities. This study examines the early Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle’s ἀληθεύειν in his inquiries at Marburg and the articulation of this notion in the concept of Eigentlichkeit in Sein und Zeit (1927). Turning to Aristotle’s analysis of φαίνομενον and λόγος, Heidegger’s project in Marburg is motivated by the return to Aristotle in order to retrieve and exhibit ἀληθεύειν as the phenomenon that articulates the research on factual Dasein in the world. In undertaking this kind of phenomenological reflection, Heidegger is not trying merely to clarify his own stance in relation to Aristotle, but he is also in fact reactivating the Greek (Aristotelian) sense of phenomenology retrieving Aristotle’s view on philosophical research. It is shown that the phenomenological description of Dasein to which Heidegger appeals in Being and Time is not a ‘project’ of his philosophy, but rather it arises as a possibility on the basis of the possibilities inherent in thinking (and so language) as such. In Sein und Zeit, the theme of Eigentlichkeit is situated from the beginning within Aristotle’s teleology and traced back to Aristotle’s understanding of life and πρᾶξις, since it is based upon the phenomenon of ἀληθεύειν as the basic trait of human activity. It is argued that the point in revealing the practical foundation of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν is essentially to find out what it means for Dasein to be a form of κίνησις that opens up the possibility of authenticity in human being. In this pursuit, it becomes possible not only to regard authenticity as a form of ἀληθεύειν or articulative disclosing of being-in-the-world, but also as a temporal phenomenon whose origin is to be found in the Aristotelian κίνησις and σοφία underlying its core notion: Entschlossenheit. On the basis of this concept it is argued that authenticity cannot be determined nor exhausted by being-towards-death but, rather, by the most far-reaching possibility of ἀληθεύειν: historicity.
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Introductory Notes

1. Unless where otherwise indicated, all renderings in English from other languages are the author’s.

2. References to Heidegger’s writings are to the Gesamtausgabe (=GA) still under publication by Vittorio Klostermann. Exception is made to Sein und Zeit (=SZ) that refers to the original Max Niemeyer edition.
Abbreviations

Aristotle:

AP  Analytica Posteriora
CT  Categoriae
DA  De Anima
De Int  De Interpretatione
EE  Eudemian Ethics
META  Metaphysics
NE  Nicomachean Ethics
PHY  Physics
POL  Politics
RT  Rhetoric

Heidegger:

SS  Summer Semester Course
WS  Winter Semester Course
GA  Gesamtasugabe
SZ  Sein und Zeit
AM  Aristoteles: Metaphysik Θ 1-3 – Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft
EM  Einführung in die Metaphysik
EPF  Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung
GAP  Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie
GAPH  Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie
GM  Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit
GP  Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie
HZ  Holzwege
KPM  Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik
LFW  Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit
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<th>Abkürzung</th>
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<td>PIA</td>
<td>Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles</td>
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<td>PGZ</td>
<td>Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs</td>
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<td>PRL</td>
<td>Phänomenologie des Religiösen Lebens</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Platon: Sophistes</td>
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<td>WBP</td>
<td>Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις, Aristoteles Physik B, 1.</td>
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“We have all read in scientific books, and, indeed, in all romances, the story of the man who has forgotten his name. This man walks about the streets and can see and appreciate everything; only he cannot remember who he is. Well, every man is that man in the story. Every man has forgotten who he is. One may understand the cosmos, but never the ego; the self is more distant than any star. [...] We are all under the same mental calamity; we have all forgotten our names. We have all forgotten what we really are. All that we call common sense and rationality and practicality and positivism only means that for certain dead levels of our lives we forget that we have forgotten. All that we call spirit and art and ecstasy only means that for an awful instant we remember that we forget.”

INTRODUCTION

I. The clarification of ἀληθεύειν as a central philosophical task

This study explores Heidegger’s early attempt to addressing the legacy of Aristotle, regarded as the philosophical origin, and its legacy in the concept of Eigentlichkeit (authenticity) in Being and Time (1927). Heidegger’s project will be considered here with respect to how it retrieves and exhibits Aristotle’s notion of ἀληθεύειν (to be disclosing, making-true) in the inquiries on Aristotle’s teleology at Marburg and how this notion is reflected in the concept of Eigentlichkeit (authenticity) in Being and Time (1927).

I will focus on Heidegger/Aristotle’s research in two key terms ἀληθεύειν and Eigentlichkeit since these two key terms – ἀληθεύειν and Eigentlichkeit – comprise the fundamental philosophical questions, the essential connection of the presence of Aristotle in Heidegger’s thinking and Heidegger’s retrieval, interpretation and transformation of Aristotle in Being and Time: the problematic of ὃν ὡς ἀληθεύει (being as true/unconcealed) in the research on factical being in the world.

A close analysis of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in his early 1920s Marburg Courses – namely an examination of the notion of ἀληθεύειν in de Anima, Rhetoric, de Interpretatione and the Nicomachean Ethics, and in particular the way in which that interpretation was reflected in Being and Time (1927) – has much to contribute to the philosophical clarification of these problems.

Since I am aiming to relate Heidegger’s research on Aristotle’s ἀληθεύειν in Marburg and the way he takes Aristotle’s thought to Being and Time, this analysis must be guided by an encompassing theme from both periods. ἀληθεύειν and Eigentlichkeit are the two culminating notions of Heidegger’s research on Aristotle at Marburg and in Being and Time, respectively. The interpretation of ἀληθεύειν is a central issue in the early 1920s Marburg courses and in the development of the theme of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time insofar as it can tell Heidegger something basic about the broader notion of ἀληθεύω (unconcealment) both as an
ontic condition – ἀληθεύω and ὄν ὡς ἀληθές – and as a human performance, ἀληθεύειν as a power of ψυχή (soul).

In 1922, Heidegger wrote an introduction to a book on Aristotle which he was planning for publication. In his “Afterword” to the 1989 publication of the long misplaced Heidegger manuscript of 1922 entitled “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation),” Hans-Ulrich Lessing reports that this text was submitted to Marburg and Göttingen as part of Heidegger’s application for teaching positions at both universities. Theodore Kisiel says of this manuscript: “... we have before us the nuclear structure of the book Being and Time, or more precisely, of the Daseinsanalytik which is to serve as a fundamental ontology.”

The manuscript sent to Paul Nathorpp, who eventually hired Heidegger in Marburg in the summer of 1923, had been lost by Gadamer in an air raid during World War II and was not discovered until 1989. Heidegger scholars in the United States, Thomas Sheehan and Theodore Kisiel are responsible for finding the manuscript. What specifically concerns Heidegger in this text is the movement of the practical disclosure in Aristotle, ἀληθεύειν and its significance to the research on Dasein.

In an enlightening remark appended to the recently discovered summary of Heidegger’s planned treatise to PIA Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan state that:

“The outstanding new interpretation in this survey of Aristotelian texts [sc. Nicomachean Ethics, VI, Metaphysics I and II; Physics I, II, III] is Heidegger’s very first full account of factic (finite) truth understood as a process of ‘un-concealment’. ‘The aletheuein does not mean to I take

1  PS, p. 23, “Bevor Aristoteles die Weisen des ἀληθεύειν aufzählt, sagt er: ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψυχή. Die Wahrheit ist also zwar ein Charakter des Seienden, sofern es begegnet, aber im eigentlichen Sinne doch eine Seinsbestimmung des menschlichen Daseins selbst.” [“Before Aristotle enumerated the modes of ἀληθεύειν, he said: ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψυχή. Truth is hence a character of beings, insofar as they are encountered; but in an authentic sense it is nevertheless a determination of the being of human being itself.”] Fridolin Wiplinger in his study on truth, Wahrheit und Geschichtlichkeit: Eine Untersuchungen über die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit im Denken Martin Heideggers, makes a similar point that ‘being-true’ as ‘being-uncovering’ (ἀληθεύειν) is not merely the meaning of a term but a way of being of Dasein: as ontic – the to-be-in-the-world of Dasein as uncovering of beings within the world; as existential – the articulated structural unity of to-be-in-the-world as disclosing of existence; and as ontological – the unity of ‘disclosing’ and ‘closing off’.

possession of the truth’ in usurpation, but to take it in trust for conservation, to take the
intended being into the safekeeping of habitual truth as unveiled’.”

In a series of explanatory notes in his translation of a typescript made by an
unknown auditor of Heidegger’s 1924 Cologne Address, discovered by Thomas
Sheehan among the papers of Heidegger’s student Franz Joseph Brecht, Brian
Hansford Bowles refers to ἀληθεύειν as “the most fundamental and highest form
of uncovering that reveals and maintains an entity [being] in its ἄρχη and τέλος.
Thus, in the most proper sense, uncovering an entity in its being means revealing it
and understanding it as it always already is. And what is in the fullest sense is also
what can be uncovered in the most proper sense.”

Heidegger refers in his 1924 Cologne speech that:

“Ἀληθεύειν refers to a mode of being that Dasein is such that Dasein uncovers
being itself and maintains it in this discoveredness. Ἀληθεύειν means being-disposed
[Gestelltein] toward something and that entails ἐπιστοσθαι, that is, being-placed with
something in such a way that you see it.”

This idea is further developed in the WS 1924/25 Marburg lecture course, Platon:
Sophistes (GA 19):

“Insofar as disclosure and knowledge have for the Greeks the goal of ἀληθεία, the
Greeks designate them as ἀληθεύειν, i.e., designate them in terms of what is achieved in
them, ἀληθεία. We do not intend to translate this word, ἀληθεύειν. It means to be
disclosing, to remove the world from concealment and coveredness. And that is the mode
of being of human Dasein.”

The same expression appears in a more general form two years afterwards in
1926 right before the publication of Being and Time (1927) when Heidegger gives
a talk on Pentecost Monday. Credit is due in this particular case to Kisiel who
recently discovered this talk among the holdings of the Helene Weiss Archive at
the Stanford University Library and realized that “the dated record of page proofs

3 Sheehan, Kisiel, Becoming Heidegger – On the Trail of his Early Occasional Writings, 1910-
1927, pp. 175, 176.
4 Sheehan, Kisiel, op. cit., p. 218. This communication is still forthcoming in GA80 so we only
have access to the English version of a transcript made by an unknown auditor of the speech, which
as Kisiel refers, p. 214, “was discovered by Thomas Sheehan in typescript form among the holdings
of Heidegger’s early student, Franz Joseph Brecht”
5 Sheehan, Kisiel, op. cit., p. 228.
6 PS, p. 17, (my italics).
and galleys shuttling between Heidegger’s pen in Todtnauberg and Marburg and the printers in Halle shows that he [Heidegger] was at this time just finalizing the very last section of the First Division, section 44 entitled “Dasein, Disclosedness and Truth” (SZ 212-30), for the printer”. This piece of information provides valuable evidence regarding the philosophical place of ἀληθεύειν in Heidegger’s research of Aristotle in Marburg but most of all it permits Heidegger to work out the Daseinsanalytik and present the concept of authenticity in Being and Time. For in this talk Heidegger, as indicated above, seems to expand the definition of ἀληθεύειν into the analytic of Dasein in that:

“The Dasein is therefore, inasmuch as it is according to its essence in the world, discovering. It has, in various degrees of distinction-and-articulation [Deutlichkeit], discovered the beings around it. The Dasein is, insofar as it defined by being-in-the-world and in accord with its proper essence, discovering. Subject – Dasein – Being-in-the-world-discovering: it already sees and has already always sighted other beings that it itself is not. The Dasein is discovering: this is the authentic and proper sense of truth. Truth means nothing but being discovering! It is not an arbitrary definition selected at random. The sense of truth as being-uncovering [ἀληθεύειν] is nothing other than the sense of truth as the Greeks understood it: ἀ-ληθέα, unconcealment (λήθη, the concealed).”

In Being and Time, Heidegger points to the pre-phenomenological insight, contained in the Greek word for truth, ἀληθεύειν, used by Aristotle:

“The ἀληθεύειν which Aristotle equates with πράγμα and φαινόμενα, (...) signifies the ‘things themselves’; it signifies what shows itself – beings in the ‘how’ of their uncoveredness.”

Hence the term ‘truth’ is not founded on the structure of an “agreement” between the knower and the known; it is best expressed by such terms like ‘unconcealment’ or ‘un-hiddenness’ (Unverborgenheit). Being-true (Wahrsein) means, ‘being-uncovering’ (Entdecken), to be disclosing, making-true. For Heidegger the clue to any such discussion of ἀληθεύειν and the means to work it out, ἀληθεύειν, remains the question of λόγος and it is through this question that he starts working out the modes of ἀληθεύειν in Marburg (GA 17, 18, 19) in

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7 Sheehan, Kisiel, op. cit., p. 275.
9 SZ, p. 219.
reference to Aristotle’s works such as *de Anima, Rhetoric* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and takes his findings into his own *Daseinsanalytik*, namely in the theme of *Eigentlichkeit*.

II. AIM AND STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT STUDY

The question of ἀληθεύειν in Aristotle drives Heidegger through the various steps of his ontology about being and the description of our modes of being in the world. This farther-reaching ontological perspective will be kept in view in this study through the relation of Heidegger’s inquiry into the modes of ἀληθεύειν with the concept of *Eigentlichkeit*.

The problem of ἀληθεύειν as an ontological disclosure of *Dasein* is fundamentally grounded in the question that drives the *Daseinsanalytik*: time. This is a question that leads Heidegger through Aristotle’s own understanding of being as pure presence.

Heidegger had an intense engagement with Aristotle’s texts from his first published lectures in 1919 and throughout the 1920s. Thereafter there is less (but not nothing) in the published record of Heidegger’s collected works that discusses Aristotle in such depth. There are several volumes from lectures given earlier in this period (in fact the first Freiburg period) from which corroborating arguments and material could be drawn. My aim is to explore Heidegger’s thought, especially in *Being and Time*, from reading Heidegger’s courses on Aristotle from the 1920s, since almost all of his lectures on Aristotle as a whole belong to this decade and lead directly to its articulation with the central planks of *Sein und Zeit*. These courses present Aristotle’s findings as exhibiting an original phenomenological thought elaborating on the analysis of everyday life its modes of disclosure and temporal determinations. Heidegger opens up several research threads for his courses on Aristotle in Marburg and we shall focus at least on its general configuration so that we can shed some light on the key moments of authenticity in *Sein und Zeit*.
Heidegger’s encounter with Aristotle occur during Heidegger’s teaching years at Freiburg from 1915 to 1923 (interrupted between 1917 and 1919 due to WWII). This culminates with the publication of the *Nathorp Report* that Heidegger sent to Paul Nathorp in support of his candidacy for associated professor at Marburg. The main core of Heidegger’s work were Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics*, the third book of the *de Anima*, books VI-IX of *Metaphysics* and the first book of *Physics*. After Heidegger is offered the teaching post to which he applied at Marburg he furthers the investigation into Aristotle with the publication of the first lectures for the Winter Semester at Marburg 1923/24 *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (GA 17), for the Summer Semester 1924: *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (GA 18) devoted to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s *Rethoric* in which Heidegger assimilates Aristotle’s account of the παθη (affects) in the context of the speech of the rethor and aims to show how it works as an ontological account of Dasein; also, the following Winter Semester 1924/25 course on Plato’s *Sophist: Platon Sophistes* (GA 19) in which Heidegger examines Aristotle’s notion of αληθεια (truth=unconcealedness) in relation to the λογος (speaking) of the modes of αληθευειν (disclosing)

*Platon: Sophistes* (GA 19) (1924/25) is on this regard an important preparatory discussion of *Sein und Zeit*. Here we find the first third of the text devoted to his interpretation of Aristotle, before he proceeds to read Plato's text. It is in vol. 19 that the connection in Aristotle between the terms *theoria* and *Sophia*, and the modes of αληθευειν are discussed. Heidegger’s strategy is to challenge Aristotle’s understanding of being (on) concentrating upon the meaning of being as αληθεια (truth=unconcealedness) in attempting to go back beyond the determination of the υν ως αληθες (beings as unconcealed), Heidegger articulates the modes of αληθευειν (disclosing) – in book VI of Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics* – into his own analytic of Dasein. Albeit there are later texts of particular importance for *Sein und Zeit* which I will keep in view in this study, such as *Wegmarken* (GA 9) which contains the lecture “Vom Wesen und

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Begriff der Φυσική that deals with the problem of Κυνηγική it is in the early lessons at Marburg, before Sein und Zeit and the first Freiburg period that we find the lesser known Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle. More specifically, not only where Heidegger mentions Aristotle and interprets him explicitly but also, more especially, where he doesn’t talk about him and seems to concentrate upon the problems that become explicit in Heidegger’s own thinking, especially, but not exclusively, in Sein und Zeit. Implied in Heidegger’s strategy is the notion of the ‘Formale Anzeige’, which we may not develop in this study but shall nevertheless mention as it is Heidegger’s first attempt to show how Aristotle had grounded his conclusions, but it was such a difficult concept for his students to understand that he abandoned it in later work.\(^{11}\)

Finally, in the Summer Semester 1926: Grundbegriffe der Antiken Philosophie (GA 22) in which Heidegger handles the history of Greek philosophy from Thales to Aristotle and the final part is devoted to an interpretation of the Aristotelian philosophy. The research results Heidegger found in the Marburg courses still linger and drives more recent lectures delivered in his second period at Freiburg (1928/1944), namely 1925/26: Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (GA 21) and 1927: Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24), when Heidegger works again on the problem of truth in Aristotle.\(^{12}\)

The difficulties in reading and interpreting Aristotle along with Heidegger’s own interpretation of Aristotle are many. Often Heidegger requires to be read

\(^{11}\) Heidegger refers to it in several lecture courses from the 1920’s, and in Sein und Zeit and we can see there is a connection between this and the discussion of Besinnung (which can be translated as theoría, contemplation - even as sophia) in Vol. 66 of the Gesamtausgabe. Also the articulation between Aristotle’s problem of being andousia with Heidegger’s own views on the analogical character of being. For this purpose, we would need to compare Heidegger’s 1924 course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie (GA 18) with the 1931 course Aristoteles. Metaphysik Theta 1-3: Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft, (GA 33). This comparison would have to consider Heidegger’s notion of “Formale Anzeige” suggested by Aristotle’s “το ου λεγεται πολλάχος λεγομενον” which highlights what Heidegger calls “Einstellung auf vieldeutigkeit” as present in Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung, (GA 61). This idea would need to be tested in order to see in what ways it ontologically grounds the methodological connection between Heidegger and Aristotle.

\(^{12}\) Cf., Volpi, F., “Dasein as Praxis”, p. 28 and end of § 72 of Gesamtausgabe 29/30, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit. Also, the first part of Gesamtausgabe 31, Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit, which contains an interpretation of Metaphysics IX, 10 that Heidegger fully unfolds in the next Summer Semester, cf., Gesamtausgabe 33, Aristoteles: Metaphysik Q 1-3 – Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft.
literally. This is a way of reading which cannot be taken for granted as we tend to generally read otherwise. Sometimes, we read with a view to orientation so that we may acquaint ourselves with the thoughts of another. Often we “skip”, even preferring to read “between” the lines. We content ourselves with getting just an idea of what the author is trying to convey. The requirement that, now, Heidegger and Aristotle are to be read literally means just the opposite of such reading. Not that we have to linger on words as in the case of a piece of writing of which the objective precision motivates a literal reading; here, by reading the Greek along with Heidegger’s German and expressing it into English requires us to pay attention to a word in respect of what, as a word, it signifies or conveys. For Heidegger, “The word does not merely name, and so enable us to have it in our grasp, our already represented present reality (or being), it is not merely a means to the depiction of something given. On the contrary, it is the word which first of all bestows presence, that is, being, in which anything appears as a being.”

This intricate linguistic procedure makes the translation of Heidegger and Aristotle into appropriate English an important but problematic procedure. I will therefore make special efforts to translate Heidegger’s and Aristotle’s particular concepts into viable English and attempt to provide a detailed philosophical elucidation of the key terms that Heidegger analyses in Aristotle’s texts, and to cross-relate these to the texts themselves with a view to distinguish between Heideggerian senses from their ordinary senses or from the senses intended by other thinkers and translators. This option if we like, would consistently show how Heidegger was reading Aristotle, and how he was transforming this reading in the development of his own phenomenology. I would like to indicate where I believe Heidegger would disagree with some of the classical Aristotle translations of Sir David Ross, Charlston or Tredennick.

In Chapter One, I give a survey of the relationship between Heidegger and Aristotle in order to locate Aristotle within Heidegger’s philosophical project, and also to indicate the philosophical background to the question of ἀληθεύειν as a philosophical theme in Heidegger. According to Robert Bernasconi: “a number of scholars, working largely independently of each other, began to discover Aristotle’s Ethics in Being and Time”\(^\text{14}\). This is endorsed by Weigelt who refers that: “the scholars being among others, Theodore Kisiel, Thomas Sheehan, Franco Volpi, Jacques Taminiaux, John van Buren and Walter Brogan. The discovery of Aristotle’s influence on Heidegger seems to have been made possible initially by the circulation of student notes of the then still unpublished ‘Sophist Lectures’.”\(^\text{15}\)

The student notes of GA 19 seem to have steered the first stage of his inquiry where Heidegger aims to bring into question the relation between φανόμενον and λόγος in order to bring to light Aristotle’s phenomenological inquiry on being as a research on factual being-in-the-world. Heidegger cannot here directly turn to Aristotle himself, for Aristotle’s account of λόγος is accessible only on the basis of a confrontation with the received scholastic view on this topic according to which assertion is the primary mode of λόγος since it is the basic element of truth and knowledge. However, Heidegger will test weather this claim stands with Aristotle himself, since he thinks that it has its origin in an insufficient interpretation of Aristotle. The overall aim of this chapter is to show how Heidegger tries to question this view as an interpretation of Aristotle. His basic argument is that, when analysing the assertion in terms of συνθεσις (positing together) and διαίρεσις (taking apart) Aristotle has managed to point out a feature of human understanding as such, namely its discursivity or the ‘as-structure’. On the basis of this claim, Heidegger argues that assertoric speaking as theoretical articulation presupposes an unthematic mode of understanding and articulation which is therefore thought to make up a more basic level of human being’s speaking: ἀληθεύειν. Thus, Chapter One has a somewhat introductory character.

The following three chapters each deal with the presence of ἀληθεύειν in the theme and interpretation of Eigentlichkeit at three levels: everydayness and

\(^{14}\) Bernasconi, R., “Heidegger’s Destruction of Phronesis”, 1989, p.129.

inauthenticity, resoluteness and authenticity, historicity and being-a-self. Each chapter is organized into three main points. Having began with the notion of λόγος as initially accessible or with respect to how it has been interpreted traditionally, the investigation then proceeds to an analysis of the structure of ἀλήθευσιν in every mode of speaking under scrutiny in chapter VI of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. On the basis of this analysis, one could ask what kind of access to being and truth is admitted by the specific ἀλήθευσιν at stake in the possibility of Eigentlichkeit. To some extent this is the order of the two main chapters of the second half of the research, so that each of them represents one of the three points enumerated above.

Chapter Two centres on Heidegger’s account of Uneigentlichkeit (inauthenticity) in *Being and Time* with what in his view is the traditional or common understanding of λόγος. It will be shown how Heidegger makes use of his analysis of everydayness in order to reveal precisely the ‘everyday’ phenomenal basis of Aristotle’s understanding of λόγος ἀληθεύων which Aristotle himself supposedly was not able to thematize, and simultaneously turns to Aristotle for help in this analysis. The question of the everyday ἀληθεύων is therefore opened up through λόγος and will be treated here to a great extent as a question concerning the theme of Eigentlichkeit in its potential form, that is, in the inauthentic ways of being. Heidegger’s preoccupation with the pre-theoretical, everyday ἀληθεύων is therefore exhibited in *Being and Time* under the mode of inauthenticity worked out from an ontological re-reading of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύων: ποιήσις (production), τέχνη (know-how) and the notion of δοξα (opinion) discussed under the heading of “concern” (*Besorgen*).

Having opened up the theme of Eigentlichkeit I will present its interpretation in Chapter Three. The task in this Chapter is to provide an interpretation of Heidegger’s Eigentlichkeit from Aristotle’s main traits of εὐδαιμονία (happiness, man’s proper being), φρόνησις (practical wisdom/consciousness), βουλευτική ὀρέξεις (deliberate desire) and νοῦς (pure apprehension) in the *Nicomachean Ethics* so that it may be shown how Aristotle understands these notions philosophically and in what ways Aristotle helps Heidegger to think through (and in some cases to forge the ontological/temporal conceptuality of authenticity such as *Die Sorge* (care) and its modes – *Besorgen* (concern), Fürsorge (solicitude), Zu-
Sein (has-to-be) Sein-können (potentiality-of-being-a-self) Worumwollen (for-the-sake-of-which). Bringing together the modes of Eigentlichkeit and Aristotle’s πράξεις (activities) it becomes possible not only to regard authenticity as a form of ἀληθεύειν or articulative disclosing of being-in-the-world, but also to think of Eigentlichkeit along the lines of action, that is, to see in Heidegger’s account of Eigentlichkeit a temporal/ontological perspective opened up by the interplay of νοῦς and Entslossenheit (resoluteness) in human being, interpreting these in terms of κίνησις, (movement/temporality). Therefore, this chapter leads to Heidegger’s interpretation of Eigentlichkeit as a reinterpretation and transformation of Aristotle’s νοῦς as the very own possibility of ἀληθεύειν. I argue that by re-reading Aristotle’s κίνησις and the retrieval of φρόνησις, Heidegger is able to work out his concept of Entslossenheit that articulates his account of authenticity.

When the nature of Eigentlichkeit has been further elucidated from its underlying νοῦς ἀληθεύειν it should be possible to approach the question concerning historicity and its mode of speaking. Heidegger’s philosophical pursuit of Aristotle’s ἀληθεύειν in Being and Time becomes properly understood and clear to us as a theme in its own right in connection with Historicity. This is the task of Chapter Four. In this final chapter, having dwelt at length on the central Heideggerian themes in the concept of Eigentlichkeit and exhibited the correspondences with Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν, my main concern is to get to the ‘wholeness’ of Heidegger’s existential analysis of Dasein, that culminates itself in the notion of historicity. I argue that Heidegger’s analysis of authentic historicity yields an ereignis as regards its being-a-totality retrieved through ἀληθεύειν. The analysis of historicity will show the philosophical scope of ἀληθεύειν in Heidegger’s account of Eigentlichkeit. What is specifically at stake in this last paragraph on ‘Historicity’ is the situation of the understanding appropriation of the past in the situation of a living present. Since the analysis of ἀληθεύειν and Eigentlichkeit are steered to the notion of historicity and the return to Aristotle, I can as well say that I am viewing Heidegger’s relationship to Aristotle through this leitmotif.
PART ONE
CHAPTER ONE

1. DECONSTRUCTING DASEIN: HEIDEGGER’S PROJECT AND ITS RELATION TO ARISTOTLE

a) The question of λόγος in the early Heidegger

In the following I will examine closely the phenomenological grounds of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle during the period which precedes the publication of Being and Time which comprises the years of his first teaching period at Freiburg (1919-1923) and the teaching at Marburg (1923/1928). My aim in this section is twofold: firstly, to ask to what extent Heidegger’s position regarding λόγος in Being and Time is a follow up of his reflections on λόγος at Marburg in the early 1920s and secondly, how Heidegger understands and interprets the character of human life – that is the metaphysical/scholastic tradition of thought under the determination of λόγος and judgement – by showing the importance and the meaning to which the tradition is assigned, and at the same time, Heidegger claims, covered over as λόγος. From here I hope to demonstrate how the phenomenological method to which Heidegger makes appeal in the analytic of Dasein (1927) is not a ‘project’ of his philosophy, but that it arises as a possibility on the basis of the possibilities inherent in thinking (and so language) as such, that Heidegger started to explore in the early 1920s Marburg Courses on Aristotle.

The interpretation of Aristotle, occupies the first part of all the three courses above mentioned (GA 17, GA 19 and GA 21). The main goal Heidegger keeps in view in all three courses is to show, as he himself makes explicit in Being and Time, how philosophy is connected with being truth (Wahrsein) and this with Aristotle’s understanding of philosophy. By focusing his attention in the problem

16 Cf., SZ, p. 213. “Philosophie selbst wird bestimmt als φιλοσοφεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, Wissenschaft von der »Wahrheit«. Zugleich aber ist sie charakterisiert als eine ἐπιστήμη, ἢ θεωρεῖ τό ὃν ἢ ὄν”, als Wissenschaft, die das Seiende betrachtet als Seiendes, das heißt hinsichtlich seines Seins.” It is in this way that “Wahrheit mit Sein zusammengetellt” (sz212). Further on we read,
of ἀλήθεια (truth=unconcealment), Heidegger explores also the meaning of phenomenology and ontology in Aristotle and Husserl in his two Marburg courses, the first of which being the Summer Semester 1925 published under the title Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs and the second the Winter Semester of the same year published under the title Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. Heidegger addreses in different levels in all courses the locus originary of truth starting from the notions of φαινόμενον (phenomenon=that which shows itself) and λόγος (speaking) in GA 17 and opening them up to each mode of ἀλήθευσις (disclosing) in GA 19.

“The Greeks exist in the word, speaking” and their “fundamental determination of the being of Man is to be-with-one-another (das Miteinandersein)”, brought by λόγος.”

In nearly all the following courses Heidegger, as I aim to show, concentrates his efforts to grasp Aristotle’s understanding of λόγος within the framework of a phenomenological understanding of human life.

We can translate λόγος for speaking or speech but this also implies understanding of λόγος as the specific articulation of human life.

In the following I would like to show how the question of λόγος – as the specific articulation of human life – made thematic for the first time in the philosophical programme of Being and Time, is interplayed with the analyses made in Marburg and that this account is offered not without a critical positioning toward the metaphysical tradition. I will merely enunciate the following issues on λόγος that will be exhibited in more detail later in this section when I survey the previous literature on Heidegger’s relation to Aristotle and confront the relevant steps from Aristotle’s de Interpretatione, de Anima and Peri Hermeneias with Heidegger’s Marburg courses (GA 17, 18, 21) and Being and Time and the passages from the 1929/30 Freiburg course where why find a detailed explication of λόγος.

“Die ἀλήθεια, die von Aristoteles nach den oben angeführten Stellen mit πρᾶγμα, φαινόμενα gleichgesetzt wird, bedeutet die.

17 Cf. PGZ, LFW.

18 GAP, p.108, “Die Griechen existieren in der Rede”, “… die grundbestimmung seines Seins selbst ist Miteinandersein.”, “… das durschnittliche Reden über die Sachen, über die man eine gewisse Auskenntnis hat, ohne sie sich zu vergegenwärtigen. Aus ihm erwächst die Möglichkeit des reinen Vollzugs und in ihm selbst die Möglichkeit des rechten Aufzeigens”.

22
Therefore, in the following and in the overall structure of the first part of this study I will merely elaborate an examination of those aspects that are recurrent in the early Marburg courses on Aristotle before attempting to show how they are at work in Heidegger’s account of the existential analytic of Dasein—specifically in the concept Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time, to be dealt with and explicated in relation to Heidegger’s findings on λόγος in Chapter 2 (The Fall into das Man and Inauthenticity) of this study.

I will specifically examine Heidegger’s claims that support his contention—made explicit in Being and Time—that the metaphysical tradition has reduced λόγος to its propositional dimension, that is understanding λόγος ἀποφαντικός in terms of a mere enunciation and a judgement and in what ways this reduced the determination of the λόγον ἔχον to animal rationalis. What is at stake is a traditional way of restricting λόγος to a pure theoretical enunciation which makes human life be reduced as to a categorical grasp without thinking of the whole as such.

It also presupposes a hierarchy of the modes of ἀληθεύειν in such a way that being is revealed by a pure presence of θεωρία over πρᾶξις, as the cognitive attitude on which Man could be thought of as λόγος (not as speaking, unveiling but as reason or judgment, as an extant state of affairs) and consequently leading to a predominance of presence (constant, objective presence) as the mode of being which better conveyed the theoretical attitude.

The general argument that Heidegger gives to substantiate his critical position toward the traditional determination of λόγος— and I merely indicate it now— is that all concepts and traditional definitions of λόγος are insufficient to grasp the essence of Man without reducing it to one object amongst many others. The traditional determination of Man as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον is not grasped in its the movement (Bewegtheit) proper to human life. In his Marburg years Heidegger aims to deconstruct Dasein and challenge what he calls the metaphysics of presence in order to show that λόγος originally means a comprehension of Man (ζῷον) in terms of Dasein, in his existence, and not in terms of a scientific/theoretical consideration. In other words, an understanding of human being in the specific

19 A perspective shared with Kant, being the latter more akin to the anthropological sense of Man as spirituality (Geistigkeit).
mode of disclosure of its being and, therefore, not in terms of λόγος as a category that remains tied to a theoretical consideration of being and beings worked from the objects of the turning a blind eye to the core of πράξις (activity).

Before developing these points, I will trace back the arguments deployed by Aristotle and proceed to Heidegger’s reading of these arguments in order to delineate the proper and necessary philosophical context for understanding ultimately what is at stake in the notion of λόγος, both for Aristotle and Heidegger, in an effort to see how they are best utilized within Heidegger’s research in Being and Time.

b) Dasein as revealing-being (ψυχή ώς ἀληθεύειν) and the determination of ἀληθεύειν

Some fundamental questions in need of clarification arise: if Heidegger seems to be so dismissive of the tradition, why is he so insistent on preserving so many themes of the tradition in terms of his own ilk in Being and Time? Why have Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle and of the ‘basic words’ of philosophy such as ἀληθεύεια, φαινόμενον, λόγος or φύσις drawn the wrath of classical scholars, orthodox ‘academic’ philosophers and theologians alike? Moreover, Heidegger’s orientation to Aristotle is unavoidably at pains with the way Aristotle has been interpreted by renowned scholars, like Sir David Ross or Werner Jaeger.

Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle – indicated by Heidegger in his autobiographical essay – the analyses of λόγος and ὁν ως ἀληθεύειν are a central theme in Heidegger’s output in the Marburg period up to the existential analytic of Being and Time and even beyond: the 1929/30 courses also offer an important analysis of λόγος with a reference to Aristotle’s de Interpretatione.

Concerning the texts from the Marburg period, among which GA 17, 18 and 19, Heidegger grasps the role of language in the interpretation of Dasein out of his orientation towards the Aristotelian determination of λόγος, interpreting λόγος as an oppenness and a privileged access to being. This purpose is integrated in an analysis of the multiple senses of being namely an analysis of the ὁν ως ἀληθεύειν orientated to the fundamental question of the unitary meaning of being designated
by the formula τὸ ὅν λέγεται πολλαχῶς.20 I align here my position with Volpi in that: “The analysis of being in the sense of the ἀληθές is intertwined with the analysis of the phenomenon of λόγος with a double purpose in view: firstly, to understand why and in what ways has λόγος been considered by the tradition to be the proper term for truth; secondly, according to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle, to see how λόγος works as the articulation proper to human life (ψυχή) how it indicates an unconcealing-discovering character in the sense that ψυχή is ἀληθεύεται. What is at stake for Heidegger is therefore 1) to put into question the way metaphysics reduces the phenomenon of truth to the problem of λόγος in the sense of assertion and judgment; 2) to demonstrate the unilateralism of the thesis according to which truth is an adaequatio intellectus et rei; 3) to refuse Aristotle’s ‘fatherhood’ of this double reduction.”21

These are the texts that provide the framework for Heidegger’s study, interpretation and transformation of Aristotle’s philosophy into the key planks of Being and Time in the contention that Aristotle’s research is about the being of factual life, the same claim that leads Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik. What is the place of λόγος in the Heideggerian determinations, the modes of disclosure of existence – terms such as Verstehen (Understanding), Befindlichkeit (findliness) and Rede (speaking or speech) and how can λόγος help us to clarify both the sort of object and character of being that Aristotle had in mind in interpreting, and experiencing human life and Heidegger’s contention that the interpretation of Aristotle (until his own reading of the Stagirite) had historically been obscured by this same tradition? These are fundamental questions I hope to clarify in the first half of the present study, namely the question of λόγος in the courses prior to Being and Time where Heidegger is able to retrieve what he considers to be the implicit ontological grounds of Aristotle’s thinking and transform these grounds in the determinations of Dasein, the same as Heidegger is able to work out the determinations of existence in Being and Time – as it will be clear in subsequent sections on Eigentlichkeit.

20 “A being is spoken of in many ways”. Cf., Heidegger, M., Aristoteles: Metaphysik Θ 1-3 – Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft (GA 33).
21 Volpi, F. “La Quaestion du Logos chez le Jeune Heidegger”, 1996, p. 40. “Heidegger presents very concisely this triple questioning in paragraphs 7B, 33 and 34 of Being and Time as he had already deployed in the Marburg and Freiburg courses. In every course his argumentation is constantly supported in Aristotle’s de Interpretatione and the de Anima.”, p. 40.
I purport to show what position the question of language occupies in the comprehension of human life in terms of the development of key determinations of existence in the early 1920s Marburg courses in order to exhibit the grounds upon which Heidegger forges the terminology at work in the articulation of the Daseinsanalytik (analytic of Dasein) in Being and Time (1927). With this purpose in view, I will leave aside the first treatment of the question of language in Heidegger’s habilitationschrift Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (1915) and, the thematization of language in the later Heidegger.22

With this in mind I turn now to an analysis of Aristotle’s de Interpretatione in order to dissect the general framework upon which Heidegger exhibits on one hand the traditional conception of λόγος as judgment and how he then reviews and aims to correct this reading through his claim that Aristotle’s thinking is phenomenological. The steps involved in the interpretation of λόγος in Aristotle are as follows: by approaching λόγος phenomenologically, one can see that there are different ways in which world and life come to expression. To reveal the foundation and possibility of this diversity of speeches, one has to elucidate the constitution of “as-ness” as such. I will closely follow SZ paragraphs 7B, 33 and 34, Heidegger’s analyses on De Interpretatione (GA 17) and Volpi’s analytical framework on λόγος as I understand it to be respectively, the major sources and the reference study that preliminary identifies the connections upon which Heidegger is able to work out the terminology of existence that he will adopt in Being and Time especially in the comprehension of the modes of ἀληθεύειν operating in the concept of Eigentlichkeit to be addressed in section 3 and to be made thematic in the second half of this study.

Volpi refers that: “Aristotle turns – in de Interpretatione – to an analysis of λόγος and its synthetic structure according to which the simple determinations are composed. Aristotle analyses the parts of λόγος, the noun (ὄνομα) and the verbs

22 Within the scope of the present research it will not be possible to address Heidegger’s interpretation of Duns Scotus – which would presuppose the revision of a number of considerations related to Husserl’s Logischen Untersuchungen – or Hölderlin, Rilke and other poets or his views on art. Although Heidegger’s later interpretation of language and art falls from the scope of this research I would like to refer Else Buddeberg’s monograph, Denken und Dichten des Seins – Heidegger/Rilke, Stuttgart, Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1956, which offers a very good introduction to both the thinker and the poet.
to the structure of predication and its being true or false, their quality (affirmative or negative) and their quantity (universal, particular and infinite) and their modes (possibility, reality and necessity). Having outlined the general context and indicated the relation between being and thought, thought and language, language and writing, Aristotle focuses his attention on a linguistic analysis of the structure of \( \lambda\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \).

In his exegesis of Aristotle’s de Interpretatione – undertaken in various forms from 1923/4 to 1929/30 – Heidegger re-inverts Aristotle’s focalization of the problems, as it were, from the general philosophical questions of this treatise to the rather more telling linguistic problems. He will do this – as I aim to show now – by interpreting the same Aristotelian linguistic determinations as ontological determinations.

Heidegger considers propositions and language in general as an unconcealing-discovering act or comportment of human life in its relation to being and he takes this finding as the starting point for a questioning of being that necessarily presupposes a leap, a radical changing of focus, from an originally intended consideration of the ‘internal’ elements of language to a thorough thinking of the grounds, or conditions of possibility of language. Heidegger does not, therefore, interpret Aristotle’s problematic in the de Interpretatione in a strict logical or linguistic sense, but in a strong ontological perspective that, I suggest, is motivated not exclusively by Heidegger’s ontological re-reading of Aristotle but by Aristotle’s own thinking. This principle is demonstrated in the WS 1923/4 Marburg course (GA 17) where a reading of the de Interpretatione is first offered. (…) For example, the celebrated definition of language that reads: \( \lambda\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \ \delta\epsilon\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\ \phi\omega\nu\eta\ \sigma\epsilon\mu\mu\alpha\nu\tau\iota\kappa\iota \) (de Interpretatione 4, 16 b26) is translated by Heidegger as “\( \lambda\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \) is audible being that means something, is a voice.”23 Even a seemingly non-problematic notion as \( \phi\omega\nu\eta \) becomes under Heidegger a philosophical term: audible being (lautliches Sein).24

Following Volpi’s line of thought there appears to be a ‘strong ontologisation’ of Aristotle’s key concepts in the terminology of existence. As it were the target of Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of \( \lambda\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \) and

\[ 23 \] EPA, p. 14, “\( \lambda\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \) ist lautliches Sein, das bedeutet, ist Stimme.”

\[ 24 \] Volpi, F. op. cit., p. 42
phenomenology in this course is above all a phenomenological interpretation of *Dasein* from the analysis of factical life. It is not only the case that a preparatory analysis of factical life will pave the way for a proper encounter with Aristotle, but this preparation is itself prepared by a very close reading of Aristotle. This means that this course on the *de Anima* and the *de Interpretatione* is decisive for the clarification of the situation peculiar to philosophical interpretation opened up by, and never addressed thematically in, the Nathorp Report: the explication of factical life. For this reason, also this course contains the seeds, the presuppositions for the research on being as ἀληθεύειν and constitutes thereby the framework for the analysis of *Eigentlichkeit* in *Being and Time*. That is to say, the line by line analysis of Aristotle is not intended to make us see what possibilities are revealed and what ones are hidden as Heidegger were to offer its own shining light upon Aristotle but rather what is here at stake is the various modes of approaching and disclosing the ‘thing itself’ for to ‘this thing’ belongs Aristotle’s interpretations of it.

It is in this sense that it is important to go back to Heidegger’s translation of key Aristotle definitions in the *de Interpretatione* and the *de Anima* (GA 17), the *Rhetoric* (GA 18) the *Nicomachean Ethics* (GA 19) and the thematization of *Dasein* as ἀληθεύειν. From GA 17 course (1923/24) to a course post *Being and Time* 1929/30 (GA 29/30) for I believe the latter offers an important re-interpretation of the concept of λόγος that Heidegger started to develop in the WS 1923/24 (GA 17) taking it up again in the WS 1925/26 (GA 21). Specifically, this course offers the possibility of articulating the previous courses on Aristotle in the sense of presenting the general Aristotelian framework from which Heidegger was able to work out the fundamental character of *Dasein* as the one who makes-true, discloses an understanding that springs forth from Aristotle: philosophy is connected with being truth (*Wahrsein*) – a direct translation of Aristotle’s ὃν ὡς ἀληθεός.\(^\text{25}\)

\(^{25}\) *SZ*, p. 213, “Philosophie selbst wird bestimmt als ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῆς ἀληθετάς. Wissenschaft von der »Wahrheit«. Zugleich aber ist sie charakterisiert als eine ἐπιστήμη, ἢ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὃν ἢ ὧν, als Wissenschaft, die das Seiende betrachtet als Seiendes, das heißt hinsichtlich seines Seins.” [“Philosophy is itself determined as *epistēma* περὶ τῆς ἀληθετάς, the ‘science of truth’. But it also characterized as *epistēma*, ἢ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὃν ἢ ὧν, as a science that contemplates being as beings – that is in regard to their being.”] Further on we read, p. 219, “Die ἀληθετάς, die von Aristoteles nach den oben angeführten Stellen mit πράγμα, φανομένα gleichgesetzt wird, bedeutet die »Sachen selbst«, das was sich zeigt, das Seiende im Wie seiner...
Again when Volpi mentions the ‘ontologisation’ of Aristotle he is not merely understanding Heidegger to be recreating Aristotle but rather transforming and pushing the terminology of presence to a whole new hermeneutical level, and hence the importance of quoting and rendering Heidegger’s own efforts in translating Aristotle: “The translations and interpretations Heidegger provides of Aristotle’s account of the parts of speaking, (or speech) are the following:

Aristotle’s definition of noun reads: “όνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἀνευ χρόνου ἢς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον” (de Interpretatione, 2, 16a 19ff.) Heidegger translates it in the following way:

“Naming, however, is an utterance that means the basis of an agreement, without referring to time as such in naming. It is simultaneously a φωνή σημαντική, a totality of sounds, of which no individual part taken by itself means anything.”

As for the verb, Aristotle’s definition is the following: “ῥήμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσσημαίνων χρόνον οὐ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς [καὶ ἐστίν ἀεὶ] τῶν καθ’ ἐτερον λεγομένων σημείων” (de Interpretatione, 3, 16b 6-7.) Heidegger paraphrases and comments:

“A saying, a verb is what refers to time in addition, something to whose essence it belongs to refer to time in addition, namely in addition to what is otherwise referred to in the verb; it is always a meaning which is meaningful in such a way as to be related to whatever is being spoken about. In accordance with its intrinsic meaning, every verb is thus concerned with something that the discourse is about, something underlying as a being, as such and such a being. Thus we can see that the ῥήμα is distinguished from the ὄνομα by the criterion of time. Although Aristotle did not pursue this any further, there is indeed a quite decisive insight here. The two essential elements characterising the verb are that it also refers to time, and in its meaning is always related to something that the discourse is about, namely to beings. This indicates that all positing of beings is necessarily related to time. In keeping this, we therefore call the verb a time-word in German.”

Entdecktheit.” [“The ἀλήθεια which Aristotle equates with πράγμα and φαινόμενα means the things themselves, what shows itself, being in the how of their uncoverenedness.”]

26 GM, pp. 462-463, 465, “Die Nennung aber ist nun eine Verlautbarung, die bedeutet aufgrund des Übereinkommens, ohne im Nennen die Zeit als solche zu meinen. Es ist zugleich eine φωνὴ σημαντική, ein Ganzes von Lauten, davon kein einzelner Teil für sich genommen etwas bedeutet.” Heidegger prefers to render here ὄνομα to Nennung. He justifies his choice in this way: “ὁνόμα bedeutet das Wort, der Name, was etwas nennt. Wir sagen Hauptwort, obwohl das schein ausgedrückt sein kann, da ja auch ein verbum die Funktion eines Haupwortes annehmen kann”.

27 Heidegger prefers this version to the one more commonly accepted of ἐστὶ δὲ.

28 GM, pp. 465-66, “Ein Sagen, ein Verbum, ist das, was die Zeit dazu meint, zu dessen Wesen es gehört, die Zeit dazuzumeinen, nämlich zu dem dazu, was sonst im Verbum gemeint ist; es ist
Concerning the definition of λόγος, Aristotle refers: “λόγος δὲ ἐστὶ φωνῇ σημαντικῇ, ἢς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικών ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένων ὡς φάσις ἀλλ’ σύχ ὡς κατάφασις” (de Interpretatione, 4, 16b 26-28). I have already remarked on the strong ontological character of the translation Heidegger proposes in this passage in the 1923/24 course (GA 17). In the present course of 1929/30 (GA 21) Heidegger not only focuses his attention on both the general and the predicative speech but also in the assertion. Aristotle’s definition reads: “ἐστι δὲ ἢ μὲν ἀπλὴ ἀπόφασις φωνῇ σημαντικῇ περὶ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν τι ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ὡς οἱ χρόνοι διήρηται” (de Interpretatione, 5, 17a 23-24). Heidegger translates this passage as:

“The simple assertion is therefore an utterance that means something and that asserts something while referring, in that it deals with something being at hand or not being at hand, and does so in the manner of holding the temporal apart in each case – i.e. grammatically: present, perfect, future.”

Aristotle distinguishes the differences in communication (ἐρμηνεία) between animals and humans: the sounds uttered by animals are ἀγράμματοι ψόφοι, voces non articulatae whilst human beings are capable of φωναί σημαντικοί, of voces significativae or litteratae. The significant (or meaningful) voices constitute the fundamental units of language. These can either be simple or complex. In the first case, there is a simple diction (φάσις, diction), that is, the spelling out of nouns (ὄνομα, nomina) or verbs (ῥήμα, verba). In the second case, we have λόγος (oratio, sentential, sermo) as the speaking, or speech, in the proper sense of the term which consists of connection of the representations through a copula.

immeine Bedeutung, die was sonst im Verbum gemeint ist; es ist immer eine Bedeutung, die so bedeutet, daß sie bezogen ist auf solches, worüber gesprochen wird. Jedes Verbum geht so seiner inneren Bedeutung nach auf etwas, worüber gesprochen wird. Jedes Verbum geht so seiner inneren Bedeutung nach auf etwas, worüber die Rede ist, auf etwas, was als Seiendes, als so und so Seiendes zugrunde gelegt wird. Wir sehen also, daß ῥήμα vom ὄνομα durch das Kriterium der Zeit unterschieden ist. Obwohl Aristoteles das nicht weiter verfolgt hat, liegt hier doch eine ganz entscheidende Einsicht vor. Das sind die zwei Wesensmomente, die das Verbum charakterisieren: Zeit mitzumeinen und in diesem Bedeuten immer auf etwas bezogen zu sein, worüber die Rede ist, auf Seiendes. Dies deutet darauf hin, daß alle Setzung von Seiendem notwendig auf Zeit bezogen ist. Wir nennen daher entsprechende im Deutschen das Verbum Zeitwort.”

29 GM, p. 464, “Es ist also die einfache Aussage eine Verlautbarung, die etwas bedeutet, und zwar meinend etwas aussagt, indem sie handelt über das Vorhandensein von etwas oder Nichtvorhandensein, und zwar in der Weise, die jeweils die Zeiten auseinandergehalten sind – also grammatisch gesprochen, Präsens, Perfekt oder Futurum.”
Logos can be apophantical or non-apophantical, that is, indicative or non-indicative. The non-indicative λόγος is found in types of discourse such as prayer or commandment (εὐχή, ἐντολή) or other types of discourse that Aristotle addresses in the Poetics and the Rhetoric – the discourses that present a vocative, interrogative, optative or imperative forms. The indicative λόγος is, on the other hand, ἀποφασις, the assertion or enunciation or judgment (proloquium, oratio enuntiativa, proposition, assertio). This is the form of λόγος: speaking can be affirmative when it makes an attribution, literally in Greek a κατάφασις (dedicatio, adfirmatio), or negative when it denies a predicate (ἀπόφασις, abdicatio, negatio).

In this sense, predication, the λόγος ἀποφασικός, aufweisender Satz, is the mode of speaking that can be true or false. Heidegger translated this passage early on in his 1924/4 course (GA 21):

“Every speaking [or speech] points out in direction to something (it means something in general) – therefore every speaking does not show, does not let see [sehenlassen] but that which occurs in speaking as being-true or being-false (as the mode of speech).”

This is the implicit key passage to which Heidegger refers in his account of speaking in Being and Time, paragraph 33, where he determines the Aussage with the three senses of Aufzeigung, Prädikation and Mitteilung. This general fully developed framework of Aristotle’s de Interpretatione (1929/30 GA 21) that originated in the 1923/4 course (GA 17) obviously influences Heidegger’s research on Aristotle in the early 1920s for two reasons. Not only that this dialogue –de Interpretatione – provides the basis of the traditional conception of λόγος as predication but it also allows Heidegger to work on the revision of the central notions of λόγος by recovering their original phenomenological meaning – its ἀποφαίνεσθαι - on which the structure of predication can be exhibited and which I will now address.

30 De Int., 4, 17 a 2-3, “ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἀπας μὲν σημαντικὸς (...) ἀποφασικὸς δὲ οὐ πᾶς, αὐλ. ἐν ὦ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἡ πεινεῖσθαι ὑπάρχει.”
31 LFW, p. 129, “Jedes Reden weist zwar auf etwas hin (bedeutet überhaupt etwas) – aufweisend, sehenlassen dagegen ist nicht jedes Reden, sondern nur das, darin das Wahrsein oder Falschsein vorkommt (als die Weise des Reden).”
32 Volpi, F. op. cit., pp. 44-46.
Heidegger starts to explore this connection in 1923/4 in paragraph 2 of GA 17 and here he first attempts a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s book A 1, B 8 of de Anima and some passages of de Interpretatione so that he explicates “in what connection the concept of φαινόμενον stand in what Aristotle explicates as λόγος”.

Heidegger focuses on Aristotle’s de Anima by making an exegesis of the word φαινόμενον from φαίνεσθαι which is “that which shows itself from itself”, being a middle-voice of φαίνω [literally “come to light”], means to “show oneself” in the sense of coming to light. Both φαίνομαι (showing itself) and φαίνω (come to light) are grounded on, and are an expression of, φῶς (light, clarity). Φαινόμενον, in Greek, works as the participle of φαίνεσθαι. The φαίνεσθαι, is a showing up of the way of the unspeakable with the many ways of speaking about it, that is, an indication of the sich-zeigens which points out itself from the always already openness of the open-that-we-are, which makes possible all takings-as and attributions of each “is”. Hence whatever shows itself is therefore that which can be revealed and be brought into the light of day and this is what constitutes the visible, (ὁρατόν). Heidegger shows that Aristotle thinks about what can be revealed and be brought to the light of day and this is what constitutes the visibility of the visible, (ὁρατόν). Heidegger aims to show that phenomenology is a way that brings into light (φαίνεσθαι) the self-showing that reveals the appearance of beings in their being and therefore, as a way, is also a “how” of revealing that which does not generally shows itself at first sight but rather remains hidden, out of sight, occult in the sense of something at the point of appearing. In SZ Heidegger formulates the meaning of phenomenology as λέγειν (speaking, laying out, exhibiting), that is, the ἀποφαίνεσθαι of νομένον: φαινόμενον – “letting that which shows itself, just as it shows itself by its own self, be seen from its own self.”

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33 *EPF*, p. 13, “In welchem zusammenhang steht der Begriff des φαινόμενον mit dem, was Aristoteles als λόγος?” [“In what connection does the concept of φαινόμενον stand to what Aristotle designates as λόγος?”]

34 *PGZ*, p. 111, “Das Medium φαίνεσθαι ist eine Bildung von φαίνω: etwas an den Tag bringen, sichtbar machen an ihm selbst, in die Helle stellen” [“The middle voice φαίνεσθαι is a form of φαίνω: to bring something to light, to make it visible in itself, to put it in a bright light.”] Cf. the same point in Inwood, Michael, *A Heidegger Dictionary*, p. 159.

35 *PGZ*, p. 117. The same formulation is maintained in the WS Marburg course 1925/26 *LFW*, pp. 132, 133 and finally adopted in *SZ*, p. 34.
pure grasping of something that is present in its pure being present.\textsuperscript{36} This saying exhibits what comes forth to presence. The λόγος of φανεῖν is not to be taken as a simple λόγος of assertion, or assertive speaking, that is, a categorical saying that, in saying, shows the saying. Λόγος originally means, according to Heidegger, gathering or collecting in the sense of openness placing into the aspect, εἴδος. I can see what I can see – people, roads, stars, the world – because the visible shines in many ways. It is this shining, the constant presence of the visible that makes me realize that whatever I see is itself manifest as it is in itself.\textsuperscript{37} The possibility of seeing is given by light. Light is the condition of possibility of seeing things in their look, that is, as they appear to me and therefore as they appear here in the world (Da). Light is what allows this pure presence to come first to the seeing as what constitutes the ἐνέργεια of the seeing of every presence in the world. For Aristotle, this means not actuality (as rendered by Hicks or Ross) but coming or being brought into light and presence and enduring.\textsuperscript{38} Aristotle says that “light is the presence and enduring of this transparent as transparent. Similarly darkness has a power”.\textsuperscript{39} He says that “as long as I can perceive (δύτις) I see the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[36]SZ, p. 25. This idea was first exhibited in the WS 1924/25, PS, pp. 26-27 and Heidegger keeps it after SZ in the WS 1927/28 in reference to von Leibniz’s thought, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (GA 26) p. 18.
\item[37]EPF, p. 9, “Phänomenologie ist λέγειν τα φαινόμενα= άποφαινεσθαι τα φαινόμενα das an ihm selbst Offenbare von ihm selbst her sehen lassen.” [“Phenomenology is λέγειν τα φαινόμενα= άποφαινεσθαι τα φαινόμενα – letting the manifest in itself be seen from itself.”]
\item[38]Ross, Jowett and some Latin translations render ἐνέργεια and δύναμις respectively by ‘actuality’, ‘actus’ and ‘potentiality’, ‘potentia’. This rendering presents major difficulties, for it transforms Greek nouns into adverbs making the transparent and the darkness the ‘result’ or acts of an external cause: “Light is the actuality of the transparent qua transparent; and that which is light can also be dark”, cf., Ross, David, Aristotle de Anima, p. 240, “Actus huisce diaphani, qua diaphani, constituit lumen. Ubi [diphanum] nonnisi in potentia existisset, [adsunt] etiam tenebrae”. Also Siwek, Paulus, Aristotelis de Anima, Libris Tres Grace et Latine, pp. 137-138. Cf., also the same sense in Aristotle, de Sensu, 3, 439 a 18-19. It is not so “easy to see” how light can be a “first potentiality” or a “first actuality” as Kosman puts it in his Aristotle’s Prime Mover, pp. 346, 347.
\item[39]DA, 418 a25, “ὡς δὲ ἔστιν ἡ τούτων ἐνέργεια, τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἢ διαφανείς, δυνάμει δὲ ἐν ὦ τούτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ σκότος.”
\end{footnotes}
Colour is that which overlays what is itself visible, that which has in itself the cause of its visibility, what is actually transparent: “The visible, then, is colour and [colour] is that with which the visible is itself overlaid”. This ‘itself’ is what overlays and it is there to take (vernehmen), it is present, “it is” the presence of the visible that stands along with constant – con-standere – allowing me first to see through the light, the here to be seen – the trans-parent (διαφανές) of co-presence (παρουσία) Aristotle is constantly thinking of what is at work between the διαφανές and the visible (ὅρατον) in terms of a co-presence (παρουσία) which leads his interpretation of beings from the simple awareness of something just there in its pure presence or anwesen. This means that Aristotle thinks through the “showing or exhibiting itself” of the being of beings in each being: phenomenology. Heidegger thematizes in Being and Time the meaning of Erscheinung as appearance, not showing itself but the announcing of something that does not show itself or appear through something that does appear. Not showing itself, it can also seem not to be. Yet Erscheinung presupposes and is possible only in the sense of something that shows itself though it itself is not the Erscheinung.

Therefore, the first primary sense of phenomenon as showing itself or appearing is the basic one:

40 DA, 418a 26, “οὐ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπερετοίς, τούτοις ἐστὶν ὅρατον.”
41 DA, 418 a 26-31, “τὸ γὰρ ὅρατον ἐστι χρώμα, τούτω δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπί τοῦ καθ’ αὐτὸ ὅρατον.”
42 DA, 418 b 16-17, “παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ” [the co-presence of the transparent [dia-pha-nous literally, the through which of light, the constant glimmering]; 418 b20, “παρουσία τῷ φῶς ἐστὶν” [the co-presence is light].
44 SZ, p. 29, “Erscheinung als Erscheinung »von etwas besagt demnach gerade nicht: sich selbst zeigen, sondern das Sichmelden von etwas, das sich nicht zeigt, durch etwas, was sich zeigt. Erscheinen ist ein Sicht-nicht-zeigen. Dieses »Nichts« darf aber keineswegs mit dem privativen Nicht zusammengefordern werden, als welches es die Struktur des Scheins bestimmt. Was sich in der Weise nicht zeigt, wie das Erscheinende, kann auch nie schein. Alle Indikationen, Darstellungen, Symptome und Symbole haben die angeführte formale Grundstruktur des Erscheinens, wenngleich sie unter sich noch verschieden sind.” [‘Thus appearance as the appearance of something does precisely not mean: showing itself, rather the announcing itself by something which does not show itself but announces itself. Appearing is a not-showing-itself. But the ‘not’ is by no means to be confused with the privative ‘not’ which as such is determined by the structure of seeming. What appears does not point out itself and can never seem. All indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal fundamental structure of appearing, even though they are different amongs themselves.”]
"The expression \( \phi\alpha\iota\upsilon\omicron\omicron\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\nu \) is accordingly not a conceptual category, but instead a manner of being, how something is encountered and, indeed, encountered in the first and, as such, first legitimate way. The category “object” was alien to the Greeks. In its place was \( \pi\rho\omega\gamma\mu\sigma \), what one has to deal with – what is present for the concern that deals with things. “Object” means, by contrast, what stands opposite the mere observer who simply looks at it, what is present, after being thematically selected and had as such. \( \phi\alpha\iota\upsilon\omicron\omicron\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\nu \) means the existing being itself; it is a determination of being and is to be grasped in such a way that the character of showing itself is expressed. \( \tau\alpha \ \phi\alpha\iota\upsilon\omicron\omicron\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\nu \) can be represented by \( \tau\alpha \ \delta\nu\tau\alpha \); it is what is always already here, what we encounter the moment we open our eyes. It does not need first to be disclosed, but it is frequently covered up. The accent lies, in a completely primary sense, on the character of the “here”.

Heidegger also exhibits the meaning of phenomenology and ontology in Aristotle and Husserl in his two Marburg courses, the first of which being the SS 1925 published under the title Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs and the second the WS of the same year published under the title Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. In these courses Heidegger examines the question of language in search for the ontological condition of possibility that makes possible the speaking of the unconcealing: \( \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma \ \alpha\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\varsigma\epsilon\upsilon\nu \). In these courses Heidegger purports firstly, to recover language as a fundamental structure of \( \text{Dasein} \); secondly, the historical-ontological dimension where this phenomenon originates: the question of \( \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma \) and the epochal determination of being as the original dimension of every linguistic disclosure of \( \text{Dasein} \).

In order to achieve this purpose, Heidegger in the 1925/26 course (GA 21) introduces a subtle terminological distinction between the purely logical-categorical meaning of being true (\( \text{Wahrsein} \)), which belongs to the proposition to the \( \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma \ \alpha\pi\omicron\omicron\varphi\alpha\omicron\nu\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma \), and the ontological meaning of truth (\( \text{Wahrheit} \)), which

\[ \text{EPF, p. 14, "Der Ausdruck } \phi\alpha\iota\upsilon\omicron\omicron\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\nu \text{ ist demnach nicht eine Auffassungskategorie, sondern eine Seinsweise, ein Wie des Begegnens und zwar des ersten und als solchen erstlich rechtmäßigen. Den Griechen war die Kategorie »Gegenstand« fremd. An ihrer Stelle stand } \pi\rho\omega\gamma\mu\sigma \text{, das, womit man im Umgang zu tun hat, – was für das mit den Dingen umgehende Besorgen anwesend ist. Gegenstand heißt dagegen das, was dem bloßen Betrachter entgegensteht in der Form des Nurhinsehens, das thematisch herausgefaßt und als solches gehabte Anwesende. } \phi\alpha\iota\upsilon\omicron\omicron\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\nu \text{ bedeutet das Daseiende selbst und ist eine Seinsbestimmung und so zu fassen, daß der Charakter des Sichzeigens ausgedrückt wird. } \tau\alpha \ \phi\alpha\iota\upsilon\omicron\omicron\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\nu \text{ kann durch } \tau\alpha \ \delta\nu\tau\alpha \text{ vertreten werden und ist dasjenige, das immer schon da ist, das im nächsten Augenauflaufschlag begegnet. Es braucht nicht erst erschlossen zu werden, ist aber häufig verdeckt. Der Akzent liegt ganz primär auf dem Charakter des Da".} \]
belongs to the phenomenon of truth in its original scope, in the sense of ἀληθεύον interpreted as uncealing-discovering being of \( Dasein \).^{46}

Deepening the direction in which Husserl reflects upon the notion of truth (the traces of which can be seen in the first part of the lecture course of the SS 1925 published under the title \( \textit{Prolegomena zur Geschichte der Zeitsbegriffe} \) Heidegger addresses on different levels in the previous course (GA 17) the \( \textit{locus originarius} \) of truth, starting from the notions of \( \phiαυνόμενον \) and \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) that he takes – as we will see in point d) – to the modes of \( \alphaληθεύο\v\i\u\ı\n \) in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} (GA 19). It is, though, as we will now see, in GA 21 that Heidegger lays out with particular clarity the fundamental structure of \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) that he started to explore in the two previous courses.

In this course, Heidegger distinguishes, as he did in \( \textit{EPF} \) (GA 17), the semantic aspect of \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \), that is to say, the property of having a signification, an aspect which belongs to every form of the \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \). This notion is found, as we have seen, in one of Aristotle’s final manuscripts \( \textit{Περὶ ερμηνείας} \), where Aristotle indicates that \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) is an audible being that means something (\( \lambda\o\g\o\z \ δὲ ἐστι φωνὴ στιματικὴ \)).^{47} Aristotle says here that the basic meaning of \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) is speaking and Heidegger aims to indicate what speaking itself is.\(^{48}\) Its simple meaning remains completely hidden from view when \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) is translated by – and this always means interpreted – as judgment, conception, definition, ground or relationship and the explained in terms of this.\(^{49}\) On the other hand, \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) as speaking, Heidegger says, means rendering manifest the thing spoken about\(^{50}\). Heidegger had already formulated this description of \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) three years earlier in

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46 The following argumentative progression is to be found in \( \textit{PS} \) paragraph 26, pp. 179-188) and from \( LFW \), p. 1.

47 Cf. Heidegger’s own working edition of this work: "de Interpretatione" in \textit{Aristotelis Organon Graece}. Also the idea of \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) (speaking) as an audible being in Aristotle’s \textit{De Anima} B 8, 420 b 5, b 14, b 13, b 18, b 19, b 29.

48 \( \textit{SZ} \), paragraph 7, ‘Die begriff der Logos’ where Heidegger points out that in Plato and Aristotle this notion has a variety of meanings which they never reduce to a common one.

49 \( \textit{SZ} \), p. 32. ‘Die spätere Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) und vor allem die vielfältigen und willkürlichen Interpretationen der nachkommenden Philosophie verdecken ständig die eigentliche Bedeutung von Rede, die offen genug zutage liegt. \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) wird übersetzt, d.h. immer ausgelegt als Vernunft, Urteil, Begriff, Definition, Grund, Verhältnis.” [‘The real meaning of ‘speaking’, gets constantly covered up by the later history of the word \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \), and especially by the numerous and arbitrary interpretations of subsequent philosophy. \( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) gets ‘translated’ and this means always interpreted as Reason, Judgement, Concept, Definition, Ground, or behaviour.”]

50 \( \textit{SZ} \), p. 32. ‘\( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) als Rede besagt vielmehr soviel wie δηλο\v\i\u\ı\n, offenbar machen das, wovon in der Rede »die Rede« ist.’ [‘\( \lambda\o\g\o\z \) as ‘speaking’ means rather the same as δηλο\v\i\u\ı\n, to make manifest what in the speaking is ‘the speaking.’”]
GA 17 but now he makes the connection between λόγος and δηλοῦν, that is, ἀληθεύειν much more explicit in relation to what can be understood as the true and the false. Not a pure theoretical uncovering but one that makes being manifest.\(^{51}\) This is a point also developed in the famous 1980s study by Thomas Sheehan on hermeneia and apophansis where it is claimed that “In On Hermeneia Aristotle’s concern with the question of truth (ἀληθεύεια) is, at best, indirect and narrow. (...) Heidegger is interested in the treatise only insofar as it can tell him something basic about “truth”, both as an ontic condition (ἀληθεύεια as ὤν ὡς ἀληθεύειν) and as a human performance (ἀληθεύειν as a power of ψυχή)\(^{52}\) Heidegger takes up the discussion of ἀληθεύειν to Being and Time when he thematizes and ‘validates’ the same connection again by specifically pointing out what Aristotle is thinking when he describes the function of speaking as ἀποφαίνεσθαι, letting something be seen, letting what is spoken about come to light\(^{53}\). In speech or speaking as ἀποφαίνεσθαι what is said fulfils its function in making manifest, thus rendering available for oneself and others, that which is said.\(^{54}\) Hence, ἀποφαίνεσθαι finds its concrete expression in uttered speaking.\(^{55}\)

\(^{51}\) EPF, p. 18, “Nichts jedes Reden ist ein solches, das in der Weise eines Bedeutens ein Aufzeigen von etwas leistet, sondern nur dasjenige Reden ist ἀποφαίνεσθαισι, in dem so etwas wie ein ἀληθεύειν vorkommt: Seiendes als Unverdecktes geben oder Seiendes so geben, daß in diesem Aufzeigen etwas »vorgemacht« wird (ψυχήδεσθαι).” [“Not every speaking is as such in the mode of a meaning of something in the manner of pointing out, rather the only kind of speaking is ἀποφαίνεσθαι in which something like an ἀληθεύειν occurs: being as un concealed or being in such a way that this pointing out of something is ‘feigned’ and becomes a (ψυχήδεσθαι)”] Cf. the original source of this passage in De Int., 4, 17 a2.

\(^{52}\) Sheehan, T., ‘Hermeneia and Apophansis: The Early Heidegger on Aristotle’, p. 68, (Original source in transliterated Greek. I have rendered it into the original font in the main text).

\(^{53}\) SZ, p. 43, “Aristoteles hat diese Funktion die Rede schärfer expliziert als ἀποφαίνεσθαι.” [Aristotle has explicated more precisely this function of discourse as ἀποφαίνεσθαι.”] Heidegger explains in a footnote to this sentence that he is addressing Aristotle’s, de Interpretatione, chapters 1-6; Metaphysics ZA ; Nicomachean Ethics Z which contain the specific evidence for this claim.

\(^{54}\) EPF, pp. 22-23, “Der ursprüngliche einheitliche λόγος ἀποφαίνεσθαισι ist die κατάφασις, mit der die ἀπόφασις zusammengeht, beide charakterisiert als ἀποφαίνεσθαι (Bejahung und Verneinung). Κατάφασις: etwas von etwas anderem auf etwas zu sprechen. Ἀπόφασις: etwas von etwas weg sprechen.”

\(^{55}\) SZ, p. 33, “Und nur weil die Funktion des λόγος als ἀποφαίνεσθαι im aufweisenden sehenlassen von etwas liegt, kann der λόγος die Strukturform der σύνθεσις haben. Synthesis sagt hier nicht Verbinden und Verknüpfen von Vorstellungen (...) Das σὺν hat hier rein apophantische Bedeutung und besagt: etwas in seinem Beisammen mit etwas, etwas als etwas sehen lassen.” [“And only because the connection of λόγος as ἀποφαίνεσθαι lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out, can the λόγος have the structural form of the σύνθεσις. Here ‘synthesis’ does not mean a binding and a linking together of representations (...) Here the σὺν has a pure apophantine signification and means: letting something be seen in its togetherness with something, letting it be seen as something.”] Also the same connection already addressed in PS, pp. 181, 544.
“Λόγος, therefore, is taken here quite generally, either as a simple addressing of something in itself or as an addressing of something in view of something else, determining something pre-given in relation to something else. This means that λέγειν, addressing beings, taken quite generally, discloses beings in two directions: first, as they themselves are in simple presence [phenomenologically: being as correlative to seeing], and secondly in the mode of the πρὸς τι, in terms of a relation to. Correlative to λόγος, beings can therefore be characterized in their possible presence [being] either as simply there in themselves or as a πρὸς τι, in relation-to. In λέγειν a double presence of beings becomes graspable [faßbar]: “in themselves” and “in relation to.”

56

Heidegger reads the notion of λόγος in a twofold way. On one hand, he says that λόγος corresponds to a simple apprehension (schlicht). On the other hand, λόγος is determined by a σύνθεσις (positioning together), which is not a simple apprehension but is more complex, it is already a composition (literally a position that comprehends) which primarily consists, not in the joining together of ideas in a judgement or logical reasoning, but in letting something be seen as something in this togetherness. It is because λόγος is a ‘letting something be seen’ that it can be true or false. From here there is a conclusion to be drawn: “The truth of the apophantic λόγος, its disclosing character, ἀλήθευειν, consists of taking out of its hiddenness that which is spoken about so that it reveals itself and lets itself be seen in its truth, that is, in its unconveredness – in ‘dis-covering’ (Unverborgen), ‘dis-closing’ it. Similarly, falsity consists in covering up (Verborgen), masking something, so that it is is seen as something that it is not.”

57 Just because ‘truth’


57 EPF, p. 20, “Ἀλήθευειν und ψευδεσθαι sind die Grundweisen, in denen der λόγος als ἀποφασιτικός etwas aufzeigt und zwar zeigt er Seiendes als Seiendes.” (“Ἀλήθευειν und ψευδεσθαι are the fundamental ways in which λόγος as ἀποφασιτικός points something out and indeed points being as being.”) Also, Sein und Zeit, p. 33, “Und wiederum, weil der λόγος ein Sehenlasse ist, deshalb kann er wahr oder falsch sein. Auch liegt alles daran, sich von einem konstruierten Wahrheitsbegriff im Sinne einer »Übereinstimmung« freizuhalten. Diese Idee ist keinesfalls die primäre im Begriff der ἀλήθεια. Das »Wahrsein« des λόγος als ἀλήθευειν besagt: das Seiende, wonon die Rede ist, im λέγειν als ἀποφασιτικός aus seiner Verborgenheit herausnehmen und es als Unverborgenes (ἀλήθεια) sehen lassen, entdecken. Imgleicherem besagt das »Falschsein« ψευδεσθαι soviel wie Täuschen im Sinne von verdiecken: etwas vor etwas stellen (in der Weise des Sehenlassens) und es damit ausgeben als etwas, was es nicht ist.” (“And furthermore, because the λόγος is a letting something be seen, it can therefore be true or false. But here everything depends on our steering clear of any concept of true that is construed in the sense of
means ‘un-concealment’, ‘disclosure’ and because λόγος is a particular mode of ‘letting something be seen’, we must not speak of λόγος as the locus of truth. In the Greek sense, truth resides basically in the pure sensible taking in or perception of something, (αἰσθησις) (that Heidegger calls Vernehmen):

"‘True’ in the purest and most original sense, that of unconcealed concealment, is the pure, straightforward perceptual apprehension (νοεῖν) of the simplest sense qualities and ‘determinations of the being of the things that are as such’."58

Heidegger finds in the ἀπό the unity of λόγος in such a way that he is able to provide evidence from Aristotle’s texts that the latter’s view on λόγος foreshadows, though without realizing its full ontological implications, the ‘as’ structure of judgment that the tradition didn’t examine basically, that is, in its origin: the ‘as’, the ἀπό translated by Heidegger as “lăst sehen von dem selbst her”59. In the word ἀποφαντικός Heidegger suggests that Aristotle is thinking the origin of the structure of judgment and he points out in this connection that ‘Logic’, as it has developed out of the Platonic and Aristotelian views of λόγος as sentence, statement, is itself ultimately rooted in life, in the existential structure of Dasein.60

Yet, Heidegger does not limit his findings to the question of the categorial and predicative in the apophantic ἀπό.61 Rather he takes this question to an ontological level. “Predication is possible since the mode of being of Dasein is characterized

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59 SZ, p. 43.
60 De Int., 4, 17a1-a2 and SZ, p. 32. Also the same idea already formulated in EPF, p. 21.
61 SZ, paragraphs 32, 33, 44b, 69b. Also EPF, p. 31, “Die Abhebungseinstellung ist schon als solche ein Aufzeigen (also kein Urteilen); es soll ein Daseindes als Daseindes gezeigt werden (…) In diesem Abheben wird das »als«, das Andersein-als, ausdrücklich gemacht, wobei das Andersein selbst nicht thematisch zu sein braucht.” ["The readiness to set things off from one another is already an ostending (thus, not a judging); an existing being is to be shown as an existing being. (…) In this manner of setting one thing off from another, the “than” or “as”, the “being other-than” or “not-being-as”, is made explicit, whereby the being-other need not itself to be thematized."]
by an openness, as it were, an unconcealing comportment that Heidegger refers to as \(\varepsilon\rho\mu\iota\nu\varepsilon\iota\nu\) in *Being and Time.*\(^{62}\) The ‘als’ structure is the terminological distinction Heidegger introduces in the 1925/6 course (GA 21) in order to clarify the meaning and difference of being true (\(\text{wahrsein}\)) proper to the apophantical \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\) and the more general phenomenon of truth (\(\text{Wahrheit}\)) in the sense of \(\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\).\(^{63}\) It is this distinction that appears to be implicitly at work in the spirit of the translation and exegesis of Aristotle’s terms that Heidegger proposes in the 1923/4 WS Course (GA 17) on Aristotle’s *de Anima* – which contains the first detailed interpretation of this text – up to the Winter Semester Course of 1925/6 where Heidegger makes this distinction thematic and reiterates it in *Being and Time* in relation to the modes of speaking of *Uneigentlichkeit.*

The apophantical structure of the ‘als’ – the \(\alpha\pi\omicron\) – as the structure of a declarative sentence, is rethought by Heidegger and is taken up as its original ‘pre-verbal’ meaning. This means Heidegger discovers in Aristotle’s notion of \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\ \alpha\pi\omicron\phi\alpha\nu\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\) an ontological determination of *Dasein,* notably its *Verstehen* – as a mode of \(\alpha\lambda\epsilon\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu\) that discloses the world by working it out in terms of

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\(^{62}\) Volpi. F., *op. cit.*, p. 48

\(^{63}\) It would be out of the scope of this study to re-engage in the philological aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation of \(\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\) and his thesis that the Greeks expressed the phenomenon of truth by a ‘negative’ concept (formed by the \(\alpha\) privative which Heidegger retakes to the German *Un* to *Unverborgenheit* on the basis of \(\lambda\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota\nu\): ‘being concealed’) whilst the Latins and the Germans expressed it as a ‘positive’ concept, respectively *veritas* and *Wahrheit.* This specific interpretation of \(\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\) triggered a controversy between Heidegger and one of his colleagues at Marburg, the classical philologist Paul Friedländer. Friedländer contends in his monograph on Plato that the most ancient occurrences of \(\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\) in Homer present this word in connection to the *verba dicendi* and that, for this reason, the phenomenon of truth depends originally from its linguistic usage. Yet, according to Heidegger, \(\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\) means an ontological pre-verbal openness. This point is made, for example, in *WM,* p. 443. In the third edition of his *Platon* monograph, Friedländer had partially taken on board Heidegger’s reasons, p. 252. On the other hand, Heidegger advances the argument that \(\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\) for the Pre-Socratics was taken as character of being itself and that it suffered an essential change with Plato becoming thereby \(\omicron\rho\theta\omicron\tau\omicron\zeta\zeta\), the correctness of vision regarding a subject that grasps it: Cf. Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (GA 14), p. 78. Apart from the old Greek dictionaries of Pape and Benseler and the Liddel & Scott, for the hidden sources of Heidegger I would appeal to the article on the concept of \(\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\) written by the theologian Rudolf Bultmann for the *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* of Gerhard Kittel, widely used by Heidegger, and especially to the text Heidegger also knew from Ernst von Lasaulx, *Neuer Versuch einer alten, auf die Wahrheit der Thatsachen gegründeten Philosophie der Geschichte,* that mentions twice the negative character of \(\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\). The etymology adopted by Heidegger is however well documented in late Antiquity for example in Sextus Empiricus *Adversus Mathematicos* and also in Modern Age in François de la Mothe Le Vayer’s first *Dialogue[s] fait[s] à l’imitation des Anciens:* ‘La vérité est nomée des Grecs, \(\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\), quasi \(\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\thetion\), erratio seu vagatio divina, comme despindent plustost, s’il y en a, d’une extravagance divine, que du discours de nostre humanité. Si ce n’est pas que nous prenions le vraisemblablement ou apparent, appelé \(\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\theta\epsilon\zeta\), quasi \(\mu\eta\ \lambda\iota\thetion\), non latens, for a vérité essentielle.’

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Dasein understood as a unity of Verstehen and Befindlichkeit that articulates the meanings based on the verbal comportments that ‘add’ words to the original pre-verbal meanings.\textsuperscript{64}

Heidegger makes a recovery of a hidden meaning of λόγος exhibited in Aristotle’s own text de Interpretatione 4, 17a1-a2 and he takes it in to Being and Time:

‘The λόγος lets something be seen (φαίνεσθαι), namely, what the speaking is about and what it does either for the one who is doing the talking (Medium) or, for example, for the talking between each other. Speaking ‘lets something be seen ἀπό from the thing itself of which the speaking is about. In speaking (ἀπόφασις), so far as it is genuine, what is said is drawn out from what the speaking is about, so that the spoken communication, in what it says, makes it manifest and accessible to the other.’\textsuperscript{65}

For the Greeks, the ‘as’ worked as a vorhanden: a number of words juxtaposed in a certain order. The unity behind the words was to be found, according to Plato, in the thing disclosed by them; for him all λόγος is λόγος τυός. Aristotle takes Plato’s notion of λόγος further and he says that λόγος is at the same time σύνθεσις (positioning together) and διάθεσις (taking apart), a positioning together, connecting, and separating at once, taking apart, and in this manner revealing a reality as such. It is only because λόγος is a ‘letting something be seen’ it can be true or false. The truth of the apophantic λόγος means for the Greeks ἀλεθεύειν and ψευδεσθαι (distortion).\textsuperscript{66}

In Being and Time Heidegger states that:

“The ‘being-true’ of the λόγος of ἀλεθεύειν means that in λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι the beings of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddeness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden (ἀληθές); that is, they must be discovered. Similarly, ‘being-false’ (ψευδεσθαι) amounts to deceiving in the sense of

\textsuperscript{64} LFW, p. 151 note 1.

\textsuperscript{65} SZ, p. 32, “Der λόγος last etwas sehen (φαίνεσθαι), nämlich das, worüber die Rede ist und zwar für den Redenden (Medium), bzw. für die miteinander Redenden. Die Rede »läßt sehen« ἀπό... von dem selbst her, wovon die Rede ist. In die Rede (ἀπόφασις) soll, wofern sie echt ist, das, was geredet ist, aus dem, worüber geredet wird, geschöpft sein, so daß die reddeten Mitteilung in ihrem Gesagten das, worüber sie redet, offenbar und so dem anderen zugänglich macht.” Cf. footnote 59. This step was already sketched out three years earlier in EPF, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{66} Heidegger appeals to Aristotle’s MT book V, chapter 29 in order to indicate the relationship of ψευδό with the genuine being of things, ως πράξιμα ψεύδος (META, Δ 29, 1024 b17 ff); in relation to speech, λόγος ψευδής (META, Δ 29, 1024 b26) and in relation to the human being, ως ευθροπος ψεύδης (META, Δ 29, 1025 a2).
covering up [verdecken]: putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not.” 67

Heidegger also translates ψευδός (deception) into German, as sich verkeheren, which means to change in the sense of continuously coming and going and thus to be transformed or turned into – to be distorted. He chooses Unverkerheit to translate απεκέια, and thus better convey the sense of the Greek, non-entangled, not confused, and therefore simple. 68 Later on in the 1950s in the Parmenides lectures Heidegger would say that this covering involved in ψευδός is “always at the same time an unveiling, a showing, and a bringing into appearance”. 69 In both cases the apophantic λόγος and its ἀλήθευεν, consists in taking out of its hiddenness that which is spoken about so that it reveals itself and lets itself be seen. “The λόγος ἀποφαντικός (literally in Greek, the speaking of the letting be seen) is the sort of talking with the world, by means of which the existing world is pointed out as existing (‘ἀποφαίνεσθαι’ is “letting something be seen from itself in its way of existing”). 70 This formal sense of the term λόγος amounts to the same meaning as expressed by the term φαινόμενον: phenomenology is the speaking, laying out, exhibiting, (λέγειν) that is to say, the ‘to let be seen’ (ἀπό) of that which shows itself (φαινομένον) and hence Heidegger’s definition of phenomenology that gathers together the meaning of λέγειν and ἀποφαίνεσθαι – ‘letting that which shows itself, just as it shows itself by its own self, be seen from its own self’. And this means, distinguishing between a showing itself as itself, and a showing itself as it is not, but can appear to be. Aristotle identifies λόγος as the part of human being that aims at bringing him to his highest possible existence (εὖ ζῆν: proper life). 71 In the course of the WS 1923/4 course, Heidegger states that “the ability to address and discuss what was

67 SZ, p. 33, “Das »Wahrsein« des λόγος als ἀλήθευεν besagt: das Seiende, wovon die Rede ist, im λέγειν als ἀποφαίνεσθαι aus seiner Verborgenheit herausnehmen und es als Unverborgenes (ἀλήθες) sehen lassen, entdecken. Imgleichen besagt das »Falschein« ψευδόθαι so viel wie Täuschen im Sinne von verdecken: etwas vor etwas stellen (in der Weise des Sehenlassens) und es damit augeben als etwas, was es nicht ist.”
68 For the Greeks, ‘being’ means presencing in the unhidden. Duration and extension are not what is decisive but rather whether the being gives itself in the hidden of the inexhaustible, or whether presencing distorts itself (ψευδός) into what merely ‘looks like’, into mere appearance, instead of holding itself in undistortedness (α- τρεκέια).
70 EPF, p. 15.
71 DA, B 8, 420 b20.
encountered (world and self), something that does not need to be philosophy, he
[Aristotle] characterizes it as a being a human being: λόγον ἔχειν.\(^{72}\)

In ascribing to Aristotle, the “doctrine” that truth resides in judgment, we not
only do injustice to him but thoroughly misunderstand the Greek notion of truth as
unconcealed concealment: ἀληθεία. In the Greek sense, truth resides basically in
the pure sensible taking in or perception of something, (ἀσθενικός) (that
Heidegger calls Vernehmen).\(^{73}\)

As I have already noted, an analysis of the hermeneutical structure of
judgement is important because it occupies a central place in the problems of
fundamental ontology but most of all it allows us to step back to and from
metaphysics and to realize how beings has been approached from the point of view
of the tradition and and interpreted in terms of its relationship to thinking.

c) The limits of λόγος and the uncovering of Dasein

It would not be possible to present the highly dense analyses of λόγος in
Aristotle and Heidegger without at least exhibiting some of the arguments upon
which the structure of judgement in Aristotle is based. For it is from here that
Heidegger attempts to establish a proper understanding of the relationship between
thinking, being and truth at the center of metaphysics as the only way to grasp in
what ways metaphysics represents being.\(^{74}\)

With this in mind, I will now summarize in broad outlines Heidegger’s
discovery of the ἀποφαντικός (which Heidegger transforms into a term he
employs throughout Being and Time “Sehenlassen” (a letting be seen) and his
proposal to read λόγος as ἀληθεύειν – a proposal clearly exhibited in the
central theme of language in Being and Time namely of Dasein as ἀληθεύειν and

\(^{72}\) EPF, p. 18, “Das Ansprechen und Besprechenkönnen des Begegnenden (Welt und Selbst),
welches nicht Philosophie zu sein braucht, charakterisiert er [Aristoteles] als Menschsein: λόγον ἔχειν, Sprache haben.”

\(^{73}\) SZ, p. 33.

\(^{74}\) My reference is to Kant’s thesis on being as explicit in Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (1781), to
which Heidegger, much later in 1961, appeals in his ‘Kants These über der Sein’ in WM. Cf. Kant,
op.cit., A 598, B 626.

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in the terminology employed in reference to the unconcealing-discovering character of being: Entdecktheit (as Heidegger refers in his first Freiburg courses) and Erschlossenheit (according to the definitive vocabulary of Being and Time in the discussion of Eigentlichkeit). No doubt the classical reading of λόγος motivates Heidegger’s inquiries on this concept because, since the beginnings of classical ontology and throughout the Western philosophical tradition, λόγος has been thought to provide a unique mode of access to everything that really is and to the being of beings. Also, because judgment has always been regarded as the ultimate and proper term for truth, a phenomenon intimately connected with the question of being, there is for Heidegger an urgency and a need to clarify Aristotle’s thinking of λόγος.75

According to Aristotle, judgement signifies exhibiting in the original sense of λόγος ἀποφασικός. Judgement for Aristotle is not a proof, a theory, or a representation but letting beings be seen as they show themselves by themselves. Heidegger addresses statement (Aussage) or judgement in paragraph 33 of Being and Time and he gives some examples. For example, the assertion, ‘the hammer is too heavy’ is meant to enable the disclosure, not of a ‘sense’, but of this being (the hammer) itself in a certain mode of handiness, nor has it anything to do with any sort of ‘representation’ or with some mental state of the speaker. Secondly, judgment is a predicating that involves ‘asserting’ of a ‘predicate’ about a ‘subject’, which thus becomes determined by the former.

“The parts of the predicative articulation, subject and predicate, are an unfolding within the function of exhibiting. The determination as such does not itself disclose but, as a mode of exhibiting, limits our seeing to what shows itself – the hammer – as such, so that what stands in openness (or is disclosed) may be explicitly disclosed in its determinate character through an express restriction of our vision”.76

75 SZ, paragraph 33, “Sodann hat die analyse der Aussage innerhalb der fundamentalontologischen Problematik eine ausgezeichnete Stelle, weil in den entscheidenden Anfängen der antiken Ontologie der λόγος als einziger Leitfaden für den Zugang zum eigentlich Seienden und für die Bestimmung des Seins dieses Seienden fungierte. Schließlich gilt die Aussage von alters her als der Primäre und eigentliche »Ort« der Wahrheit. Dieses Phänomen ist mit dem Seinsproblem so eng verkoppelt, daß die vorliegende Untersuchung in ihrem weiteren Gang notwendig auf das Wahrheitsproblem stößt, sie steht sogar schon, obzwar unausdrücklich, in seiner Dimension.”

A statement in the sense of a predication also remains basically apophantical in character. Thirdly, statement is communication in the sense that it leads others also to see what is exhibited as thus determined. What is shared through communication here is a common mode of being-in-the-world in its relation to or in its being-toward what is exhibited.

What is at stake in the āpofantikoζ is that any preview I make of an object, sees something simply there in what was a utensil, a hammer, a pencil or a lap-top something to-do-it, so that its handiness retreats in favour of the objectivity of something vorhanden, something present as an object possessing such and such attributes. When I speak about the hammer, the lap-top, or any object, in order to say something about the lap-top the āπό structure, the as also undergoes a modification, because now the ‘as’ is cut off from the ‘nets’ of meaning which are constitutive of the environing world (Umwelt). The ‘as’ is pushed back into the uniform level of a simple, objective ‘given’. When I produce a statement about the features of this lap-top I’m merely letting a determinate vorhanden be seen and thus I’m levelling down the āπό, the original ‘as’ of circumspect interpretation to the ‘as’ which determines what is there available, given, for thus alone does it become capable of working as a pure theoretical judgement and of exhibiting something in the mode of being purely looked at (i.e. all the specifications, the characteristics of the lap-top). Hence, all possible judgment about an object, a state-of-affairs has its genesis not in a theoretical approach made by a subject in relation to an object in a world of material things but it oscillates always between what is already available to me in the environing world and what I come to describe. In the word āpofantikός Heidegger finds that Aristotle is thinking through the origin of the structure of judgement and he points out in this connection that ‘Logic’, as it has developed out of the Platonic and Aristotelian views of λόγος as sentence, statement, is itself ultimately rooted in life, in the existential structure of Dasein.77

The argument Heidegger makes in paragraph 33 of Being and Time works as the corollary of the researches on the λόγος āpofantikός specifically the ‘as’ structure of judgement. A failure to grasp the origin of āpofantikός has led to

die ausdrüklische Einschränkung des Blickes das Offenbare in seiner Bestimmtheit ausdrücklich offenbar zu machen.”

77 De Int., 4, 17a1-a2 and SZ, p. 32.
the development of the Aristotelian doctrine into what Heidegger calls a ‘superficial theory of judgement’. According to this theory, judging consists of the connecting together and separating of representations and concepts. Although Heidegger does not devote a thorough analysis of these problems in *Being and Time* he is implicitly taking us to his findings back in the 1924/25 WS course on Logic. That is to say, for Heidegger, what is true is above all being itself in as much as it possesses the character of being manifest, disclosed. With this thesis, Heidegger revives Aristotle’s understanding of the truth that can be expressed in the formula: ὅν ὡς ἀληθές. Behind this thesis it is not difficult to see the recovery of an Aristotelian determination of ἀληθές as ἀληθεύειν. Heidegger’s treatment and special emphasis in the φαινόμενον and λόγος the ἀποφαντικός in GA 17, that is to say, the character of predication (and assertion in its κατάφασις or its ἀπόφασις form), is a reading especially but not exclusively of Aristotle’s understanding of λόγος. It is a reading of the phenomenon of truth, a recovery of ὅν ὡς ἀληθές in Aristotle, from the derivative and restrictive structure of predication and in fact a radicalization of Aristotle’s ὅν ὡς ἀληθές, especially in book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Heidegger sees an analysis of the different ways in which the soul uncovers being, in its truth, in its unconcealment, and therefore a phenomenological analysis of Dasein that motivates the project of *Being and Time*:

“Ἀληθεύεια does not belong to being in the sense that being could not be without unconcealedness. For nature is there at hand even before it is disclosed. Ἀληθεύεια is a peculiar character of the being of beings insofar as beings stand in relation to a regard aimed at them, to a disclosure circumspecting them, to a knowing. On the other hand, the ἀληθές is certainly both in ὅν and is a character of being itself, and specifically insofar as being—presence and the latter is appropriated in λόγος and “is” in it. Disclosure, however, in relation to which there is ἀληθεύεια, is itself a mode of being, and indeed not of the beings which are first disclosed – those of the world – but, instead, of the beings we call human Dasein.”

In this section, the meaning of phenomenology was exhibited from Heidegger’s exegesis of φαινόμενον and λόγος in Aristotle’s inquiries in the *de Anima* and *de Interpretatione* made when Heidegger taught at Marburg in the early 1920s, before *Being and Time*. Heidegger appealed to Aristotle’s own

78 *PS*, pp., 17-18.
phenomenological notions in order to retrieve the ontological grounds of Aristotle’s own thinking that could secure a phenomenological understanding of *Dasein* in factical life.  

This is clear, as I have indicated, both from the retrieval and re-reading of key Aristotelian notions that exhibit Aristotle’s thinking of being from factical life.  

I have concentrated on Heidegger’s approach to λόγος and the phenomenological seeing of Aristotle’s own thinking. This phenomenological seeing did not only clear the way for Heidegger to return to Aristotle’s phenomenology, but it also made Heidegger aware of the importance of reflecting upon the way in which philosophical tradition read Aristotle. The name Heidegger gives to this reflection is ‘destruction’ (*Destruktion*). Within this stage of the inquiry into λόγος and φανομένον Heidegger thinks it necessary to listen to what Aristotle has to say about it.  

I have shown that this interest occurs early on in the 1923/24 *Phenomenology* course but his interpretation of the phenomenon of language in the 1929/30s WS course. In both these courses we find an important shift in Heidegger’s understanding of language, one that reveals both a second ‘ontologisation’ (Volpi) of the phenomenon of language stretching, as it were, the ontological-existential implications of λόγος to the historical genesis of language in *Being and Time* – an event that is at the heart of the contrast between Uneigentlichkeit and Eigentlichkeit as we will see later on. It was indicated that although this shift is made clear in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* course (1929/30) after *Being and Time* (1927) it is already at work in the mid 1920s Marburg courses leading to Heidegger’s account of Eigentlichkeit and historicity in *Being and Time* (1927).

I have stressed the paramount importance of this shift: at the heart of Heidegger’s understanding and interpretation of Aristotle's λόγος is the possibility of making language and the modes of disclosure of *Dasein* thematic in *Being and Time* – from the inauthentic or authentic realization of ἀληθεύειν (chapters 2 and 3 of this study) to the determination of *Dasein*'s authenticity (chapters 4 and 5 of this study).

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79 For a general summary of Heidegger’s phenomenology see Spiegelberg, Herbert, *The Phenomenological Movement*.  
80 *SZ*, pp. 272, 267, 305 ff.  
81 *SZ*, p. 34.
d) Αληθεύειν in the Nicomachean Ethics and Heidegger’s terminology of existence in Being and Time

We have seen how Heidegger unfolded the question of language from an interpretation of λόγος in Aristotle – an interpretation taken up by Heidegger in his university courses comprising ten years of lectures (1919-1929). How in these courses Heidegger was able to recover Aristotle’s understanding of language as exhibiting the discovering/unconcealing being ὅν ως ἀληθές and how Heidegger determined language as the fundamental possibility of articulating ἀληθεύειν, the disclosing character of being exhibited in Aristotle’s own inquiries and assimilates this finding in terms of an operation that works to be an ‘ontological disclosure’” of Dasein in Being and Time, namely its Entdecktheit and Erschlossenheit (these are the two terms – to which a section will be devoted in this research – that articulate Dasein’s ways of being in the world either in relation to itself, to the world of others or the work-tool world).

In this initial stage of the research I have thus demonstrated that, in the lecture courses before Being and Time, Heidegger is searching for an ontological-existential foundation of language that enables him to ‘deconstruct’ Dasein in the sense of finding the ontological basis for the structure of existence. This contention is supported by the specific steps in which Aristotle presents λόγος as the specific character of human life and Heidegger’s explicit articulation (Artikulation or Artikuliertheit) of the modes of existence in Being and Time – a connection that we aim to examine in more detail in chapter II in the analysis of Uneigentlichkeit.

The next stage in Heidegger’s research into Aristotle in the 1920s is to continue the investigation on Aristotle’s determination of ὅν ως ἀληθές which he takes to be a major problematic in Aristotle’s philosophy. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s ὅν ως ἀληθές is made explicit in the WS 1924/25 Freiburg course on Plato’s Sophist (GA 19) which in its first part carries a detailed interpretation of book VI of Nicomachean Ethics.82 In this course, Heidegger focuses on the

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82 Aristotle speaks of the ὅν ως ἀληθές (beings as uncealed) in DA, III, 3, 427 b 12; 428a 11, 428 b18.
plurality of uncovering attitudes of human life, in the 6th book of *Nicomachean Ethics* by reading each one of Aristotle’s modes of ἀλήθευειν. Here, he concentrates his in-depth examination upon the meaning of being as ἀλήθεια and the possibility of going beyond the determination of ὃν ὡς ἀλήθες:

“All ἀλήθες’ means literally uncovered. The Greek words for ‘truth’ (ἡ ἀλήθεια, τὸ ἀλήθεια) are compounded of the private prefix ἀ- (‘not’) and the verbal stem –λαθ- (‘to escape notice’, ‘to be concealed’). The truth may thus be looked upon as that which is unconcealed, that which gets discovered or uncovered (‘entdeckt’).”  

Aristotle speaks in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of the modality of uncovering, proper to γνωσsis that distinguishes the human being from the gods and from the other animals: it is made manifest by the way of λόγος under five modes of ἀλήθευειν: ἐπιστήμη (knowledge), τέχνη (know-how), φρόνησις (practical wisdom), σοφία (understanding) νοος (pure apprehension) and elaborates an understanding of the λόγος of ἀλήθεια in each mode of ἀλήθευειν.

The task is to trace back the correspondences deposited in the argumentative steps of the *de Anima*, *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Being and Time* where Heidegger often does not speak about Aristotle explicitly but sheds light on the structural and terminological correspondences between Aristotle’s ἐπιστήμη πρακτική (knowledge pertaining to action) and Heidegger’s equation of the practical structure πραξις (activity) – φρόνησις in terms of the ontological constitution of *Dasein*.

Therefore, one’s chances of coming to terms with Heidegger’s own phenomenology are improved in the light of Aristotle’s own texts, namely by identifying the correspondences by means of which one can see how Heidegger takes up and reformulates the meaning of equivalent concepts from Aristotle’s thinking often deposited in passages and in argumentative connections where Heidegger does not speak of Aristotle explicitly. Examples may (and will) be given which illustrate (and I merely indicate it at this point) the correspondences between

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83 PS, pp. 16, 24, “ἀλήθεια heißt: nicht mehr verborgen sein, aufgedeckt sein. [ἀλήθεια means: to be hidden no longer, to be uncovered” “ἀλήθες bedeutet dem Wortsinn nach: unverdeckt” [ἀλήθες means literally uncovered]. The Greek words for ‘truth’ (ἡ ἀλήθεια, τὸ ἀλήθεια) are compounded of the private prefix ἀ- (‘not’) and the verbal stem –λαθ- (‘to escape notice’, ‘to be concealed’). The truth may thus be looked upon as that which is unconcealed, that which gets discovered or uncovered (‘entdeckt’).”

84 NE, VI, 3, 1139b 15-17.
Aristotle and Heidegger’s own phenomenology that will receive a more detailed treatment in *Being and Time*: the three fundamental uncovering attitudes of ποιήσις (production) and πράξεις – and the Zuhandenheit (available-at-hand) and Vorhandenheit (pure, objective presence), together with the specific forms of knowledge which accompany them, namely, σοφία, τέχνη and φρόνησις with Gewissen (conscience), ὑπάτες (desire) – and the double meaning of νοῦς ὑπατικός (discernment involving desire) and βουλευτική ὑπάτες (deliberate desire) ὑπάτες διανοητική (desire involving thought) – with *die Sorge* (care)\(^\text{85}\), προαίρεσις (choice in advance) with Entschlossenheit (resoluteness)\(^\text{86}\) πάθη (affects) with befindlichkeit (findliness), νοῦς πρακτικός (discernment involving action) with Verstehen (understanding).

At the center of Heidegger’s interpretive work during this period were Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, the book III of the *de Anima*, books VI-IX of *Metaphysics* and the first book of *Physics*. This labour was initiated in the WS course 1921/22 *Phaenomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles, Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (GA 61) where Heidegger addresses the problem of the movement of life. It was not until very recently that the follow up to the above mentioned first Freiburg course was published: Heidegger’s SS 1922 course *Phaenomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik* (GA 62) is the most detailed and extensive of Heidegger’s lecture courses on Aristotle and presents material from *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Heidegger aims to arrive at a basic understanding of what is called the “Ontology” of Aristotle and when, how and why does the ontological question of being first arise.

This confrontation continues when Heidegger is offered the teaching post for which he applied at Marburg: the publication of the first lectures for the Winter Semester at Marburg 1923/24: *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (GA 17), for the SS 1924: *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (GA 18) devoted to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s *Rethoric* in which Heidegger assimilates Aristotle’s account of the πάθη in the context of the speech of the rethor and aims to present it as an ontological account of *Dasein*; also, the

\(^{85}\) Cf. νοῦς, pp. 67, 68, 181, 185, 186, 188, 194, 216; βουλευτική ὑπάτες (deliberate desire) and *Sorge*, pp. 183, 184, 187, 188, 191, 194.

\(^{86}\) Cf., pp. 192 ff.
following WS 1924/25 course on Plato’s *Sophist: Platon Sophistes* (GA 19) in which Heidegger examines Aristotle’s notion of ἀληθεύειν in relation to the λόγος of the modes of ἀληθεύειν; the SS 1925 course *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* in which having introduced the concept of ἀληθεύειν in the 1924 lectures, Heidegger explains its λόγος, that is, phenomenology thus clarifying its original sense; the WS course in 1925/26: *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (GA 21), the SS 1926: *Grundbegriffe der Antiken Philosophie* (GA 22) in which Heidegger handles the history of Greek philosophy from Thales to Aristotle whose last part is devoted to an interpretation of the whole of the Aristotelian philosophy and finally that of the SS 1927: *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (GA 24). end of the war when Heidegger works again on the problem of truth in Aristotle.

My aim is to show how, in this course (GA 19), Heidegger comes to articulate and assimilate the modes of ἀληθεύειν– in book VI of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* – into his own analytic of Dasein. Before I can show what terms are exactly at work in the text, I should move carefully to decide whether or not it is sensible to take a position regarding the general agreement concerning how exactly the presence of Aristotle in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* should be understood from the reading of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The reference to ἀληθεύειν comes from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 3, X, 6-8 and *Metaphysics* I, 1-2 to which Heidegger refers in the present course on *Platon’s Sophistes* as the “Boden der Seinsforschung” (the ground of research into being). This course was delivered one year after Heidegger’s Marburg lectures on Aristotle’s *de Anima* and Husserl, also in Marburg and it constantly keeps in view, and will stretch further the connection of the modes of disclosing with ἀληθεύειν ἡ ψυχή.

As Theodore Kisiel very clearly enuntiated in his *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, Heidegger’s phenomenological way to Aristotle discovered not only that Aristotle was thinking phenomenologically (Kisiel uses the word ‘proto-phenomenologist) but “the most memorable achievement of this innovative textual

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87 At the time of this course, Heidegger was busy preparing SZ for publication, consequently, unlike most lecture courses for which Heidegger wrote his notes in full sentences, these notes are in a more abbreviated form. Cf. Richard Rojcewicz’s introduction in his translation of GAP.
88 Cf. GM, paragraph 72. Also, the first part of *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit* (GA 31) Freiburg lecture course, SS 1930, which contains an interpretation of *META* IX, 10 that Heidegger fully unfolds in *AM* the coming Summer Semester,
89 *PS*, p. 21.
practice was the insight, in book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, into ἀληθέων as a multifaceted process of revealment. The discovery led to a deeper comprehension of the nature of phenomenology, the λόγος of φαίνεσθαι, which in fact played a governing role throughout this evolution of insights. The insight into ἀληθεία as unconcealment in turn prompted the recognition of the fundamental trait of ὄσσία, the being of beings, as presence”.91

For Aristotle and the Greeks being is constant presence. Aristotle says in de Partibus Animalium that that which points out from itself is brought about in a fundamental presentation.92 Heidegger says that the presentation of a phenomenon is re-presented by Dasein whilst “for the man of science being is a representation in relation to the world.”93 How can we see what shows itself and speak about it? Heidegger asks in his Introduction to Phenomenological Research course: “In what connection stands the concept of phenomenon with that which Aristotle expressed as λόγος?”94 Heidegger set out to explore this connection, as we have previously seen, from the meaning of λόγος in Aristotle, and he deliberately chooses and builds up his terminology and his way of putting things not only for the positive purpose of disclosing new ‘phenomena’ but in studied contrast with the traditional philosophical vocabulary.95

There is therefore a discussion on Aristotle previous to Being and Time, in the lectures from the 1920s that is put forward in Being and Time. I would like to work out how Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύων and the uncovering of ὃν ὡς ἀληθεῖς provides him with the ontological outlook which permits him to take Aristotle’s findings in a radical manner and work them out in relation to the uncovering structure of Dasein in Being and Time. “The existential-
ontological foundations of uncovering is first shown by the most primordial phenomenon of truth.”

“The purpose of the philosophical investigation is human Dasein as a question about him in his character of being”. He makes clear that his projected reading of Aristotle is to be a Daseinsanalytik, a questioning about the being who experiences and interprets being.

Even at this time, towards the middle of the 1920s, the vision of the problem which characterizes and will characterize Heidegger’s thinking is being formed more and more. Heidegger thinks it is possible to claim that the unquestioned foundation of Aristotle’s equation between τὸ δῦνον and ἀληθεύον consists of the presupposition of a very clear relationship between being and time implicitly understood as presence (Anwesen), for only what has been previously understood as present can later be determined as disclosed, that is to say, as true (ἀληθεύον) in the sense suggested by Heidegger’s etymology of the Greek word. But the interpretation of being as presence with regard to an understanding of time which privileges the dimension of the present, corresponds an interpretation of being in which presence stands out. Heidegger arrives at this conclusion by way of his interpretation of the problem of ἀληθεύον (unconcealment) in Aristotle from the time of the lecture course of WS 1925/26 (GA 21) to the present lecture course delivered just one year before, when he examined the modes of ἀληθεύειν in the Nicomachean Ethics and onto which I will now move the focus.

A significant part of Heidegger’s treatment of the modes of ἀληθεύειν, in this introduction to the projected book of Aristotle has to do with the meaning of and its relationship to λόγος and hence λέγειν. Heidegger reading of Aristotle’s book VI of the Ethics, which treats dianoetic excellence or virtue, if we like, is a work about truth.

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96 SZ, p. 220, “Die existenzial-ontologischen Fundamente des Entdeckens selbst zeigen erst das ursprünglichste Phänomen der Wahrheit.”

97 PIA, p. 10, “Der Gegenstand der philosophischen Forschung ist das menschlichen Dasein als von ihr befragt auf seinen Seinscharakter.”

98 PIA, p. 40, “Die führende Frage der Interpretation muß sein: Als welche Gegenständigkeit welchen Seinscharakters ist das Menschsein, das ›im Leben Sein‹ erfahren und ausgelegt ? Welches ist der Sinn von Dasein, in dem die Lebensauslegung den Gegenstand Mensch im vorhinein ansetz?” [“The guiding question of the interpretation must be: in what terms in what character of being is the being of man that is experienced and interpreted in ‘his life’? What is the sense of Dasein in which the interpretation of man is previously established?”]
“(…) Human life in its being, ὑπὸ ξῆρα, is speaking, interpreting, i.e., it is a carrying out of ἀληθεύειν (disclosing). Aristotle did not only, in the De Anima, find this state of affairs ontologically, but, for the first time and before all else, he saw and interpreted on that ground the multiplicity of phenomena, the multiplicity of the various possibilities of ἀληθεύειν. The interpretation is accomplished in the sixth book of Nichomachean Ethics, chapters 2-6, 1138 b35ff.”

It would be the task for an archaeologist to retrace, find and identify all the interpretation and linguistic details of Aristotle’s own terms in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν.

Each of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν, the Aristotelian determinations in question as they are presented in the Nicomachean Ethics, expresses fundamental uncovering modes of human life and they therefore constitute the first phenomenological analysis of Dasein, that, Heidegger claims, Aristotle does not succeed in posing explicitly, and in a sufficient radical manner, the problem of ἀληθεύειν which lies within these three determinations and which articulates them. In other words, the problem here at stake is one of seeing why, for Heidegger, Aristotle did not succeed in grasping the fundamental ontological constitution of human life and why according to Heidegger, this omission is due to the fact that, by remaining within the horizon of a metaphysics of presence, Aristotle remained tied to an understanding of time which prevented him from seeing that the structure of human life is original temporality. The problem of temporality will be addressed in Chapter III of this study in relation to Heidegger’s lecture course on Aristotle’s Physics and Chapter IV in relation to historicity.

My aim now is to identify firstly, the modes of ἀληθεύειν that Heidegger works out in Platon: Sophistes (GA 19) and indicate some of the structural and terminological correspondences between these Greek notions and Heidegger’s own existential notions, secondly, move on to the framework of ontological concepts upon which Heidegger is able to articulate his Daseinsanalytik.

I propose thereby, before seeing how exactly these notions are at play in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity in *Being and Time*, to portray Heidegger’s earlier reading of Aristotle’s ἄληθεύειν in order to trace its development in the project of *Being and Time* through the analysis of *Eigentlichkeit*.

In his work on Heidegger’s relationship to Aristotle, Walter Brogan elaborates that: “Heidegger claims that the primordial sense of being for Aristotle – the field of beings and sense of being that orientate his general understanding and interpretation of beings – is production (ποιήσις).”\(^{100}\) For the most part, beings are interpreted in their being as available for use in our dealings (*Vorhandensein*). Thus, according to Heidegger’s analysis in this essay – and I make this point to illustrate the insight at stake when Heidegger reads and appropriates each mode of ἄληθεύειν – the idea that Aristotle employed an objective, theoretical ‘model’ of understanding the being of beings is false. Beings are understood in terms of how they appear (their look to us or ἔτος) and in terms of their being addressed and claimed in a λόγος oriented by its surroundings. This is to say, Heidegger insists that Aristotle’s word for being – σοσία – still resonates with the sense of availability for use, in the sense of possessions and belongings.\(^{101}\) Heidegger insists further, that Aristotle’s ontological structure arises from this preliminary way of grasping beings in general. The question is whether human being is also analyzed on the basis of this general notion of being in terms of production. In saying that production drives the Aristotelian understanding of being, Heidegger is not arguing that Aristotle understood all beings including human being on the basis of a model drawn from τέχνη. What is at issue, rather, is something like world, though Heidegger does not make this explicit in this essay. However, he does point here to the framework on which he will be able to work from Aristotle, that is, Heidegger’s point is that this sense of production, beings of τέχνη produced beings in the sense that their coming to be is handled and managed by a craftsperson, natural beings and human beings, are all produced differently, but are all interpreted (through τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη and φρονήσις as ways of being produced or brought forth. In

\(^{100}\) *PIA*, p. 374; *GAP*, pp. 24-36.

\(^{101}\) *GAP*, p. 24.
fact, when it comes to making explicit the ontological structure of beings, Aristotle’s field of research is not beings from τέχνη at all but being from φύσις. The primary text for an ontological investigation of produced beings is the Physics as an original investigation of moved-beings and of being-moved as the way of being of these natural beings. Finally, the Nicomachean Ethics is about the ‘movement’ or way in which one becomes human.

I have quoted this passage at length as it identifies important steps that are related to three fundamental modalities of being, namely Dasein, Zuhandenheit (available-at-hand) and Vorhandenheit (pure, objective presence), modes distinguished and determined in the lectures from the 1920s, as also in Being and Time and the three fundamental uncovering attitudes of ψυχή – θεωρία, ποιήσις and πράξις which we will now see in its determinations.

The first determination is θεωρία and Vorhandenheit. If we divide the word θεωρία we have two fundamental roots upon which Heidegger thinks. These are θέως and οράω, θέως means the pure onlooking seeing and οράω to see, to look upon. θεωρία is the immediate unity of seeing and what is seen in unconcealment, that is in the visible, ορατόν. The particular orientation of beings is however the θέσις, a noun that is the Greek reduplication of τιθέμαι. This is made possible by the arrangement of beings with their own sight, θεα, such that being is revealed as part of the whole in this in-sight – θεωρός. This sight that sees is not the pure onlooking seeing but the spectator – of the pure seeing, the on-looking seeing of place revealed in each oriented being, θετός. The original sense of θεωρία provides itself the evidence of the uncovering attitude of human life as an immediate unity of the seeing and what is seen, which is prior to the separation of subject and object, and the consequent ‘analysis’ that is based on this split. In this sense I endorse Brogan’s view in that: “Aristotle doesn’t think at all about such division. One indication of this is that his first mention of θεωρία after book VI of Nicomachean Ethics comes in his discussion on friendship. He says that we can observe or witness (θεωρεῖν) others actions better than our own. We come to be aware of the being of our friend because, Aristotle says, we perceive, on the basis

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102 I will address this problem in chapter III with a discussion of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s Physics B1 in connection to the notion of κινησις and ‘Entschlossenheit’ in the concept of Eigentlichkeit.
of the experience of ourselves, that human life is intrinsically good and pleasant especially for the good person. Our awareness of our own being implies in this sense awareness of being and thus the being of the others such that in perceiving ourselves, we perceive at the same time others like ourselves. Aristotle says that all knowledge presupposes a certain kinship between the knower and what is known.105 As Volpi refers: “According to Heidegger, when human life assumes this uncovering attitude, being presents itself in a modality he calls Vorhandenheit.”106 Confirmation of this correspondence comes from the suggestive conjunction that by Vorhandenheit Heidegger translates in fact Aristotle’s idea of wonder (θαυμάζειν) in which the desire of knowledge is rooted: “διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἡρέμωνον φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων θαυμάσαντες”, (It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophize; wondering originally about obvious perplexities.) 107 This seems to be the key passage from Aristotle to which Heidegger refers in Being and Time to make sense of the relationship between θεωρία and pure objective presence (Vorhalten).108 “He mentions that our senses affect us because, as attuned through moods, we are already accessible but he takes Aristotle further when he refers that ontologically, therefore, our moods and dispositions must be considered as being the basic condition of the possibility of uncovering the world, for they alone render us open to what comes from the world. A pure looking at ‘even though it may pierce into the inmost veins of the being of a vorhanden entity’, can never discover such a thing as a threatening object confronting it in the world. Even the purest θεωρία

105 Brogan, W., op. cit., p. 146.
106 Volpi, F., op. cit. 41.
108 SZ, p. 61, “Auf dem Grunde dieser Seinsart zur Welt, die das innerweltlich begegnende Seiende nur noch in seinem puren Aussehen (εἴδος) begegnet läßt (…) Dieses Hinsehen ist jeweils eine bestimmte Richtungnahme auf,…, ein Anvisieren des Vorhandenen. Es entnimmt dem begegnenden Seienden im Vorhinein einen »Gesichtspunkt«. Solches Hinsehen kommt selbst in den Modus eines eigenständigen Sichauftahtens bei dem innerweltlichen Seienden. In sogeartetem »Aufenthalts« – als dem Sichenthalten von jeglicher Hanierung und Nutzung – vollzieht sich das Vernehmen des Vorhandenen.” [“Fundamentally this way of being towards is one in which the intramundane being remains only still in its pure presence. (…) This looking at is every time a determinate direction towards… of envisaging the present at hand. It takes over a view-point in advance from the encountered being. Such looking at enters the mode of an autonomous mode of the intramundane being. In this kind of ‘dwelling’ – as holding oneself back from any manipulation and utilization – the perception of the present at hand is consummated.”]
or ‘contemplation’ has its basic mood of a ‘quiet tarrying with’.\textsuperscript{109} This is to say, for Heidegger, \(\text{θεωρία}\) is only one of the different possibilities and modalities of uncovering through which Man accesses being. But I won’t be able to unfold fully this connection of \(\text{θεωρία}\) with \textit{Vorhandenheit} without first delineating the other two above mentioned modalities of uncovering: \textit{ποιήσις} and \textit{πράξις}.

\begin{quotation}
\textquoteleft\textit{Ποιήσις} is the manipulative mode of uncovering attitude in which one handles entities and finds oneself when one handling beings and this attitude aims at the production of works. This mode of uncovering is made available through \textit{τέχνη}, the knowledge that guides the latter towards its objective. When one assumes this uncovering orientation, beings present themselves to us in the modality of being that Heidegger calls \textit{Zuhandenheit} (available-at-hand).

\textit{Πράξις} is the mode of uncovering realized in this form of action and whose goal is for the sake of which (\textit{σοῦ ἐνεκα}), that is to say, in its success as action and not for the sake of something (\textit{ἐνεκα τινός}).\textsuperscript{110}

\textit{Φρόνεσις} is the kind of knowledge which belongs to the latter and which gives it its orientation. This last correspondence, which certainly appears as the most problematic and disputable, but which, is for all that the most significant and the most central, has to be developed in greater detail.\textsuperscript{111}

We ought to see now in what terms are these modes of \textit{ἀληθεύειν} interconnected and why Heidegger recovers them and how he works them out from the standpoint of the ontological structure of \textit{Dasein}.

Heidegger explains the three determinations of \textit{θεωρία: ποιήσις} and \textit{πράξις} as the first ways of carrying through \textit{ἀληθεύειν}. Heidegger says that all the modes of \textit{ἀληθεύειν— ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς} \textsuperscript{112}— stand connected to \textit{λόγος} and that all, with the exception of \textit{νοῦς} are \textit{μετά λόγον}, that is, “there is no circumspection, no understanding, which would not be a speaking.”\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quotation}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnoteref{110} This notion is addressed further on pp. 177-179, 183, 192, 202, 215, 217. Cf. also Inwood, M, \textit{A Heidegger Dictionary}, the meaning of \textit{οὐ ἐνεκα}, pp. 3, 77, 124.
\footnoteref{111} Cf. Volpi, F. op. cit., p. 41 and also Chapter III in connection to \textit{Entschlossenheit} and \textit{Gewissen}, pp. 227-232, 244 to \textit{ποιήσις} and \textit{πράξις}, p.244.
\footnoteref{112} \textit{NE}, VI, 3, 1139b 15-17.
\footnoteref{113} \textit{PS}, pp. 21-22, “Alle dieser verschiedenen Weisen des \textit{ἀληθεύειν} stehen im Zusammenhang mit dem \textit{λόγος}; alle, außer dem \textit{νοῦς}, sind hier \textit{μετά λόγον}.” Also, the same idea in \textit{PLA}, p. 53.
\end{footnotes}
*Ethics* by suggesting that the λόγος that defines human being who by its being has a λόγος is double, divided in two. He says: “ὑποκείσθω δύο τά λόγον ἔχοντα” (Underlying this there are two basic modes of λόγος).  

“The two λόγοι are the one by which we contemplate beings whose ἀρχαί (origin) do not admit of being other, and the one by which we apprehend beings that can be other. Aristotle designates the one that encompasses both ἐπιστήμη and σοφία by the word επιστημονικόν and the other that includes τέχνη and φρόνησις by the word λογιστικόν. Heidegger points out that “the distinction between επιστημονικόν and λογιστικόν is made in reference to what is disclosed in such speaking and discourse; it is taken from the beings themselves, the beings appropriated in the ἀληθεύειν.” Heidegger had already indicated that in this division, νοῦς has been left out. This is because νοῦς is itself twofold and also has two senses, corresponding to the two λόγοι – the νοῦς involved in the disclosing of beings that have otherness (ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, literally beings that can be otherwise, NE, 1140a1), and the νοῦς that discloses the ἀεὶ δὲ (always being) or the beings that are always-being, that hold themselves always, as long as they are, the same in their being.”

Heidegger goes on into a very dense and specific analysis of the modes of ἀληθεύειν that discloses more and more a double λόγος in every mode of disclosing, as it were, stretching Aristotle’s understanding of the double sense of being as both able to be otherwise and not able to be otherwise than it is. I certainly concur with Brogan in that if “on one hand, one of the questions Heidegger asks in the beginning of the *Sophist* course is the question of λόγος and its relationship to ἀληθεύεια. If this is the case, is Heidegger trying to discover in the twofold λόγος the movement between the two λόγοι, that is to say, a διαλόγος or dialectic – a certain reinscription of Plato that would go ‘beyond’ Aristotle and discover the philosopher as the one who dwells in

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114 NE, VI, 2, 1139a6.

115 PS, p. 28, “Die Unterscheidung des επιστημονικόν und des λογιστικόν ist gewonnen im Hinblick auf das, was im Ansprechen und Besprechen aufgeschlossen wird; sie ist gewonnen von dem Seienden selbst her, das im αληθεύειν zur Aneignung kommt.”

116 Cf. Brogan, W. *op. cit.*, p. 174 and NE, VI, 1139 a6 ff, “ὁ θεωρούμεν τά τοιούτα τῶν ἄντων ὄσον αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδεχόμεναι ἄλλως ἔχειν” [with which we regard beings whose ἀρχαί [origin] cannot be otherwise]; “ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν” (that which can be otherwise) and Heidegger’s thematization in *PS*, p. 28.
the between?”¹¹⁷ Let us go back to the modes of ἀληθεύειν and to the importance of disclosing itself at stake both in λόγος and νοῦς in relation to ἀληθεία.

Τέχνη and φρόνησις disclose what can be otherwise. The difference here is that τέχνη has to do with produced beings while φρόνησις has to do with human being itself.¹¹⁸

“Τέχνη has to do with things which first have to be made and which are not yet what they will be. Πρόνησις makes the situation accessible; and the circumstances are always different in every action.”¹¹⁹

But this is a not a ready-made difference, not even a philosophical consideration of human being from other beings, in other words, this points out to the constitution of human being as otherness, not by virtue of being dependent for its being on another being but because it is involved, literally, concerned (Besorgen) in its activity, in its προσείς:

“This initial and most primitive ontological distinction does not arise primarily in a philosophical consideration but it is a distinction of natural Dasein itself; it is not invented but lies on the horizon in which the ἀληθεύειν of natural Dasein moves. (…) This world of nature, which is always as it is, is in a certain sense the background from which what can be other and different stands out. This distinction is an entirely original one. Therefore, it is wrong to say that there are two regions of being, two fields, as it were, which are set beside one another in theoretical knowledge. Rather, this distinction articulates the world; it is its first general ontological determination.”¹²⁰

We have here a first indication of Heidegger’s thinking of the world but we will not be able to provide enough evidence of it before working out what kind of

¹¹⁹ PS, pp. 28, 29, “Die Τέχνη hat zu tun mit Dingen, die erst gemacht werden, die noch nicht das sind, was sie sein werden. Die φρόνησις macht die Situation zugänglich; die Umstände sind bei jeder Handlung immer wieder andere. ” [“Τέχνη has to do with things which first have to be made and which are not yet what they will be. Πρόνησις makes the situation accessible; and the circumstances are always different in every action.”]
disclosure Heidegger thinks Aristotle has in mind when he speaks about ἐπιστήμη and σοφία and the latter with φρόνησις. The question for Heidegger is that the apprehension of ἀεὶ ὅν in ἐπιστήμη and σοφία is the way of disclosing the φύσει δυνά and the question is of knowing whether these beings have their ἀρχή in themselves and not in another. The main point to disentangle here is according to Brogan “in each case of σοφία and φρόνησις, theoretical an practical wisdom, – νοῦς – an immediate grasp of what is – is required. While Aristotle does privilege σοφία over φρόνησις, Heidegger does not see Aristotle as tying σοφία and φρόνησις in a hierarchical way so that σοφία would be the disclosure of being while φρόνησις would be the equivalent of an apophantic speaking of being through synthesis or division. Both σοφία and φρόνησις are activities that involve νοῦς. The philosophical closeness of φρόνησις and σοφία that is established in this way does not deny, according to Aristotle, that σοφία has a certain priority as a higher way of apprehending beings. Heidegger says, because it is primarily an αἴσθησις (perception), an ultimate simple view of the moment, or a moment-of-vision, an Augenblick of the moment as it were, revealed in its fullness and brought to fruition in activity, in its πρᾶξις.”

The philosophical sense of this methodological, linguistic analysis of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθέωςυν undertaken by Heidegger is, I suggest, opened to a more content oriented introduction, which I call a preliminary analysis of how time is commonly understood in everyday experience. In other words, the discussion of the complex hierarchy of Aristotle’s ἀληθέωςυν and the absence of explicit reference to the question of the meaning of being in general is no more argument against the conception of this question in 1924 than is the absence of Erschlossenheit (disclosedness) an argument against the existence of this term in Heidegger’s repertoire in Platon: Sophistes (GA19).

121 PS, p. 31.
122 Cf., Brogan, W., op. cit., p. 174: “(…) it is not a question of a division within practical life between prudence or wisdom and choice or action. Heidegger makes this point strongly in the Sophist volume. Φρόνησις is intrinsically an αἴσθησις, and fundamentally a disclosure that occurs in human action. Indeed, Heidegger translates φρόνησις at one point to Gewissen, conscience. This practical being called back to the situation and situating oneself out of an overview of one’s being is for Aristotle a noetic activity, a νοῦς πρακτικός. As Heidegger shows, this way of having its being that is disclosed in φρόνησις is peculiar. Though noetic, there can be no pure, a-temporal beholding of such being since the resolute moment of πρᾶξις is always already caught up in coming to be, in the character of its being able to be other than it is.” Cf. also PS, also on p. 174.
The point I have been making throughout this section by appealing to the fundamental works of Volpi and Brogan was to show the central planks of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the *Rhetoric*, the latter read as “the first systematic hermeneutic of everydayness of existence”, that articulate Heidegger’s research into *Being and Time*. In the research on ἀληθεύειν in Marburg we see the fundamental shape of the core of *Being and Time*’s treatment of Dasein’s everyday ontic experience and temporality. But that shape is, as far as I can see, still somewhat primitive and still on the way towards formulation. For example, the concept of resoluteness (that makes the core of Chapter III) presents many difficulties for it is linked to a number of temporal notions that Heidegger knows from Aristotle but that are intertwined in a difficult interpretive puzzle. Heidegger says, for example, that “the unwavering precision with which Dasein is thus essentially individualized down to its ownmost potentiality-for-being, discloses the advancing towards death as the possibility which is non-relational.”

With this example, I reach my second point, for similar interpretive difficulties in the text can, in my view, be effectively tackled with reference to Heidegger’s conceptuality in *Being and Time*. A particular area in which this is the case is the difference between the ontological and the ontic. Ontological concepts are meant to express “beings in their being” (”Diesem Seienden in Seinem Sein”) and conceptualize “a more original structure of Dasein” (“einer ursprünglicher Seinsstruktur des Daseins”) that is essential and “determinative” for human being (“wesenhaften Strukturen (…) seinsbestimmende durchhalten”, “(…) kann ontologisch sehr wohl in prägnanten Strukturen gefaßt werden”). These show the most “fundamental concepts” (“Grundbegriffe”) of a given subject matter and “lay bare”, exhibit, the conceptual structure of that subject matter. The subject matter or horizon presently under consideration is “average everydayness”, the way we are “at first and for the most part” in our everyday work world and social world.

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123 SZ, p. 138.
125 SZ, pp. 12, 54, 16-17, 44, 10, 37.
The philosophical method to which Heidegger appeals in his ontological outline out of the ontic phenomena is phenomenology.\textsuperscript{126}

Heidegger’s ontological categories, as we shall see in the account of \textit{das Man} and \textit{uneigentlichkeit} are worked out from Aristotle’s notions describing what Heidegger believed Aristotle to be aiming at when he inquired into the modes of \(\alpha\lambda\nu\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\nu\): factual life. Heidegger’s description of inauthenticity in our everyday ways of talking, understanding, seeing, interpreting and acting are, as we will see in the following chapter, interconnected in a concept of \textit{Eigentlichkeit} which points out to profound transformations of these ways of being.\textsuperscript{127} The concept of \textit{Eigentlichkeit} adds an important relevance to \textit{Being and Time}, which gains increased interest by a clarification of the full import of Aristotle’s modes of \(\alpha\lambda\nu\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\nu\).

In conclusion, these points even if they do not prove it yet, at least render plausible the general argumentation with regard to a retrieval by Heidegger of the framework for the problems posed by Aristotle’s modes of \(\alpha\lambda\nu\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\nu\) and to a correspondence, yet to be fully examined in this research, between Aristotle’s phenomenological notions and Heidegger’s existential analytic. Even though as the points previously taken into consideration are provisional they will be self-evident in the context of Heidegger’s own original analytic of \textit{Dasein}.

The uncovering structure which designates Aristotle’s understanding of \(\delta\nu\ \omega\zeta\ \alpha\lambda\nu\theta\varepsilon\zeta\), and which in fact determines the ontological constitution of \textit{Dasein} is the result – and this is my contention – of a thorough thinking made by Heidegger of the essential meaning of being as \(\alpha\lambda\nu\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\nu\) presented by Aristotle in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}. By linking Heidegger’s analysis of existence so closely to Aristotle, problems and questions will arise on Heidegger’s own text, in his presentation of an existential analytic. To do this, and so to verify our argument, it will be necessary in this research to re-read the critical passages from the existential analysis in a deciphering way rather than in a pure interpretive way – a

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{SZ}, p. 27, “Mit der leitenden Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins steht die Untersuchung bei der Fundamentalfrage der Philosophie überhaupt. Die Behandlungsart dieser Frage ist die \textit{phänomenologische}.”

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{SZ}, p. 44, “Auch in ihr geht es dem Dasein in bestimmter Weise um sein Sein, zu dem es sie ihm Modus der durschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit verhält (…).”
reading however supported by the Marburg texts finds ample support in Being and Time.

Finally, I wanted to show how Heidegger (and the reader) struggled to get close to Aristotle, or, if we prefer, to bring Aristotle close to himself throughout the reading of the multiple connections in the modes of ἀλήθεύειν. The transition from the reading at stake in GA 19 and Being and Time is most important. Having dealt with the five modes of ἀλήθεύειν of ψυχή and their corresponding λόγος, Heidegger distances himself from Aristotle. Aristotle was not able to see original temporality as the fundamental ontological foundation of human life which, nevertheless, he grasped and described, because he remained within the horizon of a natural understanding of time as constant presence. The well known apory of the relationship between ψυχή and χρόνος explicitly raised by Aristotle (Physik IV, 14, 223 to 21, 29) which is handled by Heidegger in his commentary on the aristotelian treatment of time (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, GA 24), seems not be enough, in Heidegger’s eyes, to remove Aristotle from the horizon of a natural understanding of time. And yet, Aristotle provides the ontic signpost which Heidegger raises to the ontological description of Dasein and Zeitlichkeit (temporality). This is a conjecture that can be based upon a passage from Aristotle’s de Anima III, 10, 453 b 5-8- where it seems as though Aristotle is thinking of Man out of a specific characteristic that distinguished it from animals, ‘χρόνος αἰσθησις’, the perception of time. The fact that Heidegger connects the perception of time to action in order to retrieve the specific character of human life, lends credence to this conjecture and paves the way for the key concepts of the existential analytic of Dasein, that which will be examined next in the analysis of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time – for example, Zu-Sein, Jemenigkeit, Worumwillen, Befindlichkeit and Verstehen, Sorge, Entschlossenheit and Gewissen.128

128 Cf. Volpi, F., op. cit., p. 58
2. CHAPTER II: DISCOVERING DASEIN: ΑΛΗΘΕΙΝ AND THE THEME OF *EIGENTLICHKEIT* IN *Sein und Zeit*

a) *Das Man* and the ἀληθεύων of Inauthenticity

In this chapter, I will show how Heidegger, mainly on the basis of his interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric* at Marburg, argues that Aristotle has articulated the perspective of everyday life by means of his concepts of ποιήσις (production) and τέχνη (know-how) and in what ways this enables Heidegger to undertake an analysis of the disclosing (ἀληθεύων) at stake in the mode of inauthenticity, discussed under the heading of “concern” (*Besorgen*).

This is a task that Heidegger now takes on to *Being and Time* after he called upon his investigation of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric* in the *Sophist* lectures (GA 19) and in the *Basic Problems of Aristotelian Philosophy* (GA 18) at Marburg in order to clarify what it meant to be ζωὴν λόγον ἔχουν, in the sense of a speaking being, as previously noted, and how in this pursuit he turns to Aristotle's ἀληθεύων as the investigation of *Dasein* in factual life. Heidegger is convinced, as we will now see, that although Aristotle has seen ποιήσις as having the dominating perspective in everyday life, Aristotle himself has paved the way for its overcoming, as he has shown that πρᾶξις (activity) and not ποιήσις is the essence of life.

I therefore hope to assess the ways in which Aristotle's (and the Greek) interpretation of Man's existence precisely in terms of ποιήσις, as produced-being, underlies Heidegger's conviction that ποιήσις or concern (*Besorgen*) is taken to be what is primarily given to phenomenological inquiry, serving as a name for life's self-explanation. Once this has been established, however, everyday life must be further elucidated, with the help of πρᾶξις. This is the underlying discussion operating in Heidegger's account of everyday ways of being where we encounter the important question of Heidegger's view between the theoretical and the practical.\(^{129}\)

\(^{129}\) Cf. Weigelt, C., *op. cit.*, p. 89: “Does Heidegger take theoretical activity, including assertoric speech (or speaking), to be essentially parasitic upon everyday, “practical” life, or does he think that theory has its own possibility of original disclosing?”
I also aim to show that in the account of das Man and inauthentic everyday ways of being ποιήσίσς not only concerns things as equipment, (τὰ πρόγματα), within the sphere of teleological relations between intraworldly beings but also includes Dasein’s bringing together the understanding of things with his self-understanding.

We shall see in this chapter how Heidegger’s description of the everyday self introduces us to the conceptions of A) das Man and inauthenticity. I will examine, as noted, the ἀληθευέων of everyday life by means of a transformation of Aristotle’s concepts of ποιήσις and τέχνη discussed under the heading of besorgen in some of the inauthentic ways of being of the das Man self. In this section I wish to examine carefully Heidegger’s language of inauthenticity in order to discern its correlations to the λόγοι ἀληθευέων in Aristotle.

I therefore now intend to take further the previous analyses of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθευέων in the Nicomachean Ethics and explore some threads in the Rhetoric (GA 18) to the analysis of das Man and inauthenticity in Being and Time. I will direct this analysis to the investigation of the inauthentic ways of being in order to provide evidence that Heidegger is rethinking, and in fact giving an ontological interpretation of Aristotle’s ἀληθευέων in the analytic of Dasein.

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Heidegger writes in Being and Time: “Because das Man seems to make all one’s judgements and decisions, it takes away responsibility from the individual Dasein”\(^\text{130}\). Macquarrie and Robinson translate this specific phrase “nimmt es dem jeweiligen Dasein die Verantwortlichkeit ab” as “deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability”. Although the translation is very accurate it does not however convey the sense of “responsibility” implied in Verantwortlichkeit. I believe

Macquarrie and Robinson have made the right choice here for when questioned as to why one performed or failed to perform any given action, everyday Dasein can always appeal to das Man for justification. Invoking the defence that one says, does, would do, should refrain from, and so forth, as das Man's anonymous nature makes it impossible at this average level to pinpoint responsibility to anyone in particular. Heidegger ironically suggests: “in Dasein's everydayness that through which most things happen is that of which we must say ‘it was no one’.”[^131]

“Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. Das Man which provides the answer to the question of the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein is the ‘nobody’ to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in being-among-one-another.”[^132]

Yet again, Heidegger, “is not simply presenting his views on the nature of everyday conduct but he is also involved in a destruction of the traditional ontology, and more precisely the Greek notion of ποιησις which is regarded as something of a paradigm for the Greek understanding of being.[^133] Aristotle’s main focus on ποιησις meant he was in a certain sense restricted to the perspective of being as Hergestelltsein (being-produced) so Heidegger also seems to struggle to offer an interpretation of the way in which we for the most part move daily in our world. However, the difference is that Heidegger tries to aim at the basic characteristics of human being and its “wordly” existence by circumscribing different modes of understanding (I will explore these next) but his major target of criticism here is the belief that it is possible to learn what knowledge is without taking notice of its human context.

[^131]: SZ, p. 127, “In der Alltäglichkeit des Daseins wird das meiste durch das, von dem wir sagen müssen, keener war es.”
[^132]: SZ, p. 128, “Jeder ist der Andere und Keiner er selbst. Das Man, mit dem sich die Frage nach dem Wer des alltäglichen Daseins beantwortet, ist das Niemand dem alles Dasein im Untereinandersein sich je schon ausgeliefert hat.”
[^133]: As Bernasconi and Weigelt note: “Later on, Heidegger will also state this explicitly, remarking that because of the importance of the ἐπιστημή ποιητική for the Greek understanding of the world, he considered his task in SZ to be to clarify the relationship between man and work in terms of his dealings with equipment or tools, and not "in order to correct Marx or put forward a new political economy.". Cf. Weigelt, op.cit., p. 90, R. Bernasconi, op. cit., pp. 137-138 and AM, p. 137 and also this concern already express earlier in GM, pp. 262-263.
“The Greeks had an appropriate term for ‘things’: ‘pragmata’, i.e. that which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings [or activity] (πράξις). But ontologically, they left in obscurity precisely the specifically "pragmatic" character of pragmata and determined them ‘proximally’ as ‘mere things’.”

Heidegger had already made this same point one year earlier, in his WS 1924/25 Platon: Sophistes course at Marburg when he stated that the Greeks tended to reduce beings to products failing therefore to see that this is only one form of “givenness” and so did not see the phenomenon of “givenness” as such. “Thus, if Aristotle’s understanding of being must ultimately be derived from his notion of ποιητικός, his philosophy is essentially just the natural elaboration of everyday intelligibility.” Although I am not able to discuss here Heidegger’s analysis of environmentality (Umweltlichkeit) and worldhood (Weltlichkeit) in general and worldliness undertaken a few paragraphs earlier (paragraph 15) I would like to briefly stress its importance in order to understand the teleological structure in das Man and inauthenticity.

In paragraph 3 of Being and Time, in the section “analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general” Heidegger follows Aristotle’s poietic view on the world of things are experienced as equipment and ready at hand and its teleological structure, “in order to” (Um-zu) and “for what” (Wozu), as they are regarded as a means for something. It is in this context that we should be able to make sense of everyday ways of being which will be analysed next. The point of this analysis is to show that our everyday modes of speaking are not simply a declaration of a state-of-affairs (διάποιησις) itself but also what we do, our work. When human being becomes dispersed in his occupation with things, he understands his own being from his own conduct, and this means that his self-understanding tends to become dominated by concern and concealed for the benefit of an object-directed concern: the “who” of everyday Dasein:

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134 SZ, p. 68, “Die Griechen hatten einen angemessen Terminus für die ‘Dinge’: pragmata, d. i. das, womit man es im besorgenden Umgang (πράξις) zu tu hat. Sie ließen aber ontologisch gerade den spezifisch ‘pragmatischen’ Charakter der pragmata in Dunklen und bestimmten sie ‘zunächst’ als ‘bloße Dinge’.”

135 PS, pp. 269-272 also this crucial point raised by Weigelt, C., op. cit., p. 116.
"The work that is produced does not only refer to the "towards which" of its usability and the "whereof" of which it consists, under simple craft circumstances it also has an assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it. The work is cut to his figure, he "is" there along with it as the work emerges... Thus along with the work, we encounter not only beings that are available, but also beings with Dasein’s kind of being – beings for which in their concern the product becomes available, and together with these we encounter the world in which wearers and users live, which is at the same time our world."\textsuperscript{136}

Up to now I have been putting into perspective the main traits of \textit{das Man} so that I clarify the horizon where Heidegger uses ‘inauthentic’ in his claim that everyday \textit{Dasein} is in a “state of inauthenticity”. In this chapter, I have indicated, still provisionally, that for Heidegger inauthenticity represents a way of not being oneself that is conceptualized in terms of the structures of \textit{das Man} (‘they’/world of everybody and nobody) and interpreted in the hermeneutic of authenticity. Also, how this reading presupposes a re-reading of Aristotle’s \textit{ποίησις} and \textit{τέκνη}. Although Heidegger makes it very clear that the choice of what I am to be is undoubtedly my own, I can and must choose for myself in my very being, win myself or loose myself, have an authentic mode of being or an inauthentic one. How does Heidegger understand this interconnection of \textit{das Man} with inauthenticity and the contrast of the \textit{das Man} self (inauthentic self) to be working in terms of the authentic self? As Kellner states: “Are there any substantial grounds that may lead one to claim that Heidegger's hermeneutical project comes with a certain 'negative' evaluation of \textit{das Man} and that ‘inauthenticity’ expresses thereby a rather negative account of this way of being-in-the world in contrast with authenticity? For does not the tendency of \textit{das Man} toward averageness and a conformist submission in its mode of inauthenticity indicate a character of mediocrity, banality and negativity?”\textsuperscript{137} The language that describes the inauthentic or authentic \textit{αληθεύων} gives expression of Man’s \textit{ηθος}, his habitual way of being situated in the world, which admits to different forms of access to

\textsuperscript{136}SZ, pp. 70-71, “Das hergestellte Werk verweist nicht nur auf das Wozu seiner Verwendbarkeit und das Woraus seines Bestehens, in einfachen handwerklichen Zuständen liegt in ihm zugleich die Verweisung aus den Träger und Benutzer. Das Werk wird ihm auf den Leib zugeschnitten, er ‘ist’ im Entstehen des Werkes mit dabei... Mit dem Werk begegnet demnach nicht allein Seiendes, das zuhanden ist, sondern auch Seiendes von der Seinsart des Menschen, dem das Hergestellte in seinem Besorgen zuhanden wird; in eins damit begegnet die Welt, in der die Träger und Verbraucher leben, die zugleich die unsere ist.”

truth. In this sense the language of *Being and Time* articulates a family of concepts in their original signification (i.e. inauthenticity, *Unselbständigkeit*, *Gerede*, *Entfremdung*, etc.) that describes the ways of oppeness of the ἔξις. On the other hand, Heidegger's own ontological formulations and explicatio of his concepts seem to be rather strikingly ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ to use a traditional terminology, suggesting that his language not only reveals an awareness of the ἔξις, the kinds of openness to the world described by Aristotle but it also takes into account the evaluative descriptions that Aristotle had already undertaken in the *Ethics* (i.e., to condemn, criticize, elicit change, recommend modifications, guide action, propose alternatives, etc.). Lastly, as we will see in a specific step from the text on page 310, when Heidegger himself characterizes his concept of authenticity he admits that an *ideal* of existence underlies his interpretation, indicating that authenticity is an *ideal* which he is recommending as a modification of inauthenticity. This *ideal* has nothing to do with a romantic idea or the presence of a philosophical idealism in Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik* but it emerges from an ontological analysis of *Dasein* in factual life, an analysis that presents and articulates an ontological description of the ἀληθεύειν at stake in the various kinds of ἔξις (oppeness) of *Dasein* in *das Man*. I suggested in the first chapter that this analysis started from a re-thinking of Aristotle's ὑν ὡς ἀληθεύεις undertaken, as already indicated, in the Marburg courses (GA 17 and 19) namely in the inquiries on λόγος and φανώμενον. I have shown that, by confronting the Greek terms upon which Aristotle was able to think about human being with Heidegger’s own concepts and investigations in the analytic of *Dasein*, the so much debated confrontation between the ethical and ontological in Heidegger’s phenomenology cannot be thought radically in opposition or to be on a collision course but both are shown to be concomitant in the deep textual layers of *Being and Time*.

In the following point, in regard to the employment of the determinations of inauthenticity, I propose that a careful study of Heidegger's language and descriptions owes much to Heidegger's insight on Aristotle's ἀληθεύειν in what concerns the determinations of *das Man*: Absorption (*Aufgehen*) and Dispersion (*Zerstreuung*). 138

138 This strategy appears to be at work especially in *SZ* pp., 126-30, 167-80.
Heidegger’s argument that Aristotle has articulated the perspective of everyday life – in which Aristotle himself may or may not be entangled – by means of δόξα (opinion) and the modes of ἀληθεύειν ποιήσις and τέχνη which Heidegger discusses under the heading of “concern” (Besorgen) are denoted in two specific terms Absorption (Aufgehen) and Dispersion (Zerstreuung) which in my view configure phenomenally das Man.

I concur here with Weigelt’s analysis on the problems of tackling everydayness as a philosophical conundrum: “Even though everydayness displays a particular mode of existence, the point of subjecting it to philosophical analysis constitutes a beginning of the phenomenological analysis of Dasein, although from a philosophical perspective that is not what is given at the beginning, since philosophy must try to let everyday life explicate itself, as it were this requires a certain distance. Even though one should be careful with the term “everydayness” in connection with philosophy and theory, since it is primarily intended to refer to a pre-theoretical activity, philosophy could be said to have its own everyday mode, not least insofar as its relation to Aristotle is concerned, for “primarily and for the most part”, philosophy leans on Aristotle without confronting him as its origin. For this reason Aristotle plays a complex role in Heidegger’s analysis of everydayness and inauthenticity. Accordingly, Heidegger’s aim is not merely to let everyday life come forward on its own terms, but also to let Aristotle “show himself from himself”, that is, before his views are subjected to criticism. In this pursuit, as we will see throughout his implicit and explicit recovery of Aristotelian concepts, Heidegger seems to regard Aristotle as a forerunner, approaching him as someone who managed to affirm everyday, pre-theoretical life as a philosophical beginning. Occasionally however, Heidegger seems to imply that Aristotle’s interpretation of everyday life is in fact itself “everyday”, that is, rooted in everyday life itself, so that it mainly just gives voice to the “natural” views on life and world which are embedded in everyday life itself. With this in mind, the analysis of das Man and inauthenticity would be the same thing as an interpretation

139 Cf., PS, p. 10, where Heidegger remarks that the legacy of Plato and Aristotle nowadays is something alltäglich, something we no longer are able to see.
140 This strategy is manifest notably in PS.
of Aristotle’s analysis of everydayness, but it would require a non-Aristotelian perspective, since the philosophical interpretation cannot simply go along with everyday life but has, to a certain extent, distance itself. To make things even more complicated, though, this “non-Aristotelian” perspective will in fact be retrieved from Aristotle himself. Again, this attitude towards Aristotle has to do with Heidegger’s hesitance concerning what kind of origin Aristotle’s really is, whether it is a “simple” or an already reflected philosophical origin.”¹⁴¹ Yet, Heidegger’s employment of the terms “absorption” and “dispersion” as the specific ἄληθεύειν of everydayness and each of its modes (Gerede, Neugier and Zweideutigkeit) can put things into a clearer perspective.

The term absorption (Aufgehen) is one of the words Heidegger uses to denote the concealment of being lost in das Man. In this sense, Aufgehen points to something as a λαμβάνειν, ‘to escape notice, be unseen, unnoticed, concealed’, associated with a ‘forgetting, forgetfulness’ hence also a ληθη, a forgetting. Aufgehen means “absorption”, In a footnote on Being and Time the translators note that “Aufgehen” means literally ‘to go up’ or ‘to rise’ in the sense that the sun ‘rises’. It is exactly this sense that is mute in Heidegger’s use of Aufgehen that I am trying to elucidate and which I believe better conveys the sense of Aufgang in the sense of the emergence of being, the coming forth, to show of itself (φανερέω) to appearance, that is the appearance itself as the emerging ἄληθεύειν. I believe this sense is important for Heidegger’s analysis insofar as it raises the question of how can something just appear ‘for itself’ – and who is doing this saying? In whom it is grounded? Who ‘says’, and in saying ‘shows’ – and is this a self-showing, or a pointing-out? I am deliberately merging the mute sense of Aufgehen with φανερέω as one of the many examples of notions in which I find Heidegger appealing to the voices of the Greek verbs and his translation of these: medial = shows itself; active: points out; passive: makes itself available to be pointed out. Heidegger never gives a detailed elucidation of Aufgehen in Being and Time but his references to it and its connection with benommen, zerstreueung, and verfallen makes it clear that Aufgehen is to describe a mode of being absorbed in the world of concern such that one is completely immersed (lost) in instrumental and public concern.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Weigelt, C., op. cit., pp. 103-105.
¹⁴² SZ, pp. 113, 129, 175 et passim.
Zerstreuung means “dispersion, diversion, absence of mind. Heidegger’s determinations of das Man, their interconnection with the fall into inauthenticity, the contrast between inauthenticity and authenticity, and his emphasis on Being and Time (pages 130 and 179) indicate also that his ontological investigations come hand in hand with the inquiry on Man’s Ἰθακη, his “habitual” way of being situated in the world, which admits to different ways of access to the truth in both das Gerede (idle talk) die Neugier (curiosity) and zweideutigkeit (ambiguity). I would invite us now to look at how Heidegger takes theses modes of everydayness up again as an ontological radicalized framework of the same problem that Aristotle grasped and confronted in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics as ἔξυπνος.

b) Inauthentic Ways of Being

1) Idle talk (das Gerede)

The first mode of disclosure that Heidegger describes is das Man’s way of talking which he calls Gerede. In the following lines I suggest that it is plausible to interpret Gerede in Being and Time as a mode of inauthenticity grounded on Heidegger’s re-reading of Aristotle’s δοξα in the Rhetoric back in the 1924/25 SS course at Marburg (GA 18).

The lure of the pathway that draws Heidegger's account of das Man and Uneigentlichkeit in Being and Time is the description of everydayness ways of being in the form of established and publicly accessible opinions concerning various things that produce a convincing opinion (δοξα πιστον). Indeed, Heidegger claims, when correctly interpreted, that one sees that Rhetoric not only lets the “peculiar domain” of everydayness show itself, but that it also contains a highly developed conceptuality of the explication of everydayness. However, more than just to point out that Aristotle in the Rhetoric has managed to let life explain itself on its own terms, Heidegger wants to further the conditions of possibility of rhetorical explication of everyday speaking (idle talk, curiosity,

143 GAP, paragraph 16.
144 GAP, p. 136.
ambiguity) in order to show how Aristotle has achieved certain preliminary
determinations of the ἀληθεύειν which recur in the everyday communication,
namely through δοξα – that I will consider now and further on in the structures of
facticity in falling.

In order to exhibit the intricate ‘elliptical architecture’ of Heidegger’s analysis
of authenticity I must show how Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity depends on
the recovery and interpretation of the discursivity of Man in each mode of speaking
of everydayness so as to exhibit the hermeneutical structure (als-Struktur) that
articulates each of these ways of being in the world.¹⁴⁵

Heidegger begins with the simple point, which he learned from Aristotle’s de
Interpretatione, that speaking is always about something. Thus, speaking (speech
or discourse) expresses an understanding of what is being talked about. Moreover,

“In language, as a way things have been expressed or spoken about, there is hidden a
way in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted... At first, and within
certain limits, Dasein is constantly delivered over to this interpretedness, which controls
and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of the mood of belonging to
it.”¹⁴⁶

Heidegger claims that language contains an “interpretation” constituted by das
Man’s average understanding, so that to a certain extent we are bound to language,
but language itself, as we have seen, is not a distorting mirror which serves to
prevent one from gaining direct access to the phenomena being talked about. For
how one appropriates and makes his own the understanding that is communicated
in speaking depends on one’s relationship to the subject matter of which we are
talking. As we remember from Aristotle’s analyses on de Anima, the λόγος of
φάνειν is not to be taken as a λόγος of assertion – a categorial saying that, in
saying, shows the saying. Λόγος originally meant, according to Heidegger,
gathering or collection, a sense of openness of what is to be brought forth through
the shining of the appearance, that is, the outward appearance of the presence in the

¹⁴⁵ Cf., also 42, 50, 51, 106.
¹⁴⁶ SZ, pp. 167-8, “Die Sprache als die Ausgesprochenheit birgt eine Ausgelegtheit des
Daseinsverständnisses in sich. (...) Ihr ist das Dasein zunächst und in gewissen Grenzen ständig
überantwortet, sie regelt und vertreibt die Möglichkeit des durschnittlichen Verstehens und der
zugehörigen Befindlichkeit.”
placing into aspect, ἔλθος. For example, one can have a direct relationship to the matter of understanding, i.e. one can have appropriated and worked out his understanding from the “things themselves”. Heidegger calls this phenomenon of direct appropriation “primordial understanding”. On the other hand, one can also understand what is being talked about without being directly acquainted with the subject matter itself. In this case one has not appropriated his understanding from the phenomena but has merely grasped “what is said in the talk”. This distinction between primordial understanding and grasping “what is said in the talk” receives, for the present purposes, most attention from Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's concepts of δόξα and πάθος in the Rhetoric. This idea is particularly clear in the SS course 1924 (GA 18) where Heidegger discusses Aristotle’s understanding of everyday speaking as communication in connection with the Rhetoric and the Politics, and then proceeds to the relationship between speaking and action in the Ethics (the latter being also addressed in Platon: Sophistes – WS course of the same year, before the publication of Being and Time). It is on this basis of Aristotle’s notion of δόξα that Heidegger discusses the notion of Gerede in Being and Time. Heidegger’s interpretation of πάθος in the constitution of δόξα and the way Gerede carries it through indicates that speaking, at this level of everydayness, involves an inauthentic ἀληθεύειν of Dasein for it is restricted to the interplay between making appear something to be said (ποιεῖν διδάκτειν λέγειν) and to be determined from-without (πάσχειν), affecting therefore the way a speaker affects the hearers so as to bring about a response, an action. Heidegger’s account, “presupposes that Aristotle’s conceptuality both preserves and transforms the experiences and are embedded in everyday speaking, in that it

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147 This idea is more explicitly brought forward in Heidegger’s later Freiburg EM lecture course, SS 1935, p. 98, “Er weist das Verstehen von »sein« auf einen bestimmten Horizont, aus dem her sich das Verständniss erfüllt. Die Begrenzung des Sinnes von »Sein« hält sich im Umkreis von Gegenwärtigkeit und Anwesenheit, von Bestehen und Bestand, Aufenthalt und Vor-kommen."

148 This term appears throughout SZ. Cf., a good summary of this notion vs. averageness in the very recent Dreyfus, Hubert L., Skilled Coping as Higher Intelligibility in Heidegger’s Being and Time.

149 SZ, p. 168, “Man versteht nicht so sehr das beredete Seiende, sondern man hört schon nur auf das Geredete als solches, Dieses wird verstanden, das Worüber nur ungefähr, obenhin: man meint dasselbe, weil man das Gesagte gemeinsam in derselben Durschnittlichkeit versteht.”

150 Weigelt refers that “Heidegger devotes considerable time to the notion of δόξα which is hardly surprising bearing in mind the importance he ascribes to Man's πάθος,”, op. cit., p. 112.
has sharpened and brought to explicit articulation that which is only ambiguously articulated there.\textsuperscript{151}

The point Heidegger makes when he discusses each way of being of inauthenticity is the idea that every mode of speaking is only a mode of \(\acute{\alpha}l\eta\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\upsilon\), of our access to the world, but as it were, speaking is a limited mode of uncovering.\textsuperscript{152} It is this line of approach that I believe to be at work in Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle’s determinations of everydayness and which I will now retrace in the notion of \textit{das Gerede}.

Thus, in everyday life we achieve our understanding through our access to already established opinions. In the notion of \(\delta\delta\xi\alpha\) we find the key that articulates each of Heidegger’s ways of being of everydayness and inauthenticity for he sees the basic everyday phenomenon of speaking in the form of established and publicly accessible opinions concerning various things that govern everyday action whilst providing it with an aim and direction. This reading is particularly clear in Aristotle’s account of \(\delta\delta\xi\alpha\) in the \textit{Rhetoric} and Heidegger’s interpretation of \(\delta\delta\xi\alpha\) in GA 18, paragraph 16 – a proposal that seems to be suggested and supported by Heidegger’s explication and description of \textit{Gerede}:

\begin{quote}
“\(\Lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\omicron\) is first of all idle talk, which has the facticity to not let the things be seen, but to develop a certain contentment, to remain standing by that which one thus says. The domination of empty speaking precisely conceals beings for Dasein and makes it blind to that which has been uncovered and also to the possibility of uncovering.”\textsuperscript{153}
\end{quote}

Therefore, one may say that \textit{Gerede} and \textit{Rethoric} have the aim of letting people see what speaks in favor of a particular opinion, so that they become convinced it is the truth. The point is “to see how Aristotle conceives of the relationship between everyday and theoretical speaking. For even though Heidegger thinks that Aristotle affirmed \(\delta\delta\xi\alpha\) as a form of understanding in its own right, he suspects that Aristotle’s attitude towards \(\delta\delta\xi\alpha\) is governed by his notion of theory in particular

\textsuperscript{151} Cf. Weigelt, C., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 111 and also GA 18, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{PS}, pp. 17-25.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{PS}, p. 114, “Der \(\Lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\omicron\) ist zunächst das \textit{Gerede}, das die Faktizität hat, die Sachen nicht sehen zu lassen, sondern eine eigentümliche Genügsamkeit auszubilden, be idem stehen zu bleiben, was man so sagt. Die Herrschaft des Geredes verschließt gerade für das Dasein das Seiende und macht also blind gegen das Aufgedeckte und mögliche Aufdecken.”
and by his ontological assumptions in general. Basically, Heidegger’s idea is that Aristotle could not find the limit (πέρας), in everyday life. For δόξα is itself imperfect, for whilst being incapable of delimiting its object (ὁρίζειν) so strictly as to be a definition, it only says what things are “more or less”. Moreover, the things of everyday concern are also imperfect, since they are changeable. Aristotle names this change in the Rhetoric as “ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν” (beings than can also be otherwise.)¹⁵⁴ This idea of theoretical speaking as ὁρίζειν as complete demarcation is something that Heidegger just cannot take on board, since he believes, again, that this idea is rooted in the notion of being as Fertigsein (finished being). Still, in spite of his hesitance on this point, Heidegger thinks, as was also noted above, that Aristotle’s diagnosis of δόξα depicts essential aspects of everyday life, including its shortcomings.”¹⁵⁵

Heidegger mentions the “groundlessness” (Bodenlosigkeit) of idle talk which “perverts” (verkehrt) the act of disclosing offering further support to the proposal that Gerede is based upon a revision of Aristotle’s δόξα (view, opinion) through which Dasein gets cut off from its authentic possibilities. Heidegger already mentioned in the Sophistes course that, in fact “δόξα (view, opinion) is not a genuine mode of ἀλήθευειν.”¹⁵⁶ This seems to endorse and confirm Volpi’s view, that: “the American scholar Joseph J. Kockelmans supported the thesis that in Being and Time language wasn’t ever put explicitly under scrutiny. It is true that in his book Heidegger does not seem to attribute a central role to the phenomenon of language. Language is exhibited in Being and Time in terms of an existential analysis of Dasein under the title of Rede understood as an articulation of Dasein, co-originary to Befindlichkeit (findliness) and Verstehen (understanding). Language works in this regard in terms of the ontological structure of Dasein, its modes of disclosure, Rede is the phenomenon that works as the condition of possibility of the word, namely in its mode of Uneigentlichkeit (inauthenticity) – in the Gerede (idle Talk, chatter, hearsay, gossip) – or in its authentic mode under Schweigen (silence).”¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ RTOS A 2, 1357 a 13 ff., “ἀναγγέλλειν τὸ τε ἐνθύμημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παραδείγμα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχόμενων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν ἄλλως.” Cf. the same line in GAP pp. 132, 139-140 and PS, pp. 11, 22, 28, 40.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Weigelt, op. cit., p. 142.

¹⁵⁶ PS, p. 55, “(...) die δόξα die keine eigentliche Weise des ἀλήθευειν ist.”

¹⁵⁷ Volpi, F. op. cit., p. 36.
Without wanting to anticipate too much of the subsequent discussion, one may just indicate that self-understanding is found in the interpretation of everyday speaking, the determination of its ἀληθεύειν. Of particular importance to Heidegger in this connection at this stage of Being and Time is to emphasize that life in Gerede, δόξα is a life dominated by assertions, that is, by speaking in sofar as it has become separated from the very activity of speaking:

“Furthermore, it is to be noted that ἀληθεύειν as it exists in δόξα, (...) has a peculiar character of fallenness. What I experience, notice, or have learned, I can forget; in this possibility, ἀληθεύειν is subject to ληθη (where the stem of the verb λαυθάνειν lies hidden) – what is disclosed can sink back into concealment. The ability to become forgotten is a specific possibility of that ἀληθεύειν which has the character of θεωρεῖν. For the ἔξις μετὰ λόγου is an ἔξις of ἀληθεύειν.”

It is this “stability” of δόξα that only intensifies the state of unrest and fallenness, as we shall see as follows with the notion of die Neugier (curiosity).

2) Curiosity (die Neugier)

The next phenomenon operating in inauthentic ways of being is Neugier “curiosity” meaning a certain disposition towards wishing to see which belongs to everydayness. Heidegger notes the striking priority according to “seeing” as an access to beings in the world both by everydayness and how this was found by Aristotle, Parmenides and Augustine. He claims that philosophy and science, from their genesis in the Greeks, have been oriented by sight as the primary relationship towards the world and the way of access to truth. Earlier in Marburg, as noted in the discussion of λόγος and φαινόμενον (GA 17) Heidegger made clear what “seeing” could mean and in the initial paragraphs of Being and Time he

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158 PS, pp. 55, 56, “Ferner ist zu beachten, daß das ἀληθεύειν wie es in δόξα, (...) einen eigentümlichen Charakter des Verfallens hat. Das, was ich erfahren, mir gemerkt, gelernt habe, kann ich vergessen; diese Möglichkeit des ἀληθεύειν untersteht der ληθη, – worin der Stamm des λαυθάνειν steckt; es kann die Verborgenheit zurücksinken. Das vergessen-werden-Können ist eine spezifische Möglichkeit des ἀληθεύειν, das den Charakter des θεωρεῖν hat. Denn die ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ist eine ἔξις des ἀληθεύειν.” “To some extent, we always remain dependent upon δόξα for if one could not understand what is said without having undergone the experiences that make up the foundations of opinions, a shared world would not be possible Cf. Weigelt, op. cit., p.p. 142-43 and PS, pp. 25-27.
159 SZ, pp. 170-1.
Heidegger uses the term curiosity which is not limited, characteristically, to seeing but denotes generally the peculiar tendency to make perceptual contact with everything, an idea found in the very first sentence of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*: “Πάντες ἀνθρώποι τοῦ εἴδειν ὀρέγονται φύσει”.¹⁶⁰ Heidegger’s scope is vast and his intention ambitious. Neugier, if it is to be an effective ontological “existential”, must be broad enough to encompass a wide variety of ἐξής and suggestive enough to express this ‘openness’ character that exhibits this concept.

We have seen that idle talk and curiosity appear to be the antipodes of a genuine ἀληθεύειν.

In the previous section, it was pointed out that Heidegger, drawing upon Aristotle’s notion of ποιήσις and δόξα and their respective ἐξής, argues that the understanding that guides human life and its various activities simultaneously makes life fall off from itself, towards its objects of concern. This is because a poietic perspective on the world requires that we look away not only from the things with which we occupy ourselves but also from the very activity we are enacting, whilst directing ourselves to the work that is to be done. Such a perspective no doubt forms our self-understanding, but it forms it by turning us away from ourselves. Regarding this, Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle’s own notions seeks to transform the ontical proximity of everydayness into an ontological one. This ontological proximity can be found in Heidegger’s landmark analysis of Aristotle’s notion of τόπος (place) and φύσις (being). This ontological proximity is retrieved by Heidegger by examining and giving an interpretation of each mode of ἀληθεύειν achieved through an act of distancing, with respect to the ontical perspective.

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¹⁶⁰ META, A1, 980 a21. Heidegger renders this sentence in SZ p. 171 as: “Im Sein des Menschen liegt wesenhaft die Sorge des Sehens”. (In the being of Man there lies essentially the care of seeing). See also, p. 63.
Heidegger claims that the state of passive activity (πάσχειν) in which tranquillized Dasein finds itself becomes “strange” (fremd) calling it alienation (Entfremdung) which is another name for ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit).

3) Ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit)

We have seen that idle talk and curiosity appear to be the antipodes of a genuine αισθετικός which is directly retrieved from the phenomena, and which dwells alongside the world and draws its speaking from a genuine understanding (“primordial sources”). But since in our everyday being-with-others “passing the word along” and restlessly seeking distraction are such prevalent modes of being in the world, it is often difficult to decide what reveals a genuine understanding and what does not.161 For “everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at the bottom of it, it is not ; or else it does not look so, and yet at the bottom of it, it is.”162

Heidegger’s analysis of ambiguity is extremely difficult, so I will attempt in some detail to unravel the thread of his main argument.163 This phenomenon seems to be particularly important for Heidegger stresses that not only does ambiguity affect the way we talk and act, how we manage our affairs and enjoy ourselves, but it also becomes a potentiality-for-being that constitutes how we understand our possibilities and how we project ourselves into the future.164

The basic trait of ambiguity that I wish to make clear is that ambiguity is an inauthentic way of relating to the future that alienates us from from authentic possibilities. Thus, we must find out how ambiguity relates itself to the future and how it projects Dasein into inauthentic possibilities. This analysis should disclose the interconnection of ambiguity with idle talk and curiosity.

161 SZ, p. 173, “Wenn in alltäglichen Miteinandersein dergleichen begegnet, was jedem zugänglich ist und worüber jeder jenes sagen kann, wird bald nicht mehr entscheidbar, was in echtem Verstehen erschlossen ist und was nicht.”
162 SZ, p. 173, “(…) was jedem zugänglich ist und worüber jeder jenes sagen kann, wird bald nicht mehr entscheidbar, was in echtem Verstehen erschlossen ist und was nicht.”
163 SZ, pp. 173-4.
Everyday *Dasein* in the mode of ambiguity, Heidegger claims, pretends to be interested in certain endeavours, talks about what must be done, and then abandons this concern for what is currently “up for discussion”. Ambiguity is “on the scent” of the latest fad and concern. This “being on the scent” exhibits the movement of curiosity and is directed by idle talk, thus we see how *das Man*’s ways of being work together to entangle *Dasein* in *das Man* so that its authentic possibilities are suppressed.\(^{165}\) Ambiguity does not want to translate its projects into “deeds”, but is comfortable in just surmising and scenting out newer plans.\(^{166}\) Heidegger’s contrast is between a noncommittal (*unverbindlichen*) in “surmising” and “scenting out” (*geahnt* and *gespurt*).\(^{167}\) In fact, everyone seems to know what is happening and has its own ideas about how best to deal with it. If by chance, however, something actually does materialize, then everyone reacts with indignation, for “in that case the opportunity to keep on surmising has been snatched away.”\(^{168}\) Even more, what has been surmised actually happens then one is forced to take a stand on the matter and avoid such any ambiguity.

Heidegger is trying to work out a contrast between surmising and scenting out possibilities, and an active involvement in carrying through a project and committing oneself to it. The superficial ambiguity that is always on the scent of something but never really “into” anything. For ambiguity, actually carrying out a project is found upon since it is already on the scent of something new and sees what was earlier surmised as “out of date”.\(^{169}\) In following this ambiguous way of being, *Dasein* can never really engage in any definite projects or concerns, for *das Man* is already on the scent of something else and so abandons his project in favour of the new matter of interest. Thus,

> “In the ambiguity of the way things have been publicly interpreted, talking about things ahead of the game and surmising curiously, gets passed off as what is really happening [*das eigentliche Geschehen*], while taking action and carrying something

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\(^{165}\) *SZ*, p. 173, “Dieses Auf-der-Spur-sein, und zwar vom Hörensagen her… ist die verfänglichste Weise, in der die Zweideutigkeit Möglichkeiten des Daseins vorgibt, um sie auch schon in ihrer Kraft zu ersticken.”

\(^{166}\) Cf., Kierkegaard, S., *Stages on Life’s Way*.

\(^{167}\) *SZ*, p. 173.

\(^{168}\) *SZ*, p. 174.

\(^{169}\) *SZ*, p. 174, “Sofern nun aber die Zeit des sich einsetzenden Daseins in der Verschwiegenheit des Durchführung und des echten Scheiterns eine andere ist, öffentlich gesehen eine wesentlich langsamere, als die des Geredes, das ‘schneller lebt’, ist dies Gerede längst bei einem anderen, dem jeweilig Neuesten angekommen.”
through gets stamped as something merely subsequent and unimportant. Thus, Dasein’s understanding in das Man is constantly going wrong [versieht] in its projects, as regards the genuine possibilities of being.’’

Ambiguity goes hand in hand with curiosity and idle talk to alienate Dasein from its authentic possibilities. For everyday Dasein entangled in the ways of being of das Man is constantly uprooting itself in a process of ever increasing flight and distraction. Idle talk keeps surmising about what is happening and what “they” are doing, curiosity constantly keeps Dasein in a state of perpetual motion, seeking ever new novelties and diversions, which ambiguity passes off as “the latest” and then rejects it as “out of date”.

“Heidegger’s remarks on how “loud idle talk” and “ingenious curiosity” create the semblance of activity, significance, and involvement, in which “nothing” is really happening. For the other (including oneself) is seen in terms of what they say about him; hence, what gets passed along about one is constitutive for how one is seen in the eyes of das Man. Therefore, the possibility of a genuine access to the other is cancelled for “into primordial being-with-one-another, idle talk has slipped in”.  

“Zwischen das ursprüngliche Miteinandersein schiebt sich zunächst das Gerede.”

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172 SZ, p. 174, “Zwischen das ursprüngliche Miteinandersein schiebt sich zunächst das Gerede.”
“Being-with-one-another in das Man is by no means an indifferent side-by-sideness in which everything has been settled, but rather an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-in. Under the mask of ‘for one another’ an ‘against-one-another is at play.’”\(^\text{173}\)

I have been following Heidegger as he sketches out the ways of being through which Dasein alienates himself from his authentic possibilities. I suggest that Heidegger’s analysis portrays this condition in das Man existence, as “uprooted”, “groundless”, “null”, and “alienated”.

To further develop this interpretation, we must examine more closely the interconnection between the ways of being examined in this section and the inauthenticity of das Man. I hope to have stressed the interconnection of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity while exhibiting and describing these everyday ways of being. What will be of concern in the next point is “the kind of being which belongs to this interconnection.”\(^\text{174}\) This interpretation will further explain how Dasein becomes das Man and how the phenomena described in this section constitutes the inauthentic self.

c) The Place and Movement of Presence in Inauthenticity

1) Motion (κίνησις) and Rest (ἡρεμία)

In order to support this interpretation one must clarify the grounds upon which this interpretation may stand out for itself, namely the meaning of **motion** or **movement**. I will raise some further questions about the nature of the fall and how this is possible by making a re-reading and appropriation of Aristotle concepts of ὑαπαμάζειν (wonder) in the *Metaphysics* and πάθος (affection) in the *Nichomachean Ethics* upon which Heidegger is able to speak of alienation and change (Umschlag).

Brogan mentions that: “For Heidegger, the fundamental horizon of Aristotle’s philosophical questioning is the problem of movement, and it is in the *Physics* that

\(^{173}\) *SZ*, p. 175, “Das Miteinandersein im Man ist ganz und gar nicht ein abgeschlossenes, gleichgültiges Nebeneinander, sondern ein gespanntes, zweideutiges Aufeinander-aufpassen, ein heimliches Sich-gegenseitig-abhören. Unter der Maske des Füreinander spielt ein Gegeneinander.”

\(^{174}\) *SZ*, p. 175, “Die Seinsart dieses Zusammenhanges (...)”
Aristotle most explicitly addressed this issue\textsuperscript{175}. In the following steps I will see how in Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity there is an underlying centrality of the concept of motion (\kappa\upi\upsilon\nu\sigma\iota\varsigma) as an ontological notion at the very heart of Aristotle’s understanding of being. I will therefore in the following points make appeal to specific steps from a post-Being and Time 1939 essay \textit{On the Essence and Concept of Physis: Aristotele’s Physics} B1 (GA9) in order to substantiate the problem of movement (Bewegung) that articulates the analysis of facticity described in falling, anxiety, death and conscience. This analysis should finally enable us to thematize the \alpha\lambda\iota\theta\epsilon\zeta\varepsilon\iota\nu of inauthenticity: withdrawal and authenticity emerge as the “way out” of Dasein’s fall into das Man and its alienation from its self-being.

Heidegger’s analysis in \textit{Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις. Aristoteles, Physik B, 1} (1939) and in the second chapter of \textit{Platon: Sophistes} make explicit the implicit phenomenological meaning of presence in Aristotle’s treatment of \phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma which opens up the horizon to think being in the sense of a double \alpha\rho\chi\iota:\ emergence and movement. Heidegger finds in Aristotle thinking of \phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma the aim to show the connection between the question of being and therefore the thinking of \phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma.

Although \phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma is left untranslated by Heidegger he suggests that we can translate it as \textit{Aufgang} in the sense of the emergence of being, the coming forth of the show up, \phi\omicron\upsilon\nu\epsilon\iota\upsilon\nu to appearance, that is the appearance itself as the emerging \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma in relation to the whole of nature and therefore phenomenology itself.

Phenomenology is a way that brings up to the light the self showing that reveals the appearance of being in its being. Aristotle makes explicit the pre-understanding of being as a whole through movement. \kappa\iota\nu\pi\theta\iota\varsigma is the phenomenon that opens the access to the being of beings as the self-concealing revealing, and \omicron\upsilon\sigma\omicron\alpha is itself the horizon of \phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma as presencing of the absencing that is on the way from itself unto itself.

We aim to examine the phenomenological operators \epsilon\iota\delta\epsilon\nu\omega\omicron\iota and \epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\sigma\omicron\sigma\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicr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the self-concealing

\begin{footnotesize}
\\textsuperscript{175} Brogan, W., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 21.
\\textsuperscript{176} This is fragment 123 of Heraclitus (taken from Porphyry) \textit{apud WBP}, p. 300.
\end{footnotesize}
revealing of φύσις. Place is the ontological determination of the knowing as the leading forth of the φανέων, the ἀέαν to the ἀέαν τί which is the holding together of the being of the whole through νόος with the distribution of the unity of being to the particular seeing of each being, ἀλογησις.

The purpose is to demonstrate how Heidegger considers Aristotle to think within the ontological difference, namely by articulating the notions of the whole, ὅλον, with being as it initially presents itself, ἐκαστον, as the way of revealing how is Dasein gathered together as a whole holding itself as such in relation to what is common, κοινῷν, as the separate, χώρις. It is this insight that being differs in itself, in its oneness that puts Aristotle attuned to the ontological difference but not thematizing it as such.

This lead us to the conclusion that the beingness of being corresponds to the double ἀρχὴ of υσικ, one that unites the being, ὅν, to the many, πολλά, to the double mouvement of change and permanence in beings: the co-presence of the one in the many and the many in the one.

I suggest that the problem of place set forth by Aristotle on implicit ontological grounds (as Heidegger remarked in the so-called Nathorp Report177) is connected with the capacity to hold together the perception (νοος) of the whole and the sense perception (ἀλογησις) of the individual that is constituted by this whole. The knowledge Aristotle is seeking in Physics can only be reached within a framework of a ‘phenomenology’ of beings that asks the question what beings must be so that they can show themselves as they are in such a way that we can know beings in their being through having already recognized them.

In order to reach the notion of τόπος we must first proceed from the analysis of φύσις and motion, δύναμις since they open up the full ontological meaning and character of place.

The first objective is to indicate the phenomenological operators of Physics which will put us on track toward the ontological-temporal determinations of τόπος in the φύσει δύνα.

177 Cf. PIA, pp. 43–44, “Aristoteles interpretiert die je nach den entsprechenden Seinsregionen verschiedenen Weisen der Umgangserhellung (Umsicht, Einsicht, Hinsicht) in einem ursprünglichen Problemzusammenhang als Vollzugsweisen des reinen, überhaupt Sicht gebenden Vernehmens auf ihre mögliche Grundleistung der Seinsaneignung und Verwahrung. (…) Durch die Interpretation dieses Stückes soll von vornherein der phänomenale Horizont gewonnen warden.”
The second objective is to demonstrate how the possibility of appearance of each particular being, ἐκαστὸν, grounds in the ontological determinateness of place as the ἄει δυν of the ἐἶναι, the original structure of self-showing, thence revealing that each particular appearance has its roots in the νοῦς as the making lie-open of every possible openness of being that makes every particular being visible and intelligible.

The double possibility of φύσις – the φανένι of the νούμενον and the νούμενον in ἀισθησις – constitutes the essential temporal structure of co-presence of place in beings in terms of the possibility of presence of a being: τόπος as δύναμις.

Aristotle starts the inquiry on Physic by indicating a way to go after the first principles rooted in the phenomenological operators of “to know” (ἐπιστασθαί) and, also, “to know” (ἐπιστασθαί):

“Since to know (ἐπιστασθαί) and to know (ἐπιστασθαί) come together (συμβαίνει) in the way we go after the (μεθοδοῦς) principles (ἀρχαί), grounds (αἰτία) and...

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178 I have translated μεθοδοῦς as “the way we go after. Odos: way. Meta: after” rather than “systematic inquiry” or “systematical knowledge” as present in Charlton, W., Aristotle’s Physics I, II, translated with introduction and notes, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970, p. 1 or even “scientific knowledge” cf. ROSS, W. D., The Works of Aristotle, translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross, vol. II “Physica” by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1930. Charlton’s rendering of μεθοδοῦς to “systematical knowledge” is only possible at the cost of “translating” εἰδέναι and ἐπιστασθαί as disciplines. In the context of Physics specially of an inquiry peri aρχαί which are the termini a quo of Aristotle’s account of Physics in particular the Metaphysics (stated right in the first three lines). Εἰδέναι and ἐπιστασθαί are the phenomenological operators which reveal Aristotle’s programmatic teleological method of treatment of the scientific treatises. On this regard the method will always work as a manner of inquiry to the own matter of thought rather than a kind of knowledge and much less a scientific one. The operators εἰδέναι and ἐπιστασθαί are the conditions of possibility of a (μεθοδοῦς) on the various kinds of αἰτία and therefore they can never be assumed as a scientific proof for they ineplexibly (in this first line) refer to γνώριμον ἡμῖν instead of γνώριμον τῇ φύσει (vide further developments on footnote 8).

179 Αἰτία could be best rendered to “grounds” instead of “causes”. Catriona Hanley suggests that either “cause” or “explanation” fails to express the ontic conditions of αἰτία since a “cause” or an “explanation” is already dependent upon an interpretation of a state of affairs. To identify αἰτία with a ground means already to open the way to the ontic conditions of its explanation and so to its “explanatory grounds”. This solution is adopted by the German and French commentary and it’s the one which best expresses the phenomenological sense of αἰτία: “To use “cause” to translate the term is to distort the etymological meaning of αἰτία, as well as to betray the technical use that Aristotle makes of the word. “Cause” in our mechanistic age suggests only what Aristotle calls “he ti próton ekíne”, that which initiated the change, or the “efficient cause”. It leads the reader away from the more complex Aristotelian notion of “responsibility” or “guilt” that the term αἰτία implies. (...) “Grounds”, on the other hand, has a given legitimacy. Its definition (…) as “fundamental principle”, or “circumstance on which an opinion, inference, argument, statement or claim is founded” is consistent with the Greek meaning. Because the term relates both to the epistemic condition of knowing the reason why (“fundamental principle”), and (primarily) to the “objective” conditions in the world that make such knowledge possible (the “circumstance” on which claims are founded),
elements (στοιχεῖα) it arises (γνωρίζειν) from those (we think (σώμεθα) we have knowledge when we have found its primary grounds (αἴτια) and principles (ἀρχαί), and followed it back (μετὰπ) to its elements) [that] clearly, then, knowledge about nature must start with an attempt to settle questions about principles” (184 a10-16)

The terms ειδέναι and επιστασθαι are translated by the traditional commentary either by “systematical knowledge” (Charlton) or “scientific knowledge” (Ross). This trend is followed by all the commentators and reveal inconsistencies both at a syntactic and philosophical level for they miss out the phenomenological meaning of ειδέναι and επιστασθαι which determine the method of Physics.

Ειδέναι is in fact, “to know”, but it is also an aorist indicative infinitive that in Greek has the meaning of having already seen something, to recognise by already being able to recognise. On the other hand επιστασθαι has the same meaning – “to know” – but as a present middle infinitive it has the sense of standing for itself, something that stands for itself and therefore concerns the self standing of something to be worked out. In this sense the possible interpretive

“grounds” is adequate in conveying the sense of “responsibility” that the Greek word carries. It is wide enough, and abstract enough, to apply to all of Aristotle’s four αἴτια as technical terms.”. Cf. Hanley, C., Being and God In Aristotle and Heidegger – The Role of Method in Thinking the Infinite, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, pp. 8-9.

We adopt the constructive sense of σώμεθα rather than the radical sense of supposition, assumption [apparently closer to the text] since to think means here to be genuinely convinced of having knowledge of a thing once we have found its primary grounds (commonly causes lato sensu). But truly we cannot be sure of this unless we actually grasp the first principles and that is why (ideally at least) we must keep in sight the radical sense for in fact what we think is only a supposition and a contingency until we prove it. What Aristotle is saying is this: we can only be certain to have knowledge of a thing when we get to first principles. As long as we start that journey we can’t do anything but assume it. And that’s fine because it is what we have. More than a doubt it is our only certainty that will be put to test. The only way to doubt is to put our knowledge to test. On the other hand, adopting the radical sense of σώμεθα would mean rendering it as a pure supposition which inevitably would originate a contingency. This option is grammatically wrong for it refers to a future tense which doesn’t exist in this sentence. Although the constructive case of σώματι (specially used in Homer) is mostly “constructed” with the infinitive future (still keeping in view its radical sense) we have here a special case of the infinitive built with a present (not with a future sense but a real present) whose subject is being supplied from the context and not sine accusativo as often happens. This means that σώμεθα γινώσκειν ἐκαστόν works also as a doxographic statement (we think we have knowledge when…). The possible existence of a doubt here (exception made to the radical Cartesian doubt!) in the relative adverb “when” taken as conditional and therefore a “condition” of knowledge would still have to be dismissed because it lacks the universal character of knowledge). Cf. Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R, A Greek-English Lexicon, fifth edition, revised and augmented, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1844.

“Επειδή τε ειδέναι καθ’ τε επιστασθαί συμβιβαίνει περί πάσας τας μεθόδους, ὡν εἰσίν ἄρχαι ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεία, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τοτε γαρ σώμεθα γινώσκειν ἐκαστόν, ὅταν τα αἴτια γνωρίσωμεν τα πρῶτα καὶ τας ἄρχας τας πρώτας καὶ μετρὶ τῶν στοιχείων), δήλων ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσισθαι πρῶτον τα περὶ τας ἄρχας. Aristotle, Physics, 184a 10-16. 87
meanings for εἰδέναι can be “to be already present” and for ἐπισταθαι “presencing”.

The use of ἀρχαί, αἰτία and στοιχείων almost as synonyms is a sign that Aristotle will use them indiscriminately throughout book 1 to explain the internal principles of a natural body rather than establishing an immediate distinction between them. The fact that book 1 is concerned with the elements of a natural body (matter and form) also justifies the limitative use of ἀρχαί, αἰτία and στοιχείων in this introductory paragraph. This connexion will be further explored in book 2 as the object of study of the physicist 182.

“The way of bringing into light (πέφυκε) is to proceed from what is clearer (ἡ ὁδὸς) and more knowable to us (δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν καὶ σαφεστέρων); to what is more knowable and clearer by nature (ἐπὶ τὰ σαφεστέρα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτέρα); for the same things are not knowable to us (σὺ γὰρ ταύτα ἡμῖν τε γνωρίμα) and [knowable] without qualification (καὶ ἀπλώς).” (184a 16–18) 183

This trajectory is to be understood as a movement from what is clearer to us (ἡ ὁδὸς) to what is clearer by nature (ἐπὶ τὰ σαφεστέρα τῇ φύσει). 184

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182 Their difference in nuance can be further explored in Meta Delta 4. Cf. also Charlton, op. cit., p. 51 and Ross, op. cit., p. 456.

183 πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφεστέρα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτέρα; σὺ γὰρ ταύτα ἡμῖν τε γνωρίμα καὶ ἀπλῶς διότερ ἀναγκῆ τὸν τρόπον τούτου προαγεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφεστέρα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτέρα. ἦστι δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεκριμένα μᾶλλον ὅστεν ὅ ἐκ τούτων γινεται γνωρίμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί διαίρεσιν ταύτα. διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθολοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ καθ ἐκείνα δεὶ προέτρεψεν τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν σιδήριν γνωριμωτέραν, τὸ δὲ καθολοῦ ὅλον τι ἦστι πόλλα γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ως μέρη τὸ καθολόν, πεποίθη δὲ ταῦτα τούτον τρόπον τίμη καὶ τὰ ὄνομα πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὅλου γὰρ τί καὶ ἄδοριστοις σημαίνει, σῶν ὁ κυκλός, ὁ δὲ ὀρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαίρει εἰς τὰ καθ’ ἐκείνα καὶ τὰ παῖδα τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσογορεῖν πάντας τοὺς ἀνάδρας πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τας γυναικας, ὅστεν δὲ διορίζει τούτων ἐκατέρων’, Aristotle, Physics, 184a 16–18.

184 Ross claims that proceeding from τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτέρα is the opposite of a scientific proof that would proceed from nature and then to man, which is the reverse from τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτέρα τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν. He affirms that this is the opposite of the scientific proof implied in Analytical Posteriora I, 2 and clearly meets his own reservations to Paciūs’s interpretation of Aristotle’s proposed method of study. He affirms that this is the opposite of the scientific proof implied in Analytical Posteriora I, 2 and clearly meets his own reservations to Pacius’s interpretation of Aristotle’s proposed method of study the (archai) “Paciūs describes Aristotle as propounding three methods for the study of the first principles of physics: (1) the methodus resolutiva ab toto integrato ad partes integrantes; e.g. from a natural body into the matter and form that constitute it. This is the method described in a 21-3 and actually pursued in bk. i. (2) The methodus divisive ab universalibus et a notoribus secundum sensum ad particularia. This is the method described in a 23-6 and followed in natural philosophy generally as it passes from bodies in general (studied in the Physics) to simple bodies (De Caelo) and then to complex bodies (De Gen. et Corr., Meteor., and the biological treatises). (3) The methodus definitive a nominee ad definitionem, described in a 26 b 12 and used passim in the physical works. (…) Pacius seizes correctly the nature of the methods described (…) but he is clearly wrong in suggesting that Aristotle puts these forward as three distinct methods.” Ross, Physica. However to advance the possibility of a proof at this stage is already implicitly anticipating
Then again, Aristotle is pointing out the method of attaining knowledge of the ἀρχαί by saying that “πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίς” (184 a15) (we must start with an attempt to settle questions about principles) from things which are clearer to us, that is, from the perceptible objects to things that are clearer by nature and therefore more knowable. This means that knowledge of things that are clearer to us is not of the same sort of knowledge of things that are clearer by nature for the knowledge of things which are clearer to us is composite and the knowledge of things which are clearer by nature is simple.

“Hence we must start with things which are less clear by nature (ἀσαφεστέρον μὲν τῇ φύσει) but clearer to us (ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων) and move on to things which are clearer and more knowable by nature (ἐπὶ τὰ σαφεστέρα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτέρα.) The things which are in the first instance (τὸ πρῶτον) clear and plain to us are those which are compounded (τὰ συγκεχωμένα). It is only later (υπότερον) through an analysis of these, that we come to know elements (τὰ στοιχεῖα) and principles (ἀρχαί).” (184a 18-23)

Aristotle’s point is that we only gain access to the particular because we already have a καθολοῦ perspective, a universal perspective lato sensu. A καθολοῦ perspective corresponds to the way the whole, ὅλον, of that which encloses, περιέχου reveals itself in each particular, ἐκαστοῦ so that it works as the way of revealing Dasein as gathered together as a whole holding itself as such in relation a path which hasn’t yet been undertaken. Ross is still assuming that a method is a technique as a theoretical tool to confirm a theory which is already taken for granted. Method is not a technique for Aristotle. Rather it is a manner of inquiry that remains faithful to the matter of thought itself. The transition from τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτέρα comes from the same fold of nature and κινεσις and that’s why Aristotle indicates so clearly in the beginning of Physics the εἰδέναι and επιστασθαι: in order to point out the presencing character of being – which Heidegger brilliantly thematizes: κινεσις as οὐσία – presencing, “Es gilt jetzt, die Bewegtheit als οὐσία zu begreifen, und d.h. zu sagen, was Bewegtheit denn sei. Erst so heißt sich das Wesen der φύσις als der ἀρχή κινήσεως auf, und erst aus dem so aufgehellten Wesen der φύσις wird einsichtig, welch die μορφή mehr das Wesen der οὐσία erfüllt und deshalb mehr φύσις ist”, WBP 283. Cf. the same point in Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, Pfullingen, Günther Neske, Zweite, unveränderte Auflage, 1958 : “Aristoteles beginnt seine Vorlesung, indem er den Weg überlegt, auf dem das Denken dahin gelangt, das von-sich-her-Seiende, τὰ φύσει ὑπὸ hinsichtlich seines Seins und dieses Sein als φύσις zu umgrenzen. Der Weg heißt griechisch ὀδός; μετὰ heißt «nach»; μεθοδός ist der Weg, auf dem wir einer Sache nachgehen: die Methode. Es gilt, dem Sein des Seienden nachzugehen. Das Sein des von-sich-her-Aufgehenden und – Anwesenden heißt φύσις. Wie steht es nun mit dem Weg des Denkens, das unterwegs zur φύσις ist? Der Weg dahin empfängt seinen eigenen Charakter aus der Weise, wie das Sein des Seienden für den erkennenden Menschen offenbar ist”, p. 111. Vide also Heidegger’s Parmenides lectures parag. 4, pp. 87-88 about methodos.
to what is common, κοινόν as the separate, χωρίς. This is itself the pure appearance of the ἔιδέναι as prior condition of knowledge. For instance, when I see a dog I know it is a dog because I already possess a general characteristic (i.e. it is an animal) which allows me to say: “there’s a dog [i.e. crossing the road]”. It happens like this because when I see a dog I know already it is an animal so I don’t need to thematize a dog as an animal when I see it. I don’t say “Look! There’s an animal!” because I’m not referring to a universal but to an object of my concrete experience. I recognize a dog, a cat, a squirrel because I already possess a general characteristic (they are animals) which allows me to identify them as different species and distinguish them in their specificity. There is an alreadyness of being given in our access to the world. I see a library and not books, shelves, carpet, windows, because of the synthesis of recognition operating in my perspective and this is why the operator “to know” is so crucial: it makes the transition of being καθόλου rooted in the γνώριμον ἡμῖν that itself is a γνώριμον τῇ φύσει. The possibility of understanding as that which constitutes knowledge, σοφία, stands therefore between the double stance of the νοῦς of the ὅλον in each ἐκαστὸν opening up the horizon where beings are revealed in their being. All particular presencing, ἐπίσθασται derives from the same fold of being manifest in the simple appearance of the ἔιδέναι.

In this paragraph Aristotle is describing how the structure of the presentation of the world is made of compounded determinations συγκεχυμένα. The compound of a thing, i.e. a dog, is a multiplicity of determinations which I cannot keep in view (the way the bones are connected, the aspect of the fur, the different

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185 This transition is connected with the nature of what is τῷ σοφῆς, the clear, the manifest and therefore with that from which fusis speaks of: sein. Fusis is the showing of the manifest such that the being of beings points itself out of the very own way onto itself: “pecies δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνώριμοτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφέστερων ἐπὶ τα σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνώριμοτέρα” (184 a 16 ff.). Cf. Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, ed. cit., “(…) was der Name φυσίς sagt, das Sein. Das zuerst gennante Offenkundigere, d.h. das für uns Zugänglichere, ist das jeweilige Seinde. Der Weg der Philosophie führt nun nach dem Satz des Aristoteles von dem für uns Offenkundigeren aus auf das an ihm selbst von-sich-her-Aufgehende zu. Mithin erblicken wir das Sein nie unmittelbar. Dies liegt daran, daß unsere Augen nicht ohne weiteres zum Erblicken des Seins taugen, also keineswegs daran, daß das Sein sich entzieht. Der Satz des Aristoteles sagt vielmehr genau das Gegenteil von dem, was er uns durch seine Anführung doch bezwecken soll, daß nämlich das Sein selbst sich entziehe. Aristoteles sagt: Die φύσις und was zu ihr gehört, ist τα ἁπλὰς σαφέστερα. Sein ist das von sich her Offenkundigere. Ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob es von uns eigens erblickt wird oder nicht, scheint es schon; denn es scheint bereits auch dort, wo wir das erfahren, was nur für uns das Offenkundigere ist: das jeweilig Seiende. Solches zeigt sich nur im Licht von Sein”, p. 113.
shades of fur, the aspect of the muscles when they are moving, etc...) but know are there. This means that I cannot keep in view all the parts of the compound “dog” either because I can’t see them, they remain out of sight, and because those parts are diluted in the general καθόλου presentation.

What is shown in this paragraph is that our immediate access to the world, the way we see the world, is affected by a phenomenon of immediate encounter of the things presented. To see a person, a dog or a flower is not problematic even if we can’t see all the aspects of each one precisely because the transition from the recognition of the generic nature of an object to the recognition of its specific nature is synthetic a priori (to use the Kantian formulation) in a καθόλου presentation. And this is why things which are clearer to us are not the things which are clearer by nature. For what we take to be clear to us involves ἁσάφεια, a lack of clarity in such a way that we tend to think that the whole of things which is ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρον (the clearer to us) is also what by nature is less clear σαφεστέρον μὲν τῇ φύσει. Again, Aristotle is saying that our access to the world is topsy-turvy, unbiased since what we know is no other but a result of an amalgamation of non-examined perspectives. This process is illustrated with the example of children who first call all men “father” and all women “mother” and only gradually come to distinguish “who’s who”.

2) Being moved (κινεῖσθαι) and the Origin of the Movement (ἀρχὴ κινήσεως)

The problem of self-motion/mover in the definition of nature still holds in some commentaries on Aristotle. We hope to clarify it with the analysis of the verb κινεῖσθαι along with its correlate ἀρχὴ κινήσεως

186 The description of a “καθόλου” progression to a “καθ’ ἐκαστον” is examined by the philosopher Carvalho, M. J.. He advances that “the beginning of Phys. and the more common version of the “epagogic” progression of the “καθ’ ἐκαστον” to the “καθόλου” [was] developed in the medieval thought inspired in Aristotle, specially in the works of Duns Scotus. The analysis of this progression as resoluto is drawn from the natural presentation to its outer limits, to its most primary factors (the ultimate elements). This analysis is associated with the project of a scientia transcendens which works as the common radical of all determinations. It is in the context of a scientia transcendens that the identification of a compound, a confuse character of the system of determinations has to be understood.”

187 “Physis has been (ἐπεὶ δ’ ἂν) defined as a principle of motion and change (ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς) so that the way we follow (μεθοδοὺς ἡμῖν) is on the meaning of motion (τι
Aristotle says that:

“nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute” (ὥς ὁμολογήσῃ τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἥρεμειν ἐν ὦ ὑπάρχει πρῶτος καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς) (Phys. 192 b 22-23).

The analysis of κινεῖσθαι as a Greek homographic verb shows us that there is a meaning for each voice. In this case a middle voice or passive voice. It also reveals that Aristotle was aware of this form when he contrasted it with its homographic correlate in order to avoid a possible ambiguity concerning the understanding of the mover/motion pair. This analysis also radically changes the traditional discussion of τόπος since τόπος is to be determined by the way it relates to motion, so if motion is now clarified so will topos. Aristotle thinks motion in terms of the manifold and thinks the multiple changing appearances of being in terms of the same origin, the same ἀρχή. Thererefore every instance of movedness has a principle of ordering. One of Heidegger’s suggestions to translate arche is “ausgangliche Verfügung und Verfugenden Ausgang” [originating ordering and ordering origin] in the sense of αἰτίαν. Something which is the originating order (ἀρχή) is responsible for the fact that the constant present has a unique kind of standing-on-its-own.

188 Following Lang’s line of analysis, op. cit., when she confronts the various renderings of κινεῖσθαι by Hardie, Gaye, Graham, Charlton, Furley, Waterlow, Cohen, whom adopt the middle voice of κινεῖσθαι thus taking it as mover, cf. pp. 41-50.

189 Heidegger’s point is precisely to show that φύσις is “das, was ein eigengeartetes Insichtstehen von Ständigem verschuldet” thus finding in arche a more definitive term to express the word aition, ground in the more specific sense of fusis as origin and beginning. Vide Heidegger, Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις, GA 9: “vVon diesem nämlich/das aus der φύσις her ist, was es ist und wie es ist/hat ein Jegliches in ihm selbst die ausgängliche Verfügung (ἀρχή) über die Bewegtheit und den Stillstand (Ruhe), wobei Bewegtheit und Ruhe das eine Mal hinsichtlich des Ortes, das andere Mal hinsichtlich der Mehrung und Minderung, das andere Mal hinsichtlich der Änderung (Wandlung) gemeint sind.” (192 b 13-15) Hier steht für αἰτίαν und αἴτια ausdrücklich das Wort ἀρχή. Die Griechen hören aus diesem Wort meist sin Doppeltes heraus: ἀρχή meint einmal das, von woher etwas seinen Ausgang und Anfang nimmt; zum anderen aber das, was zugleich als dieser Ausgang und Anfang über das Andere, was von ihm ausgeht, weggreift und so es einbehält und damit beherrscht. ἀρχή bedeutet zumal Anfang und Herrschaft. In einer
The identification of nature as a self-mover in *Phys.* II, 1, cannot be attributed exclusively to the voice of κινεῖσθαι. This option has historical roots back to Philoponus when he replaces κινεῖσθαι by ἀρχὴ κινήσεως making the point that the verb is not ambiguous. A closer look to the initial lines of *Phys.* III, 1, 200 b10 reveals that Aristotle uses ἀρχὴ κινήσεως and κινεῖσθαι in 200 b 22 which suggests that he is clear about the proper voice to use: the passive voice. Had Aristotle intended to use the middle voice he wouldn’t have introduced ἀρχὴ κινήσεως to refer to nature as a “principle of motion” for to use ἀρχὴ κινήσεως is to take an active verb with an object or passive with an agent which dismisses any trace of a possible reflexive usage of the middle voice. This point can only be made on more substantial grounds if we consider the general use of κινεῖσθαι in *Phys.* II, 192b 9-11 which is the starting point for an analysis of motion. For clearly the use of the passive voice refers to things by nature. Since things by nature contain a principle of motion and are the subject matter of *Physics*, our enquiry (μεθόδους ἡμῶν) is on the meaning of motion (τί ἐστι κίνησις) for if it were unknown (λαμβάνειν), the meaning of nature too would be unknown [λαμβάνειν] (φύσεως ἐστι). (*Phys.*, III, I 200b 10-15). The being of beings is is the enduring character and presence of the showing, the σωμ of rest (ἡρεμοῦ) and movement (κίνησις). Being is κίνησις in its state of movedness and φύσις is the origin of the movedness.

The way Aristotle states the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως¹⁰⁰ (*Phys.* III, I 200b 10) indicates that the elements are moved by something. This “something” is the very notion of evidence as the indicative of motion: δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς, *Phys.*, A, 2, 185 a 12 ff.) Hence the meaning of as that which leads towards what comes in view as i.e. living things, trees, stars. The sense of ἐπαγωγή is central in the first steps of Aristotle’s *Physics* for it opens the horizon to think κίνησις from movedness but in a way that points out the capacity of beings of seeing being as such in the whole. Ἐπαγωγή is the previous understanding of the being of beings

¹⁰⁰ The problem of κίνησις and its implications in the analysis of φύσις goes from *Physics* III to VIII to the broader discussion of movers and self-movers within the various commentaries.
in a way of the ἐπίσθοστοι, the presencing and making visible what stands there in view\textsuperscript{191}.

On this regard nature is to be understood in terms of the process of potency and actuality as a source of being moved and being at rest. What we understand as an intrinsic source of motion is the unique active orientation of a thing towards its own being – it can be a potency, moved, to the actuality of being moved. Τέλος is the coming to appearance of the ἐίδος of a thing in its ability to be fulfilled such that it comes to full presence. Ἐντελεχεία is the ἔν that comes to full presence as having-itself-in-its-end. The αἰτιόν is the responsible ground of bringing being into appearance. By unfolding the ἔν of the ἐίδος with the τέλος that holds itself, ἔχειν, that is, as Heidegger puts it “das τέλος, das Ende, worin sich die Bewegung des Ausblickens erst auffängt und wesentlich Bewegtheit ist”\textsuperscript{192} [the end where the movement of seeing first gathers itself up and essentially in movedness] we can already foresee how τόπος as the ποῦ will determine the σῶς of each being that is at this stage only thought in terms of every instance of change – the τέλος with the αἰτιόν in the overlapping appearances of movedness and their fundamental character of μεταβολή. Place is the most self-consistent δύναμις of all beings in their beingness, thereby it is the constitutive presence of δύναμις in beings that, ifself, is a mode of presencing of the already present, εἶδος. Therefore, Aristotle is just advancing at this initial stage of Physics that Ἐντελέχεια is ὑσία in the essence of movedness because rest, πρεμέειν, is what most perfectly shows ὑσία: the stable presencing in appearance. What Aristotle will say later on – and this is one of the main points Heidegger makes in his discussion on κίνησις and ἐνέργεια in Meta and WBP - is that the most intrinsically stable presence is ἐνέργεια and not δύναμις since ἐνέργεια is πρῶτον in terms of ὑσία (Meta., Θ 8, 1049 b 10, 11)\textsuperscript{193}.

\textsuperscript{191} Heidegger explores the notion of ἐπαγωγή in WBP adverting to the risks of translating it for “induction” since “Ἐπαγωγή meint nicht das Durchlaufen einzelner Tatsachen und Tatsachenreihen, aus deren ähnlichen Eigenschaften dann auf ein Gemeinsames und »Allgemeines« geschlossen wird. Ἐπαγωγή bedeutet die Hinführung auf Jenes, was in den Blick kommt, indem wir zuvor über das einzelne Seiende weg blicken, und wohin? Auf das Sein”, p. 244. Cf. also Walter Brogan’s discussion of Ἐπαγωγή in op. cit., pp. 27-30.

\textsuperscript{192} Cf., WBP, GA 9, p. 285.

\textsuperscript{193} This discussion is made by Heidegger in WBP and it is connected with the very own determinateness of φύσις and κίνησις in the sense that “Das Wesen der κίνησις aber ist die Ἐντελέχεια, die ihrerseits das Wesen der ὑσία ursprünglicher, mehr erfüllt als die δύναμις.
But what is the “where” of a thing in relation to its nature? This is a crucial point to understand the arguments of *Phys. II* where Aristotle asks whether nature is more properly identified with matter or form. After defining motion in natural things as the “where” of a thing in relation to its nature, Aristotle is now being more specific and enquiring into what extent is nature to be more properly identified: matter or form. Matter and form shall be seen as the conditions of possibility of Aristotle’s definition of nature (nature will be identified as form) and motion for motion is pressuposed by a definition of nature and nature is entangled in the definition of motion because natural things contain an intrinsic source of motion and rest. By understanding the form and matter pair we are already opening the way to unfold the meaning of *potentiality* and *actuality* as the operators of motion. Motion is to be fully understood as the relation between the actuality of the mover and the potentiality of the moved.

The relation of nature to matter and form has to be seen through the specification of natural being (φύσις ἔστιν) and being by nature (φύσις δέ). If, as we saw, natural things contain an intrinsic principle of being moved and being at rest this is due to “the action [actuality] of the mover (τοῦ κινητικοῦ δὲ ἐνέργεια) [which] is no other than (οὐκ ἄλλη ἔστιν) the actuality of both [the mover and the moved] δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἐντελεχείαν ἁμφοῖν.” (*Phys. III, 3, 202 a 15-16*).  

194 The moving from a potential state (δυνάμει) to an actualized state (ἐντελεχεία) is the becoming of a thing in itself.  

195 The key to understand place is in the “where” of the becoming of natural things. Place is a separation of being and becoming, it is the χώρα, the place of place which is the separation and
gathering of beings in their appearance. Thus we have to understand place as the matrix of significance of the encountered being in beings. This means that, once place itself emerges, it will become the “where” of the δια, self-pointing, of the pure seeing (Θεώρησις) because letting something be in its destinations means emerge out of the inconspicuousness to the conspicuousness, that is, presence.

Place is the condition of possibility not only of encountering beings in their being but of disclosing them in the coming back and going forth of their presence, the first signs of temporal ecstasies which are not just transports in which we are carried away but which are the “where to” of the transport.

After the analysis of Phys. IV we will relate the discussion of τόπος with the de Anima so that we may understand the meaning of time. Time as place is the self-same which gives motion and direction to heaven and earth, taking the substantial form of the εὖ (one) of the εἶναι (being) to an altogether different level. Time and Place hold essentiality in the ψυχή (soul) through νοῦς (thought). The capacity of the soul to become the contemplation is the gathering together of what it continues to be through the motion of what moves, the underlying οὐσία (the present being) of things themselves preserved in their own beginning. Soul always remains unmoved within the moved, within place as the αἰεί (the always, the ever) of the becoming and the non-being of appearances.

The central point of this discussion is to understand what brings together the emergence of place with beings and beings with place. What kind of αἰτία is operating in φύσις (nature) and τόπος (place) such that beings can come to a stand sustaining themselves in their limit (πέρας) by place?

One of the clues to understand this relation lies in the way place is connected with the capacity to hold together the perception (νοῦς) of the whole and the sense perception (αἰσθησις) of the individual that is constituted by this whole. The visibility of the seen always implies that I am already-present with respect to what calls forth my understanding either I recognize a being in its presence (εἰδούναι) or come to know a being by its presencing (επιστασθομαι). This means that the

Ort. Platon will sagen: das Seiende und das Sein an verschiedenen Orten. Seiendes und Sein sind verschieden geortet.” Heidegger’s point is, as already remarked by Hemming, that “(...) this separation of being ‘over there’ from the beings here, destroys the genuine relation of beings to being in their being: the being of beings is given by beings themselves, it is not separable, nor separated, from them”, cf. Hemming, L. P., Postmodernity’s Transcending – Devaluing God, Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 2005, p. 72.
visibility of the seeing is the bringing together of the being into its έιδος and that’s what renders a being visible. A being comes to φύσις through a συνεστάναι, a holding together in itself in the togetherness of its cause, of its being brought to a standstill, to place.

The task here is to think the meaning of place as the distribution of the unity of the cosmos to every particular being. Thinking place as the essential οὐσία (being) of the τί (this) of a being is to already understand that only a being which is in a τί can be. A being in its τί can’t be just reduced to its material extension, as a mere location of a mass in place.

“Place is not an indifferent container that defines being but it is itself the περαξε, the limit (Phys. 212 a7) of the surrounding body. If it is the limit of the surrounding body it is also separated from a body yet belonging to the κοινόν, the community of beings”.

Aristotle is implicitly raising the analysis of place to an ontological level. The question of knowing how place works at the level of μεταβολή (the withdrawing-emerging) of beings while being the unity of the particular beings opens the question of place as the unity of the cosmos, the ontological unity of being that preserves beings in their sameness out of their difference.

The fact that the general meaning of μεταβολή is “change, alteration” demands a closer examination of this meaning for every change is a change from something to something from the out-of-which of place and being-toward-something in appearance – a change is always from something to something as Aristotle states in various steps of Phys. “πᾶσα μεταβολή ἐστιν ἐκ τινος εἰς τί” (Phys., I, 225 a 1) But what is the true meaning of this “something” out of which we change, i.e. how can a being appear (how can a young person age, how can the not-yet be already included in being), how can I endure, no longer be and not-yet be?

This change is already pointing out the expression of the unity of beings, the συνεσθάναι, that unites and brings apart beings in the enduring character of presence. That’s how Aristotle thinks of being in terms of motion. To endure in the sense that movement is continuous and gathered in the arrival of being and bound

197 Cf. full quotation, Lang, H., op. cit, pp. 41-50
198 Cf. the same sense in Phys., IV, 234 b 11, 252 a 10.
therein to its proper place. There is a kind of movement and hence continuity in \( \text{μεταβολή} \) that withdraws beings from what they have been and yet makes them resist to their what-is-to-be.

Literally, what Aristotle is saying is that:

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“ήτοι ταύτων ἐστί τὸ μεταβάλλειν καὶ τὸ ἀπολείπειν, ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἀπολείπειν, ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἀπολείπειν.” [everything that changes withdraws from (ἀπολείπειν – to leave behind, to forsake, to be absent) that from which it changes; and withdrawing, if not the same thing as changing follows it (ἀκολουθεῖ)] (Phys., V, 235 b 9-11)
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However, this is still a very brief account of \( \text{μεταβολή} \) for what is yet an insight into the implicit phenomenological meaning of Aristotle’s analysis of place has to be fully worked through the \( \text{ἐιδέναι/ἐπίστασθαι} \) articulation as the \( \text{ὅλον} \) (whole) of \( \text{ἐκαστὸν} \) (being as it initially presents itself) in the various steps of \( \text{Phys. IV, Meta. V, 26, Top. VI, 4 and Phys. I, 1.} \)

The importance of the \( \text{ὅλον} \) (whole) cannot be underestimated for not only it defines the character of place but its meaning in Aristotle’s thinking of the ontological difference. Although Aristotle thinks being as twofold he doesn’t thematize the difference as such. If we find that place works as the unity of the cosmos in every particular we can understand why each human being in the world is not only part of the whole but the expression of the whole in its being. Place operates in every particular as the ability a being has to be there, in such a way that, being there it is properly present. After this step we are able to relate it to the visibility of the seen, i.e. in terms of the articulation with \( \text{οὐσία} \) and the \( \text{κοτάκ} \) \( \text{συμβεβηκός} \) of the things seen. Place acts as an ontological principle of being in the sense of rendering visible, revealing the \( \text{ἀρχαί} \) of each being.

We are trying to secure with Aristotle a conceptuality framework to work on how Heidegger understands himself to be grounding his own phenomenological enquiry in what Aristotle’s enquiry was also grounded in. In other words, our aim is to assess the impact of Aristotle’s thinking as phenomenological basis of Heidegger’s own views on being in \( \text{Being and Time}. \)
The capacity to reveal the twofold is the defining characteristic of human being, according to Aristotle. Heidegger is evaluating this regard by thinking the twofold itself. The point is that the twofold shows in the doubling of the regard and not in a dualistic interpretation of human life. The seeds for this misunderstanding of the regard – as a way of revealing and seeing being – lie precisely on the very own way of grasping the meaning of revealing for we know that much of this dualistic coupure between apophantic circumspection and contemplation comes from Aristotle’s insistence that σοφία is a higher way of revealing than φρονησις (as the double regard itself).

The very important and remarkable historical analyses of Kisiel, van Buren, Caputo, Richardson, also explore the historical dimension of Aristotle in the development of Sein und Zeit but I shall argue that, although they throw light to the ontological connection of Aristotle with Heidegger, they still require a closer work with greek language at stake in each philosophical enquiry. By delivering the past to its own possibility I am allowing the past to adress me. The difficulty lies in the way I listen to it because there is always a planned direction to everything in life such as this thesis. Authenticity has much to do with this situadness of places with places in this overwhelming facticity that defines the being of life.

Let us come back to the point of the implicit phenomenological meaning in Aristotle’s analysis of place by the εἰδέναι/ἐπιστασθαι articulation in place as the ὅλον (whole) of ἐκαστον (being as it initially presents itself).

In the beginning of the Physics we read:

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199 This is an insight extensively treated by Brogan, W. op. cit.
200 Cf. a detailed discussion of this problem in PIA.
201 The clarification of the hermeneutical situation as the line of sight into which the past can be set is one of the major ideas explored by Kisiel such that “(...) Philosophical research is of its nature something which a “time” can never borrow from another; nor will it be able to claim to lift the burden and distress of radical questioning from future generations. The possibility of influencing its future can never be located in the results of a past philosophical inquiry, but instead in the originality of the questions which a time attains and concretely develops. As a paradigm for eliciting problems, philosophical research, through the [revolutionary power of] renewal implicit in that interrogative radicality, has the capacity to become the living present [καίρων] ever anew.”, Kisiel, T., The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, University of California Press, 1993, p. 253.
“We must start with things which are less clear by nature (άσαφεστέρου μὲν τῇ φύσει) but clearer to us (ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων) and move on to things which are clearer and more knowable by nature (ἐπὶ τα σαφεστερά τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτερά.) The things which are in the first instance (το πρώτον) clear and plain to us are those which are compounded (τα συγκεχυμένα). It is only later (υστερον) through an analysis of these, that we come to know elements (τα στοιχεία) and principles (ἀρχαί).” (184a 18-23)

This trajectory of knowledge pressuposes that there are things that are clearer to us and things that are clearer and more knowable by nature. In order to pressupose that a thing is clear to us we must somehow have already recognized the thing in its presencing to us, in the way of its appearance. The same applies for a thing which is clearer by nature, a thing that by its presence stands out for itself. In either case the visibility of a thing is possible because it is in a place and thence is determined by its being in place. What this means is that if a thing is determined by its being in place then place constitutes somehow the ὅλων of each ἐκαστον (man, horse, dog) in such a way that when I see a man, a dog or a cat I have a priori the possibility of the εἰδέναι or επιστασθαι of each one which allows me to recognize in their extanteness.

Although in Phys. III, 1 Aristotle states that his investigation of place will consider that which is “πάντων ἐίναι κοινά καὶ καθόλου ταῦτα” [common and universal for all things] while “υστερα γὰρ ἡ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων θεωρία τῆς περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐστιν” [the investigation of proper things will come later] it is evident that in Phys. III he is already anticipating a definition of place as a whole that will ultimately define the “single place” of each thing, thence the καθόλου ταῦτα.

In a way Aristotle is preparing the ontological grounds for determining the καθ’ ἀυτό (the for itself, the in virtue of itself) of each ἐκαστον (particular [thing]). Therefore, if “ὅλων λέγεται οὐ τε μηθεν ἄπεστι μέρος εξ ὧν λέγεται ὅλων φύσει [a ὅλων is said to be something in which nothing is absent, in which no part, no relevant piece, is missing] (Meta., V, 26, 1023 b 26 ff.) then place operates as an ontological cause of things since it is surrounding (περιέχου) of the being of each thing.
To know a thing is to see it in the twofold trajectory of the specific presence (εἰδέναι) or in the presencing (ἐπιστασθαι) of the ὅλον, place. The ability to know is immediately comprehensive of the whole “(ὅλον λέγεται) καὶ τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιεχόμενα ὥστε ἐν τι εἶναι ἐκεῖνα” [The ὅλον is the surrounding, in such a way that the things circumscribed form something like a one] (Meta., V, 26, 1023 b 27 ff.) in such a way that to know is either in the sense of that “ἳ γὰρ ὡς ἔκαστον ἐν] [everything circumscribed is one] or in a “ἳ ὡς ἕκ τούτων τὸ ἐν” [the one is to be grasped from the comprehended]. Thus, each, ἔκαστα, being itself part of the whole not only is connected directly to the primordial unity of place but also as a particular part that reveals the unity of place as the καθ-ὅλον stricto sensu. I can only gain access to my particular knowledge if I proceed from the inarticulated specific καθ of the ὅλον I interpret, that is καθ-ὅλον, in such a way that the ἐν is unfolded, Parmenides “ἐν τὰ πάντα” quoted by Aristotle in Phys. I, 2, 185 a 22 brought to the fore. The first problem is therefore to know how is place to contain each ἔκαστα and how each ἔκαστα is a part of the container. What kind of relation is operating in the in of place with things and what difficulties are involved in the problem of place in place?

Lang notes that “Aristotle raises the question of “whether a thing can be in itself, or whether nothing can be in itself – everything being either nowhere or in something else” (Phys., IV, 3, 210 a 25-27). The purpose is to show that a thing cannot be in itself directly because it is related to the whole. The illustrative example of the wine and the amphora show that neither the wine nor the amphora are in themselves but both are parts of the same whole (Phys. IV, 210 a 30-33). Yet place is no part of the thing (Phys., IV, 210 b 39). Place is the first unmoved body of what it limits, that is, it comprehends the particulars through the predication of each ἔκαστον so that every particular as such is a ὅλον which I access by λόγος. The being of each ἔκαστον is first revealed through the comprehensive completeness of place which shows itself as the ὅλον λεγόμενον . I understand that a jar is the contained and wine is the contained because within the whole these two parts remain distinct, not by themselves but unified into the united whole, of καθόλου κατηγορεῖσθαι.

The fact that the ὅλον is predicated of each ἔκαστον reveals another dimension of the ὅλον, namely that, not only every single thing is in itself the
όλου but also each ἕκαστα first constitutes the ἐν of the whole. The way to access the καθόλου is the ἐπίστασθαι and the ἕκαστον is the εἰδέναι for, as we have discussed earlier, knowledge of things that are clearer to us is not of the same sort of knowledge of things that are clearer by nature for the knowledge of things which are clearer to us is composite and the knowledge of things which are clearer by nature is simple\textsuperscript{203}. It is precisely this composite/simple nature that is at stake in the ὀλον λεγόμενον of the ἕκαστον.

Aristotle is touching here the phenomenological meaning of the εἰδέναι and the ἐπίστασθαι by capturing the distinctive feature of the καθόλου/ἔκαστον. When Aristotle says ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων he is referring to those things which are limited to visual appearance, in a pure level of presence, that is, to those things which are disclosed through an ἀίσθησις, the ὁι πολλοί. What this means is that a thing shows itself by its mere standing out. The εἰδέναι is a primary way of access to the factuality of a thing in the sense that a thing stands for itself while the ἐπίστασθαι is the presencing of a being, bringing being to a stand\textsuperscript{204}. This transition is relevant to understand the phenomenological sense of Aristotle’s claim that “place would not have been thought if there had not been a special kind of motion, namely that with respect to place” (Phys., IV, 10-13).

The understanding of the being of natural beings that is beginning to take shape in our discussion is that only a being that endures, stands and its held in its τέλος can be. In a way the εἰδέναι and ἐπίστασθαι don’t require a reduction of this being to a particular form of presence or presencing from which a given knowledge of being can be derived. Rather what is really important in the “to know” is the “to not yet have know”, that is, what Heidegger calls das Ungedachte in the sense of the unthought. In other words, having come forth into unhiddenness, stands there as the invariant τóδε τί. This movement is not the particular motion from place to place but rather the power beings have to move themselves through

\textsuperscript{203} Cf. Lang, H., \textit{op. cit.} and also Heidegger claims that the Greek voice of “Das ὀλον in καθόλου ist also gemäß der genitivischen Fassung dadurch ausgezeichnet, daß es sich nur insofern zeigt, als es ausdrücklich Thema wird, während das kathakaston in der aesthesis von selbst sich zeigt, ohne eigens Thema zu werden.”, \textit{Sophistes}, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{204} The way from the inarticulated καθόλου to an articulated ἔκαστον which is formulated by Aristotle at the beginning of \textit{Phys.}, I, 1 “ἐκ τῶν καθόλου εἰς τὰ καθ ἔκαστο δὲλ προειναι” shows, Heidegger claims, that “Aristoteles zugleich den Bewegungssinn der Geschichte der Seinsbefragung der φύσις, die seinen Forschungen vorausgegangen ist und die er ihm.”, cf. GA19, \textit{ed. cit.}, p. 89.
place. It is place that grants the ontological dimension to motion as the singular αἰτίον responsible for gathering the causes that bring being to stand in its being.

3) Unfolding the in of the hereness of beings: Eternal (αἰδιον) and Limit (πέρας)

As indicated, movement has to do with change of beings in place in such a way that “ήτοι ταύτων ἐστι τὸ μεταβάλλειν καὶ τὸ ἀπολείπειν, ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἀπολείπειν, ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἀπολείπειν.” [everything that changes withdraws from (ἀπολείπο – to leave behind, to forsake, to be absent) that from which it changes; and withdrawing, if not the same thing as changing follows it (ἀκολουθεο)] (Phys., V, 235 b 9-11)²⁰⁵.

What is at stake in a phenomenological comprehension of place is ultimately the comprehension of the in of place as the hereness of beings. We understand the in of place in the there of each ἐκαστὸν as locomotion, “it is necessary to understand that place would not be considered if there were not motion according to place”, (Phys., IV, 211 a 12-13). Although the discussion of the in is already in aperçu in Phys. III in terms of the distinction between a thing being moved in virtue of itself or accidentally (as also in Phys. II, 3, 195 a6, 195 b 2; VII, 1, 241 b 37-39; VIII, 4, 254 b 8-12) its discussion in Phys. IV refers only to the accidental motion²⁰⁶. But this is just an apparent problem for by trying to show that, i.e. when I move my hand the fingers move accidentally because they are part of the hand, Aristotle is actually trying to understand how a thing can be “in” another. What sort of access is there of a thing in its local place and a thing related to place as a whole?

Again, the question is to know how place is related to beings at hand and at the same time transcending the givenness and availability of beings. It is a distinction between the ἐκαστά and their ὀλον, that is, between particular beings

²⁰⁵ This is Walter Brogan’s translation which I quote apud op. cit., p. 37.
²⁰⁶ Such as the parts of the body or a nail in a ship which cannot be moved by themselves but thorough its conjunction with something else, as whiteness or science. Cf. Phys. IV, 4, 211 a 19-24.
comprehended by their limit (place) in relation to cosmos. To understand place as the first unmoved limit of the cosmos we have first to understand what kind of articulation exists between place as a limit and cosmos as the everlasting (αἰτία):

Heidegger says in *Einführung in die Metaphysik*:

“But this standing there upright in itself, coming to a stand and remaining in the *stand*, is what the Greeks understood as being. Yet what comes to a stand and endures in itself thereby emerges forth freely of itself into the necessity of its limit, *peras*. This limit is not something that comes to the being from outside. Still less is it a deficiency in the sense of a harmful restriction. No, the holding which governs itself from out of the limit, the having itself in which that which endures holds itself, is the being of beings. Even more, it first makes it a being as such in differentiation from non-being. Coming to a stand means therefore: to achieve limit, to limit itself. Consequently, a fundamental characteristic of beings is to be defined by a *telos*, which means not aim or purpose, but end. Here “end” is not meant in a negative sense, as though there were something about it that did not continue, that failed or ceased. End is ending in the sense of fulfilment (*Vollendung*). Limit and end are that with which the being begins to be”.

The articulation between πέρας and αἰτία and the way they reveal themselves in human being set the issue of τόπος (place) and κίνησις (motion) to a very complex ontological level. The striking feature of the greek construction is that the noun αἰτίαν is built with the adverb αἰτία with the verbal form ὄν. So the natural way of thinking the αἰτίαν would be an αἰτία ὄν, a forever being. Instead we have αἰτίαν. The Christian tradition has rendered αἰτίαν for *aeternitas* but its temporal meaning has faded with the idea that eternity is something “outside time”. Still the greek αἰτία appears in the latin prefix ae. The original meaning of the ὄν through the αἰτία, that is, the original meaning of *aeternitas* is thus not opposed to the *temporal* but expressing the “to return always”, the *everlasting* that *aeternitas* speaks of: sempiternal. If we understand *aeternitas* as the a-temporal, the

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inaccessible everlasting, we loose sight of the second half of the term ἀιδιον, the διος: that which is divine-like. Only a being that holds itself through time in the presence of the divine, is. This sets place in an altogether extraordinary crossroad at the very core of the ontological difference. This is the emergence of the very own ὑσις through the αει whose place is the first limit. This αει holds forth and endures, is from out there here in our lives. The ουσία of being lies precisely in this presence of the everlasting that remains in the shining of presence. If it shines it comes forth, holds itself forth and endures. The character of endurance shows itself, appears through a ὑποκείμενον, that which lies there underneath. We only endure in the presence of being through two modes: θεωρείν and ἀληθεύειν. The transition of the θεωρείν to the ἀληθεύειν is implicitly present in the way Aristotle articulates the εἰδέναι and ἐπιστασθαι. Both reveal our pre-cognitive, pre-theoretical being-in-the-world, that grants us the factual “to know” of being. θεωρείν as the “to see and behold” of the “to know in presence” (εἰδέναι) and ἀληθεύειν as the “to disclose and unconceal” of the “to know in presencing” ἐπιστασθαι. And yet the εἰδέναι, the presence of a thing which I have already recognised, is necessarily related to the θεωρείν. In fact, like αει, θεωρία is divine, it is the ὅραν, the look upon of the θεός in the ὄρατον, the visible, so it couldn’t be an ulterior moment of my access to a being. The αει of the look through θεός reveals itself in me through the immediate unity of the seeing and what is seen, θεωρία. This is the phenomenological and essential meaning of θεωρία, the pure seeing, the onlooking of the divine through the perception of the visible, νοῦς. θεωρία and ἀληθεία are in their originary togetherness through νοῦς, and this explains why Aristotle says in the De Anima that noetic being is ἀιδιον\(^\text{208}\). It is capable of being in and of itself. It has the character of necessity (ανάγκη).

\(^{208}\) Cf., ARISTOTLE, de Anima, with translation, introduction and notes by R. D. Hicks, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1907, "τὸ δ’ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ’ ἑνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρονὸς προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί· ὁλὸς δ’ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ· ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὅτε μεν νοεῖ ὅτε δ’ ὁ νοεῖ. χωρίσθεις δ’ ἐστὶ μονὸν τοῦτ’ ὅπερ ἦν· ἃ ἐν αὐτῷ” [Now actual knowledge is identical with the thing known, but potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual; and yet not universally prior in time. But this intellect has no intermittence in his thought. It is, however, only when separated that it is its true self, and this, its essential nature, alone is immortal and eternal", p. 135.}
Hence, we start to see how place starts to unlock ontological operators in Aristotle’s implicit phenomenological approach to philosophy, making very clear to us that he is thinking beings in terms of how they appear and how they are addressed by a λόγος oriented by its surroundings, that is, the ἀρχή/ὕστια and the various connections to κίνησις.

Being place the first unmoved limit of that it contains (Phys. IV, 4, 3, 210 a 21), one of its meanings is that it completes by circumscribing things in its presence. But what are the questions at stake in this claim? It seems clear that what is πέρας is the obvious opposite of what is ἀπειρός, without limit. But is it so? In fact, just apparently for the ἀπειρός is ἀιδίον, that is, ἀεὶ as the enduring of something in its isness and διος as that which has the power to hold itself through this permanence, then how can we conceive of this “return always”, this ever that lasts, as the enduring of a being limited and contained by place?

This is in fact the problem Aristotle himself had to struggle with: what is the meaning of κίνησις, how to understand the natural ὑστία of natural beings and how is ὑστία to be thought with κίνησις? In itself this question wouldn’t be problematic except that Aristotle had to think the ἀιδίον/ἀπειρόν connection in articulation with the ὀλον of the ἐκαστά in their togetherness. In other words, it required the greatest philosophical exertion for Aristotle to explain how was it possible that the ἀιδίον could be in a thing which is συμβεβηκός, accidental and therefore not eternal. How to make clear this subtle shift between accidental motion of the συμβεβηκός and the essential, enduring presence of being? How could Aristotle be able to solve the dilemma that motion and enduring presence are not mutually exclusive being the first, πέρας and the other, ἀεὶ – one appearance and another presencing of the presence?

A possible clue comes out from not thinking the obvious, that is, not to think the ἀεὶ and the πέρας in their difference but to think their difference out of their togetherness for the only genuine contrast to be made is out of the limit in relation to the limited, not out of the limited in relation to the unlimited. Otherwise we will incur in the same sort of traditional thinking of the ἀεὶ as a-temporal.

As Heidegger remarks, “diesen Gegensatz als den des »Ewigen« und des »Zeitlichen« (...) ist das erstlich vorliegende Verfassungslose das »Ewige«, aller
ruθμος als Wechsel das »Zeitliche«"\textsuperscript{209} thence making explicit the phenomenological dimension of Aristotle’s attempt of the that-it-is and the what-it-is of a being. When Aristotle names οὐσία as the enduring presence he had truly found the ἀίδιον the greeks understood as the essence of being.

The understanding of the temporal character of the ἀεί is leading us gradually to the very own ontological determination of τόπος place. Place as the ὄλον of each ἐκκαστον in its πέρας renders a thing determinate. To limit a thing is not to render it weaker or less determinate but on the contrary to serve as a “common boundary in relation to which points conjoin” (“ἐστι γὰρ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὄρον πρὸς δὲ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει (Cat. 6, 5 a 2) since limit means the last point of each thing, i.e. the first point within which every part is and therefore limit limits something by touching it. This common boundary can be understood as the gathering of πέραν with ἀίδιον and on this regard the granting of εἴδος to a thing. Being πέρας “the primary and ultimate, out of which it is impossible to take anything (indivisible) (Meta 1022 a4-14) it is also making beings what they are, namely, letting shine the τί ἐν ἔννοια. It is precisely this “letting shine” that constitutes the ἀεί of their presence since what endures holds itself there at any given time\textsuperscript{210}. As we have said, Man is the τὸ δὲ τί that is present in the whole and therefore is a part of the ἀίδιον holding itself in its in there as such, in its thereness: place. Hence, place renders each τί determined by being the self-determination of the very holding itself forth of a thing, its ὑποκείμενον. This very subtle relation of place as the indivisible of each τί with ἀίδιον as the shining of presence means that Aristotle is interpreting being in a no longer derived way but, as Heidegger remarks:

“ He thinks for the first time the individual being as the actual (Jeweilige), and thinks its lasting (Weile) as the distinctive manner of presencing, of the presencing of eidos itself in the most extreme present of the indivisible, that is, no longer derived, appearance (ἀτομον εἴδος) [the outward look that can be dissected no further, literally un-cut, un-mown] \textsuperscript{211}.”

\textsuperscript{48} Also, that’s why Heidegger will assign such an importance to his jeweils operator. The je from ewig in German and Weilig from weilen (dwell) come from ἀίδιον as i.e. aeternitas.
Therefore, a first understanding of place must keep in view that place has a
“δύναμις: ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν” (Phys., IV, 1 208 b 10 ff.) as the constitutive
presence of being. This starts to tell us something about the ἐιδος of place for it is
the outward look of place that begins to take shape in its very essence. The outward
look of place is the limit and possibility of the proper being of a being.

Simultaneously, this path is revealing the unity of the manifold of being, that
is, τόπος as the determination of co-presence of the φύσει ὑντα. As we hope to
make clear in the next point, only through the adequate comprehension of χώρα-
tόπος connection can we clarify what is at stake in the determination of the φύσει
ὕντα as κεκινημένον (the moved) specifically as moved according to place
κινούμενον κατὰ τόπον. This difficulty will come to a stand when we discuss,
further on, the relation of the ἁίδιον with the κατὰ συμβεβηκός (that which is
not accidental but belonging to and being present along with that which shows
itself as such, οὐσία).

As we have seen through ἀεί and πέρας, natural beings emerge out of
themselves toward their being while maintaining themselves in the necessity of
their limits which means that ἁίδιον is the one and unchanging enduring being.
Now we will turn to the way place itself constitutes the prepositional structure of
the “towards which”, “in order to, “for the sake of which”: place as the unity of the
utterly simple (απλοῦν) as opposed to the manifold (πληθῶς) without limit. The
disclosing of the very own ontological precedence of place through the outward
look of the utterly visible: the ἐιδος of place212. Place as the positum of being, as
the selfsame being that is uncovered.

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212 “οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη
προτότου εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολλυται ἃ τόπος τῶν φθειρομένων,". Physics., 208 b 35 [for that
without which nothing else can exist, while it can exist without the others, must needs be first; for
place does not pass out of existence when the things in it are annihilated].
4) Exchanging motion (κινήσεως μετασχόν) of a proper being: εἰδέναι and ἐπίστασθαι

The central question is therefore: why is it so difficult to grasp the essential character of place? Place does not move and bodies are in motion and motion has a privilege regarding the εἰδέναι and ἐπίστασθαι.

This task has a double sense for a research on τόπος: first, to unfold place as the ontological prior condition of beings and second, to make clear that every possibility of being is determined by place as what constitutes the proper presence of the being in question.

Aristotle says that “ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἦστι τι, ὁ τόπος”, τόπος must itself be something (Phys., IV, 1, 208) for “δοκεῖ δὴλον εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἀντιμετάστασεως”; it holds/manifests itself (δοκεί) to be visible from being exchanged.

Then again, we have a subtle but very important transition in the Greek text. What happens between the οὖν ἦστι of τόπος and its δοκεῖ δήλον? Can we draw a parallel with the εἰδέναι and ἐπίστασθαι in what concerns the presence of the δήλον and the presencing of the οὖν ἦστι or is it place the very own determination of both the εἰδέναι and ἐπίστασθαι?

We will explore this possibility with Aristotle bearing in mind that the οὖν ἦστι of τόπος and its δοκεῖ δήλον is connected with ἀντιμετάστασεως. It is precisely in the μεταστάσις that lies the solution to understand the nature of the στάσις of τόπος in relation to the limit (πέρας) and possibility (ἔννομις) of a proper being.

Aristotle mentions that the possibility of exchange of two things in a container is determined by place which is different from all bodies that come to change but not separated from them:

“ὅποι γὰρ ἦστι νῦν ὕδωρ, ἐγείρθη ἐξελθόντος ὡσπερ ἐξ ἀγγείου παλιν ἀπρ ἐκεῖ ἑνερτιν· ὅτε δὲ τὸν αὐτόν τὸν τούτον ἄλλο τί τῶν σωμάτων, καταρχῇ, τούτῳ δὴ τῶν ἑγγίσκουν καὶ μεταβαλλόντων ἔτερων παρτών ἐνεαὶ δοκεῖ· ἐν ώ γὰρ ἦστι νῦν, ὕδωρ ἐν τούτῳ προτερων ἦν, ὡστε δήλον ἡς ὁ τόπος τι καὶ ἡ χωρὰ ἐτέρων ἀμφοτερ, εἰς ἥν καὶ ἐξ ἡς μετέβαλον”. (Phys., IV, 208 b1-8) (If there formerly was water in a container and if now there is air in it, then place is something other than that which fills it. What now contains air formerly contained water, so that clearly
the place or space into which and out of which they passed was something different from both).

Aristotle is calling attention to the fact that place was already in place before the water or air, that is, he is saying that "(ὡστε δὴλον ὡς ἢν ὁ τόπος τί καὶ ἡ χώρα ἔτερον ἄμφοτα, εἰς ἢν καὶ εξ ἢς μετέβαλον". Place is the was (ἡν) and goes-on being, it is the eternal, αἰεί. A was is what has already been but it also has the specific sense of something necessary, that has to be present a priori as the condition of possibility of what it contains, not as χώρας (the separate) but as τόπος. It has the character of determination of the contained being in such a way that it posits the φύσει δύναμιν in their proper place. What kind of positing is this? We are about to see that it is a positing of the very own ἀρχαί with κινούμενα such that place emerges along with beings: place as δύναμις: ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν.

The limit and the possibility of a proper being is the κινούμενον to κινούμενα, the essential character of τόπος that has power over beings. "Ετι δὲ οἱ φοραὶ τῶν φυσικῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἀπλῶν, διὸν πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων, οὐ μόνον δηλοῦσιν ὅτι ἐστὶ τι ὁ τόπος, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν." [Further the motions of elementary (ἀπλῶν: utterly simply) natural beings – namely fire, earth and the others – make visible/held manifest (δηλοῦσιν) not only that place is something, but also that it exerts a certain power]. Phys., IV, 208 b 8-10.

Aristotle is well aware of the difficulty of grasping place for what it is. Heidegger translates and comments the opening lines of Phys., IV:

""δοκεῖ, δὲ μέγα τι εἶναι καὶ χαλεπὸν ληφθῆμαι ο τόπος διά τε το παρευμφαίνεσθαι την ύλην καὶ την μορφήν, καὶ διὰ το εν ἣρεμοντι τῶ περιεχοντι γινεσθαι την μετάστασιν τοῦ φερομενούν" "It seems that it is something great and very difficult to grasp place for what it is, because along with it there always is given the body, in what it is made of and in its outward look, its form", [Phys., IV, 212 a7-8] so that one is tempted to take the extension of the material or the limit of the form as the place. And, further, it is difficult to see place as such, because the μετάστασις of what is in motion comes to pass in each case.
in such a way that the place itself does not thereby move. And what is in motion has a privilege with regard to perceptibility.”

Heidegger’s point it to show that Aristotle is aware of the difficulty to seeing place as such for we tend to see place as an extension of the body or the limit of the form of the body.

We should note that Heidegger’s commentary on this passage seems to be indirectly referring to Aristotle’s central thesis of Phys. V, 1-5, that place is absolutely determined by φύσις setting therefore the task to think the ειδέναι of place as the outward look of the through (δια) of the stances (στάσις) into which beings are dissected. This implies thinking the continuum, the “in contact with” of place with beings, that is, the continuum as the τί, the “this one” of each ἀπτεσθαι. In other words, the continuum as the συν that bounds together so that is co-present in the φύσει ὅντα. The συν of place reveals the very own temporal character of beings – beings which have the δύναμις κοινωνίας, the potential to be with another in association and therefore as enduring presence. This means that place constitutes the possibility of the proper presence of beings.

As indicated, Aristotle usually uses ἀπτεσθαι to refer to the contact of one body with another so we cannot use it to refer place to a body for that would imply that place and what is surrounded are two bodies. What we have to think through is what makes possible the in of the “in contact with”, ἀπτεσθαι. “In contact with” here is not a random translation for ἀπτεσθαι is to touch something. If a thing touches another it is “in contact with” but this contact is only possible through the a priori συν. This is because when something is in contact with another it is already and necessarily in place, that is, it coincides exactly with the thing it touches: it is a συνάπτει. We begin to see now how the phenomenon of co-presence of the continuum with the movable operates within the specific articulation of place as the limit (πέρας) and possibility (δύναμις) of the κινούμενον. For to coincide exactly or to conjoin (taking Lang’s own interpretive hypothesis) is not in relation

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213 Cf. PS, GA 19, pp. 108, 109: “Es scheint, daß es etwas Großes und sehr Schweres ist, den Ort in dem, was er ist, zu fassen, weil sich dabei immer mit zeigt das, woraus der Körper besteht, und sein Aussehen, seine Gestalt, so daß man versucht ist, die Ausdehnung des Stoffes oder die Grenze der Gestalt als den Ort zu nehmen. Und ferner ist es schwer, den Ort als solchen zu sehen, weil die μετάστασις des Bewegten jeweils so geschieht, daß der Ort dabei selbst nicht bewegt. Das Bewegte selbst aber hat hinsichtlich der Wahrnehmbarkeit einem Vorzug.”
of place and the movable as two bodies but *stricto sensu* of place as limit of the limited. The sense of *συν* is, as we’ve seen, a *con-*junction of each τι with its limit because it works ontologically as the very own *in-*junction of the *πέρας* of every *κινούμενον* and thus as the constitutive principle of that which is constituted. In other words, place and beings are one and the same in the *αἰών*, the everlasting, the sempiternal as the boundary of the bounded, the *κοινὰς ἁπάντησας*, the common sensibles, that are always to move with respect to place, *κινεῖν κατὰ τόπον*. Hence why the cosmos is *αἰών*. This discussion is also unfolding the path to understand how place is already working at the level of *οὐσία*.

The outward look of place only resembles form in the *μετάστασις* of what is in motion. The *εἰδέναι* of place is working essentially as the first look of the manifold of particular orientations we take up for the sake of seeing, *διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι*. Its place determines the first demarcations of the manifold of positions of beings so it is the capacity of a being to be, the *πρῶτον* of *οὐσία*. The *πρῶτον* is this incredible and revolutionary *συν* of place that works as the common radical of the posited beings. The *συν* is itself place working as limit and determination of the being of each particular orientation (*θέσις*) in such a way that beings are the *συν* of *θέσις*, the posited together, the *συχνός* the many together, which means the *continuous* itself! Therefore, it is no surprise that both the *εἰδέναι* and *ἐπίστασθαι* derive from the same “to know”, the same *συνοραν* “to see together”. For it is precisely the outward look of place which operates in beings as their *syn-*thesis, positing together of in the same seeing together, *συνορασθαί*. What we have now to consider is how the outward look of place works in terms of its co-presence in beings. For this effect there is a special insight Aristotle gives us in *Phys.*, IV, 1, 208 b where lies the solution to understand the nature of the *στάσις* of *τόπος* in relation to the limit (*πέρας*) and possibility (*δύναμις*) of a proper being.
As pointed out, there is a key word in this passage, μετάστασις which stretches into Aristotle’s account of place, namely as δύναμις, beyond reckoning – comprising the notions of matter (ὕλη), outward look or form (μορφή) and the to become (γίγνεται).

Μετάστασις is usually translated by “change of place” or “displacement” but in fact μετάστασις is not a displacement as such. Μετάστασις means literally a “taking over of the rest”, and therefore it can be directly related to χώρις as that which is “displaced” in the strict sense of extracted, separated. It also adds to this fact that μετά can have multiple meanings such as after, over, according to, in common with. It seems to us that the essential character of χώρις is a μετά in the “towards which of our relation” (πρὸς ἡμῖν) to the particular orientations we take up and τόπος has to be a διά in relation to φύσις. Then again, what concerns the formal character of τόπος has to do with the way we address and understand the transition between the σὲν ἐστι of τόπος and its δοκεῖ δῆλον. Thence, we should start to inquire about the meaning of one of the correlates of μετά: the through, διά, the in of place.

Thinking about this shift makes us aware of the contrast between the διά and the μετά. What is at stake is not a philological exegesis of the Greek to show the niceties of the words interplay. It is rather the opposite. We are opening the way that drastically reveals the genuine meaning of στάσις for διά is “through” and only place is through while, on the other hand, a μετά is already a “projecting beyond” that necessarily involves a relative determinateness in relation to διά. The simple point to make is that because a μετά presupposes a διά and not the opposite, the respective correlates of what is a “through” and a “projecting beyond”

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214 The connection between τόπος and χώρα presents hugely difficult complexities that were recently studied by Morison but in slightly different contours. Although Morison claims (well) that “in the de Caelo Aristotle uses chora in contexts where topos would do just as well” he assumes that “chora drops out during the argument of Physics IV, I-5 as Aristotle gets close to defining his notion of place (... for he wants to mark out his notion of place from that of Plato”, cf. Morison, B., On Location: Aristotle’s Concept of Place, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 22-23. Morison goes on through an exegetical discussion of Plato’s Timaeus, 48 E – 53 C to show the connections between χώρα and space or extension as a version of a theory of place as matter. What is worth considering along with Morison’s argument is that Aristotle wants to go further than to mark out his notion of place from Plato.”
must necessarily be, respectively, an ἑιδος, what is properly visible (a priori) and a θεσις, a particular orientation (a posteriori) towards the absolute determinations of τόπος within the world. In either case, ἑιδος is what appears through the presence already uncovered before we come to assign a meaning, a direction. These and other consequences come out of Heidegger/Aristotle ontological phenomenology to philosophy – we need first to come back to our main issue: place. Place’s own genesis constitutes implicitly the phenomenological basis to unlock the concealed in all its force.

Understanding the different meaning of δια and μετα takes us closer to the genetic character of τόπος in the sphere of co-appurtenance to beings. When Aristotle says “ταύτα δ’ ἐστὶ τόπου μέρη και ἑιδη, τὸ ἄνω και κάτω και ὁι λοιποὶ τῶν ἐξ διαστάσεων”, Phys., IV, 1, 208 b12, [The outward look of place is determined according to these possibilities: above-below, front-back, right-left] he is advancing that these possibilities are related to us in terms of how they are placed, in the sense of orderly arranged.

We are moving through (δια) the determinations (στάσεις) of place in relation to a projection beyond the στάσεις. We refer to right, left, up and down, ahead behind, from the particular stance of our position in the world, i.e. what is left to me may not be right to you, etc… thence the possibility of change is immense. Because what is in motion has a privilege regarding perceptivity it seems that we take place as a simple extension of the material “adapting” the manifold of locations to our own designation of place as if place could be only relieved by our particular stances regarding its outward look form. But as Aristotle points out, this kind of relation with the διαστάσεις of place that is “ἐστι δὲ τα τοιαύτα” (relative to these things [above-below, right and left]), are not just “οὗ μόνον προς ἡμᾶς”[in relation to us] but to “αλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θέσιν, ὅπως ἄν στραφῶμεν, γίνεται”[but instead they correspond to a θεσις, to the way we happen to stand and turn at any time], (Phys., IV, 1, 208 b 15 ff.)

We relate to the different parts of the whole of place by differentiating them in their differentiation, that is, in differentiating each of the μέρη of place through the

215 And that is why ἑιδος, as that which directs, plays a decisive role to solve the axiom of contradiction (and not non-contradiction !) This explains why thinking the ontological difference as a συνθεσις is a loose statement: because the private character of being shouldn’t be seen as a synthesis but belonging to the very character of ἑιδος! In order to assert the λόγος of a something we need more than a συνθεσις/διαίρεσις operation through νοῦς.


διαστάσεις in which it can be dissected [τὸ ἀνω καὶ κάτω καὶ οί λοιποὶ].

The fact that we relate to the different parts of the whole shows that both ἀνω and κάτω are already present as determinations of place: μέρη – hence the statements of Parmenides that the one is distributed through all the parts. The ὁν ἐστι of τόπος and its δοκεῖ δῆλον work in the very own appearance of the εἰδέναι and επίστασθαι in what concerns the presence of the δῆλον and the presencing of the ὁν ἐστι of place, by the way being posits itself from a determinate πρὸς τι that is relative to something. This orientation is operated through a θέσις. A θέσις is only made possible by an already oriented being, θετός that is in the ἀεί, everlasting and therefore a being actively orientated towards the world and simultaneously grounded in the everlasting look held by the θέσις, thence in the ἀεί of each θετός: αἴσθησις. When reading through Aristotle that ἐν δὲ τῇ φύσει διώρισται χωρίς ἕκαστον [On the other hand, in nature itself (φύσει=the self-emergent presence of being) everything is for itself positioned in its own place], (Phys., IV, 1, 208 b 18-19) we see that the τὸ ἀνω καὶ κάτω καὶ οί λοιποὶ differentiation is rooted in the own δύναμις of place and not merely through a θέσις so that nature of the στάσις of τόπος in relation to the limit (πέρας) and possibility (δύναμις) of a proper being works itself as the ἀεί of each τί in the στάσις such that it is the σὸν of each θέσις of being, the positing together of being in the very own νοεῖν, that is, the appearance of νοῦς that opens the every possible openness of being.

The “already” of ἀεί, διά and σὸν point out to the co-presence of place in the φύσει δύνα through motion, but what kind of motion?

In order to provide an explanation for this already-giveness of place we must bear in mind that the δύναμις of place is not of the same order of the μετάστασις of locomotion because what comes into being is not of the order of motion in respect to time but it is rooted in an a-temporal ἀεί that works as the what-holds-itself-together of κίνησις. Hence place is the ἦν of each τί and

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216 "ὡς οὖν τῇ θεσεὶ διαφέροντα μόνον ἀλλαὶ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει". [because these places are not differentiated merely through a θέσεις – πρὸς ἡμᾶς – but on the contrary τῇ δυνάμει] Phys., IV, 1, 208 b 24.

217 "πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατανοῆσαι ὅτι οὐκ ἐν εξητείτο τὸ τόπος, ἐι μὴ κίνησις τις ἦν ἣ κατὰ τόπον", Phys., IV, 1, 211 a 12 ff.
simultaneous the α-κινητὸν of the κινητὸν. A being is only moved because it is first unmoved by its limit: place.

Κίνησις is first granted to being by place since beings move first in their being unmoved, in their proper potentiality to be: the everlasting of the lasting. A being only is when it reaches forth to an a-temporal point of completion. The very own essence of τόπος is concealed in the Ἡν of beings not in relation to its outward phenomenal appearance but in relation to the τέλος of each being that is, in relation to our own understanding of what is in full presence: the Ἡν-τέλος-ἔχειν, coming to a limit, reaching a point of completion – ἐντελέχεια. To be the Ἡν, an already-is-being is to be rooted in a stability of the present in the way of coming into rest. The ontological dimension of place may even be relieved through a change of motion of the φύσει δύνα but it is always rooted in the a-temporal ἀεὶ that is manifest in beings as the capability of their seeing together, συνοράσθαι through εἶδος, a self-same συνοράν, a see together. The character of τόπος is concealed and unconcealed in the very from-out-of-which and being-toward of change, the movement of presence and absence: μεταβολή. If we understand this we will certainly agree that the κίνησις as it were is a κινήσεως μετασχον, in the partaking in motion since “οὐ γὰρ πάν ἐν τόπῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινητὸν σώμα” [for not only everything that is is in place but only a body which is movable, κινητὸν]. This possibility co-exists in the Ἡν of εἴναι of each body. We note, co-exists, for to co-exist in a being means to release is own determinateness from what lies there underneath, ὑποκείμενον.

In order to examine this peculiar indication, the to-show-itself of the indication, δοκεῖ δῆλον of τόπος we must understand this peculiar character of coming to a stand. The δῆλον, shown-up, pointed-out as the disclosed and therefore seen is not what we think through a mere ὁδὸν ἐστι of τόπος, a simple outward look of place but the δῆλον is the pointing out of place in the very own thorough thinking, determining, διάνοια granted by νοεῖν. Τόπος allows the manifest, δηλούμενον to be disclosed as such through νοῦς in every particular being. The particular orientation of beings is the θέσις, the arrangement of beings with their own sight, θεός, such that being is this in-sight – θεωρός, the sight that sees, the spectator – of the pure seeing, the onlooking seeing of place revealed in each oriented being, θετός. The nature of place itself – ἔχει τινα δύναμιν is
the soul in the capacity of being everlasting. The moved, κινούμενον, changes and passes from a δύναμις κοινωνίας to a δύναμις εἰς is the expression of the movement of the soul in perception. The underlying presence of the soul in the αἰεί of each θέσις makes perception not only possible in the basis of an everlasting positum of the θετός but also unifies and gathers what most persists in the perceivable, αἰσθητὸν.218

Being is in the world holding itself in relation to what is common and separate, χωρίσμος. In other words, being manifests itself as the κοινων gathered together as being-in-the-totality-of-places. This gathering together arises out of being itself from the οὐσία of heavenly bodies so that if place as such is relieved by motion of the natural bodies it is precisely because the movable is already in place. The ἦν of a κινητὸν σῶμα corresponds therefore to the ἁἰεί ἐν κινήσει of the heavens:

“διὰ γὰρ τούτο καὶ τὸν σωφρονὸν μάλιστ' οἴομεθα ἐν τοῖς, ὅτι ἁἰεί ἐν κινήσει” [Therefore we believe that the heavens are most in a place, because they are constantly in motion], (Phys., IV, 1, 211 a 13 f.)

Therefore, there is a double coincidence of νοῦς with place, that is to say, a coincidence of νοῦς in the συμβεβηκός i.e. through the description of place between movables, and a coincidence in the way of νοῦς to place itself. To coincide here must be taken literally in the conjunctive sense of continuity rather than in the disjunctive sense of a distinct reaching-in-respect-of. The possibility of understanding the in and the with of place within the κινητὸν is also indicated by the phenomenological structure “άμα” that Aristotle uses to refer to the φύσει ὄντα in relation to the touch ἀπτεσθαι (Phys., V, 3). The unfolding of co-presence of place in beings is articulated in the ἀιδίον, πέρας and σουν structures

218 Cf. Aristotle, de Anima, 7, 431 a 1-7, “Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ ἢν ἢ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πραγματί. ἢν δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνων προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑν, ὅλως ἢν οὐκ ἱστέρησέν: ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνετέλεσεν ὄντος παῦτα τὰ γεγονότα, ἐστιγματί τὸ μὲν αἰσθήτου ἐκ δυναμεί ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνέργεια ποιοῦν· οὐ γὰρ παρέχει αἰῶν ἄλλη σοφίας, διὸ ἀλλὰ ἐλάλοις τοῦτο κινεῖσθαι· ἢ γὰρ κινήσει τοῦ ἀτέλεος ἐνέργεια ἢν, ἢ δ’ ἀπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἔτερα τοῦ τετελεσμένου.” (Now actual knowledge is identical with the thing known. But potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual, and yet not universally prior even in time. For it is from something actually existent that all which comes into being its derived. And manifestly the sensible object simply brings the faculty of sense which was potential into active exercise; in this transition, in fact, the sense is not acted upon or qualitatively changed. Consequently, this must be a different species of motion. For motion is, as we saw, an activity of that which is imperfect; but activity in the absolute sense, that is, activity of that which has reached perfection, is quite distinct)."
in relation to Being bearing in mind that the co-presence of ἀεὶ with πέρος had already anticipated an account of the in of place which is still only implicit at this stage of Aristotle’s Physics.

The importance of unlocking the phenomenological sense of the temporal operators in the Physics is itself a first sign of how the phenomena of co-presence and the συνεχές unfold not exclusively in relation to the contained but in terms of the essential character of the containing limit, the περιέχου of the ἀόριστον in beings. Up to the moment there are no scholarly commentaries available which take the sense and implications of the co-presence of topos further into its ontological level of presence and presencing in beings in inauthenticity. One of the reasons for this is that we still tend to regard place as material extension, i.e. space mainly because we have forgotten the meaning of the ἔσχατον, the outermost limit as the essential element of τόπος in the containing limit, περιέχου. Let’s take a closer look at the following passage and to that which appears to be a contradictio in actu adjectivandi regarding the articulation of περιέχου ἔσχατον219:

“όταν μὲν οὖν μὴ διήρημένον ἢ τὸ περιέχου, ἀλλὰ συνεχές, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τοπῷ λέγεται εἶναι ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλὰ ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ ὃταν δὲ διήρημένον ἢ καὶ ἀποτελούμενον, ἐν πρώτῳ ἦστι τῷ ἔσχατῳ τοῦ περιέχουτος, ὅ όμως ἐστὶ μέρος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐτε μείζον τοῦ διαστήματος ἀλλὰ ἐκατόν ἐν γαρ τῷ αὐτῷ τῷ ἔσχατῳ τῶν ἀποτελούμενον. καὶ συνεχές, μεν δὲν ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῳ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐκείνου, διήρημένος δὲν ἐν ἐκείνῳ· καὶ έαν τε κινήσῃ τὸ περιέχου ἐαν τε μή, οὔδεν ἤττον.” (When what surrounds then, is not separate from the thing, but it is in continuity with it, the thing is said to be in what surrounds it, not in the sense of in place, but as a part in a whole. But when the thing is separate and in contact, it is immediately in the inner extremity of the surrounding body, and this surface is neither a part of what is in it nor yet greater than its extension, but equal to it; for the extremities of things which touch are coincident. Further, if one body is in continuity with another, it is not moved in that but with that. On the other hand it is moved in that it is separate) (Phys., IV, 211 a 29-35).

219 Cf. The connection περιέχου/ἔσχατον has led commentators to produce numerous pages of analytical material concerning the individuation of the limits of place and the most amazing logical puzzles! Vide, for example, Morison’s inventive corollaries such as “limits depend ontologically on their hosts (not vice-versa): a limit is the limit of something. (Indeed things have limits because they have such-and-such a form.) But despite this ontological inferiority, limits have explanatory power.”., p. 142.
An apparent contradiction is not a contradiction but a dilemma. Looking at the Greek we clearly see that 1) the touching and contiguity between moved beings reveals the “in” rather than the “with” of bodies, 2) the very structure of the *continuum* as a limit of the body, that is, the *συν* of place works as the with of a movable thing. The analysis of *Phys. IV*, defines place as the container and cosmos as the contained affirming that they are not continuous but dividing and touching.

What Aristotle is saying is that place is in a way separable from what is in place because what is in place is in a sense apart from place but touching place, that is, their extremities touch, but are always divided. An *in* can be undivided and continuous and at the same time divided and touching. Yet we can only assert that place is separable from the body because what is in place must be necessarily be divided from place yet touching place. This is a very difficult step for Aristotle is considering two manifolds of the same fold, that is, he is actually pointing two possibilities of place: the first possibility is of the domain of *αλσθησις* and the other possibility presents *νῶς* as the extreme *καθόλου*, the being of cosmos revealed in its indivisibility. Aristotle is having the revolutionary insight of grasping the essence of place as the *περιέχου*, the common boundary of *νῶς* with the everlasting of the one.

“Again, place is among continuous things. For the parts of a body occupy some place and these parts conjoin in relation to some common boundary. Surely then, the parts of place, which each of the parts of the body occupy, conjoin to the same boundary in relation to which also the parts of the body conjoin. Therefore place too would be continuous, for its parts conjoin in relation to some common boundary” (*Categ.*, 5a 8-14).

Aristotle is also predelineating what he will outline in *Meta Θ* 1-2 as the original sense of *σοφία* as opened through *νοῦς* of the *καθόλου* in the *ἐσχατον*. Thus place works at the level of *ουσία* in each *τί* manifesting itself as the “many ways”, *πολλαχία* of the one, *ἐν* itself the unity of the cosmos. In other words, place co-exists in beings as the originary *ἐξί* that binds together beings operating at the ontological level of a *συμβεσις*, the co-presence of *συν* with each *τί*. Only grasping this transition at the core of the unity of place will we see the self same showing of the being indivisible and without magnitude. The *ἀμα* is a term that brings forward the structure of co-presence of place in the *φύσει ὄντα* for it
is this togetherness in time of place and beings, ἰμα, that also hinges on the question of the relationship of νοῦς to the λόγος of assertion; as Walter Brogan remarks, “the hama opens up the relationship of being and non being. Nonbeing can be disclosed precisely because being, the eidos, is always already uncovered before we come to the disclosure or nondisclosure of beings in time”. This is the temporal sense of co-presence of place: an already opened eιδέναι through νοῦς. In this sense we are also assuming that there is an intermediate structure operating at the level of νοῦς with being, that is, a structure that pertains to place in beings as that in which something in changing changes prior to arriving at the ἐκαστόν: the μεταξύ. Without the parts of place we couldn’t even posit an identity of thinking and being, as for instance we do in our discourse towards being since beings who have being in themselves are ἀεὶ ὅν and a being that is eternal only needs to touch what is given by νοῦς, in the truth of νοεῖν granted by place. The ἀπεσθαί of being is made through the μεταξύ that isn’t of the same character of the apophtic discourse, λόγος. For Aristotle there are two

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220 This discussion is thoroughly treated by Heidegger in Logik. Die Frage nach der Warheit (GA 21) where his interpretation of truth in Aristoteles Meta aims to open the sphere in which the truth of λόγος and the truth of νοῦς emerge: time. By recovering Aristotle’s notions of λόγος and νοῦς, Heidegger explains that time is the horizon from which both emerge. This investigation of truth in Aristotle provides Heidegger with the basis to discuss time as one of the main issues of SZ and in fact as the central issue of phenomenology.

221 Cf. Brogan, W., op. cit., p. 182.

222 Cf. Hemming, L., for the discussion of the “already” in the context of upliftment as “the analogous relating of what is moved within the soul to its unmovedness and the soul’s relation to unmovedness in the whole”. Hemming’s arguments refer to the central phenomenological operator ἀεὶ in the Greeks, namely in connection with Aristotle’s τὸ ἐσχατόν. “For the Greeks that which cannot be surpassed and is at the same time the furthest reach is that which is most stable, most perfect, the unmoved and ‘always’ (ἀεὶ) – being itself. The threshold in question is the outermost of Greek thought, the unmoved limit of the heavens, which is also the seat of the divine. The outermost, for Aristotle, is the first containing place of all that is in and under the heavens – in this sense it provides the condition for every possible thing to have a place in the cosmos. Every thing has a ‘where’ which is absolutely determinate, because the cosmos is, for the Greeks, finite and implicitly ordered. God, or the divine, is outside place (considered in this way), because God has no ‘where’. The outermost, strictly speaking, does not even necessarily denote a region as such, but is a reach which is constitutive for everything within the reach. The threshold in question is therefore, dialectically considered, what Aristotle named as τὸ ἐσχατόν, the outermost limit of the heavens (as that which surrounds the heavens, and that which has no ‘outer’ or ‘outside’), that which at the same time denotes all that is interior to the heavens because it is the outermost reach. The outermost has no ‘outside’ because it is that than which there is no further. Upliftment and the sublime each indicate the same thing – a seeking of what is most ‘beingful’ in what is there to be experienced and known. As such, upliftment is the reach-out to the ‘over-there’ from here: it is the experience (and so in what is coming to be) of being itself”, Postmodernity’s Transcending: Devaluing God, ed. cit., pp. 40-41.
fundamental ways of revealing being: as we have, seen one of them is σύνθεσις which belong to the λόγος of assertion and therefore occurs in the disclosure of beings in relation to their accidental properties. But this σύνθεσις, by its very etymological and ontological determinateness pressuposes a previous συν that is rooted in the άει δων aeι that binds together our multiple ways of addressing beings. Hence discourse is only a partial way of access to being for it doesn’t reveal the originary togetherness of beings with other beings. By bringing beings to presence in terms of something else, a mere κατάφασις (affirmation) discourse also covers up the κοινωνείν dimension of being as a simple saying of what is in touch. It is precisely this in touch that makes all the difference. The in touch of beings in place is the in touch of place as the successive in beings and thus the πρότερον of νοείν, hence why Aristotle did not understand λόγος as phenomenologically basic.

This is essential to point out its pertinency to open up a radical and genuine understanding of the phenomenological basis of Aristotle’s thinking of being and Heidegger’s discussion and reappropriation of key concepts for the thematization of the structures of his own phenomenological ontology, i.e. Besorgen. – A concept which Heidegger explores and is relating to this coming back to the place where we dwell, this everlasting that makes possible the unity of thinking and being not having a mere relation of priority of νοῦς and λόγος and being and beings as Aristotle suggested but pertaining to the very own pre-ontological presentation of being, I mean, a presentation not thematized by the Greeks or by Aristotle because they naturally dwelled in an understanding of being itself not finding the need to thematize its meaning.

The disclosure of εἰδος always comes prior to the επισαφθαι and since the co-presence of place in being is the presence of the touch in being. The νοῦς that occurs as always the same in beingm is ontologically grounded in the unity of the cosmos, it is πρότερον. The unity of the first mover with the moved works in

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223 The ontological precedence of μεταξύ in beings as the πρότερον was however object of controversy in the Latin commentary of Aristotle but this wasn’t immediately proved or dismissed in posterior editions of the Physics probably because it didn’t change drastically the meaning of μεταξύ. Heidegger in fact adopts both πρῶτον and πρότερον, cf. HEIDEGGER, Platon: Sophistes, ed. cit., μεταξύ δε εἰς ὁ πέφυκε πρότερον ἡρκυκεῖσθαι τὸ μεταβαλλόν ἢ εἰς ὁ ἐσχατόν μεταβαλλει κατὰ φύσιν συνεχός μεταβαλλόν (226 b 23sqq). »Das Zwischen ist, wohin das sich Bewegende von Natur aus früher kommt als in das, wohin es als letztes kommt, wenn es sich naturgemäß kontinuierlich bewegt«. Strittig ist 226 b24 πρότερον.
beings in the activity of ἔνος with the perceptivity of the perceivables and, as Hemming remarks, this provides us with the double insight that the αἰτι, the time which is granted to human, which he also translates by “the allotted span of time” “means both the restriction to its own life of a (human) being, and it means the interrogbility of the whole of life through the ineluctability of that restriction”\textsuperscript{224}.

Heidegger is reaching Aristotle’s description of being in beings by assuming that Dasein’s way of being is fundamentally hidden in the way a human community, κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν tends to take over the other or the place of the other. The standpoint of authenticity and mineness, what Heidegger calls respectively Eigentlichkeit and Jemeinigkeit belong to Dasein in being-towards-death. This shows being by privation showing at the same time a prior and usually concealed understanding of relationality in beings. Then again we come back to the central issue of Aristotle in thinking the ontological difference and here I certainly agree with Brogan’s view when he claims that the Megarians were not capable of understanding movement as transition, that is to, say, the co-presence of place in the ἔκαστα and therefore they collapse the difference between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια at the basis of the possibility of movement and the relationality of thingngs. They’ve missed the twofoldness of being, because, they didn’t think of privation as intrinsically belonging to the actuality of beings.\textsuperscript{225} Hence it is of the utmost importance to think the δύναμις of place in beings as the manifestation of the being everlasting in beings that struggle to attain being. This discussion was made by Heidegger Meta theta On the Essence and Origin of Force and we will go back to it later, but for the time being it is enough to note that Heidegger recovers the whole of Aristotle’s confrontation with the Megarians. His central concern is,
again, to understand the topic of privation at the centre of δύναμις and to point out the proper way of thinking the Greek voice of δύναμις and στερησίς, absencing. Aristotle provides Heidegger with the phenomenological basis to think and understand the double movement of δύναμις as ἀρχή μεταβολῆς.

The most significant aspect of the separate, χωρίς, the ‘to touch of that which touches’, ἀπεσθατι and the intermediate, μεταξὺ, is the way they show place in its co-existence in beings through that which is in one place, ἀμα. The determinations of co-presence of place in the φύσει ὄντα reveals a triple connection from the same fold at the heart of τόπος. Not only the ontological character of place is revealed through its presencing by beings in the activity of the soul, νοῦς, with perception, ἀληθησίς but also by the eternal which encloses, ἄξι περιέχου, that is distributed in every particular being, ἐκαστον. The ontological determination of place in beings is in a sense present and may be revealed in the νοῦς passageway of the ἄξι δι of cosmos to each τί. This means to think place in terms of its essential character: indivisible, ἀδιάδιρετον, without parts, ἀμερὲς and without magnitude, οὐδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος in such a way that this same unity is revealed by means of its being distributed by each particular.

Bearing this in mind we may suggest that human being is the monad of place in the sense of being the manifold of the folding of place, not in the sense of being as two parts – unity and divisibility – but in the radical way of an agogig relation of being which says something out of what is unable to be said, a being from out of non-being. This may seem paradoxical but in fact it is clear that the sudden emergence into being of a natural being is always an immediate abandonment of the not-being from out of which it arose. Movement begins in the becoming. That’s the whole point we hope to make of Aristotle and Heidegger analyses of the successive, ἐφεξῆς, the self-consistent, ἔχομενον and the continuum, συνεχές.

Heidegger understood the structure of the co-presence of place in beings in connection to the συνεχες – since it pressuposes the other determinations – as “die prinzipielle struktur des μέγεθος, die jede Erstreckung auszeichnet”226.

We need to secure with Heidegger a genuine phenomenological comprehension of this revealing character of the εἶδέναι of place in beings. In Platon Sophistes, Heidegger accounts for a very brief and very important

description of the co-determinations of place in natural beings, φύσει ὄντα. We must fully understand how the “first unmoved limit of what it contains” operates genetically in the way being, οὐ, reveals in many ways, πολλαχῆ in each τί. In other words, we have to understand the γενεσίς/στερεσίς connection to gain the proper ontological insight to κίνησις – this is the central idea of the whole book of Physics V where Aristotle discusses the μεταβολή of γενεσίς from the μεταβολή of motion. How can the successive, the continuum, the self-possessed present motion in beings if they come from the unmoved, eternal motion? How are we to realize that this incredible split between being and non-being is what makes being possible, and how is it that this apparently irreconcilable split led to the assumption that they cannot be said together and thence led to the denial of natural beings as an illusion? Was the law of contradiction (and not non-contradiction) Aristotle’s way of introducing time so that he could resolve this difficult equation of being/non-being? And if so why does Aristotle denies motion insisting that in this case this relation is μεταβολή, not κίνησις?

“L’étendue visible du monde nous surpasse visiblement; mais comme c’est nous qui surpassons les petites choses, nous nous croyons plus capables de les posséder; et cependant il ne faut pas moins de capacité pour aller jusqu’au néant que jusqu’au tout: il la faut infinie pour l’un et l’autre, et il me semble que qui aurait compris les derniers principes des choses pourrait aussi arriver jusqu’a connaître l’infini. L’un depend de l’autre, et l’un conduit a l’autre. Ces extremités se touchent et se réunissent a force de s’être éloignés, et se retrouvent en Dieu, et en Dieu seulement.”

I have in the last pages followed Heidegger’s Platon Sophistes in broad outlines and undertaken a close analysis of the Greek word compounds showing the temporal and ontological determinations of the the modes of disclosure addressed in the discussion of Eigentlichkeit my point being, and I concur with Volpi here, that these are ontological designations of Aristotle’s πράξεις. These phenomena are, in Heidegger’s interpretation, ‘ontological’. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is very different here from the commonly accepted reading of Aristotle, in that he claims that the nature of Aristotle’s practical philosophy is a universal constituent of human being that discloses fundamental insights into what it is to be

227 Pascal, Pensées, 72, 600, “Disproportion de l’homme”.
human, and which have a transformative effect in Dasein. In other words, the idea is that the Aristotelian structure of πρᾶξις as ἀληθέων makes it possible to see the relationship between Heidegger’s and Aristotle’s respective ontological projects in a different light, compared as to how it has been conceived of in the earlier literature on this topic, and how Aristotle and Heidegger have their basic motivation in the idea that the possibility of ontology presupposes a decision to realize one of the possibilities for the enactment of human being: ἀληθέων. I hope to make clear in the following how Heidegger demonstrates that Aristotle considers human life in its totality as a πρᾶξις and not a ποιήσις which for him works respectively as authenticity and inauthenticity. In the Aristotelian thesis in accordance with which πρᾶξις is κίνησις του βίου (the movement specific to human life) Heidegger finds strong support for, and substantial confirmation of, the direction of his research and at the same time characterizes the possible misunderstandings of this point made by the tradition.

In order to support this contention I would begin by asking a) how anxiety works as a disclerotic phenomenon that withdraws Dasein from i das Man (the ‘they’, world of everybody and nobody) and individuates it for the choice of authenticity, and how Heidegger was able to support his claim from what he read in Aristotle and made explicit in the analyses of his terms in his GA 18 course, namely by appealing to Heidegger’s reading of βουλευσις (anxiousness) and προαίρεσις (anticipatory choice), πρᾶξις and κίνησις (Eudemian Ethics, Physics VI) in the notion of Angst, Jemenigkeit and Zeit; b) how the awareness of death plays a similar withdrawing-individuating role and offer a first account of φόνησις.

To conclude this chapter and the examination of the conditions of possibility of the transformation of the inauthentic self, I will examine Heidegger’s account of Conscience and the connection to Aristotle’s παθη (Rethoric, book II) – [Befindlichkeit, Verstehen].

What will be explored in this chapter is therefore the possibility of a transition from inauthenticity to authenticity from Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle’s

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228 PL, I, 4, 1254a7. ὃ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις, ἐστιν.’
230 EE, on the basis of the cited passage II, 3, 1220 b27.
thinking of place, and the origin of motion. The guiding question throughout the present chapter is therefore: what makes authenticity possible? i.e., what are the conditions of the possibility of authenticity? How central are Aristotle’s concepts from his practical philosophy to Heidegger’s *Daseinsanalytik*? How Heidegger apprehends and determines the fundamental ontological structure of human life, of *Dasein*, or more specifically the character of the latter on the basis of his reading of being uncovering, in its being as ἀληθεύειν?

d) Falling and Thrownness

In the paragraph on “falling”, Heidegger indicates that this term does not express any “negative evaluation”, but should be taken as meaning that “Dasein is at first and for the most part within (bei) the world of its concern.” Since for the most part *Dasein*’s being within the world of concern has the character of being absorbed in *das Man*’s publicness, falling is a notion that describes the absorption-dispersion into inauthenticity and *das Man*.

In this section we aim to see how falling describes the movement of inauthenticity by indicating why everyday *Dasein* becomes ensnared in the ways of being of *das Man* and how this implies, as Heidegger will also later formulate, that in everyday life, we are ontically closest to, but ontologically farthest from, ourselves. This is true not only of our relationship to our own being but also our understanding of the being of beings in general, since no articulate ontological knowledge is required in order to be able to cope with intrawordly beings. Regarding this, Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle’s own notions that we have seen especially in his analysis in *Platon Sophistes* (GA19) in the last few sections, seeks to transform the ontical proximity of everydayness into an ontological one. This ontological proximity examining and giving an interpretation of each mode of

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231 *SZ*, p. 175, “Der Titel, der keine negative Bewertung ausdrückt, soll bedeuten: das Dasein ist zunächst und zumeist bei der besorgten ‘Welt’”. It may not be superfluous to mention that Heidegger does not wish the fall to be interpreted in a theological sense as he refers in several steps of the text. Cf., pp. 176, 179-80.
232 *SZ*, p. 16. Also Kellner and *GP*, p. 220.
achieved through an act of distancing, at least with respect to the ontological perspective, but precisely countering the ontological distance peculiar to everyday life.²³³

It is at this point that Heidegger can turn the notion of “falling” (Verfallen) through which he describes the dispersion and absorption of everyday Dasein in das Man and inauthenticity.

The notion of falling describes the “motion” of everydayness and is thus an “ontological motion concept”²³⁴ suggesting a dynamic movement of falling away from oneself and falling into the world. In a footnote on Being and Time p. 220, the translators suggest that in translating “and the ‘Welt’ verfallen” as “falling into the world”, the preposition ‘into’ is hardly the correct one. The idea is rather falling at the world or collapsing against it. I wish to disagree with this remark and suggest that the preposition “into” is the best translation, which is elucidated by the terms Aufgehen and Zerstreuung. Heidegger makes it clear that what he means by “falling into the world” is “falling into das Man.”²³⁵

“Through the interpretation of falling, what we have called the inauthenticity of Dasein may be defined more precisely. In no way, however, do the terms ‘inauthentic’ and ‘non-authentic’ signify ‘really not’, as in this mode of being, Dasein would to lose its being altogether. Inauthenticity… is a quite distinctive kind of being-in-the-world – the kind which is completely bemused by the functions as a positive possibility of that being which, in its essential concern, is absorbed in a world. This kind of not-being closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part.”²³⁶

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²³³ Cf. Weigelt, C., op. cit., “How might such a transformation come about? For if it is not only the case that everyday life can do without ontological knowledge, but if, moreover, philosophy takes a view on things that is more or less distorted from the perspective of everydayness, then the possibility of philosophical thinking is not something over which Man has completely mastery. In order for the everyday understanding to be threatened, something must happen to us which forces us to see the world in a new way.”

²³⁴ SZ, p. 180, “Das Verfallen ist ein ontologischer Bewegungsbegriff.”

²³⁵ SZ, p. 175, “Die Verfallenheit und die ‘Welt’ meint das Aufgehen im Miteinandersein, sofern dieses durch Gerede, Neugier und Zweideutigkeit geführt wird.” (“Falleness into the world means an absorption in being-with-one-another in so far as this is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity”).

Dasein’s “fundamental constitution” is falling, this means that, at first and for the most part, everyday Dasein falls into das Man’s inauthentic ways of being, which means that everyday Dasein is inevitably inauthentic. Heidegger first notes that everyday Dasein finds the ways of being of das Man tempting (versucherisch). In the analysis of idle talk, we have seen how Dasein lets the public interpret the events and happenings of the world, taking over their account as a factual report of “what's going on” or “what's it all about” and therefore, Dasein is disburdened by das Man.

Secondly, Dasein is tranquillized. This category is especially evident in this tablet and social media day and age but it is really nothing as long I have my own self regarding ego and illusions well polished.

“Since the public interpretedness has already become a temptation to itself in this manner, it holds Dasein fast in its fallenness. Idle talk and ambiguity, having seen everything, having understood everything, develop the supposition that Dasein's disclosedness, which is so available and so prevalent, can guarantee to Dasein that all the possibilities of its being will be secure, genuine, and full. Through the self-certainty and decisiveness of das Man, it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic understanding or the mood that goes with it. The supposition of das Man that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine 'life' brings Dasein a tranquillity, for which everything is 'in the best of order' and all doors are open. Falling being-in-the-world which tempts itself is at the same time tranquillizing.”

However, Dasein’s being-tranquillized in its das Man existence is not a state of calm or serenity, but a plunge into ceaseless activity whilst falling Dasein never comes to rest: “the tempting tranquillizing intensifies the falling.” This movement of Dasein falling further and further away from itself into the


239 SZ, p. 178, “Die versucherische Beruhigung steigert das Verfallen.”
“groundlessness and nullity” of das Man is characterized by Heidegger as a “downward plunge” (Absturz). Dasein in its striving for upward mobility and increased consumption believes that things are getting better all the time and that it is making the ever higher climb into the “good life”. This falling away from a primordial understanding of its ownmost possibilities into the herd existence, this whirling away of its freedom and independence is, in Heidegger's conceptualization, the movement of turbulence (Wirbel).

“This ‘movement’ of Dasein in its own being, we call its downward plunge (Absturz). Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness. But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein in the public interpretedness, so much so, indeed, that it gets interpreted as a way of ‘ascending’ and ‘living concretely’.

This downward plunge into and within the groundlessness of the inauthentic being of das Man, has a kind of motion which constantly tears the understanding away from the projecting of authentic possibilities, and into the tranquillized supposition that is supposition that it possesses everything, or that everything is within its reach. Since the understanding is thus constantly torn away from authenticity and sucked into das Man (though always with a sham of authenticity), the movement of falling is characterized by turbulence (Wirbel).”

The fall is an (Absturz) and a (Wirbel) in which “Dasein plunges out of itself… into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness” such that “it is constantly torn away from authenticity and sucked into das Man”.

This interpretation is further supported by Heidegger's description of how Dasein falls further away from itself into self-entanglement and what Heidegger calls alienation. Heidegger claims that the state of passive activity (πάσχειν) in which tempted, tranquillized Dasein finds itself becomes aggravated through an increasing entanglement in the variety of ways of being offered by das Man. This leads to an experimentation with various life-styles, an exaggerated self-dissection seeking motives and explanations for its demeanour from widely variant sources

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and cultures. Through this desperate introspection and self analysis Dasein becomes entangled in its inauthentic self, lost in the labyrinth of a mystified fragmentation, that is, in a wide variety of “strange” (fremd) interpretive schemes and categories that Heidegger calls alienation (Entfremdung).

“Heidegger writes “Das Man is an existentiale: and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution. It itself has, in turn, various possibilities of becoming something concretely characteristic of Dasein. The extent to which its dominion becomes compelling and explicit may change in the course of history.”

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242 SZ, p. 129, “Das Man ist ein Existenzial und gehört als ursprüngliches Phänomen zur positiven Verfassung des Daseins. Es hat selbst wieder verschiedene Möglichkeiten seiner
The motion of falling (tranquillizing, tempting, alienating, and entangling) has been characterized by Heidegger as “turbulence” and a “downward plunge” into “the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness”. Heidegger claims that this way of being “makes manifest that throwness which can intrude itself upon Dasein in its moods.”²⁴³ Heidegger’s reference to “throwness” in this step of Being and Time and its analysis should show what is at stake:

“Dasein’s facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of das Man’s inauthenticity.”²⁴⁴

In order to support this interpretation one must attend to the the grounds upon which this interpretation may stand out for itself, namely the phrase “remains in the throw” and the meaning of motion or movement for in falling there is an underlying centricity of the concept of motion (κίνησις) as an ontological notion at the very heart of Aristotle’s understanding of being.

In section 2 of Being and Time, Heidegger stresses the primordiality of authenticity, and claims that inauthenticity is founded upon authenticity, implying that a das Man existence is a deficient way of being, a fall away from one’s authentic being.²⁴⁵ We can say, then, that although inauthenticity is the way most people are most of the time (zunächst und zumeist), authenticity is ontologically more primordial. This proposal will be elucidated in a later chapter on the authentic self. For the moment, I would like to continue the exploration and clarification of “throwness” for this term signifies the inexorability of inauthenticity and alienation in that “at first and for the most part” Dasein is thrown into a way of ἄληθευειν – concern, Mitsein, das Man, publicness – from which it becomes absorbed and dispersed into inauthentic-alienating ways of being. This does not rule out the possibility of withdrawal and authenticity, for although “at first and for

²⁴³ SZ, p. 179, “Der Wirbel offenbart zugleich den Wurf- und Bewegtheitscharakter der Geworfenheit, die in de Befindlichkeit des Daseins ihm selbst sich aufdrängen kann.”
²⁴⁴ SZ, p. 179, “Zu dessen Faktizität gehört, daß das Dasein, solange es ist, was es ist, im Wurf bleibt und in die Uneigentlichkeit des Man hineingewirbelt wird.”
²⁴⁵ SZ, p. 317-8.
the most part” Dasein is inauthentic, the phrase “for the most part” means that inauthenticity prevails as a way of being in everydayness “for the most part”, leaving open the possibility of withdrawal and modification. Hence, I suggest that Dasein “remains in the throw” of inauthenticity only as long as it persists in the ways of being of das Man. Dasein can withdraw himself from das Man and choose the project of authenticity. It is this project of withdrawal and individuation that will be the subject matter of the next point.

Another interpretive problem we face in exhibiting the ontological status of “falling” is the many experimental positions of the phenomenon of falling, in particular the one contained in the 1922 manuscript where Heidegger emphasizes with a number of intricate latin justapositions the interrelation between the constitutive and the concealing role of the fall.246 “Without going into etimological details one may just note that terms such as Reluzenz (to shine back), das zerrstreuen (dispersion) or Praestruktion (to arrange beforehand) ‘dislocate’ Aristotle’s (and the Greek) language of sight, or phenomenology, into a language that best expresses a movement that “dislocates the lumen naturale, implying that its source is not so much reason or subjectivity taken by itself, as rather a world of concern, as Heidegger refers “the movement of life in its encounter-laden direction towards itself.”247 In fact Heidegger uses the word Sorge (care) to characterize this movement of facticity.248

“Falling, as a kind of being of this being-in, affords us the most elemental evidence for Dasein’s existentiality, (i.e. its possibility of existing either authentically or inauthentically). In falling, nothing other than our potentiality-for-being-in-the-world is at stake, even if in the mode of authenticity. Dasein can fall only because being-in-the-world understandingly with its moods is at stake.”249

246 Cf. Weigelt, C., op. cit., p. 140 “This was probably due to the course on Augustine the preceeding semester. Cf. also “Heidegger, M., Phänomenologie des Religiösen Lebens. This book contains the lectures from two courses at Freiburg, Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion from winter semester 1920 and Augustine and Neoplatonism from summer semester 1921. In addition there are twenty pages of notes for a course on The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism that was not held because Heidegger decided to lecture on another subject in the WS 1919.

247 Cf. Weigelt, C., op. cit., p. 141. PIA, p. 120, “Bewegung des faktischen Lebens in der begegnishaften Richtung auf der selbst.”

248 Heidegger, M., Sein und Zeit, p. 192 and also p. 176 where Heidegger describes falling as “eine existentiale Bestimmung des Daseins selbst” and p. 179 where falling is defined as “eine wesenhafte ontologische Struktur des Daseins selbst.”

249 SZ, p. 179, “Verfallen als Seinsart dieses In-Seins vielmehr den elementarsten Beweis für die Existenzialität des Daseins darstellt. Im Verfallen geht es um nichts anderes als um das In-der-Welt-
In the following passage, Heidegger stresses the hardship Dasein must endure to withdraw oneself from \textit{das Man}:

“If Dasein discovers the world on its own and brings it close, if it discovers for itself its own authentic being, then this discovery of the ‘world’ and this disclosure of Dasein always lead to a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein makes its own way.” \textsuperscript{250}

In this passage Heidegger clearly speaks of the importance bringing out the \textit{\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\rho\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\nu} of \textit{Eigentlichkeit} by a “clearing away of concealments and obscurities” and a breaking up of the “disguises” of inauthenticity. What is here at stake is a changing of one’s life, a transformation of one’s inauthentic ways of being-in-the-world.

“If authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon.” \textsuperscript{251}

The shift of \textit{Dasein’s} liberation from its inauthenticity to authenticity is withdrawing (\textit{entziehung}) and individuation (\textit{Vereinzelung}). The term individuation refers to an individuation of the authentic self from \textit{das Man} self. ‘Withdrawing’ is a term to describe \textit{Dasein’s} liberation (\textit{Befreiung}) from inauthentic possibilities\textsuperscript{252}, the extraction (\textit{entziehen}) of \textit{Dasein} from \textit{das Man’s} ways of being\textsuperscript{253} and the act of tearing oneself away from \textit{das Man (entreissen)}.\textsuperscript{254} I will use the terms withdrawing and individuation as the interpretive key in which we can work out the \textit{\alpha\lambda\iota\eta\rho\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\nu} of anxiety, authentic-being-toward-death, and conscience, and how these are revealed and awaken \textit{Dasein} from its slumber in \textit{das Man} (the ‘they’, sein-können, wenngleich im Modus der Uneigentlichkeit. Das Dasein kann nur verfallen, weil es ihm um das verstehend-befindlich In-der-Welt-sein geht.”

\textsuperscript{250} \textit{SZ}, p. 129, “Wenn das Dasein die Welt eigens entdeckt und sich nahebringt, wenn es ihm selbst sein eigenstes Sein Erschließen von Dasein immer als Wegräumen der Verdeckungen und Verdunkelungen, als Zerbrechen der Verstellungen, mit denen sich das Dasein gegen es selbst abriegelt.”

\textsuperscript{251} \textit{SZ}, p. 179, “Umgekehrt ist die eige\textit{]nic} Existenz nichts, was über der verfallenden Alltäglichkeit schwelt, sondern exitenzial nur rein modifiziertes Ergreifen dieser.”

\textsuperscript{252} \textit{SZ}, pp. 264, 303, 344, 122, 198.

\textsuperscript{253} \textit{SZ}, pp. 169, 296, 299, 383.

\textsuperscript{254} \textit{SZ}, pp. 263, 383-384.
world of everybody and nobody), arouse Dasein out of its absorption in publicness, and disclose its lostness, alienation, and inauthenticity in inauthentic existence.

The phenomena that I am examining at present are not the unique determinations of Eigentlichkeit nor are the terminological correspondences with Aristotle to be unfolded restricted to the phenomena currently being examined. Therefore, the provisional nature of this point should be noted, as it is only the beginning of the disclosure of Eigentlichkeit. Specifically, I suggest that the modes of disclosure addressed in the discussion of Eigentlichkeit are ontological designations of Aristotle’s πράξεις. These phenomena are, in Heidegger’s interpretation, ‘ontological’. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is very different here from the commonly accepted reading of Aristotle, in that he claims that the nature of Aristotle’s practical philosophy is a universal determination of human being that discloses fundamental insights into what it is to be human, and which have a transformative effect in Dasein. In other words, the idea is that the Aristotelian structure of πράξεις as ἀληθεύειν makes it possible to see the relationship between Heidegger’s and Aristotle’s respective ontological projects in a different light and how the possibility of ontology presupposes the disclosing action of human being: ἀληθεύειν. I hope to make clear in the following how Heidegger demonstrates that Aristotle considers human life in its totality as a πράξεις and not a ποιήσις which for him works respectively as authenticity and inauthenticity.255

In the Aristotelian thesis in accordance with which πράξεις is κίνησις τοῦ βίου (the movement specific to human life) Heidegger finds strong support for, and substantial confirmation of, the direction of his research and at the same time characterizes the possible misunderstandings of this point made by the tradition.256

In order to support this contention I would begin by asking a) how anxiety works as a disclosive phenomenon that withdraws Dasein from das Man (the ‘they’, world of everybody and nobody) and individuates it for the choice of authenticity, and how Heidegger was able to support his claim from what he read in Aristotle and made explicit in the analyses of his terms in his GA 18 course, namely by appealing to Heidegger’s reading of βουλευσίς (anxiousness) and προαιρεσίς (anticipatory choice), πράξεις and κίνησις (Eudemian Ethics,

255 PL, I, 4, 1254a7. ὁ δὲ βίος πράξεις, οὐ ποιήσις, ἐστιν.’
256 EE, II, 3, 1220b 27, “ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεξε, ἢ δὲ πράξεις κίνησις’ and 6, 1222b 19-20, “πρὸς δὲ τούτως ὁ γ’ ἀνθρώπως καὶ πράξεων ὑπὸν ἦστὶν ἀρχῇ μόνον.”
Physics VI) in the notion of Angst, Jemenigkeit and Zeit; b) how the awareness of death plays a similar withdrawing-individuating role and offer a first account of φρόνησις.

To conclude this chapter and the examination of the conditions of possibility of the transformation of the inauthentic self, I will examine Heidegger’s account of Conscience and the Call to Authenticity and the connection to Aristotle’s πάθη (Rethoric, book II) – [Befindlichkeit, Verstehen] including 1) Conscience as the call to authenticity; 2) Dasein’s understanding of the appeal and guilt: Dasein’s being guilty (seinkönnen).

What will be explored in this chapter is therefore the possibility of a transition from inauthenticity to authenticity from Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle. The guiding question throughout the present chapter is therefore: what makes authenticity possible? i.e., what are the conditions of the possibility of authenticity? How central are Aristotle’s concepts from his practical philosophy to Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik? How Heidegger apprehends and determines the fundamental ontological structure of human life, of Dasein, or more specifically the character of the latter on the basis of his reading of being uncovering, in its being as ἀληθεύειν?

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257 EE, on the basis of the cited passage II, 3, 1220 b27.
258 SZ, pp. 34, 271-3, 276, 277.
259 I will follow this analysis in pp. 267-301 specifically pp. 280, 285, 287-8 of SZ.
e) Anxiety and Advancing in the Possibility (*Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit*)

My proposal on anxiety is restricted by my focus on authenticity and the \(\alpha\lambda\theta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\) at stake in every mode of disclosure. Anxiety, in Heidegger’s interpretation, is not taken as mental pathology but is rather interpreted as a “distinctive mode of disclosure… one of the most far-reaching and primordial possibilities of disclosure.”\(^{260}\) Now, I would like therefore to offer an interpretation of anxiety in *Being and Time* as an extreme experience that withdraws and individuates inauthentic *Dasein*, and as a special mode of \(\alpha\lambda\theta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\), that is a *grundbefindlichkeit* that helps make authenticity possible. Again, as in previous sections, we see how Heidegger retrieves an understanding of *Dasein* by letting Aristotle’s notions point to where they are worked out: factical life. In this sense, I shall go back and forth from Aristotle’s ontic notions to the structures and concepts with which Heidegger describes and interprets these phenomena (ontological). This way of dwelling on the ontic grounds, that is the \(\alpha\lambda\theta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\) in which any ontological description is rooted, is clearly stated in *Being and Time*.

Heidegger claims that there is one mood that is a relevant disclosive phenomenon. This mood is anxiety (*Angst*) which is designated as a “basic findliness” (*Grundbefindlichkeit*) and it opens up the meaning of “advancing in the possibility” coined from Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s \(\beta\omicron\upsilon\ell\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma\), \(\pi\omicron\omicron\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma\) and \(\kappa\upsilon\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma\).\(^{261}\)

In anxiety, there is no definite threat. Rather on the contrary, one is anxious because the world has lost all meaning and importance. Heidegger suggested previously at Marburg (GA 18) that anxiety also gives testimony to the idea that understanding is constituted of \(\pi\alpha\theta\omicron\varsigma\) namely when it destroys our ordinary speaking for the benefit of another superior disclosing.\(^{262}\)

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\(^{260}\) *SZ*, p. 182, “ausgezeichneter Weise erschlossen (…) eine der weitgehendsten und ursprünglichsten Erschließungsmöglichkeiten suchen, die im Dasein selbst liegt.”

\(^{261}\) *NE*, VI, 2, 1139b 7-11 and III, 5.

\(^{262}\) *GAP*, pp. 196-197.
In describing anxiety, Heidegger’s first point is that the ‘object’ *lato sensu* of anxiety, “*that in the face of which one has anxiety (das Wovor der Angst) is being-in-the-world as such.*” Therefore, the focus of anxiety is on no particular being in the world:

“That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite. Not only does this indefiniteness leave factically undecided which being within-the-world is threatening us, but it also tells us that beings within-the-world are not ‘relevant’ at all. Nothing which is available-at-hand or present-at-hand within the world works as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious.”

Although the aim of anxiety is nothing definite, for nothing threatens, nevertheless the experience causes a rupture in *Dasein*’s involvement, and as with the case of the broken instrument one “stumbles to a void” (*stöß ins Leere*). The void that arises in the experience of anxiety is a *loss of meaning* such that the world of *das Man* no longer has any interest, importance or urgency:

“The totality of involvements of the available-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within the world, is, as such, without importance; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of complete meaninglessness (…) The utter meaninglessness which makes itself known does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that beings within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this meaninglessness of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself (…) In anxiety what is environmentally available-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do beings within-the-world. The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, and neither can the *Dasein*-with of others.”

It should be noted that in *Being and Time* the ‘object’ and source of anxiety is *not* a metaphysical nothingness (*das Nichts*). Although that which threatens in the state of anxiety can be said to be “nothing and nowhere” in that no definite object in a particular region is the source of the threat, Heidegger clearly says that that which one is anxious is “not totally nothing” (*kein totales Nichts*). Although after

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263 *SZ*, p. 186, “*Das Wovor der Angst ist das In-der-Welt-sein als solches.*” (Heidegger’s italics)
264 *SZ*, p. 186, “Das Wovor der Angst is völlig unbestimmt. Diese Unbestimmheit läßt nicht nur faktisch unentschieden, welches innerweltliche Seiende droht, sondern besagt, daß überhaupt das innerweltliche Seiende nicht ‘relevant’ ist. Nichts von dem, was innerhalb der Welt zuhanden und vorhanden ist, fungiert als das, wovor die Angst sich ängstet.”
265 *SZ*, p. 75.
266 *SZ*, pp. 186-7.
267 *SZ*, p. 187. We find an analysis on ‘nothingness’ in some of Heidegger’s post *SZ* courses as in *KPM*, p. 228. Cf. also “*Was ist Metaphysik?*” in *WM*, p. 16.
a seizure of anxiety when asked what the matter is, we may reply, “it was really nothing”, this everyday disclosure which we usually use to talk about familiar things in the world is unable to articulate the experience. For in anxiety everything in the familiar everyday world has become completely insignificant. There is nothing to be done, nothing to discuss, nothing to be said. But the “nothing” here is not a mysterious metaphysical “nothingness”, but rather a world without meaning, a world stripped of its usual significance that has nothing to offer. Everyday existence has become empty, vacuous, hollow, void.\textsuperscript{268}

Heidegger argues from this experience of meaninglessness that anxiety is not only intentional (\textit{das Wovor}), but also reflexive (\textit{das Worum}), that is, one is anxious about something. What one is anxious about “is not any definite kind of being for Dasein or a definite possibility (…) but rather (…) that which anxiety is anxious about is its own being-in-the-world.”\textsuperscript{269} This means that \textit{Dasein} is anxious about its own being-in-the-world profoundly disturbed about the loss of meaning and the flat indifference of everything in its everyday world. The consequence of anxiety is therefore that \textit{Dasein} can no longer remain tranquil and self-confident in the protecting shelter of \textit{das Man}.

“Anxiety takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted. It throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world.”\textsuperscript{270}

In this sense, anxiety makes the understanding maintained by \textit{das Man} collapse resulting in the disintegration of the \textit{das Man} self. Hence, anxiety also withdraws \textit{Dasein} out of its dispersion-absorption “throwing Dasein back upon its authentic potentiality-for-being-a-self.” The point here is that precisely because \textit{Dasein} is related to its being in a relation of a practical kind, he is faced with its ‘authentic

\textsuperscript{268} Cf. Kellner, D., \textit{op. cit.}, p.64

\textsuperscript{269} \textit{SZ}, p. 187, “Die Umsicht stöß ins Leere (…) .”

potentiality-for-being-in-the-world’ which represents a future being, that Aristotle frequently underlines – βουλευσίς (anxiousness) and προοφέσις (anticipatory choice).\(^{271}\)

The point here is that das Man self which disintegrates and collapses. The destruction of the tyranny of das Man's domination over Dasein in anxiety withdraws Dasein from its absorption in everydayness and frees it for authentic possibilities. The point here is that precisely because Dasein is related to its being in a relationship of a practical kind, he is faced with its ‘authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world’ which represents a future being.

Heidegger's purpose is to show one can become free to appropriate and develop one's own possibilities of understanding, interpreting, and acting, and thus be open to one's potentiality-for-being-a-self.\(^{272}\) Furthermore, this notion certainly echoes what Plato had already expressed in the Theaetetus, when he refers that what a human being is, this he seeks to understand.\(^{273}\) Aristotle expresses similar view in the Physics when he states that:

“The way of bringing into light (πέφυκε) is to proceed from what is clearer (ἡ δόξα) and knowable to us (δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν καὶ σαφεστέρων), to what is more knowable and clearer by nature (ἐπὶ τὰ σαφεστέρα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτέρα); for the same things are not knowable to us (οὐ γὰρ ταύτα ἡμῖν τε γνωρίσα) and knowable without qualification (καὶ ἀπλῶς).”\(^{274}\)

For Aristotle, this desire for knowledge is to be understood as a movement from what is clearer to us (ἡ δόξα) to what is clearer by nature (ἐπὶ τὰ σαφεστέρα τῇ φύσει).\(^ {275}\)

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271 Aristotle, *NE*, VI, 1139 a31. I will explore these terms further in the next chapter.

272 This notion certainly echoes what Plato had already expressed in the Theaetetus, 174b 1-6, when he refers that what a human being is, this he seeks to understand.

273 Aristotle, *PHY*, 184a 16-18, “πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ δόξα καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφεστέρα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτέρα· οὐ γὰρ ταύτα ἡμῖν τε γνωρίσα καὶ ἀπλῶς.”

274 Ross claims that proceeding from τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτέρα is the opposite of a scientific proof that would proceed from nature and then to Man, which is the reverse of τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμωτέρα τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν. He affirms that this is the opposite of the scientific proof implied in *Analytical Posteriora* I, 2. However to advance the possibility of a proof at this stage is already implicitly anticipating a path which hasn’t yet been undertaken. Ross is still assuming that a method is a technique, a purely theoretical tool to confirm a theory which is already taken for granted. Method is not a technique for Aristotle. Rather it is a manner of inquiry that remains faithful to the matter of thought itself. The transition
Heidegger seems to have retrieved the idea of an interruption of concern, caused by anxiety, from Aristotle’s own views on Philosophy. “This question seems also particularly worth posing when exploring the traditional esteem for philosophy as metaphysics, as πρῶτη φιλοσοφία, which places philosophy at the top of the hierarchical order of knowledge (…) that philosophy not only makes up a particularly far-reaching or comprehensive form of knowledge, but that it is also something exceptional and extraordinary, something which cannot be conceived of simply as a continuation of our everyday understanding for the world. For the rise of philosophy is not only concomitant with but indeed dependent upon a suspension of our immersion in everyday concerns – which however does not prevent philosophy from aspiring to the ultimate truth even about that everyday life on which it has turned its back.”

Weigelt concludes that “it is not because philosophical wisdom is especially useful to us that it can put claim to superiority, but because its objects constitute the most admirable and overwhelming aspects of reality” stating that “this is particularly clear in the celebrated first lines of the Metaphysics where Aristotle suggests that the sciences that do not aim at utility could arise only when such arts that provide Man with the necessities of life had been developed, as this for the first time enabled men to have leisure:

“That it [philosophy] is not productive is clear also from those who first philosophised. For it is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophise, wondering first at common perplexities, and then by gradual progression being perplexed by greater things as well, … He who is perplexed and wonders thinks that he is ignorant (…); hence if it was to escape ignorance that men began to philosophise, it is obvious that they pursued science [ἐπιστασθαι] for the sake of knowledge [εἰδέναι] and not for the sake of anything useful.”

from τῶν γνωριμώτερον ἡμῖν τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα comes from the same fold of nature as κίνεσις and this is the reason why Aristotle indicates so clearly in the beginning of Physics the εἰδέναι and ἐπιστασθαι: in order to point out the presencing character of being – which Heidegger brilliantly thematizes: κίνεσις as οὐσία – presencing, Heidegger, M., WWP, p. 283. Cf. the same point in Heidegger’s later essay, Der Satz vom Grund, (GA 10), p.111. The final (extended) lecture was given in Vienna and to the Bremen Club in 1956. Vide also Heidegger’s reference to μεθόδος Parmenides (GA 54), pp. 87-88.

276 Weigelt, C., op. cit., p. 150.
277 META, 982b 11-21, “οτι δ’ ου ποιητικη, δηλον και εκ των πρωτων φιλοσοφησαντων δια οι κα τα θαυμαζεν οι ανθρωποι και γιν ν και το πρωτον ηρεματο φιλοσοφησαν, εξ αρχης μεν τη προερχεται των απορων θαυμαζαντων, εντα κατα μικρων ουτω προιντων και περ των μειζων διαπορησαντων, (…) ο δ’ απορων και θαυμαζον οιεται αγνοειν (…) ώστε ειπε δια το φευγειν την αγνοειν εφιλοσοφησαν, φανεραν ότι δια το ειδεναι το επιστασθαι ειτωκου και ου χρησεως τινος ένεκεν.” The translation of ἐπιστασθαι as ‘science’ and εἰδέναι as ‘knowledge’ was adopted here bearing in mind the classical translation of these terms as “disciplines” (Charlton) or “scientific knowledge” (Ross). However, it is important to
The point here is that precisely because Dasein is related to its being in a relation of a practical kind, he is faced with its ‘authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world’ which represents a future being, that Aristotle frequently underlines – 

βούλευσις (anxiousness) and προσέρεσις (anticipatory choice).  

He refers that what a human being is, this he seeks to understand. Aristotle expresses similar view in the Physics when he states that:

“The way of bringing into light (περφυκε) is to proceed from what is clearer (η ὄδος) and knowable to us (δε ηκ των γνωριμοτερων ημιν και σαφεστερων), to what is more knowable and clearer by nature (επι τα σαφεστερα τη φυσει και γνωριμωτερα); for the same things are not knowable to us (ου γαρ ταυτα ημιν τε γνωριμα) and [knowable] without qualification (και απλως).”  

For Aristotle, this desire for knowledge is to be understood as a movement from what is clearer to us (η ὄδος) to what is clearer by nature (επι τα σαφεστερα τη φυσει).  

see what lies behind these translations. For paying attention to both terms that Aristotle uses especially in PHY (i.e. 184a 10-16) I find eidoùai and epistataskai to both mean literally “to know”. As an aorist indicative infinitive that in Greek has the meaning of having already seen something, eidoùai means to recognise by already being able to recognise. On the other hand, epistataskai as a present middle infinitive has the sense of standing for itself, something that stands for itself and therefore concerns the self standing of something to be worked out: “presencing”. For example, in this line, μεθοδος, means “the way we go after. ὄδος: way, μετα: after” rather than “systematic inquiry” or “systematical knowledge” as present in CHARLTON, W. Aristotle’s Physics I, II, p. 1 or even “scientific knowledge” cf. ROSS, W. D., The Works of Aristotle. Charlton and Ross’ renderings of μεθοδος to “systematical knowledge” is only possible at the cost of understanding ειδηαι and επιστασθαι as “disciplines”. Cf. Weigelt, op. cit., p. 151.

Aristotle, NE, VI, 1139 a31. I will explore these terms further in the next chapter.  

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Plato, Theaetetus, 174b 1-6.  

Aristotle, PHY, 184a 16-18, “περφυκε δε ηκ των γνωριμοτερων ημιν η νοσος και σαφεστερων επι τα σαφεστερα τη φυσει και γνωριμωτερα ου γαρ ταυτα ημιν τε γνωριμα και απλως.”  

Ross claims that proceeding from των γνωριμοτερων ημιν τη φυσει και γνωριμωτερα is the opposite of a scientific proof that would proceed from nature and then to Man, which is the reverse of τη φυσει και γνωριμωτερα των γνωριμοτερων ημιν. He affirms that this is the opposite of the scientific proof implied in Analytical Posteriora I, 2. However to advance the possibility of a proof at this stage is already implicitly anticipating a path which hasn’t yet been undertaken. Ross is still assuming that a method is a technique, a purely theoretical tool to confirm a theory which is already taken for granted. Method is not a technique for Aristotle. Rather it is a manner of inquiry that remains faithful to the matter of thought itself. The transition from των γνωριμοτερων ημιν τη φυσει και γνωριμωτερα comes from the same fold of nature as κινησις and this is the reason why Aristotle indicates so clearly in the beginning of Physics the ειδηαι and επιστασθαι: in order to point out the presencing character of being – which Heidegger brilliantly thematizes: κινησις as ωσια – presencing. Heidegger, M., WWP, p. 283. Cf. the same point in Heidegger’s later essay, Der Satz vom Grund, (GA 10), p.111. The final (extended) lecture was given in Vienna and to the Bremen Club in 1956. Vide also Heidegger’s reference to μεθοδος Parmenides (GA 54), pp. 87-88.
The point I would like to draw from these excerpts is that \( \theta \alpha \nu \mu \alpha \zeta \varepsilon \iota \nu \) (wonder) and *Angst* both share the interruption of Man’s concern. “For Heidegger, the notion of wonder harbours a tendency towards seeing and helps to pave the way for the idea of knowledge and authenticity as vision. Even though Heidegger does not say so explicitly, the reason seems to be that the experience of wonder gives rise to the idea that there must be a form of knowledge that is able to correspond to the world in its full appearance, and that furthermore can be a proper response to the experience of wonder.” The “great expectations” of such knowledge can only be fulfilled by \( \alpha \lambda \nu \theta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) and this is the reason why \( \alpha \lambda \nu \theta \varepsilon \iota \varepsilon \iota \nu \) as the way of carrying through the truth in its uncovering is so decisive for Heidegger’s own phenomenology. For as \( \theta \alpha \nu \mu \alpha \zeta \varepsilon \iota \nu \) (wonder), philosophy and authenticity arise out of wonder from a feeling that the world is no longer familiar but on the contrary more or less obscure and overwhelming (*Angst*). To bring about such change in human being is, thus, the task of \( \theta \alpha \nu \mu \alpha \zeta \varepsilon \iota \nu \) for Aristotle, and *Angst* for Heidegger. If the experience of anxiety can withdraw *Dasein* from a grasp of beings to a grasp of its being, one can say that it is an experience that borders on pure disclosedness, a pure \( \alpha \lambda \nu \theta \varepsilon \iota \varepsilon \iota \nu \), due to the suspension of the activity of disclosing in absorbed concern. Therefore, it seems that all one can do is to be appalled by it, to wonder at it.

The study of the withdrawing aspect of anxiety in Heidegger’s text from Aristotle’s notion of \( \theta \alpha \nu \mu \alpha \zeta \varepsilon \iota \nu \) in the *Metaphysics* and the *Physics* should help explain why Heidegger chose anxiety as a unique ontological phenomenon for, it is anxiety alone that works as an \( \alpha \lambda \nu \theta \varepsilon \iota \varepsilon \iota \nu \), an uncovering of the situation and place of *Dasein* in the world.

Heidegger’s interpretation of anxiety operates a movement between the withdrawing-disclosive capacity of working out *das Man*, and the role of “investing” *Dasein* with the possibility of being-a-self. This central aspect of withdrawal of *Dasein* from its fallenness in *das Man* and the individuating

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αὐθεντικὸν (disclosing, making-true) of an authentic existence is clearly portrayed in the following passage:

“Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Therefore, with that which it is anxious, anxiety discloses Dasein as being possible and indeed as that which it can be singular from itself as individualized in individuation.

Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its being toward its ownmost potentiality-for-being – that is, its being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its being-free-for (propensio in) the authenticity of its being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is.”

The two “insights” which Heidegger claims are disclosed to Dasein through anxiety are its “being possible” and its “being free”. The argument would seem to be that the αὐθεντικὸν of anxiety discloses a way of being-in-the-world that is blind to its possibilities, that is, truth, αὐθεντικὲς. In other words, the disruption of the ways of being of das Man is activated through the αὐθεντικὸν of anxiety that enables Dasein to realize that it is possible to act, understand, and interpret in its own ways. “Anxiety individuates and discloses Dasein as ‘solus ipse’.” The journey towards authenticity begins, one can claim, paradoxically, with inauthenticity, with a seizure of anxiety that reveals one’s lostness in das Man and opens up to the possibility of self-transformation.

It isn’t necessary to recall here how Heidegger directs his analysis toward an investigation of the unitary foundation which sustains the autoreferential practical structure of Dasein indicated by Zu-Sein. Heidegger claims that “unbiased evidence” for his description of anxiety is found in the everyday way of talking about anxiety that says, “in anxiety on e is ‘uncanny’ (unheimlich).” The term “uncanniness”, Heidegger claims, elucidates the “peculiar indefinitness” of anxiety,

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283 SZ, pp. 187-8, “Die Angst vereinzelte das Dasein auf sein eigenstes In-der-Welt-sein, das als verstehtendes wesenhaft auf Möglichkeiten sich entwirft. Mit dem Worum des Sichängstens erschließt daher die Angst das Dasein als Möglichkeit und zwar als das, das es einzig von ihm selbst her als vereinzeltes in der Vereinzelung sein kann. Die Angst offenbart im Dasein das Sein zum eigenstes Seinkönnen, das heißt das Freisein für die Freiheit des Sich-selbst-wählens und – ergreifens. Die Angst bringt das Dasein vor sein Freisein für… (propensio in…) die Eigentlichkeit seines Seins als Möglichkeit, die e immer schon ist.”

284 Underlying this claim is, perhaps, a reference to Kierkegaard’s depiction of anxiety as the “vertigo of freedom” in which the individualized self dizzyly explores the infinity of possibilities before it and experiences anxiety in the face of its freedom and possibility.

285 SZ, p. 188.

286 SZ, p. 188, “In der Angst ist einem ‘unheimlich’.”
its being over “nothing and nowhere”; but more important to our purposes, uncanniness also means “not being at home.”\footnote{SZ, p. 188, “Unheimlichkeit meint aber dabei zugleich das Nicht-zu- hause-sein.”} In an earlier chapter we saw that Heidegger already remarked that “the obviousness and self-assurance of the average ways in which things have been interpreted, are such that while the particular Dasein drifts along toward an ever-increasing groundlessness as it floats, the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden from it under their protecting shelter.”\footnote{SZ, p. 170, “In der Selbstverständlichkeit und Selbstsicherheit der durchschnittlichen Ausgelegtheit jedoch liegt es, daß unter ihrem Schutz dem jeweiligen Dasein selbst die Unheimlichkeit der Schwebe, in der es einer wachsenden Bodenlosigkeit zutreiben kann, verborgen bleibt.”} In anxiety the protecting shelter and das Man's “at-homeness” collapse and the groundlessness and uncanniness of a das Man existence make themselves manifest. In this way anxiety and uncanniness \textit{halt} the fall into das Man by disrupting the complacency of everydayness.\footnote{SZ, p. 189, “Die Angst dagegen holt das Dasein aus seinem verfallenden Aufgehen in der 'Welt' zurück. Die alltägliche Vertrautheit bricht in sich zusammen. Das Dasein ist vereinzelt, das jedoch als In-der-Welt-sein. Das in-Sein kommt in den existentialen 'Modus' des \textit{Un-zu-hause}. Nicht anderes meint die Rede von der 'Unheimlichkeit'.” Cf. also Kellner, D., \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 40-76.}

The argument would seem to be that the \textit{άληθεύειν} of anxiety discloses a way of being-in-the-world that is blind to its possibilities, that is, truth, \textit{άληθεύεια}.

Even though \textit{Angst} and \textit{θαυμάζειν} are supposed to work as an impetus for philosophy and disclosing of human being's authenticity, both Heidegger and Aristotle are aiming at knowing what originally gave rise to it.\footnote{Weigelt, C., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 159.} The question now for Heidegger is how to find the expression to show everyday meaning whilst at the same time reaching for another form of speaking ‘the things themselves’ “While everydayness may seize upon the heritage, it happens that Dasein has the possibility to tear the heritage from everydayness and to bring it to an original \textit{explicatedeness}, that is, in the \textit{hexis} to \textit{appropriate}, out of everydayness and against it, the nature of conceptuality [\textit{das Begriffliche} \textit{in the proper sense}].”\footnote{\textit{GAP}, pp. 272; 277,}
indicated why anxiety, among all our manifold “moods”, was chosen as the Befindlichkeit which can most directly withdraw and individuate Dasein from das Man. Now let us examine the liberating role anxiety plays in Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity and seek to grasp how and why Heidegger maintains his interpretation of advancing in the possibility towards death.

Heidegger’s argument is that authentic being-towards-death “reveals to Dasein its lostness in the das Man self, and brings it before the possibility (...) of being itself the disclosive understanding of one’s own death, Heidegger maintains, is one of the fundamental ways in which one gains a sense of self-being. This account comes from an in-depth reading of Aristotle’s notion of φύσις. Before this connection can be properly exhibited perhaps we should heed some aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology. I will not be able to cover this theme in its own right in this study but will concentrate mainly on Heidegger and Aristotle’s understanding in πράξις and further the previous indications on βούλευσις and προσέρεσις in connection to Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle’s κίνησις (motion) to the notion of individuation (Jemenigkeit) of Dasein.

In order to understand what Vorlaufen means we need to take into account the sense of Sein zum Tode (being-towards-death) and Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit (advancing in the possibility) and focus on the connection to Aristotle’s notion of κίνησις. For, the concept of κίνησις is determinative of Aristotle’s thinking of life and world, meaning amongst other things the interplay between ποιήσις and πάθος. These notions are aspects of ἀληθεύειν strictly connected with Aristotle’s notion of νοῦς in the de Anima and the Physics and Heidegger’s discussion of the interplay between νοῦς, ποιήσις and πάθος back at Marburg (GA 18). I will restrict myself here to the notion of κίνησις as it is laid out by Aristotle in the Physics and indicate how κίνησις captures the meaning of Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit. Then I will move on in the next chapter to the connection to vorlaufende Entschlossenheit with the notion of νοῦς ὁρετικός (discernment involving action) in the interpretation of being-towards-death as an “existential” constitutive structure of human being.

292 This view is also taken by MacNeill, W., The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory, pp. 93-131.
293 This is at least Heidegger’s view in GAP.
There is one thing, Heidegger claims, that stands before one (Bevorstand) in a distinctive way. This unique possibility is my own death.\footnote{SZ, p. 250.} All other possibilities of everydayness are based on my being-with-others and are dependent on the prescriptions of \textit{das Man}: “but there may also be impending for \textit{Dasein} a journey, for instance, or a disputation with Others, or the forgoing of something of a kind which \textit{Dasein} itself can be – its own possibilities of being, which are based on its being with others.”\footnote{SZ, p. 250, “Bevorstehen kann dem \textit{Dasein} aber auch zum Beispiel eine Reise, eine Auseinandersetzung mit Anderen, ein Verzicht auf solches, was das \textit{Dasein} selbst sein kann:eigene Seinsmöglichkeiten, die im Mitsein mit Anderen gründen.” ["But there may also be impending for \textit{Dasein} a journey, for instance, or a disputation with Others, or the forgoing of something of a kind which \textit{Dasein} itself can be – its own possibilities of being, which are based on its being with others."]}

My death is, Heidegger argues, something that is distinctively \textit{mine}: death is my \textit{ownmost} possibility that is of personal concern to me and whose source is me alone.\footnote{SZ, p. 240, “Der Tod ist, sofern er ‘ist’ wesentlich je der meine. Und zwar bedeute er eine eigentümliche Seinsmöglichkeit, darin es um das Sein des je eigenen \textit{Dasein}s schlechthin geht. Am Sterben zeigt sich, daß der Tod ontologisch durch \textit{Jemeinigkeit} und Existenz konstituiert wird.” ["By its very essence, death is in every case mine. And indeed it signifies a peculiar possibility of being in which the very being of one’s own \textit{Dasein} is an issue."]}

Death as my ultimate possibility, or ultimate end, is explained in terms of its being a \textit{distinctive} possibility in which no one can replace me, act as my substitute, or take away from me, and which therefore stands before me as something irreplaceably mine. Heidegger claims that “representability is constitutive for our being with one another.”\footnote{SZ, p. 240.} With my death, “this possibility of representing breaks down completely” when it comes to the question of my own death. Through this breakdown I become aware of my \textit{Jemeinigkeit}, my mineness, my being a unique, non-representable self.

The fundamental determination that an authentic being-towards-death should free, understand, and endure is the nature of death as a \textit{distinctive possibility}:

“\textit{If being-towards-death has to disclose understandingly the possibility which we have characterized, it must be understood as a possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, in the way we comport ourselves toward it.”}\footnote{SZ, p. 261, “Im \textit{Sein} zum Tode dagegen, wenn anders es die charakterisierte Möglichkeit als \textit{solche} verstehend zu erschließen hat, muß die Möglichkeit ungeschwächt als \textit{Möglichkeit} verstanden, als \textit{Möglichkeit} ausgebildet und im Verhalten zu ihr als \textit{Möglichkeit} ausgehalten werden.”}
The only way to preserve the “pure possibility” character of death, so as to endure it as possibility, is through what Heidegger calls “advancing in the possibility” (Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit).

Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit is an “advancing” in the possibility “being-towards-death”, or literally, Vor-lauf-en is a projecting call into the future out of Dasein’s finitude. In Weigelt’s reading there is a conception of end in this determination: “Heidegger’s basic argument in this connection is that Aristotle has an ontological conception of τέλος thought as being constitutive of the being of movement and action”. This is the point Heidegger makes in GA 18 in relation to Aristotle’s claim in the Metaphysics that the basic meaning of τέλος is end in the sense of limit. 299 Heidegger also adds that “it is only because this is the basic sense of τέλος that it may also mean “goal.” 300 “In this way he wants to object to the idea that Aristotelian teleology necessarily involves ascribing to nature a goal or design, as if everything that happens would do so according to some plan. We must be careful with the word “teleology”, Heidegger says, for Aristotle did not in fact have any teleological world view. 301 Instead, the basic idea of his teleology is that to be is to be limited, whereas what is unlimited borders on non-being.” 302 “On the other hand, however, Aristotle takes πράξις to be an end in itself. As such, it is not a form of κίνησις since κίνησις does not have its end immanently, but has the mode of being of ἐνέργεια (presence, actualization) or ἐντελέχεια (full presence).” 303 “Therefore, insofar as action involves deliberation (βουλευσις), it is in fact a form of κίνησις, though it is possible for us to regard it as an end in itself.” 304

Before I can show how κίνησις displays the movement of life in its authentic lines of action I must secure for now its original meaning in Aristotle in order to make clear what kind of reading is at stake in Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit and

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300 GAP, pp. 39-82. Idem, p. 135.
301 GAP, p. 82. Idem, p. 135.
303 For the idea that πράξις (activity) in the proper sense cannot be a form of κίνησις (motion) see also Aristotle, META, 1048b 18-27. Idem, p. 135.
304 Weigelt, C., op. cit., p. 135.
how on the basis of this notion is the movement of δρεζίς διανοητική /νούς δρετικός grasped: the guidelines of authenticity.

*Vorlaufen* signifies an advancing into the future, but the phrase “in die Möglichkeit” indicates that the “advancing” or the projecting is not towards death (nor does *Vorlaufen* in means an “anticipation of death”) but rather signifies a projecting into the future from my own being-towards-death.\(^{305}\)

“Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be ‘actualized’, nothing which Dasein as actual could itself be (...) In accordance with its essence, this possibility offers no support for becoming intent on something, ‘ picturing’ to oneself the actuality that is possible, and so forgetting its possibility.”\(^{306}\)

Reading through Heidegger’s account of death as *Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit* do we not hear Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια (in the sense of *Fertigsein*: finished and complete being? In the following passage:

“Being-towards-death is advancing in a potentiality-for-being whose mode of being is itself advancing. In the advancing revealing of this potentiality-for-being, Dasein discloses itself as regards its uttermost possibility. But to project itself on its ownmost potentiality-for-being means to be able to understand itself in the being of the being so revealed – namely to exist. Advancing turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-being – that is to say, the possibility of an *authentic existence*.\(^{307}\)

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\(^{305}\) I am suggesting that Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of “*Vorlaufen in...*” as “anticipation of...” is misleading. For it suggests what Heidegger denies, i.e. “anticipation of” suggests that death is something that is anticipated as a future event that is “still outstanding”. For “anticipation” refers to an object of anticipation, something anticipated as if death were the intentional object of a privileged sort of act, and authentic being-towards-death were an intentional projecting of death as its end or object. Hence, the translation “anticipation of” suggests exactly what Heidegger denies and fails to account for Heidegger’s important stress that authentic being-towards-death understandingly endures death as a distinctive possibility and not as an object of an indefinite future. We will later see how this mistranslation can contribute to a misunderstanding of authenticity.

\(^{306}\) *SZ*, p. 262, “Der Tod als Möglichkeit gibt dem Dasein nichts zu ‘Verwirklichendes’ und nichts, was es als Wirkliches selbst sein könnte. (...) Ihrem Wesen nach bietet diese Möglichkeit keinen Anhalt, um auf etwas gespannt zu sein, das mögliche Wirkliche sich ‘auszumalen’ und darob die Möglichkeit zur vergessen.”

Heidegger’s formulation captures Aristotle’s definition of movement in the difference between beings and being in the *Physics*.

Aristotle states that:

“*Physis* is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest, in that it primarily belongs by virtue of itself and not by virtue of a concomitant attribute.”²⁰⁸

What is ultimately at issue here both for Aristotle and Heidegger is the possibility of time. When Heidegger says “In the advancing revealing of this potentiality-for-being, Dasein discloses itself as regards its uttermost possibility” he is taking us back to the Greek notion of κίνησις as μεταβολή (change) indicating the ‘for the sake of which of every end’.²⁰⁹ The relationship between the verb κινεῖσθαι along with its correlate ἀρχὴ κινήσεως in the *Physics* elucidates how Heidegger’s account of death as a possibility, potentiality-for-being, and being-towards-death depends on the grasp of the proper meaning of μεταβολή essential in the interpretation of the correct voice of the Greek verb κίνησις:

“*Physis* has been (ἐπεὶ δ’ ἦ) defined as a principle of motion and change (ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς) so that the way we take towards it (μεθόδους ἡμῖν) is on the meaning of motion (τί ἦστι κινήσις) for if it were concealed (λαυθανεῖν), the meaning of *Physis* too would be concealed [λαυθανεῖν] (φυσικῶς ἐστὶ). When we have determined the nature of motion (διορισμένος δὲ περι κινήσεως), our next task will be to confront in the same way (πειράτευν τὸν αὐτὸν the terms with which it is involved.”²¹⁰

The central point in confronting Aristotle’s text with Heidegger’s account of death as *Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit* is so far to present the Aristotelian grounds

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²⁰⁸ PHY, 192 b 22-23, “ὡς οὖσας τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αὐτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἰσμαῖν ἐν ὧν ἦπαιρχε πρῶτος καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.”

²⁰⁹ Cf., Inwood, M., *A Heidegger Dictionary*, p. 124, “Heidegger’s down-to-earth terminology (abandoned after BT) is inspired by such coinages of Aristotle as τοι ἐνὶ τινακε ἐνὶ τοι ἐνικανοὶ, ‘for the sake of which’. For the importance of this term to the ‘futural’ character of authentic temporality, cf. pp. 66, 77.

²¹⁰ PHY, II, 192b 9-11, “*Physis* has been (ἐπεὶ δ’ ἦ) defined as a principle of motion and change (ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς) so that the way we follow (μεθόδους ἡμῖν) is on the meaning of motion (τί ἦστι κινήσις) for if it were unknown (λαυθανεῖν), the meaning of *Physis* too would be unknown [λαυθανεῖν] (φυσικῶς ἐστὶ). When we have determined the nature of motion (διορισμένος δὲ περι κινήσεως), our next task will be to confront in the same way (πειράτευν τὸν αὐτὸν the terms which are involved in it”; III, I 200b 10-15.
that underlie Heidegger’s teleological account of Dasein as time, pressuposing we are aware of the passive meaning of κινησις.

This trajectory is, as noted, a movement from what is clearer to us (ἡ ὀδός) to what is clearer by nature (ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τὴ φύσει). Now, this same trajectory seems to be at play in Heidegger’s words “death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-being, in which its very being is at stake” and further, “advancing turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-being – that is to say, the possibility of an authentic existence.” This implies that Dasein’s potentiality-for-being (Seinkönnen) is authenticity. Dasein can be (Sein-können) authentic. Seinkönnen thus signifies that Dasein has the power, the ability (können) to be authentic. This analysis thus suggests that “advancing” brings one to the threshold of authenticity by disclosing the possibility of an authentic existence.

Precisely on this point I believe that, in view of all these elements, Heidegger had to uphold a radical distinction between the ontological constitution of Dasein and that of beings different from Dasein, by basing it on the consideration that Dasein is the only being ontologically constituted as Zu-Sein. Upon this distinction as we have mentioned, he had to rely on Aristotle’s Topica VI, 4 and Metaphysica VII, 3 in Platon: Sophistes course (GA 19), being the idea that we only gain access to the particular because we already have a καθόλου (universal) perspective, lato sensu. In other words, a καθόλου perspective corresponds to the way the whole, ὅλον, of that which encloses (περιέχον) reveals itself in each particular, (ἐκαστον) so that it works as the way of revealing

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311 PHY, 184a 16-18. Ross claims that proceeding from what is clear to us to what is clear by nature is the opposite of a scientific proof that would proceed from nature and then to Man, which is the reverse of τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμότερα τοῖς γνωριμότεροι ἡμῖν. He affirms that this is the opposite of the scientific proof implied in AP I, 2. However to advance the possibility of a proof at this stage is already implicitly anticipating a path which has not yet been undertaken. Ross is still assuming that a method is a technique, a purely theoretical tool to confirm a theory which is already taken for granted. Method is not a technique for Aristotle. Rather it is a manner of inquiry that remains faithful to the matter of thought itself. The transition from τῶν γνωριμότερων ἡμῖν to τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμότερα comes from the same fold of φύσις as κινησις and this is the reason why Aristotle indicates so clearly in the beginning of PHY the εἰδέναι and ἐπιστασθῆναι in order to point out the presencing character of being – which Heidegger thematizes: κινησις as συστατικό – presencing: WBP, pp. 283. Cf. the same point in Heidegger’s later Freiburg, Winter Semester 1955/56 essay, Der Satz vom Grund, p.111 and the reference to μεθόδος in Parmenides (GA 54), pp. 87-88, Aristotle, META, 982b 11-21.

312 SZ, p. 262, “Das Vorlaufen erweist sich als Möglichkeit des Verstehens des eigensten äußersten Seinkönnens, das heißt als Möglichkeit eigentlicher Existenz.”
Dasein as gathered together as a whole holding itself as such in relationship to what is common, κοινόν as the separate, χωρίς. This is itself the pure appearance of the εἶδησεν as prior condition of knowledge and this may explain why at this point in the text Heidegger’s claims that Dasein merely understands that it can be authentic; it has not chosen yet authenticity as a project, resolved on its authentic possibilities, or constituted an authentic self.

We have seen that Dasein’s capacity to be authentic lies in the fact that Dasein has a potentiality, that is, has change, can change which brings us back to the general meaning of μεταβολή distinguished by Aristotle through the use of ἀλλοίωσις. In an analogous sense, the distinctive possibility of death and authenticity depend on Dasein’s capacity to be (Seinkönnen) and individuation. Heidegger claims that an authentic being-towards-death, first, conceives death as its ownmost possibility. The effect of this disclosure is described in the following terms in Being and Time:

“Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. Being toward this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-being, in which its very being is at stake. Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from das Man. This means in advancing Dasein can have been wrenched away from das Man already. The understanding of this ‘can’ (Könens) first reveals its factual lostness in the everydayness of the das Man self.”

This sense of taking over one’s ownmost possibility provides a paradigm for projecting one’s own self-chosen possibilities. The term ‘ownmost’ is a direct translation of Heidegger’s investigations of the ἀλλοίωσις of ἐκκαστοῦ in Aristotle’s Physics.

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313 Cf. Heidegger’s illustrative example of the tree and the fox where ἀλλοίωσις – as change, alteration – is contrasted with the “rest of non-alteration” [Ruhe der Unveränderung] and therefore a type of movedness, WBP, p. 249. “(...) Solches, was sich im Sinne des Ortwechsels bewegt, kann gleichwohl ruhen in der Weise, daß es so bleibt, wie beschaffen es ist: der Fuchs im Laufen ruht, sofern er dieselbe Färbung behält, die Ruhe der Unveränderung, ohne alloiwsis. Oder etwas kann bewegt sein in der Weise des Verkümmerns, zugleich aber noch in der anderen Weise sich bewegen, nämlich der des Anderswerdens: am verdorrenden Baum welken die Blätter, das Grün wird zu Gelb. Das so zweifach Bewegte (hēsis-alloiwsis) ruht zugleich als der dort stehende Baum.”


315 PHY, I, 1, IV; META V, 26, Topics VI, 4.
In the chapter on “being-towards-death” Heidegger contrasts authentic and inauthentic ways of confronting one’s self towards death:

“Our everyday falling evasion in the face of death is an inauthentic being towards death. But inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity. Inauthenticity characterizes a kind of being into which Dasein can divert itself and has for the most part always diverted itself; but Dasein does not necessarily and constantly have to divert itself into this kind of being. Because Dasein exists, it determines its own character as the kind of being it is, and it does so in every case in terms of a possibility which it itself is and which it understands.”

The Seinkönnen disclosed by death is factual, that is, it means to be the from-out-of-which and being-toward of change: being. In other words, when Heidegger speaks of Seinkönnen he is stressing that here is an alreadyness of being given in our access to the world. In his Heidegger Dictionary, pp. 9, 171, Inwood makes a strong case of Seinkönnen as “ability, capacity/potentiality” as different from “possibility” which I unreservedly adopt in my own reading.

Aristotle’s operator “to know” is crucial for this aspect for it makes the transition of a being καθόλου rooted in the γνώριμον ἡμῖν that itself is a γνώριμον τῇ φύσει. For Heidegger this knowledge is the capacity to project one’s own existence (“can” signifies here: can choose and project one’s possibilities). Advancing in one’s

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317 In his Heidegger Dictionary, pp. 9, 171, Inwood makes a strong case of Seinkönnen as “ability, capacity/potentiality” as different from “possibility” which I unreservedly adopt in my own reading.

318 NE, VI, 1141b 31-34, “Now knowledge of oneself will indeed be a kind of practical wisdom, but different from other kinds.” This sentence comes in the sequence of VI, 2, 1139b 7-11 and III, 5 where Aristotle discusses the futural structure of action.

319 This transition is connected with the nature of what is τὸ σοφῆς, the clear, the manifest and therefore with that from which φύσις speaks of. Ὁ παρελθόν τῆς φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα (184 a 16 ff.). Cf. also Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, p. 113.
ownmost possibility thus discloses that one is free, and is able to choose and project one’s own possibilities. On the other hand, the possibility of choosing in every being translates the unity of beings, the συνεσθονων. Heidegger retrieves this same sense of μεταβολή as resistance in Being and Time by regarding an authentic being-towards-death which experiences its own death as a non-relational, distinctive possibility which discloses that one is on his own, abandoned to himself:

“Vorlaufen allows Dasein to understand that potentiality-for-being in which its ownmost being is at stake, must be taken over by Dasein alone. Death does not just ‘belong’ to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in Vorlaufen individualizes Dasein down to itself.”

In explaining the individualizing impact of the experience of one’s own death, we encounter the phenomenon of κίνησις working through the absorption-breakdown-disclosing of anxiety through μεταβολή. Undercutting Heidegger’s claim that “to understand itself in the being of the being so revealed – namely to exist” is the re-reading of Aristotle’s κίνησις as ἀρχή μεταβολή thus unfolding the teleological structure of Dasein in existence: the ἔν of the εἶδος with the τέλος that holds itself, ἔχειν, that is, as Heidegger puts it “the end where the movement of seeing first gathers itself up and essentially in movedness” is understood in terms of the process of potency and actuality as a source of being moved and being at rest.

At this stage of Heidegger’s interpretation this κίνησις/μεταβολή is interpreted ontologically as: Dasein can be, “has to be” (zu-Sein), Dasein is in anticipation of his ownmost possibility of being authentic, meaning Dasein discovers its cause (αἰτίαν) in the overlapping appearances of motion (inauthenticity) and their fundamental character of μεταβολή (change).

Underlying this, there is again the possibility of understanding as that which constitutes knowledge, σοφία, and stands therefore between the double stance of the ὀλον in each ἐκαστον opening up the horizon where beings are revealed in

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321 VWB, p. 285, “das τέλος, das Ende, worin sich die Bewegung des Ausblickens erst auffängt und wesentlich Bewegtheit ist.”
their being: finitude. All particular presencing, ἐπὶσθασταὶ derives from the same fold of being manifest in the simple appearance of the ἐνδεικτικά.

For what we take to be clear to us involves ἀσαφεῖα, a lack of clarity in such a way that we tend to think that the whole of things which is ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων (the clearer to us) is also what by nature is less clear ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει. Again, Heidegger with the help of Aristotle is saying that our access to the world is topsy-turvy, since what we know is none other than a result of an amalgamation of non-examined perspectives.

One might then ask, can death and anxiety really be taken in this seemingly beneficial way Heidegger is recommending? Are the concepts we have been examining really ontological modes of ἀληθεύειν? To answer the last question, we would need to embark on a long journey with both Aristotle’s analysis of εὐδαιμονία in the Nicomachean Ethics and Heidegger’s account on δαιμόν on his Parmenides course (Ga 54), but our purpose is more modest here and we are simply making appeal to the text of Being and Time and some specific passages of Aristotle that underlie Heidegger’s concepts in his Daseinsanalytik to project itself onto its ownmost potentiality-for-being, thus making possible its authenticity.

“We may now summarize our characterization of authentic being towards death as we have projected it existentially: Advancing (Vorlaufen) reveals to Dasein its lostness in the das Man self, and brings it back face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death – a freedom which has been released from the illusions of das Man, and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious.”322

The point of bringing up our relationship to our own death is to show that the possibility of action, and human activity as such, presuppose a difference between end and activity, “for if the basic function of ends is to make our activities possible, then when regarding death as such an end the meaning of τέλος is in some sense lost, since death as τέλος annihilates our existence. Therefore, the analysis of

322 SZ, p. 266, “Die Charakteristik des existenzial entworfenen eigentlichen Seins zum Tode läßt sich dergestalt zusammenfassen: Das Vorlaufen enthält dem Dasein die Verlorenheit in das Man selbst und bringt es vor die Möglichkeit, auf die besorgende Fürsorge primär ungestützt, es selbst zu sein, selbst aber in der leidenschaftlichen, von den Illusionen des Man gelösten, faktischen, ihrer selbst gewissen und sich ängstgenden Freiheit zum Tode.”
death “throws us back” to the explication of life.\textsuperscript{323} Although I have not yet reached a thematic discussion of \periphrasis{\epsilonλη\thetaε\epsilonνιν} in connection to the temporality of \textit{Dasein}, I have been underlining that it is already at play in the discussion of \textit{Uneigentlichkeit} under the ontological foundation of its possibility.

On this point I have shown the presence of Aristotle in Heidegger’s account of \textit{Uneigentlichkeit} and I have contrasted a number of notions that appear in Aristotle’s \textit{Physics} which Heidegger reworks and ‘elevates’ to ontological rank. The main point was to show Heidegger’s development of many transitional determinations of the being of Man as an agent of action, by transforming these notions, sometimes ambiguously, and inserting them in the more profound and existential description of \textit{Dasein}. For Heidegger, definitions hold the key to understanding the basic concepts in their development as concepts.\textsuperscript{324} In \textit{Being and Time} we are finding the same exploratory process of new terms recoined from Heidegger’s research on \textit{Fundamental Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (GA18)} where the way of proceeding from a definition to a concept lead Heidegger through Aristotle’s concepts of \textit{λόγος, οὐσία, τέλειον, δόξα, ἡθος, πάθος, ἐξίς, ἐντελέχεια, ἐνέργεια, δύναμις} and \textit{κίνησις}. Each concept points to something that one is not always able to express. It lies beyond one’s power to express as it points out a state of things rather then contents, it points to the basis from which the basic concepts develop, and how they develop. This means they bear a relationship to their specific conceptuality, through a definition.\textsuperscript{325} In the account of inauthenticity Heidegger is pursuing his analysis of \textit{möglichkeit} “possibility” as an inquiry into the human finitude of existence, taking the same line of approach he began in Marburg (GA 18) by pointing out Aristotle’s own remark in \textit{Metaphysics} that “in a transferred sense, one also speaks about death as an end, since they are both something ultimate. For also the ultimate ‘for the sake of which’ is an end” (“\textit{διό καὶ ἡ τελευτή κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγεται τέλος,}

\textsuperscript{323} Weigelt, C., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 137.

\textsuperscript{324} \textit{GA18}, p. 4, “Es muß gesehen werden der \textit{Boden}, aus dem diese grundbegriffe erwachsen, und wie sie erwachsen sind, d.h. die grundbegriffe sollen betrachtet werden auf ihre \textit{spezifische Begrifflichkeit}, so daß wir fragen, wie die da gemeinten Sachen selbst gesehen sind, woraufhin sie angesprochen warden, in welcher Weise sie bestimmt sind.”

\textsuperscript{325} \textit{GA18}, p. 13, “Es handelt sich um das Verständnis von Grundbegriffen in ihrer Begrifflichkeit (…) In der Definition wird der Begriff ausdrucklich, kommt zum Vorschein.”
This insight has led Heidegger through paragraph 53 of *Being and Time* in that authentic being-towards-death, unlike inauthentic evasion, understands and endures death in its existential reality or in Heidegger’s formulation back at Marburg “With this transference, τέλειον, τέλος shows itself as a character of Dasein. Thus, by showing how Vorlaufen is a way of authentic being-towards-death, Heidegger shows that this way of being is not an arbitrary construction, but is rather a way of being grounded in the way of κίνησις.

We have been discussing some of Aristotle’s teleological structures in the *Physics*, i.e., κίνησις as ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆ which underly Heidegger’s account of Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit.

This insight leads Heidegger through paragraph 53 of *Being and Time* in that authentic being-towards-death understands and endures death in its existential reality, or in Heidegger’s formulation back at Marburg “with this transference, τέλειον, τέλος shows itself as a character of Dasein.”

Authentic on this analysis would then describe a way of being grounded in the explication of life, and would in no way indicate a subjective preference. Thus, by showing how Vorlaufen is a way of authentic being-towards-death, towards the ultimate end, Heidegger shows that this way of being is not a random concept, but is rather a way of being grounded in the way of κίνησις.

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326 *META*, 1021b 28-30 ; Weigelt, C., *op. cit.*, p. 136 and Heidegger’s translation of this sentence in *GAP*, p. 82.
327 *GAP*, p. 87, “Mit dieser Übertragung zeigt sich τέλειον, τέλος als ein Daseinscharakter.”
f) Conscience and the Call to Authenticity

Heidegger’s analysis of conscience seeks to find an existential phenomenon (im Sein des Daseins ihre Wurzel haben) which exhibits the possibility of authenticity, and which further shows that authenticity is not a random mode of being but whose origin lies in Dasein’s grasp-of-being (Seinsverfassung). The aim of the analysis is to show that Dasein has an authentic potentiality-for-being-a-self.

The existential concept of conscience is worked out in pages 267-301 of Being and Time.

“In choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes possible first and foremost its authentic potentiality-for-being.”

But can we rely in the ‘voice of conscience’? Is it enough to for the possibility of being authentic? Heidegger explains that:

“That the very ‘fact’ of conscience has been disputed, that its role as a higher court for Dasein’s existence has been variously assessed, and that ‘what conscience says’ has been interpreted in manifold ways – all this might only mislead us into dismissing this phenomenon if the very ‘doubtfulness’ of this fact – or of the way in which it has been interpreted – did not prove that here a primordial phenomenon of Dasein lies before us.”

In describing conscience, Heidegger’s first point is that it is not just an event like others but, rather, an original disclosure that can speak to us in various modes. Since Heidegger characterizes conscience as a call (Ruf) it is in the mode of speaking that we may interpret it. The call is interpreted as an appeal (Anruf) to everyday Dasein lost in the ways of being of das Man to return to itself, and as a summons (Aufruf) to authenticity beyond its structure of ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Moreover, all modes of speaking have a “possible way of hearing” – as we learnt

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328 SZ, p. 268, “Im Wählen der Wahl ermöglicht sich das Dasein allererst sein eigentliches Seinkönnen.”

329 SZ, p. 268. “Daß die ’Tatsache’ des Gewissens umstritten, seine Instanzfunktion für die Existenz des Daseins verschieden eingeschätzt und das, ’was es sagt’, mannigfaltig ausgelegt wird, dürfte nur dann zu einer Preisgabe dieses Phänomens verleiten, wenn die ’Zweifelhaftigkeit’ dieses Faktums bzw. die seiner Auslegung nicht gerade bewies, daß hier ein ursprüngliches Phänomen des Daseins voliegt.”
from Aristotle’s presentation of ὑπὲρ σημαντική (meaningful sound) in de Anima – which in the analysis of conscience “unveils itself as wanting-to-have-a-conscience.”

“Primarily conscience must be traced back to its existential and structural foundations and made visible as a phenomenon of Dasein, holding fast to the secured grasp of being of this being.”

The call of conscience and the “wanting-to-have-a-conscience” that hears the call provides the basis for choosing to be oneself that Heidegger calls Entschlossenheit.

Therefore, since conscience is to be seen as a phenomenon of Dasein we should perhaps look to its existential constitution for clues to the interpretation of the “it” that does the calling. Heidegger’s analysis of talking and listening stresses that vocal utterance is not essential for speaking – expressing here therefore a different view from that of Aristotle in this regard as we have seen earlier –, therefore the “voice” of conscience is not an audible voice off that turns on into linguistically articulated meaning, prescribing specific commands or moral prohibitions. Rather, “the tendency to disclosure which belongs to the call lies the momentum of a push – of an abrupt arousal. The call is from afar unto afar. It reaches him who wants to be brought back.”

‘Who’ is called? “Manifestly Dasein itself. This answer is as incontestable as indefinite.”

“And because the Self of das Man [they-self]-self gets appealed to and brought to hear, das Man [they/world of everybody and nobody] collapses. But the fact that the call passes over the ‘they’ and the public interpretation of Dasein does not by any means signify that the the ‘they’ [er] is not reached too. Precisely in passing over the ‘they’, keen as it is for public repute, the call pushes it into insignificance [Bodenlosigkeit: the lack of

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330 SZ, p. 270.
grounds]. But the Self, which the appeal has robbed [beraubt] of this lodging [Unterkunft] and hiding-place [versteck], gets brought to itself by the call.\textsuperscript{334}

Although the call communicates in “silent mode” and tells me “nothing”, Heidegger claims that “the direction it takes is a sure one and is not to be overlooked.”\textsuperscript{335} The call \textit{summons Dasein} to its potentiality-for-being-a-self, and thus to the choice of its own possibilities:

“One must keep in mind that the call, that we designate as such as conscience, is an appeal to the das Man-self [they-self] in its Self; as such an appeal [Anruf], it sumsmons [Aufruf] the self to its potentiality-for-being-its-self [Selbstseinkönnen] and thus calls Dasein forth [Vorrufen] to its possibilities.”\textsuperscript{336}

\textit{Dasein} becomes “anxious with anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-being” and finds itself in the “depths of uncanniness.”\textsuperscript{337} For while the call points \textit{forward (Vorruf)} to one’s potentiality-for-being, it also calls one \textit{back (Rückruf)} to one’s situation as a thrown being delivered over and abandoned to one’s own ‘here’. Hence, The call, then, has a double movement calling us back to our current situation)as it calls us forth to authenticity.\textsuperscript{338}

“What is Dasein to report from the uncanniness of its own thrown being? \textit{What} else remains for it than its potentiality-for-being as revealed in anxiety? \textit{How} else is ‘it’ to call other than by summoning Dasein toward this potentiality-for-being which alone is the issue?”\textsuperscript{339}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{334} \textit{SZ}, p. 273, “Weil nur das Selbst des Man-selbst angerufen und zum Hören gebracht wird, sinkt das Man in sich zusammen. Daß der Ruf das Man und die öffentliche Ausgelegtheit des Daseins übergeht, bedeutet keineswegs, daß er es nicht mittrifft. Gerade im Übergehen stößt er das auf öffentliches Ansehen erpichte Man in die Bedeutungslosigkeit. Das Selbst aber wird, dieser Unterkunft und dieses verstecks im Anruf beraubt, durch den Ruf zu ihm selbst gebracht.”
\item\textsuperscript{335} \textit{SZ}, p. 274, “Über der scheinbaren Unbestimmtheit des Rufgehaltes kann nicht die sichere Einschlagsrichtung des Rufes übersehen werden.”
\item\textsuperscript{336} \textit{SZ}, p. 274, “Festzuhalten gilt es: der Ruf, als welchen wir das Gewissen kennzeichnen, ist Anruf des Man-selbst in seinem Selbst; als dieser Anruf der Aufruf des Selbst zu seinem Selbstseinkönnen und damit ein Vorrufen des Daseins auf seine Möglichkeiten.”
\item\textsuperscript{337} \textit{SZ}, p. 276, “Wenn das im Grunde seiner Unheiligkeit sich befindete Dasein.”
\item\textsuperscript{338} \textit{SZ}, p. 280. “Das Woher des Rufens im Vorrufen auf… ist das Wohin des Zurückrufens. Der Ruf gibt kein ideales, allgemeines Seinkönnen zu verstehen; er erschließt es als das jeweiligen Daseins. Der Erschließungs character der Rufes wird erst voll bestimmt, wenn wir ihn als vorrrufenden Rückruf verstehen.” (”But the ‘whence’ [Woher] from which the call is called forth to something… is the whither [Wohin] of the called back [Zurückrufens]. The call does not give us an ideal or universal potentiality-for-being to understand; it discloses it as that [which belongs] to each particular [jeweiligen] Dasein. The disclosive character of the call will be fully determined when we understand it as one which calls us back in calling us forth [vorrüfenden Rückruf].”
\item\textsuperscript{339} \textit{SZ}, p. 277, “Was soll aber das Dasein aus der Unheimlichkeit seines geworfenen Seins auch berichten? \textit{Was} bleibt ihm anderes, denn das in der Angst enthüllte Seinkönnen seiner selbst? Wie soll es anders rufen, denn als Aufrufen zu diesem Seinkönnen, darum es ihm einzig geht?”
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
What exactly does the call give me to understand? Heidegger claims that the call “speaks somehow of guilt”. In German the root *Schuld* offer various meanings such as “having debts”, “being responsible for”, “lawbreaking”, causing something to happen to another person. These various senses of being-guilty refer to ways in which *Dasein*’s relationship to others is constituted by a lack: owing something (*Schulden haben*), causing something to happen for which I am responsible (*schuld sein an*), breaking some law (*sich schuldig machen*), causing damage to someone (*Schuldigwerden an Anderen*)

“We can define the formally existential idea of the ‘guilty’ as: being-the-basis for a being which has been defined by a not – that is to say, as being-the-basis of a nullity.”

This *nichts* belongs to *Dasein*’s ownmost potentiality-for-being leading Heidegger to conclude that *Dasein is* the null basis of a nullity. Dasein is guilty of not being itself, not choosing itself. But when the call is authentically heard, Heidegger stresses that *Dasein* “wants to have a conscience”. This does not mean wishing to be more conscientious into existence, but signifies *becoming ready* for the transformation to authenticity. Understanding the call means that *Dasein* lets its self *take action* in terms of its potentiality-for-being which it chooses. Only now is it responsible for its action.

“When the call is rightly understood, it gives us that which in the existential sense is the ‘most positive’ of all – namely, the ownmost possibility which *Dasein* can present to itself, as a calling-back which calls it forth into its factual potentiality-for-being itself in the world. To hear the call authentically, signifies bringing oneself into a factual taking action.”

Understanding the call of conscience indicates that one ready for the choice of authenticity which Heidegger calls *Entschlossenheit*.

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341 *SZ*, p. 283, “Die formal exizentiale Idee des ‘schuldig’ bestimmen wir daher also: Grundsein für ein durch ein Nicht bestimmtes Sein – das heißt Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit.”

342 *SZ*, p. 288, “Rufverstehend läßt das Dasein das eigenste Selbst aus seinem gewählten Seinkönnen in sich handeln. Nur so kann es verantwortlich sein.” [*In understanding the call, Dasein lets its ownmost [or most genuine=eigenste] self *take action in itself* [in sich handeln]. Only so can it be responsible (verantwortlich).]*

343 *SZ*, p. 295, “(…) Existenzieles Verstehen besagt: sich entwerfen auf die je eigenste faktische Möglichkeit der In-der-Welt-sein-könnens.(…)”
PART TWO
I have examined the grounds upon which Heidegger supported his account of everydayness and Uneigentlichkeit and have analyzed some notions of Aristotle’s teleology that Heidegger investigated back at Marburg and on a later course on Aristotle’s Physics. The task was to see how Heidegger secured in Being and Time the álηθευσιν of inauthenticity from his inquiries at Marburg (GA 17, 18, 19) which permitted him to base the mode of Uneigentlichkeit in Being and Time.

I hope to have clarified the importance of Heidegger’s retrieval and transformation of some of the notions of Aristotle’s teleology (as exhibited in Aristotle’s De Anima, Eudemian Ethics, Rhetoric, Nicomachean Ethics, Physics back in Marburg) to Heidegger’s modes of everydayness in Being and Time and to have described their articulation by making appeal to its álηθευσιν, namely by exploring the notions of withdrawing and individuation from an inauthentic existence.

I have focused more strongly on the distinction of two modes of álηθευσιν: ποιήσις (production) and πρᾶξις (activity) thereby endorsing Weigelt’s position: “To Aristotle, as noted, the being of ποιήσις is imperfect, primarily for teleological reasons: its movement is incomplete and its end is external to it, since it is a process involving change. Heidegger’s idea in the description of everydayness and inauthenticity was not only to exhibit Aristotle’s sense of ποιήσις as production of works but to grasp it in the wider sense of bringing something of use. The idea is to show that this mode of disclosure had become decisive to our way of relating not just to things of everyday life but also to human beings. Heidegger argued, however, that at this level of absorbed concern, ποιήσις and τέχνη (know-how) are insufficient modes of disclosure of our comportment towards and understanding of other human beings, for they disclose humans as the means, as something which can be controlled and calculated upon as in das Man. In this regard, Heidegger’s account of anxiety suggested, at the level of inauthenticity, that human being can and should be indeed understood in terms of
its πράξις, that is in terms of its human interaction so that it becomes open to the possibility of self-understanding which comes with such interaction. However one perhaps has also sensed difficulties in conceiving of action without recourse to production, not least since it has been thought that Aristotle himself tended to understand πράξις in terms of ποιήσις. In this connection Heidegger could be regarded as someone who has overcome the “poietic” notion of Man by showing how this idea has its roots in man’s everyday existence. Against this, Heidegger has pointed out the possibility of authentic existence, which is action governed by φρόνησις, the authentic understanding of one’s self.”

The task now is to provide an interpretation of Heidegger’s Eigentlichkeit from Aristotle’s main determinations of εὐδαιμονία, φρόνησις (practical wisdom; Nichomachean Ethics I, III, and VI, 2, 1139b 7-11 GA19), βουλευτική ὁρεξίς (deliberate desire) and νο doctrines (discernment) in the Nicomachean Ethics so that it can be shown how Aristotle understands these notions philosophically and in what ways Aristotle helps Heidegger to think through (and in some cases to coin) the ontological/temporal conceptuality of authenticity such as Die Sorge (care) and its modes – Besorgen (concern), Fürsorge (solicitude), Zu-Sein (has-to-be) Seinkönnen (potentiality-of-being-a-self) Worumwillen (for-the-sake-of-which).

William MacNeill has pointed out that “Eudamonia, as the ultimate end and completeness of human existence, constitutes, as Heidegger describes it, ‘the authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] of the being of human Dasein.’ I would like to keep this idea in view and clarify the shift of perspective from inauthenticity to authenticity. I will supplement my proposal in this chapter by appealing to some of Aristotle’s principles of motion in the Physics, the de Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics so that I can exhibit the temporal notions upon which Heidegger is able to work out his main operator of authenticity: Entschlossenheit (resoluteness). I argue that the concept of κίνησις is the ground of resoluteness, the key of authenticity.

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344 Weigelt, C., op. cit., p. 114. “Sarah Broadie’s view in Ethics with Aristotle, chapter 4, III, that although Aristotle was not as confused about the distinction between τέχνη and φρόνησις as one usually has claimed, he tended to think of the τέλος of φρόνησις in terms of the τέλος of τέχνη, and therefore he failed to see that the former is empty, i.e. that εὐπράξεια (well-performed action), has no specific content, for it concerns well-performed action in general.”, cf. footnote 32, p. 114.

It is shown how on the basis of this interpretation authenticity cannot be determined, nor exhausted by being-towards-death but, rather, by the possibility of historicity.

My proposal in this chapter also aims to clarify some of the doubts that may arise regarding the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity and exactly how action, as an end, is of fundamental importance to Heidegger and Aristotle in this connection. Indeed, there is a problem claiming that everydayness and inauthenticity root in ποιήσις and τέχνη and authenticity in φρόνησις and πρᾶξις, and “articulate a basic notion of human existence, in terms of which not only everydayness but also authenticity can be understood. If one identifies everydayness solely with production, while reserving action for resoluteness and authenticity, it is difficult to see how the latter could be a modification of the former. Thus the question is not primarily whether ποιήσις and τέχνη belong within the domain of everyday life, but whether this phenomenon can be accounted for without the help of φρόνησις and πρᾶξις. The answer is no: if τέχνη represents an understanding of how to bring things (i.e. the three modes of everydayness) about and φρόνησις the ability to see what is good for one’s life, they are both needed to explain the form of conduct that is characteristic of everydayness. In Being and Time Heidegger seems indeed, as we have seen, to draw upon both τέχνη and ποιήσις, since he describes how man in his everyday dealings makes things with a view to an external end, which is the basic trait of ποιήσις.”

The idea to be grasped here is that Heidegger needs to work out his own notion of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time from νοῦς ἀληθεύειν and φρόνησις. This is the methodology Heidegger, as we have seen in the first chapter, starts to outline from the inquiries on λόγος and φαινόμενον in Aristotle’s de Anima (GA 17) and develops in relation to modes of ἀληθεύειν in the Nicomachean Ethics (GA19) so that in Being and Time he articulates Dasein’s ἀληθεύειν as

346 Cf. Weigelt, C., op. cit., p. 115. “Heidegger concept of Besorgen (absorbed concern) can be compared both with τέχνη and ποιήσις just like Sorge captures aspects of both φρόνησις and πρᾶξις, depending upon what perspective one takes. When Heidegger’s focus is on the aspect of understanding, I draw a parallel to τέχνη and φρόνησις, but when it is a question of the teleological structure of Besorgen and Sorge, I compare respectively these concepts to ποιήσις and πρᾶξις.”

347 This argument is to be worked out from SZ, pp. 220-221 and DA, 430b 26-31.
disclosive-being in-the-world. With the impossibility of dealing in this study with all the determinations implied in ἀληθεύειν I have selected the notions of νοῦς, φρόνησις and εὐδαιμονία (happiness/man’s proper being) since these help us to further on the implications of Heidegger’s analysis of Aristotle’s teleology in GA 18 from the shift of perspective of inauthenticity to the perspective of authenticity in Being and Time.

In order to counter the standard interpretation of authenticity I now wish to develop an analysis of resoluteness in which I will consider Heidegger’s interpretation of the self-other relationship by offering an analysis of the meaning of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit in connection to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s φρόνησις and the basic traits of action προαίρεσις (Metaphysics, book IV, νοῦς πρακτικός –Verstehen, Seinkönnen). I propose to show that an understanding of resoluteness and the notion of authentic caring-for-others roots in Aristotle’s basic concept of physics and grounds Heidegger’s concept of Eigentlichkeit.

a) Resoluteness, Being-a-Self and Aristotle’s εὐδαιμονία (NE, I-5,6) and φρόνησις (NE, X, 7, 1077 a17)

In the hope of clarifying how the phenomenon of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) is the key to authenticity I will first present the main passages of Being and Time that may help us to acquaint ourselves with this notion before attempting a close reading of Aristotle’s book I, 5-6 of Nicomachean Ethics in an effort to disentangle the multiple connections at stake in Heidegger’s equation of Eigentlichkeit and Entschlossenheit.

In order to explore the concept of Entschlossenheit and how it works as a way of self-determination and being-a-self I invite us to focus on the traits of the Aristotelian notion of φρόνησις (X, 7, 1077 a17) which I believe to be at the heart of Heidegger’s coinage of Entschlossenheit (by appealing to προαίρεσις) and articulating the whole notion of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time. Among the passages which attest to this, the one which seems to be particularly significant occurs in the pre-Being and Time WS 1924 course Platon: Sophistes where
Heidegger sees the separation of θεωρεῖν (to see, behold) from πρᾶξις that can be seen in book X of Nicomachean Ethics.\textsuperscript{348}

Furthermore, I would show that Aristotle’s account of φρόνησις is also meant to ask the question of authenticity understood as the highest good of human life: “τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία” (I, 3, 1095 b 14, ff.) and that this question is developed by Aristotle from a τέλος (end) hierarchy that results in the primacy of θεωρεῖν over πρᾶξις. We find that Aristotle’s emphasis on the tendency of θεωρία to become an independent πρᾶξις results from the prioritizing of the θεωρεῖν which, according to the arguments Heidegger lists from Book X, is the Greek tendency toward understanding being as “absolute presence”: “For the Greeks the consideration of human existence was oriented purely toward the meaning of being itself, i.e. toward the extent to which it is possible for human Dasein to be everlasting. The Greeks gathered this meaning of being, being as absolute presence, from the being of the world.”\textsuperscript{349} Along with Heidegger’s contention, I align my position here with McNeill’s question in his recent study on Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory in the context of what I take to be his reading of this same passage: “(…) if the authenticity of human existence, on this reading of Aristotle, is to be aligned with an implicit understanding of being as “absolute presence”, with a striving for immortality in a direction divergent from the mortality of human praxis amid its worldly activities, then is it not part of the subsequent project of Being and Time to relocate the authentic being of human Dasein in the midst of mortality and to understand Dasein’s most proper way of being otherwise than in terms of pure presence? To understand it, rather, in terms of the Augenblick which here in the Sophist course is understood as intrinsic to phronesis?\textsuperscript{350} Reflecting upon this question I aim to show by the end of this chapter how Heidegger, reflecting in depth upon the Aristotelian structure of πρᾶξις and the teleological determinations it contains, draws therefrom many fundamental determinations and displacements which he no longer considers

\textsuperscript{348} Cf. also chapter I.
\textsuperscript{349} PS, p. 178, “Für die Griechen ist die Betrachtung der menschlichen Existenz rein orientiert am Sinn des Seins selbst, d.e daran, inwieweit das menschliche Dasein die Möglichkeit. Dieser Sinn von Sein, das Sein als absolutes Anwesendsein, ist von den Griechen am Sein der Welt abgelesen.” Also, pp. 173-179.
\textsuperscript{350} MacNeill, op. cit., p. 53 and his impeccable blend of scholarship on the account of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν in the context of Heidegger’s GA19, pp. 17-54.
particular moments of action but as ontological characteristics of human life. This will lead us to the relationship of ἐρμηνεία (Nicomachean Ethics I, III, and VI, 2, 1139b 7-11) with the assimilation in the notion of Gewissen (conscience) (paragraphs 54-60 of Being and Time.)

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Heidegger’s term Entschlossenheit ‘unlocks’ the possibility of Eigentlichkeit, and that it is the opening to an authentic existence. The German roots of Entschlossenheit show the ‘key’ image as well as the metaphor ‘unlocking’. The similarity between Entschlossenheit and Erschlossenheit suggests the interconnection between resoluteness and disclosedness (αληθεύειν) which leads to a shift of one’s one’s self-understanding:

“This authentic disclosing modifies with co-originality both the way in which the ‘world’ is discovered, and the way in which the co-existence of others is disclosed. The ‘world’ which is ready-to-hand does not become another one ‘in its content’, nor does the circle of others get exchanged for a new one; but both one’s being toward the ready-to-hand understandingly and concernfully, and one’s solicitous being with others are now determined in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-being-their-selves.”

Resoluteness removes Dasein out of its lostness in das Man and out of the solicitude into which it withdrew in αληθεύειν by bringing it back into its threefold relationship to the work world, social world, and selfhood, so that its relationships to its world are modified. Perhaps, a further explication of the structure of resoluteness and ἐρμηνεία would dispell some of the most obvious objections to Heidegger’s analysis.


Indeed, one of the crucial tasks in working out Heidegger’s concept of *Eigentlichkeit* is a clarification of ἀληθεύειν, the disclosing of the end or purpose of human existence and whether or not it fulfils the criterion of ἐυδαιμονία, as the ultimate and most complete possibility of human existence, that is, the authenticity of human being.

“But upon what does Dasein disclose itself in resoluteness? On what is it to resolve? Only the resolution itself can give the answer. One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one should want to suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them. The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time. To resoluteness, the indefinitiveness characteristic of every potentiality-for-being into which Dasein has been factically thrown, is something that necessarily belongs. Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself.”

As we may remember, Aristotle presents us with the context of involvements of human action where every particular end in our lives receives its specific character when it is synthesized with (but simultaneously divorced from) the “context of involvements” thereby becoming a factual end. For only on the basis of a foregoing access to meaning is it possible to direct oneself to an end as meaningful in a concrete situation. As Heidegger puts it, “The survey which illuminates one’s concern receives its ‘light’ from Dasein’s potentiality for being, *for the sake of which* concern exists as care.” One way to motivate the shift from everydayness to philosophy is to point to the necessity of exploring the most far reaching and distinctive aim of disclosure (ἀληθεύειν), which for Aristotle is ἐυδαιμονία (man’s proper being: ἐὐ-δαιμόν) and for Heidegger is authenticity worked out through ἀληθεύειν of φρόνησις.

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Let us then begin by examining how Heidegger introduces resoluteness, so as to provide a starting point for the desired elucidation of ἐγκατάλείψεις at the heart of Eigentlichkeit.

In his introduction to the chapter on conscience, Heidegger writes:

“To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing. Our understanding of the appeal unveils itself as our wanting to have a conscience. But in this phenomenon lies that existentiell choosing which we seek – the choosing to choose a kind of being-one’s-self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call resoluteness.”

Resoluteness is introduced as a a decision to become a self. We have also seen that “resoluteness ‘exists’ only as a resolution which understandingly projects itself”\(^{356}\), and that “as resolute Dasein is already taking action.”\(^{357}\) – makes clear the action characteristic of resoluteness. To supplement this point, I note that on page 297 resoluteness is described as a mode of ἀληθεύειν – indeed, a “primordial uncovering” of the “truth of existence”. This “this authentic disclosure modifies with equal primordiality both the way in which the ‘world’ is discovered and the way in which one’s co-existence with others is disclosed.”\(^{358}\) This analysis allows us to exhibit resoluteness as an ἀληθεύειν that carries out a disclosure of Dasein throughout two interconnected determinations: understanding and action.

Firstly, as a mode of understanding, resoluteness refers to seeing through (durchsichtigkeit) das Man’s concealments. Secondly, though, resoluteness includes the act of carrying out the modification of fallen inauthenticity, the ἀληθεύειν constituted in a choice of specific resolves, and in this sense it refers to taking action in the situation, προς ἔνδοξος. On page 300, Heidegger writes:

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357 SZ, p. 300, “Als entschlossenes handelt das Dasein schon.”

“As resolute, Dasein is already taking action. The term ‘action’ (Handeln) is one which we are purposely avoiding. For in the first place this term must be taken so broadly, that ‘activity’ will also embrace the passivity of resistance.”

I have first circumscribed some of the determinations at stake in the teleological structure of προκήρυξ in the account of inauthenticity in order to present the specific discursivity of Dasein in everydayness. Now, in this specific step of Being and Time Heidegger tries to maintain Aristotle’s line of thought engaging us readers and himself in the task that he set himself in the analysis of Aristotle’s teleology back in Marburg: “If the conceptuality is rooted in Dasein itself, [then] Dasein itself must in some sense be this conceptuality.” In the analysis of resoluteness and authenticity, Heidegger tries to explain thematically the nature of action by applying Aristotle’s account to Aristotle’s own account with which it should be possible for him to work out those ways in which acting, projecting possibilities and self-determination are essential features of the activity of self-modification, through which one passes from inauthenticity to authenticity through Entschlossenheit.

Furthermore, resoluteness is extreme in that it that radically changes one’s ways of being-in-the-world. To account for this possibility, however, one has to start with life’s own showing with the help of προκήρυξ in one’s everyday “poietic” conduct in order to describe human existence from the point of view of concern, since it is this absorbed concern that corresponds to the perspective of everyday life itself. Now we should be able to show how Heidegger proceeds from the αληθεύειν of inauthenticity to the level of care, showing that with this step the truth of human existence is uncovered. Heidegger stresses that:

“Even resolutions remain dependent upon das Man and its world. The understanding of this is one of the things that a resolution discloses, inasmuch as resoluteness is what first gives authentic transparency (durchsichtigkeit) to Dasein.”

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360 Apud Weigelt, C., op. cit., 109 : GAP, p. 271 : “Wenn die Begriflichkeit im Dasein selbst bondenständig ist, muß das Dasein selbst die Begriflichkeit in gewisser Weise sein.”

361 SZ, p. 299, “Auch der Entschluß bleibt auf das Man und seine Welt angewiesen. Das zu verstehen, gehört mit zu dem, was er erschließ, sofern die Entschlossenheit erst dem Dasein die eigentliche Durchsichtigkeit gibt.”
This passage from *Being and Time* certainly parallels Heidegger’s analysis of φρόνησις (practical wisdom) back in Marburg where he argued that:

“Insofar as the human being himself is the object of the aletheueien of φρόνησις, the human being must be in a situation of being covered over from himself, of not seeing himself, so that an explicit άληθεύειν is required in order to become transparent [durchsichtig] to oneself.”

A failure to see resoluteness as a form of πράξις promoted by the carrying through of Dasein’s αληθεύειν relative to the practical situation bears the consequence of reducing authenticity to a psychological aspect. As suggested above, one question in this connection is whether, in Heidegger’s view, φρόνησις displays an everyday inauthentic or an authentic mode of existence. We shall first consider the central steps of Aristotle’s own characterisation of φρόνησις so that we clearly understand what kind of αληθεύειν it is and how it underlies Heidegger’s notion of **Entschlossenheit**:

“It seems as if the person who is φρονίμου has the power to deliberate on that which is good for himself and beneficial to him, and this is not a single part of his life, e.g. regarding his health or strength, but in what concerns the good life as a whole (περί τά αὐτῶν ἀγαθά).”

As Weigelt points out: “According to Aristotle, the capability to see what is good for one’s life is dependent upon practice”. Adding that, “Aristotle considers the task of ethics to be to find out what is specific (ίδιον) to Man as Man, in order to from there on uncover the different possibilities for human action and thinking.” The scope of Aristotle’s *Ethics* appears quite different from Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein. For the human good is of such a changeable nature “that it might seem to be determined by custom only and not by nature.”

The key to this interconnection of virtue and the capacity to exist is Aristotle’s notion of ἀγαθόν (good). Heidegger intends to point out that Aristotle

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362 *PS*, p. 51, “Sofern der Mensch selbst Gegenstand des αληθεύειν der φρόνησις ist, muß es so um den Menschen stehen, daß es eigens eines άληθεύειν bedarf, um sich selbst durchsichtig zu werden.”

363 *NE*, 1140 25-28, “δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου ἐνεπεί τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀγαθά καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ύγίειαν, πρὸς ισχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ἠγέρη ὀλίγος.”


365 *Idem*, p. 108; *NE*, 1097 b34ff.

366 *NE*, 1094 b16, “(...) ὡστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μῆ.”
is the first to achieve a strictly ontological understanding of good as an end which determines human activity as such.\(^{367}\)

This line of thought appears to be working in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1143a b6-13 where Aristotle seems to regard φρόνησις as a gift of nature. Aristotle remarks, a few lines before 1141 a26-28, “that one can even say of some animals that they are φρόνιμος prudent ones in this sense of the word, namely those that have the power of foresight or precaution, which lets them see what is good for their lives. Furthermore, in the *Politics* it is stated that it is νοûς determines the ends of our nature, therefore our habits must be regulated with a view to them. In this way, “there is in Aristotle a vacillation between φρόνησις as that understanding which guides human beings lives by necessity, and as something which only belongs to sensible men. This vacillation is present also in Heidegger’s interpretation of φρόνησις and that is why one can see similarities between it and both everydayness and authenticity.”\(^{368}\)

In this regard, if we compare and contrast respectively the above quoted passages of Heidegger (p. 300, SZ) and Aristotle (1140 25-28) we verify that “Insofar as φρόνησις represents for Aristotle an unthematic understanding of good that can be interpreted as a kind of self-understanding on the part of the agent which makes action possible, it is no doubt useful to Heidegger’s development of care in its everyday mode. More important for Heidegger, though, is to see how the concept of φρόνησις admits of a more “authentic” form of understanding as compared with what Heidegger terms the inauthentic adherence to public development sustained by das Man.\(^{369}\) In what way might Aristotle’s discussion of φρόνησις have influenced Heidegger’s notion of care (die Sorge), the self-other relationship The notion of φρόνησις as Gewissen (consciousness) and authenticity will allow us to uncover the level of care between situation and end. This is the unconcealment of being promoted by what Heidegger refers to as disclosedness or disclosing (Erschlossenheit/ἀληθεύειν) in *Being and Time* and prefigured, as we will see next, in the Aristotelian notion of νοûς in *de Anima*.

\(^{367}\) GAP, p. 43; *PS*, p. 123.

\(^{368}\) Weigelt, C., *op. cit.* pp. 120.

\(^{369}\) Weigelt, C., *op. cit.* pp. 120.
b) The Self and the Other. Aristotle’s νοῦς and βουλευτικὴ ὁρεξίς (NE, 1113a 10-11) and Heidegger’s Die Sorge and its modes.

Although Heidegger states that we all relate to others we only relate authentically to others through resoluteness. This is made clear in this striking passage:

“Dasein’s resoluteness toward itself is what first makes it possible to let others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for-being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicititude which leaps forth and liberates (vorspringend-befreienden). When Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of others. Only by authentically being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another—not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in das Man and in what ‘they’ want to undertake.”

Heidegger’s remarks that he opposes a sharp dichotomy between practical and theoretical ways of behaviour (Being and Time, pp. 300-1) lends credence to my proposal that we should interpret the lines of action of resoluteness as a specific reading of Aristotle’s νοῦς (de Anima 429 a 21-22, E.N., 1142 a 25-30) and βουλευτικὴ ὁρεξίς (deliberate desire) (Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a 10-11) that includes understanding and action as inseparable and interconnected determinations of the way of becoming authentic. Hence, in making this ‘separation’ of the two main features of resoluteness I am not thinking of categories here but calling attention to the articulation between the theoretical and the

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370 SZ, p. 298, “Die Entschlossenheit zu sich selbst bringt das Dasein erst in die Möglichkeit, die miteinander Anderen ‘sein’ zu lassen in ihrem eigensten Seinkönnen und dieses in der vorspringend-befreienden Fürsorge mitzuerleben. Das entschlossene Dasein kann zum ‘Gewissen’ der Anderen werden. Aus dem eigentlichen Selbstsein der Entschlossenheit entspringt allererst das eigentliche Miteinander, nicht aber aus den zweideutigen und eifersüchtigen Verabredungen und den redseligen Verbruderungen im Man und dem, was man unternehmen will.”

371 SZ, pp. 300-1, “Sorge aber als besorgende Fürsorge umfaßt das Sein des Daseins so ursprünglich und ganz, daß sie in der Scheidung von theoretischem und praktischem Verhalten je schon als Ganzes vorausgesetzt werden muß und aus diesen Vermögen nicht erst zusammengebaut werden kann mit Hilfe einer notwendig grundlosen, weil existenzial ungegründeten Dialektik.” [“Care, however, as concernful solicitude, comprises Dasein’s being so primordially and wholly, that it must already be presupposed as a whole when we distinguish between theoretical and practical behaviour; it cannot first be build up out of these faculties by a dialectic, which because it is existenzially ungrounded, is necessarily groundless.”]
practical. Rather, I wish to exhibit these notions as the basic trait of anticipatory choice (προσέρχεσθαι) that is the outcome of the deliberation process involved in the account of φρόνησις and which comprises the teleological structure of προσέρχεσθαι and βουλή (resolution, decision). On this account I suggest that the choice involved in *Entschlossenheit* is the origin of action connected with the origin of movement. From here it can be shown that Heidegger’s chief aim is to find a way to account for human conduct without establishing a division between action and thinking, and to confirm this Heidegger takes us to Aristotle’s conception of action, that discusses action out of the distinction between action and thinking (e.g. between πράξεις and βουλή). As Weigelt points out: “Since it is important for Heidegger to show that the situation of action cannot be strictly divided into deliberation and its conclusion, as if they were understandable in isolation from each other, he must show that the latter is actually included in the former.”372 This is Heidegger’s task, as we will now see, with the fusion of these notions in terms of their ontological appearance in human being. As this makes clear, it is not primarily the end of action that resoluteness chooses, but rather the “how” of its enactment that Heidegger will choose to address as vorlaufende *Entschlossenheit* – a claim to be focused on the following point: decision, projection and disclosure are for Heidegger related to understanding and activity.

In order to substantiate the present proposal, it is necessary to exact the grounds for Heidegger’s articulation of resoluteness in terms of his analysis of *die Sorge* and to confront the notion of βουλευτική ὀρέξεις with einspringend-beherrschende Fürsorge (leaping-in and dominating solicitude) and vorspringendbefreiende Fürsorge (leaping forth and liberating solicitude) and the notion cited that concerns a contrast between authentic and inauthentic ways of being-with-others. Taking the Aristotelian notion of βουλευτική ὀρέξεις and citing, as an interpretive clue, the resoluteness that co-discloses the possibility of authenticity ‘in the solicitude which leaps-forth and liberates’, I now propose to examine Heidegger’s concept of solicitude in relation to the question of the involvement of authentic *Dasein* with others. I will argue that resoluteness is connected with his concept of Seinkönnen which means not only a capacity for doing but also understand. If this is the case, then authenticity describes the capacity of a human

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being to carry out the ἁληθεύειν of his existence as an “understanding activity of self-transformation.”

The idea that Heidegger thinks his own notion of ἁληθεύειν as prefigured in the Aristotelian notion of νοῦς, may be found in his inquiries on Aristotle back at Marburg (GA 18) when he realized the importance of ἁληθεύειν in the research of factical being in the world:

“The kind of being in the world, characterised by the uncoveredness of νοῦς, is only possible insofar as νοῦς is determined by a νοῦς which uncovers the world in general. I can intend something only insofar as this thinkable something is disclosed as such. Νοῦς παθητικός is only possible on the basis of νοῦς ποιητικός, on the basis of a νοεῖν which uncovers the world.”

In other words, and agreeing with Weigel: “Heidegger feels confident that νοῦς in its pure form – on the basis of an original νοεῖν that articulates νοῦς παθητικός and νοῦς ποιητικός – is a natural consequence of Aristotle’s conception of being and motion or movement, for it alone can work out ἁληθεύειν by fulfilling the nature of movement of every being as coming to an end, full presence (ἐντελέχεια).

According to Aristotle in de Anima, human νοῦς is defined precisely as a δύναμις, as no actual existence until it thinks.

This same claim is also taken up to the Nicomachean Ethics:

“(…) ὁ δ’ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένων καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προσάσεως· ἀρχαί γὰρ τοῦ οὐ ἐνέκει αὐτάς· ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἐκκατὰ γὰρ τὰ καθόλου.” (“that [sc. νοῦς] which has to do with action grasps the ultimate, the possible, the minor premise. These things are principles in the sense of being that for the sake of which one acts, for from these particulars the universal is won.”)

It is at this point that νοῦς enters into Heidegger’s analysis in Being and Time, for as Aristotle’s passage refers, the task of ὁ πρακτικός νοῦς is to see the circumstances of action. As Aristotle has raised the issue of ὁ πρακτικός νοῦς

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373 This activity will receive its fullest explication in the last chapter on authentic historicity.
375 Heidegger had this insight onto Aristotle as early as 1922 in his manuscript, PIA, p. 263 and also in his then unpublished lecture course of 1922, available now as PIA (GA 62), pp. 25-26.
376 DA, 429 a 23-25.
in the *de Anima* 433a ff. in terms of a phenomenology of seeing, of truth as ἀληθεύειν in what concerns the showing of the world and the articulative speaking of being in the world (φανομένων and λόγος) and developed it further in the *Nicomachean Ethics* in terms of human beings ἀληθεύειν, so Heidegger adopts the same phenomenological strategy. Firstly, as we have seen earlier, by exhibiting the notion of νοεῖν in his inquiries on the *de Anima* (GA 18; cf. chapter 1), then working it out in terms of the ἀληθεύειν in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (GA 19) and now taking it up in *Being and Time*, condensing his previous investigations in the term *Entschlossenheit*, aligning νοεῖν and ἀληθεύειν in human beings capacity to be authentic.

Can we interpret Aristotle, though, as just saying that seeing what is proper here and now is not a part of the process of deliberation itself (resoluteness for Heidegger) since it is presupposed by it? I believe we can, and the above quotation seems to lend credence to this position in the sense that in *Being and Time* νοεῖν is necessary to express the particular experience of *Dasein* in its capacity to choose and be(come) authentic. It is precisely this aspect which stands at the centre of Heidegger’s interpretation and equation of *Entschlossenheit* with Sein-zum-Tode: such a seeing could indeed make a starting-point for deliberation, as it apprehends the τέλος (end) of action. But, Heidegger is more concerned with how νοεῖν works at the end of deliberation, and he describes it accordingly as a “simple grasp” (schlichtes Erfassen) of determinate circumstances or of the bare “fact” of the situation: a νοεῖν.378 “Such νοεῖν is a matter of simple presentifying of something, so that it speaks purely out of itself and no longer requires discourse or a demonstration on our part. Here it can still be said: φανερωται, the things that show themselves in this way. The only possibility here is to look on and, in looking, to grasp.”379

As Aristotle sees it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, “action has the following constituent elements: its first stage is λόγος and ὅρεξις of that for-the-sake-of-

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379 *PS*, p. 161, “In solchem νοεῖν handelt es sich um ein schlichtes Vergegenwärtigen der Sache selbst, so daß sie rein von ihr selbst spricht und es nicht mehr eines Besprechens, Aufzeigens von uns aus bedarf. Es kann hier noch gesagt werden: φανερωται, die Sache zeigt sich so. Es besteht einzig die Möglichkeit, hinzusehen und im Hinschen zu erfassen.” [“Such νοεῖν is a matter of simple presentifying of something, so that it speaks purely out of itself and no longer requires discourse or a demonstration on our part. Here it can still be said: φανερωται, the things show themselves in this way. The only possibility here is to look on and, in looking, to grasp.”]
which the action is to be performed. This is the ruling principle of origin (ἀρχή) of one’s choice of a specific course of action, in such a way that given the purpose why of action, one deliberates on how to perform it. As noted, this προαιρεσις is the outcome of the deliberating process from unfounded to founded desire, and Aristotle defines it accordingly as “deliberate desire” βουλευτική ὑπεξίς. Now, if we come back with Heidegger to his Marburg course on the research on Aristotle’s ἀληθεύειν in the Nicomachean Ethics (GA 19), we see that indeed he calls our attention to the question of how to understand the relationship between the actual course of action and the deliberating that makes it possible. As noted, this is because he wants to find an explanation for human conduct without establishing a division between action and thinking, for even though Aristotle makes a conceptual distinction between action and thinking (i.e. between πρᾶξις and βουλευσίς) he never abstracts from the aspect of understanding when discussing action. This implies that Aristotle wants to show both a “subjective” and an “objective” side to action in the agent who performs it. In Aristotle’s view, in deliberation, the agent sets out from a given end and deliberates until he reaches the first principle of action, which he leads back to himself in order to make clear that the end is possible for him. Hence, with this principle, which concludes the deliberating act, the action begins.380 On the other hand Heidegger’s point is to show that “the situation of action cannot be strictly divided into deliberation and its conclusion, as if they were standing in isolation from each other. He must show that the latter is actually included in the former. He interprets this situation as follows in the Nicomachean Ethics:

‘This βουλευεσθαι, to have deliberated, is enacted as λογίζεσθαι (...) The conclusion of βουλευεσθαι is the action itself; it is not some kind of sentence, nor a kind of knowledge, but the breaking loose of the agent as such’.”381
Instead of νοεῖν or φρονεῖν we find Heidegger to be retrieving the philosophical content of Aristotle’s notions by thinking through the phenomenological sense of the Greek voices that not only are revelatory of the philosophical importance of Aristotle’s description of the temporal determination of human action, but also permit Heidegger to work out his notion of resoluteness. The perfect (that is past) infinitive βουλεύεσθαι: ‘to have deliberated,’ is often translated as present infinitive, ‘deliberation or resoluteness=βουλή’. It is translated as ‘deliberation or resoluteness’ because it contains a reference to what is (presently) known only because it conforms to what is already seen (the past sense of the perfect tense of the verb), in other words we act because we recognize it (we already knew what to look for in seeing what we now see) and so we are en-acting. That is, we are acting from what we have-seen-already, and so what we are ready to look for (looking by knowing what to look for already, in advance), with the present action. We know we are acting because we are already projected in the action. In Greek this infinitive βουλεύεσθαι appeals to an εἰδέναι, a knowledge, but as Heidegger suggests in this passage (and in the first lines of the Physics, as we saw in connection to εἰδέναι and επισθασταί) both βουλεύεσθαι and εἰδέναι are not a kind of knowledge for they have no present indicative form, no form for ‘I am (now) deliberating or knowing’. The infinitive always employed in the present tense to indicate seeing is ὄραν, a verb which always has a specific connection not with the seeing of νοεῖν and so knowing by working out (thinking), but the seeing of the eyes, and so looking, on-looking, looking-out-for, uncovering: ἀληθεύειν.

It is this same passage from Aristotle that is taken now to Being and Time and is underlying Heidegger’s account of concern in page 26 of Being and Time to contrast Dasein’s ways of relating to others, and contrasting positive and distorted modes of caring-for-others (Fürsorge). takes one’s care away, and is thus described as “leaps-in and take-away ‘care.”’

Heidegger’s description of the way of caring-for that leaps ahead (vorausspringen) as a liberating way of being-with-others that gives one back his care “authentically as such for the first time”: “this kind of solicitude pertains

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essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of others, not to a ‘what’ with which one is concerned.”

In contrast with this mode of caring-for that leaps in and dominates, we find Heidegger suggesting in the same passage, a positive way of caring-for that *leaps ahead* of the other (*ihm vorausspringt*) and discloses possibilities that enable him to take over his own care, towards authenticity: *vorspringend-befreiende Fürsorge* (leaping forth and liberating solicitude). This άληθευέτων of authentic possibilities enables one “to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become free for it.”

This way of leaping forth and liberating also indicates one of the major tasks of philosophy: to indicate the way a human being may find his own way to fulfilment in the world, the path to Man’s εὐδοκιμονία, the way authentic *Dasein* relates and displays authentic care to other people.

I have argued so far how a βουλευτική ὁρέξεως promoted by a νοῦς άληθευέτων presents the opportunity to act by directing itself to a determinate end embracing in the project of authenticity. We have read that this kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of others, not to a ‘what’ with Heidegger does not limit the possibilities of *Mitsein* to negative modes. In fact, he even speaks of being *authentically bound together* in a devotion to a common cause which each individual *Dasein* has chosen as an authentic possibility.

This interpretation is supported by Heidegger’s analysis of authentic solicitude in *Being and Time* page 122 to which we will now appeal in connection to Aristotle’s προαίρεσις and the concept of φρόνησις.

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383 *SZ*, p. 122, “Diese Fürsorge, die wesentlich die eigentlich Sorge – das heißt die Existenz des Anderen betrifft und nicht ein *Was*, das er besorgt.” Also, “Die Fürsorge erweist sich als eine Seinsverfassung des Daseins, die nach ihren verschiedenen Möglichkeiten mit dessen Sein zur besorgten Welt wie mit dem eigentlichen Sein zu ihm selbst verklammert.” [“Solicitude proves to be a grasp of being of Dasein, one which in accordance with its different possibilities, is bound up with its being towards the world of concern, and likewise with its authentic being towards itself”], p. 122.

384 *SZ*, p. 122, “*in seiner Sorge sich durchsichtig und für sie frei zu warden.*”

385 *SZ*, p. 122, “Diese *eigentliche* Verbundenheit ermöglicht erst die rechte Sachlichkeit, die den Anderen in seiner Freiheit für ihn selbst freigibt.” [“This *authentically* binding-together makes possible the right kind of objectivity which frees the other in his freedom for himself.”]
Heidegger seems to have taken to *Being and Time* the idea of φρόνησις that he explored back in Marburg (GA 19) when he stated that “what φρόνησις (practical wisdom) deliberates upon is not that which whereby a πρᾶξις reaches its end. A result is not constitutive of the being of action, but only the εὖ, the ‘how’.”386 “The τέλος of action is εὑπραξία, successful action. But Heidegger is more interested in showing that Aristotle’s conception of φρόνησις and πρᾶξις indicates that he regards Man as the ultimate “for the sake of which” of his own existence” and hence the reason why he proceeded with caution in his Aristotle course (GA 18) at Marburg in showing that “πρᾶξις is not a particular activity opposed to ποιήσις, but simply our existence, i.e. care, which, however, may be enacted in different ways”387:

“Πρᾶξις does not mean ‘activity’ as such in the general meaning of the word, but a determination of the being of Man. Ποιήσις and πρᾶξις are two possibilities that often point out to different modes of appropriation.”388

Now, in *Being and Time* Heidegger mentions “rechte Sachlichkeit” emphasizing the point that only on the basis of a foregoing access to meaning is it possible to direct oneself truly to an end that is meaningful in a concrete situation. Again, more than speculating, Heidegger is again referring to προαιρέσις offering a strict ontological exegetis of *Nicomachean Ethics* 1112 a15-17:

“ἡ γὰρ προαιρέσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποστημαίειν δ’ ἑοικε καὶ τόνυμοια ὡς ὅν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰτετοῦ.” [The choice is about speaking and thorough thinking (diανοιακες). Even the name seems to indicate that something is taken before something.”389

386 *PS*, p. 51, “Und was die φρόνησις überlegt, ist nicht das, wobei eine πρᾶξις zu Ende Kommt. Ein Resultat is nicht konstitutiv für das Sein des Handelns, sondern lediglich das εὖ, das Wie.”
388 *GAP*, pp. 188-189, “πρᾶξις nicht genommen in der weiteren Bedeutung ‘Handlung’ als solche, sondern als Bestimmung des Seins des Menschen. Ποιήσις und πρᾶξις zwei Möglichkeiten, die vielleicht nur zwei verschiedene Weisen der Aneignung bezeichnen.”[“πραξις does not mean in the general meaning of the word ‘activity’ as such, but a determination of the being of Man. Ποιήσις and πρᾶξις are two possibilities that often point out to different modes of appropriation.”] Cf. Weigelt, C., *op. cit.*, p. 122 and *NE*, 1111 a3-5.
389 *NE*, 1112 a15-17.
To choose is to take a possibility or end “before” the others, and to do so means to “take apart into pieces”, to cleave (διαχρείν) the present situation, distinguishing one possibility within the situation.

So far I have presented some passages that indicate that Heidegger’s resolute *Dasein* is not a self-regarding being and hope to have developed Heidegger’s analysis of resoluteness as the condition of possibility of self-determination, as a leaping forth and liberating and authentic being-with-others. 390 Throughout this presentation I have provided the basic traits of action as understood by Aristotle with the terms νους and βουλευτική ορεξίς and coined by Heidegger in several steps of *Being and Time* with the notion of Entschlossenheit, einspringende-beherrschende Fürsorge and vorspringend-befreiende Fürsorge that involve a contrast between authentic and inauthentic ways of being with others.

In the next section, point a) I propose to exhibit the notion of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit while keeping in mind the Aristotelian grounds examined specifically by exhibiting some of Aristotle’s principles of motion in the *Physics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* thought to be underlying the notions of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit and Sein-zum-Tode.

c) Advancing resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) and Aristotle’s principles of κίνησις and ἐντελέχεια

At this point I would like to show that the interpretation that equates authenticity with being-towards-death cannot be held as the development of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity without violating to the text of *Being and Time*. I argue that this interpretation is put into critical question by a careful study of Heidegger’s reading of the ἀληθεύειν in his pronouncements on authentic historicity which I will examine in the next chapter.

390 *SZ*, p. 116, “Die Klärung des In-der-Welt-seins zeigte, daß nicht zunächst ‘ist’ und auch nie gegeben ist ein bloßes Subjekt ohne Welt. Und so ist am Ende ebensowenig zunächst ein isoliertes Ich gegeben ohne die Anderen. (‘In clarifying being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject without a world is ‘never’ proximally, nor is it ever given. And so in the end an isolated ‘I’ without others is just as far away as from being proximally given.’)
For this purpose, I would first examine paragraph 62 where Heidegger brings together the analyses of resoluteness and authentic being-towards-death which combine to produce vorlaufende Entschlossenheit and attempt to show the connection of these notions to the teleological interpretation of change in some of the passages of Aristotle’s Physics.

In Being and Time, paragraph 62, Heidegger asks, “to what extent does resoluteness ‘thought through to the end’ in corresponds to its ownmost tendency of being lead to authentic being-towards-death?”

The concept of resoluteness, seems by all accounts to present a recovery of Aristotle’s principles of change and movement in the Physics. However, it would not do justice to such a connection just to enumerate the principles of change and then contrast these with some of the notions echoed in the passages of Being and Time. The notion of Entschlossenheit seems to condense and make thematic the being of change and movement, the meaning of moving from a potential state (δυνάμει) that is Heidegger designates by Vorlaufen to an actualized state or full presence (ἐντελέχεια) as the becoming of a thing in itself (Entschlossenheit). Heidegger aims to understand how these two phenomena are connected:

“How are these two phenomena of advancing and resoluteness to be brought together? Has not our ontological projection of the authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole led us into a dimension of Dasein which lies far from the phenomenon of resoluteness? What can death and the ‘concrete situation’ of taking action have in common?”

Heidegger raises some further questions:

“What if resoluteness, in accordance with its own meaning, should bring itself into its authenticity only when it projects itself not upon any random possibilities which lie just ahead of every factual potentiality-for-being of Dasein, and, as such, enters more or less undisguisedly into every potentiality-for-being of which Dasein factically takes hold? What if it is only in the advancing toward death that resoluteness, as Dasein’s authentic truth, has reached the authentic certainty which belongs to it? What if it is only in the advancing in death that all the factical provisionalness of resolving would be authentically understood – in other words, that it would be caught up with in an existential way?”

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392 SZ, p. 302, “Wenn sich die Entschlossenheit ihrem eigenen Sinne nach erst dann in ihre Eigentlichkeit gebracht hätte, sobald sie sich nicht auf beliebige und je nur nächste Möglichkeiten entwirft, sondern auf die äußerste, die allem faktischen Seinkönne des Daseins vorgelagert ist und als solche in jedes faktisch ergriffene Seinkönne des Daseins mehr oder minder unverstellt
With the phenomenology of Dasein in *Being and Time* Heidegger is presenting Aristotle’s greatest achievement: that there is a possibility of presence that is *α-τελες*, or in other words, that it is possible to be present as being on the way towards an end.\(^3\) It is this discovery by Aristotle himself that drives Heidegger to the notion that may best express and comprise the being of change and movement in human *Dasein: Entschlossenheit*.\(^4\) As noted, insofar as Heidegger does not intend to formulate just another version of Aristotle’s thought in the *Daseinsanalytik*, it seems that even his attempt to liberate Aristotle from that tradition requires that he turns against Aristotle as well and interprets his thought in the light of *κινησις* as its proper self-explanation, that is, coming back to what philosophy had always been: Aristotle.\(^5\)

To Aristotle, the question is: how beings that are through *όσια* can have movement *κινησις* as their way of being – their way of presencing. *Κινησις* is the phenomenon that opens the access to the being of beings as the self-concealing revealing (\(\alphaληθευμεν\)).

In the interpretation of *Eigentlichkeit* we are confronted with a question about the temporal structures of the *in* of the hereness of Dasein presupposed in, and worked out from the teleological structure of human action in the concrete situation.

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\(^4\) I may not offer here a proper and desired clarification of the aspects at play in *PHY* and a fully fledged account of the teleological determinations that could eventually lead us to a full confirmatory study of the connection between *κινησις* and Entschlossenheit. However, one faces a complex crossroad at this stage of the text together with Aristotle’s intricate temporal notions, in the sense that in order to come back with Heidegger to the past one has to take over that which one had always been, which in turn is possible only because one is also on the way or directed towards oneself as possibility. Cf., *SZ*, pp. 325, 339.

\(^5\) This is a point made earlier in *GAP*, pp. 272-273 and by Weigelt, Kisel and Sheehan. Heidegger points precisely to this concept to show what it means to frame a proper conceptuality.
“Resoluteness, as authentic being-one’s-self does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free floating ‘I’. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosing [ἀληθεύω], is authentically no other than being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its current concernful being – alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous being with others. In the light of the projected will (Worumwillen, literally: for-the-sake-of-which) of one’s self-chosen potentiality-for-being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. The resolution is precisely the disclosing projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time (…).”

Heidegger would make this question thematic later in EM, p. 46:

“But this standing there upright in itself, coming to a stand and remaining in the stand, is what the Greeks understood as being. Yet what comes to a stand and endures in itself thereby emerges forth freely of itself into the necessity of its limit, peras. This limit is not something that comes to the being from outside. Still less is it a deficiency in the sense of a harmful restriction. No, the holding which governs itself from out of the limit, the having itself in which that which endures holds itself, is the being of beings. Even more, it first makes it a being as such in differentiation from non-being. Coming to a stand means therefore: to achieve limit, to limit itself. Consequently, a fundamental characteristic of beings is to be defined by a telos, which means not aim or purpose, but end. Here "end" is not meant in a negative sense, as though there were something about it that did not continue, that failed or ceased. End is ending in the sense of fulfilment (Vollendung). Limit and end are that with which the being begins to be”

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“Understanding the call of conscience reveals the lostness in das Man. Resoluteness brings Dasein back to its ownmost potentiality-for-being-its-self. One’s ownmost transparent in understanding being-towards-death as one’s ownmost possibility.”

If we take vorlaufende Entschlossenheit as a way of authentic being-towards-death that constitutes authentic existence through a projection upon death, we are reversing the focus of being-towards-death from relating to it as a pure possibility (as Heidegger recommends) to rendering death as an ever present actuality activated in human life, becoming an end in itself πρῶτης, and would thus result in a mode of ἀληθεύειν that was rejected by Heidegger as an inappropriate way of relating to death. For if we were to accept that our choice to be authentic would inevitably be a dead-end literally the-way-of-being-towards-death, how could an end in itself still promote existence? For as such, πρῶτης is not a form of κίνησις as κίνησις does not have its end immanently, but, rather, has the mode of being of ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια. For within life, death exists or has meaning only as a possibility and this is the way the possibility of death reveals particularly clearly the meaning of possibility as such (as we have seen with the notion of vorlaufende in die möglichkeit in the perspective of inauthenticity) but furthermore it shows that ends make action possible precisely by virtue of their potentiality, that is, insofar as they are not actualized but anticipated as possibilities.

This sense of death as possibility and not an end in itself seems to be exactly the idea underlying the following passage, half way through Being and Time, page 308:

Grenze und Ende sind jenes, womit das Seiende zu sein beginnt” [This is Walter Brogan’s translation, Heidegger and Aristotle, p. 65.]


399 SZ, p. 261, “Wenn also mit Sein zum Tode eine ‘Verwirklichung’ seiner gemeint ist, dann kann es nicht besagen: sich aufhalten bei dem Ende in seiner Möglichkeit. Eine solche Verhaltung läge im ‘Denken an den Tod.’” [“Hence, if by being-toward-death we do mean an ‘actualization’ of death, neither can we mean ‘dwelling upon the end in its possibility’. This is the way one comports oneself when one ‘thinks about death.’”]

400 For the idea that πρῶτης in the proper sense cannot be a form of κίνησις (motion), see also Meta, 1048 b 18-27.
“When resoluteness is transparent to itself, it understands that the *indefiniteness* of one’s potentiality-for-being is made definite only in a resolution as regards the current situation.(…) The *indefiniteness* of one’s own potentiality-for-being, even when this potentiality has become certain in a resolution, is first made *wholly* manifest in being towards death. *Vorlaufen* brings Dasein face to face with a possibility which is constantly certain but which at any moment remains indefinite as to when that possibility will become an impossibility.” ⁴₀₁

Precisely for this reason, the phenomenon of situation is fundamental in *Entschlossenheit*. ⁴₀² As Heidegger says, “Just as the spatiality of the ‘here’ is grounded in disclosedness, the situation has its foundations in resoluteness. The situation is the ‘here’ which is disclosed in resoluteness – the ‘here’ in which the existent being is here.” ⁴₀³ Now we can ask: how is Dasein determinate in the ‘here’? From where does the resoluteness that helps us Dasein face its end come? Does not our being *here* in the world depend on the fact that we will cease to be? How can we make sense of “what can death and the ‘concrete situation’ of taking action have in common?” It seems clear for Heidegger that in resoluteness we experience a distance between ourselves and the object of our concern which gives us a clearer view of the limit of the situation which we have already understood in an unthematic way. Now, the question about what τ₁ (what *this one Dasein*)? seems to be working out for Heidegger as it seemed to work for Aristotle, that is, *not* a phenomenological question, and not an ontological question – in concentrating only on the extantness of what *is* and its presence, it overlooks and so ignores the question *for whom*, the question of the *emerging presencing* of beings and the question of the “*who?*” for whom they appear: if the same being shows itself in the same way to each one, then each one to whom the being appears would be the same as any other ‘each’ – but this is not true. Aristotle knows this from the

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⁴₀₁ *SZ*, p. 308, “Die sich selbst durchsichtige Entschlossenheit versteht, daß sich die *Unbestimmtheit* des Seinskönens je nur bestimmt im Entschluß auf die jeweilige Situation. Sie weiß um die Unbestimmtheit, die ein Seiendes, das existiert, durchherrscht. Dieses Wissen aber muß, wenn es der eigentlichen Entschlossenheit entsprechenden will, selbst aus einem eigentlichen Erschließen entspringen. Die *Unbestimmtheit* des eigenen, obzwar im Entschluß je gewiß gewordenen Seinskönens offenbart sich aber erst ganz im Sein zum Tode. Das Vorlaufen bringt das Dasein vor eine Möglichkeit, die standing gewiß und doch jeden Augenblick unbestimmt bleibt in dem, wann die Möglichkeit zur Unmöglichkeit wird.”

⁴₀² The term situation has a shade of special significance which is also present in the here of *Dasein* but it is based on place and not space, I suggest that *Dasein* works out his existence for whom disclosedness is a basic constituent. Cf., *SZ* p. 299.

⁴₀³ *SZ*, p. 299, “So wie die Räumlichkeit des Da in der Erschlossenheit gründet, so hat die Situation ihre Fundamente in der Entschlossenheit. Die Situation ist das je in der Entschlossenheit erschlossene Da, als welches das existierende Seiende da ist.”
Nicomachean Ethics – beings appear in the same way but differentiate for whom with respect to who, the actual being of the one to whom the being appears. Thereby, the constancy of presence comes from the very own solicitation of presence such that the actual being of the one concedes to every particular being the “gift of presence” – to use a terminology from the latter Heidegger – and therefore present is that which gives Man the awareness of what is manifested in all letting-be-present. Beings can show themselves as they are in such a way that we can know beings in their being through having already recognized them by their reaching over presence to us. Heidegger learns from Aristotle that to limit a thing is not to render it weaker or less determinate, but on the contrary: “ἔστι γὰρ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον πρὸς δὲν τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς συνάπτει” ["a common boundary in relation to which points conjoin."].

On the other hand, Heidegger writes that:

“He [Aristotle] thinks for the first time of the individual being as the actual (Jeweilige), and thinks of its ‘lasting’ (Weile) as the distinctive manner of presencing, of the presencing of eidos itself in the most extreme present of the indivisible, that is, no longer derived, appearance (ἄτομον εἰδος) [the outward look that can be dissected no further, literally un-cut, ].” 405

Keeping in view that for Aristotle place has a “δύναμις: ἔχει τυχα δύναμιν” 406 Heidegger, as we see in this passage, refers us to Aristotle’s understanding of being as “the actual (Jeweilige), and thinks its lasting (Weile) as the distinctive manner of presencing.” In other words, a being is only actual insofar as it achieves its potentiality-to-be in its ‘being unmoved’, in its “ἄτομον εἰδος” [the outward look that can be dissected no further, literally un-cut], that means its proper potentiality to be. Heidegger states that “the resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time (...).” 407 In this sentence we find the words “disclosive projection” and “what is factically possible” whilst in the Physics Aristotle states that:

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404 CT, 6, 5 a 2.
405 Cf. Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik (GA 6.2) apud Brogan, W., op. cit., p. 62
406 Phys., IV, 1 208 b 10 ff.
407 SZ, pp. 298-9, “Der Entschluß ist gerade erst das erschließende Entwerfen und Bestimmen der jeweiligen faktischen Möglichkeit.”
“διηρημένου δὲ καθ’ έκαστον γένος τού μὲν ἐντελεχεία τού δὲ δύναμιν, ἢ τοῦ δύναμει ὑπὸς ἐντελεχεία, ἢ τοιούτοιον, κίνησις ἐστὶν, (…)” [“Since in every genus there is a difference between which is in actuality and that which is in potentiality, change is the actualisation of a potential being as such [i.e. as potential], (…)”].

If we translate the Greek literally, we find that what makes up the difference between what is actual and potential is κίνησις as change (μετάβολη) for in order to have a potentiality for something, beings must already be something, and thus existing in the mode of ἐνέργεια or ἐντελεχεία. In other words, that being which has potential or possibility must already be where it is, or present (gegenwärtig). This peculiar union of κίνησις with ἐντελεχεία permits Heidegger to work out “what is factically possible at the time” in the sense that a being that is potential (δύναμι) is not only already something, thus being marked by its ἐντελεχεία, but is also “not yet” something thus being the “disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time”. Although, for the most part, Heidegger translates κίνησις as movement/motion (Bewegung) rather than μετάβολη, change (Veränderung= μετάβολη), the fact that the general meaning of μετάβολη is “change, alteration” distinguished by Aristotle through the use of ἀλλωσίς – demands a closer examination, for every change is a change from something to something from the out-of-its situation and being-toward-something in appearance – a change is always from something to something as Aristotle states in various steps of the Physics “πάσα μεταβολή ἐστιν ἐκ τινος εἰς τι” (Phys., I, 225 a 1). What is though the true meaning of this “something” out of which we change, i.e. how can a being attain its potential? Heidegger observes that the essence of μεταβολή is only attained after observing that in every change there is something absent that comes to presence and that

408 Phys., III, 201 a 9-11, “διηρημένου δὲ καθ’ έκαστον γένος τού μὲν ἐντελεχεία τού δὲ δύναμιν, ἢ τοῦ δύναμει ὑπὸς ἐντελεχεία, ἢ τοιούτοιον, κίνησις ἐστὶν.”

409 GAP, pp. 295, 299-300.

410 Cf. Heidegger’s illustrative example of the tree and the fox where ἀλλωσίς – as change, alteration – is contrasted with the “rest of non-alteration” (Ruhe der Unveränderung) and therefore a type of movedness, WBP, p. 249, “(…) Solches, was sich im Sinne des Ortwechsels bewegt, kann gleichwohl »ruhen« in der Weise, daß es so bleibt, wie beschaffen es ist: der Fuchs im Laufen ruht, sofern er dieselbe Färbung behält, die Ruhe der Unveränderung, ohne alloiwsis. Oder etwas kann bewegt sein in der Weise des Verkümmerns, zugleich aber noch in der anderen Weise sich bewegen, nämlich der des Anderswerdens: am verdorrenden Baum welken die Blätter, das Grün wird zu Gelb. Das so zweifach Bewegte (φησις- ἀλλωσίς) ruht zugleich als der dort stehende Baum.”

411 Cf. the same sense in Phys., IV, 234b 11, 252a 10.
every instance of movedness is an ἐντελέχεια of the thing moved (κινούμενου) such that in the generation of something to something there is already movement, κίνησις that comes into appearance with the changing thing.412

Heidegger is here suggesting that every being to which potentiality or possibility belongs is already in motion — for to be in motion is to relate to something absent — presupposes a presence. On the other hand the sentence “When resoluteness is transparent to itself, it understands that the indefiniteness of one’s potentiality-for-being is made definite only in a resolution as regards the current situation.”413 This seems to equate “potentiality-for-being” with “current situation”, condensing Aristotle’s particle ἡν of ἐντελέχεια, of a being not in relation to its outward phenomenal appearance but in relation to the τέλος of the being that is, in relation to its own understanding of what is in full presence: the ἡν-τέλος-ῄχειν, coming to a limit, reaching a point of completion — ἐντελέχεια: full presence.

The point in bringing these passages to light and contrasting them with the specific steps from Entschlossenheit and being-towards-death is to show that insofar as Dasein is movable (κινητῶν) it is also the moved (κινούμενου) whose outward look (εἴδος) is always determined by a πρός τί, that is, a relationship to something. This is the question that articulates Heidegger’s notion of resoluteness as the operator of Eigentlichkeit. In other words, while on one hand, Aristotle inquires into the coming of a being to the present as full, complete presence (ἐντελέχεια) which is presupposed by κίνησις and μεταβολή, Heidegger, on the other hand, retrieves this idea in Being and Time in order to inquire about the point when the exact course of action presents itself and one decides what to do out of the situation as it is settled. If we are to understand how the idea that death as a possibility actually affects in fact the moved Dasein (κινούμενου) we should realize that death as an end lets Dasein be present but precisely in its being towards something; it does not essentially determine Dasein as such, for the possibility of death itself is in turn dependent upon its relation to the presence of Dasein: death

412 WBP, pp. 249, 285, “Das Wesenskern der grieschich gedachten metabole treffen wir allerdings erst dann, wenn wir beachten, daß im Umschlag etwas bisher Verborgenes und Abwesendes zum Vorschein kommt (»Aus-schlag« und » Durchschlag«) (…) Von der als entelecheia begriffenen Bewegtheit aus müssen wir jetzt versuchen, die Bewegung eines Bewegten als eine Art des Seins, nämlich die des kinionmenon zu begreifen. (…) Kinesis ist metabole, das Umschlagen von etwas zu etwas dergestalt, daß im Umschlagen dieses selbst in einem mit dem Umschlagenden zum Ausschlag, d. h. in den Vorschein kommt.”

413 SZ, p. 308.
comes forward only insofar as it lets the \( \kappa \nu \omega \omicron \upsilon \mu \epsilon \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \) become present in its *already being present*.

The notion of being-towards-death becomes less tantalizing when the situation is settled and there is no longer any question of how to act or what that means: “in such \( \nu \omicron \epsilon \nu \) it is a matter of a pure making present of the thing itself, so that it *speaks purely out of* itself, and there is no longer any need of an address or making manifest on our part.”\(^{414}\) We cannot therefore determine Entschlossenheit from *Sein-zum-Tode*. By positing Entschlossenheit with *Sein-zum-Tode* we incur the risk of equating the origin of change in death, namely accounting for the possibility of \( \kappa \nu \nu \eta \sigma \iota \zeta \) by positing death as a mover. To know movement in human beings is to know how beings come to presence for it is only on the basis of the latter that the former is accessible, thus including death, *as a distinct possibility*. Hence, I suggest that death is certainly related to something towards which beings are moving (\( \pi \rho \omicron \zeta \ \tau \iota \)) but it is also a mode of incomplete presence insofar as beings are already moving toward their own \( \tau \epsilon \lambda \omicron \zeta \) themselves and the others (\( \pi \rho \omicron \zeta \ \tau \iota \ \kappa \alpha \iota \ \tau \iota \nu \omicron \zeta \)).\(^{415}\)

In this section I have shown the basic elements of of authenticity with *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*, interpreted as a way of being-towards-death, and have appealed to the problems and opened up an understanding of the roles of *vorlaufende* (advancing) and Entschlossenheit in connection to Aristotle’s principles of motion and the determination of authenticity in order to help us avoid reducing authenticity to being-towards-death.

\(^{414}\) PS, p. 161, “In solchem \( \nu \omicron \epsilon \nu \) handelt es sich um ein schlichtes Vergegenwärtigens der Sache selbst, so daß sie rein von ihr selbst her spricht und es nicht mehr eines Besprechens, Aufzeigens von uns aus bedarf.”

\(^{415}\) GAP, (Handschrift), p. 388, “Gegenwart des Bewegenbaren und Bewegenden. Ἐν τινὶ ἢ κίνησις; μία ἀμφότερ. Rückgang auf \( \pi \rho \omicron \zeta \ \tau \iota \).” (“Presence of the movable and the moved. Access to the \( \pi \rho \omicron \zeta \ \tau \iota \).”)
d) *Vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* (Advancing Resoluteness), φρόνησις and *Gewissen*.

I now wish to contrast briefly the suggested interpretation of advancing resoluteness (as so far developed) with the widespread interpretation that takes advancing resoluteness as a way of being-towards-death that constitutes authenticity. In order to do this I propose to advance my interpretation of advancing resoluteness (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*) by evoking some steps of Aristotle’s φρόνησις (*Nicomachean Ethics* I, III, and VI, 2, 1139b 7-11) in order to see the ways in which Heidegger works out and assimilates Aristotle’s findings in the concept of *Gewissen* (conscience) (paragraphs 54-60).

Heidegger writes:

“Advancing resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the ‘overcoming’ of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which gives death the possibility of assuming power over Dasein’s existence, and of basically dispersing all fugitive self-concealments.”

The phrase that advancing resoluteness “disperses all fugitive self-concealments” could indicate that being-towards-death helps effect a transparency of one’s ἀληθεύειν, a breaking through. I suggest that Heidegger – when he states explicitly ‘taking action without illusions’ – is implicitly thinking through φρόνιμος (the wise one) and φρόνησις in order to translate this concept into *Gewissen* in the sense that one must have the practical wisdom in order to know and “want to have a conscience”.

Let us take a closer look at this connection by appealing to Aristotle’s account of φρόνησις in some specific steps of the *Nicomachean Ethics* so that I can show how Heidegger works out some of these passages in GA 19 and finally takes up the term to *Being and Time* as *Gewissen*. I will complement this reading by taking up a position regarding Joachim’s exegesis of the term in his commentary to the *Nicomachean Ethics.*

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417 Cf., pp. 69-73.
In the old classic commentary of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, Joachim argues that “The φρόνιμος is the man whose action is intelligent, controlled by reasoning, i.e. true deliberation. His φρόνησις is ἐξ ἀναγκής – an established power of reasoning or deliberating – which expresses itself in syllogisms whose conclusions are προσαρέσκεις (purposes), or (Aristotle says this is the same thing) actions.” Joachim is here appealing to Aristotle’s relation of σοφία ‘wisdom’ to φρόνησις as intrinsically valuable forms of human excellence (or virtue in his translation of ἀρετή) but he says that “φρόνησις implies moral virtue and complete moral virtue implies φρόνησις.”

Joachim translates ἡττική ἀρετή (N.E., 1144 b 30-32 and 1178 a 16-19) as ‘moral virtue’ and φρόνησις as correctness of reasoning, rightness of deliberation, isolating Aristotle’s findings in 1144a 20-2, 1145 a 2-6 and 1178a 16-19 and warning that there is no real separation of the two elements in good character itself. The point Joachim is driving at is to show that, although φρόνησις calculates the means to the ends, it does not determine those ends themselves, for the right end is more than ἡττική ἀρετή (moral virtue) or more accurately a “disposition toward excellence”. Rather, Joachim concedes that “this must be treated as a lapse on Aristotle’s part from the truer conception of the function of thought in conduct.”

I believe Joachim is right when he says that φρόνησις cannot determine the ends themselves for the right end is more than a ‘disposition towards excellence’ but I do not think that this is a lapse on Aristotle’s part for it can only be considered as such if we accept, like Joachim, that φρόνησις is “correctedness of reasoning” and ἡττική ἀρετή is ‘moral virtue’ –that is, if we take φρόνησις to be speaking about correctedness in relation to disclosedness involving an uncovering of a specific being, and admits to truth and falsity. This is a problematic point, for disclosedness, the openness of truth (ἐξ ἀληθεύειν) involves its own counterpart, a concealment (that Heidegger calls, as noted, Verschlossenheit). The only way to make sense of the φρόνησις limitation, as Joachim rightly points out, is not taking it as he does, as correctedness, adequation, calculation, that contrasts it a right or wrong ‘moral’ end, as a mark of truth or falsity. Rather on the contrary, it

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is to find a phenomenological legitimate connection that clarifies the unstable equation of φρόνησις as practical wisdom with its corresponding έξις ἀληθεύειν, that is, τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν (the good in activity) that lends credence to Heidegger’s proposal that φρόνησις is Gewissen, as we will now see.

Let us take a closer look at the term πρακτική, and the importance Heidegger attaches to it so that we realize the implications of έξις ἀληθεύειν and provide a clear picture for the desired elucidation of φρόνησις as Gewissen in Being and Time.

According to Heidegger in his Platon: Sophistes Marburg course (GA 19), the term πρακτική does not have in Aristotle the sense we commonly give it – practical as opposed to theoretical, that implies no major reflection – but rather, means that it pertains to activity or action concerning matters and affairs that undergo change (τὰ πρᾶγματα). Following from this we see that a human being can become transparent to himself in hand. As Aristotle seems to suggest in the end of chapter V book 6 of Nicomachean Ethics, “έξις ἀληθής μετὰ λόγον πρακτικῆ πέρα τὰ ἀνθρώποι ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ” admitting therefore that this definition is not exhausted in its essence but it is something more than an openness or disposition (έξις).421

Heidegger explains that Aristotle distinguishes between ἐπιστήμη and φρόνησις and says that we can forget what we know, what we have learnt, i.e. it can fall back into concealment (λῆθη b28), but such forgetting is not possible for φρόνησις. With our “practical wisdom” we are always confronted with new, singular situations that have to be considered ab ovo. Practical life is concerned with “that which can accept otherness [literally, something that can be otherwise]” (τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀλλῶς ἔχειν) [and] is directed at that which is always the way it is.422

Heidegger comments on this passage from Nicomachean Ethics (b29) as follows:

“φρόνησις (practical wisdom) is nothing other than conscience/conscientiousness set into motion which makes an action transparent. Conscience/conscientiousness cannot forget [let slip into concealment]. However, that which conscientiousness uncovers can be

421 PS, p. 50.
422 PS, p. 55. (NE, 1140 b27), “περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀλλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις.”
allowed to become distorted and be made ineffective by moods and passions. Conscience makes itself felt insistently."

Here the connection with the play and strife of closing/disclosing or covering/uncovering (ἀλήθευων) is plain once again. Φρόνησις understood as consciousness is a 'happening' in Dasein which does not allow the transparency of our actions to somehow 'slip' into concealment. Rather, what reveals itself to conscience is allowed to become distorted. Conscientiousness would then seem to be characterized by being clear and transparent regarding what we are about in the πράγματα (matters) of daily life. Heidegger must have arrived at the conclusion that if it is more than an ἔξεις it must be a characteristic of the soul or discernment itself (νοῦς), and the way he explains it in terms of Dasein is to give an ontological interpretation of consciousness that enables Dasein to attain the realization of its authentic existence. Thus the only way to make sense of this situation would seem to be the openness to the calling of what Dasein needs to do in a situation or with its life: Entschlossenheit. Heidegger, as we have seen, refers to such a calling as the “voice” of conscience”. I have argued that this sense may be authenticity or inauthenticity, which means whatever οἴδαμαι Dasein is operating it is finite and conditioned by finitude. We come to the realization that Heidegger has Φρόνησις in view when he speaks of ‘taking action’ and assumes it as Gewissen aiming at what we could call a εὐπραξία (well living) in Being and Time.

423 PS, p. 56, “Die Φρόνησις ist nichts anderes als das in Bewegung gesetzte Gewissen, das eine Handlung durchsichtig macht. Das Gewissen kann man nicht vergessen. Wohl aber kann man das, was das Gewissen aufdeckt, durch ἡδονή und λύπη durch Leidenschaften [was H. weiter oben mit 'Stimmung' uebersetzt], verstellen und unwerksam werden lassen. Das Gewissen meldet sich immer wieder.”

424 Cf., Joachim, H. H. and Rees, D. A., op. cit., p. 168, it is said that “In Book VI Aristotle brings out the nature of this thinking: the identity of end which characterizes it, and also the different forms which it assumes in realizing that end in the various spheres of man’s activity. The φρόνιμος, the artist, and the philosopher, qua exhibiting intellectual virtue, all think truly, attain truth: truth is the function and end of the thinking soul.”

425 Here, Heidegger certainly faces a problem which he does not solve in SZ. For if in falling, one discloses its inauthenticity, it seems that one has to pose an independent correlate, to which to be disclosing (ἀλήθευων) would relate in a more or less correct way, but it was precisely such a pre-phenomenological notion of truth that Heidegger wanted to escape. However, if falling is interpreted as the inner finitude of αἰτία, there is no need for such correlate. For this problem see also, Tugendhat, E., Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, pp. 295-298, 328-330, 356-362.

426 Michael Zimmerman in his Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, points out Heidegger’s ‘eureka’, p. 175: “Once, several of Heidegger’s students were trying vainly to interpret the following passage from Aristotle’s Ethics: ‘a state of that sort [a
This elucidation has brought us again, on one hand to the centrality of the theme of ἀληθεύειν in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, and on the other, to a substantial conclusion to the problems and contradictions of equating authenticity with being-towards-death and lastly to the importance of the mode of ἀληθεύειν φρόνησις as the mode of disclosing a situation of authentic solicitude.

My main concern in this section was to retrieve from the text the grounds upon which Heidegger supports his account of authenticity, specifically when he speaks of resoluteness and authenticity by showing the difficulties and contradictions of an interpretation of authenticity which reduce the temporal determinations of Dasein as a projecting being-towards-death. I have been exhibiting the aletheic dimension of φρόνησις as a moment of uncovering (unmasking) a situation in any proper (authentic) caring-for. The “un-” indicates a negative, painful movement. Initially and for the most part, human being is hidden to himself. The other is his friend when he unmarks his self-obfuscation. The mode of φρόνησις is seen to call into question the possibility of caring-for in the notion of care. This would imply that genuinely caring for the other involves the aletheic strife between closure and disclosure, but what does φρόνησις disclose?

Heidegger states that:

“Neither does the advancing resoluteness stem from ‘idealistic’ exactions soaring above existence and its possibilities; it springs forth from a sober understanding of what are factically the basic possibilities for Dasein.”427

The ἀληθεύειν at stake is φρόνησις/Gewissen and concerns the “the basic possibilities” of Dasein with the others:

“By ‘others’ we do not mean everyone else but me – those [others] over against which the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself – those among whom one also is. (...) By reason of this with-like (mithaften) being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with others. The

reasoned state] may be forgotten but practical wisdom cannot.’ Finally Heidegger exclaimed: ‘That is conscience!’”. Cf., Aristotle, NE, 1140b 29-30.

world of Dasein is a *with-world* (*Mitwelt*). Being-in is *Being-with* (*Mitsein*) others. Their being-in-themselves within-the-world is *Dasein-with* (*Mitdasein*).  

Relating this *Mitdasein* to Heidegger’s interpretation of φρόνησις, it means that *eigentliche Fürsorge* (properly caring for) has to do letting the others become clear to us in their own transparency, as atmospheres (to retrieve Husserl expression). In everydayness the world stares at Dasein. The point is that the opacity of beings from which one is freed are not worldly being as such but are indicated by the specific involvement of Dasein in everydayness. As we have seen, the thrownness of Dasein is disclosed as thrownness into a world of beings (i.e. equipment, natural beings, etc…) revealing its inseparable relationship with them. In other words, it discloses Dasein’s “to-be-in-the-world”, by which Dasein shows itself not only as “that-it-is” (thrownness), but also as “that-which-it-has-to-be” Heidegger argued earlier in paragraph 26, “anticipating the other in his *existenziell* potentiality-to-be (*Seinkönnen*), not in order to relieve him of all ‘care’, but really to give it back to him as such, as his own ‘care’, for the first time.”

This is the authentic solicitude which enables the other “to become transparent to himself in his care, and to become free for it.” My proposal throughout the concept of *Eigentlichkeit* and the question of *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* is that these ontological notions are meant to crown the findings of the teleological structure of *Dasein* that Heidegger found in his Aristotle courses back at Marburg and developed under the notion of *Uneigentlichkeit*. Evidence for this is, as we have seen, contained in Heidegger’s research into ἀληθεύειν that led him to the previous re-readings of notions of Aristotle’s teleology back at Marburg, which we now find to be *unthetically* underlying the account of the modes of everydayness, inauthenticity and authenticity. The question that motivated this account is, as noted, the potentiality-for-being-a-whole that Heidegger found under the auspices of ἀληθεύειν which he retrieved from the *Nicomachean Ethics* (GA

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429 *SZ*, paragraph 26.
19). In resoluteness Insofar as that which is disclosed is appropriated or held-as-true, it becomes the task of ἀληθεύειν to uncover “the primordial truth of existence [which] demands an equiprimordial being-certain, in which one maintains oneself in what resoluteness discloses.”

I have attempted to work out the passages in the text that elicit a strong presence of Aristotle’s notions. I hope to have shown that one cannot establish the equivalence between authentic being-towards-death and authenticity from the notion of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit in Being and Time without distorting Heidegger’s text and the grounds of Aristotle contained. I shall now assess how vorlaufende Entschlossenheit projects Dasein into its authentic existence.

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430 SZ, p. 307, “Die ursprüngliche Wahrheit der Existenz verlangt ein gleichursprüngliches Gewißsein als Sich-halten in dem, was die Entschlossenheit erschließt.”

431 A hard task no doubt. In his Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, p. 175, Michael Zimmerman points out Heidegger’s ‘eureka’: “Once, several of Heidegger’s students were trying vainly to interpret the following passage from Aristotle’s Ethics: ‘a state of that sort [a reasoned state] may be forgotten but practical wisdom cannot.’ Finally Heidegger exclaimed: ‘That is conscience!’” Cf., Aristotle, NE, 1140b 29-30.
I have dwelt on the central Heideggerian themes in the concept of \textit{Eigentlichkeit} and explored its genesis from the phenomenological possibilities of Aristotle’s thought, namely from the modes of \(\alpha\lambda\tau\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\) that articulates \textit{Dasein}’s authentic being-in-the-world.

In order to motivate the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity Heidegger has pointed out the necessity of exploring the most far reaching possibility of \(\alpha\lambda\tau\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\), which is authenticity, in which life becomes truly itself or \textit{Eigen}. We have already seen how Heidegger, in trying to let Aristotle’s \(\alpha\lambda\tau\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\) being exhibited itself, has touched upon the limits of Aristotle’s project on several occasions, for example when he equated \(\phi\rho\omicron\omicron\nu\sigma\omicron\varsigma\) with \textit{Gewissen}. It is sometimes thought that in Heidegger’s analysis of human existence, Aristotle’s teleology is turned upside-down, so to speak, in that \(\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\nu}\rho\gamma\omicron\epsilon\alpha\alpha\) or actuality is deprived from its former priority (Werner Marx and Catriona Hanley support this claim). This might indeed seem to be the case when one considers that Heidegger is critical of Aristotle’s concept of \(\nu\sigma\omicron\varsigma\), insofar as it represents a kind of simple seeing, which does not take its object as something. Thereby \(\nu\sigma\omicron\varsigma\) displays the supreme form of access to reality as actuality or \(\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\nu}\rho\gamma\omicron\epsilon\alpha\alpha\), whereas \(\alpha\lambda\tau\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\) in virtue of its articulation with \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma\) (speaking), involves the possibility of change and therefore is a form of \(\kappa\iota\nu\nu\pi\sigma\iota\varsigma\). But, as already indicated, as Heidegger sees it, the problem with Aristotle’s teleology does not really lie in the concept of \(\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\nu}\rho\gamma\omicron\epsilon\alpha\alpha\) but in \(\kappa\iota\nu\nu\pi\sigma\iota\varsigma\), in that it tends to be identified with production. Therefore, Heidegger faces a challenge as he cannot simply use \(\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\nu}\rho\gamma\omicron\epsilon\alpha\alpha\) instead of \(\kappa\iota\nu\nu\pi\sigma\iota\varsigma\) as the ontological interpretation of the being of life, but has to reinterpret it. In other words, the question Heidegger has to confront within Aristotle’s teleology is: how is it possible to conceive of the being of life and its \(\alpha\lambda\tau\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\) in terms of movement or change without reducing it to a technical/ productive mode of disclosing.

The answer which Heidegger gives to this question I have explored in the course of this research in connection to authenticity, by claiming that the practical
foundation of Aristotle’s two modes of ἀληθεύειν (τέχνη and ποιήσις) is essentially to find out what it means for Dasein to be a form of κύησις (time) that opens to the possibility of authenticity in human being. Here I have just wanted to indicate the problematic within which Heidegger situates his own project. Briefly put, Heidegger follows Aristotle in describing life in terms of movement, as being on the way towards something and thus being outside itself; what Heidegger, especially in his earliest courses, terms as the “mobility” (bewegheit) of life (PA, pp. 240, Ga 60, pp. 116-117 ff.) Heidegger thinks that the τέλος towards which life directs itself is not so much a product as a possibility of man’s being and understanding. However, this is the point at which Heidegger turns to Aristotle analysis of προξείς, in the hope of finding there precisely such a conception of τέλος in the highest ἀληθεύειν (σοφία and φρόνησις), the key to authenticity.

In undertaking this phenomenological reflection, Heidegger is retrieving Aristotle’s view on philosophical research precisely in order to understand what is involved in such a reflection. That is, if the ‘thing’ (Sache) to which phenomenology should direct its attention, does not exist independently of its interpretations, the nature of philosophical research is not essentially different from exploring Aristotle’s understanding of it.

I have seen that, at the basis of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s own conceptuality is the idea that Aristotle’s teleological interpretation of life conveys an experience of the factual, situation-bound nature of life. Heidegger wants to to challenge an ideal of knowledge and its radical shift from pre-established concepts, which it can never fully dismiss, as Heidegger states in the early manuscript on Aristotle (PA, p. 248).

A ‘preparatory’ analysis of factual life will pave the way for a proper encounter with Aristotle, but this preparation is itself prepared by a reading of Aristotle. The philosophy of factual life could not work as a proper preparation to Aristotle if it was not from the beginning projected in the light of an interpretation of the nature and the aim of the philosophical problematic in Aristotle. In other words, if the task of philosophy is to let life and its disclosure be expressed, one way to do so is precisely to make visible Aristotle’s ἀληθεύειν. For if philosophy is a specific mode of life, of its own theme, then the philosophical explications of life may be investigated as an integral part of life itself.
And all the differences between Heidegger and Aristotle notwithstanding, one might say that it was Aristotle who initiated, or at least prepared such a view on philosophical work. For, Aristotle claims that the success or failure of philosophical investigations depends on the ability to encounter δόξα (opinion) in the right way. Accordingly, Aristotle almost always begins his discussions with a statement of the current opinions of the matter at hand, and he is also the first to write something like a history of philosophy.

In this final chapter ἀλήθευσις will be interrogated with respect to its own most original or far-reaching possibility, where its limits should supposedly be visible. It is precisely in this connection that Heidegger’s philosophical pursuit of Aristotle’s ἀλήθευσις in Being and Time may be properly established and becomes clear as a philosophical theme in its own right. In the chapter on Historicity Heidegger offers a thematic description of the notion that has been driving his Daseinsanalytik: retrieval, going back, appropriating authentic possibilities, making-true, disclosing: ἀλήθευσις.

I would contend that Heidegger’s analysis of authentic Ereignis yields a major share of the philosophical tradition and indicates the ἀλήθευσις of authenticity as an ontological movement in the historical world.

In order to do this, I will firstly point out the centrality and importance of the analysis of historicity for Heidegger’s existential ontology and hermeneutic of authenticity. I will offer an examination of Dasein’s determinations of authentic historicity

I will conclude this section with a proposal delineating the structure of an authentic existence and summarizing the interpretation of ἀλήθευσις and authenticity worked out in this study.
a) **Authentic Historicizing and the Philosophical Scope of \(\alpha\lambda\tau\iota\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\varepsilon\nu\)**

If we may recall the report Heidegger sent to Paul Nathorp, between September and October 1922, in support of his candidacy for associate professor at Marburg, we verify that Heidegger is already pointing out that our conception of philosophy will determine the attitude we have towards its history and that Aristotle is a privileged figure in this regard.

Walter Brogan, opening up Kisiel’s findings in the 1980s, has very recently argued in his *Heidegger and Aristotle* book about the crucial importance of this essay in understanding the genesis of *Being and Time*, for not only its composition resembles the bipartite structure of the original plan of *Being and Time* (a first “constructive” part about *Dasein* followed by the destruction of the ontological tradition) but it also presents what Heidegger regards as an unthematized phenomenology in Aristotle. Walter Brogan’s study provides, in my view, an especially clear exposition of parts of Heidegger’s Aristotle interpretation study and I certainly subscribe to one of the main points of his book: that Heidegger’s relationship to Aristotle should be explicitly faced as a problem and its consideration taken up to the point where Aristotle (but also Plato and the Greeks) left it unexamined with all its fateful implications. 433

Throughout this study, I have been seeing that, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger does not find the need to run explicitly through Aristotle again but rather aims to develop his own phenomenology out of Aristotle’s phenomenology. In this sense, Heidegger gives voice to Aristotle in the idea of the understanding appropriation of the past in the situation of a living present.

432 Heidegger started his report with an “Indication [anzeige] of the hermeneutical situation” which tells us that our conception of philosophy will determine the attitude we have towards its history. The clarification of the hermeneutical situation as the *line of sight* into which the past can be set is one of the major ideas explored by Kisiel in *The Genesis of Being and Time*, p. 253. “(...) Philosophical research is of its nature something which a “time” can never borrow from another; nor will it be able to claim to lift the burden and distress of radical questioning from future generations. The possibility of influencing its future can never be located in the results of a past philosophical inquiry, but instead in the originality of the questions which a time attains and concretely develops. As a paradigm for eliciting problems, philosophical research, through the [revolutionary power of] renewal implicit in that interrogative radicality, has the capacity to become the living present [\(\kappa\kappa\iota\rho\omega\zeta\) ever anew].”

433 Cf. Brogan, W., *op. cit.*
"The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing and discloses them out of the heritage which that resoluteness as thrown takes over." 434

Heidegger’s claim is that one’s historical heritage is the place of possibilities of an authentic existence and is therefore the source of authenticity. It is clear right from the early Freiburg 1924/5 PS course (GA 19) and throughout his writings that Heidegger considers a de-structuring of Aristotle’s works to be essential if philosophy and thinking are to be set free for their proper tasks.

After showing the interconnection between temporality and everydayness in Division Two, Chapter IV, Heidegger confesses that this “bewildering phenomenon” (verwirrenden phänomen) reveals the “inadequacy” of the foregoing Dasein analysis. 435 For, as Kellner, says: “this analysis has been “static”, focusing on Dasein “immobilized in certain situations” (i.e. being-towards-death) and has overlooked its “stretching through life.” 436 The grounds of the previous analyses are put into question on pages 371-2 in Heidegger’s quest for an analysis of historicity in which “this being has been interpreted in a way which is sufficiently primordial.” 437 The last three paragraphs of Being and Time, especially paragraph 71, contain indications that the analytic of Dasein is incomplete as it stands and requires an analysis of historicity to provide an “adequate” and “sufficiently primordial” interpretation of human being. In this regard, the importance of the chapter on historicity for the interpretation of Eigentlichkeit can hardly be exaggerated”. 438

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434 SZ, p. 383, “Die Entschlossenheit, in der das Dasein auf sich selbst zurückkommt, erschließt die jeweiligen faktischen Möglichkeiten eigentlichen Existierens aus dem Erbe, das sie als geworfene übernimmt.”

435 SZ, p. 371, “Oder wird an diesem verwirrenden Phänomen gerade das Unzureichende der vorstehenden Explikation der Zeitlichkeit offenkundig?”

436 SZ, p. 371, “Haben wir bisher nicht standing das Dasein auf gewisse Lagen und Situationen stillgelegt und ‘konsequent’ mißachtet, daß es sich, in seine Tage hineinlebend (…).”

437 SZ, pp. 371-2, “(…) dieses Seiende zuvor hinreichend ursprünglich interpretiert ist.”

438 Apud Kellner, D., op., cit., p. 224, “Heidegger had been prepared for its philosophical appropriation by his encounter with the dimension of the historical through an intensive study of early Christianity and the religious thought of Augustine. It is not a coincidence that Heidegger’s analyses on the Phenomenology of Religion while he was a Privatdozent at Freiburg University were delivered after the GAP, WS 1920/21 (GA58) and immediately before the present course on Aristotle’s phenomenology (GA17) and three years after this in Heidegger’s only book SZ. This dimension of historicity essential for such a retrieval was opened up not only by Aristotle himself but by Heidegger’s intense preoccupation, at this time, with the work of Dilthey and his friend count Paul York of Wartenburg (that perhaps not surprisingly is quoted at length in the chapter on ‘historicity’), thinkers who themselves were on the trail that led beyond metaphysics but even long
Heidegger writes:

“Death is only the ‘end’ of Dasein; and, taken formally, it is just one of the ends by which Dasein’s totality is enclosed. The other ‘end’, however, is the ‘beginning’, the ‘birth’. Only that being which is ‘between’ birth and death presents the whole which we have been seeking. Accordingly, the orientation of our analytic has so far remained ‘one-sided’, in spite of all its tendencies toward a consideration of existent being-a-whole and in spite of the (genuineness) with which authentic and inauthentic being-towards-death have been explicated.”

I am arguing, in this last section on “Historicity”, that expressions such as “out of the heritage” and “taking over”, constitute the scope of ὀληθευτική in the concept of Eigentlichkeit that, in Being and Time, make up for the revision of the historical/philosophical grounds upon which the Daseinsanalytik lies.

I would like to mention two later courses that further the historicity findings in Being and Time, for example, On the Way to Language (1965) where Heidegger states that: “We do not aim at advancing further. All that we want is just really to get where we already are”.

Also in Introduction to Metaphysics (1935) Heidegger argues that:

“To ask the question about being means nothing less than to recapitulate (wiederholen) the beginning of our historical-spiritual existence, in order to transform it into a new beginning. This is possible. It is in fact the authentic pattern of historicity, for all history starts with a fundamental happening. We do not repeat a beginning by reducing it to something past and now known, which we may simply affect and ape. The beginning must be begun again, more radically, with all the strangeness, the darkness and the insecurity that attend a true beginning. Repetition as we understand it is nothing but an improved continuation of what has been up till now by mediation of the up-till-now.”

before this, as Pögeller has pointed out, and indeed with the work of Dilthey. Cf., EPF, p. 91, and Pogeller, Sein als Ereignis, p. 604 and Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, Also, PGZ, paragraphs 4 and 13”.


440 US, p. 12, For Heidegger, at this later stage, this meant to bring about the “unthought” of that which has been already thought by philosophy – what Heidegger calls the gedacht – and the matter of thinking – the Gedanke – to what is yet unthought (Ungedachte) in it and so that which is yet to be thought. Cf. WHD? p. 42.

Although these two examples of Heidegger’s later courses demonstrate Heidegger’s concern with tradition and historicity in a rather more thematic fashion than in Being and Time, I should emphasize once more that since so much of Heidegger’s work in the twenties was focused on Aristotle, it stands to reason that Aristotle is a hidden interlocutor in this section on historicity in Being and Time. For, in Being and Time Heidegger is conducting a research on ἀληθεύειν of human existence and therefore he is specifically focused on “handing down to oneself (sich überliefern) the possibilities that have come down [to one].”442 These “handing down to oneself” possibilities from the heritage is not a simply unquestioning acceptance of the tradition and neither does his proposed destruction has anything to do with asserting a private point. Rather it is a critical dialogue in which one questions the tradition and then chooses which of those possibilities is conceived of as constitutive for his own existence: the task of ἀληθεύειν.443 Indeed textual evidence abounds to lend credence that Heidegger’s return to the tradition by means of its destructuring or destruction is concerned with how we stand in relation to the tradition:

“Destruction is rather the authentic way in which the present must be encountered in its own basic movements, and encountered in such a way that thereby the ständige Frage, the persistent questioning, breaks out of history to the extent that it (the present) is concerned with the appropriation and interpretation of the possibility of a radical and fundamental experience.”444


442 SZ, p. 383, “(...) ein Sichüberliefern überkommener Möglichkeit in sich, obzwar nicht notwendig als überkommener.”

443 Cf. for example Walter Brogan’s remarks, op. cit., pp. 8-9, “A human being can uncover the hidden possibilities of thought only insofar as he first listens to the meaning of being that addresses and claims him through the text. Destruction means: to open our ears, to make ourselves free for what addresses us in the tradition as the being of beings. By listening to this address, we attain the correspondence (Entsprechung).”

444 PIA, p. 35, “Die Destruktion ist vielmehr der eigentliche Weg, auf dem sich die Gegenwart in ihren eigenen Grundbewegtheit begeben muß, und zwar so begeben, daß ihr dabei aus der Geschichte die ständige Frage entgegenspringt, wie weit sie (die Gegenwart) selbst um Aneignungen radikaler Grunderfahrungsmöglichkeiten und deren Auslegungen bekümmert ist.”
The “possibility of a radical and fundamental experience” in Being and Time is *being open* to one’s temporal dimensions, that is, making-true, disclosing and choosing authentic possibilities from one’s heritage, so that one can project one’s own future. “The more authentically Dasein resolves – and this means that in advancing to death it understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibility – the more unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence, and the less does it do so by accident. Only the advancing to death drives away every accidental and ‘provisional’ possibility. Only being-free for death gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Grasping the finitude of one’s existence tears one out of the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one – those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly – and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its *fate.*”

In order to bring back the totality of Dasein in the world as authenticity regarding its being-a-totality retrieved through ἀληθεύονται Heidegger asks:

“Although up to now we have seen no possibility of a more radical approach to the existential analytic, yet, if we have regard for the preceding discussion of the ontological meaning of everydayness, a difficult consideration comes to light. Have we in fact brought the totality of Dasein, as regards its authentically being-a-totality, into the fore-having of our existential analysis? It may be that a formulation of the question as related to Dasein’s totality possesses a genuinely unequivocal character ontologically. It may be that as regards *being-toward-the-end* the question itself may even have found its answer.”

Heidegger’s answer indicates that the previous analysis of totality *is* incomplete:

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“Death is only the ‘end’ of Dasein; and, taken formally, it is just one of the ends by which Dasein’s totality is enclosed. The other ‘end’, however, is the ‘beginning’, the ‘birth’. Only that being which is ‘between’ birth and death presents the whole which we have been seeking. Accordingly, the orientation of our analytic has so far remained ‘one-sided’, in spite of all its tendencies toward a consideration of existent being-a-whole and in spite of the (genuineness) with which authentic and inauthentic being-towards-death have been explicated.”

“If everything ‘good’ is a heritage and the character of ‘goodness’ lies in making authentic existence possible, then the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness.”

If, as this passage implies, authentic existence is constituted by the choice of possibilities from the heritage handed down in resoluteness, what is the role of death and being open as χληθεύειν in one’s finite future?

Heidegger answers:

“The more authentically Dasein resolves – and this means that in advancing to death it understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibility – the more unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence, and the less does it do so by accident. Only the advancing to death drives away every accidental and ‘provisional’ possibility. Only being-free for death gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Grasping the finitude of one’s existence tears one out of the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one – those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly – and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate.”

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This passage explicates the relationship between authentic being-towards-death and anticipating resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) from the resolute choice of authentic possibilities from the heritage.

Resoluteness chooses authentic possibilities from the heritage and projects them into the future in the way of vorlaufend, advancing. Dasein is always ahead of itself (sich vorweg), throwing itself into possibilities which are determined by the structure of being-towards-death as finite.450

Thus, I suggest that Heidegger’s concept of authentic historizing and the heritage opens up the scope of authenticity from the ontological structure of finite Dasein worked out through ἀληθεύων, in the current historical situation which is the motivation of resolute choice and the pinnacle of authenticity.

I have been showing in this study that Heidegger’s existencial/temporal analytic of Dasein is articulated in the concept of authenticity. The development of this concept follows from Heidegger’s implicit (and at times explicit) reading of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύων and some of the notions of his teleology retrieved and conceptualized in the ontological notions of Being and Time. Given the dialogue between Heidegger and Aristotle in the accounts of das Man and authenticity, in which Heidegger consistently opts to exhibit and offer and existential interpretation of ἀληθεύων as the intrinsic capacity of Dasein to disclose the world and move toward the ultimate truth of existence, (ἀληθεύω), it seems not valid to interpret Heidegger’s analysis as having any kind of dependency upon sp.

Authentic historicity is grounded in Dasein’s temporality. In order to fully grasp the conditions of Dasein’s authentic historizing, I will now turn to Dasein’s authentic temporal structure. I would like to show that it is Dasein’s three-dimensional temporality that provides the conditions of its historicity, and that makes possible the phenomenon of authentic historizing, that is to say, authenticity. In the following point I will investigate ἀληθεύων as an historical-temporal phenomenon of the moment of vision (Augenblick) that projects the repetition of authentic possibilities from the heritage, and constitutes the authentic self.

450 SZ, p. 264 also Kellner, D., op. cit., p. 265 and SZ, p. 384, “Im Miteinandersein in derselben Welt und in der Erschlossenheit für bestimmte Möglichkeiten sind die Schicksale im vorhinein schon geleitet.” (“Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our being with one another in the same world, and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities.”)
Recalling Heidegger’s 1923/24 *Introduction to Phenomenology* course (GA 17), addressed in the first chapter, we realized that he found much common grounds in Aristotle’s phenomenological description in *de Anima*, especially regarding *Dasein*’s standing in the world in relation to the *thinking* and *appearance* of this same world. When exploring the meaning of phenomenology from specific passages from the *de Anima* we have focused on Heidegger’s exegesis of Aristotle and the question of the perception of the world as a mode of seeing.\(^451\) In this course, Heidegger worked through the meaning of a specific passage from Aristotle’s *de Anima* to show what kind of phenomenon was accessible in the seeing that *sees*. Indeed, Aristotle maintained: “What is perceivable in seeing is the visible.” (“Όὐ μὲν σοῦ εἶστιν ἡ ὅψις, τοῦτ’ εἶστιν ὅρατόν.”)\(^452\) Heidegger furthered this examination into what is made accessible in this seeing and how that related to the perception of the perceived: “What is seeing, what is it that is perceived in such seeing, how is it that that which is accessible in seeing is characterized with respect to its content and perceptibility?”\(^453\) The reason why I am now revisiting this early Marburg course is to show that Aristotle’s phenomenological description of human being is operating at this stage of *Being and Time* in terms of Heidegger’s analysis of the disclosure of the presence of the world at the level of the *Augenblick* (moment-of-vision).

We have seen to a certain extent, in the discussion of authenticity that this seeing corresponded to an immediate grasp (νους) that would consist of a return to that which had already been disclosed and understood in an non thematic way. I have suggested that νους could indeed be working as Heidegger’s conceptualization of the “pre-objective” ἀληθεύειν of authenticity and how this helped Heidegger through his notion of *Entschlossenheit*, a notion that could best render and condense the temporal determinations of ἀληθεύειν of authenticity:

\(^{451}\) *EPF*, p. 7, “Analyse des Vernehmens der Welt in der Weise des Sehens.”
\(^{452}\) *DA*, B7 418 a26, “Οὐ μὲν σοῦ εἶστιν ἡ ὅψις, τοῦτ’ εἶστιν ὅρατόν.”
\(^{453}\) *EPF*, p. 7, “Wie ist das im Sehen Zugangliche hinsichtlich seines Gehaltes und seiner Vernehmbarkeit charakterisiert?”
κίνησις, φρόνησις as Gewissen. With hindsight, though, if resoluteness corresponds to a choice, that is, if authenticity is still grounded in a discursive νοῦς ἀληθεύειν then how are we really able to express ἀληθεύειν without objectifying it?

A response to the question of authentic ἀληθεύειν cannot be exhausted by the disclosedness of νοῦς in deliberation; not only because deliberation is directed towards its end in such a way as to disregard the present, but also because the end is not grasped as such. Bearing this in mind, Heidegger needed to move beyond the confines of everyday action, as authentic as it may be. In Heidegger’s view it is necessary to lay bare the conditions of possibility that would open up to a more far-reaching vision, represented by the Augenblick, which no doubt picks up certain traits of νοῦς but simultaneously points beyond such an ideal: authentic historicizing.

Authentic historicizing is connected to authentic temporality in its three-dimensional ‘ecstatic unity’. This analysis suggests that authentic being-towards-death is but one of the three temporal conditions of authenticity and that the Augenblick as the original ἀληθεύειν gives directives for the nature of authenticity and philosophical understanding as well.

This authentic time of returning to past events is called Wiederholung by Heidegger.454 I would like to suggest that Wiederholung, in the context of choice from authentic possibilities from the heritage, is the key to authentic resolve and presents us with the full scope of ἀληθεύειν as a philosophical notion of retrieval and repetition. This proposal grounds the philosophical connection between ἀληθεύειν and Eigentlichkeit by suggesting that one must first rescue the possibilities from the heritage through a resolute choice of authentic existence possibilities not letting these fall into oblivion. This process, or movement if we like, of retrieval-repetition is Heidegger’s very own illustration of the purpose of ἀληθεύειν operating in Eigentlichkeit and it is enunciated in the following passage of Being and Time:

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454 SZ, p. 385, “Die Wiederholung ist die ausdrückliche Überlieferung, das heißt der Rückgang in Möglichkeiten des dagewesen Daseins.” [“Repetition is the explicit handing-down, that is, the going back to the possibilities of the Dasein that has been there.”]
“The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the retrieval-repetition (Wiederholung) of an existence possibility that has come down to us. Repetition is the explicitly handing-down, that is, the going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has been there. The authentic repetition of a past existence possibility – that Dasein itself chooses its hero – is grounded in advancing resoluteness; for in it one first chooses the choice that makes one free for the struggle of loyalty and the struggling succession of the repeatable.”

I would like to underline the centrality of Wiederholung, for the place of the authentic resolution is History. As I have already suggested in this study, Heidegger does develop his notion of Eigentlichkeit on the basis of Aristotle’s inquiry into ὑπὸ ἀληθείας as the analysis of Dasein’s ways of being-in-the-world. This finding permitted Heidegger to retrieve the phenomenological character of Aristotle’s thought by releasing this thought out of its ontological presuppositions. However, the return to Aristotle in Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik and in the repetition of past possibilities, the choice of Aristotle (among the Greeks) from the heritage is not a backtracking or a romantic ideal that seeks to imitate one of the greatest philosophers of all time as Heidegger puts it:

“(…) the repetition replies (erwirdert) on the possibility of that existence which has been there. But when such a reply (Erwiderung) is made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made in a moment of vision; and as such it is at the same time a retraction (Widerruf) of that which in the ‘today’, is working itself out as the ‘past’. Repetition does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress. In the moment of vision authentic existence is indifferent to both these alternatives.”

This passage makes it clear that this movement towards the tradition is for the sake of authentic existence, that is, for the purposes of the analysis of authenticity and the presence of Aristotle’s phenomenology in Being and Time, Heidegger is

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neither supporting a cultivation of the tradition for its own sake, or an aesthetic appreciation of one’s heritage, but rather accounting for Dasein’s disclosive movement towards an authentic existence and Aristotle’s phenomenological help in this regard. Thus, there is no appropriation of the heritage as such, nor can one simply label Heidegger as destructuring the tradition in order to make it his own, or appropriating its findings for the ontological analysis of Dasein. Rather, Heidegger is engaged in an active dialogue with the past, specifically in order to release Aristotle himself out of a tradition that has interpreted his thought metaphysically. Regrettably, I am not able to address here the implications of the metaphysical appropriation of Aristotle in the middle-ages and the Aquinas interpretation, although I hope to have raised some reflections in the first chapter in connection to the traditional interpretation of λόγος as judgment. For the present purposes my aim is to see how these two terms cement the current proposal that Heidegger is indeed offering a twofold reading of historicity that not only fully grounds the concept of Eigentlichkeit but also stretches out the philosophical significance of ἀληθεύειν in Being and Time.

If we take a closer look at the etymological meaning of the term Erwiderung und Widerruf we eventually exhibit more clearly what both terms express philosophically. An Erwiderung is a reply, entailing an active dialogue with the past. Widerruf along with Wiederholung-Erwiderung expresses the twofold nature of the resolute repetition of past possibilities; it is also a retraction of how these have been traditionally interpreted. That is, authentic repetition accepts but also declines the past, in a movement of oscillating way of retrieving, interpreting and appropriating which is at the core of the twofold relationship to the tradition which Heidegger wishes at the same time to “destroy” and “preserve”. The same relationship, I believe, is indicated by the Wiederholung that is at the same time retrieved by, and a repetition of, ἀληθεύειν in the concept of Eigentlichkeit and the notions of Erwiderung and Widerruf as signposts to Aristotle. Therefore, I believe I can with some approval claim that Heidegger’s “destruction of the history of ontology” and the project of going back to Aristotle is “positive in its aim” and that “its critique aims at today.”

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457 SZ, p. 22 “Die Destruktion hat ebensowenig den negativen Sinn einer Abschüttelung der ontologischen Tradition. Sie soll umgekehrt diese in ihren positiven Möglichkeiten, und das besagt
The “authentic present” within which one retrieves and appropriates authentic possibilities is called by Heidegger, as noted, the “moment of vision” (Augenblick). Since the “moment of vision temporalizes itself in a resolution” it depends on an openness to the past, in which one sees authentic possibilities in the heritage that free it from the dependence and conventions of the ways of being of das Man. The term Augenblick suggests a flash of insight, a sudden understanding, a disclosure that illuminates the situation, such that one can choose authentically. Although this moment of vision removes one from one’s immersion in present concern and provides a break or rupture in which a radical disclosure takes place, one must always return to everydayness: “Existence can in a moment of vision master the everyday, although of course often only ‘for a moment’, but it can never extinguish.” Hence, after the moment of vision, the authentic present gives way to the “struggle for loyalty” and repetition of one’s resolve.

I would now like to consider the structures that make possible authentic historizing and see how these relate to each other in the constitution of authenticity. I stress this point since in order to work out the full structural complexity of αληθεύειν and Eigentlichkeit, I believe it is important to grasp the articulation between being-towards-death, the resolute repetition of authentic possibilities, and one’s authentic being toward the past. As Kellner states: “A brief look at Heidegger’s existential ontology and methodology might provide a schematic clarification of what is meant by claiming that authenticity is a unitary structure composed of co-original determinations. Heidegger’s ontology aims at disclosing and developing “unitary primordial structures” composed of co-original determinations. He argues that it is important in ontology to conceptualize the constitution of complex phenomena in terms of co-original structures, and not to reduce the phenomena in question to a ‘ground zero’ from which one goes to more
complex, derivative structures.\textsuperscript{461} For example, Heidegger begins his existential analytic with an analysis of the unitary structure of being-in-the-world, and then analyzes its constitutive co-original structures: being-in, world, and the self who is in the world. Then Heidegger takes the unitary structure of \textit{being-in (In-Sein)} and analyzes it in terms of its co-original determinations (\textit{befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Rede}). He then brings together his analyses in an interpretation of “Care as the being of Dasein”\textsuperscript{462}, which provides an analysis of an original unitary structure of πράξις within which the constitutive structures already analyzed find their interconnection. Care is “not simple in its structure”, Heidegger notes, but it is “structurally articulated”.\textsuperscript{463} The second part of \textit{Being and Time} is a search for more primordial unitary structures which are the primary characteristics of existence that in Heidegger’s language make up the “being of care”. The more primordial structures are disclosed in the analysis of temporality and historicity.\textsuperscript{464}

Perhaps a convincing analogy for the interpretation of authenticity may be drawn and developed from this characterization of Heidegger’s phenomenological method in \textit{Being and Time}. To equate authenticity with advancing resoluteness is, I believe, equivalent to simply equating the being of \textit{Dasein} with care, to stop one’s investigation halfway through Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle, and to omit the temporal and/or historical importance of the research in Aristotle.

In attempting to state more clearly the relationship between the presence of \textit{αληθεύειν} in the connection between advancing resoluteness and authentic historicity, one encounters a complex and confusing interpretive crossroad. For example, what does it mean to say that “authentic being-towards-death is the hidden ground (\textit{der verborgene Grund}) of Dasein’s historicity?” What does Heidegger mean by “hidden ground”? Is he anticipating the discussion that he was

\textsuperscript{461} \textit{SZ}, pp. 131-132, “Das Phänomen der \textit{Gleichursprünglichkeit} der konstitutiven Momente ist in der Ontologie oft mißachtet worden zufolge einer methodisch ungezügelten Tendenz zur Herkunftsnachweisung von allem und jedem aus einem einfachen ‘Urwurm’. ” [“The phenomenon of the co-originality of constitutive moments has often been disregarded in Ontology, mostly due to a methodological unrestrained tendency to derive everything from anything from some simple ground zero.”]

\textsuperscript{462} \textit{SZ}, paragraph 41.

\textsuperscript{463} \textit{SZ}, p. 196, “Der Ausdruck ‘Sorge’ meint ein existenzial-ontologisches Grundphänomen, das gleichwohl in seiner Struktur \textit{nicht einfach} ist. (...) dieses Phänomen in sich noch structural \textit{gegliedert} ist.” [“The expression ‘Care’ signifies a basic existential-ontological phenomenon, which all the same is not simple in its structure. (...) this phenomenon is structurally articulated.”]

due to have later in *On the Essence of Ground (Von Wesen des Grundes)* and how important a role would the Aristotelian temporal notions play in this connection? I believe that it is best to bracket the question of “ontological primordiality” and a series of ontological puzzles that go far beyond the scope of this study. Following Heidegger’s recommendations on pages 131-2 on the use of equiprimordial structures, I believe that it is that authenticity is a unitary structure that is made possible by the discovery of ἀληθεύειν, a disclosive capacity of making-true of being-in-the-world. On this point, I have argued that it is not authentic being-towards-death, but the interconnected temporal structures of the mode of ἀληθεύειν at stake in advancing resoluteness, φρόνησις and authentic historicity that are the fundamental determinations of authenticity; that the summit and culmination of *Being and Time* and the concept of authenticity is not exhausted in section 62 on advancing resoluteness but suggests a further reading of authentic historicity.

c) *Ereignis* and the Authentic Self

The term “En-own-ment” or “Ap-propri-ation” (Er-eign-is) is constant in Heidegger's thinking since the 1930s — marks his attempt to think more originally than metaphysics the relation between being and beings in terms of the being “enowned” of humans through being and in terms of the belonging of humans to being. I will rethink the question of this relation in reference to Heidegger’s concept of Selbständigkeit on pp. 321-324 on *Being and Time* and later reflections from the essays and lectures of the second Freiburg period – from the 1940s and 1950s – specially from the essay ‘Das Ding’ first given in 1949 and again in 1950, and then first published in 1954 in the collection *Vorträge und Aufsätze* and the chapter on Ereignis in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (written in 1936-1938) and will focus on his struggle for a language that could give expression to what still remains concealed in the metaphysical expression of authentic self: the truth (or ground) or being as Ereignis. In the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* - Contributions to Philosophy: Of Enowning in the recent English translation.465

465 In the recently translated Towards a Definition of Philosophy (GA56/57), a lecture course from 1919, there's a discussion of Ereignis with Erlebnis (lived experience) and the attempt to
The word *eignen* has several senses: it can mean ‘to own’, i.e. property, but also ‘to be proper’, ‘to be suitable’; *eigen* is ‘own’. The prefix *er*- in German has the sense of a bringing forth, a bringing about. *Ereignis* is usually translated as ‘event’.\(^{466}\)

“In terms of the authenticity of care the *constancy of the self (Selbständigkeit)*, as the supposed persistence of the *subjectum*, is clarified. But the phenomenon of this authentic potentiality-for-being also opens our eyes to the *constancy of the self* in the sense of its having achieved some sort of position. The *constancy of the self*, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the *authentic* counter-possibility to the non-self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling.”\(^{467}\)

The challenge we face on this point is to discern what constitutes *Dasein’s Selbständigkeit* and individuality.

Heidegger seems to be making simultaneous use of its ‘true’ and apparent etymologies. Heidegger is therefore playing with a number of meanings at once, which are well preserved in the English ‘propriation’ and related words, with the senses of proper, property, peculiarity, suitability, own, owning, ownership, belonging, appropriation. Derrida notes in *Donner le Temps* that *Ereignis* “c’est un mot qui est difficile à traduire” and he suggests ‘event’ [évènement] or propriation inseparable from a movement of de-propriation, *Enteignen*. From the mid 1930s these words are the core of Heidegger’s thinking, and occur in most of his later texts, not always explicitly, and generally obscured in translation. In the late lecture *Zeit und Sein*, Heidegger tries to provide some clarification of this notion of *Ereignis*. He is concerned that it will simply be thought of as a definition of being. He suggests that formerly, philosophy thought being in terms of being as ἐνεργεῖα,
actualitas, - and now, one could think, as Ereignis. However, still understood as representation. Parmenides dictum “τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ ἔστι” [for the same is indeed for thinking as is for being ”], exhibits this character of thinking as a presentation rather than a re-presentation. The double meaning of perceive, grasping (vernehmen) in the sense of νοεῖν connected to being in the sense of φύσις or emergence – what makes thinking and being the same is the originating presence of thinking original for me – the same (αὐτό), for thinking (νοεῖν ἔστιν) is the out-of-which of the being towards here (Being=εἶναι). The same (αὐτό) and the indeed (γὰρ) ground thinking and being in the accepting of being in its appearance, letting what appears in, taking care as a need. Aristotle understands this sameness as an ὑπόκειμενον, literally a what lies there underneath, a lying present of beingness. As long as each human being stands out in the open, as long as a being stands on its own (υπόστασις), that is, as long as a being is for itself present, it has the character of beingness: οὐσία. Heidegger discovers in Aristotle’s interpretation of φύσις as οὐσία– a mode of presencing – a double meaning of emergence and movement. For Aristotle human being is not an epiphenomenon of being, or a singularity of being but the wholeness of being itself in the gathered character of being itself in its pure presence. In this line, we could say in the self-same and through this self-same. Aristotle exhibits this transitive character of knowledge by thinking what I can know, the to cognize in terms of the cognizing and not of re-cognizing. The Greek construction is also revelatory that Aristotle thinks of knowledge and therefore thinking in terms of a presentation, an exhibiting of the being in the world. Aristotle’s thinking of knowledge in the Physics certainly illustrates that there are ways of speaking which more than others encourage representational thinking (like speaking in terms of presence, of transcendence, and i.e. of horizon of thought). The question is “How can these two terms be understood as describing in one way how ‘Da-sein sich ereignet’? What eventuates in what self-eventuates? – asked another way, in what occurs-for-itself, what occurs-for-me? How do I bring this question to an adequate description (which is not to say, how do I give it content, fill it out, answer it?), but, on the other hand, there are no written or spoken words which in themselves are

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468 This is one of the original senses of νοεῖν; cf., WHD, p. 125.
469 Cf. Chapter II of this study.
non-metaphysical. The fundamental thinking of the Beiträge is strikingly reminiscent of Aristotle’s own explicit attempts in the Physics to hold itself in a Grundstimmung, in a basic attunement in which beyng in its historical occurrence, in its Geschichtlichkeit (not Historie) is disclosed.

On Being and Time, page 332, Heidegger writes:

“The ontological structure of the being, that in each case I myself am, centers on the self-constancy (Selbständigkeit) of existence. Because the self can be conceived neither as a substance nor as a subject, but is grounded in existence, the analysis of the inauthentic self, das Man, has remained wholly in the context of the preparatory interpretation of Dasein. Now, though, after selfhood has been explicitly taken back into the structure of care and temporality, the temporal interpretation of Selbst-ständigkeit and Unselbst-ständigkeit takes on its own importance. It requires a separate, thematic carrying through. This interpretation, however, not only first gives the right kind of insurance against the paralogisms and the ontologically inappropriate questions about the being of the I in general, but at the same time it is in accordance with its central function, a primordial insight into the temporalizing structure of temporality. This reveals itself as the historicity of Dasein.”

This passage indicates that the temporal interpretation of the authentic self requires a working out of its temporalal structures, which “reveals itself as the historicity of Dasein”. What is “stretching along, movement, and persistence which are specific to Dasein.” This movement in which “Dasein stretches itself along and is stretched along (erstreckten Sicherstreckens)” is Dasein’s historizing (Geschehen, Being and Time, p. 375), which, as we have seen, provided the place of Dasein’s totality and authenticity.

Upon reading this excerpt can we hear that Ereignis work out to be the selfsame, the self-constancy hiding itself in the name ἀλήθεια truth, unconcealment?


471 SZ, p. 374, “(…) der spezifischen Erstreckung, Bewegtheit und Beharrlichkeit des Daseins.”
d) Towards νοος ἀληθεύειν (insight) and Self-Transparency

The characteristic of self-transparency or disclosing, that presents Heidegger’s coinage of the main term that has been leading us throughout all this research: ἀληθεύειν. Self-transparency, disclosing and making-true indicates that insight and understanding are the conditions of possibility of action; before the self can act authentically, its being-in-the-world must be disclosed and transparent; i.e. it must understand its situation, its place and be open to the full range of its possibilities if it is to choose in a “moment-of-vision”, that is fully open and aware to what is possible and appropriate. We have seen how this structure was articulated in terms of νοος ἀληθεύειν that sheds light on Heidegger’s analysis of resoluteness and authenticicty and the reference to the problem of self-knowledge.

In Being and Time, page 146 in a discussion of the various kinds of “sight”, Heidegger writes:

“The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence, we call ‘transparency’ (Durchsichtigkeit). We choose this term to designate ‘knowledge of the self’ in a sense which is well understood, so as to indicate that here it is not a matter of perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the ‘self’, but rather one of seizing upon the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world throughout all the constitutive items which are essential to it, and doing so with understanding.”

Firstly, this passage suggests that “self-knowledge” appears as a making transparent “the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world” throughout all its essential constitutive moments – or, in other words, making transparent the structure of care, temporality, and one’s threefold relation to the self, other and world. The key term is Durchsichtigkeit which indicates a seeing through, thus presenting an activity of insight (νοος ἀληθεύειν). In this sense, self-knowledge according to Heidegger indicates a gaining of insight into one’s being-in-the-world.

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472 SZ, p. 146, “Die Sicht, die sich primär und im ganzen auf die Existenz bezieht, nennen wir die Durchsichtigkeit. Wir wählen diesen Terminus zur Bezeichnung der wohlverstandenen ‘Selbsterkenntnis’, um anzuzeigen, daß es sich bei ihr nicht um das wahrnehmende Aufspüren und Beschauen eines Selbstpunktes handelt, sondern um ein verstehendes Ergreifen der vollen Erschlossenheit des In-der-Welt-seins durch seine wesenhaften Verfassungsmomente hindurch” (my italics).
Seeing through distortions, illusions, concealments and gaining insight into the being of *Dasein* is the task of ἀληθεύειν, the pre-requisite for achieving authenticity and constituting an authentic self.

Heidegger has chosen his figure: Aristotle. It is within Aristotle’s philosophy and the discovery that there is an ἀληθεύειν that belongs to factical life and makes up for *Dasein*’s uncovering of itself and the world, that Heidegger gets the motivation to clarify the many modes of disclosing being and knowing in the world, and gains the insight to describe the most extreme possibility of human being: authenticity.

Authentic possibilities are at stake in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. These exist in the historical heritage and are to be taken over and made one’s own by an act of resolute repetition which aims at self-transformation.

The possibilities to be grasped in the project of authenticity are the historical possibilities of one’s heritage that are to be retrieved and repeated. It is historicity that helps us to give expression to an understanding of what it means to go back to the past, to retrieve possibilities of Aristotle’s phenomenological ilk that gave direction and planning to the central planks of *Being and Time*. The point Heidegger makes in the concept of historicity, paragraph 68 of *Being and Time*, is only comprehensible in terms of his analysis of authenticity, and would appear rather disconnected if removed from the context of the temporal *Daseinsanalytik*.

“As historical, Dasein is possible only on the ground of its temporality. Temporality temporalizes itself in the ecstatio-horizontale unity of its raptures. Dasein exists authentically as futural in resolutely disclosing a chosen possibility. Coming back resolutely to itself, it is, by repetition, open for the ‘monumental’. Dasein is as having-been delivered over to its thrownness. (...) Dasein temporalizes itself in the way the future and having been are united in the present. The present discloses the ‘today’ authentically, and of course as the moment of vision. But insofar as this ‘today’ has been interpreted in terms of future repetitive understanding of a possibility of existence which has been seized upon, authentic historiology becomes a way in which the ‘today’ gets deprived of its character as present; (...) But the ground on which authentic historiology is founded is temporality as the existential meaning of the being of care.”

Earlier it was noted that authentic being-with-others was what Heidegger called “leaping forth and liberating”, and I suggested that this described his thinking of Aristotle’s ῥηθευΞα in the context of the disclosure of care.

Although Heidegger does not work out any clear lines of demarcation between a large number of authentic as opposed to inauthentic ways of being, I believe, nevertheless, as suggested in the 2nd Chapter, that there are guidelines, signposts in Being and Time as to what constitutes authentic and inauthentic ways of being. Authenticity is in Heidegger’s admission “circular”, but the hermeneutic circle, if it is ontologically grasped, encompasses that which is fundamental to being human. Being human in Heidegger’s analysis is to be uncovering and maintaining being in the possibility of its uncoveredness, in its truth: trueing. The unity of the self is conceived in terms of the structure of authentic temporality, which is held in the past, future, and present in the ecstatical unity of the “moment of vision”.

I have argued that the project of Dasein and authenticity in Being and Time was first envisaged and prepared in Marburg with Heidegger’s inquiry into Aristotle’s research of factual being-in-the-world and the retrieval of an intrinsic ἀληθεύειν. In the Daseinsanalytik, ἀληθεύειν is the phenomenon that articulates the choice and appropriation of authentic possibilities for human existence.

Throughout this study I have shown that these possibilities constitute ways of being-in-the-world. Dasein’s retrieval and repetition of possibilities from the world is a making-true, a disclosing of one’s own ways of speaking, interpreting, understanding, acting and being, that enables one to work out, to disclose the truth of existence. These concrete possibilities come together to form the existential interconnection of an authentic existence that alone can bring human being to the source of truth: ἀληθεία.


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CONCLUSION

This study has proposed a reading of the phenomenological character of Aristotle’s thought in Heidegger’s own phenomenology. I have followed Heidegger’s attempt to retrieve and exhibit the phenomenon of \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \nu \) (to be disclosing, uncovering, making-true) in the inquiries on Aristotle’s teleology at Marburg and how this notion could also be said to articulate the concept of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time.

One way to understand the motives behind Heidegger’s encounter with the Aristotelian \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \nu \) was to point out the effort of understanding his own work to be informed by an implicit phenomenology in Greek thought (as exemplified by Aristotle) and how that phenomenology had become explicit in Being and Time. By retaining the original insight of Being and Time— that truth is \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \nu \)— and by reflecting deeply on the various determinations of Eigentlichkeit, I have approached Heidegger’s project from several perspectives.

In the first half, I have shown Heidegger’s research into Aristotelian notions from the Nicomachean Ethics, de Anima, and the Physics most of which were first explored by Heidegger before Being and Time in the Marburg period, and then retained in Being and Time, either transformed and remade under new conceptuality, or deposited in argumentative connections. The linguistic procedure presented a double challenge in exhibiting a phenomenological analysis of Aristotle’s notions in terms of Heidegger’s research into \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \nu \) and in the philosophical import of this theme for Heidegger’s ontological notions in the Daseinsanalytik.

In the second half, I have exhibited Aristotle’s modes of \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \nu \) as underlying the articulation of Heidegger’s concept of Eigentlichkeit in terms of two central planks of Being and Time A) Everydayness and Inauthenticity B) Authenticity and Being a Self.

In A) It was noted that Heidegger made use of his analysis of everydayness in Being and Time in order to reveal precisely the ‘everyday’ phenomenal basis upon which Aristotle thought of being even though Aristotle himself supposedly was not able to thematize and turns to him for help in this analysis. The question of the everyday \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \nu \) was addressed in Being and Time to a great extent as a
question concerning the theme of *Eigentlichkeit* in its potential form, that is, in the inauthentic ways of being.

I have shown the \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \omega \varepsilon \nu \) of everydayness: \( \tau \varepsilon \chi \nu \eta \) (know-how) and \( \pi \omega \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \sigma \iota \varsigma \) (production) and exhibited the specific concern-care structure of inauthenticity. I have argued that anxiety worked as a liberating-disclosive phenomenon that withdraws *Dasein* from its lostness in *das Man* (the ‘they’, world of everybody and nobody) and individuates it for the choice of authenticity, and have suggested that Heidegger was able to support his claim from what he read in Aristotle and made explicit in the analyses of his terms in his GA 18 course, namely by appealing to the Aristotelian \( \beta \omicron \upsilon \lambda \varepsilon \nu \sigma \iota \varsigma \) (anxiousness) and \( \pi \rho \sigma \alpha \iota \rho \varsigma \sigma \iota \varsigma \) (anticipatory choice), \( \pi \rho \acute{\alpha} \xi \varsigma \) (activity) and \( \kappa \iota \eta \zeta \sigma \iota \varsigma \) (motion) in the notion of *Angst*, *Jemenigkeit* and *Zeit*.

In B) I have suggested that all the structures of authenticity indicated were unified in one unitary structure which Heidegger progressively developed in the course of his analysis with ever more determinations worked out from the modes of \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \omega \varepsilon \nu \): \( \nu \omicron \varsigma \) (pure discernment) and \( \phi \rho \omicron \eta \sigma \iota \varsigma \) (practical wisdom/consciousness). A guiding assumption has been that when developing his notion of *Entschlossenheit* (resoluteness) Heidegger was in fact rethinking Aristotle’s concept of \( \kappa \iota \eta \zeta \sigma \iota \varsigma \).

I hope to have clarified into what extent Heidegger discovered in Aristotle a precursor of the phenomenological method that indicated to him (1) that phenomenology was the originary form of philosophy and (2) that all subsequent metaphysics was grounded phenomenologically, but was incapable of knowing why. Two basic insights of Aristotle’s provided Heidegger with an interpretative method both for Plato and for the pre-Socratics (Heraclitus, Parmenides): the first was that being is finite; the second was that although Aristotle’s understanding of time was not phenomenological in itself, it was grounded phenomenologically. The key to these notions is found on the first section of *Platon Sophistes* (GA19), *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (GA 18).

However, Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle and *Eigentlichkeit* themselves, could to some extent be regarded as a confirmation of the theme of \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \omega \varepsilon \nu \) and he also seems to have entertained this idea himself in the section on historicity. My idea has been that in the account of historicity Heidegger
presented \( \text{\textalpha\textlambda\texttau\textbeta\varepsilon\upsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\upsilon\nu} \) as a philosophical theme in its own right within his own ontology. The emergence of historicity appeared from the first chapter in which the reflection on Heidegger’s early courses on Aristotle and the study of Aristotle’s \( \text{\textalpha\textlambda\texttau\textbeta\varepsilon\upsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\upsilon\nu} \) in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity showed that, from the beginning, this was an investigation that brought out an historical and literary gain. Expressions such as “out of the heritage” “taking over” and “appropriating” demonstrate in Being and Time the need for revision of the historical/philosophical grounds of which Eigentlichkeit could be a part of, and a reflection on the labour of the research into Aristotle’s \( \text{\textalpha\textlambda\texttau\textbeta\varepsilon\upsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\upsilon\nu} \) at Marburg. Since the analysis of \( \text{\textalpha\textlambda\texttau\textbeta\varepsilon\upsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\upsilon\nu} \) and Eigentlichkeit was steered from the beginning towards the notion of historicity – within Heidegger’s project of examining the ‘historical’ presuppositions of Aristotle’s thought – we could also say that I was viewing Heidegger’s relationship to Aristotle through this angle both before and in Being and Time.

This investigation that, therefore, aimed at exhibiting the phenomenological nature of Aristotle’s thought that underlies and makes possible Heidegger’s own phenomenological description of Dasein was overdue.

I have attempted such a study because of the paramount importance of the impact that Heidegger’s discovery of an \( \text{\textalpha\textlambda\texttau\textbeta\varepsilon\upsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\upsilon\nu} \) underlying Aristotle’s research into being had in the ontological-existential account of the concept of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time.

In working out the concept of authenticity, Heidegger seeks to show that Dasein has the possibility of an authentic existence that can be made transparent by phenomenological reflection, thus arguing that his presuppositions are part of Dasein’s pre-ontological comprehension of his own being.

The phenomenology of Aristotle in Heidegger’s thought has the merit of raising the importance of authenticity, truth and finitude.

For this profound insight into reality as temporal-historical keeps Heidegger’s own phenomenology dynamic and open by reaffirming the need to go back to its foundations, to Aristotle. An original unveiling of human being’s own origins of being.

A new beginning:
It is necessary to surpass Aristotle – not in a forward direction in the sense of a progression, but rather backwards in the direction of a more original unveiling of what is comprehended by him.  

(AM, p. 69)
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