The Phenomenology of Aristotle in Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*: 
Άληθεύειν in the Development of the Concept of 
*Eigentlichkeit*

London, 2010
I hereby declare that this dissertation is entirely my own work except where specific acknowledgment is given to the work of other authors.

_________________________________
Miguel Santos Vieira
ABSTRACT

In the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger the quest for an existential analysis of Dasein is motivated by the awareness of Aristotle’s phenomenological nature of thought: its dependency upon its phenomenological possibilities. This study examines the early Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle’s άλθευειν in his inquiries at Marburg and the articulation of this notion in the concept of Eigentlichkeit in Sein und Zeit (1927). Turning to Aristotle’s analysis of φανόμενον and λόγος, Heidegger’s project in Marburg is taken to be driven by the ambition to retrieve and exhibit άλθευειν as the phenomenon that articulates the research on factical Dasein in the world. In undertaking this kind of phenomenological reflection, Heidegger is not trying merely to make his own situation transparent in relation to Aristotle, but he is also in fact reactivating the Greek (Aristotelian) sense of phenomenology retrieving Aristotle’s view on philosophical research. It is shown that the phenomenological description of Dasein to which Heidegger appeals in Being and Time is not a ‘project’ of his philosophy, but rather it arises as a possibility on the basis of the possibilities inherent in thinking (and so language) as such. In Sein und Zeit, the theme of Eigentlichkeit is situated from the beginning within Aristotle’s teleology and traced back to Aristotle’s understanding of life and πρόξεις, since it is based upon the phenomenon of άλθευειν as the basic trait of human activity. It is argued that the point in revealing the practical foundation of Aristotle’s modes of άλθευειν is essentially to find out what it means for Dasein to be a form of κίνησις that opens up the possibility of authenticity in human being. In this pursuit, it becomes possible not only to regard authenticity as a form of άλθευειν or articulative disclosing of being-in-the-world, but also as a temporal phenomenon whose origin is to be found in the Aristotelian κίνησις and νοῦς underlying its core notion: Entschlossenheit. On the basis of this concept it is argued that authenticity cannot be determined nor exhausted by being-towards-death but, rather, by the most far-reaching possibility of άλθευειν: historicity.
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Introductory Notes

1. Unless where otherwise indicated, all renderings in English from other languages are the author’s.

2. References to Heidegger’s writings are to the Gesamtausgabe (=GA) still under publication by Vittorio Klostermann. Exception is made to Sein und Zeit (=SZ) that refers to the original Max Niemeyer edition.

3. Due to space restrictions the original foreign language sources will not be quoted, but rather a reference is made in the footnotes to the author, work and page to which the translation refers.

4. When reference is made to a work more than once, it is indicated only with the title, abbreviated if necessary. Except in the case of Aristotle and Heidegger's works, all the titles are specified by the name of the author enabling one to trace the bibliographical details.

5. A full bibliographical reference is provided in the bibliography.
## Abbreviations

### Aristotle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Analytica Posteriora</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>De Anima</td>
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<tr>
<td>De Int</td>
<td>De Interpretatione</td>
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<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>Eudemian Ethics</td>
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<tr>
<td>META</td>
<td>Metaphysics</td>
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<td>NE</td>
<td>Nicomachean Ethics</td>
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<td>PHY</td>
<td>Physics</td>
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<td>POL</td>
<td>Politics</td>
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<td>RT</td>
<td>Rhetoric</td>
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### Heidegger:

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<thead>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Summer Semester Course</td>
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<td>WS</td>
<td>Winter Semester Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>Gesamtasugabe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SZ</td>
<td>Sein und Zeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Aristoteles: Metaphysik Θ 1-3 – Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>Einführung in die Metaphysik</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPF</td>
<td>Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie</td>
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<td>GAPH</td>
<td>Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie</td>
</tr>
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<td>GM</td>
<td>Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit</td>
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<td>GP</td>
<td>Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie</td>
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<td>HZ</td>
<td>Holzwege</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPM</td>
<td>Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFW</td>
<td>Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIA</td>
<td>Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles</td>
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PGZ  Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs
PRL  Phänomenologie des Religiösen Lebens
PS   Platon: Sophistes
WBP  Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις, Aristoteles Physik B, 1.
US   Unterwegs zur Sprache
WHD  Was heißt Denken?
WM   Wegmarken
“We have all read in scientific books, and, indeed, in all romances, the story of the man who has forgotten his name. This man walks about the streets and can see and appreciate everything; only he cannot remember who he is. Well, every man is that man in the story. Every man has forgotten who he is. One may understand the cosmos, but never the ego; the self is more distant than any star. […] We are all under the same mental calamity; we have all forgotten our names. We have all forgotten what we really are. All that we call common sense and rationality and practicality and positivism only means that for certain dead levels of our lives we forget that we have forgotten. All that we call spirit and art and ecstasy only means that for an awful instant we remember that we forget.”

INTRODUCTION

I. The clarification of ἀληθεύειν as a central philosophical task

This study explores Heidegger’s early attempt to provide philosophy with a new beginning by addressing, explicitly, the legacy of Aristotle, regarded as the philosophical origin, which philosophy cannot avoid confronting without remaining naive with respect to its own foundation. Heidegger’s project will be considered here with respect to how it retrieves and exhibits Aristotle’s notion of ἀληθεύειν (to be disclosing, making-true) in the inquiries on Aristotle’s teleology at Marburg and how this notion is reflected in the concept of Eigentlichkeit (authenticity) in Being and Time (1927).

I have chosen to narrow down Heidegger/Aristotle’s research to two key terms ἀληθεύειν and Eigentlichkeit, rather than select Heidegger’s general ontological problematic, his interpretations of other philosophers, or some of the anthropological themes in his work, since these two key terms – ἀληθεύειν and Eigentlichkeit – comprise the fundamental philosophical questions, the essential connection of the presence of Aristotle in Heidegger’s thinking and Heidegger’s retrieval, interpretation and transformation of Aristotle in Being and Time: the problematic of ὃν ὡς ἀληθές (being as true/unconcealed) in the research on factual being in the world.

There exist concerns today for the problems of truth and authenticity, self-transformation and autonomy. A close analysis of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in his early 1920s Marburg Courses – namely an examination of the notion of ἀληθεύειν in de Anima, Rhetoric, de Interpretatione and the Nicomachean Ethics, and in particular the way in which that interpretation was reflected in Being and Time (1927) – has much to contribute to the philosophical clarification of these problems and mankind’s concern for authenticity.
Since I am aiming to relate Heidegger’s research on Aristotle’s \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \) in Marburg and the way he takes Aristotle’s thought to \textit{Being and Time}, this analysis must be guided by an encompassing theme from both periods. \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \) and \textit{Eigentlichkeit} are the two culminating notions of Heidegger’s research on Aristotle at Marburg and in \textit{Being and Time}, respectively. The interpretation of \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \) is a central issue in the early 1920s Marburg courses and in the development of the theme of \textit{Eigentlichkeit} in \textit{Being and Time} insofar as it can tell Heidegger something basic about the broader notion of \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \alpha \) (unconcealment) both as an ontic condition – \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \alpha \) and \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon - \) and as a human performance, \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \) as a power of \( \psi \nu \chi \eta \) (soul).

In 1922, Heidegger wrote a lengthy introduction to a book on Aristotle which he was planning for publication. In his “Afterword” to the 1989 publication of the long misplaced Heidegger manuscript of 1922 entitled “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation),” Hans-Ulrich Lessing reports that this text was submitted to Marburg and Göttingen as part of Heidegger’s application for teaching positions at both universities. Theodore Kisel says of this manuscript: “... we have before us the nuclear structure of the book \textit{Being and Time}, or more precisely, of the \textit{Daseinsanalytik} which is to serve as a fundamental ontology.” The manuscript sent to Paul Nathorp, who eventually hired Heidegger in Marburg in the summer of 1923, had been lost by Gadamer in an air raid during World War II and was not discovered until 1989. Heidegger scholars in the United States, Thomas Sheehan and Theodore Kisel are responsible for finding the manuscript. What specifically concerns Heidegger in this text is the movement of the practical disclosure in Aristotle, \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \) and its significance to the research on \textit{Dasein}.

In an enlightening remark appended to the recently discovered summary of Heidegger’s planned treatise to \textit{PLA} Theodore Kisel and Thomas Sheehan state that:

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1 Fridolin Wiplinger in his study on truth, \textit{Wahrheit und Geschichtlichkeit: Eine Untersuchungen über die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit im Denken Martin Heidegger}, makes a similar point that ‘being-true’ as ‘being-uncovering’ (\( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \)) is not merely the meaning of a term but a way of being of \textit{Dasein:} as \textit{ontic} – the to-be-in-the-world of \textit{Dasein} as uncovering of beings within the world; as \textit{existential} – the articulated structural unity of to-be-in-the-world as disclosing of existence; and as \textit{ontological} – the unity of ‘disclosing’ and ‘closing off’.

“The outstanding new interpretation in this survey of Aristotelian texts [sc. Nicomachean Ethics, VI, Metaphysics I and II; Physics I, II, III] is Heidegger’s very first full account of factic (finite) truth understood as a process of ‘un-concealment.’ Heidegger refers in his overview to this treatise that ‘The aletheuein does not mean to ‘take possession of the truth’ in usurpation, but to take it in trust for conservation, to take the intended being into the safekeeping of habitual truth as unveiled’.”

In a series of explanatory notes in his translation of a typescript made by an unknown auditor of Heidegger’s 1924 Cologne Address, discovered by Thomas Sheehan among the papers of Heidegger’s student Franz Joseph Brecht, Brian Hansford Bowles refers to ἀληθεύειν as “the most fundamental and highest form of uncovering that reveals and maintains an entity [being] in its ἀρχή and τέλος. Thus, in the most proper sense, uncovering an entity in its being means revealing it and understanding it as it always already is. And what is in the fullest sense is also what can be uncovered in the most proper sense.”

Heidegger refers in his 1924 Cologne speech that:

“Ἀληθεύειν refers to a mode of being that Dasein is such that Dasein uncovers itself and maintains it in this discoveredness. ἀληθεύειν means being-disposed [Gestellsein] toward something and that entails ἐπιστασθαι, that is, being-placed with something in such a way that you see it.”

This idea is further developed in the WS 1924/25 Marburg lecture course, Platon: Sophistes (GA 19):

“Insofar as disclosure and knowledge have for the Greeks the goal of ἀληθεύειν, the Greeks designate them as ἀληθεύειν, i.e., designate them in terms of what is achieved in them, ἀληθεύειν. We do not intend to translate this word, ἀληθεύειν. It means to be disclosing, to remove the world from concealment and coveredness. And that is the mode of being of human Dasein.”

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3 Sheehan, Kisiel, Becoming Heidegger – On the Trail of his Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927, pp. 175, 176.
4 Sheehan, Kisiel, Becoming Heidegger – On the Trail of his Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927, p. 218. This communication is still forthcoming in GA80 so we only have access to the English version of a transcript made by an unknown auditor of the speech, which as Kisiel refers, p. 214, “was discovered by Thomas Sheehan in typescript form among the holdings of Heidegger’s early student, Franz Joseph Brecht”
5 Sheehan, Kisiel, Becoming Heidegger – On the Trail of his Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927, p. 228.
6 PS, p. 17, (my italics).
The same expression appears in a more general form two years afterwards in 1926 right before the publication of *Being and Time* (1927) when Heidegger gives a talk on Pentecost Monday. Credit is due in this particular case to Kisiel who recently discovered this talk among the holdings of the Helene Weiss Archive at the Stanford University Library and realized that “the dated record of page proofs and galleys shuttling between Heidegger’s pen in Todtnauberg and Marburg and the printers in Halle shows that he [Heidegger] was at this time just finalizing the very last section of the First Division, section 44 entitled “Dasein, Disclosedness and Truth” (SZ 212-30), for the printer”.⁷ This piece of information provides valuable evidence regarding the philosophical place of ἀλήθευμα in Heidegger’s research of Aristotle in Marburg but most of all it permits Heidegger to work out the *Daseinsanalytik* and present the concept of authenticity in *Being and Time*. For in this talk Heidegger, as indicated above, seems to expand the definition of ἀλήθευμα into the analytic of *Dasein* in that:

“The Dasein is therefore, inasmuch as it is according to its essence in the world, discovering. It has, in various degrees of distinction-and-articulation [Deutlichkeit], discovered the beings around it. The Dasein is, insofar as it defined by being-in-the-world and in accord with its proper essence, discovering. *Subject – Dasein – Being-in-the-world-discovert*ing: it already sees and has already always sighted other beings that it itself is not. *The Dasein is discovering: this is the authentic and proper sense of truth. Truth means nothing but being discovering!* It is not an arbitrary definition selected at random. The sense of truth as being-uncovering [ἀλήθευμα] is nothing other than the sense of truth as the Greeks understood it: ἀλήθεια, unconcealment (λήθη, the concealed).”⁸

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger points to the pre-phenomenological insight, contained in the Greek word for truth, ἀλήθεια, used by Aristotle:

“The ἀλήθεια which Aristotle equates with πράγμα and φανομένα, (...) signifies the ‘things themselves’; it signifies what shows itself – beings in the ‘how’ of their uncoveredness.”⁹

⁹ SZ, p. 219.
Hence the term ‘truth’ is not founded on the structure of an “agreement” between the knower and the known; it is best expressed by such terms like ‘unconcealment’ or ‘un-hiddenness’ (Unverborgenheit). Being-true (Wahrsein) means, ‘being-uncovering’ (Entdecken), to be disclosing, making-true. For Heidegger the clue to any such discussion of ἄληθευσιν and the means to work it out, ἄληθευσειν, remains the question of λόγος and it is through this question that he starts working out the modes of ἄληθευσειν in Marburg (GA 17, 18, 19) in reference to Aristotle’s works such as de Anima, Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics, and takes his findings into his own Daseinsanalytik, namely in the theme of Eigentlichkeit.

II. AIM AND STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT STUDY

Heidegger’s preoccupation with the question of ἄληθευσειν in Aristotle can be described as a prelude to the project of fundamental ontology, inquiring into how we speak about being, into our modes of being in the world in order to finally get at the meaning of being as such. This farther-reaching ontological perspective will be kept in view in this study through the relation of Heidegger’s inquiry into the modes of ἄληθευσειν with the concept of Eigentlichkeit.

When treating the problem of ἄληθευσειν as intimately connected with an ontological disclosure of Dasein, one inevitably comes across the question of time or temporality in Heidegger and Aristotle, not least when considering Heidegger’s suspicion that Aristotle’s understanding of being as a whole may ultimately be traced back to the assumption that being in the true sense is present, finished being. Throughout this study, I will touch upon the temporal implications of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle, but I will not address temporality as a theme in its own right until the last chapter.

Also, it is not my intention to produce a comparative study, which is not to say that comparisons will be wholly absent, but as my primary aim is to explore Heidegger’s thought, especially in Being and Time, Aristotle is from the beginning situated in the context of Heidegger’s philosophy. The scope of this study is mainly...
restricted to Heidegger’s works on Aristotle from the 1920s, since almost all of his lectures on Aristotle as a whole belong to this decade. Practically all of Heidegger’s lecture courses during this period involve a confrontation with Aristotle to a greater or lesser extent, and the presence of Aristotle can be felt even in those works where he is not explicitly mentioned. For this reason, the study covers nearly all Heidegger’s writings from this period. But of particular importance are the two extensive courses *Platon: Sophistes* (GA 19) (1924/25) and the recently published *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (GA 18) from the previous semester. I also make use of a text published in 2005 *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Ontologie und Logik*, which was delivered in 1922. This lecture course preserves the same basic tendency as Heidegger’s other courses on Aristotle during this period, since it too tries to make clear how Aristotle’s ontology is related to his understanding of life. The overall orientation of both these courses is to explore Aristotle’s works as phenomenological investigations into different aspects of life, but also to draw out their ontological presuppositions. The same strategy can be found in what is known as the Aristotle introduction written in 1922, *Phänomenologischen Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)*, which is the first text Heidegger devoted to Aristotle.

Accordingly, my interpretation primarily concerns Heidegger’s encounter with Aristotle during the Marburg period, when the project of fundamental ontology is being developed, and the presence of Aristotle in *Being and Time*, and it is not my intention to exhaust all the views that Heidegger ever held on Aristotle. However, since it is not my aim to give a chronological exposition of Heidegger’s thought, i.e. to trace a development or perhaps a change in Heidegger’s views on Aristotle, I make appeal to later texts whenever they are beneficial to my argument or seem to throw light on Heidegger’s earlier position, either in the Marburg courses or *Being and Time*, thus assuming that the later works are not opposed to the earlier ones to such an extent that they must be kept strictly apart and out of reach of this research. For the truth is that when it comes to Heidegger’s understanding of

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11 It is above all to one later text that interests me, as it is concerned with key notions of Aristotle’s teleology that operate in the concept of *Eigentlichkeit: Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φυσική*, *Aristoteles Physik B, I*, (GA 9).
Aristotle, it is not easy to delimit a homogeneous ‘early’ view that could be contrasted with a later position, let alone *Being and Time*. The ambiguity that Heidegger locates in Aristotle is reflected in Heidegger’s interpretation, causing it to point at least in two directions: one which puts emphasis on what Heidegger regards as Aristotle’s metaphysics of presence and the primacy of propositional thought, seeing this as the final target of the destruction of the history of ontology and logic; and the other which concentrates on the phenomenological character of Aristotle’s thought, receiving from it the means to pursue this destruction.

I hope not to over-simplify Heidegger’s philosophy, nor to dilute Aristotle in Heidegger or vice-versa, or cover up the ‘inflammable content’ of Heidegger’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence. Although I wish to relate the connection of the ἀληθεύειν with *Eigentlichkeit* to the current World/European philosophical concerns and our contemporary social predicament, I would also certainly like to call attention to Heidegger’s thinking that challenges our philosophical presuppositions, as for example, when the ἀληθεύειν at stake in *Dasein’s Eigentlichkeit* puts into question an entire tradition of commentators that reduce *Eigentlichkeit* to *Sein-zum-Tode* (being-towards-death). I would also certainly not gloss over the challenges of truth and authenticity to our everyday sense of the self, the social conformist tendencies, our inauthenticity with which Heidegger confronts us. Indeed, one of the possible benefits of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is his calling into question our common view of our being-in-the-world.

In this study I will strive for a clear, comprehensible presentation of Heidegger’s sometimes difficult and deep analyses and the highly ontological interpretation of Aristotle’s thinking. A close examination of the Greek sources in comparison with Heidegger’s own interpretation of them will be essential to understand in what sense Aristotle and Heidegger each think about the meaning of being. The difficulties in reading and interpreting Aristotle along with Heidegger’s own interpretation of Aristotle are notorious. One must first wrestle with his language. Heidegger’s terminology is complex and very deeply embedded in the German language. Heidegger’s inquiries into being are inextricably bound up with a reflection on language. The linguistic peculiarities of Heidegger constitute a formidable obstacle not only to us foreign readers, but have evoked rather sharp
and sometimes deprecatory comment from German scholars themselves. Some categories are borrowed from classical philosophical sources, namely Aristotle, and re-coined in his own vocabulary; other concepts are his own neologisms, or common usage words which he has chosen to develop into philosophical concepts. As is well known, Heidegger works closely with words, their meanings and etymologies, and often he will try to retrieve a forgotten meaning, a hidden significance of a word which currently has a different sense. Heidegger’s vast array of coined translations of the Greek, plus abstract terms, employing circumlocutions, hyphenated phrases, the use of paradox, the fusion of heterogeneous linguistic elements, the use of compound terms not in common use, compound words broken up into their component parts and abstract nouns made out of words of almost every other part of speech, could be thought to be part of a private language, a system of thought designed to scandalize. Conversely one can see that these new words only serve the purpose of illuminating the phenomena dug out in the analyses and painfully gathered into a concept. Heidegger’s neologisms and the novelty of his technical vocabulary are precisely meant to force the reader away from the accustomed way of categorical thinking in terms of the conceptual framework appropriated from the Greeks by the metaphysicians of modern subjectivism. This is meant to avoid the traditional terms suggestive of the ‘essentialist’ ontology of the object (vorhanden). Often Heidegger requires to be read literally. This is a way of reading which cannot be taken as a matter of course, for one generally reads otherwise. Sometimes, we read with a view to orientation so that we may acquaint ourselves with the thoughts of another. Often we “skip”, even preferring to read “between” the lines. We content ourselves with getting just an idea of what the author is trying to convey. The requirement that, now,

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12 Heidegger explains in SZ, pp. 38, 39, that “with respect to the lack of pliancy [Ungefüge] and the ‘uncouthness’ of expression in the analyses that follow, we may add the remark that it is one thing to narrate accounts of beings, but another to comprehend the being in its being. For the latter task we not only mostly lack the words but, above all, the ‘grammar’. If it is permissible to refer to earlier, on their level incomparable, researches on the analysis of being, one may compare the ontological sections of Plato’s Parmenides, or the fourth chapter of the seventh book of the Metaphysics of Aristotle with a narrative piece from Thucydides; one will see the unprecedented and outrageous character of the formulations which were imposed upon the Greeks by their philosophers. And where (as in our case) the powers are comparatively feeble and where, moreover, the domain of being to be disclosed is ontologically far more difficult than that which confronted the Greeks, the circumstantiality of concept formation and the heaviness and roughness of expression are bound to increase still further.”
Heidegger and Aristotle are to be read literally means just the opposite of such reading. Not that we have to linger on words as in the case of a piece of writing of which the objective precision motivates a literal reading; here, by reading the Greek along with Heidegger’s German and expressing it into English requires us to pay attention to a word in respect of what, as a word, it signifies or conveys. For Heidegger, “The word does not merely name, and so enable us to have it in our grasp, our already represented present reality (or being), it is not merely a means to the depiction of something given. On the contrary, it is the word which first of all bestows presence, that is, being, in which anything appears as a being.”

This intricate linguistic procedure makes the translation of Heidegger and Aristotle into appropriate English an important but problematic procedure. I will therefore make special effort to render Heidegger’s and Aristotle’s particular idioms and their correlations into viable English and attempt to provide a detailed philosophical elucidation of the key terms that Heidegger analyses in Aristotle’s texts, and to cross-relate these to the texts themselves with a view to distinguish between special Heideggerian senses from their ordinary senses or from the senses intended by other thinkers and translators. This procedure, if we like, would consistently show how Heidegger was reading Aristotle, and how he was transforming this reading in the development of his own phenomenology. I would like to indicate where I believe Heidegger would disagree with some of the classical Aristotle translations of Sir David Ross, Charlston or Tredennick.

The second problem the Anglo-European reader faces in confronting Heidegger and Aristotle is the philosophical framework and background of Being and Time. Heidegger was heavily steeped in Greek, Medieval, and German philosophy, in Husserl’s phenomenology, and in the themes of what we may today call ‘existentialism’. In this regard, the concept of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time has a privileged position, because, as I aim to show, it can more readily elucidate the problems involved in the basic orientations of being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Seins).

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In Chapter One, I give a survey of the relationship between Heidegger and Aristotle in order to locate Aristotle within Heidegger’s philosophical project, and also to indicate the philosophical background to the question of ἀλήθευσιν as a philosophical theme in Heidegger. The idea that it is, above all, ontology that makes up albeit the basic point of contact between Heidegger and Aristotle has been questioned during the last two decades. According to Robert Bernasconi’s testimony, in the middle of the 1980s “a number of scholars, working largely independently of each other, began to discover Aristotle’s Ethics in Being and Time”, the scholars being among others, Theodore Kisiel, Thomas Sheehan, Franco Volpi, Jacques Taminiaux, John van Buren and Walter Brogan. The discovery of Aristotle’s influence on Heidegger according to Friedrich von-Hermann (personal communication, Freiburg, 2000) seems to have been made possible initially by the circulation of student notes of the then still unpublished ‘Sophist Lectures’. In the first stage of his inquiry Heidegger aims to bring into question the relation between φανόμενον and λόγος in order to bring to light Aristotle’s phenomenological inquiry on being as a research on factical being-in-the-world. Heidegger cannot directly turn to Aristotle himself, for Aristotle’s account of λόγος is accessible only on the basis of a confrontation with the received scholastic view on this topic. As regards this view, Aristotle is, if not the originator, then at least a major proponent of a theoretical ideal of cognition, according to which assertion is the primary mode of λόγος since it is the basic element of truth and knowledge. However, Heidegger is not entirely prepared to ascribe this understanding to Aristotle himself, since he thinks that it has its origin in a specific – and insufficient – interpretation of Aristotle. The overall aim of this chapter is to show how Heidegger tries to question this view as an interpretation of Aristotle. His basic argument is that, when analysing the assertion in terms of σύνθεσις (positing together) and διαίρεσις (taking apart) Aristotle has managed to point out a feature of human understanding as such, namely its discursivity or the ‘as-structure’. On the basis of this claim, Heidegger argues that assertoric speaking as theoretical articulation presupposes an unthematic mode of understanding and articulation which is therefore thought to make up a more basic level of human being’s speaking: ἀλήθευσιν. Thus, Chapter One has a somewhat introductory character.
The following three chapters each deal with the presence of ἀληθεύειν in the theme and interpretation of Eigentlichkeit at three levels: everydayness and inauthenticity, resoluteness and authenticity, historicity and being-a-self. Each chapter is organized into three main points. Having began with the notion of λόγος as initially accessible or with respect to how it has been interpreted traditionally, the investigation then proceeds to an analysis of the structure of ἀληθεύειν constituting every mode of speaking under consideration in chapter VI of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. On the basis of this analysis, one could ask what kind of access to being and truth is admitted by the specific ἀληθεύειν at stake in the possibility of Eigentlichkeit. To some extent this is the order of the two main chapters of the second half of the research, so that each of them represents one of the three points enumerated above.

Accordingly, Chapter Two centres on Heidegger’s account of Uneigentlichkeit (inauthenticity) in Being and Time with what in his view is the traditional or common understanding of λόγος. It will be shown how Heidegger makes use of his analysis of everydayness in order to reveal precisely the ‘everyday’ phenomenal basis of Aristotle’s understanding of λόγος ἀληθεύειν which Aristotle himself supposedly was not able to thematize, and simultaneously turns to Aristotle for help in this analysis. The question of the everyday ἀληθεύειν is therefore opened up through λόγος and will be treated here to a great extent as a question concerning the theme of Eigentlichkeit in its potential form, that is, in the inauthentic ways of being. Heidegger’s preoccupation with the pre-theoretical, everyday ἀληθεύειν is therefore exhibited in Being and Time under the mode of inauthenticity worked out from an ontological re-reading of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν: ποιήσις (production), τέχνη (know-how) and the notion of δόξα (opinion) discussed under the heading of “concern” (Besorgen).

Having opened up the theme of Eigentlichkeit I will present its interpretation in Chapter Three. The task in this Chapter is to provide an interpretation of Heidegger’s Eigentlichkeit from Aristotle’s main traits of εὐδαιμονία (happiness, man’s proper being), φρόνησις (practical wisdom/consciousness), βουλευτική ὀρεξίς (deliberate desire) and νοῦς (pure apprehension) in the Nicomachean Ethics so that it may be shown how Aristotle understands these notions philosophically and in what ways Aristotle helps Heidegger to think through (and
in some cases to forge the ontological/temporal conceptuality of authenticity such as 

Die Sorge (care) and its modes – Besorgen (concern), Fürsorge (solicitude), Zu-Sein (has-to-be) Sein-können (potentiality-of-being-a-self) Worumwillen (for-the-sake-of-which). Bringing together the modes of Eigentlichkeit and Aristotle’s πράξεις (activities) it becomes possible not only to regard authenticity as a form of ἀλήθευσις or articulative disclosing of being-in-the-world, but also to think of Eigentlichkeit along the lines of action, that is, to see in Heidegger’s account of Eigentlichkeit a temporal/ontological perspective opened up by the interplay of νοῦς and Entschlossenheit (resoluteness) in human being, interpreting these in terms of κίνησις, (movement/temporality). Therefore, this chapter leads to Heidegger’s interpretation of Eigentlichkeit as a reinterpretation and transformation of Aristotle’s νοῦς as the very own possibility of ἀλήθευσις. I argue that by re-reading Aristotle’s κίνησις and the retrieval of φρόνησις, Heidegger is able to work out his concept of Entschlossenheit that articulates his account of authenticity. Within this context, I hope to supplement previous interpretations (Sartre, Biswanger, Löwith, Marcuse, Buber) that reduce the concept of Eigentlichkeit to Sein-zum-Tode (being-towards-death).

When the nature of Eigentlichkeit has been further elucidated from its underlying νοῦς ὡς ἀλήθευσις it should be possible to approach the question concerning historicity and its mode of speaking. Heidegger’s philosophical pursuit of Aristotle’s ἀλήθευσις in Being and Time becomes properly understood and clear to us as a theme in its own right in connection with Historicity. This is the task of Chapter Four. In this final chapter, having dwelt at length on the central Heideggerian themes in the concept of Eigentlichkeit and exhibited the correspondences with Aristotle’s modes of ἀλήθευσις, my main concern is to get to the ‘wholeness’ of Heidegger’s existential analysis of Dasein, that culminates itself in the notion of historicity. I argue that Heidegger’s analysis of authentic historicity yields an authenticity of self-transformation as regards its being-a-whole retrieved through ἀλήθευσις. The analysis of historicity will show the philosophical scope of ἀλήθευσις in Heidegger’s account of Eigentlichkeit. What is specifically at stake in this last paragraph on ‘Historicity’ is the situation of the understanding appropriation of the past in the situation of a living present. Since the analysis of ἀλήθευσις and Eigentlichkeit are steered to the notion of
historicity and the return to Aristotle, I can as well say that I am viewing Heidegger’s relationship to Aristotle through this crowning theme.

PART ONE
CHAPTER ONE

1. **DECONSTRUCTING DASEIN: HEIDEGGER’S PROJECT AND ITS RELATION TO ARISTOTLE**

a) The question of \( \lambda \gamma \omega \zeta \) in the articulation of *Dasein* in the early Heidegger

In the following I will examine closely the phenomenological core which impacted upon the confrontation of Heidegger and Aristotle considerably at a particular moment, that is, during the ten year period of silence which precedes the publication of *Being and Time* and which coincides with the years of the first teaching at Freiburg (1919-1923) and those with the teaching at Marburg (1923/1928). My aim in this section is twofold: firstly, to ask to what extent Heidegger’s position regarding \( \lambda \gamma \omega \zeta \) in *Being and Time* is a follow up of his reflections on \( \lambda \gamma \omega \zeta \) at Marburg in the early 1920s and secondly, how Heidegger understands and interprets the character of human life – that is the metaphysical/scholastic tradition of thought under the determination of \( \lambda \gamma \omega \zeta \) and judgement – by showing the importance and the meaning to which the tradition is assigned, and at the same time, Heidegger claims, covered over as \( \lambda \gamma \omega \zeta \). From here I hope to demonstrate how the phenomenological method to which Heidegger makes appeal in the analytic of *Dasein* (1927) is not a ‘project’ of his philosophy, but that it arises as a possibility on the basis of the possibilities inherent in thinking (and so language) as such, that Heidegger started to explore in the early 1920s Marburg Courses on Aristotle.
In the university course on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* given by Heidegger at Marburg in the SS of 1924 (GA 18) – which opens with a celebrated line of Aristotle’s biography, “Once upon a time he [Aristotle] was born, he worked and then he died”\(^\text{14}\) – we find a surprising translation of the Aristotelian definition of Man as a living being which has λόγος. Heidegger translates the celebrated formula ζῷον λόγον ἔχουν – which the romans had translated to *animal rationale* – in these terms: ‘Man is a living being that reads newspapers’.\(^\text{15}\) He adds some remarks that explicate and clarify this provocative statement: “The Greeks exist in the word, speaking” and their “fundamental determination of the being of Man is to be-with-one-another (das Miteinandersein)”, brought by λόγος.”\(^\text{16}\) In the course of the preceding WS 1923/4 course, Heidegger states that “the ability to address and discuss what was encountered (world and self), something that does not need to be philosophy, he [Aristotle] characterizes it as a being a human being: λόγον ἔχειν”\(^\text{17}\). In nearly all the following courses Heidegger, as I aim to show, concentrates his efforts to grasp Aristotle’s understanding of λόγος within the framework of a phenomenological understanding of human life.

Heidegger’s translation of λόγος does not fail to provoke. This paradoxical and seemingly anachronistic translation of λόγος orientates the reader towards a word to be thought toward. How to translate λόγος? I have suggested the possible translation of “speaking” but can we translate it differently? ‘Language’, ‘Word’, ‘Reason’, ‘Thought’? Rather than to exhaust every possible translation of this term from Greek language to contemporary vocabulary, Heidegger invites us to follow his own thinking of λόγος as the specific articulation of human life.

In the following I would like to show how the question of λόγος – as the specific articulation of human life – made thematic for the first time in the philosophical programme of *Being and Time*, is interplayed with the analyses made in Marburg and that this account is offered not without a critical positioning toward the metaphysical tradition. I will merely enunciate the following issues on λόγος that will be exhibited in more detail later in this section when I survey the previous literature on Heidegger’s relation to Aristotle and confront the relevant steps from

\(^{14}\) GAP, p. 5.
\(^{15}\) GAP, p. 108.
\(^{16}\) GAP, p.108.
\(^{17}\) EPF, p. 18.
Aristotle’s *de Interpretatione*, *de Anima* and *Peri Hermeneias* with Heidegger’s Marburg courses (GA 17, 18, 21) and *Being and Time* and the passages from the 1929/30 Freiburg course where why find a detailed explication of λόγος.

Therefore, in the following and in the overall structure of the first part of this study I will merely elaborate an examination of those aspects that are recurrent in the early Marburg courses on Aristotle before attempting to show how they are at work in Heidegger’s account of the existential analytic of Dasein – specifically in the concept Eigentlichkeit in *Being and Time*, to be dealt with and explicated in relation to Heidegger’s findings on λόγος in Chapter 2 (*The Fall into das Man and Inauthenticity*) of this study.

I will specifically examine Heidegger’s claims that support his contention – made explicit in *Being and Time* – that the metaphysical tradition has restricted and reduced λόγος to its propositional and categorical dimension, by attributing the primacy to λόγος ἀποφαντικός, hence to predication and judgement and in what ways this reduced the determination of the λόγον ἔχον to animal rationale. ¹⁸

I will focus on the following claims:

1) Every definition, as a theoretical enunciation, submits human life to a categorical grasp that never succeeds to apprehend it as totality – since every definition requires a discursive articulation and a categorical net that divides, shares and analyses its object without thinking of the whole as such.

2) Determining the specific character of Man as λόγος means to assign to the ‘highest modes of knowledge’ the central part in the comprehension of human life. This led the tradition to assign a predominance of θεωρία over πράξις, as the cognitive attitude on which Man could be thought of as λόγος (not as speaking, but as reason or judgment, as an extant state of affairs) and consequently leading to a predominance of presence (constant, objective presence) as the mode of being which better conveyed the theoretical attitude.

The general argument that Heidegger gives to substantiate his critical position toward the traditional determination of λόγος – and I merely indicate it now – is that all concepts and traditional definitions of λόγος are insufficient to grasp the

¹⁸ A refusal Heidegger shares with Kant – who thinks the humanity of Man is determined neither by its animality (Tierheit) nor by its rationality (Vernünftigkeit) but by its spirituality (Geistigkeit) – and one that brings Heidegger nearer, one could claim, at least from a programmatic point of view, of the philosophical anthropology outlined by Max Scheler in the conference *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 9, Zurich and Munich, Francke Verlag, 1976.
essence of Man without reducing it to one object amongst many others. The traditional determination of Man as \( \zeta\omicron \omicron \omicron \ \lambda\omicron \omicron \nu \ \epsilon\chi\omicron\nu \) is oblivious to the movement (Bewegtheit) proper to human life. In his philosophical programme Heidegger aims to show that \( \lambda\omicron \gamma\omicron\omicron \zeta \) originally means a comprehension of Man (\( \zeta\omicron \omicron \omicron \nu \)) in terms of \( \text{Dasein} \), in his existence, and not in terms of a scientific/theoretical consideration. In other words, an understanding of human being in the specific mode of disclosure of its being and, therefore, not in terms of \( \lambda\omicron \gamma\omicron\omicron \zeta \) as a category that remains tied to a theoretical consideration of being and beings worked from the consideration of nature and beings. These traditional approach is tied to an understanding of being as constant presence and the corresponding primacy of the theoretical attitude that merely observes and describes the specific movement of human life, reifying and truncating thereby the original dynamic of \( \pi\rho\alpha\varsigma\iota\varsigma \) (activity).

Before developing these points I will trace back the arguments deployed by Aristotle and proceed to Heidegger’s reading of these arguments in order to delineate the proper and necessary philosophical context for understanding ultimately what is at stake in the notion of \( \lambda\omicron \gamma\omicron\omicron \zeta \), both for Aristotle and Heidegger, in an effort to see how they are best utilized within Heidegger’s research program in \textit{Being and Time}.

\begin{enumerate}
\item[b)] \textit{Dasein} as revealing-being (\( \psi\upsilon\chi\eta \ \omicron \zeta \ \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\nu \)) and the determination of \( \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\nu \)
\end{enumerate}

In the understanding of human life – taken into account in the philosophical program of the early Heidegger in the 1920s and under different titles: ‘originary theoretical science’, ‘hermeneutics of facticity’, ‘analytic of existence’, in the hope of avoiding the risk of a reifying categorical comprehension – Heidegger avoids a definition of \textit{Dasein} using Aristotle’s terminology of \( \lambda\omicron \gamma\omicron\omicron \zeta \) but rather attempts to establish new determinations specific to \textit{Dasein} that he calls “existentials”, so that he distinguishes them from the traditional ones.\textsuperscript{19} Some fundamental questions in

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{SZ}, pp. 44-45, “All explicata to which the analytic of \textit{Dasein} gives rise are obtained by considering \textit{Dasein}’s structure of existence. Because \textit{Dasein}’s characters of being are determined in
need of clarification arise: if Heidegger seems to be so dismissive of the tradition, why is he so insistent on preserving so many themes of the tradition in terms of his own ilk in *Being and Time*? Why have Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle and of the ‘basic words’ of philosophy such as ἀληθεία, ϕαινόμενον, λόγος or φύσις drawn the wrath of classical scholars, orthodox ‘academic’ philosophers and theologians alike? Moreover, Heidegger’s orientation to Aristotle is unavoidably at variance with the way Aristotle has been interpreted by renowned scholars, like Sir David Ross or Werner Jaeger.

Taking the year 1919 as the starting point for Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle – indicated by Heidegger in his autobiographical essay – I find the analyses of λόγος and ὁν ώς ἀληθείς to be a central theme in Heidegger’s output in the Marburg period up to the existential analytic of *Being and Time* and even beyond: the 1929/30 courses also offer an important analysis of λόγος with a reference to Aristotle’s *de Interpretatione*.

Concerning the texts from the Marburg period, among which GA 17, 18 and 19, Heidegger grasps the role of language in the interpretation of *Dasein* out of his orientation towards the Aristotelian determination of λόγος, interpreting λόγος as an oppeness and a privileged access to being. This purpose is integrated in an analysis of the multiple senses of being namely an analysis of the ὁν ώς ἀληθείς orientated to the fundamental question of the unitary meaning of being designated by the formula τὸ ὁν λέγεται πολλαχῶς. The analysis of being in the sense terms of existentiality, we call them existentialia. These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call categories”, “Existentialia and categories are the two fundamental possibilities for characters of being.”]. The notion ‘existentielen’ appears throughout SZ in pp. 54, 57, 64, 87, 88, 106, 110, 111, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 129, 130, 134, 137, 139, 142, 143, 144, 152, 160, 161, 162, 163, 196, 199, 200, 226, 304 and 332.

20 Only bare mention of a few names in this context can be made here: P. Friendländer and G. Krüger on the interpretation of ἀληθεία, of Plato and Greek philosophy in general; E. Cassirer and H. Levy on that of Plato and of Greek philosophy in general; E. Cassirer and H. Levy on that of Kant; B. Liebrucks and van der Meulen on Heidegger’s interpretation of Hegel and W. Marx on that of Aristotle and Hegel; K. Löwith on that of Nietzsche. Heidegger always acknowledged the ‘correctness’ of this criticisms but, in a deeper sense, he was left untouched by them. The hermeneutic problem involved is too large to be dealt with here but cf. Gadamer’s comments (*Wahreit und Methode*, pp. 472-473) on Löwiths criticism and on Heidegger’s ‘impatience’ with philosophical texts. Also W. Marx’s study of the relation between Heidegger and Aristotle in *Heidegger und die Tradition*, Equally discerning for a understanding of Heidegger’s way of interpreting the pre-socratic philosophers is the monograph by George Joseph Seidel entitled *Martin Heidegger and the Presocratics*.

of the ἀληθεύς is intertwined with the analysis of the phenomenon of λόγος with a double purpose in view: firstly, to understand why and in what ways has λόγος been considered by the tradition to be the proper seat of truth; secondly, according to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle, to see how λόγος works as the articulation proper to human life (ψυχή) how it indicates an unconcealing-discovering character in the sense that ψυχή is ἀληθεύειν. What is at stake for Heidegger is therefore 1) to put into question the way metaphysics reduces the phenomenon of truth to the problem of λόγος in the sense of assertion and judgment; 2) to demonstrate the unilateralism of the thesis according to which truth is an adaequatio intellectus et rei; 3) to refuse Aristotle’s ‘fatherhood’ of this reduction.

Heidegger presents very concisely this triple questioning in paragraphs 7B, 33 and 34 of Being and Time as he had already deployed in the Marburg and Freiburg courses. In every course his argumentation is constantly supported in Aristotle’s de Interpretatione and the de Anima. These are the texts that provide the framework for Heidegger’s study, interpretation and transformation of Aristotle’s philosophy into the key planks of Being and Time in the contention that Aristotle’s research is about the being of factual life, the same claim that leads Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik. What is the place of λόγος in the Heideggerian determinations, the modes of disclosure of existence – terms such as Verstehen (Understanding), Befindlichkeit (findliness) and Rede (speaking or speech) and how can λόγος help us to clarify both the sort of object and character of being that Aristotle had in mind in interpreting, and experiencing human life and Heidegger’s contention that the interpretation of Aristotle (until his own reading of the Stagirite) had historically been obscured by this same tradition? These are fundamental questions I hope to clarify in the first half of the present study, namely the question of λόγος in the courses prior to Being and Time where Heidegger is able to retrieve what he considers to be the implicit ontological grounds of Aristotle’s thinking and transform these grounds in the determinations of Dasein, the same as Heidegger is able to work out the determinations of existence in Being and Time – as it will be clear in subsequent sections on Eigentlichkeit.
The American scholar Joseph J. Kockelmans supported the thesis that in *Being and Time* language wasn’t ever put explicitly under scrutiny.\(^{22}\) It is true that in his book Heidegger does not seem to attribute a central role to the phenomenon of language. Language is exhibited in *Being and Time* in terms of an existential analysis of *Dasein* under the title of *Rede* understood as an articulation of *Dasein*, co-originary to *Befindlichkeit* (findliness) and *Verstehen* (understanding). Language works in this regard in terms of the ontological structure of *Dasein*, its modes of disclosure – a claim which will be examined in Chapter II in connection to Heidegger’s own thematization of *Rede*. *Rede* is the phenomenon that works as the condition of possibility of the word, namely in its mode of *Uneigentlichkeit* (inauthenticity) – in the *Gerede* (idle Talk, chatter, hearsay, gossip) – or in its authentic mode under *Schweigen* (silence).

I purport to show what position the question of language occupies in the comprehension of human life in terms of the development of key determinations of existence in the early 1920s Marburg courses in order to exhibit the grounds upon which Heidegger forges the terminology at work in the articulation of the *Daseinsanalytik* (analytic of *Dasein*) in *Being and Time* (1927). With this purpose in view, I will leave aside the first treatment of the question of language in Heidegger’s *Habilitationschrift Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* (1915) and, the thematization of language in the later Heidegger.

With this in mind I turn now to an analysis of Aristotle’s *de Interpretatione* in order to dissect the general framework upon which Heidegger exhibits on one hand the traditional conception of \(\lambda\delta\gamma\omicron\varsigma\) as judgment and how he then reviews and aims to correct this reading through his claim that Aristotle’s thinking is phenomenological. The steps involved in the interpretation of \(\lambda\delta\gamma\omicron\varsigma\) in Aristotle are as follows: by approaching \(\lambda\delta\gamma\omicron\varsigma\) phenomenologically, one can see that there are different ways in which world and life come to expression. To reveal the foundation and possibility of this diversity of speeches, one has to elucidate the constitution of “as-ness” as such. On the basis of such an elucidation I aim to present in this chapter the Aristotelian framework upon which Heidegger is able to work out the terminology of existence that he will adopt in *Being and Time* especially in the comprehension of the modes of \(\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\omicron\epsilon\nu\) operating in the

\(^{22}\) Kockelmans, J., *On Heidegger and Language*, p. xii, preface and pp. 3-32.
concept of *Eigentlichkeit* to be addressed in section 3 and to be made thematic in the second half of this study.

As it is known, the order of the treatises of the *Organon* is rigorous: after having considered in the *Categories* the simple highest kinds of being and of predication, Aristotle turns – in *de Interpretatione* – to an analysis of *λόγος* and its synthetic structure from which the simple determinations are composed. This text begins with a dense philosophical discussion of the relation between reality, thinking and language. In the first six chapters, Aristotle analyses the parts of *λόγος*, the noun (*δνωμα*) and the verb (*ῥημα*), then *λόγος* as such and finally the structure of predication and its being true or false. In the remaining eight chapters, Aristotle considers the forms and the modes of assertion, their quality (affirmative or negative) and their quantity (universal, particular and infinite) and their modes (possibility, reality and necessity). Having outlined the general context and indicated the relation between being and thought, thought and language, language and writing, Aristotle focuses his attention on a linguistic analysis of the structure of *λόγος*.

In his exegesis of Aristotle’s *de Interpretatione* – undertaken in various forms from 1923/4 to 1929/30 – Heidegger re-inverts Aristotle’s focalization of the problems, as it were, from the general philosophical questions of this treatise to the rather more telling linguistic problems. He will do this – as I aim to show now – by interpreting the same Aristotelian linguistic determinations as ontological determinations.

Heidegger considers propositions and language in general as an unconcealing-discovering act or comportment of human life in its relation to being and he takes this finding as the starting point for a questioning of being that necessarily presupposes a leap, a radical changing of focus, from an originally intended consideration of the ‘internal’ elements of language to a thorough thinking of the grounds, or conditions of possibility of language. Heidegger does not, therefore, interpret Aristotle’s problematic in the *de Interpretatione* in a strict logical or linguistic sense, but in a strong ontological perspective that, I suggest, is motivated not exclusively by Heidegger’s ontological re-reading of Aristotle but by Aristotle’s own thinking. In undertaking this kind of reflection, Heidegger is not
merely trying to make his own situation transparent in relation to Aristotle, but he is in fact retrieving Aristotle’s view on factual life precisely in order to understand what is involved in such a reflection. This principle is demonstrated in the WS 1923/4 Marburg course (GA 17) where a reading of the *de Interpretatione* is first offered. An important reason why Heidegger can turn with approval to Aristotle in this course is that Aristotle does not have any idea of a philosophical beginning without presuppositions in the modern sense and therefore, at a point where these lectures develop critical differences between Heidegger’s phenomenology from Descartes and Husserl and elaborate questions of facticity, everydayness and flight from existence – central themes in the notion of *Eigentlichkeit* in *Being and Time* – Heidegger returns to Aristotle as the originator of these notions. Hence Heidegger understands Aristotle’s ‘ontic’ expressions to be expressing ontological concepts and therefore factual *Dasein*. For example, the celebrated definition of language that reads: \( \text{λόγος δὲ ἔστι φωνὴ στημαντική} \) (*de Interpretatione*, 4, 16 b26) is translated by Heidegger as “\( \text{λόγος} \) is audible being that means something, is a voice.”23 Even a seemingly non problematic notion as \( \text{φωνὴ} \) becomes under Heidegger a philosophical term: audible being (*lautliches Sein*).

The target of Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of \( \text{λόγος} \) and phenomenology in this course is above all a phenomenological interpretation of *Dasein* from the analysis of factual life. It is not only the case that a preparatory analysis of factual life will pave the way for a proper encounter with Aristotle, but this preparation is itself prepared by a very close reading of Aristotle. This means that this course on the *de Anima* and the *de Interpretatione* is decisive for the clarification of the situation peculiar to philosophical interpretation opened up by, and never addressed thematically in, the Nathorp Report: the explication of factual life. For this reason also this course contains the seeds, the presuppositions for the research on being as \( \text{αληθεύω} \) and constitutes thereby the framework for the analysis of *Eigentlichkeit* in *Being and Time*. That is to say, the density of the reading of Aristotle is not merely to achieve a heightened awareness of what presuppositions one will enact when approaching the ‘thing itself’ for to ‘this thing’ belongs Aristotle’s interpretations of it.

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To make clear the spirit and the philosophical sense of Heidegger’s first detailed interpretation of the Aristotelian terms in the *de Interpretatione* and the *de Anima* (GA 17), the *Rhetoric* (GA 18) the *Nicomachean Ethics* (GA 19) and the thematization of *Dasein* as ἀληθεύειν I will now examine more deeply Aristotle’s texts alongside the close translations and paraphrases Heidegger makes in these courses. I choose to go back with Heidegger to the GA 17 course (1923/24) from a course post *Being and Time* 1929/30 (GA 29/30) for I believe the latter offers an important re-interpretation of the concept of λόγος that Heidegger started to develop in the WS 1923/24 (GA 17) taking it up again in the WS 1925/26 (GA 21). Specifically, this course offers the possibility of articulating the previous courses on Aristotle in the sense of presenting the general Aristotelian framework from which Heidegger was able to work out the fundamental character of *Dasein* as the one who makes-true, discloses an understanding that springs forth from Aristotle: philosophy is connected with being truth (*Wahrsein*) – a direct translation of Aristotle’s ὅν ὡς ἀληθές.24

The translations and interpretations Heidegger provides of Aristotle’s account of the parts of speaking, (or speech) are the following:

Aristotle’s definition of noun reads: “όνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου ἡς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον” (*de Interpretatione*, 2, 16a 19ff.) Heidegger translates it in the following way:

“Naming, however, is an utterance that means the basis of an agreement, without referring to time as such in naming. It is simultaneously a φωνὴ σημαντικὴ, a totality of sounds, of which no individual part taken by itself means anything.”25

As for the verb, Aristotle’s definition is the following: “ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσημαίνον χρόνον οὐ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρὶς [καὶ ἐστὶν ἄει]26 τῶν καθ’ ἐτερου λεγομένων σημείων” (*de Interpretatione*, 3, 16b 6-7.) Heidegger paraphrases and comments:

“A saying, a *verbum* is what refers to time in addition, something to whose essence it belongs to refer to time in addition, namely in addition to what is otherwise referred to in the name; it is always a meaning which is meaningful in such a way as to be related to

24 SZ, p. 213.
26 Heidegger prefers this version to the one more commonly accepted of ἐστὶ δὲ.
whatever is being spoken about. In accordance with its intrinsic meaning, every verb is thus concerned with something that the discourse is about, something underlying as a being, as such and such a being. Thus we can see that the ῥήμα is distinguished from the ὄνομα by the criterion of time. Although Aristotle did not pursue this any further, there is indeed a quite decisive insight here. The two essential elements characterising the verb are that it also refers to time, and in its meaning is always related to something that the discourse is about, namely to beings. This indicates that all positing of beings is necessarily related to time. In keeping this, we therefore call the verb a time-word in German.\(^{27}\)

Concerning the definition of λόγος, Aristotle refers: “λόγος δὲ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικῆ, ἢς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικὸν ἐστι κεχωρισμένον ὡς φάσις ἀλλ' ὑχ' ὡς κατάφασις” (de Interpretatione, 4, 16b 26-28). I have already remarked on the strong ontological character of the translation Heidegger proposes in this passage in the 1923/24 course (GA 17). In the present course of 1929/30 (GA 21) Heidegger not only focuses his attention on both the general and the predicative speech but also in the assertion. Aristotle’s definition reads: “ἐστι δὲ ἢ μὲν ἀπλὴ ἀπόφασις φωνὴ σημαντικῆ περὶ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν τι ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ὡς οἱ χρόνοι διηρημνοῦν” (de Interpretatione, 5, 17a 23-24).

Heidegger translates this passage as:

“The simple assertion is therefore an utterance that means something and that asserts something while referring, in that it deals with something being at hand or not being at hand, and does so in the manner of holding the temporal apart in each case – i.e. grammatically: present, perfect, future.”\(^{28}\)

Aristotle distinguishes the differences in communication (ἐρμηνεία) between animals and humans: the sounds uttered by animals are ἀγρόματοι ψόφοι, voces non articulatae whilst human beings are capable of φωναὶ σημαντικαί, of voces significativae or litteratae. The significant (or meaningful) voices constitute the fundamental units of language. These can either be simple or complex. In the first case, there is a simple diction (φάσις, diction), that is, the spelling out of nouns (ὄνοματα, nomina) or verbs (ῥήματα, verba). In the second case, we have λόγος (oratio, sentential, sermo) as the speaking, or speech, in the proper sense of the term which consists of connection of the representations through a copula. Λόγος can be apophantical or non-apophantical, that is, indicative or non-indicative. The non-indicative λόγος is found in types of discourse such as prayer

\(^{27}\) GM, pp. 465-66.

\(^{28}\) GM, p. 464.
or commandment (ἐνωτική, ἐντολή) or other types of discourse that Aristotle addresses in the Poetics and the Rhetoric – the discourses that present a vocative, interrogative, optative or imperative forms. The indicative λόγος is, on the other hand, ἀποφασις, the assertion or enunciation or judgment (proloquium, oratio enuntiativa, proposition, assertio). This is the form of λόγος: speaking can be affirmative when it makes an attribution, literally in Greek a κατάφασις (dedicatio, adfirmatio), or negative when it denies a predicate (ἀπόφασις, abdicatio, negatio).

In this sense, predication, the λόγος ἀποφασιτικός, aufweisender Satz, is the mode of speaking that can be true or false. Heidegger translated this passage early on in his 1924/4 course (GA 21):

“Every speaking [or speech] points out in direction to something (it means something in general) –therefore every speaking does not show, does not let see [sehenlassen] but that which occurs in speaking as being-true or being-false (as the mode of speech).”

This is the implicit key passage to which Heidegger refers in his account of speaking in Being and Time, paragraph 33, where he determines the Aussage with the three senses of Aufzeigen, Prädikation and Mitteilung. This general fully developed framework of Aristotle’s de Interpretatione (1929/30 GA 21) that originated in the 1923/4 course (GA 17) obviously influences Heidegger’s research on Aristotle in the early 1920s for two reasons. Not only that this dialogue –de Interpretatione – provides the basis of the traditional conception of λόγος as predication but it also allows Heidegger to work on the revision of the central notions of λόγος by recovering their original phenomenological meaning – its ἀποφαίνεσθαι - on which the structure of predication can be exhibited and which I will now address.

Heidegger starts to explore this connection in 1923/4 in paragraph 2 of GA 17 and here he first attempts a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s book A 1, B 8 of de Anima and some passages of de Interpretatione so that he explicates “in what connection the concept of φαινόμενον stand in what Aristotle explicates as

29 De Int., 4, 17 a 2-3.
30 LFW, p. 129.
Heidegger focuses on Aristotle’s *de Anima* by making an exegesis of the word *φαινόμενον* from *φαίνεσθαι* which is “that which shows itself from itself”, being a middle-voice of *φαίνω* [literally “come to light’’], means to “show oneself” in the sense of coming to light. Both *φαινόμενον* (showing itself) and *φαίνω* (come to light) are grounded on, and are an expression of, *φως* (light, clarity). *Φαινόμενον*, in Greek, works as the participle of *φαίνεσθαι*32. The *φαίνεσθαι*, is a showing up of the way of the unspeakable with the many ways of speaking about it, that is, an indication of the sich-zeigens which points out itself from the always already openness of the open-that-we-are, which makes possible all takings-as and attributions of each “is”. Hence whatever shows itself is therefore that which can be revealed and be brought into the light of day and this is what constitutes the visible, (ὁρατόν). Heidegger shows that Aristotle thinks about what can be revealed and be brought to the light of day and this is what constitutes the visibility of the visible, (ὁρατόν). Heidegger aims to show that phenomenology is a way that brings into light (φαίνεσθαι) the self-showing that reveals the appearance of beings in their being and therefore, as a way, is also a “how” of revealing that which does not generally shows itself at first sight but rather remains hidden, out of sight, occult in the sense of something at the point of appearing. Heidegger formulates the meaning of phenomenology as λέγειν (speaking, laying out, exhibiting), that is, the ἀποφαίνεσθαι of νομένον: φαινόμενον – “letting that which shows itself, just as it shows itself by its own self, be seen from its own self.”33 Λέγειν itself for the Greeks, for instance Parmenides, means the pure grasping of something that is present in its pure being present.34 This saying exhibits what comes forth to presence. The λόγος of φαινεῖν is not to be taken as a simple λόγος of assertion, or assertive speaking, that is, a categorical saying that, in saying, shows the saying. Λόγος originally means, according to Heidegger, gathering or collecting in the sense of openness of what is to be brought forth through the shinning of the appearance, that is, the outward appearance of the...

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31 *EPF*, p. 13.
33 *PGZ*, p. 117. The same formulation is maintained in the WS Marburg course 1925/26 *LFW*, pp. 132, 133 and finally adopted in *SZ*, p. 34.
presence in the placing into the aspect, ἔπειτα. I can see what I can see – people, roads, stars, the world – because the visible shines in many ways. It is this shining, the constant presence of the visible that makes me realize that whatever I see is itself manifest as it is in itself. The possibility of seeing is given by light. Light is the condition of possibility of seeing things in their look, that is, as they appear to me and therefore as they appear here in the world (Da). Light is what allows this pure presence to come first to the seeing as what constitutes the ἐνέργεια of the seeing of every presence in the world. For Aristotle, this means not actuality (as rendered by Hicks or Ross) but coming or being brought into light and presence and enduring. Aristotle says that “light is the presence and enduring of this transparent as transparent. Similarly darkness has a power” He says that “as long as I can perceive (διψανύ) I see the visible (ὄρατον)” Colour is that which overlays what is itself visible, that which has in itself the cause of its visibility, what is actually transparent: “The visible, then, is colour and [colour] is that with which the visible is itself overlaid”. This ‘itself’ is what overlays and it is there to take (ver-nahmen), it is present, “it is” the presence of the visible that stands along with constant – con-standere – allowing me first to see through the light, the here to be seen – the trans-parent (διαφανές) of co-presence (παρουσία). Aristotle is constantly thinking of what is at work between the διαφανές and the visible (ὄρατον) in terms of a co-presence (παρουσία) which leads his interpretation of beings from the simple awareness of something just there in its pure presence or anwesen. This means that Aristotle thinks through the “showing or exhibiting itself” of the being of beings in each being: phenomenology. Heidegger thematizes

35 EPF, p. 9.
36 Ross, Jowett and some Latin translations render ἐνέργεια and δύναμις respectively by ‘actuality’, ‘actus’ and ‘potentiality’, ‘potentia’. This rendering presents major difficulties, for it transforms Greek nouns into adverbs making the transparent and the darkness the ‘result’ or acts of an external cause: “Light is the actuality of the transparent qua transparent; and that which is light can also be dark”, cf., Ross, David, Aristotle de Anima, p. 240, “Actus huisce diaphani, qua diaphani, constituit lumen. Ubi [diaphanum] non nisi in potentia exsistit, [adsunt] etiam tenebrae”. Also Siwek, Paulus, Aristotelis de Anima, Libris Tres Grace et Latine, pp. 137-138. Cf., also the same sense in Aristotle, de Sensu, 3, 439 a 18-19. It is not so “easy to see” how light can be a “first potentiality” or a “first actuality” as Kosman puts it in his Aristotle’s Prime Mover, pp. 346, 347.
37 DA, 418 a25
39 DA, 418 a 26-31.
40 DA, 418 b 16-17, “παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεί”的 [the co-presence of the transparent [dia-pha-nous literally, the through which of light, the constant glimmering]; 418 b20, “παρουσία τὸ φῶς ἐστίν” [the co-presence is light].
in *Being and Time* the meaning of *Erscheinung* as appearance, not showing itself but the announcing of something that does not show itself or appear through something that does appear.41 Signs, indications, representations and symbols, for example, in showing themselves do not indicate or point to something that itself does not appear. It is a sort of not showing itself, but one which is different from the privative sense mentioned above. Not showing itself, it can also *seem* not to be. Yet *Erscheinung* presupposes and is possible only in the sense of something that shows itself though it itself is not the *Erscheinung*. Therefore, the first primary sense of phenomenon as showing itself or appearing is the basic one:

“*The expression 
φαινόμενον* is accordingly not a conceptual category, but instead a manner of being, *how something is encountered* and, indeed, encountered in the *first* and, as such, *first legitimate* way. The category “object” was alien to the Greeks. In its place was πράγμα, what one has to deal with – what is present for the concern that deals with things. “Object” means, by contrast, what stands opposite the mere observer who simply looks at it, what is present, after being thematically selected and had as such. 

*Φαινόμενον* means the existing being itself; it is a determination of being and is to be grasped in such a way that the character of *showing itself* is expressed. Τά *φαινόμενα* can be represented by τά δεσμα; it is what is always already here, what we encounter the moment we open our eyes. It does not need first to be disclosed, but it is frequently covered up. The accent lies, in a completely primary sense, on the character of the “here”.

Heidegger also exhibits the meaning of phenomenology and ontology in Aristotle and Husserl in his two Marburg courses, the first of which being the SS 1925 published under the title *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* and the second the WS of the same year published under the title *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*. In these courses Heidegger examines the question of language in search for the ontological condition of possibility that makes possible the speaking of the unconcealing: λόγος ἀλεθεύειν. In these courses Heidegger purports firstly, to retrieve the active genesis of language as a fundamental structure of *Dasein*; secondly – taking language as an exhibiting phenomenon of the world – he concentrates his attention in the historical-ontological dimension where this

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42 *SZ*, p. 29.
phenomenon originates: the question of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \zeta \) and the epochal determination of being as the original dimension of every linguistic disclosure of \textit{Dasein.}

In order to achieve this purpose, Heidegger in the 1925/26 course (GA 21) introduces a subtle terminological distinction between the purely logical-categorical meaning of being true (\textit{Wahrsein}), which belongs to the proposition to the \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \alpha \pi \omicron \omicron \alpha \nu \tau \iota \kappa \omicron \omicron \zeta \), and the ontological meaning of truth (\textit{Wahrheit}), which belongs to the phenomenon of truth in its original scope, in the sense of \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) interpreted as unconcealing-discovering being of \textit{Dasein}.\footnote{The following argumentative progression is to be found in \textit{PS} paragraph 26, pp. 179-188) and from \textit{LFW}, p. 1. Later on, in the \textit{GM} WS Marburg course 1929/30, Heidegger’s quest for the ontological foundation of truth takes a significant turn. The emphasis will be no longer solely on the uncovering attitude of \textit{Dasein} (Heidegger’s task before and after the publication of \textit{SZ}), but rather on its being-free (\textit{Freisein}), that is, no longer on the productivity of \textit{Dasein} but the ontological character (being-free) of the horizon constitutive of its condition.}

Deepening the direction in which Husserl reflects upon the notion of truth (the traces of which can be seen in the first part of the lecture course of the SS 1925 published under the title \textit{Prolegomena zur Geschichte der Zeitsbegriffes} Heidegger addresses on different levels in the previous course (GA 17) the \textit{locus originarius} of truth, starting from the notions of \( \phi \alpha \iota \nu \omicron \omicron \mu \epsilon \omicron \nu \omicron \) and \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \zeta \) that he takes –as we will see in point d) – to the modes of \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \varepsilon \iota \iota \varepsilon \iota \nu \) in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} (GA 19). It is, though, as we will now see, in GA 21 that Heidegger lays out with particular clarity the fundamental structure of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \zeta \) that he started to explore in the two previous courses.

In this course, Heidegger distinguishes, as he did in \textit{EPF} (GA 17), the semantic aspect of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \zeta \), that is to say, the property of having a signification, an aspect which belongs to every form of the \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \zeta \). This notion is found, as we have seen, in one of Aristotle’s final manuscripts \textit{Περὶ ἐρμηνείας}, where Aristotle indicates that \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \zeta \) is an audible being that means something (\( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \zeta \ \delta \varepsilon \ \varepsilon \varepsilon \tau \iota \phi \omega \nu \eta \ \sigma \tau \mu \alpha \nu \tau \iota \kappa \eta \)).\footnote{Cf. Heidegger’s own working edition of this work: “de Interpretatione” in \textit{Aristotelis Organon Graece}. Also the idea of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \zeta \) (speaking) as an audible being in Aristotle’s \textit{De Anima} B 8, 420 b 5, b 14, b 13, b 18, b 19, b 29.} Aristotle says here that the basic meaning of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \zeta \) is speaking and Heidegger aims to indicate what speaking itself is.\footnote{\textit{SZ}, paragraph 7, ‘Der Begriff des Logos’ where Heidegger points out that in Plato and Aristotle this notion has a variety of meanings which they never reduce to a common one.} Its simple meaning remains completely hidden from view when \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \zeta \) is translated by – and this always means interpreted – as judgment, conception, definition, ground or
relationship and the explained in terms of this.\textsuperscript{47} On the other hand, λόγος as speaking, Heidegger says, means rendering manifest the thing spoken about\textsuperscript{48}. Heidegger had already formulated this description of λόγος three years earlier in GA 17 but now he makes the connection between λόγος and δήλος, that is, αληθεύειν much more explicit in relation to what can be understood as the true and the false. Not a pure theoretical uncovering but one that makes being manifest.\textsuperscript{49} This is a point also developed in the famous 1980s study by Thomas Sheehan on \textit{hermeneia} and \textit{apophansis} where it is claimed that “In \textit{On Hermeneia} Aristotle’s concern with the question of truth (αληθεία) is, at best, indirect and narrow. (…) Heidegger is interested in the treatise only insofar as it can tell him something basic about “truth”, both as an ontic condition (αληθεία as ὁν ὡς αληθές) and as a human performance (αληθεύειν as a power of ψυχή).”\textsuperscript{50} Heidegger takes up the discussion of αληθεύειν to \textit{Being and Time} when he thematizes and ‘validates’ the same connection again by specifically pointing out what Aristotle is thinking when he describes the function of speaking as ἀποφαίνεσθαι, letting something be seen, letting what is spoken about come to light\textsuperscript{51}. In speech or speaking as ἀπόφασις what is said fulfils its function in making manifest, thus rendering available for oneself and others, that which is said.\textsuperscript{52} Hence, ἀπόφασις finds its concrete expression in uttered speaking.\textsuperscript{53}

“Λόγος, therefore, is taken here quite generally, either as a simple addressing of something \textit{in itself} or as an addressing of something \textit{in view of something else}, determining something pre-given \textit{in relation to something else}. This means that λέγειν, addressing beings, taken quite generally, discloses beings in two directions: first, as they themselves are in \textit{simple presence} [phenomenologically: \textit{being} as correlative to \textit{seeing}], and secondly in the mode of the πρός τι, in terms of a relation to. Correlative to λόγος, beings can therefore be characterized in their possible \textit{presence} [\textit{being}] either as simply there in

\textsuperscript{47} SZ, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{48} SZ, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{49} EPF, p. 18, “Not every speaking is as such in the mode of a meaning of something in the manner of pointing out, rather the only kind of speaking is ἀποφαίνεσθαι in which something like an αληθεύειν occurs: being as unconcealed or being in such a way that this pointing out of something is ‘feigned’ and becomes a (ψυχή)”. Cf. the original source of this passage in \textit{De Int.}, 4, 17 a2.
\textsuperscript{50} Sheehan, Thomas, ‘\textit{Hermeneia and Apophansis}: The Early Heidegger on Aristotle’, p. 68, (Original source in transliterated Greek. I have rendered it into the original font in the main text).
\textsuperscript{51} SZ, p. 43. Heidegger explains in a footnote to this sentence that he is addressing Aristotle’s, \textit{de Interpretatione}, chapters 1-6; \textit{Metaphysics} Z4 ; \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} Z which contain the specific evidence for this claim.
\textsuperscript{52} EPF, pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{53} SZ, p. 33. Also the same connection already addressed in PS, pp. 181, 544.
themselves or as a πρός τι, in relation-to. In λέγειν a double presence of beings becomes graspable [faßbar]: “in themselves” and “in relation to.”\textsuperscript{54}

Heidegger reads the notion of λόγος in a twofold way. On one hand, he says that λόγος corresponds to a simple apprehension (schlicht). On the other hand, λόγος is determined by a σύνθεσις (positioning together), which is not a simple apprehension but is more complex, it is already a composition (literally a position that comprehends) which primarily consists, not in the joining together of ideas in a judgement or logical reasoning, but in letting something be seen as something in this togetherness. It is because λόγος is a ‘letting something be seen’ that it can be true or false. From here there is a conclusion to be drawn: “The truth of the apophantic λόγος, its disclosing character, ἀληθεύειν, consists of taking out of its hiddenness that which is spoken about so that it reveals itself and lets itself be seen in its truth, that is, in its unconveredness – in ‘dis-covering’ (Unverborgen), ‘dis-closing’ it. Similarly, falsity consists in covering up (Verborgen), masking something, so that it is is seen as something that it is not.\textsuperscript{55} Just because ‘truth’ means ‘un-concealment’, ‘disclosure’ and because λόγος is a particular mode of ‘letting something be seen’, we must not speak of λόγος as the locus of truth. In the Greek sense, truth resides basically in the pure sensible taking in or perception of something, (αἰσθησις) (that Heidegger calls Vernehmen):

“‘True’ in the purest and most original sense, that of unconcealed concealment, is the pure, straightforward perceptual apprehension (νοεῖν) of the simplest sense qualities and ‘determinations of the being of the things that are as such’.”\textsuperscript{56}

Heidegger finds in the ἀπὸ the unity of λόγος in such a way that he is able to provide evidence from Aristotle’s texts that the latter’s view on λόγος foreshadows, though without realizing its full ontological implications, the ‘as’ structure of judgment that the tradition didn’t examine basically, that is, in its origin: the ‘as’, the ἀπὸ translated by Heidegger as ‘läst sehen von dem selbst

\textsuperscript{54} PS, p. 544.
\textsuperscript{55} EPF, p. 20. Also, SZ, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{56} SZ, p. 33. The notions of νοεῖν, διανοεῖν and νοῦς appear throughout SZ on pages 25, 26, 33, 44, 58, 59, 96, 147, 171 and 226.
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In the word ἀποφαντικός Heidegger suggests that Aristotle is thinking the origin of the structure of judgment and he points out in this connection that ‘Logic’, as it has developed out of the Platonic and Aristotelian views of λόγος as sentence, statement, is itself ultimately rooted in life, in the existential structure of Dasein.

Yet, Heidegger does not limit his findings to the question of the categorial and predicative in the apophantic ἀποφαντικός. Rather he takes this question to an ontological level. Predication is possible since the mode of being of Dasein is characterized by an openness, as it were, an unconcealing comportment that Heidegger refers to as ἐρμηνεία in Being and Time. The ‘als’ structure is the terminological distinction Heidegger introduces in the 1925/6 course (GA 21) in order to clarify the meaning and difference of being true (wahrsein) proper to the apophantical λόγος and the more general phenomenon of truth (Wahrheit) in the sense of ἀλήθεια. It is this distinction that appears to be implicitly at work in the spirit of the translation and exegesis of Aristotle’s terms that Heidegger proposes in the 1923/4 WS Course.

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57 SZ, p. 43.
58 De Int., 4, 17a1-2 and SZ, p. 32. Also the same idea already formulated in EPF, p. 21.
59 SZ, paragraphs 32, 33, 44b, 69b. Also EPF, p. 31.
60 It would be out of the scope of this study to re-engage in the philological aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation of ἀλήθεια and his thesis that the Greeks expressed the phenomenon of truth by a ‘negative’ concept (formed by the α privative which Heidegger retakes to the German Un- to Unverborgenheit on the basis of λάθειν: ‘being concealed’) whilst the Latins and the Germans expressed it as a ‘positive’ concept, respectively veritas and Wahrheit. This specific interpretation of ἀλήθεια triggered a controversy between Heidegger and one of his colleagues at Marburg, the classical philologist Paul Friedländer. Friedländer contends in his monograph on Plato that the most ancient occurrences of ἀλήθεια in Homer present this word in connection to the verba dicendi and that, for this reason, the phenomenon of truth depends originally from its linguistic usage. Yet, according to Heidegger, ἀ-λήθεια means an ontological pre-verbal openness. This point is made, for example, in WM, p. 443. In the third edition of his Platon monograph, Friedländer had partially taken on board Heidegger’s reasons, p. 252. On the other hand, Heidegger advances the argument that ἀλήθεια for the Pre-Socratics was taken as character of being itself and that it suffered an essential change with Plato becoming thereby ὁρθότης, the correctness of vision regarding a subject that grasps it: Cf. Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (GA 14), p. 78. Apart from the old Greek dictionaries of Pape and Benseler and the Liddel & Scott, for the hidden sources of Heidegger I would appeal to the article on the concept of ἀλήθεια written by the theologian Rudolf Bultmann for the Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament of Gerhard Kittel, widely used by Heidegger, and especially to the text Heidegger also knew from Ernst von Lasaulx, Neuer Versuch einer alten, auf die Wahrheit der Thatsachen gegründeten Philosophie der Geschichte, that mentions twice the negative character of ἀ-λήθεια. The etymology adopted by Heidegger is however well documented in late Antiquity for example in Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos and also in Modern Age in François de la Mothe Le Vayer’s first Dialogue[s] fait[s] à l’imitation des Anciens: ‘La vérité est nomée des Grecs, ἀλήθεια, quasi ἀλήθεια, erratio seu vagatio divina, comme despendant plustost, s’il y en a, d’une extravagance divine, que du discours de nostre humanité. Si ce n’est pas que nous prenions le vraisemblablement ou apparent, appelé ἀλήθεια, quasi μὴ λάθουν, non latens, pour un vérité essentielle.’
(GA 17) on Aristotle’s *de Anima* – which contains the first detailed interpretation of this text – up to the Winter Semester Course of 1925/6 where Heidegger makes this distinction thematic and reiterates it in *Being and Time* in relation to the modes of speaking of *Uneigentlicheit*.

The apophantical structure of the ‘als’ – the ἀπό – as the structure of a declarative sentence, is rethought by Heidegger and is taken up as its original ‘pre-verbal’ meaning. This means Heidegger discovers in Aristotle’s notion of λόγος ἀποφαντικός an ontological determination of Dasein, notably its *Verstehen* – as a mode of ἀληθεύων that discloses the world by working it out in terms of *Dasein* understood as a unity of *Verstehen* and *Befindlichkeit* that articulates the meanings based on the verbal comportments that ‘add’ words to the original pre-verbal meanings.61

Heidegger makes a recovery of a hidden meaning of λόγος exhibited in Aristotle’s own text *de Interpretatione* 4, 17a1-a2 and he takes it in to *Being and Time*:

‘The λόγος lets something be seen (φαίνεσται), namely, what the speaking is about and what it does either for the one who is doing the talking (Medium) or, for example, for the talking between each other. Speaking ‘lets something be seen ἀπό from the thing itself of which the speaking is about. In speaking (ἀποφανσία), so far as it is genuine, what is said is drawn out from what the speaking is about, so that the spoken communication, in what it says, makes it manifest and accessible to the other.’62

For the Greeks, the ‘as’ worked as a *vorhanden*: a number of words juxtaposed in a certain order. The unity behind the words was to be found, according to Plato, in the thing disclosed by them; for him all λόγος is λόγος τινός. Aristotle takes Plato’s notion of λόγος further and he says that λόγος is at the same time σύνθεσις (positioning together) and διαίρεσις (taking apart), a positioning together, connecting, and separating at once, taking apart, and in this manner revealing a reality as such. It is only because λόγος is a ‘letting something be

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61 LFW, p. 151 note 1.
62 *De Int.*, 4, 17a1-a2 and SZ, p. 32. This step was already sketched out three years earlier in *EPF*, p. 21.
seen’ it can be true or false. The truth of the apophantic λόγος means for the Greeks ἀλήθευειν and ψεύδεσθαι (distortion).  

In *Being and Time* Heidegger states that:

“...the ‘being-true’ of the λόγος of ἀλήθευειν means that in λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι the beings of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddleness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden (ἀληθές); that is, they must be discovered. Similarly, ‘being-false’ (ψεύδεσθαι) amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up [verdecken]: putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not.”

Heidegger also translates ψευδός (deception) into German, as *sich verkeheren*, which means to change in the sense of continuously coming and going and thus to be transformed or turned into – to be distorted. He chooses Unverkerheit to translate ἀπρέκεια, and thus better convey the sense of the Greek, non-entangled, not confused, and therefore simple.  

64 Later on in the 1950s in the *Parmenides* lectures Heidegger would say that this covering involved in ψευδός is “always at the same time an unveiling, a showing, and a bringing into appearance”.  

In both cases the truth of apophantic λόγος and its ἀλήθευειν, consists in taking out of its hiddleness that which is spoken about so that it reveals itself and lets itself be seen. “The λόγος ἀποφαίνεται (literally in Greek, the speaking of the letting be seen) is the sort of talking with the world, by means of which the existing world is pointed out as existing (‘ἀποφαίνεσθαι’ is “letting something be seen from itself in its way of existing”).  

This formal sense of the term λόγος amounts to the same meaning as expressed by the term φαινόμενον: phenomenology is the speaking, laying out, exhibiting, (λέγειν) that is to say, the ‘to let be seen’ (ἀπό) of that which shows itself (φαινομένον) and hence Heidegger’s definition of phenomenology that gathers together the meaning of

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63 Heidegger appeals to Aristotle’s *MT* book V, chapter 29 in order to indicate the relationship of ψευδός with the genuine being of things, ὡς πράγμα ψευδός (*META. Δ29, 1024 b17 ff*); in relation to speech, λόγος ψευδής (*META. Δ29, 1024 b26*) and in relation to the human being, ὡς ἀνθρώπος ψευδής (*META. Δ29, 1025 a2*).

64 *SZ*, p. 33.

65 For the Greeks, ‘being’ means *presencing in the unhidden*. Duration and extension are not what is decisive but rather whether the being gives itself in the hidden of the inexhaustible, or whether presencing distorts itself (ψευδός) into what merely ‘looks like’, into mere appearance, instead of holding itself in undistortedness (α- τρέκεια).


67 *EPF*, p. 15.

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λέγειν and ἀποφαίνεσθαι – ‘letting that which shows itself, just as it shows itself by its own self, be seen from its own self’. And this means, distinguishing between a showing itself as itself, and a showing itself as it is not, but can appear to be. Aristotle identifies λόγος as the part of human being that aims at bringing him to his highest possible existence (ἐὖζην: proper life). 68

In ascribing to Aristotle, the “doctrine” that truth resides in judgment, we not only do injustice to him but thoroughly misunderstand the Greek notion of truth as unconcealed concealment: ἀληθεία. In the Greek sense, truth resides basically in the pure sensible taking in or perception of something, (αἰσθησίς) (that Heidegger calls Vernehmen). 69

As I have already noted, an analysis of the structure of judgment is important because it occupies a central place in the problems of fundamental ontology but most of all it allows us to step back to and from metaphysics and to realize how throughout the entire history of Western philosophy, being has been approached from the point of view and interpreted in terms of its relationship to thinking.

c) The limits of λόγος and the uncovering of Dasein

It would not be possible to present the highly dense analyses of λόγος in Aristotle and Heidegger without at least exhibiting some of the arguments upon which the structure of judgement in Aristotle is based. For it is from here that Heidegger attempts to establish a proper understanding of the relationship between thinking, being and truth at the center of metaphysics as the only way to grasp in what ways metaphysics represents being, why thinking is considered by metaphysics as an activity of the human subject and why it has always served the purpose of providing the horizon for truth, the setting for the interpretation of being. 70

68 DA, B 8, 420 b20.  
69 SZ, p. 33.  
70 My reference is to Kant’s thesis on being as explicit in Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (1781), to which Heidegger, much later in 1961, appeals in his ‘Kants These über das Sein’ in WM. Cf. Kant, op.cit., A 598, B 626.
With this in mind, I will now examine more deeply the question of the structure of judgment and Heidegger’s discovery of the \( \alpha \rho \omega \phi \alpha \nu \tau \iota \kappa \omicron \varsigma \) (which Heidegger transforms into a term he employs throughout *Being and Time* “Sehenlassen” (a letting be seen) and his proposal to read \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) as \( \alpha \lambda \epsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \epsilon \nu \) – a proposal clearly exhibited in the central theme of language in *Being and Time* namely of *Dasein* as \( \alpha \lambda \epsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \epsilon \nu \) and in the terminology employed in reference to the unconcealing-discovering character of being: *Entdecktheit* (as Heidegger refers in his first Freiburg courses) and *Erschlossenheit* (according to the definitive vocabulary of *Being and Time* in the discussion of *Eigentlichkeit*). No doubt the classical reading of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) motivates Heidegger’s inquiries on this concept because, since the beginnings of classical ontology and throughout the Western philosophical tradition, \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \) has been thought to provide a unique mode of access to everything that really is and to the being of beings. Also, because judgment has always been regarded as the ultimate and proper seat of truth, a phenomenon intimately connected with the question of being, there is for Heidegger an urgency and a need to clarify Aristotle’s thinking of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \).\(^71\)

According to Aristotle, judgement signifies exhibiting in the original sense of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \varsigma \ \alpha \rho \omega \phi \alpha \nu \tau \iota \kappa \omicron \varsigma \). Judgement for Aristotle is not a proof, a theory, or a representation but letting beings be seen as they show themselves by themselves. Heidegger addresses statement (*Aussage*) or judgement in paragraph 33 of *Being and Time* and he gives some examples. For example, the assertion, ‘the hammer is too heavy’ is meant to enable the disclosure, not of a ‘sense’, but of this being (the hammer) itself in a certain mode of handiness, nor has it anything to do with any sort of ‘representation’ or with some mental state of the speaker. Secondly, judgment is a predication that involves ‘asserting’ of a ‘predicate’ about a ‘subject’, which thus becomes determined by the former. Even though what was exhibited in the judgment in the first instance has here been narrowed down by undergoing a determination through the predicate, the judgment in this sense is still exhibiting:

“The parts of the predicative articulation, subject and predicate, are an unfolding within the function of exhibiting. The determination as such does not itself disclose but, as a mode of exhibiting, limits our seeing to what shows itself – the hammer – as such, so that

\(^{71}\) SZ, paragraph 33.
what stands in openness (or is disclosed) may be explicitly disclosed in its determinate character through an express restriction of our vision.”

A statement in the sense of a predication also remains basically apophantical in character. Thirdly, statement is communication in the sense that it leads others also to see what is exhibited as thus determined. What is shared through communication here is a common mode of being-in-the-world in its relation to or in its being-toward what is exhibited. Communication as understood in this existential sense of sharing the speaking may take the form of a propositional utterance, which can be repeated and passed on from one to another. Thus ‘objectified’, an utterance widens the area of shared disclosure, though this always exposes the utterance to the possibility of becoming merely repetitive. What it purports to exhibit may once again sink into partial or total obscurity. The nature of a judgement can be thus summed up by saying that it is a communicative and determining showing forth or exhibiting.

The statement can exhibit because something has already been revealed to understanding. As Heidegger explicitly points out here, the term understanding (Verstehen) is used by him in the sense of a fundamental ‘existential’ and not as a particular mode of knowing, different for example from causal explanation, nor indeed in the sense of knowing as thematically grasping anything. Heidegger is constantly calling attention to the fact that every utterance of thinking is not its expression but thinking itself and he wants his readers to concentrate on the positive content of the Greek words and indeed of the basic philosophical words, old or new, and give these full weight. Heidegger is taking words apart like φαινόμενον and λόγος, and Greek particles such as ἀπό not to show his fluency in Greek but to focus his (and our) attention upon the component parts of the word, squeezing out of it all its precise complex meaning and force. Therefore this

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72 SZ, p. 155.
73 This marks a radical departure from the usage of Dilthey and Jaspers, for whom the understanding is one particular mode of knowing, exemplified in the humanities sciences, which is the characteristic mode of knowledge in the natural sciences.
74 In this regard mention should be made to Heidegger’s discussions of Vorstellen and Gegenstand but also sometimes in his later works where he takes recourse to “imaginative” etymologies that may better project, “compose” the primordial, root meaning of a term, a meaning prior to and underlying the particular meanings a word acquires in actual usage and at different times – as for example, he demonstrates in the specific essays on Logos and aletheia in Vorträge und Aufsätze. As Ortega y Gasset has remarked early in his career, “Heidegger pierces through the common and
understanding is interpretive; it is a mode of interpretation that shows that a statement can only make anything objective, representable because something has already been revealed to understanding. Heidegger calls such seeing, by which we become aware of the being of the utensil, i.e. hammer, *Umsicht* (circumspection) taken in its literal etymological sense. The proposition “the hammer is too heavy”, (Heidegger’s example in paragraph 33, *Being and Time*), formulates what is already disclosed and understood through preoccupied circumspection and what is already interpreted, even without the use of words, and that’s why even if I put the hammer on the table because it is too heavy I don’t need to say it to understand it. To say “too heavy!” is obviously not a proper judgement in the above sense. What is intended is always the hammer as a handy utensil, but in becoming the ‘object’ of a judgement my intention undergoes a change. The available-at-hand becomes something with which I want to accomplish some purpose, like make a statement *about* it in which an assertion is made. What is at stake in the *ἀποφαντικός* is that any preview I make of an object, sees something simply there in what was a utensil, a hammer, a pencil or a lap-top something to-do-it, so that its handiness retreats in favour of the objectivity of something *vorhanden*, something present as an object possessing such and such attributes. When I speak about the hammer, the lap-top, or any object, in order to say something about the lap-top the *ἀπό* structure, the *as* also undergoes a modification, because now the ‘as’ is cut off from the ‘nets’ of meaning which are constitutive of the environing world (*Umwelt*). The ‘as’ is pushed back into the uniform level of a simple, objective ‘given’. When I produce a statement about the features of this lap-top I’m merely letting a determinate *vorhanden* be seen and thus I’m levelling down the *ἀπό*, the original ‘as’ of circumspect interpretation to the ‘as’ which determines what is there available, given, for thus alone does it become capable of working as a pure theoretical judgement and of exhibiting something in the mode of being purely looked at (i.e. all the specifications, the characteristics of the lap-top). Hence, all possible judgment about an object, a state-of-affairs has its genesis not in a theoretical approach made by a subject in relation to an object in a world of superficial sense of a word and sets it aside. Under pressure he makes the underlying meaning leap up out of the depths… The common word, with Heidegger, suddenly fills up to the brim, with meaning… It seems to us as if we were surprising a word in its *statu nascenti.*” Vide Ortega y Gasset, “Heidegger und die Sprache der Philosophie”, *Universitas*, 7, 1952, quoted in Erasmus Schöfer, *Die Sprache Heideggers*, p. 57.
material things but it oscillates always between what is already available to me in the environing world and what I come to describe. In the word ἀποφαντικός Heidegger finds that Aristotle is thinking through the origin of the structure of judgement and he points out in this connection that ‘Logic’, as it has developed out of the Platonic and Aristotelian views of λόγος as sentence, statement, is itself ultimately rooted in life, in the existential structure of Dasein.75

The argument Heidegger makes in paragraph 33 of Being and Time works as the corollary of the researches on the λόγος ἀποφαντικός specifically the ‘as’ structure of judgement. A failure to grasp the origin of ἀποφαντικός has led to the development of the Aristotelian doctrine into what Heidegger calls a ‘superficial theory of judgement’. According to this theory, judging consists of the connecting together and separating of representations and concepts. Judging is then formalized into a system of relations so that propositions become, in corresponding measure, instruments of calculation rather than media of ontological interpretation. The scholastic copula, for example, becomes in this process, a mere connecting link and it is forgotten that in the basic sense it has nothing to do with links and bindings. Since making statements and ontological understanding constitute the possibilities of being of Dasein itself, the ‘is’ leads back ultimately to problems connected with the existential analytic.76 Although Heidegger does not devote a thorough analysis of these problems in Being and Time he is implicitly taking us to his findings back in the 1924/25 WS course on Logic. That is to say, for Heidegger, what is true is above all being itself in as much as it possesses the character of being manifest, disclosed. With this thesis, Heidegger revives Aristotle’s understanding of the truth that can be expressed in the formula: ὃν ὡς ἀληθεύειν. Behind this thesis it is not difficult to see the recovery of an Aristotelian determination of ὑποκήνετα as ἀληθεύειν. Heidegger’s treatment and special emphasis in the φανομένον and λόγος the ἀποφαντικός in GA 17, that is to say, the character of predication (and assertion in its κατάφασις or its οπόφασις form), is a reading especially but not exclusively of Aristotle’s understanding of λόγος. It is a reading of the phenomenon of truth, a recovery of ὃν ὡς ἀληθεύειν in Aristotle, from the derivative and restrictive structure of

75 De Int., 4, 17a1-a2 and SZ, p. 32.
76 SZ, pp. 159-161.
predication and in fact a radicalization of Aristotle’s ὁ ὑ ἀληθές, especially in book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Heidegger sees an analysis of the different ways in which the soul uncovers being, in its truth, in its unconcealment, and therefore a phenomenological analysis of *Dasein* that motivates the project of *Being and Time*:

“Ἀληθεία does not belong to being in the sense that being could not be without unconcealness. For nature is there at hand even before it is disclosed. Ἀληθεία is a peculiar character of the being of beings insofar as beings stand in relation to a regard aimed at them, to a disclosure circumspecting them, to a knowing. On the other hand, the ἀληθές is certainly both in ὁ and is a character of being itself, and specifically insofar as being=presence and the latter is appropriated in λόγος and “is” in it. Disclosure, however, in relation to which there is ἀληθεία, is itself a mode of being, and indeed not of the beings which are first disclosed – those of the world – but, instead, of the beings we call human Dasein.”

In this section, the meaning of phenomenology was exhibited from Heidegger’s exegesis of φαινόμενον and λόγος in Aristotle’s inquiries in the *de Anima* and *de Interpretatione* made when Heidegger taught at Marburg in the early 1920s, before *Being and Time*. Heidegger appealed to Aristotle’s own phenomenological notions in order to retrieve the ontological grounds of Aristotle’s own thinking that could secure a phenomenological understanding of *Dasein* in factual life. This is clear, as I have indicated, both from the retrieval and re-reading of key Aristotelian notions that exhibit Aristotle’s thinking of being from factual life, and in Heidegger’s scorn for “free floating” philosophical constructions cut off from experience.

I have concentrated on Heidegger’s approach to λόγος and the phenomenological seeing of Aristotle’s own thinking. This phenomenological seeing did not only clear the way for Heidegger to return to Aristotle’s phenomenology, but it also made Heidegger aware of the importance of reflecting upon the way in which philosophical tradition, perhaps necessarily, assumes Aristotle as a foundation. For only against the background of such a reflection will it be possible to decide what it could mean to give a proper response to this foundation. The name Heidegger gives to this reflection is ‘destruction’

77 *PS*, pp., 17-18.
78 For a general summary of Heidegger’s phenomenology see Spiegelberg, Herbert, *The Phenomenological Movement*.
79 *SZ*, pp. 272, 267, 305 ff.
(Destruktion). For it is at this early stage that the goal of destruction is precisely to make Aristotle – and no one else – accessible. Heidegger aims to recover the facticity of Aristotle’s thought. Thus, the goal of this destruction is to make clear the phenomenal basis of Aristotle’s philosophy. Within this stage of the inquiry into λόγος and φανωμένου. Heidegger thus thinks it necessary to devote some effort to just listening to Aristotle and to what he has to say about it. I have shown that this listening occurs early on in the 1923/24 Phenomenology course but also on occasion of his interpretation of the phenomenon of language in the 1929/30s WS course. In both these courses we find an important shift in Heidegger’s understanding of language, one that reveals both a second ‘ontologisation’ of the phenomenon of language stretching, as it were, the ontological-existential implications of λόγος to the historical genesis of language in Being and Time – an event that is at the heart of the contrast between Uneigentlichkeit and Eigentlichkeit as we will see later on. It was indicated that although this shift is made clear in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics course (1929/30) after Being and Time (1927) it is already at work in the mid 1920s Marburg courses leading to Heidegger’s account of Eigentlichkeit and historicity in Being and Time (1927).

I have stressed the paramount importance of this shift: at the heart of Heidegger’s understanding and interpretation of Aristotle’s λόγος is the possibility of making language and the modes of disclosure of Dasein thematic in Being and Time – from the inauthentic or authentic realization of ἀληθεύειν (chapters 2 and 3 of this study) to the determination of Dasein’s authenticity (chapters 4 and 5 of this study).

d) ἀληθεύειν in the Nicomachean Ethics and Heidegger’s terminology of existence in Being and Time

We have seen how Heidegger unfolded the question of language from an interpretation of λόγος in Aristotle – an interpretation taken up by Heidegger in his university courses comprising ten years of lectures (1919-1929). How in these courses Heidegger was able to recover Aristotle’s understanding of language as

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80 SZ, p. 34.
exhibiting the discovering/unconcealing being ὤν ὡς ἀληθές and how Heidegger determined language as the fundamental possibility of articulating ἀλεθεύειν, the disclosing character of being exhibited in Aristotle’s own inquiries and assimilates this finding in terms of an operation that works to be an ‘ontological disclosure’ of Dasein in Being and Time, namely its Entdecktheit and Erschlossenheit (these are the two terms – to which a section will be devoted in this research – that articulate Dasein’s ways of being in the world either in relation to itself, to the world of others or the work-tool world).

In this initial stage of the research I have thus demonstrated that, in the courses before Being and Time, Heidegger is searching for an ontological-existential foundation of language that enables him to ‘deconstruct’ Dasein in the sense of finding the ontological basis for the structure of existence. This contention is supported by the specific steps in which Aristotle presents λόγος as the specific character of human life and Heidegger’s explicit articulation (Artikulation or Artikuliertheit) of the modes of existence in Being and Time – a connection that we aim to examine in more detail in chapter II in the analysis of Uneigentlichkeit.

The next stage in Heidegger’s research into Aristotle in the 1920s is to continue the investigation on Aristotle’s determination of ὤν ὡς ἀληθές which he takes to be a major problematic in Aristotle’s philosophy. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s ὤν ὡς ἀληθές is made explicit in the WS 1924/25 Freiburg course on Plato’s Sophist (GA 19) which in its first part carries a detailed interpretation of book VI of Nicomachean Ethics.81 In this course, Heidegger focuses on the plurality of uncovering attitudes of human life, in the 6th book of Nicomachean Ethics by reading each one of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν. Here, he concentrates his in-depth examination upon the meaning of being as ἀληθεύειν and the possibility of going beyond the determination of ὤν ὡς ἀληθές:

"ἀληθές", means literally uncovered. The Greek words for ‘truth’ (ἠ ἀληθεύειν, τὸ ἀληθές) are compounded of the private prefix ἢ ('not') and the verbal stem –λαθ- ('to escape notice', 'to be concealed'). The truth may thus be looked upon as that which is unsealed, that which gets discovered or uncovered ('entdeckt'). 82

81 Aristotle speaks of the ὤν ὡς ἀληθές (beings as unsealed) in DA, III, 3, 427 b 12; 428a 11, 428 b18.
82 PS, pp. 16, 24.
Aristotle speaks in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of the modality of uncovering, proper to ψυχή that distinguishes the human being from the gods and from the other animals: it is made manifest by the way of λόγος under five modes of ἀληθεύειν: ἐπιστήμη (knowledge), τέχνη (know-how), φρόνησις (practical wisdom), σοφία (understanding) νοῦς (pure apprehension) and elaborates an understanding of the λόγος of ἀληθεύειν in each mode of ἀληθεύειν.

It is precisely the Aristotelian horizon of certain fundamental determinations developed by Heidegger in his phenomenology which I now want to elucidate by tracing back the correspondences deposited in the argumentative steps of the *de Anima*, *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Being and Time* where Heidegger often does not speak about Aristotle explicitly but takes it up again in a few fundamental terms of his own analysis: the structural and terminological correspondences between Aristotle’s vision of the fundamental problem at stake in the question of an ἐπιστήμη πρακτική (knowledge pertaining to action) and Heidegger’s equation of the practical structure πράξεις (activity) – φρόνησις in terms of the ontological constitution of Dasein.

Therefore one’s chances of coming to terms with Heidegger’s own phenomenology are improved in the light of Aristotle’s own texts, namely by identifying the correspondences by means of which one can see how Heidegger takes up and reformulates the meaning of equivalent concepts from Aristotle’s thinking often deposited in passages and in argumentative connections where Heidegger does not speak of Aristotle explicitly. Examples may (and will) be given which illustrate (and I merely indicate it at this point) the correspondences between Aristotle and Heidegger’s own phenomenology that will receive a more detailed treatment in *Being and Time*: the three fundamental uncovering attitudes of

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83 *NE*, VI, 3, 1139b 15-17.
84 Traces of this understanding and of this suggestion can be found also in other texts from this period published by Heidegger himself, from the *Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers’ Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (1919/21) written between 1919 and 1921 and sent to Karl Jaspers. To *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (GA 3). For example, in the lecture ‘Phänomenologie und Theologie’ (1927) one finds this statement: ‘Existieren [ist] Handeln, πράξεις (GA 9, p. 58). But we are considering explicitly in this piece the introductory part of the lecture from the SS course *PS* and the concluding part of the latter from the SS 1926 GAP course. One can also draw valuable hints from the book from H. Weiß, *Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie der Aristoteles*; Weiss, who attended the lectures given by Heidegger, makes a fairly circumstantial summary of the Heideggerian interpretation of Aristotle’s practical philosophy in chapter 3 of his book whose title is “Menschliches Dasein – praxis” (pp. 99-153). Cf., also Fritz Kaufmann’s ‘bold’ review of Weiß’s book pp. 164-169.
ποίησις (production) and πράξις – and the Zuhandenheit (available-at-hand) and Vorhandenheit (pure, objective presence), together with the specific forms of knowledge which accompany them, namely, σοφία, τέχνη and φρόνησις with Gewissen (conscience), ὑπεξίς (desire) – and the double meaning of νοῦς ὑπετικός (discernment involving desire) and βουλευτική ὑπεξίς (deliberate desire)/ὑπεξίς διανοητική (desire involving thought) – with die Sorge (care)\(^{85}\), προαιρεσίς (choice in advance) with Entschlossenheit (resoluteness)\(^{86}\) πάθη (affects) with befindlichkeit (findliness)\(^{87}\), νοῦς πρακτικός (discernment involving action) with Verstehen (understanding).

At the center of Heidegger’s interpretive work during this period were Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the book III of the de Anima, books VI-IX of Metaphysics and the first book of Physics. This labour was initiated in the WS course 1921/22 Phaenomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles, Einführung in die phanomenologische Forschung (GA 61) where Heidegger addresses the problem of the movement of life in the historical context of an ontological research and raises the question of approaching Aristotle from the concrete locus vitæ of university and sciences as a need originated from facticity and returning to it. It was not until very recently that the follow up to the above mentioned first Freiburg course was published: Heidegger’s SS 1922 course Phanomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik (GA 62) is the most detailed and extensive of Heidegger’s lecture courses on Aristotle and presents material from Physics and Metaphysics. Heidegger aims to arrive at a basic understanding of what is called the “Ontology” of Aristotle and when, how and why does the ontological question of being first arise.

This confrontation continues when Heidegger is offered the teaching post for which he applied at Marburg: the publication of the first lectures for the Winter Semester at Marburg 1923/24: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (GA 17), for the SS 1924: Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie (GA 18) devoted to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Rethoric in which Heidegger assimilates Aristotle’s account of the πάθη in the context of the speech of the

\(^{85}\) Cf. νοῦς, pp. 67, 68, 181, 185, 186, 188, 194, 216; βουλευτική ὑπεξίς (deliberate desire) and Sorge, pp. 183, 184, 187, 188, 191, 194.

\(^{86}\) Cf., pp. 175 ff.

\(^{87}\) Cf., p. 95, 97.
rethor and aims to present it as an ontological account of Dasein; also, the following WS 1924/25 course on Plato’s Sophist: Platon Sophistes (GA 19) in which Heidegger examines Aristotle’s notion of ἀλήθεια in relation to the λόγος of the modes of ἀληθεύειν; the SS 1925 course Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs in which having introduced the concept of φανομένον in the 1924 lectures, Heidegger explains its λόγος, that is, phenomenology thus clarifying its original sense; the WS course in 1925/26: Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (GA 21), the SS 1926: Grundbegriffe der Antiken Philosophie (GA 22) in which Heidegger handles the history of Greek philosophy from Thales to Aristotle whose last part is devoted to an interpretation of the totality of the Aristotelian philosophy and finally that of the SS 1927: Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (GA 24), all of which have contributed documents of major importance for the reconstruction of, and the confrontation with Aristotle.

If in addition, one considers how many important studies on Aristotle – and indeed on Hegel, Kant, Schelling, Hölderlin and Nietzsche – have been motivated by Heidegger’s Marburg courses and especially those lectures delivered in his second period at Freiburg (1928/1944), namely SS 1931 course Aristoteles, Metaphysik Theta 1-3: Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft (GA 33), the WS course 1935/36 Die Frage nach dem Ding, Zu kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen (GA 41), the WS course 1937/38, Grundfragen der Philosophie, Ausgewählte Probleme der Logik, or the essay “Vom Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις. Aristoteles, Physik B, 1 (1939) (GA 9), one disposes of a number of fundamental indications with regard to the beginning and to the first decisive development of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle, in the lecture courses from his teaching assignements at Freiburg (including the second Freiburg period 1928/29) at the end of the war when Heidegger works again on the problem of truth in Aristotle.

My aim is to show how, in this course (GA 19), Heidegger comes to articulate and assimilate the modes of ἀληθεύειν– in book VI of Aristotle’s Nicomachean

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88 At the time of this course, Heidegger was busy preparing SZ for publication, consequently, unlike most lecture courses for which Heidegger wrote his notes in full sentences, these notes are in a more abbreviated form. Cf. Richard Rojewicz’s introduction in his translation of GAP.

89 Cf. GM, paragraph 72. Also, the first part of Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit (GA 31) Freiburg lecture course, SS 1930, which contains an interpretation of META IX, 10 that Heidegger fully unfolds in AM the coming Summer Semester,
Ethics – into his own analytic of Dasein. Before I can show what terms are exactly at work in the text, I should move carefully to decide whether or not it is sensible to take a position regarding the general agreement concerning how exactly the presence of Aristotle in Heidegger’s Being and Time should be understood from the reading of the Nicomachean Ethics. For, one basic tendency extracted from nearly all available texts on this topic, is the idea that Heidegger’s interpretation of Ethics of Aristotle is an ‘ontologisation’ of Aristotle’s practical philosophy. This is the view adopted by Volpi, van Buren and Kisiel. I agree with Bernasconi’s concern if the idea of an ‘ontologisation’ would not at least imply an assumption to the effect that Heidegger could not make use of Aristotle’s ontology because of its metaphysical presuppositions, and so had to turn to his practical works instead.

Having said this, I believe one of the consequences of this focus is that the question concerning the relationship between Heidegger’s and Aristotle’s Ontology has been pushed into the background by most of the above-mentioned scholars. The last few years seem to testify to a renewed interest in Heidegger’s encounter with Aristotle’s Ontology (Sadler, Hanley, Brogan and Sheehan) or indeed Ontology and Theology. On this point, along with the research question of the ἀληθεύειν, I will develop the question the other way round, as it were, if the influence of Aristotle's Ethics on Heidegger’s work suggests there is (or there isn’t) an ethical dimension to Heidegger’s ontological investigations. This has not been discussed to any great extent and I believe it can only really be addressed in its own terms after I succeed in seeing how the ‘ontologisation’ is believed to amount to that which Heidegger translates into the domain of existential ontology as an analytic of Dasein that in Aristotle’s Ethics is thought to concern only the ethical dimension of human existence, thus neutralising the ethical structures so that they could be applied to human being as such. I am asking to what extent it is or it is not philosophically accurate to draw such a radical line from Heidegger's ontological intentions and an underlying ethology of das Man, for from this distinction, and contra Heidegger, a controversy was born regarding his purported un-ethical approach to human being. As mentioned above, the literature on Heidegger and Aristotle has largely been devoted to Heidegger’s “appropriation” of the Ethics to his existential analytic, and there is a fairly widespread view that this appropriation consists in a kind of ‘ontologisation’. I believe this to be correct insofar as one is
aware that Heidegger does not take Ethics to be concerned with ethics or morality in a narrow sense, but insists – and this is what leads his research on Aristotle to Being and Time – upon approaching it as an analysis of the being of human Dasein, the aim of which is to uncover the possibilities for Man’s access to the truth. This is at the very centre of the presence of Aristotle in Being and Time with ἀληθεύειν (to be disclosing, making-true) as its theme.

The reference to ἀληθεύειν comes from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VI, 3, X, 6-8 and Metaphysics I, 1-2 to which Heidegger refers in the present course on Platon’s Sophistes as the “Boden der Seinsforschung” (the ground of research into being).90 This course was delivered one year after Heidegger’s Marburg lectures on Aristotle’s de Anima and Husserl, also in Marburg and it constantly keeps in view, and will stretch further the connection of the modes of disclosing with ἀληθεύειν ἡ ψυχή:

“Before Aristotle enumerated the modes of ἀληθεύειν, he said: ἀληθεύειν ἡ ψυχή. Truth is hence a character of beings, insofar as they are encountered; but in an authentic sense it is nevertheless a determination of the being of human being itself.”91

As Theodore Kisiel very clearly enuniated in his The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, Heidegger’s phenomenological way to Aristotle discovered not only that Aristotle was thinking phenomenologically (Kisiel uses the word ‘proto-phenomenologist) but “the most memorable achievement of this innovative textual practice was the insight, in book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, into ἀληθεύειν as a multifaceted process of revealment. The discovery led to a deeper comprehension of the nature of phenomenology, the λόγος of φαινομένα, which in fact played a governing role throughout this evolution of insights. The insight into ἀληθεύειν as unconcealment in turn prompted the recognition of the fundamental trait of ὑστία, the being of beings, as presence”.92

For Aristotle and the Greeks being is constant presence. Aristotle says in de Partibus Animalium that that which points out from itself is brought about in a

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90 PS, p. 21.
91 PS, p. 23.
92 Cf. Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, pp. 228, 229. Kisiel makes this point when he refers to Aristotle’s thinking of being as Anwesenheit: Anwesen (ousia) and Anwesenheit (parousia) (DA, 418b 17). Cf. also SZ, p. 34.
fundamental presentation. Heidegger says that the presentation of a phenomenon is re-presented by *Dasein* whilst “for the man of science being is a representation in relation to the world.” To rethink what lies in Aristotle’s conception of being as constant presence, the temporal character of this notion and the consequences it bore to metaphysical thought, is, for Heidegger, the unthought (*das Ungedachte*) of metaphysics, the foundation on which metaphysics itself stands and therefore beyond its reach. How then does it stand with *Being and Time*? How is it a signpost to this unthought of all metaphysics? How can we see what shows itself and speak about it? Heidegger asks in his *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* course: “In what connection stands the concept of phenomenon with that which Aristotle expressed as λόγος?” Heidegger set out to explore this connection, as we have previously seen, from the meaning of λόγος in Aristotle, and he deliberately chooses and builds up his terminology and his way of putting things not only for the positive purpose of disclosing new ‘phenomena’ but in studied contrast with the traditional philosophical vocabulary.

There is therefore a discussion on Aristotle previous to *Being and Time*, in the lectures from the 1920s that is put forward in *Being and Time*. I would like to work out how Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν and the uncovering of ὁ ὡς ἀληθεία provides him with the ontological outlook which permits him to take Aristotle’s findings in a radical manner and work them out in relation to the uncovering structure of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*. “The existential-ontological foundations of uncovering is first shown by the most primordial phenomenon of truth.”

One of the clearest indications of the legitimacy of efforts that has been undertaken to show the link between the genesis of *Being and Time* and Heidegger’s work on Aristotle is found in the manuscript where Heidegger announces that the question he is asking as he approaches Aristotle’s texts is the question of being of human being: “The purpose of the philosophical investigation

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94 *EPF*, p. 12.
95 *EPF*, p. 13.
96 Heidegger will insist later on, in the 1950s, that the attempt to go beyond metaphysics and comprehend it in its genesis and essence cannot be carried out in the language of metaphysics. The enquiry into the essence of being expires unless it gives up the language of metaphysics, in which its representational thinking is cristalized. For example in *Zur Seinsfrage* (GA 9), p. 233.
97 *SZ*, p. 220.
is human Dasein as a question about him in his character of being." 98 He makes clear that his projected reading of Aristotle is to be a *Daseinsanalytik*, a questioning about the being who experiences and interprets being. 99

Even at this time, towards the middle of the 1920s, the vision of the problem which characterizes and will characterize Heidegger’s thinking is being formed more and more. Heidegger thinks is is possible to claim that the unquestioned foundation of Aristotle’s equation between τὸ ὄν and ἀλήθεια consists of the presupposition of a very clear relationship between being and time and therefore in the presupposition of a certain comprehension of being and of time themselves. Certainly, this presupposition gets its sense from the problem of τὸ ὄν (being) and ἀλήθεια because in order that the truth, in the sense of being disclosed or unconcealed (ἀλήθεια) is characterized as an ontological being of beings, the latter must first be implicitly understood as presence (*Anwesen*), for only what has been previously understood as present can later be determined as disclosed, that is to say, as true (ἀλήθες) in the sense suggested by Heidegger’s etymology of the Greek word. But the interpretation of being as presence has its implicit foundation itself in a presupposition of an unquestioned connection of being *with* time, in the context of which the dimension of the present is taken to be the determinative dimension of time. In other words, with regard to an understanding of time which privileges the dimension of the present, there corresponds an interpretation of being in which the primacy is consequently given to presence. Heidegger arrives at this conclusion by way of his interpretation of the problem of ἀλήθεια (unconcealment) in Aristotle from the time of the lecture course of WS 1925/26 (GA 21) to the present lecture course delivered just one year before, when he examined the modes of ἀλήθευσιν in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and on which I will now change the focus.

A significant portion of Heidegger’s treatment of the modes of ἀλήθευσιν, in this introduction to the projected book of Aristotle has to do with the meaning of and its relationship to λόγος and hence λέγειν. It is seldom noted or paid attention to, but Heidegger is certainly correct that the book VI of the *Ethics*, which treats dianoetic excellence or virtue, if we like, is a treatise on truth.

98 *PLA*, p. 10.
99 *PLA*, p. 40.
“(…) Human life in its being, ψυχῆ, is speaking, interpreting, i.e., it is a carrying out of ἀληθεύειν (disclosing). Aristotle did not only, in the De Anima, found this state of affairs ontologically, but, for the first time and before all else, he saw and interpreted on that ground the multiplicity of phenomena, the multiplicity of the various possibilities of ἀληθεύειν. The interpretation is accomplished in the sixth book of Nichomachean Ethics, chapters 2-6, 1138 b35ff.”

It requires the greatest philosophical exertion to keep in view the ontological interpretation, hierarchic displacement and unitary structuration of Aristotle’s own terms in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν.

Each of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν, the Aristotelian determinations in question as they are presented in the Nicomachean Ethics, is indicative of the three fundamental uncovering modalities of human life, that is to say, the three forms in which the soul is in the truth, and that they therefore constitute the first phenomenological analysis of Dasein, that, Heidegger claims, Aristotle does not succeed in posing explicitly, and in a sufficient radical manner, the problem of the unity which lies at the bottom of these three determinations and which sustains them. In other words, the problem here at stake is one of seeing why, for Heidegger, Aristotle did not succeed in grasping the fundamental ontological constitution of human life and why according to Heidegger, this omission is due to the fact that, by remaining within the horizon of a metaphysics of presence, Aristotle remained tied to an understanding of time which prevented him from seeing that the structure of human life is original temporality. The problem of temporality will be addressed in Chapter III of this study in relation to Heidegger’s lecture course on Aristotle’s Physics and Chapter IV in relation to historicity.

My aim now is to identify firstly, the modes of ἀληθεύειν that Heidegger works out in Platon: Sophistes (GA 19) and indicate some of the structural and terminological correspondences between these Greek notions and Heidegger’s own existential notions, secondly, move on to the framework of ontological concepts upon which Heidegger is able to articulate his Daseinsanalytik.

I propose thereby, before seeing how exactly these notions are at play in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity in Being and Time, to portray Heidegger’s

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100 PS, p. 18.
earlier reading of Aristotle’s όληθεύειν in order to trace its development in the project of Being and Time through the analysis of Eigentlichkeit.

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Heidegger claims that the primordial sense of being for Aristotle – the field of beings and sense of being that orientate his general understanding and interpretation of beings – is production (ποίησις). For the most part, beings are interpreted in their being as available for use in our dealings (Vorhandensein). Thus, according to Heidegger’s analysis in this essay – and I make this point to illustrate the insight at stake when Heidegger reads and appropriates each mode of όληθεύειν – the idea that Aristotle employed an objective, theoretical ‘model’ of understanding the being of beings is false. Beings are understood in terms of how they appear (their look to us or έιδος) and in terms of their being addressed and claimed in a λόγος oriented by its surroundings. This is to say, Heidegger insists that Aristotle’s word for being – οὐσία – still resonates with the sense of availability for use, in the sense of possessions and belongings. Heidegger insists further, that Aristotle’s ontological structure arises from this preliminary way of grasping beings in general. The question is whether human being is also analyzed on the basis of this general notion of being in terms of production. Hence, in saying that production drives the Aristotelian understanding of being, Heidegger is not arguing that Aristotle understood all beings including human being on the basis of a model drawn from τέχνη. What is at issue, rather, is something like world, though Heidegger does not make this explicit in this essay. However, he does point here to the framework on which he will be able to work from Aristotle, that is, Heidegger’s point is that this sense of production, beings of τέχνη produced beings in the sense that their coming to be is handled and managed by a craftsman, natural beings and human beings, are all produced differently, but are all interpreted (through τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη and φρόνησις as ways of being

101 PIA, p. 374; GAP, pp. 24-36.
102 GAP, p. 24.
produced or brought forth. In fact, when it comes to making explicit the ontological structure of beings, Aristotle’s field of research is not beings from τέχνη at all but being from θύσις\(^\text{103}\). The primary text for an ontological investigation of produced beings is the *Physics* as an original investigation of moved-beings and of being-moved as the way of being of these natural beings. The *Nicomachean Ethics* on the other hand, is about the ‘movement’ or way in which one chooses and decides about the modalities of his life by turning toward which he takes to be the best.

The first correspondence is that between the three fundamental modalities of being, namely *Dasein*, *Zuhandenheit* (available-at-hand) and *Vorhandenheit* (pure, objective presence), modalities distinguished and determined in the lectures from the 1920s, as also in *Being and Time* and the three Aristotelian determinations – the three fundamental uncovering attitudes of ψυχή – θεωρία, ποιησις and πράξις.

The first determination is θεωρία and *Vorhandenheit*. If we divide the word θεωρία we have two fundamental roots upon which Heidegger thinks. These are θέως and ὅραν. θέως means the pure onlooking seeing and ὅραν to see, to look upon. θεωρία is the immediate unity of seeing and what is seen in unconcealment, that is in the visible, ὅρατόν. The particular orientation of beings is however the θέσις, a noun that is the Greek reduplication of τίθέμεν. This is made possible by the arrangement of beings with their own sight, θέα, such that being is revealed as part of the whole in this in-sight – θεωρος. This sight that sees is not the pure onlooking seeing but the spectator – of the pure seeing, the on-looking seeing of place revealed in each oriented being, θετός. The original sense of θεωρία provides itself the evidence of the uncovering attitude of human life as an immediate unity of the seeing and what is seen, which is prior to the separation of subject and object, and the consequent ‘analysis’ that is based on this split. Aristotle doesn’t think at all about such division and an indication of this is that his first mention of θεωρία after book VI of *Nicomachean Ethics* comes in his discussion on friendship. He says that we can observe or witness (θεωρεῖν) others actions better than our own. We come to be aware of the being of our friend because, Aristotle says, we perceive, on the basis of the experience of ourselves,

\(^{103}\) I will address this problem in chapter III with a discussion of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s *Physics* B1 in connection to the notion of κίνησις and ‘Entschlossenheit’ in the concept of *Eigentlichkeit*. 61
that human life is intrinsically good and pleasant especially for the good person. Our awareness of our own being implies in this sense awareness of being and thus the being of the others such that in perceiving ourselves, we perceive at the same time others like ourselves and therefore all knowledge presupposes a certain kinship between the knower and what is known. According to Heidegger, when human life assumes this uncovering attitude, being presents itself in a modality he calls *Vorhandenheit*. Confirmation of this correspondence comes from the suggestive conjunction that by *Vorhandenheit* Heidegger translates in fact Aristotle’s idea of wonder (θαυμάζειν) in which the desire of knowledge is rooted: “διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἡρέσαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, ἦ στὶ χρής μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων θαυμάσαντες”, (It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophize; wondering originally about obvious perplexities.)

This seems to be the key passage from Aristotle to which Heidegger refers in *Being and Time* to make sense of the relationship between θεωρία and pure objective presence (*Vorhanden*).

He mentions that our senses affect us because, as attuned through moods, we are already accessible but he takes Aristotle further when he refers that ontologically, therefore, our moods and dispositions must be considered as being the basic condition of the possibility of uncovering the world, for they alone render us open to what comes from the world. This pure looking, Heidegger comes to realise, “even though it may pierce into the inmost veins of the being of a vorhanden being”, can never discover such a thing as a threatening object confronting it in the world. Even the purest θεωρία or ‘contemplation’ has its basic mood of a ‘quiet tarrying with’.

This is to say, for Heidegger, θεωρία is only one of the different possibilities and modalities of uncovering through which Man accesses being. But I won’t be able to unfold fully this connection of θεωρία with *Vorhandenheit* without first delineating the other two above mentioned modalities of uncovering: ποίησις and πράξεις.

Ποίησις is the manipulative mode of uncovering in which one finds oneself when one handling beings and this uncovering aims at the production of works. This mode of uncovering is made available through τέχνη, the knowledge that

105 SZ, p. 61.
guides the latter towards its objective. When one assumes this uncovering orientation, beings present themselves to us in the modality of being that Heidegger calls *Zuhandenheit* (available-at-hand).

Πράξις is the mode of uncovering realized in this form of action and whose goal is for the sake of which (σῷ ἐνεκκε), that is to say, in its success as action and not for the sake of something (ἐνεκα τινός). 106

Φρόνησις is the kind of knowledge which belongs to the latter and which gives it its orientation. This last correspondence, which certainly appears as the most problematic and disputable, but which, is for all that the most significant and the most central, has to be developed in greater detail. 107

We ought to see now in what terms are these modes of ἀληθεύειν interconnected and why Heidegger recovers them and how he works them out from the standpoint of the ontological structure of *Dasein*.

Heidegger explains the three determinations of θεωρία, ποίησις and πράξις as the first ways of carrying through ἀληθεύειν. Heidegger says that all the modes of ἀληθεύειν—ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς 108—stand connected to λόγος and that all, with the exception of νοῦς are μετά λόγον, that is, “there is no circumspection, no understanding, which would not be a speaking.” 109 Aristotle, on the other hand, begins book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* by suggesting that the λόγος that defines human being who by its being has a λόγος is double, divided in two. He says: “ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα” (Let this underlie our consideration: there are two basic modes of λόγος). 110 The two λόγοι are the one by which we contemplate beings whose ἀρχαί (origin) do not admit of being other, and the one by which we apprehend beings that can be other. Aristotle designates the one that encompasses both ἐπιστήμη and σοφία by the word ἐπιστημονικόν and the other that includes τέχνη and φρόνησις by the word λογιστικόν. Heidegger indicates that “the distinction between ἐπιστημονικόν and λογιστικόν is made in reference to

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107 Cf. pp. 67, 68, 69 and also Chapter III in connection to Entschiossedheit and Gewissen, pp. 176-179, 180, 181, 192 to ποίησις and πράξις, p.192.
108 NE, VI, 3, 1139b 15-17.
109 PS, pp. 21-22. Also, the same idea in PIA, p. 53.
110 NE, VI, 2, 1139a6.
what is disclosed in such speaking and discourse; it is taken from the beings themselves, the beings appropriated in the \( \text{ἀληθεύειν} \).” Heidegger had already indicated that in this division, \( \nuούς \) has been left out. This is because \( \nuούς \) is itself twofold and also has two senses, corresponding to the two \( \lambdaόγοι \) – the \( \nuούς \) involved in the disclosing of beings that have otherness (\( \text{ἐνδεχόμενον ἀλλως ἔχειν} \), literally beings that can be otherwise, \( \text{NE} \), 1140a1), and the \( \nuούς \) that discloses the \( \alpha\epsilonι \ θυ \) (always being) or the beings that are always-being, that hold themselves always, as long as they are, the same in their being. Heidegger goes on into a very dense and specific analysis of the modes of \( \text{ἀληθεύειν} \) that discloses more and more a double \( \lambdaόγος \) in every mode of disclosing, as it were, stretching Aristotle’s understanding of the double sense of being as both able to be otherwise and not able to be otherwise than it is. On one hand, one of the questions Heidegger asks in the beginning of the \textit{Sophist} course is the question of \( \lambdaόγος \) and its relationship to \( \text{ἀληθεύειν} \). If this is the case, is Heidegger trying to discover in the twofold \( \lambdaόγος \) the movement between the two \( \lambdaογοι \), that is to say, a \( \deltaιαλόγος \) or dialectic – a certain reinscription of Plato that would go ‘beyond’ Aristotle and discover the philosopher as the one who dwells in the between? Let us go back to the modes of \( \text{ἀληθεύειν} \) and to the importance of disclosing itself at stake both in \( \lambdaόγος \) and \( \nuούς \) in relation to \( \text{ἀληθεύειν} \).

Heidegger refers the close proximity of \( \tau\varepsilonχη \) and \( \phiρόνησις \) as both being involved in the disclosing of \textit{what can be otherwise}. The difference here is that \( \tau\varepsilonχη \) has to do with produced beings whose \( \alpha\ρχη \) is in another, whereas \( \phiρόνησις \) has to do with human being itself. “\( \tau\varepsilonχη \) has to do with things which first have to be made and which are not yet what they will be. \( \phiρόνησις \) makes the situation accessible; and the circumstances are always different in every action.” But this is a not a ready-made difference, not even a philosophical consideration of human being from other beings, in other words, this points out to the constitution of human being as otherness, not by virtue of being dependent for

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111 \( \text{PS} \), p. 28.
112 \( \text{NE} \), VI, 1139 a6 ff, “ϕω\-\thetaεω\-\rhoο\-\nu\-\omega\, \tau\-\alpha\-\tau\-\omicron\-\alpha\-\omicron\-\upsilon\-\tau\-\alpha\-\omicron\-\omega\, \tau\-\omicron\-\nu\-\tau\-\omicron\-\nu\-\omega\, \alpha\-\omicron\-\rho\-\chi\-\omicron\-\eta\, \mu\-\eta\, \epsilon\-\nu\-\delta\-\epsilon\-\gamma\-\omicron\-\nu\-\omicron\-\tau\-\omicron\-\alpha\-\omicron\-\upsilon\-\tau\-\alpha\-\omicron\-\nu\-\omega\, \alpha\-\omicron\-\rho\-\chi\-\omicron\-\alpha\-\omicron\-\nu\-\epsilon\-\ς\-\nu\-\epsilon\-\in\-\nu\-\in\) [with which we regard beings whose \( \alpha\rho\chi\alpha\iota \) [origin] cannot be otherwise]; “\( \epsilon\-\nu\-\delta\-\epsilon\-\gamma\-\omicron\-\nu\-\omicron\-\tau\-\alpha\-\omicron\-\nu\-\omega\, \alpha\-\omicron\-\rho\-\chi\-\omicron\-\alpha\-\omicron\-\nu\-\epsilon\-\ς\-\nu\-\epsilon\-\in\-\nu\-\in\)” (that which can be otherwise) and Heidegger’s thematization in \( \text{PS} \), p. 28.
113 \( \text{PS} \), pp. 28, 29.
its being on another being but because it is involved, literally, concerned (Besorgen) in its activity, in its πράξις:

“This initial and most primitive ontological distinction does not arise primarily in a philosophical consideration but it is a distinction of natural Dasein itself; it is not invented but lies on the horizon in which the ἀληθεύειν of natural Dasein moves. (…) This world of nature, which is always as it is, is in a certain sense the background from which what can be other and different stands out. This distinction is an entirely original one. Therefore it is wrong to say that there are two regions of being, two fields, as it were, which are set beside one another in theoretical knowledge. Rather, this distinction articulates the world; it is its first general ontological determination.”¹¹⁴

We have here a first indication of Heidegger’s thinking of the world but we will not be able to provide enough evidence of it before working out what kind of disclosure Heidegger thinks Aristotle has in mind when he speaks about ἐπιστήμη and σοφία and the latter with φρόνησις. The question for Heidegger is that the apprehension of ἄει ὄν in ἐπιστήμη and σοφία is the way of disclosing the φύσει δύνα and the question is of knowing whether these beings have their ὀρχή in themselves and not in another.¹¹⁵ The main point to disentangle here is that in both the case of σοφία and φρόνησις an immediate grasp, apprehension, is always required – νοῦς. While Aristotle privileges σοφία over φρόνησις, Heidegger does not see Aristotle as tying σοφία over φρόνησις in a hierarchical way so that σοφία would be the disclosure of being while φρόνησις would be the equivalent of an apophasic speaking of being through synthesis or division. Both σοφία and φρόνησις are activities that involve an immediate apprehension, νοῦς. The philosophical closeness of σοφία and φρόνησις that is established in this way does not deny, according to Aristotle that σοφία has a certain priority as a higher way of apprehending beings. This higher way of apprehending beings is only possible, according to Heidegger, because it is primarily an ἀισθησίς (perception), an ultimate simple view of the moment, or a moment-of-vision, an Augenblick of the moment¹¹⁶, as it were, revealed in its fullness and brought to fruition in activity, in its πράξις. Therefore, the question of a double λόγοi is not a question of a division within practical life between

¹¹⁴ PS, p. 29.
¹¹⁵ PS, p. 31.
¹¹⁶ PS, p. 174.
sofia and φρόνησις or a προαίρεσις (a choice in advance) and πράξις. Rather – Heidegger makes this point strongly in the Sophist volume – φρόνησις is intrinsically an αἰσθησις, a disclosure that occurs in human action. Indeed, Heidegger translates φρόνησις to Gewissen at this point – and we will see in Chapter III. This practical being is not in opposition to a theoretical being but it constantly takes us, it calls us back to situation and situating ourselves out of our being, and for Aristotle that is connected to a noetic activity, a νοῦς πρακτικός (discernment involving action). This is a difficult notion to grasp, again because, as Heidegger shows, this way of having its being that is disclosed in φρόνησις is peculiar. Though noetic, there can be no pure, a-temporal beholding of such being since the resolute moment of πράξις is always already caught in coming to be, in the character of its being able to be other than it is.

The philosophical sense of this methodological, linguistic analysis of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν undertaken by Heidegger is, I suggest, opened to a more content oriented introduction, which I call a preliminary analysis of how time is commonly understood in everyday experience. In other words, the discussion of the complex hierarchy of Aristotle’s ἀληθεύειν and the absence of explicit reference to the question of the meaning of being in general is no more argument against the conception of this question in 1924 than is the absence of Erschlossenheit (disclosedness) an argument against the existence of this term in Heidegger’s repertoire in Platon: Sophistes (GA19).

The point I have been making throughout this section is that it is through Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and the Rhetoric, the latter read as “the first systematic hermeneutic of everydayness of existence”, that Heidegger comes afresh to Being and Time. In the research on ἀληθεύειν in Marburg we see the fundamental shape of the core of Being and Time’s treatment of Dasein’s everyday ontic experience and temporality. But that shape is, as far as I can see, still somewhat primitive and still on the way towards formulation. For example, the concept of resoluteness (that makes the core of Chapter III) presents many difficulties for it is linked to a number of temporal notions that Heidegger knows from Aristotle but that are intertwined in a difficult interpretive puzzle. Heidegger says, for example, that “the unwavering precision with which Dasein is thus

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117 SZ, p. 138.
essentially individualized down to its ownmost potentiality-for-being, discloses the advancing towards death as the possibility which is non-relational.”

If one takes one’s resolute choice of death as one’s ultimate possibility that constitutes an authentic existence, this implies that death is the sole authentic aim of resoluteness. Without wanting to anticipate too much of the subsequent discussion, this has led to the claim that resoluteness is non-relational (Demske). But, in fact, if Heidegger claims that Dasein’s non-relational solicitude and withdrawal is necessary as a pre-condition for taking action in the situation, I do not see how it alone can constitute authenticity, for it is clear in the text, in paragraph 60 (and some scattered later passages), as we will examine later, that Dasein must return to the everyday and must choose possibilities that are currently and factically available in order to achieve an authentic existence. Hence, despite a formal resemblance in the individualization of death and resoluteness, there is the fundamental difference that whereas authentic being-towards-death makes one aware of one’s individualized self-being (solus ipse), resoluteness brings Dasein back into the situation so as to resolutely take action in the spheres of concern and solicitude, and only in this sense can one claim that ‘resoluteness’ is non-relational.

With this example, I reach my second point, for similar interpretive difficulties in the text can, in my view, be effectively tackled with reference to Heidegger’s conceptuality in Being and Time. A particular area in which this is the case is the difference between the ontological and the ontic. Ontological concepts are said to explicate “beings in their being” (“Diesem Seienden in Seinem Sein”) and conceptualize “primordial structures of Dasein” (“einer ursprünglicher Seinsstruktur des Daseins”) that are essential and “determinative” for human being (“wesenhaften Strukturen (…) seinsbestimmende durchhalten”, “(…) kann ontologisch sehr wohl in prägnanten Strukturen gefaßt werden”). These explicate the most “fundamental concepts” (“Grundbegriffe”) of a given subject matter and “lay bare”, exhibit, the conceptual structure of that subject matter. The subject matter or horizon presently under consideration is “average everydayness”, the way

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118 SZ, p. 307.
119 Cf., p. 94.
120 Cf. the same point in pp. 135, 147.
121 SZ, pp. 12, 54, 16-17, 44, 10, 37.
we are “at first and for the most part” in our everyday work world and social world. The ontological concepts in division 1 of Being and Time, for example, are thus meant to provide the foundations of an ontology of “everyday” existence and denote characteristics purportedly common to us and shared by all historical societies.

Heidegger contrasts his ontological problematic with “the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences” (ontischen Fragen der positiven Wissenschaften).\textsuperscript{122} I suggest therefore that the ontic-ontological distinction, in terms of its use in Being and Time, be taken as a systematic distinction between different types of ‘existentialia’. Ontic ‘existentialia’, in this explication, are those of special sciences which are concerned with particular subject matters such as, for example, British society, DNA conditions for a specific experiment, or the sexual behaviour of the hippocampus. Ontological ‘existentialia’, on the other hand, are a type of general philosophical notion that describes, for instance, social being as such, the categorical structure of nature, and human sexuality in its invariant universal structures. Heidegger holds that ontological inquiry is “more primordial” (ursprünglicher) since it explicates the basic concepts of experience that constitute the subject matter in question.\textsuperscript{123} Moreover, Heidegger claims that his existential ontology lays the foundation for the ontic sciences of Man and thus comprises the various ontic sciences.\textsuperscript{124} However, the roots of the ontological analysis “are ultimately existentiell, that is ontica “, i.e. the ontological is always rooted in the ontic for Heidegger.\textsuperscript{125} The philosophical method to which Heidegger appeals in his ontological laying out of the ontic phenomena is phenomenology.\textsuperscript{126} This to and fro circular movement in which the ontic itself is understood in the light of an ontological presupposition, leads to the ontological and back again to the ontic, has its parallel in the way we will follow the central planks of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time. For example, from a particular structure of inauthenticity or authenticity phenomenologically analyzed in the light of an assumed totality, to the whole and back again to the part, until Dasein’s ontological structure is grasped in its wholeness; from the inauthentic, described in the light of the possibility of

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{122} SZ, p. 11.
\bibitem{123} SZ, pp. 10-12, 16-17, 44-45, 54-5.
\bibitem{124} SZ, pp. 10, 45, 49-51, 247, 293.
\bibitem{125} SZ, p. 13.
\bibitem{126} SZ, p. 27.
\end{thebibliography}
authenticity, to the authentic and back again to the everyday mode of existence until a clear picture of the way the two modes are related becomes apparent.127

The ontological ‘existentials’ of our existence, our life, are a matter for philosophical reflection since these are derived from the understanding of our everyday existence (what Heidegger calls our pre-ontological understanding: and from the special ontic sciences.128 Heidegger argues that ontological analysis is “accomplished by repeating what has already been ontically discovered, and by purifying it in a way which is ontologically more transparent.”129 Thus, the ontology of factical life is rooted both in the foundations of the social sciences and in our pre-ontological, that is, in our non-reflective understanding, of factical life.130 Because Heidegger’s analysis purports to describe the existence of all historical societies it lends itself to describing out current modes of disclosing our existence, which can be illustrated by ontic examples found in Aristotle. These should provide both evidence for Heidegger’s analysis and an ontic exemplification of his ontological categories. Heidegger’s ontological categories, as we shall see in the account of das Man and uneigentlichkeit are coined out of Aristotle’s notions describing what Heidegger believed Aristotle to be aiming at when he inquired into the modes of ἀληθεύειν: factical life. Heidegger’s description of inauthenticity in our everyday ways of talking, understanding, seeing, interpreting and acting are, as we will see in the following chapter, interconnected in a concept of Eigentlichkeit which recommends modifications and indeed transformations of these ways of being.131 Philosophy should not be a theoretical discipline in the same sense as science, but nor should it be “practical”, if that is taken to mean that philosophy should articulate a world-view or be ethics. Heidegger’s relation to ethics, and to practical philosophy in general, becomes a particularly urgent matter in connection to Aristotle, since Heidegger has turned precisely to Aristotle’s practical

127 Explaining the terms ‘ontic’ and ‘ontological’, Heidegger says, “The expression ontic, based on the Greek to on, being signifies ‘concerning a being’. But on the Greek to on, being, involves its own essence or character of being a being (Seiendheit, ousia) which by no means remains the same in the course of its history… Ontological means the coming about of the gathering together of beings in respect of their character of being beings. Ontological refers to that reality which by its very nature stands within this history (that is, the history of being which underlies ontology), going through that which according to the way beings become unconcealed in it.” Cf., “Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung” in HZ, pp. 161-163.
128 SZ, pp. 15-17, 312-5.
129 SZ, p. 51.
130 SZ, p. 75.
131 SZ, p. 44.
philosophy, his Politics, Rhetoric and not least the Nicomachean Ethics in order to find a testimony of Aristotle’s insight into the facticity of life and its ways of disclosure. Of particular importance in this connection is that Heidegger seemingly suppresses the ethical import of inauthenticity because he purports to offer a pure ontologic description of Dasein – this comprising λόγος ἀληθεύειν in his ontological enquiry. It is this assumption that led to such radical claims such as to find Being and Time either to be a re-interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics or a pure Ontology of human being. Any attempt, therefore, to make explicit, let alone advocate a favourable or more critical position on Aristotle's presence in Being and Time will come perhaps not without controversy for it seemingly violates to Heidegger's 'intentions', but does not de facto distort or misrepresent what Heidegger explicitly translates into the domain of his analytic of Dasein that professes to let what Aristotle says be seen from itself. Implicit in this interpretation is the assumption, as we noted, that the concept of Eigentlichkeit adds an important relevance to Being and Time, which gains increased interest by a clarification of the full import of Aristotle’s modes of ἀληθεύειν. One of the most striking features of Heidegger’s account of Eigentlichkeit and his underlying interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics in this connection is that he does not read it like a work on ethics in the common sense, but regards it as an analysis of human existence as a whole, prior to the division between the theoretical and the practical, or between what is and what should be. However, considering that Heidegger’s own work hardly is “neutral” in tone but is clearly permeated by the conviction that there is an authentic possibility for human existence – to take hold of one’s existence and to decide in favour of truth – his stated suspicion of ethics might seem a bit surprising. Nevertheless, another study would be required to show that that ethics does not necessarily have to be normative in kind, in other words, it does not have to endorse certain values on the basis of the possibility of distinguishing between morally justified and unjustified behaviour; it can also be critical, that is, investigate the foundations of valuation, the reason why we consider some things to be good and others not, etc. According to Heidegger, however, philosophy should affirm neither of these alternatives. One of the reasons why philosophy as Heidegger understands it cannot be ethics is that it cannot be divided into special branches, for to do so is to bestow upon philosophy a determinate sphere of
objects. In this way, philosophy becomes a discipline of essentially the same kind as the positive sciences and is thus from the beginning prevented from being ontology or phenomenology. Further, philosophy neither should nor can give guidance for action in the sense of rules or norms. It should not, since its true aim is not to be productive (“poietic”), but to enact a particular “how”.

In conclusion, these points even if they do not prove it yet, at least render plausible the general argumentation with regard to a retrieval by Heidegger of the framework for the problems posed by Aristotle’s modes of \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \nu \) and to a correspondence, yet to be fully examined in this research, between Aristotle’s phenomenological notions and Heidegger’s existential analytic. Even though as the points previously taken into consideration prepare the way, the legitimacy of this reconciliation of determinations which, on the surface, are so divergent, will appear self-evident in the context of Heidegger’s own original analytic of Dasein.

The uncovering structure which designates Aristotle’s understanding of \( \delta \upsilon \ \omicron \varsigma \ \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \varsigma \), and which in fact determines the ontological constitution of Dasein is the result – and this is my contention – of a thorough thinking made by Heidegger of the essential meaning of being as \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \nu \) presented by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. To be sure, by linking Heidegger’s analysis of existence so closely to Aristotle, doubts inevitably arise, doubts which can moreover be based, at least apparently, on Heidegger’s own text, in his presentation of an existential analytic. To do this, and so to verify our argument, it will be necessary in this research to re-read the critical passages from the existential analysis in a deciphering way rather than in a pure interpretive way – a reading however supported by the Marburg texts finds ample support in Being and Time.

Finally, I wanted to show how Heidegger (and the reader) struggled to get close to Aristotle, or, if we prefer, to bring Aristotle close to himself throughout the reading of the multiple connections in the modes of \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \nu \). The transition from the reading at stake in GA 19 and Being and Time is most important. Having dealt with the five modes of \( \alpha \lambda \theta \varepsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \nu \) of \( \psi \nu \chi \acute{\varepsilon} \) and their corresponding \( \lambda \acute{\omicron} \gamma \omicron \varsigma \), Heidegger distances himself from Aristotle. Aristotle was not able to see original temporality as the fundamental ontological foundation of human life which,

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nevertheless, he grasped and described, because he remained within the horizon of
a natural understanding of time as constant presence. Even the celebrated apory of
the relationship between ψυχή and χρόνος explicitly raised by Aristotle (Physik
IV, 14, 223 to 21, 29) which is handled in a magisterial manner by Heidegger in his
commentary on the aristotelian treatment of time (The Basic Problems of
Phenomenology, GA 24), seems to be insufficient, in Heidegger’s eyes, to extract
Aristotle from the horizon of a natural understanding of time. And yet, Aristotle
does anticipate correctly, even if only at an ontic level, the intuition which
Heidegger raises to the ontological description of Dasein and Zeitlichkeit
(temporality). This is a conjecture that I hope to have raised in this reading and one
which can be based, again, upon a passage from Aristotle’s de Anima III, 10, 453 b
5-8- where it seems as though Aristotle is thinking of Man out of a specific
characteristic that distinguished it from animals, ‘χρόνος αἰσθησις’, the
perception of time. The fact that Heidegger, who shows that he knows the passage
very well, nevertheless interprets it without hesitation in this sense, and the fact
that, in addition, he links the perception of time to the capacity for action in order
to define the specific character of human life, lends unquestionable credence to this
conjecture and undoubtedly paves the way for the key concepts of the existential
analytic of Dasein, that which will be examined next in the analysis of
Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time – for example, Zu-Sein, Jemenigkeit,
Worumwillen, Befindlichkeit and Verstehen, Sorge, Entschlossenheit and Gewissen.

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2. CHAPTER II: DISCOVERING DASEIN: ΑΛΗΘΕΥΕΙΝ AND THE THEME OF EIGENTLICHKEIT IN SEIN UND ZEIT

a) Das Man and the αληθευειν of Inauthenticity

Heidegger begins his theme of the analytic of Dasein by stating: “We ourselves are the being whose analysis stands as the problem. The being (Sein) of this being (Seienden) is always mine (je meines).”\(^{133}\) My being, the being of every one of us, is the problem which stands at the centre of the existential analytic of Dasein in Being and Time.\(^{134}\) Heidegger stresses that we are always delivered over

\(^{133}\) SZ, p. 41.
\(^{134}\) “Dasein” is one of Heidegger’s special concepts that defies translation, thus I will follow the convention of the translators of SZ and shall leave it untranslated, (cf. Macquarrie and Robinson’s note 1, p. 27). A literal English translation would be ‘there-being’, but this strikes one as clumsy and artificial. As Laurence Hemming remarks, “Being and Time speaks constantly of Dasein, a German term which both the English versions of the book leave untranslated (although Joan Stambaugh changes the German Dasein to Da-sein in her English text). In German Dasein means, at its simplest, ‘existence’ – this is the sense in which Kant first employed the term philosophically. Literally translated it means ‘here-to-be’ or ‘here-being’. It does not mean ‘being-there’ (a possibility of translation Heidegger himself expressly rejected). As ‘existence’ it has all the ambiguity in German the word has in English: it can mean a particular existence (mine, yours, that person’s); or it can mean a kind of existence – Heidegger often speaks of ‘human Dasein’ or on occasion ‘Christian Dasein’; or it can mean existence in general, the whole of being. In each case, for Heidegger, attention is drawn to the ‘here’ of the German word da. Da can also mean ‘there’, as in ‘here and there’ but it cannot mean ‘over there’, which in German would be dort. The reason for this is that Plato had employed a word which has the same force as ‘over there’ (epekeina) when
to our own being, and that we always have a relationship with our own being. Moreover, this being concerns me and each one of us; it is my being that is at stake (es geht um). Heidegger states that my being is a matter of vital importance to me. The being at stake, the being towards which I relate myself and which concerns me are possible ways to be. These ways to be are my possibilities. In this analysis existence means: to stand towards one’s possibilities. This analysis elucidates two of Heidegger’s propositions concerning the essence of human being: 1) “The ‘essence’ of this being lies in its ‘to be’ (Zu-sein).” The claim here indicates the temporality of human being, its being related to the future, its being toward its being in time. Heidegger claims that human being is always future oriented (sich vorweg) and always projects itself toward its future possibilities, understanding itself in terms of possibilities of which it is to be. 2) “The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this being are not ‘properties’ present-at-hand; these are always possible ways for it to be and just that.”136 Because I stand related to my possibilities and am concerned with them and because I can choose my possibilities and can determine my being, my being is not a thing or an object but a Seinkönnen, a potentiality-for-being.137

“Dasein is always mine in this or that way to be. It has itself always made some sort of decision as to the way in which Dasein is always mine. The being which in its being has this being at stake, comports itself towards its being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property, as something present-at-hand would be. And because Dasein is always essentially its own possibility, it can in its very being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something speaking of being as such. Being, as Plato has been interpreted, is itself divine, and unchanging, and ‘beyond’ every particular, changeable ‘here’: it is expressly ‘over there’ and absolutely other with respect to human life. If there is no direct discussion of anything like a philosophy of religion in Being and Time, already it is possible to see that in the very term Dasein Heidegger introduces a critique of metaphysical transcendence. Existence, being as such, is in each case being with respect to some place, ‘here and there’, but not beyond, and so ‘over there’ with respect to the ‘here’ of the world. Being is always concerned with the being of being-human: human being, as we currently and presently know it, is not determined with respect to any understanding of being that is ‘beyond’ and divine.”135

135 SZ, p. 42.
136 SZ, p. 42.
137 SZ, pp. 86, 144, 167, 232-3.
which can be *authentic* – that is, something made its own (*sich zueigen ist*) – can it have lost itself and not yet won itself.”

*Dasein* can be authentic: it can choose to be authentic, and can choose its own possibilities, appropriating, making its own (*sich zu-eigen*) those possibilities through which one constitutes an authentic existence. But Heidegger claims that first and foremost that for most part people are not authentic, they have not chosen authenticity or appropriated their own possibilities: they are inauthentic.

“The two modes of being of authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have both been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein is characterized by mineness. The inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any ‘lesser’ being or any ‘lower’ degree of being. Rather, inauthenticity can characterize Dasein even in its fullest concretion – when it is busy, excited, interested, and ready for enjoyment.”

In Heidegger’s analytic of *Dasein*, the two basic ways to be, the two fundamental possibilities of existence, which I can choose or fail to choose, are authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) and inauthenticity (*Uneigentlichkeit*). These ways

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138 SZ, pp. 42.
139 SZ, pp. 42-43.
140 Laurence Hemming in his *Heidegger’s Atheism – The Refusal of a Theological Voice*, p. 64, argues that “these two terms [authenticity and inauthenticity] can be better translated as ownliness/ownly and disownedness/disowned if only because, while accurately rendering the Greek sense of τὸ αὐτὸ to which Heidegger alludes (as well as all the German resonances of *eigen*), yet to the English-speaking ear the word *authentic* does not stress sufficiently the particularity of selfhood in what is meant by *Je-meining, my-own.*” But Hemming’s proposal seems to gloss over the fact that authenticity presents in fact the Greek αὐτὸ in a rather clearer not least grammatically more accurate fashion than ‘ownliness’. Ownliness only conveys the possessive pronoun *αὑτὸ* insofar as it stems of one of its oblique reflexive cases (ἐμὸν, ἐμαυτῷ) rather than expressing the original personal pronoun at stake (αὐτὸ/*aut[h]enticity*). For even if the Greek allows the usage of αὐτὸ as a predicate adjective, as Hemming seems to be suggesting with ownliness – thus presenting αὐτὸ as a possessive genitive – the fact is that, in this case, authenticity is not employed in any sense with a predicate (as it seems to be the case with *Je-meiningkeit* [*‘mineness’ includes literally its predicate in the formulation*]). The only case where we could eventually take the αὐτὸ of authenticity as a possessive is if this was preceded or followed by a predicate adjective [i.e. this person is authentic] which however is not the case. Also, to translate *Eigentlichkeit* to ownliness would make most of the adjectives and adverbial occurrences of this term in SZ simply redundant for it would not be possible to convey, as Hemming suggests – although for different reasons – the various resonances of *eigen*. It simply could not work in a translation. Finally, more than a philological problem, what is at stake in Hemming’s option is rather a philosophical restriction of *Eigentlichkeit* to *Jemeinigkeit* that bears the consequence of reducing the scope of *Eigentlichkeit* to the determination of selfhood, an idea conveyed by most of the commentators, and thus make the concept lapse – although Hemming would not have intended this originally –into the sort of analysis that sees *Eigentlichkeit* as a solipsistic, self-regarding account of *Dasein*. *Eigentlichkeit*, as I hope to show in this study, is a concept certainly to be conveyed with the help of philology but only insofar as it unveils a deep philosophical problematic for human existence in SZ, thus being far more comprising than *Jemeinigkeit*, one of its determinations, and in this sense not exhausted by selfhood.
are a matter of concern to me and my being is always at stake in one of these modes.

Heidegger argues that most people are not aware of their “mineness”, of their possible authenticity, and have not chosen their own possibilities. He writes: “When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern (which means at the same time in its being with others) it is not itself. Who is it, then, who has taken over being as everyday being-with-one-another?”\(^{141}\) This perhaps perplexing statement introduces Heidegger’s argument that most people are not themselves when they are absorbed in the work world of everyday concern and in the social world (Mitsein) of their interpersonal relationships. This paradox raises the question of authenticity and requires a clarification of who has taken over our selfhood in our everyday being and how and why the everyday self is disclosed as an inauthentic self who lacks authentic self-being. This situation raises not only the problem of thinking the specific kind of disclosure at stake in the situation of inauthenticity and how it can operate the transformation to authenticity but it also raises a problem of selfhood: what does it mean to be a self? What is authentic selfhood?

Before addressing these points in their own right, I should first be able to identify and explore the underlying problematic in Heidegger’s account of das Man and inauthenticity in Being and Time.

In this chapter, I will show how Heidegger, mainly on the basis of his interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric at Marburg, argues that Aristotle has articulated the perspective of everyday life by means of his concepts of ποιήσις (production) and τεχνη (know-how) and in what ways this enables Heidegger to undertake an analysis of the disclosing (ἀλήθευσιν) at stake in the mode of inauthenticity, discussed under the heading of “concern” (Besorgen).

This is a task that Heidegger now takes on to Being and Time after he called upon his investigation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric in the Sophist lectures (GA 19) and in the Basic Problems of Aristotelian Philosophy (GA 18) at Marburg in order to clarify what it meant to be ζωον λογον εχον, in the sense of a speaking being, as previously noted, and how in this pursuit he turns to Aristotle's ἀληθεύειν as the investigation of Dasein in factual life. Heidegger is convinced, as we will now see, that although Aristotle has seen ποιήσις as having

\(^{141}\) SZ, p. 125.
the dominating perspective in everyday life, Aristotle himself has paved the way for its overcoming, as he has shown that \( \pi\rho\alpha\xi\iota\varsigma \) (activity) and not \( \pi\omicron\omicron\iota\eta\sigma\varsigma\iota\varsigma \) is the essence of life.

I therefore hope to assess the ways in which Aristotle's (and the Greek) interpretation of Man's existence precisely in terms of \( \pi\omicron\omicron\iota\eta\sigma\varsigma\iota\varsigma \), as produced-being, underlies Heidegger's conviction that \( \pi\omicron\omicron\iota\eta\sigma\varsigma\iota\varsigma \) or concern (Besorgen) is taken to be what is primarily given to phenomenological inquiry, serving as a name for life's self-explanation. Once this has been established, however, everyday life must be further elucidated, with the help of \( \pi\rho\alpha\xi\iota\varsigma \). This is the underlying discussion operating in Heidegger's account of everyday ways of being where we encounter the important question of Heidegger’s view between the theoretical and the practical: does Heidegger take theoretical activity, including assertoric speech (or speaking), to be essentially parasitic upon everyday, “practical” life, or does he think that theory has its own possibility of original disclosing?

I also aim to show that in the account of das Man and inauthentic everyday ways of being \( \pi\omicron\omicron\iota\eta\sigma\varsigma\iota\varsigma \) not only concerns things as equipment, (\( \tau\alpha \ \pi\rho\alpha\gamma\mu\iota\omicron\tau\alpha \)), within the sphere of teleological relations between intraworldly beings but also includes Dasein’s bringing together the understanding of things with his self-understanding.

Our inquiry into authenticity thus begins with Heidegger’s inquiry into the everyday self and its modes of \( \delta\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\nu \). I aim to show that the question of Eigentlichkeit is first brought to our attention thematically in Being and Time, p. 27, where Heidegger engages in an analysis of how everyday Dasein interacts with others in its everyday world (Mitwelt) and a description of “certain ways of being” that disclose the structures of the everyday self.\(^{142}\) Heidegger’s remarks on the self indicate that the self is to be neither interpreted as an ontological substance with certain properties, nor as self-evident that would not justify an ontological analysis.\(^{143}\) Rather, the problem of the self is to be clarified by “exhibiting

\(^{142}\) SZ, p. 126.
\(^{143}\) SZ, p. 25. Heidegger criticizes traditional concepts of selfhood on page 25 on the grounds that traditional ontological prejudices stand in the way of gaining a genuine understanding of the phenomenon of the self and must be removed if we are to gain access to the ‘thing itself’. This activity of breaking through distortions and clearing away obstacles to understanding is what Heidegger means by a “phenomenological destruction” of the tradition, and is carried out with the
phenomenally a definitive kind of being”\(^{144}\); i.e. what is at stake is a phenomenological description of the ways of being which disclose the self in its everyday “dealings” \((Umgang)\): “The task is to make visible phenomenally the kind of this being-with-others \((Mitdaseins)\) in its closest everydayness and to interpret it in such a way that it is ontologically appropriate.”\(^{145}\)

We shall see in this chapter how Heidegger’s description of the everyday self introduces us to the conceptions of A) das Man and inauthenticity. I will examine, as noted, the \(\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\) of everyday life by means of a transformation of Aristotle’s concepts of \(\pi\omicron\iota\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma\) and \(\tau\varepsilon\chi\nu\eta\) discussed under the heading of \(\text{besorgen}\) in some of the inauthentic ways of being of the \(\text{das Man}\) self (point b), such as 1) Idle Talk, 2) Curiosity, and 3) Ambiguity. In this section I wish to examine carefully Heidegger’s language of inauthenticity in order to discern its connotation and usage in \textit{Being and Time} and its correlations to the \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\) \(\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\) in Aristotle.

I therefore now intend to take further the previous analyses of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s modes of \(\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\) in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} and explore some threads in the \textit{Rhetoric} (GA 18) to the analysis of \(\text{das Man}\) and inauthenticity in \textit{Being and Time}. I will direct this analysis to the investigation of the inauthentic ways of being in order to provide evidence that Heidegger is rethinking, and in fact giving an ontological interpretation of Aristotle’s \(\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\) in the analytic of \textit{Dasein}.

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positive intention of clarification and conceptual understanding. One of the reasons why Heidegger considers Descartes and Husserl’s accounts of the self to be obscuring is that by proceeding from the absolute \(I\) to the absolute \(other\), modern philosophy has really not been able to escape from the anthropological framework that has been in place since the Cartesian discovery of the \textit{cogito}. The question of the difference between the empirical ego and the transcendental ego was at the centre of the debate between Husserl and Heidegger in 1927 (the year of the publication of \textit{Being and Time}), when, together, they were preparing the article “Phenomenology” for the \textit{Encyclopaedia Britannica}. Heidegger simply could not accept the duality of the two egos and saw in Husserl’s theory of the transcendental subject a new form of metaphysics of the absolute subjectivity, whereas Husserl considered the Heideggerian analysis of \textit{Dasein} a betrayal of the phenomenological standpoint and a downfall of philosophy into an anthropological questioning of man. The specific problem of “being of the self” will be considered in a later section on the “Authentic Self”. Cf., also Husserl, E., \textit{Die Idee der Phänomenologie}, where one finds the first account of the phenomenological reduction; \textit{Cartesianischen Meditationen}, paragraph 41. Also, Biemel, Walter, “Husserls Encyclopaedia-Britannica Artikel und Heideggers Anmerkungen dazu,” pp. 246-280.

\(^{144}\) \textit{SZ}, p. 116.

\(^{145}\) \textit{SZ}, p. 116.
The first phenomenon to be noted is the daily nagging concern over how one stands in his worldly pursuits. This calculation of how one differs from the other is operative, Heidegger claims, either when one believes one has fallen behind the others and wishes to catch up or when he is ahead and strives to maintain his advantage.\textsuperscript{146} The watchful concern over how one stands is disturbing to everyday \textit{Dasein} who constantly worries about its position and social standing. This phenomenon of “keeping up with the Joneses” is all too familiar to us today. In our ‘global’ society governed by the thrust toward upward mobility and by climbing the social ladder, one defines his position and measures his worth by the quantitative standards provided to indicate where one stands in the race for success and advancement. Social class, income, grade average, IQ, estate, consumer possessions, money, and other quantifiable items denote our measure of success.

Although the concern over “how one stands” is often inconspicuous it continuously dominates our daily lives to such an extent that we generally live in \textit{subjection} (\textit{Botmässigkeit}) to others. For in order to maintain my standing as a philosophy student or a musician, let alone as a citizen, I must do that which \textit{they} approve, praise, command and require, thus submitting to an often subtle domination by the rules and conventions of my society. Hence, I must be careful to follow prescribed ways of ‘behaviour’ so as to maintain my ‘good standing’ in the public world. Heidegger’s remarks could be further developed to elucidate what it that supports this conformity and the self-other relation is. Heidegger believes it is this submission to the other and concern over how one stands which induces one to conform to the public. Submitting to an ‘other-directed’ existence (which doesn’t mean at this level an existence directed \textit{for} the other) has serious implications for my conception of selfhood. For when I live in the eyes of others I am as \textit{they} see me; thus, I gain my understanding of \textit{who} I am by what \textit{they} say about me and how they react to me. Afraid of “losing my standing” I refrain from doing what is unaccepted (able) and criticized by \textit{them} and thus conform to what is commonly

\textsuperscript{146} \textit{SZ}, p. 126.
referred to as ‘their patterns of behaviour’, becoming like them, one of the many, thus loosing my own possibilities of thought and action.\textsuperscript{147}

Therefore, one’s concern over where he stands (\textit{Abständigkeit}) keeps one in bondage (\textit{Botmäßigkeit}) to the others with whom he shares the world. For in calculating its “distantiality” \textit{Dasein} places itself under an inconspicuous domination whereby the other directs and dictates what one must do: what is acceptable, advantageous, required, frowned upon, forbidden, and so forth. The inconspicuousness of the other’s control resides in the fact that the others are not definite others. The others in \textit{das Man}, Heidegger stresses, are interchangeable (\textit{vertreten}) and faceless (\textit{unauffällige}). Moreover, I belong to the others myself and hence enhance their power. This unobtrusive identification with the others serves to increase their domination, for by investing my power in them I help create a gigantic anonymous abstraction that becomes what Heidegger calls the “dictator” of everydayness, \textit{das Man}. Hence, in Heidegger’s account, the “anonymous one”, “they”, “the others”, “the world of everybody and nobody” \textit{das Man}, comes to exert its constraints and control over everyday \textit{Dasein} who ‘willy-nilly’ submits to its domination, dictatorship. \textit{Who}, though, one might wonder, is \textit{das Man}? Heidegger answers:

“The ‘who’ is not this one, not that one, not oneself, and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’, \textit{das Man}.”\textsuperscript{148}

Heidegger's account of \textit{das Man} is one of his most controversial and suggestive ontological concepts. Whereas one could plausibly translate \textit{das Man} into French as \textit{le on}, it resists successful, accurate translation into English, thus I shall retain Heidegger's German \textit{das Man} to call attention to the fact that, in the same way as \textit{Dasein}, \textit{das Man} represents a very special and important term for Heidegger.\textsuperscript{149} The interesting and untranslatable peculiarity of the German “\textit{das Man}” is that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[147] \textit{SZ}, p. 126.
\item[148] \textit{SZ}, p. 126.
\item[149] \textit{Das Man} has been variously translated as the “they” (Macquarrie and Robinson), the “one”, the public, the herd, etc. These translations have varying degrees of contextual employment, but none of them seems to work properly in all contexts within which Heidegger utilizes \textit{das Man}. Since \textit{das Man} is one of the foremost interpretive keys to the contrast authenticity-inauthenticity I will retain the German, \textit{das Man}, so as to remain as faithful as possible to Heidegger's variety of meanings, i.e. ‘world of everybody and nobody’.
\end{footnotes}
Heidegger takes the pronoun *Man* which connotes “one, we, you, they, people”, and moulds it into a noun preceded by the neuter *das* thus creating a substantive neuter which skilfully expresses the anonymous yet effective character of *das Man* that Heidegger wishes to elucidate.\(^{150}\)

As Herbert Spiegelberg has said, Heidegger’s description of this everyday, anonymous mode of being is “one of the most impressive accounts of everyday personal existence in its tendency to escape from itself and to fall into inauthentic being.”\(^ {151}\) To further elucidate the phenomenological structure of the anonymous public, *das Man*, Heidegger refers back to his analysis of the shared environment suggesting that an examination of the structure of the environing world (*Umwelt*) shows the ubiquitous predominance of *das Man*. The fact to focus upon is that when one utilizes available (*Zuhanden*) public objects, one is like any other person who makes use of such things as the tube, mobile phone, newspaper, traffic lights, and is thus indistinguishable and anonymous, for these objects are designed to be used by anyone. This interchange and anonymity dissolves one's own *Dasein* into that of “functioning” as any other so that as one becomes absorbed in the facilities of the public world, one becomes indistinguishable from any one else. It is in this inconspicuousness (*Unauffälligkeit*) and 'non-detectability' (*Nichtfestellbarkeit*) that the dictatorship of *das Man* is concealed.\(^ {152}\) If this were confined to using public facilities and media it would, of course, be quite innocuous. But Heidegger claims that *das Man*'s domination and everyday *Dasein*'s submission extends into every aspect of our daily life so that how we understand, talk, interpret, and act is controlled and circumscribed by the indefinite public. In a revealing passage we read:

“We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* [*Man*] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as *they* shrink back; we find 'shocking' what *they* find shocking. *Das Man*, which is

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\(^{150}\) I might point out that, in order to avoid confusion between the ontic and ontological, one must keep in view that *das Man* is an ontological concept for Heidegger and does not refer to something that we encounter in the world (ontic). Instead, one should see that Heidegger is describing and interpreting certain modes of disclosure in terms of his analysis of *das Man* and therefore is not inventing a new concept or making a theoretical abstraction of something that has hitherto been undiscovered. Rather, we are offered a new way of seeing some familiar structures of our everyday life and their conceptual interconnectedness, that is, how they are comprehended in our life and explicated in Heidegger's account of *das Man*.


\(^{152}\) *SZ*, p. 126.
nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness."\(^{153}\)

But how can this seemingly unproblematic passage be revealing? In the above paragraph on Dasein's everyday way of being in the world, Heidegger seems indeed to drive the point home that knowledge and theory are simply derivative forms of conduct, and that everyday life consists of unreflective dealings with things. More precisely, Heidegger emphasizes the making use of things for the purpose of making something, whereas he hardly mentions such forms of conduct which, one might think, are common to both everyday life and theoretical investigations. However, our submission to das Man is not, Heidegger claims, limited to making use of public instruments. The significant and deadly domination of das Man consists in designating and prescribing certain possibilities of my everyday being and for this reason Heidegger’s description may perhaps sound slightly self-regarding for he speaks in the first person, as if giving the same voice to every reader. However, I believe at this stage Heidegger is emphasizing that Dasein is not aware of its self, for what remains is an indifferent tranquillity as to one’s self. Therefore the aim is not to present a self-regarding description of Dasein but, rather, to look upon the expressions of the inauthentic self in the ‘who’ of Dasein in its everydayness, finding that “the ‘who’ is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all: The ‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’ [das Man]”.\(^{154}\) I am to take pleasure in art as they take pleasure; I am to see and judge paintings as they see and judge; I am to feel anxious about the crowds on the tube and street as they are anxious; I am to be overtly shocked (or titillated) by the attractive person as they disapprove (or approve) – in short, I am to think and behave as one does, comme il faut. By being carried along by the ‘nobody’, Dasein is relieved of the need to make choices for itself. The important consequence of this pervasive dictatorship is that in prescribing the kind of being of everydayness das Man tends toward averageness (Durchschnittlichkeit) as its characteristic way to be.\(^{155}\) Das Man, Heidegger implies, has its interests to protect, literally 'what is at stake' [es geht...um], and thus prescribes what it regards as

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\(^{153}\) SZ, pp. 126-7.

\(^{154}\) SZ, p. 164.

\(^{155}\) SZ, p. 127.
acceptable and what is not acceptable, that to which it shall grant success or condemn to failure. This care for averageness results in what Heidegger refers to as a 'levelling down' [Einebnung] of all possibilities of being. \(^{156}\) Calculating one's standing, submission, averageness, and levelling down constitutes the publicness (Offentlichkeit) of das Man\(^ {157}\). Publicness controls Dasein's comprehension of its being-in-the-world for everything that is said or done is interpreted and understood in terms of das Man's ways of understanding for “das Man itself prescribes the way of interpreting the world and being-in-the-world which lies closest.”\(^ {158}\) Thus a certain average understanding, a levelling down of common sense controls everyday Dasein's understanding, and restricts its possibilities of understanding to what is shared and passed around in public. Despite its power over everyday Dasein, however, das Man's understanding does not, in Heidegger's view, have any special claim to disclosing a cognitive priority but rather covers over, obscures, conceals and blocks Dasein's access to 'the things themselves':

“Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein are interpreted, and it is always right – not because there is some distinctive and primary relationship of being in which it is related to things, or because it avails himself of some transparency on the part of Dasein which it has explicitly appropriated, but because it is insensitive to every difference of level of genuineness and thus never gets to the 'heart of the matter'. Publicness obscures everything, and thus what has been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone.”\(^ {159}\)

\(^{156}\) SZ, p. 127.

\(^{157}\) The phenomenon of the 'public' dominating and levelling down possibilities of understanding was analyzed already by Kierkegaard in The Present Age, p. 65: “In order that everything should be reduced to the same level, it is first of all necessary to produce a phantom, its spirit, a monstrous abstraction, an all embracing something which is nothing, a mirage – that phantom is the public.”

But Kierkegaard, unlike Heidegger, sees the rise of the levelling public as an historical phenomenon distinguishing the present age from situations of the past. This emphasis on the present situation of the existing individual differentiates Kierkegaard’s existence philosophy from Heidegger’s ontological analysis. But despite differences in methodology and emphasis, there is a basic similarity between Kierkegaard’s dissection of the present age and Heidegger’s analysis of the levelling process of public opinion, the tyranny of the anonymous mass, and the threat to authenticity that the individual faces through conforming to social practices. Heidegger’s conception is presented in language so close to Kierkegaard’s that one receives the impression that Kierkegaard was an important source for Heidegger’s notion of the anonymous dictator of everydayness, das Man. The Following samples from The Present Age should make this clear, pp. 66-70: “The public is, in fact, the real levelling-master rather than the actual leveller, for whenever levelling is only approximately accomplished it is done by something, but the public is a monstrous nothing (…) This abstraction which the individuals so illogically form, quite rightly repulses the individual instead of coming to his help (…) Made up of such individuals at the moments when they are nothing, a public is a kind of gigantic something, an abstract and deserted void which is everything and nothing, the most dangerous of all powers and the most insignificant.”

\(^{158}\) SZ, p. 129.

\(^{159}\) SZ, p. 127.
However, as Robert Bernasconi pointed out when reading these sections of *Being and Time* with Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle in mind, it becomes clear that Heidegger is not presenting his own views on the nature of everyday conduct although he certainly tells us that *das Man* restricts *Dasein* to socially accepted behaviour, and by tacitly relieving the individual of the path of choice and decision takes away the burden, in the sense of the weight of personal responsibility: “Because *das Man* seems to make all one's judgements and decisions, it takes away responsibility from the individual *Dasein*.”\(^\text{160}\) Macquarrie and Robinson translate this specific phrase “nimmt es dem jeweiligen *Dasein* die *Verantwortlichkeit* ab” as “deprives the particular *Dasein* of its answerability”. Although the translation is very accurate it does not however convey the sense of "responsibility" implied in *Verantwortlichkeit*. I believe Macquarrie and Robinson have made the right choice here for when questioned as to why one performed or failed to perform any given action, everyday *Dasein* can always appeal to *das Man* for justification. Invoking the defence that *one* says, does, would do, should refrain from, and so forth, as *das Man*\'s anonymity makes it impossible at this average level to pinpoint responsibility to anyone in particular. In summary, Heidegger ironically suggests: “in *Dasein's* everydayness that through which most things happen is that of which we must say ‘it was no one’.”\(^\text{161}\) On the other hand, it is also precisely on the basis of this answerability for which *Dasein* is accountable, and thus responsible for not being responsible at this level. In this way everyday *Dasein* abdicates its responsibility to *das Man* and is thus freed (*entlastet*=literally exonerate, disburdening, take the load off something) of its answerability (responsibility) for its actions. By exonerating *Dasein* from its responsibility, *das Man accommodates* one, making things easy for him who goes along with *das Man* and its ways to be.\(^\text{162}\) Disburdening or exonerating means here to remove or deprive *Dasein* from its responsibility. It is in such inconspicuousness that the ‘real’ dictatorship of the ‘they’ is unfolded. *Das Man* recommends to 'take it easy',


\(^{161}\) *SZ*, p. 127.

\(^{162}\) *SZ*, pp. 127-128.
and although the phrase is innocent enough and seemingly un-philosophical, the fact is that it conceals das Man's tendency to deprive Dasein of its possibilities of thought and action by freeing it of its responsibility, and by abandoning it to public opinion and ways to be "and because das Man constantly accommodates the particular Dasein by freeing it of its being, it retains and reinforces its stubborn authority."\textsuperscript{163} Hence,

"Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. Das Man which provides the answer to the question of the 'who' of everyday Dasein is the 'nobody' to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in being-among-one-another."\textsuperscript{164}

Yet again, as Bernasconi has pointed out, Heidegger is not simply presenting his views on the nature of everyday conduct but he is also involved in a destruction of the traditional ontology, and more precisely the Greek notion of \(\pi\nu\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma\) which is regarded as something of a paradigm for the Greek understanding of being.\textsuperscript{165} As Aristotle was not completely able to free himself from the perspective of \(\pi\nu\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma\) but tended to understand being as \textit{Hergestelltsein} (being-produced) so Heidegger also seems to struggle to present his interpretation of the way in which we proximally and for the most part move daily in our world. However, the difference is that Heidegger tries to aim at the basic characteristics of human being and its "wordly" existence by circumscribing different modes of understanding (I will explore these next) but his major target of criticism here is the belief that it is possible to learn what knowledge is without taking notice of its human context. It is against this background that the following statement should be read:

"The Greeks had an appropriate term for ‘things’: ‘pragmata’, i.e. that which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings [or activity] (\(\pi\rho\iota\zeta\iota\varsigma\)). But ontologically, they left in obscurity precisely the specifically "pragmatic" character of \textit{pragmata} and determined them ‘proximally’ as ‘mere things’.\textsuperscript{166}

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{163} \textit{SZ}, p. 128.
\item\textsuperscript{164} \textit{SZ}, p. 128.
\item\textsuperscript{165} Later on, Heidegger will also state this explicitly, remarking that because of the importance of the \textit{\epsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\tau\tau\omicron\mu\iota\nu\iota\tau\iota\varsigma} for the Greek understanding of the world, he considered his task in \textit{SZ} to be to clarify the relationship between man and work in terms of his dealings with equipment or tools, and not "in order to correct Marx or put forward a new political economy." Cf. \textit{AM}, p. 137 and also this concern already express earlier in \textit{GM}, pp. 262-263.
\item\textsuperscript{166} \textit{SZ}, p. 68.
\end{footnotes}
Heidegger had already made this same point one year earlier, in his WS 1924/25 *Platon: Sophistes* course at Marburg when he stated that the Greeks tended to reduce beings to products failing therefore to see that this is only one form of “givenness” and so did not see the phenomenon of “givenness” as such.\(^{167}\) Thus, if Aristotle’s understanding of being must ultimately be derived from his notion of ποίησις his philosophy is essentially just the natural elaboration of everyday intelligibility. Although I am not able to discuss here Heidegger’s analysis of environmentality (*Umweltlichkeit*) and worldhood (*Weltlichkeit*) in general and worldliness undertaken a few paragraphs earlier (paragraph 15) I would like to briefly stress its importance in order to understand the teleological structure in *das Man* and inauthenticity.

In accordance with the poietic view on the world, things are experienced as equipment and ready at hand and they are also taken to be invested with a teleological structure, “in order to” (*Um-zu*) and “for what” (*Wozu*), as they are regarded as a means for something. It is in this context that we should be able to make sense of everyday ways of being which will be analysed next. The point of this analysis is to show that our everyday modes of speaking are not simply a declaration of a state-of-affairs (ἀπόφασις) itself but also what we do, our work. When human being becomes dispersed in his occupation with things, he understands his own being from his own conduct, and this means that his self-understanding tends to become dominated by concern and concealed for the benefit of an object-directed concern: the “who” of everyday *Dasein*:

> “The work that is produced does not only refer to the “for what” of its usability and the “of what” of which it consists, in plain artisan circumstances it also has an assignment to the person who is to wear or use it. The work is cut to his figure, he “is” there along with the emerging work... Thus along with the work, we encounter not only beings that are available, but also beings that have the mode of being peculiar to humans – beings for which the product becomes available in their concern, and together with these we encounter the world in which wearers and users live, which is at the same time our world.”\(^{168}\)

\(^{167}\) *PS*, pp. 269-272.
\(^{168}\) *SZ*, pp. 70-71.
The “who” of everyday Dasein is das Man, therefore das Man is the self of everydayness. Hence, everyday Dasein is not itself, because it is das Man. Das Man, then, has “taken over” one's selfhood in one's everyday being-with-others. The structure upon which Heidegger is founding his interpretation is conformity, in the Latin sense of comformare, shaping one single formal trait into a general tendency, in this case, the tendency of Dasein to act and think as they do, thus divesting itself of its individuality and its possibility of constituting its self-being. The everyday self, the way of being just described, is explicated in terms of “calculating's one's standing, averageness, levelling down, publicness, the disburdening of one's being and accommodation.” This tendency to behave as the others constitutes the “constancy” (Ständigkeit) of everyday Dasein in its habitual behaving in much the same way as everybody else, resulting in a certain conformity in the social or work world in both the individual and the group. This constancy and conformity are the mark of the self of everydayness, the public self. I hope to show next how this “constancy” (Ständigkeit) is another name for the perspective of constant presence available for the Greeks and Aristotle which Heidegger now uses under the heading Gegenwärtigen (making present) in his discussion of die Neugier (curiosity). This tendency towards the other, submission and averageness is, Heidegger stresses, the mode of inauthenticity. Hence, the "constancy" (Ständigkeit) of the everyday self is really an inconstancy, a “failure to stand by one's self” (Unselbständigkeit). Therefore, “(…) in these ways of being, one is in a state of inauthenticity and failure to stand by one's self. [Unselbständigkeit]” Thus, everyday Dasein, in Heidegger's interpretation, exists inauthentically. At this point we face a crucial hermeneutical problem for we have not yet grasped what kind of connection exists between the concepts 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' or how this works in connection to Aristotle’s ἀληθεύειν.

Up to now I have been putting into perspective the main traits of das Man so that I clarify the horizon where Heidegger uses ‘inauthentic’ in his claim that everyday Dasein is in a “state of inauthenticity”. In this chapter, I have indicated, still provisionally, that for Heidegger inauthenticity represents a way of not being oneself that is conceptualized in terms of the structures of das Man (‘they’/world of

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169 SZ, p. 128,
170 SZ, pp. 346-349.
171 SZ, p. 128, (my italics).
everybody and nobody) and interpreted in the hermeneutic of authenticity. Also, how this reading presupposes a re-reading of Aristotle’s ποιήσις and τέχνη. Although Heidegger makes it very clear that the choice of what I am to be is undoubtedly my own, I can and must choose for myself in my very being, win myself or loose myself, have an authentic mode of being or an inauthentic one. How does Heidegger understand this interconnection of das Man with inauthenticity and the contrast of the das Man self (inauthentic self) to be working in terms of the authentic self? Are there any substantial grounds that may lead one to claim that Heidegger's hermeneutical project comes with a certain 'negative' evaluation of das Man and that 'inauthenticity' expresses thereby a rather negative account of this way of being-in-the world in contrast with authenticity? For does not the tendency of das Man toward averageness and a conformist submission in its mode of inauthenticity indicate a character of mediocrity, banality and negativity? Does not Heidegger's language of inauthenticity reveal some disenchantment, even offering a critique of das Man? To what extent is Heidegger warning that Dasein's domination by das Man indicates a dictatorship over the individual through the mass, the group, or society that poses a threat to being-a-self? Is Heidegger not also criticising das Man and the everyday self?

Since Heidegger is admittedly engaged in the hermeneutic of everyday existence, one could expect the phenomena being described to be interpreted in terms of a projection that could render it plausible to interpret the hermeneutic of das Man as critical of social forms of everydayness. However, the fact that it may be critical is different from being interpreted as a critique, in fact, the possibility of any social or psychological interpretation of inauthenticity in Being and Time is dismissed by Heidegger's claim that he is not engaged in a “moralizing critique of everyday Dasein” and that he is doing “pure ontology”:

“It may not be superfluous to remark that our interpretation has a purely ontological intention, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein and from the aspirations of 'culture philosophy'.

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172 SZ, p. 167.
This disclaimer presents problems which I believe are central to the question of interpreting inauthenticity, for it appeals to the question of the limits of language in interpreting authenticity and inauthenticity and take this into account when I exhibit the tendency present in all the commentary, as we will see next, of isolating Heidegger's language in two impervious “categories”. Either the language of inauthenticity appears to be an evaluative language that depicts a strict evaluative (psychological) interpretation of Dasein or a purely descriptive language that exhibits an ontological state-of-affairs. For it certainly seems that both modes presuppose evaluative signposts of the way Dasein stands in the world, despite Heidegger's claim that his intentions are purely ontological. This may lead us to conclude that Heidegger's analysis of Dasein is purely descriptive. In fact, this was the conclusion drawn by some interpreters of Being and Time regarding the problem of the language of authenticity. Löwith, for example, in an early article (1930) stressed the neutrality of Heidegger's “formal ontological assertions”, which are completely “neutral” and “indifferent” to all value claims, thus completely ruling out the possibility of any normative let alone ethical aspect in Heidegger's text.\footnote{Löwith, Karl, Theologische Rundschau, N.F., II, Heft 1, p. 60.} This interpretation was later proclaimed by Vietta who argued that Heidegger's language of authenticity was purely descriptive (“reine Beschreibungslehre”).\footnote{Vietta, Egon, Die Seinsfrage bei Martin Heidegger, p. 46.} Confirmation that this interpretation corresponds to Heidegger's intentions can also be found in several steps of Being and Time that clarify that Verfallen “expresses no negative evaluation”\footnote{SZ, p. 175.} and that it is not a “bad and deplorable ontic characteristic which could perhaps be removed in a progressive stage of human culture”\footnote{SZ, p. 176.} neither that Dasein may be in a state of “untruth” excluding any ontic negative evaluation.

The language that describes the inauthentic or authentic ἀληθεύω gives expression of Man’s ἀθεος, his habitual way of being situated in the world, which admits to different forms of access to truth. In this sense the language of Being and Time articulates a family of concepts in their original signification (i.e. inauthenticity, Unselbständigkeit, Gerede, Entfremdung, etc.) that describes the ways of oppeness of the ἀθεος. On the other hand, Heidegger's own ontological
formulations and explications of his concepts seem to be rather strikingly 'negative' or 'positive' to use a traditional terminology, suggesting that his language not only reveals an awareness of the ἔξις, the kinds of openness to the world described by Aristotle but it also takes into account the evaluative descriptions that Aristotle had already undertaken in the Ethics (i.e., to condemn, criticize, elicit change, recommend modifications, guide action, propose alternatives, etc.). Lastly, as we will see in a specific step from the text on page 310, when Heidegger himself characterizes his concept of authenticity he admits that an ideal of existence underlies his interpretation, indicating that authenticity is an ideal which he is recommending as a modification of inauthenticity. This ideal has nothing to do with a romantic idea or the presence of a philosophical idealism in Heidegger's Daseinsanalytik but it emerges from an ontological analysis of Dasein in factual life, an analysis that presents and articulates an ontological description of the ἀλήθευσιν at stake in the various kinds of ἔξις (openness) of Dasein in das Man. I suggested in the first chapter that this analysis started from a re-thinking of Aristotle's διν ὠς ἀλήθες undertaken, as already indicated, in the Marburg courses (GA 17 and 19) namely in the inquiries on λόγος and φανόμενον. I have shown that, by confronting the Greek terms upon which Aristotle was able to think about human being with Heidegger's own concepts and investigations in the analytic of Dasein, the so much debated confrontation between the ethical and ontological in Heidegger's phenomenology cannot be thought radically in opposition or to be on a collision course but both are shown to be concomitant in the deep textual layers of Being and Time.

In the following point, in regard to the employment of the determinations of inauthenticity, I propose that a careful study of Heidegger's language and descriptions owes much to Heidegger's insight on Aristotle's ἀλήθευσιν in what concerns the determinations of das Man and publicness.¹⁷⁷

b) Inauthentic Ways of Being

¹⁷⁷ This strategy appears to be at work especially in SZ pp., 126-30, 167-80.
I have indicated above some essential traits of being-with-others in *das Man* which Heidegger claims are ways of *Unselbständigkeit* and *uneigentlichkeit*: “As the *das Man* self, the particular *Dasein* has been *dispersed* [*zerstreut*] in *das Man* and must first find itself. This dispersal characterizes the ‘subject’ of that kind of being which we recognize as concernful *absorption* [*Aufgehen*] in the world we encounter as closest to us.” 178 In interpreting this sentence one sees how everyday *Dasein* is not only absorbed and dispersed into everyday tasks and dealings, work, uses of public facilities, and social roles and tasks, but also *falls* into inauthentic ways of being exemplified in everyday modes of talking, understanding, interpreting and seeing. These ways of being of *das Man* are modes of carrying through the ἄληθεύειν of inauthenticity and show how one’s authentic possibilities can be lost, as one becomes ensnared in “the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness”. The starting point of the analysis is that “*Dasein* is at first and for the most part [*zumein and zumeist*] absorbed in *das Man* and mastered by it.” 179 On this point I intend to develop Heidegger’s argument that Aristotle has articulated the perspective of everyday life – in which Aristotle himself may or may not be entangled – by means of δόξα (opinion) and the modes of ἄληθεύειν ποίησις and τέχνη which Heidegger discusses under the heading of “concern” (*Besorgen*).

Even though everydayness displays a particular mode of existence, the point of subjecting it to philosophical analysis is “to exhibit not arbitrary or accidental but essential structures, which, as determinative of the being of Dasein, persist in every mode of being of factual Dasein.” 180 In this sense, then, everyday life constitutes a beginning of the phenomenological analysis of *Dasein*, although from a philosophical perspective that is not what is given at the beginning, since philosophy must try to let everyday life explicate itself, as it were this requires a certain distance. Even though one should be careful with the term “everydayness” in connection with philosophy and theory, since it is primarily intended to refer to a pre-theoretical activity, philosophy could be said to have its own everyday mode, not least insofar as its relation to Aristotle is concerned, for “primarily and for the

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178 *SZ*, p. 129.
179 *SZ*, p. 167.
180 *SZ*, pp. 16-17.
most part”, philosophy leans on Aristotle without confronting him as its origin.\textsuperscript{181} For this reason Aristotle plays a complex role in Heidegger’s analysis of everydayness and inauthenticity. Accordingly, Heidegger’s aim is not merely to let everyday life come forward on its own terms, but also to let Aristotle “show himself from himself”, that is, before his views are subjected to criticism.\textsuperscript{182} In this pursuit, as we will see throughout his implicit and explicit recovery of Aristotelian concepts, Heidegger seems to regard Aristotle as a forerunner, approaching him as someone who managed to affirm everyday, pre-theoretical life as a philosophical beginning. Occasionally however, Heidegger seems to imply that Aristotle’s interpretation of everyday life is in fact itself “everyday”, that is, rooted in everyday life itself, so that it mainly just gives voice to the “natural” views on life and world which are embedded in everyday life itself. With this in mind, the analysis of \textit{das Man} and inauthenticity would be the same thing as an interpretation of Aristotle’s analysis of everydayness, but it would require a non-Aristotelian perspective, since the philosophical interpretation cannot simply go along with everyday life but has, to a certain extent, distance itself. To make things even more complicated, though, this “non-Aristotelian” perspective will in fact be retrieved from Aristotle himself. Again, this wavering attitude towards Aristotle has to do with Heidegger’s hesitance concerning what kind of origin Aristotle’s really is, whether it is a “simple” or an already reflected philosophical origin. I believe this is a main concern regarding Heidegger’s employment of the terms “absorption” and “dispersion” as the specific \(\alpha\lambda\nu\theta\alpha\nu\varepsilon\nu\) of everydayness and each of its modes (\textit{Gerede, Neugier} and \textit{Zweideutigkeit}) to be examined shortly.

The term \textit{absorption} (\textit{Aufgehen}) is one of the words Heidegger uses to denote the concealment of being lost in \textit{das Man}. In this sense, \textit{Aufgehen} points to something as a \(\lambda\alpha\nu\theta\alpha\nu\varepsilon\nu\), ‘to escape notice, be unseen, unnoticed, concealed’, associated with a ‘forgetting, forgetfulness’ hence also a \(\lambda\eta\theta\iota\eta\), a forgetting. \textit{Aufgehen} connotes in German such things as “absorption”, as when sugar is absorbed (\textit{geht in etwas auf}) in coffee; “consumption” as when a log is consumed by fire; being “deeply engrossed” or “lost”, as when we say of someone to be “lost in thought”; or “leaving no remainder”, as when in mathematics one says “\(4 \text{ geht in }\)"
16 auf”. Aufgehen thus suggests a complete absorption, immersion, being engrossed or consumed with no remainder, and is used by Heidegger to describe Dasein’s absorption in the dealings of concern. In a footnote on Being and Time the translators note that “Aufgehen” means literally ‘to go up’ or ‘to rise’ in the sense that the sun ‘rises’. It is exactly this sense that is mute in Heidegger’s use of Aufgehen that I am trying to elucidate and which I believe better conveys the sense of Aufgang in the sense of the emergence of being, the coming forth, to show of itself (φανερέω) to appearance, that is the appearance itself as the emerging άληθεύειν. I believe this sense is important for Heidegger’s analysis insofar as it raises the question of how can something just appear ‘for itself’ – and who is doing this saying? In whom it is grounded? Who ‘says’, and in saying ‘shows’ – and is this a self-showing, or a pointing-out? I am deliberately merging the mute sense of Aufgehen with φανερέω as one of the many examples of notions in which I find Heidegger appealing to the voices of the Greek verbs and his translation of these: medial = shows itself; active: points out; passive: makes itself available to be pointed out. Heidegger never gives a detailed elucidation of Aufgehen in Being and Time but his references to it and its connection with benommen, zerstreueung, and verfallen makes it clear that Heidegger intends Aufgehen to describe a mode of being absorbed in the world of concern such that one is completely immersed (lost) in instrumental and public concern.183 Thus, Aufgehen suggests an absorption in the world and a mode of loss of self through an absorption in das Man and inauthenticity. For when Dasein is absorbed in das Man it is absorbed in inauthentic ways of being, and is cut off from its authentic possibilities. This ‘condition’ is further described by the term Zerstreuung.

Zerstreuung is another rich and suggestive word that means “dispersion, scattering, dissipation, diffusion, diversion, absence of mind” – all of which convey a sense of fragmentation of self, a scattering and dispersion of one’s selfhood into multifarious activities, roles, preoccupations. The term is introduced in Being and Time as a dispersion into activities of concern but in the passage cited above we see that it refers to one’s dispersion into the ways of being of das Man.184 The three

183 SZ, pp. 113, 129, 175 et passim.
184 Cf., SZ, pp. 56, 67, 129. Heidegger often seems to use absorption (Aufgehen) and dispersion (Zerstreuung) interchangeably. But we shall see that Zerstreuung takes on some further meanings in the section on Neugier that helps us distinguish it from Aufgehen. The sources of the concept
modes of άληθεύσειν which Heidegger introduces as “definite phenomena” of everydayness into which the inauthentic self is absorbed and dispersed are idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. In interpreting these modes of disclosure we again encounter the problem of Heidegger’s re-interpretation and assimilation of Aristotle’s ethical notions into his ontological descriptions. For, as noted, before beginning his analysis he disclaims any intention of doing anything but a purely descriptive ontology, implying that his analysis should be interpreted as a non-evaluative description of the everyday ways of being which reveal the “disclosing of das Man” (“Erschlossenheit des Man”). But again Heidegger’s determinations of das Man, their explication, their interconnection with the fall into inauthenticity, the contrast between inauthenticity and authenticity, and his emphasis on Being and Time (pages 130 and 179) indicate also that his ontological investigations come hand in hand with the inquiry on Man’s ΕΘΟΣ, his “habitual” way of being situated in the world, which admits to different ways of access to the truth in both das Gerede (idle talk) die Neugier (curiosity) and zweideutigkeit (ambiguity). I would invite us now to look at how Heidegger takes these modes of everydayness up again as an ontological radicalized framework of the same problem that Aristotle grasped and confronted in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics as ΕΞΙΣ.

( ) Idle talk (das Gerede)

The first mode of disclosure that Heidegger describes is das Man’s way of talking which he calls Gerede. Although Heidegger claims that he does not intend this term to express a “disparaging” signification, it is difficult to translate this term into an English equivalent that is not “disparaging”. Hence, Gerede has been variously translated as idle talk, chatter, hearsay, and gossip. The phenomenon Heidegger is talking about concerns the relationship between language,

Aufgehen may have been Augustine or Paul who spoke of Man’s “absorption” or “being lost” in the world in the Christian metaphysics of human being. Zerstreunung could be also a translation of Pascal’s divertissement (this sense will come in the section on Neugier).

SZ, p. 167.

understanding, interpretation, and the subject matter of these activities. His analysis implies that das Man’s way of talking is based on an inauthentic understanding which serves to alienate Dasein from its authentic possibilities. In the following lines I suggest that it is plausible to interpret Gerede in Being and Time as a mode of inauthenticity grounded on Heidegger’s re-reading of Aristotle’s δοξα in the Rhetoric back in the 1924/25 SS course at Marburg (GA 18).

The lure of the pathway that draws Heidegger's account of das Man and Uneigentlichkeit in Being and Time is the description of everydayness ways of being in the form of established and publicly accessible opinions concerning various things that produce a convincing opinion (δοξα πιστος). Indeed, Heidegger claims, when correctly interpreted, that one sees that Rhetoric not only lets the “peculiar domain” of everydayness show itself, but that it also contains a highly developed conceptuality of the explication of everydayness. However, more than just to point out that Aristotle in the Rhetoric has managed to let life explicate itself on its own terms, Heidegger wants to further the conditions of possibility of rhetorical explication of everyday speaking (idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity) in order to show how Aristotle has achieved certain preliminary determinations of the αληθευειν which recur in the everyday communication, namely through δοξα – that I will consider now.

Heidegger devotes considerable time to the notion of δοξα which is hardly surprising bearing in mind the importance he ascribes to man's παθος re-translated in Being and Time as Stimmung (disposition) with respect to the constitution of understanding (Verstehen). Heidegger's interpretation of παθος in the constitution of δοξα and the way Gerede carries it through indicates that speaking, at this level of everydayness, involves an inauthentic αληθευειν of Dasein for it is restricted to the interplay between making appear something to be said (ποιειν δοκειν λέγεσθαι) and to be determined from-without (πασχειν), affecting therefore the way a speaker affects the hearers so as to bring about a response, an action.

188 GAP, paragraph 16.
189 GAP, p. 136.
Heidegger’s account of inauthentic modes of being, presupposes that Aristotle’s conceptuality both preserves and transforms the experiences and are embedded in everyday speaking, in that it has sharpened and brought to explicit articulation that which is only ambiguously articulated there.\footnote{GAP, p. 24.}

In order to exhibit the intricate 'elliptical architecture' of Heidegger's analysis of authenticity I must show how Heidegger's account of inauthenticity depends on the recovery and interpretation of the discursivity of man in each mode of speaking of everydayness so as to exhibit the hermeneutical structure (als-Struktur) that articulates each of these ways of being in the world.\footnote{Cf., also 41, 48, 49, 101.}

Heidegger begins with the simple point, which he learned from Aristotle’s \textit{de Interpretatione}, that speaking is always about something. Thus, speaking (speech or discourse) expresses an understanding of what is being talked about. Moreover,

“\textquote{In language, as a way things have been expressed or spoken about, there is hidden a way in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted... At first, and within certain limits, Dasein is constantly delivered over to this interpretedness, which controls and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of the mood of belonging to it.}”\footnote{SZ, pp. 167-8.}

Heidegger claims that language contains an “interpretation” constituted by \textit{das Man}’s average understanding, so that to a certain extent we are bound to language, but language itself, as we have seen, is not a distorting mirror which serves to prevent one from gaining direct access to the phenomena being talked about. For how one appropriates and makes his own the understanding that is communicated in speaking depends on one’s relationship to the subject matter of which we are talking. As we remember from Aristotle’s analyses on \textit{de Anima}, the λόγος of φοινείν is not to be taken as a λόγος of assertion – a categorial saying that, in saying, shows the saying. Λόγος originally meant, according to Heidegger, gathering or collection, a sense of openness of what is to be brought forth through the shining of the appearance, that is, the outward appearance of the presence in the
placing into aspect, ἐνδόσσος. For example, one can have a direct relationship to the matter of understanding, i.e. one can have appropriated and worked out his understanding from the “things themselves”. Heidegger calls this phenomenon of direct appropriation “primordial understanding”. On the other hand, one can also understand what is being talked about without being directly acquainted with the subject matter itself. In this case one has not appropriated his understanding from the phenomena but has merely grasped “what is said in the talk”. This distinction between primordial understanding and grasping “what is said in the talk” receives, for the present purposes, most attention from Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's concepts of ὅξα and πάθος in the Rhetoric. This idea is particularly clear in the SS course 1924 (GA 18) where Heidegger discusses Aristotle's understanding of everyday speaking as communication in connection with the Rhetoric and the Politics, and then proceeds to the relationship between speaking and action in the Ethics (the latter being also addressed in Platon: Sophistes – WS course of the same year, before the publication of Being and Time). It is on this basis of Aristotle's notion of ὅξα that Heidegger discusses the notion of Gerede in Being and Time. The point Heidegger makes when he discusses each way of being of inauthenticity is the idea that every mode of speaking is only a proximate mode of ἀληθεύεται, of our access to the world, but as it were, speaking is not the ultimate mode of uncovering. It is this line of approach that I believe to be at work in Heidegger's retrieval of Aristotle's determinations of everydayness and which I will now retrace in the notion of das Gerede.

Heidegger’s interpretation exhibits the groundlessness of the phenomenon of gossip, rumour, and hearsay, disclosing that this way of “passing the word along” eventuates an inauthentic understanding. But this phenomenon is not confined to speaking or discourse. It also takes the form of “scribbling” (Geschreibe) in which the groundlessness is not so much based on hearsay as on superficial reading. A consequence of this phenomenon is that it is often the case in reading and hearing about what is going on, that one does not know what is mere hearsay and what is

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193 This idea is more explicit in Heidegger’s later Freiburg EM lecture course, SS 1935, p. 98.
194 This term appears throughout SZ. Cf., a good summary of this notion vs. averageness in the very recent Dreyfus, Hubert L., Skilled Coping as Higher Intelligibility in Heidegger’s Being and Time.
195 SZ, p. 168
196 PS, pp. 17-25.
directly appropriated from the actual state of affairs. Nor can one discern whether something has been “drawn from primordial sources with a struggle” or has been merely received from a second hand source. Furthermore, the average understanding feels no need to draw this distinction for it feels it understands everything and has received all the information it needs to “be in the know”. Indeed, idle talk guards itself against any exposure of its groundlessness for were one to critically challenge its sources, it would founder on its lack of evidence and would lose credence as mere “hearsay”.

The most “damaging” thing about this way of talking is that “passing the word along” develops an inauthentic understanding which closes one off from one’s authentic possibilities of understanding, interpreting, and talking. But everyday *Dasein* who maintains himself in idle talk is satisfied with this condition, believing nothing is closed off from it, since it can reduce anything it hears to its averageness. Anything is accessible to idle talk for it “is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own.”

Thus, through idle talk everyday speaking degenerates into groundless chatter which levels down *Dasein*’s understanding of what is being passed around in the talk. In so doing, idle talk *closes off* any possibility of gaining an authentic understanding by *covering over, concealing* the things themselves with the groundlessness of what is said in the talk. Idle talk is therefore a *per-version a turning its back on itself of the genuine disclosing which enables one to directly gain access and work out what is being disclosed and thus gain a primordial understanding. This diversion is not a conscious deception but, rather, Heidegger infers, in the mere act of passing along gossip, idle talk covers over, conceals and closes off the phenomena, thus preventing a genuine making-true.

Thus, in everyday life we achieve our understanding through our access to already established opinions. In the notion of δοξα we find the key that articulates each of Heidegger’s ways of being of everydayness and inauthenticity for he sees the basic everyday phenomenon of speaking in the form of established and publicly accessible opinions concerning various things that govern everyday action whilst providing it with an aim and direction. This reading is particularly clear in

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197 *SZ*, p. 169.
198 *SZ*, p. 169.
Aristotle’s account of δοξα in the Rhetoric and Heidegger’s interpretation of δοξα in GA 18, paragraph 16 – a proposal that seems to be suggested and supported by Heidegger’s explication and description of Gerede:

“Αλόγος is first of all idle talk, which has the facticity to not let the things be seen, but to develop a certain contentment, to remain standing by that which one thus says. The domination of empty speaking precisely conceals beings for Dasein and makes it blind to that which has been uncovered and also to the possibility of uncovering.”

Therefore, one may say that Gerede and Rethoric have the aim of letting people see what speaks in favor of a particular opinion, so that they become convinced it is the truth. Of particular importance in this connection is to see how Aristotle conceives of the relationship between everyday and theoretical speaking. For even though Heidegger thinks that Aristotle affirmed δοξα as a form of understanding in its own right, he suspects that Aristotle’s attitude towards δοξα is governed by his notion of theory in particular and by his ontological assumptions in general. This being so, Heidegger’s idea is that Aristotle could not find the limit (πέρας), in everyday life. For δοξα is itself imperfect, for whilst being incapable of delimiting its object (ὁρίζειν) so strictly as to be a definition, it only says what things are “more or less”. Moreover, the things of everyday concern are also imperfect, since they are changeable. Aristotle names this change in the Rhetoric as “ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν” (beings than can also be otherwise.)

This idea of theoretical speaking as ὁρίζειν as complete demarcation is something that Heidegger just cannot take on board, since he believes, again, that this idea is rooted in the notion of being as Fertigsein (finished being). Still, in spite of his hesitance on this point, Heidegger thinks, as was also noted above, that Aristotle’s diagnosis of δοξα depicts essential aspects of everyday life, including its shortcomings. One of the most striking aspects of this is that Dasein thus finds itself “sealed” in the concealment of the averageness of das Man’s understanding. Believing that one understands what is passed along in the talk, one feels no need for further inquiry and discovery. Hence, everyday Dasein continues to pass the word along and aggravates the tendency to develop an inauthentic

199 PS, p. 114.
200 RT, A 2, 1357 a 13 ff. Cf., the same line in GAP pp. 132, 139-140 and PS, pp. 11, 22, 28, 40.
understanding. In this sense, Dasein becomes a prisoner of das Man’s averageness and is therefore alienated from authentic possibilities of understanding. This analysis brings out the subtlety and inconspicuousness of das Man’s tyranny and domination. Merely by engaging in the familiar practice of idle chatter, Dasein falls into one of the inauthentic ways of being of das Man, and becomes ensnared in the bonds of inauthenticity. As Heidegger stresses:

“This way in which things have been interpreted in idle talk has already established itself in Dasein. There are many things with which we first become acquainted in this way, and there is not little which gets beyond such an average understanding. This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first place, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed. In no case is Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a ‘world in itself’ so that it just beholds what it encounters.”

Heidegger’s language stressing the “groundlessness” (Bodenlosigkeit) of idle talk which “perverts” (verkehrt) the act of disclosing to a “closing off” (Verschliessen) and “uprootedness” (entwurzelten), and his claim that “all genuine understanding, interpreting and communicating” are achieved through a struggle against idle talk, offer further support to the proposal that Gerede is based upon a revision of Aristotle’s δόξα (view, opinion) through which Dasein gets cut off from its authentic possibilities. For Heidegger exposes the groundlessness and superficiality of the way of talking of das Man, warning that while engaging in idle talk one’s understanding is uprooted and cut off from “its primary and primordially genuine relationship of being” toward the world, the other, and one’s self. This “uprootedness” involved in idle talk leads to a constant activity of uprooting, in which one is alienated from an authentic, true and disclosive access to the world, the other and the self as it encloses itself in the inauthentic understanding articulated in idle talk. For while engaging in idle talk, Heidegger claims that Dasein is in a state of “free-floating” groundlessness ("in der Schwebe"). Moreover, he claims that this uprooted and groundless state is concealed from one

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201 SZ, p. 169.  
202 SZ, p. 169.  
203 SZ, p. 170.  
204 SZ, p. 170.
for, “the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden under its protecting shelter.”205 Thus one of the ways in which one is trapped into inauthenticity is the activity of idle talk which cuts off, closes off, and covers over Dasein’s primordial understanding, that is, the primordial to be disclosure of its being-in-the-world (In-
der-Welt-Sein). This being closed off from “primordial”, “genuine”, and “authentic” possibilities through δοξα indicates that the result of ongoing speaking is that the assertions are eventually cut off from the acts of uncovering that once were their origin, that is, speaking not so much in order to really see something but more for the sake of developing opinions, without developing genuine disclosure: an empty signification. Heidegger already mentioned in the Sophistes course that, in fact “δοξα (view, opinion) is not a genuine mode of ἀληθεύειν.”206

It is this process of “gossiping” and “passing the word along” that constitutes idle talk (Gerede), “a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand upon (Bodenständigkeit) becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness (Bodenlosigkeit)”.207 Attending only to what is said in the “talks” leads to a superficial and unfounded understanding. The clue that speaking is based on an inauthentic understanding is such phrases as “they say…” which implies that, “it is so because they say it is so”. It is in this manner that das Man, the “they”, the “world of everybody and nobody”, levels down the understanding of averageness of what is passed along in the talk. This kind of communication prevents one from gaining a primordial understanding of phenomena appropriated from the “things themselves”. Instead one listens to what is said in the speaking, in the talk and passes it along as the “facts of the matter”. Thus, das Man’s averageness spreads to ever widening circles and takes on an air of authority.208 In other words, with the analysis of everyday life in terms of the articulation of the as-structure in every mode of discursivity, Heidegger is leading us through the path of a “primordial understanding”.209

Without wanting to anticipate too much of the subsequent discussion, one may just indicate that self-understanding is found in the interpretation of everyday speaking, the determination of its ἀληθεύειν. Of particular importance to

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205 SZ, p. 170.
206 PS, p. 55.
207 SZ, p. 168.
208 SZ, p. 168.
209 Cf., the argument for the ‘as’ structure in chapter I, pp. 41-44, 48, 49.
Heidegger in this connection at this stage of *Being and Time* is to emphasize that life in *Gerade, δόξα* is a life dominated by assertions, that is, by speaking insofar as it has become separated from the very activity of speaking:

“Furthermore, it is to be noted that ἀληθεύειν as it exists in δόξα, (...) has a peculiar character of falleness. What I experience, notice, or have learned, I can forget; in this possibility, ἀληθεύειν is subject to ληθη (where the stem of the verb λαυθάνειν lies hidden) – what is disclosed can sink back into concealment. The ability to become forgotten is a specific possibility of that ἀληθεύειν which has the character of θεωρείν. For the ἔξις μετά λόγου is an ἔξις of ἀληθεύειν.”

To some extent, we always remain dependent upon δόξα for if one could not understand what is said without having undergone the experiences that make up the foundations of opinions, a shared world would not be possible. But this is also the most problematic phenomenon of everyday life, for because of its falling (*Verfallen*), life tends to become “entangled” in already established opinions, so that the possibility of change, of seeing things in a new way is annihilated. It is this “stability” of δόξα that only intensifies the restlessness and fallenness, as we shall see next with the notion of die *Neugier* (curiosity).

β) Curiosity (die Neugier)

The next phenomenon that explicates inauthentic ways of being which constitute the self of everydayness is *Neugier* that can be translated as “curiosity”. Curiosity signifies an orientation toward seeing which belongs to everydayness. I would like to see in what ways this orientation is not limited by Heidegger to what we might consider a mode of perception, but rather “express[ing] the orientation towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception.” Heidegger notes the striking priority according to “seeing” as an access to beings in the world both by everydayness and how this was found by Aristotle, Parmenides and Augustine. He claims that philosophy and science, from their genesis in the

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210 *PS*, pp. 55, 56.
211 *PS*, pp. 25-27.
212 *SZ*, p. 170.
213 *SZ*, pp. 170-1.
Greeks, have been oriented by sight as the primary relationship toward the world and the way of access to truth. Earlier in Marburg, as noted in the discussion of λόγος and φανόμενον (GA 17) Heidegger made clear what “seeing” could mean and in the initial paragraphs of Being and Time he keeps this discussion in mind when he analyses the modes of sight with which we orient ourselves in the environment and work-world, (Umsicht), and the public world, (Rücksicht and Nachsicht). With these considerations in mind, I would like to show now how curiosity represents an everyday tendency “just to perceive” and how it is an inauthentic εξίτης.

Curiosity is a way in which one’s absorption in the world of concern manifests itself. Usually everyday Dasein is absorbed in the work-world, carrying out tasks, labouring, performing. This concern is guided by what Heidegger calls “circumspection” (Umsicht), a way of seeing, utilizing, manipulating, and managing the tools of the environment (Umwelt). Circumspective concern, however, may be ‘temporarily suspended’ either by finishing its tasks or resting. The circumspection becomes free and can relax, look around, day dream, and enjoy itself without concerning itself with the tools of the work world. Sight, then, releases itself from a focus on the tasks at hand and seeks relief, escape, “getting away from it all”.214 This tendency toward utilizing one’s leisure time to get away from one’s work is not a harmless escape in Heidegger’s view, but rather entangles us in an alienating way of being. For,

“When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen – that is, to come into a being toward it – but just in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty. In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue for care does not lie in grasping something and being knowingly in the truth; it lies rather in its possibilities of abandoning itself to the world.”215

Curiosity thus signifies a way of seeing only for the sake of having seen, in which mere curiosity rather than a desire for understanding is operative.216

214 SZ, p. 162.
215 SZ, p. 172.
216 This phenomenon, like idle talk, is a familiar one that is currently demonstrated, in a way unforeseen by Heidegger, by the proliferation of such web media as Youtube, Facebook or, more
Curiosity is also marked by superficiality and groundlessness. The curiosity seeker craves sight, hopping from one thing to another, “to be in on it” without really having been involved at all. This absence of genuine interest or involvement can be illustrated by the young socialites who go from one cultural event to another merely to see, to be seen, and to be able to say, “I have never seen that Turner before, how interesting!” Heidegger’s criticism would be that this curiosity seeker really has not seen anything, because genuine seeing requires a dwelling alongside something, or as we might say, a getting involved in something.

The notion of Neugier in Heidegger’s analysis, exhibits three essential traits:

It is a restless state of agitation that is always “on the move”, “on the go” (Unverweilen). In this way of being on the move one never stops and interrogates, concentrates, or meditates on anything, but constantly seeks the new. Neugier literally means in German “greed for the new”, suggesting that curiosity is always craving the new and is thus endlessly in search of another novelty, the “latest”, the “modern”, “today”. But this never ending search for novelty never really seeks to appropriate or dwell alongside the object of its search but, “it seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty.” In this way curiosity abandons itself to the world and gets carried along by the current happenings and events, the latest fads and fancies with which das Man amuses itself. Thus, curiosity is the search for the constant possibility of diversion.

Zerstreuung (diversion) is the second trait of curiosity which we now see refers both to everyday Dasein’s dispersion into the manifold activities of concern and ways of being of das Man, and the restless search for novelty and diversion (for which Pascal coined the term divertissement). Since curiosity is always searching for novelty and distraction, it is never involved in or concerned with any one subject matter or thing at a time. Nor does it feel any of the wonder and amazement at the world which is a requisite for scientific and philosophical understanding. Instead, it constantly distracts itself with more diversion, surrendering its possibilities of understanding to a never ending search for the new. Hence,

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recently, Twitter that allows one to “see”, to be “in touch” with everything and everybody without eventually comprehending anything or anyone!

217 SZ, p. 172.

218 SZ, p. 172.
curiosity has the characteristic of “never dwelling anywhere, dwelinglessness” (\textit{Aufenthaltslosigkeit}).

This term indicates a loss of dwelling or an estrangement of “being-in” (\textit{In-Sein}). For “being-in”, in Heidegger’s interpretation, in its “primordial signification” means dwelling, residing, being familiar with, so that one “encounters” or is even “touched by” those beings alongside which one dwells.\textsuperscript{219} Hence, an authentic being-in is a dwelling alongside beings with which one is familiar and involved. Curiosity, though, is in a constant state of motion that is everywhere and thus nowhere, avoiding all genuine involvement. Thus, by virtue of being always on the move and frenetically seeking novel distraction, \textit{Dasein} is constantly uprooting itself. Almost in the manner of a synthesis, \textit{Aufenthaltslosigkeit} is the outcome of \textit{Unverweilen} and \textit{Zerstreeung}.

Another aspect of curiosity, explicated in a later chapter on temporality, is the tendency of everyday curious \textit{Dasein} to lose itself in the present.\textsuperscript{220} A detailed analysis of this phenomenon (found in the passage cited above) will require an examination of Heidegger and Aristotle’s notion of temporality, but for the present purposes I will only note that the restless search for novelty represents for Heidegger an alienation from one’s past and future. For the “movement” of curiosity is a “making present that abandons itself to the “now”, closing off its past which it “forgets”, and its future which it “flees”.\textsuperscript{221} Hence, in its temporal meaning, curiosity is an evasion which flees and forgets and which alienates \textit{Dasein} from its \textit{being-in-the-world} and its authentic temporality. Now one may ask: what are the intentions behind Heidegger’s description of this scenario? What is the argument undercutting Heidegger’s ontological analysis of curiosity, what is Heidegger criticizing in his depiction of curiosity, and to what is he referring when he makes of this notion an ontological ‘existential’?

\textit{Unverweilen}, being on the move, restlessly seeking ever new possibilities can be contrasted with a contemplative, dwelling alongside the world that seeks to fully understand and appropriate and ground itself in the matter or involvement concerned. The everyday search for distraction craves novel diversions and sees possibilities as mere things to be consumed, enjoyed, and forgotten, and is

\textsuperscript{219} SZ, paragraph 12.
\textsuperscript{220} SZ, pp. 346-9.
\textsuperscript{221} SZ, p. 348.
contrasted with an amazed wonder that quietly brings itself into an authentic understanding, thus making possible authentic disclosing and interpreting. Heidegger uses the term curiosity which is not limited, characteristically, to seeing but denotes generally the peculiar tendency to make perceptual contact with everything, an idea found in the very first sentence of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*: “Πάντες ἀνθρώποι τού εἰδέναι ὥρανται φύσει”. The result of everyday curiosity is “dwellinglessness”, an uprooted way of never ending mobility and change which can be contrasted with the rooted, at home dwelling alongside the world, in which one penetratingly surveys and discloses one’s world. Heidegger’s language in this section on curiosity as throughout *Being and Time* is full of suggestions, allusions and intimations that project opposing ways of being. What claims to be a description of an everyday tendency toward seeing and knowledge, then, becomes a contrast between two world orientations, two radically different ways of relating to one’s surrounding world (*Umwelt*). Heidegger’s scope is vast and his intention ambitious. *Neugier*, if it is to be an effective ontological “existential”, must be broad enough to encompass a wide variety of ἔξις and suggestive enough to evoke this same ethological, openness character that exhibits this concept. Thus, *Neugier* can be used to depict and suggest the ways of being of such “types” as a hedonistic pleasure seeker, superficial tourist, a restless collector of superfluous “useless and pointless knowledge” (Dylan Thomas), a frenetic involvement in trivial everyday matters, a wanderer moving place to place peddling his wares, a conformist submitting to ever new fads and novelties, the latest trends, and seeking whatever type of mobile diversion that happens to be dominant in any environment. What is striking in this analysis is not only the suggestiveness of Heidegger’s text, but also the consistent critique of whatever forms of everyday ways of being that are directly suggested to the reader such that the curiosity seeker appears in a position where curiosity is contrasted with another way of being which does not partake of the alienating characteristics already described. Here, we are not concerned, as noted, with a characterization of a presumed Heidegger’s ideal of human behaviour, which in any case is only suggested now in obscure outline without a conceptual clarification, but rather with the phenomenological structure,

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222 *META*, A1, 980 a21. Heidegger renders this sentence in SZ p. 171 as: “Im Sein des Menschen liegt wesenhaft die Sorge des Sehens”. (In the being of Man there lies essentially the care of seeing). See also, p. 63.
conceptualization and “shading” of an inauthentic existence. Curiosity, like idle talk, is a way of alienation (Entfremdung) through which Dasein loses its authentic possibilities and enmeshes itself in the grip of inauthenticity. Moreover, curiosity is interconnected with idle talk. For idle talk tells Dasein what one must do and see: “what’s new”, “what’s the latest”, “what’s happening”. The uprootedness of idle talk is further aggravated by curiosity that never stops to achieve a genuine understanding but is always on the move.223 This restless, uprooting activity supposedly provides what is called a “lively life” and indeed curiosity from which nothing is excluded, and idle chat in which everything is understood supports this contention. These two phenomena of speaking are interconnected with a third way of λαθεύω through which “the being of everydayness” is disclosed: ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit).

γ) Ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit)

We have seen that idle talk and curiosity appear to be the antipodes of a genuine λαθεύω which is directly retrieved from the phenomena, and which dwells alongside the world and draws its speaking from a genuine understanding (“primordial sources”). But since in our everyday being-with-others “passing the word along” and restlessly seeking distraction are such prevalent modes of being in the world, it is often difficult to decide what reveals a genuine understanding and what does not.224 For “everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at the bottom of it, it is not ; or else it does not look so, and yet at the bottom of it, it is.”225 Hence, Heidegger argues that our Mitsein is pervaded with an ambiguity which pertains to our relationship with ourselves, the world, and others, and that this ambiguity is interconnected with idle talk and curiosity.

223 SZ, p. 173.
224 SZ, p. 173.
225 SZ, p. 173.
Heidegger’s analysis of ambiguity is extremely difficult, so I will attempt in some detail to unravel the thread of his main argument.226 This phenomenon seems to be particularly important for Heidegger stresses that not only does ambiguity affect the way we talk and act, how we manage our affairs and enjoy ourselves, but it also becomes a potentiality-for-being that constitutes how we understand our possibilities and how we project ourselves into the future.227 Hence, ambiguity is a dominant way of being that has far reaching consequences for our everyday being-in-the-world, and is, as we shall see, a salient characteristic of inauthenticity.

The basic trait of ambiguity that I wish to make clear is that ambiguity is an inauthentic way of relating to the future that cuts one off and alienates one from authentic possibilities. Thus, we must find out how ambiguity relates itself to the future and how it projects Dasein into inauthentic possibilities. This analysis should disclose the interconnection of ambiguity with idle talk and curiosity.

Everyday Dasein in the mode of ambiguity, Heidegger claims, pretends to be interested in certain projects, talks about what must be done, and then abandons this concern for what is currently “up for discussion”. Ambiguity isn’t ever serious about carrying anything through, for it is always “on the scent” of the latest diversion and concern. This “being on the scent” exhibits the movement of curiosity and is directed by idle talk, thus we see how das Man’s ways of being work together to entangle Dasein in das Man so that its authentic possibilities are suppressed.228 Ambiguity is spurious and not genuine in that it is not really interested in translating its projects into action, but is content with surmising and scenting out newer plans. This immersion in abstract possibility that disdains actualizing and carrying through projects confines one to what Kierkegaard described as the aesthetic level of existence, which he distinguished from the ethical sphere of commitment and action229. Heidegger’s contrast is between a noncommittal dallying in “surmising” and “scenting out” (geahnt and gespurt), and a carrying through and staying with one’s project. He argues that Dasein is always acquainted with what is “under consideration” or “up for discussion” (vorliegt),

227 SZ, p. 173.
228 SZ, p. 173.
229 Cf., Kierkegaard, S., Stages on Life’s Way.
and “what ‘really’ must be done”. In fact, everyone seems to know what is happening and has its own ideas about how best to deal with it. If by chance, however, something actually does materialize, then everyone reacts with indignation, for “in that case the opportunity to keep on surmising has been snatched away.” If what has been surmised actually happens then one is forced to take a stand on the matter and avoid such any ambiguity.

Heidegger is trying to work out a contrast between surmising and scenting out possibilities, and an active involvement in carrying through a project and committing oneself to it. He is claiming that one of the salient characteristics of everyday *Dasein* is a noncommittal, superficial and “non-answerable” ambiguity that is always on the scent of something but never really “into” anything. For ambiguity, actually carrying out a project is seen to be a backward step since it is already on the scent of something new and sees what was earlier surmised as “out of date”. In following this ambiguous way of being, *Dasein* can never really engage in any definite projects or concerns, for *das Man* is already on the scent of something else and so abandons his project in favour of the new matter of interest. Thus,

“When in the ambiguity of the public interpretedness, talking about things ahead of the game and surmising curiously, gets passed off as what is really happening [das eigentliche Geschehen], while taking action and carrying something through gets stamped as something merely subsequent and unimportant. Thus, *Dasein’s* understanding in *das Man* is constantly going wrong [versieht] in its projects, as regards the genuine possibilities of being.”

Ambiguity goes hand in hand with curiosity and idle talk to alienate *Dasein* from its authentic possibilities. For everyday *Dasein* entangled in the ways of being of *das Man* is constantly uprooting itself in a process of ever increasing flight and distraction. Idle talk keeps surmising about what is happening and what “they” are doing, curiosity constantly keeps *Dasein* in a state of perpetual motion, seeking ever new novelties and diversions, which ambiguity passes off as “the latest”… and then rejects it as “out of date”.

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230 SZ, p. 173.
231 SZ, p. 174.
233 SZ, p. 174.
“Dasein is always ambiguously ‘there’... that is to say, in that public disclosedness of being-with-one-another where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep ‘things moving’, whereas in everydayness everything (but basically nothing) is happening. This ambiguity is always giving away to curiosity that which it seeks: and it gives idle talk the semblance of having everything decided in it.”

Again we note Heidegger’s remarks on how “loud idle talk” and “ingenious curiosity” create the semblance of activity, significance, and involvement, in which “nothing” is really happening. The impression created is that everyday Dasein surmises about doing things, but is ineffectual. In this sense, the inauthentic individual is a failure. But this tendency is far from harmless since being-with-one-another is profoundly influenced, Heidegger states, by das Man’s tendency toward idle chatter, curiosity, and ambiguity. For the other (including oneself) is seen in terms of what they say about him; hence, what gets passed along about one is constitutive for how one is seen in the eyes of das Man. Therefore, the possibility of a genuine access to the other is poisoned for “into primordial being-with-one-another, idle talk has slipped in”. Everyone has his eye on the other to see what he is doing and is simultaneously aware that the other is watching him.

“Being-with-one-another in das Man is by no means an indifferent side-by-sideness in which everything has been settled, but rather an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-in. Under the mask of ‘for one another’ an ‘against-one-another is at play.’”

This ambiguous way of being with others contains the core of Sartre’s account of being-for-others as conflict. But whilst Sartre claims that conflict is the fundamental element of all human relationships, Heidegger limits his diagnosis to a way of being of das Man that can be modified and transformed. For Heidegger, being-with-others is conflict only if idle chatter is operative as a way of being with one another. Although Heidegger claims that these inauthentic ways of being lead Dasein in its average everydayness, he does not say that Dasein is ‘condemned’ to a never ending absorption in these possibilities with no hope of extrication. Thus,

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234 SZ, p. 174.
236 SZ, p. 175.
237 Sartre, J. P., L’Être et le Néant, chapter III.
Heidegger reveals the sometimes hidden ways of being that keep *Dasein* in bondage to *das Man* whilst disclosing the possibility of liberation, as he reveals a way toward authenticity through which one modifies the already described alienating ways of being. A failure to note this results in one-sided misinterpretations by such critics as Buber, that – as we will see further – neglect the import of Heidegger’s analysis of inauthenticity to the possibility of an authentic understanding, disclosure, involvement and compromise.

As for ambiguity, it seems to be an even more prevalent and destructive phenomenon today due to the accelerated pace of life which puts one in a state of perpetual motion, where one is driven to constantly adjust and re-adjust, changing with the times, keeping up with all that’s new, pushing oneself ever forward and ahead, keeping constantly up to date, going along with the tempo, novelty, and changes of the world. The phenomenon of ambiguity therefore seems to be implicated in our ‘global’ society with its increasingly rapid change and development. In such a situation there is an ever more abundant proliferation of possibilities which gives one the opportunity to continuously surmise about what to do, scenting out ever new things to do, and thus failing to get involved in anything because one is floundering around in everything.

I have been following Heidegger as he sketches out the ways of being through which *Dasein* alienates himself from his authentic possibilities. I suggest that Heidegger’s analysis portrays this condition in a critical manner such that one may be led to view these ways of being with distaste, and to question critically one’s everyday practices and behaviour, thus rendering problematical one’s most taken for granted, simply accepted ways of being. In the context of everyday life, Heidegger’s depiction of such things as gossip and idle talk, escapism and frenetic diversion seeking (*Neugier*), and an uncompromised immersion in mere surmising (ambiguity) is especially striking. The *das Man* existence, then, is portrayed as an irresponsible, noncommittal, superficial, mediocre, conformist condition which Heidegger describes as “uprooted”, “groundless”, “null”, and “alienated”.

To further develop this interpretation we must examine more closely the interconnection between the ways of being examined in this section and the inauthenticity of *das Man*. I hope to have stressed the interconnectedness of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity while exhibiting and describing these everyday ways
of being. What will be of concern in the next point is “the kind of being which belongs to this interconnectedness.” This interpretation will further explain how Dasein becomes das Man and how the phenomena described in this section constitutes the inauthentic self.

c) Withdrawing and Individuation

In this point I will examine some of the modes of disclosure that make possible the modification of the inauthentic self. I will turn from Heidegger’s analysis of das Man (the ‘they’, world of everybody and nobody) and the ways of being of the inauthentic self, to an analysis of certain modes of disclosure which Heidegger claims undermine one’s confidence and security in the everyday understanding-interpretation of das Man (the ‘they’, world of everybody and nobody), and thus break up das Man’s authority and dictatorship. The phenomena which Heidegger selects as the modifiers of the inauthentic self are anxiety, death, and conscience-guilt.

The themes I would like to introduce to interpret the shift of Dasein’s liberation from its inauthenticity to authenticity are withdrawing (entziehung) and individuation (Vereinzelung). The term individuation is Heidegger’s and refers to an individuation of the authentic self from das Man self. ‘Withdrawing’ is a term I will introduce to cover a group of concepts that Heidegger uses to describe Dasein’s liberation (Befreiung) from inauthentic possibilities, the withdrawing or extraction (entziehen) of Dasein from das Man’s ways of being and the act of tearing oneself away or being torn away from das Man’s publicness (entreissen).

I will use the terms withdrawing and individuation as the interpretive key in which we can work out the ἀληθεύειν of anxiety, authentic-being-toward-death, and conscience, and how these are revealed and awaken Dasein from its slumber in das Man (the ‘they’, world of everybody and nobody), arouse Dasein out of its

238 SZ, p. 175.
239 SZ, pp. 264, 303, 344, 122, 198.
240 SZ, pp. 169, 296, 299, 383.
absorption in publicness, and disclose its lostness, alienation, and inauthenticity in inauthentic existence.

In making this point I hope to make clear a mode of ἀληθεύειν found in Being and Time which describes in every case a break or rupture in one’s absorption in everyday life, and which reveals insights into one’s inauthenticity that free the individual from the domination of das Man. What is at stake is an interconnected series of phenomena which extricate and individuate Dasein from the tyranny (Heidegger’s term) of das Man and which are therefore the conditions of the possibility of authenticity.

The phenomena that I am examining at present are not the unique constitutives of Eigentlichkeit nor are the terminological correspondences with Aristotle to be unfolded restricted to the phenomena currently being examined. Therefore, the provisional nature of this point should be noted, as it is only the beginning of the disclosure of Eigentlichkeit. I put special emphasis on this point as many interpreters of Heidegger have fixed upon death and anxiety, conscience and guilt, as the exclusive constituents of authenticity. I hope to show that this widespread interpretation which equates authenticity with being- towards-death, or which explicates authenticity exclusively in the phenomena examined in this chapter, is misleading as an interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. To avoid the deficiencies which I consider to be an erroneous interpretation of authenticity, I suggest that anxiety, death and conscience are but the beginning of a self-transformation of the self. Hence I wish to make clear that in the course of this research I will not overemphasize the role of death in Heidegger’s conception of authenticity as I consider it to be a constrictive interpretive perspective much in vogue in the philosophical purposes of the Frankfurt structuralist School. In this sense these classical readings would be evaluated out of the clarification of the Aristotelian grounds which engage Heidegger in the whole discussion of Eigentlichkeit in Sein und Zeit. Specifically I suggest that the modes of disclosure addressed in the discussion of Eigentlichkeit are ontological designations of Aristotle’s πραξισκευής. These phenomena are, in Heidegger’s interpretation, ‘ontological’. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is very different here from the commonly accepted reading of Aristotle, in that he claims that the nature of Aristotle’s practical philosophy is a universal constituent of human being that
discloses fundamental insights into what it is to be human, and which have a transformative effect in Dasein. In other words, the idea is that the Aristotelian structure of πρᾶξις as ἀληθεύειν makes it possible to see the relationship between Heidegger’s and Aristotle’s respective ontological projects in a different light, compared as to how it has been conceived of in the earlier literature on this topic, and how Aristotle and Heidegger have their basic motivation in the idea that the possibility of ontology presupposes a decision to realize one of the possibilities for the enactment of human being: ἀληθεύειν. I hope to make clear in the following how Heidegger demonstrates that Aristotle considers human life in its totality as a πρᾶξις and not a ποιήσις which for him works respectively as authenticity and inauthenticity.242 In the Aristotelian thesis in accordance with which πρᾶξις is κίνησις τοῦ βίου (the movement specific to human life) Heidegger finds strong support for, and substantial confirmation of, the direction of his research and at the same time characterizes the possible misunderstandings of this point made by the tradition.243

In order to support this contention I would begin by asking a) how anxiety works as a liberating-disclosive phenomenon that withdraws Dasein from its lostness in das Man (the ‘they’, world of everybody and nobody) and individuates it for the choice of authenticity, and how Heidegger was able to support his claim from what he read in Aristotle and made explicit in the analyses of his terms in his GA 18 course, namely by appealing to Heidegger’s reading of βούλευσις (anxiousness) and προαιρεσις (anticipatory choice), πρᾶξις and κίνησις (Eudemian Ethics, Physics VI) in the notion of Angst, Jemenigkeit and Zeit244; b) how the awareness of death plays a similar withdrawing-individuating role and offer a first account of φρόνησις.

I will discuss in detail the relationship between death and authenticity, and will provisionally indicate my opposition to those interpretations of authenticity that I believe exaggerate and distort the role of being-towards-death in Heidegger’s concept of Eigentlichkeit. After explicating Heidegger’s notion of authentic being-toward-death, I will note how Heidegger’s contrast of das Man’s evasion of death

242 PL, 1957, I, 4, 1254a7.
244 EE, on the basis of the cited passage II, 3, 1220 b27.
with authentic being-towards-death, provides an example of a distinction between inauthentic and authentic ways of being.

To conclude this chapter and the examination of the conditions of possibility of the transformation of the inauthentic self, I will examine Heidegger’s account of Conscience and the Call to Authenticity and the connection to Aristotle’s προσθητή (Rhetoric, book II) – [Befindlichkeit, Verstehen] including an interpretation of conscience as the call to authenticity.245

What will be explored in this chapter is therefore the possibility of a transition from inauthenticity to authenticity from Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle. The guiding question throughout the present chapter is therefore: what makes authenticity possible? i.e., what are the conditions of the possibility of authenticity? How central are Aristotle’s concepts from his practical philosophy to Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik? How Heidegger apprehends and determines the fundamental ontological structure of human life, of Dasein, or more specifically the character of the latter on the basis of his reading of being uncovering, in its being as ἀληθεύειν? An explication of the structure of an authentic existence will not be addressed until the coming chapter.

d) Anxiety as a liberating disclosure

Anxiety, in Heidegger’s interpretation, is not taken as a state of “mental disorder”, or as a depressive, unhealthy condition, but is rather interpreted as a “distinctive mode of disclosure… one of the most far-reaching and primordial possibilities of disclosure.”246 In his analysis of anxiety in paragraph 40, Heidegger makes the following claims: 1) anxiety “simplifies” Dasein in such a way as to make manifest the “primordial totality” of its “structural hole”; 2) “discloses primordially and directs the world as world”;247 3) reveals Dasein’s “being-in” as

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245 SZ, pp. 34, 271-3, 276, 277.
246 SZ, p. 182.
247 SZ, p. 182.
“an individualized, pure, thrown potentiality-for-being”\textsuperscript{249}; 4) individualizes \textit{Dasein} and thus discloses it as ‘\textit{solus ipse}’\textsuperscript{250}; 5) discloses \textit{Dasein}’s “not-at-homeness” in \textit{das Man}; and 6) in \textit{What is Metaphysics} anxiety takes on a further disclosive function, playing a fundamental role in the revelation of Nothingness (which in turn as something to do with making possible a grasping or experiencing being as a whole). My proposal on anxiety is restricted by my focus on authenticity and the \(\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\) at stake in every mode of disclosure, thus only claims 2-5 will be addressed in this point. I will therefore only focus on anxiety from the standpoint of its role in the modification of the inauthentic self and how this presents a re-reading of Aristotle’s notions which Heidegger started to explore in GA 18 and takes it up in this notion. Now, I would like therefore to offer an interpretation of anxiety in \textit{Being and Time} as an extreme experience that withdraws and individuates inauthentic \textit{Dasein}, and as a special mode of \(\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\), that is a \textit{grundbefindlichkeit} that helps make authenticity possible. Again, as in previous sections, we see how Heidegger retrieves an understanding of \textit{Dasein} by letting Aristotle’s notions point to where they are worked out: factical life. In this sense, I shall go back and forth from Aristotle’s ontic notions to the structures and concepts with which Heidegger describes and interprets these phenomena (ontological). This way of dwelling on the ontic grounds, that is the \(\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\) in which any ontological description is rooted, is clearly stated in \textit{Being and Time}. Heidegger’s remarks that “One of Dasein’s possibilities of being is to give us ontical ‘information’ about itself as a being”, that ontological interpretation must not overlook “the positive phenomenal bases” for its interpretation, that a “phenomenological interpretation” must strive to understand and conceptualize (\(zu\ \textit{begreifen\ bringen}\)) the ontic experience upon which it is based, and that the interpretation “only carries out the explication of what Dasein itself ontically discloses” make it clear that Heidegger wishes to provide a firm ontic grounding for his ontological analysis of anxiety, and that this concept is derived from and grounded in the \(\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\upsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\nu\) at stake in every mode of disclosure, i.e. anxiety.\textsuperscript{251} Now I will examine Heidegger’s claim that anxiety “brings Dasein

\textsuperscript{249} \textit{SZ}, p. 188.  
\textsuperscript{250} \textit{SZ}, p. 188.  
\textsuperscript{251} \textit{SZ}, pp. 184-5.
back from its absorption in the world” (extrication); and that anxiety “individualizes Dasein and discloses it as ‘solus ipse’” (individuation). This inquiry should thus show how anxiety help make authenticity possible by disclosing to Dasein in a forceful way its lostness in das Man and by liberating it for its authenticity.

Since Heidegger assigns anxiety such a major role in his existential analytic, specifically in the analysis of Eigentlichkeit, perhaps I should make some preliminary remarks on the disclosive significance of “mood” that Heidegger maintains. He argues that Dasein’s being is most directly disclosed through its moods, a claim we cannot here fully examine and explicate. Heidegger’s most comprehensive term for “moods” is Befindlichkeit. Since this term indicates our “being attuned” or emotional attunement to the world, an accurate translation would be “attunement” or “findliness”. One should keep in mind that Befindlichkeit is intended as a mode of disclosure for Heidegger that reveals the totality of being-in-the-world and not “psychological states” (thus Macquarrie and Robinson’s “states-of-mind” is not a very accurate translation, for it uses a psychological concept that Heidegger scrupulously avoids). Thus, although I will refer to anxiety as a “mood” on the grounds that this best serves my purpose of interpreting the withdrawing-individuating role of anxiety, I am not suggesting that Befindlichkeit is best translated as “mood”.

Heidegger’s first point is that we are always in some mood (angry, happy, bored, indifferent...), and that these moods reveal to us how we are doing, how things are going: “a mood makes manifest ‘how one is’, and how one is faring”. This “moodiness” is such a pervasive and ordinary aspect of our daily life that we usually attach little importance to our moods. Philosophers have reinforced this

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252 SZ, p. 189.
253 SZ, p. 188.
254 SZ, pp. 134, 136, 138. A stimulating inquiry into moods initially carried through in Auseinanderetzung with Heidegger is found in one of the first commentaries available last century, Bollnow’s, Otto, Das Wesen der Stimmung. Cf., also the more recent study of Carman, Taylor, Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Being and Time, though Carman places Heidegger’s philosophy in a broadly Kantian context contrasting it with recent theories of intentionality, notably those of Dennett and Searle.
255 Cf., Inwood, M., A Heidegger Dictionary, pp.131, 132 for a description of the semantic meanings of this notion, “which combines the idea of ‘situadness’ and of ‘feeling/faring somehow’, of where and when one finds oneself” which will be acknowledged in the next page as “findliness”.
256 SZ, p. 134.
tendency to overlook moods by interpreting them as non-cognitive, fleeting, ever-changing phantoms having no philosophical significance.\textsuperscript{257}

Secondly, Heidegger stresses that mood is not only an indication of how we are currently faring, but “from an ontological point of view we must leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘bare mood’ as a general principle.”\textsuperscript{258} This statement indicates that mood not only discloses our current “being disposed”, but also reveals far reaching insights into our being-in-the-world, thus serving as a primary mode of \underline{\text{αληθευ\={e}ιν}}.\textsuperscript{259}

Heidegger claims that there is one mood that is especially significant as a revelatory phenomenon. This mood is anxiety (\textit{Angst}) which is designated as a “basic findliness” (\textit{Grundbefindlichkeit}). This means that Heidegger takes anxiety to be a universally recurrent phenomenon of human existence, a constitutive determination of human being. Thus, although anxiety will be provisionally examined here as an indication and undermining of inauthenticity which begins the self-modification, it is never completely “overcome” or denied. To understand the important role of anxiety in Heidegger’s phenomenology we must clearly grasp the paradox that anxiety, usually considered a pathological ailment, enables one to begin breaking through the domination and constrictive control of \textit{das Man}’s dictatorship, and thus become free for the project of authenticity. This positive liberating-disclosive function of anxiety is the distinctive trait of Heidegger’s interpretation and sharply distinguishes this concept from psychiatric concepts, for it opens up the meaning of “advancing in the possibility” coined from Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s \textit{βουλ\={e}υσις}, \textit{προ\={k}ρ\={e}σις} and \textit{κίνησις}.\textsuperscript{260}

The starting point for the analysis of anxiety is \textit{Dasein}’s fallen absorption in \textit{das Man}.\textsuperscript{261} In an earlier chapter of \textit{Being and Time} Heidegger argued that the instrumental “complexes” which we utilize daily were concealed in the inconspicuousness and obvious character of habit and familiarity.\textsuperscript{262} It is only when a means-to-an-end relationship to these objects and facilities breaks down that the

\textsuperscript{257} Cf., Hemming, L., \textit{Postmodernity’s Transcending: Devaluing God}, pp. 95-101 for the clarification of the term \underline{\text{φαντασμα}} as it appears in Aristotle’s \textit{de Anima}. Also for a commentary on this term in \textit{NE} (VI, 1139b 14-1141a9) cf. Joachim, H. H, \textit{Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics}.

\textsuperscript{258} \textit{SZ}, p. 138.

\textsuperscript{259} \textit{SZ}, pp. 135-8.

\textsuperscript{260} \textit{NE}, VI, 2, 1139b 7-11 and III, 5.

\textsuperscript{261} \textit{SZ}, p. 184.

\textsuperscript{262} \textit{SZ}, I, chapter 3.
structure of the instrumental complex reveals itself.\textsuperscript{263} Similarly, in the work-world or (and) the social-world, the individual finds himself at the center of a referential totality of work/social relationships which are for the most part taken for granted, since like instrumental relationships they are generally inconspicuous and therefore obvious. Hence, in both the environmental world (\textit{Umwelt}) and the public world (\textit{Mitwelt}), one’s “being-in” is an outgoing absorption into the world of concern and solicitude. The everyday world is a familiar one.

I suggest here that the role of the broken hammer in the disclosure of the work-world – as already noted in connection to the structure of judgement in the last chapter on Heidegger’s reading of \textit{λόγος} at Marburg – is assumed by anxiety in the disclosure of inauthenticity and provides one of the transitional “bridges” from fallen, inauthentic everydayness to authenticity. For just as a breakdown in our instrumental relations (hammer, lap-top, tube) discloses for the first time the nature, structure and possibilities of an instrumental complex that was unreflectively utilized, so too does the experience of anxiety create a rupture in our everyday relationships to the social world and enables one to see with insight the alienation and lostness in a \textit{das Man} existence. This parallel event of disclosure indicates Heidegger’s recurrent thinking of an \textit{ἀληθεύειν} operating in every working out of \textit{ἀληθεία}, starting with absorption in an activity or condition, then encountering a breakdown that yields insight or disclosure. The underlying thinking of what Heidegger calls the \textit{Durchsichtigkeit} is another name for \textit{ἀληθεύειν} and is strictly interconnected with the capacity for carrying out the task of disclosure and knowledge, to remove the world from concealment and coveredness.\textsuperscript{264}

In the case of anxiety and its disclosure, we begin with \textit{Dasein} absorbed and dispersed in its social relationships, encountering a breakdown of its public preoccupation, and becoming aware of hitherto covered over or inconspicuous characteristics of \textit{Dasein}’s absorption in the world. Thus, anxiety for Heidegger performs, I suggest, an “existential \textit{ἐποχή}” that breaks through the constrictions of the “natural attitude”, thus enabling one to see through the distortions and concealments of \textit{das Man}’s understanding, and to see into \textit{Dasein}’s lostness in an

\textsuperscript{263} \textit{SZ}, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{264} \textit{PS}, p. 17 (my italics).
inauthentic existence. In the following points I will see that the experiences of death and conscience provide the same kind of disclosure and insight, enabling one to formulate a structure of experience which makes authenticity possible.

The obstacle to self-modification that must be overcome is everyday Dasein’s tendency to “flee in the face of itself – of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-being-its-self.” In order to do this, everyday Dasein must become aware that it is running away from itself. If Dasein is to halt its flight and discover its alienation from its authentic possibilities, it must first become ‘arrested’ from its fall, then turn towards itself and see that it is fleeing from its authenticity and is falling ever deeper into inauthenticity. The problem is that das Man provides Dasein with ways of fleeing and forgetting, thus pushing Dasein’s fall away from itself such that “the authenticity of being-one’s-self has been closed off and thrust aside in falling.”

For within the context of everyday routine, one is for the most part unaware of submitting to das Man and existing inauthentically, thus concealing the possibility of an authentic existence. In this complacent, self-satisfied condition one believes that all is in order, that there is nothing amiss. Yet, Heidegger claims this tranquilized condition is an artificial one, for anxiety is always present, waiting to disturb and upset the delicate balance with which everyday Dasein manages to keep control.

In describing anxiety, Heidegger’s first point is that the ‘object’ lato sensu of anxiety, “that in the face of which one has anxiety (das Wovor der Angst) is being-in-the-world as such.” Therefore, the focus of anxiety is on no particular being in the world. Although the aim of anxiety is nothing definite, for no one thing threatens, nevertheless the experience causes a rupture in Dasein’s usual relatedness and involvement, and as with the case of the broken instrument one “stumbles into the void” (stöß ins Leere). The void that arises in the experience

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265 The term “ἐποχή” here signifies that in anxiety Dasein “puts into abeyance” its everyday attitudes, roles, and understanding. The designation “existential” indicates that the breaking through of the natural attitude takes place in what Heidegger interprets as an “existential” trait of human being. This case provides an example of how Heidegger reinterprets Husserl’s phenomenological εποχή by substituting extreme experiences for theoretical cognition as key modes of αληθεύειν.

266 SZ, p. 184.
267 SZ, p. 44, 184.
268 SZ, p. 186.
269 SZ, p. 186.
270 SZ, p. 75.
of anxiety is a *loss of meaning* such that the world of *das Man* no longer has any interest, importance or urgency.\(^\text{271}\)

As is well known, in anxiety, nothing definite threatens, there is no object of anxiety. Rather on the contrary, one is anxious because the world has lost all meaning, urgency, and importance. Heidegger suggested previously at Marburg (GA 18) that anxiety also gives testimony to the idea that understanding is constituted of \(\pi\varsigma\theta\varsigma\) namely when it destroys our ordinary speaking for the benefit of another superior disclosing.\(^\text{272}\) It should be noted that in *Being and Time* the ‘object’ and source of anxiety is *not* a metaphysical nothingness (*das Nichts*). Although that which threatens in the state of anxiety can be said to be “nothing and nowhere” in that no definite object in a particular region is the source of the threat, Heidegger clearly says that that which one is anxious is “not totally nothing” (*kein totales Nichts*).\(^\text{273}\) Although after a seizure of anxiety when asked what the matter is, we may reply, “it was really nothing”, this everyday disclosure which we usually use to talk about familiar things in the world is unable to articulate the experience. For in anxiety everything in the familiar everyday world has become completely insignificant. There is nothing to be done, nothing to discuss, nothing to be said. But the “nothing” here is not a mysterious metaphysical “nothingness”, but rather a world without meaning, a world stripped of its usual significance that has nothing to offer. Everyday existence has become empty, vacuous, hollow, void.

Heidegger argues from this experience of meaninglessness that anxiety is not only intentional (*das Wovor*), but also reflexive (*das Worum*), that is, one is anxious about something. What one is anxious about “is not any definite kind of being for Dasein or a definite possibility (…) but rather (…) that which anxiety is anxious about is its own being-in-the-world itself.”\(^\text{274}\) This means that *Dasein* is anxious about its own being-in-the-world. For anxious *Dasein* is profoundly disturbed about the loss of meaning and the flat indifference of everything in its everyday world. The consequence of anxiety is therefore that *Dasein* can no longer remain tranquil and self-confident in the protecting shelter of *das Man*.

\(^{271}\) *SZ*, pp. 186-7. 
\(^{272}\) *GAP*, pp. 196-197. 
\(^{273}\) *SZ*, p. 187. We find an analysis on ‘nothingness’ in some of Heidegger’s post *SZ* courses as in *KPM*, p. 228. Cf. also “Was ist Metaphysik?” in *WM*, p. 16. 
\(^{274}\) *SZ*, p. 187.
“Anxiety takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted. It throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world.”

The point here is that precisely because Dasein is related to its being in a relationship of a practical kind, he is faced with its ‘authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world’ which represents a future being.

Heidegger's purpose with this analysis is to show that the individual can become free from the bondage of das Man so that one can become free to appropriate and develop one's own possibilities of understanding, interpreting, and acting, and thus be open to one's potentiality-for-being-a-self.

If the experience of anxiety can withdraw Dasein from a grasp of beings to a grasp of its being, one can perhaps say that it is an experience that borders on pure disclosedness, a pure ἀληθεύειν, due to the suspension of the activity of disclosing in absorbed concern. Therefore, it seems that all one can do is to appalled by it, to wonder at it. Perhaps one should say, however, that the experience of anxiety is far more distressing than wonder, not least since there is an element of admiration in wonder.

Heidegger seems to have retrieved the idea of an interruption of concern, caused by anxiety, from Aristotle’s own views on Philosophy. Aristotle too thinks – and this question seems also particularly worth posing when exploring the traditional esteem for philosophy as metaphysics, as πρῶτη φιλοσοφία, which places philosophy at the top of the hierarchical order of knowledge – that philosophy not only makes up a particularly far-reaching or comprehensive form of knowledge, but that it is also something exceptional and extraordinary, something which cannot be conceived of simply as a continuation of our everyday understanding for the world. For the rise of philosophy is not only concomitant with but indeed dependent upon a suspension of our immersion in everyday concerns – which however does not prevent philosophy from aspiring to the ultimate truth even about that everyday life on which it has turned its back. In other

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275 SZ, p. 187.
276 This notion certainly echoes what Plato had already expressed in the Theaetetus, 174b 1-6, when he refers that what a human being is, this he seeks to understand.
words, for Aristotle it is not because philosophical wisdom is especially useful to
us that it can put claim to superiority, but because its objects constitute the most
admirable and overwhelming aspects of reality. This is particularly clear in the
celebrated first lines of the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle suggests that the sciences
that do not aim at utility could arise only when such arts that provide Man with the
necessities of life had been developed, as this for the first time enabled men to have leisure:

“That it [philosophy] is not productive is clear also from those who first philosophised.
For it is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophise,
wondering first at common perplexities, and then by gradual progression being perplexed
by greater things as well,... He who is perplexed and wonders thinks that he is ignorant
(...); hence if it was to escape ignorance that men began to philosophise, it is obvious that
they pursued science \[\text{ἐπιστασθαι}\] for the sake of knowledge \[\text{εἰδεῖναι}\] and not for the
sake of anything useful.”

The point I would like to draw from these excerpts is that \(θαυμάζειν\) (wonder) and \(\text{Angst}\) both share the interruption of Man’s concern. For Heidegger,
the notion of wonder harbours a tendency towards seeing and helps to pave the way
for the idea of knowledge and authenticity as vision.²⁷⁸ Even though Heidegger
does not say so explicitly, the reason seems to be that the experience of wonder
gives rise to the idea that there must be a form of knowledge that is able to
respond to the experience of wonder. The “great expectations” of such knowledge
only be fulfilled by \(\alphaληθεύειν\) and this is the reason why \(\alphaληθεύειν\) as the
way of carrying through the truth in its uncovering is so decisive for Heidegger’s

²⁷⁷ *META*, 982b 11-21. The translation of \(\text{ἐπιστασθαι}\) as ‘science’ and \(\text{εἰδεῖναι}\) as ‘knowledge’
was adopted here bearing in mind the classical translation of these terms as “disciplines” (Charlton)
or “scientific knowledge” (Ross). However, it is important to see what lies behind these translations.
For paying attention to both terms that Aristotle uses especially in *PHY* (i.e. 184a 10-16) I find
\(\text{εἰδεῖναι}\) and \(\text{ἐπιστασθαι}\) to both mean literally “to know”. As an aorist indicative infinitive that
in Greek has the meaning of having already seen something, \(\text{εἰδεῖναι}\) means to recognise by
already being able to recognise. On the other hand, \(\text{ἐπιστασθαι}\) as a present middle infinitive has
the sense of standing for itself, something that stands for itself and therefore concerns the self
standing of something to be worked out: “presencing”. For example, in this line, \(\mu\epsilon\theta\delta\delta\omicron\omicron\upsILON\), means
“the way we go after. \(\omicron\delta\omicron\upsILON\): way. \(\text{ΜΕΤΑ}:\) after” rather than “systematic inquiry” or “systematical
knowledge” as present in CHARLTON, W. *Aristotle’s Physics I, II*, p. 1 or even “scientific
knowledge” cf. ROSS, W. D., The Works of Aristotle. Charlton and Ross’ renderings of \(\mu\epsilon\theta\delta\delta\omicron\omicron\upsILON\)
to “systematical knowledge” is only possible at the cost of understanding \(\text{εἰδεῖναι}\) and
\(\text{ἐπιστασθαι}\) as “disciplines”.

²⁷⁸ *PS*, p. 126.
own phenomenology. For as θαυμάζειν (wonder), philosophy and authenticity arise out of wonder from a feeling that the world is no longer familiar but on the contrary more or less obscure and overwhelming (Angst). To bring about such change in human being is, thus, the task of θαυμάζειν for Aristotle, and Angst for Heidegger.

The study of the withdrawing aspect of anxiety in Heidegger's text from Aristotle’s notion of θαυμάζειν in the *Metaphysics* and the *Physics* should help explain why Heidegger chose anxiety as a unique ontological phenomenon and not more cheerful moods as happiness, love, or Rausch. For, it is anxiety alone that works as an ἀληθεύειν, an uncovering of the situation and place of Dasein in the world. Moreover, since moods are supposed to represent the passive aspect of cognition, in that they determine how the world concerns Dasein prior to every kind of “active” conceptualization, the notion of θαυμάζειν would testify to an insight on Aristotle’s part that philosophy is more than a matter of changing perspectives.279 It requires a more profound transformation which is not completely at man’s disposal. At this point anxiety (Angst) is powerful enough to break through das Man's authority and thus liberate Dasein from its submission to publicness. What is at stake here is liberation from das Man and a collapse, not of the das Man itself but a disintegration of das Man's power and authority.

Moreover, in Heidegger's interpretation of anxiety, besides the withdrawing-disclosive capacity of working out das Man, it also plays the role of individualizing or “investing” Dasein with the possibility of being-a-self. This central aspect of withdrawal of Dasein from its fallenness in das Man and the individuating ἀληθεύειν (disclosing, making-true) of an authentic existence is clearly portrayed in the following passage:

“Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Therefore, with that which it is anxious, anxiety discloses Dasein as being possible and indeed as that which it can be singular from itself as individualized in individuation. Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its being toward its ownmost potentiality-for-being – that is, its being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its being-free-for (propensio in) the authenticity of its being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is.”280

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279 Cf., p. 65.
The two “insights” which Heidegger claims are disclosed to Dasein through anxiety are its “being possible” and its “being free”. The argument would seem to be that the \( \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\upsilon \nu \) of anxiety discloses a way of being-in-the-world that is blind to its possibilities, that is, truth, \( \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\upsilon \alpha \). In other words, the disruption of the ways of being of das Man is activated through the \( \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\upsilon \nu \) of anxiety that enables Dasein to realize that it is possible to act, understand, and interpret in its own ways, and that das Man's ways of being are not of an 'inferior' rank in relationship to authentic ways of being but rather these can be altered, rejected, or exchanged for other possibilities, thus 'depriving' das Man of its authoritative force. For by individuating one to one’s “solus ipse”, anxiety enables one to work through its own possibilities and one's being-free to make his own choices. Here being-free means to be open to the possibilities of Dasein brought about by the collapse of domination of das Man. Dasein's being-free and being-possible is brought home in a "forceful" way when das Man's protecting shelter collapses and it realizes it is abandoned, on its own. The journey toward authenticity begins, one can claim, paradoxically, with inauthenticity, with a seizure of anxiety that reveals one's lostness in das Man and opens up to the possibility of self-transformation.

Thus, it should now be clear that anxiety works both as an ontic \( \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\varepsilon\upsilon \) that discloses and extricates the hidden possibilities of Dasein in das Man and an ontological experience that shows itself in the weight of the ‘unbearable lightness of its being’ (to borrow Milan Kundera’s title) accompanied by uncanniness which makes itself known in the basic disposition (\( \text{Grundstimmung} \)) of anxiety (\( \text{Angst} \)). Anxiety is interpreted and conceptualized by Heidegger not as a psychological or psychiatric concept but as a disclosive mood of our being-in-the-world, that is, a fundamental way in which one is withdrawn or rescued from the absorption-dispersion in das Man, and is individuated in its being as the 'single one' with his own authenticity. Heidegger finds the idea that Dasein is not something that is realized and fulfilled in the momentary actuality of a pure activity, but is structurally a capacity (\( \text{Seinkönnen} \)) which surpasses and reaches beyond the confines of presence in order to be exposed to the temporal ecstases of the future.

Underlying this claim is, perhaps, a reference to Kierkegaard's depiction of anxiety as the "vertigo of freedom" in which the individualized self dizzily explores the infinity of possibilities before it and experiences anxiety in the face of its freedom and possibility.

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in which projection of its possibilities is unfolded, and the past, which is always the horizon and the inevitable context for projection

“In anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes. This individuation brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its being.”

Heidegger’s account of anxiety and its significance for authenticity no doubt creates difficulties for the “average understanding” as when it happens, the result is not only that the object of concern looses its availability and enters the mode of pure objective presence (Vorhandenheit), but the entire situation changes.

I will not have the space to consider other important aspects of anxiety, especially with regard to the theoretical Hinsehen and also to test the hypothesis of seeing in this analysis Heidegger’s attempt to lay bare the conditions of possibility of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, and how philosophy could respond to this rather extreme experience on which it rests. Nevertheless I hope to have indicated why anxiety, among all our manifold “moods”, was chosen as the Befindlichkeit which can most directly withdraw and individuate Dasein from das Man.

Now let us examine the liberating role anxiety plays in Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity and seek to grasp how and why Heidegger maintains his interpretation of death.

e) Advancing in the Possibility (Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit) and the finitude of Dasein

Even though Angst and θαυμαζεῖν are supposed to work as an impetus for philosophy and disclosing of human being’s authenticity, both Heidegger and Aristotle seem to think that philosophy continually needs to be informed by an experience that at least is kindred to the one that originally gave rise to it.

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282 SZ, pp. 190-1.
Heidegger expresses this as an idea that philosophy must be open to an experience that calls it into question, thus interrupting its everyday mode of discourse. The question now for Heidegger as it was in Marburg is how to step out of the everyday vicious circle of understanding, and to develop a conceptuality that does not merely sustain an everyday, inherited intelligibility but simultaneously turns to another horizon of meaning to which one’s presuppositions offer resistance: “While everydayness may seize upon the heritage, it happens that Dasein has the possibility to tear the heritage from everydayness and to bring it to an original explicatedness, that is, in the hexis to appropriate, out of everydayness and against it, the nature of conceptuality [das Begriffliche] in the proper sense.”\(^\text{283}\)

At this point I wish to make some clarifying remarks in order to avoid any misleading impression that might encourage one to exaggerate the role of death and anxiety in the constitution of an authentic existence. I propose that authentic being-towards-death takes one to the threshold of authenticity. That is, authenticity is not equivalent to or subsumed in being-towards-death. This thesis, plainly stated, may not appear too startling, but the fact is that most commentators and critics of Being and Time have concluded that an authentic being-towards-death is the fundamental determination of authenticity, thus implying that death is what is “authentic”, (i.e. what is uniquely and inalienable mine) and that authenticity and being-towards-death are equivalent.\(^\text{284}\) It is my purpose to correct this view which I believe distorts Heidegger’s subtle and liberating account of authenticity.

It is important to analyse very carefully the passages that suggest the interpretation of authenticity solely as a way of being-towards-death in order to clarify the notions and elicit passages that put such an interpretation into question, thus offering an alternative interpretation which I believe stands up from the text itself and therefore presents Heidegger’s concept of authenticity resulting from his assimilation of Aristotle’s teleology. This issue reaches its sharpest focus in the section on vorlaufende Entschlossenheit which I intend to examine in the next chapter. At this point I wish only to introduce the problem of the interpretation of the relationship between death and authenticity in the hope that an early

\(^{283}\) GAP, pp. 272; 277.

\(^{284}\) This interpretation is put by Adorno in Jargon der Eigentlichkeit, p. 64. A more ‘sophisticated’ formulation which builds on and synthesizes previous interpretations of the relation between death and authenticity is found in Demske’s Sein, Mensch und Tod, which I will examine later.
clarification will help us not only to avoid the interpretive pitfalls which have, I believe, plagued most of the interpretations of authenticity, but mostly to acquaint ourselves with this problem before we address this relationship in its own right. This arises when we examine Aristotle’s φρόνησις (Nicomachean Ethics I, and VI) and its assimilation in the phenomenon of Gewissen (conscience) (paragraphs 54-60). I would therefore propose that authentic being-towards-death is but the beginning of the journey toward authenticity, or that it takes one to the threshold of authenticity. Therefore, I wish to argue that death and anxiety withdraw Dasein from its lostness in das Man and enable one to gain a sense of the self that is the beginning of individuation toward authenticity, that these experiences of withdrawing and individuation help make possible, but do not exhaust, the constitution of authenticity in human being.

Heidegger’s argument is that authentic being-towards-death “reveals to Dasein its lostness in the das Man self, and brings it before the possibility (…) of being itself (es selbst zu sein).” My intent is to show how, for Heidegger, understanding one’s own being-towards-death withdraws one from absorption in das Man, and individuates one for the possibility of choosing and constituting an authentic self. Being-towards-death, then, like anxiety is a condition of the possibility of authenticity. Moreover, the disclosive understanding of one’s own death, Heidegger maintains, is one of the fundamental ways in which one gains a sense of self-being. This account comes from an in-depth reading of Aristotle’s notion of φρόνησις. Before this connection can be properly exhibited I find it necessary to discuss some aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology. I will not be able to cover this theme in its own right in this study but will concentrate mainly on Heidegger and Aristotle’s understanding of πραξις and further the previous indications on βουλευσις and προορισεις in connection to Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle’s κίνησις (motion) to the notion of individuation (Jemenigkeit) of Dasein. I will also provisionally indicate my opposition to those interpretations of authenticity which I believe exaggerate and distort the role of being-towards-death in Heidegger’s concept of Eigentlichkeit. After explicating Heidegger’s notion of authentic being-towards-death, I will note

285 SZ, p. 266.
286 This view is also taken by MacNeill, W., The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory, pp. 93-131.
how Heidegger’s contrast with das Man’s evasion of death with authentic being-towards-death provides an example of the distinction between inauthentic and authentic ways of being. This analysis will lead to a brief excursus in which I will comment further on the teleological structure of action involved in Heidegger’s hermeneutic of authenticity.  

I recall that, at first and for the most part, everyday life is preoccupied with the dealings and involvements of concern and solicitude. Although many events take precedence over busy everyday life, such as the arrival of a friend, a trip, a storm, a holiday, success or failure, there is one thing, Heidegger claims, that stands before one (Bevorstand) in a distinctive way. This unique possibility is my own death. All other possibilities of everydayness are based on my being-with-others and are dependent on the facilities and prescriptions of das Man: “but there may also be impending for Dasein a journey, for instance, or a disputation with Others, or the forgoing of something of a kind which Dasein itself can be – its own possibilities of being, which are based on its being with others.” These possibilities concern things to do and ways of being in my environing world which are controlled by das Man and are thus external to me. Heidegger wants to make a distinction between these everyday possibilities and the distinctive possibility of death. What we must do is to assess how death is a unique possibility different from the possibilities of das Man.

I begin by asking how the awareness of the possibility of one’s own death creates a break or a rupture in one’s absorption-dispersion in das Man and enables Dasein to gain insight into its inauthenticity and lostness. For Heidegger, the experiences of being-towards-death and anxiety are not destructive phenomena that “inhibit” one’s power to be, but rather are liberating-disclosive phenomena that help free one from bondage and lostness in das Man, and free one for the possibility of authenticity. Heidegger implies, as I will show, that the taking over and subsumption of death and anxiety into one’s own understanding of personal self-being is a positive aid in constituting an authentic self and, most of all, is an

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287 SZ, pp. 254-260.
288 SZ, p. 250.
289 SZ, p. 250. I would call attention to the last clause in this sentence that claims that Dasein’s possibilities are founded on its being-with-others, i.e. are dependent on das Man. We shall see that the quest for authenticity is in part a search for possibilities that are not founded in or are dependent on das Man.
indispensable condition of authenticity. I will now examine the grounds for this claim.

First, my death is, Heidegger argues, something that is distinctively mine: death is my ownmost possibility that is of personal concern to me and whose source is me alone. Death as my ownmost possibility, or ultimate end, is explained in terms of its being a distinctive possibility in which no one can replace me, act as my substitute, or take away from me, and which therefore stands before me as something irreplacably mine. The interpretive key that should help us to reveal the relevance of this argument for authenticity is the concept “representability” (Vertretbarkeit). Heidegger claims that “representability is constitutive for our being with one another.” That is, in everyday possibilities of das Man another person can always represent me, serve as a substitute for me, or replace me. Hence, from the standpoint of das Man I am but a cog in the wheel serving various roles, playing various parts that are interchangeable such that anyone can take over and serve in my place. Most of our everyday being-with-others (Mitsein) is grounded in and constituted by this representability in Heidegger’s view. His argument is that when one is absorbed in everyday concern, “one is what one does.” Moreover, since everyday Dasein identifies with what it does in its social relationships it understands himself in terms of these representable possibilities, roles and hierarchy in such a way that it covers over and conceals its uniqueness, individuality and irreplacability. Heidegger’s point here in appealing to my death as a paradigm of a kind of non-representational possibility that is uniquely mine, seems to be that it is in becoming aware of my own death that I become aware that I am not merely a set of interconnected tasks and social roles but am also a unique self. In other words, Heidegger’s claim is that “this possibility of representing breaks down completely” when it comes to the question of my own death. Through this breakdown I become aware of my Jemeinigkeit, my mineness, my being a unique, non-representable self.

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290 SZ, p. 240.
291 Macquarrie and Robinson suggest in a footnote to Being and Time that “The verb ‘vertreten’ means ‘to represent’ in the sense of ‘deputizing’ for someone. It should be noted that the verb ‘vorstellen’ is also sometimes translated as ‘to represent’, but in a quite different sense of ‘affording’ a “representation” or “idea” of something.”
292 SZ, p. 240.
293 SZ, p. 239.
294 Cf. the problem of representability/non-representability, pp. 70, 147.
My death, then, gives me an experience of my self. The question now arises: how does one experience and take over authentically one’s own death? Heidegger claims that most people flee from, evade, and cover over their own death. The implication is that by fleeing their own death, most people flee from their own self and thus forfeit a unique way of modifying their inauthentic ways of being. What we should be able to see is how an authentic being toward death stops the flight from the self and brings one before the possibility of authenticity.

The fundamental trait of death that an authentic being-towards-death should free, understand, and endure is the nature of death as a distinctive possibility. Heidegger maintains that this insight will not be gained by brooding over death, calculating when and how it will arrive (and thus planning one’s life in terms of this calculation), or expecting and waiting for death to happen. Heidegger argues that these attitudes towards death weaken death’s character as a possibility by conceiving of death as something ready-or present-at-hand that is to be evaded, calculated, or feared, thus covering over our own being toward this possibility. The only way to preserve the “pure possibility” character of death, so as to understandingly endure it as possibility, is through what Heidegger calls “advancing in the possibility” (Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit). Vorlaufen signifies an advancing into the future, but the phrase “in die Möglichkeit” indicates that the “advancing” or the projecting is not towards death (nor does Vorlaufen in means an “anticipation of death”) but rather signifies a projecting into the future from my own being-towards-death.

In order to understand what Vorlaufen means we need to take into account the sense of Sein zum Tode (being-towards-death) and Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit (advancing in the possibility) and focus on the connection to Aristotle’s notion of

295 SZ, paragraphs 51, 52.
296 SZ, p. 261.
297 SZ, pp. 261-262.
298 I am suggesting that Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of “Vorlaufen in...” as “anticipation of...” is misleading. For it suggests what Heidegger denies, i.e. “anticipation of” suggests that death is something that is anticipated as a future event that is “still outstanding”. For “anticipation” refers to an object of anticipation, something anticipated as if death were the intentional object of a privileged sort of act, and authentic being-towards-death were an intentional projecting of death as its end or object. Hence, the translation “anticipation of” suggests exactly what Heidegger denies and fails to account for Heidegger’s important stress that authentic being-towards-death understandingly endures death as a distinctive possibility and not as an object of an indefinite future. We will later see how this mistranslation can contribute to a misunderstanding of authenticity.
κίνησις. For, the concept of κίνησις is determinative of Aristotle’s thinking of life and world, meaning amongst other things the interplay between ποιήσις and πάθος. These notions are aspects of ἀληθεύεται strictly connected with Aristotle’s notion of νοῦς in the de Anima and the Physics and Heidegger’s discussion of the interplay between νοῦς, ποιήσις and πάθος back at Marburg (GA 18). I will restrict myself here to the notion of κίνησις as it is laid out by Aristotle in the Physics and indicate how κίνησις captures the meaning of Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit. Then I will move on in the next chapter to the connection to vorlaufende Entschlossenheit with the notion of νοῦς ὑπερτικός (discernment involving action) in the interpretation of being-towards-death as an “existential” constitutive structure of human being.

Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit is an “advancing” in the possibility “being-towards-death”, or in other words, Vorlaufen signifies a projecting into the future out of Dasein’s finitude. Rarely does Heidegger speak of a Vorlaufen zum Tode, an advancing towards death. Thus, since Vorlaufen discloses its being-towards-death as a present possibility and not as a future fact, it does not anticipate its own death as an event that will one day close out its being in the world. Rather, Vorlaufen is a projecting itself ahead in its finitude, but not in such a way that it anticipates its end, or posits its end death as a special goal, end, or “value”. Heidegger’s basic argument in this connection is that Aristotle has an ontological conception of τέλος thought as being constitutive of the being of movement and action. This is the point Heidegger makes in GA 18 in relation to Aristotle’s claim in the Metaphysics that the basic meaning of τέλος is end in the sense of limit. Heidegger also adds that it is only because this is the basic sense of τέλος that it may also mean “goal.” In this way he wants to object to the idea that Aristotelian teleology necessarily involves ascribing to nature a goal or design, as if everything that happens would do so according to some plan. We must be careful with the word “teleology”, Heidegger says, for Aristotle did not in fact have any teleological world view. Instead, the basic idea of his teleology is that to be is to

299 This is at least Heidegger’s view in GAP.
300 T. S. Eliot poetizes this concept in his Four Quartets: “In my beginning is my end.”
301 Meta. V, 17. GAP, pp. 39-82.
302 GAP, pp. 39-82.
303 GAP, p. 82.
be limited, whereas what is unlimited borders on non-being.\textsuperscript{304} On the other hand, however, Aristotle takes πράξις to be an end in itself. As such, it is not a form of κίνησις since κίνησις does not have its end immanently, but has the mode of being of ἐνέργεια (presence, actualization) or ἐντελέχεια (full presence).\textsuperscript{305} Therefore, insofar as action involves deliberation (βουλευσίς), it is in fact a form of κίνησις, though it is possible for us to regard it as an end in itself. Before I can show how κίνησις displays the movement of life in its authentic lines of action I must secure for now its original meaning in Aristotle in order to make clear what kind of reading is at stake in \textit{Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit} and how on the basis of this notion is the movement of ὁρεῖς διανοητικῆς /νοῦς ὁρετικῶς grasped: the guidelines of authenticity.

To what extent then, is Heidegger’s account of death as \textit{Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit} operating on the basis of his reading of Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια (in the sense of \textit{Fertigsein}: finished and complete being?)

Heidegger stresses that \textit{Vorlaufen} as authentic being-towards-death is not a dwelling upon the end or a brooding over it. Heidegger’s \textit{Sein zum Tode} is neither a pessimistic negation of life nor a romantic obsession with dying or finitude. His analysis of death as a distinctive possibility that I must endure rather than crippling one for life frees one from a morbid concern with such questions as “what will happen after I die”, and with futile attempts to picture the afterlife, and helps free one from an inhibiting fear of death.

“Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be ‘actualized’, nothing which Dasein as actual could itself be (…) In accordance with its essence, this possibility offers no support for becoming intent on something, ’picturing’ to oneself the actuality that is possible, and so forgetting its possibility.”\textsuperscript{306}

By making death \textit{Dasein}’s pure possibility, Heidegger draws attention away from the event of dying and the question of an afterlife, and focuses on one’s relation to one’s own finite self-being and its significance for one’s authenticity. Thus, it is a salient mark of Heidegger’s concept of being-towards-death that far

\textsuperscript{304} \textit{GAP}, pp. 31, 38-39.
\textsuperscript{305} For the idea that πράξις (activity) in the proper sense cannot be a form of κίνησις (motion) see also Aristotle, \textit{META}, 1048b 18-27.
\textsuperscript{306} \textit{SZ}, p. 262.
from intending to portray the senselessness of life in view of the impossibility of death, he stresses that authentic being-towards-death gives Dasein the power to be in the face of death, so that it makes possible individuation and authenticity. For Vorlaufen not only discloses the “measureless impossibility of existence” but reveals Dasein’s potentiality-for-being-authentic. The following passage is crucial in exhibiting Heidegger’s concept of authenticity in its relation to death.

“Being-towards-death is advancing in a potentiality-for-being whose mode of being is itself advancing. In the advancing revealing of this potentiality-for-being, Dasein discloses itself as regards its uttermost possibility. But to project itself on its ownmost potentiality-for-being means to be able to understand itself in the being of the being so revealed – namely to exist. Advancing turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-being – that is to say, the possibility of an authentic existence.”

Heidegger’s formulation echoes Aristotle’s definition of movement in the difference between beings and being in the Physics.

Aristotle states that:

“Physis is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest, in that it primarily belongs by virtue of itself and not by virtue of a concomitant attribute.”

What is ultimately at issue here both for Aristotle and Heidegger is the possibility of time. When Heidegger says “In the advancing revealing of this potentiality-for-being, Dasein discloses itself as regards its uttermost possibility” he is taking us back to the Greek notion of κίνησις as μεταβολή (change) indicating the ‘for the sake of which of every end’. The relationship between the verb κινεῖσθαι along with its correlate ἀρχή κινήσεως in the Physics elucidates how Heidegger’s account of death as a possibility, potentiality-for-being, and being-towards-death depends on the grasp of the proper meaning of μεταβολή essential in the interpretation of the correct voice of the Greek verb κίνησις:

307 SZ, pp. 262-3.
308 PHY, 192 b 22-23.
309 Cf., Inwood, M., A Heidegger Dictionary, p. 124, “Heidegger’s down-to-earth terminology (abandoned after BT) is inspired by such coinages of Aristotle as to hou eneka, ‘for the sake of which”. For the importance of this term to the ‘futural’ character of authentic temporality, cf. pp. 66, 77.
“Physis has been (ἐπέ ἐς ἥ) defined as a principle of motion and change (ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς) so that the way we take towards it (μεθοδοὺς ἡμιν) is on the meaning of motion (τὶ ἐστὶ κίνησις) for if it were concealed (λακωθανεῖν), the meaning of Physis too would be concealed (φύσεως ἐστὶ). When we have determined the nature of motion (διορισάμενος δὲ περὶ κινήσεως), our next task will be to confront in the same way (πειράτευν τον αὐτὸν the terms with which it is involved.”^{310}

If we consider the term κινεῖσθαι we verify that it is a Greek homographic verb showing that there is a meaning for each voice. In this case a middle voice or passive voice. It also reveals that Aristotle was aware of this form when he contrasted it with its homographic correlate in order to avoid a possible ambiguity concerning the understanding of the mover/motion pair.^{311} Aristotle thinks of motion in terms of the manifold and thinks of the multiple changing appearances of being in terms of the same origin, the same ἀρχή. Therefore every instance of movement has a principle of ordering. One of Heidegger’s suggestions to translate ἀρχή is “ausgängliche Verfugung und Verfugenden Ausgang” (originating ordering and ordering origin) in the sense of ἀτίον (cause). Something which is the originating order is responsible for the fact that the constant present has a unique kind of standing-on-its-own^{312}. The identification of nature as a self-mover in Physics II, 1, cannot be attributed exclusively to the voice of κινεῖσθαι. This option has historical roots back to Philoponus when he replaces κινεῖσθαι with ἀρχὴ κινήσεως making the point that the verb is not ambiguous. A closer look at the initial lines of Physics III, 1, 200 b10 reveals that Aristotle uses ἀρχὴ κινήσεως and κινεῖσθαι in 200 b 22 which suggests that he is clear about the proper voice to use: the passive voice. Had Aristotle intended to use the middle voice he wouldn’t have introduced ἀρχὴ κινήσεως to refer to nature as a “principle of motion”, for to use ἀρχὴ κινήσεως is to use an active verb with an object or passive with an agent which dismisses any trace of a possible reflexive usage of the middle voice^{313}.

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^{311} I owe this claim to Helen Lang, The Order of Nature in Aristotle’s Physics – Place and the Elements, Lang confronts the various renderings of κινεῖσθαι by Hardie, Gaye, Graham, Charlton, Furley, Waterlow, Cohen, who adopt the middle voice of κινεῖσθαι thus taking it as mover, cf. pp. 41-50.
^{312} WBP, p. 247.
^{313} PLATO, Phaedrus 245 C-246 apud Lang, op. cit., p. 43. Also Laws X, 895B-896A2, Timaeus, 57E.
This point can only be made on more substantial grounds if we consider the general use of κινεῖσθαι in Phys. II, 192b 9-11 which is the starting point of an analysis of motion. For clearly the use of the passive voice refers to things by nature. Since things by nature contain a principle of motion and are the subject matter of Physics, “our way we take towards it (μεθόδους ἡμῖν) is into the meaning of motion (τι ἔστι κίνησις) for if it were concealed [and this means unknown] (λανθάνειν), the meaning of nature too would be concealed [unknown] [λανθάνειν (φύσεως ἔστι).”

The being of beings is the essential character of φύσις in its simplicity, in that being is the enduring character and presence of the showing, the σῶν of being at rest (ἡρεμοῦν) and movement (κίνησις). Being is κίνησις in its state of movedness and φύσις is the origin of the movedness. The way Aristotle states ἀρχὴ κινήσεως (Phys. III, I 200b 10) of φύσις is then a first sign that motion is coextensive with nature because what is by nature must be moved by something. Living things, plants and animals are moved by something. The elements are moved by something. This “something” is the very notion of evidence as the indicative of motion. Hence the meaning of ἐπαγωγή as that which leads towards what comes into view as i.e. living things, trees, stars. The sense of ἐπαγωγή is central to the first steps of Aristotle’s Physics for it opens the horizon to think κίνησις from an instance of movement but in a way that points out the capacity of beings of seeing being as such in the whole. Ἐπαγωγή is the previous understanding of the being of beings in a way of the ἐπίσθανται, the presencing and making visible what stands there in view.

The central point in confronting Aristotle’s text with Heidegger’s account of death as Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit is so far to present the Aristotelian grounds

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315 PHY, A, 2, 185 a 12 ff.
316 Heidegger explores the notion of ἐπαγωγή in WBP, p. 244, drawing attention to the risks of translating it as “induction” since “Ἐπαγωγή meint nicht das Durchlaufen einzelner Tatsachen und Tatsachenreihen, aus deren ähnlichen Eigenschaften dann auf ein Gemeinsames und »Allgemeines« geschlossen wird. Ἐπαγωγή bedeutet die Hinführung auf Jenes, was in den Blick kommt, indem wir zuvor über das einzelne Seiende weg blicken, und wohin? Auf das Sein”, Cf. also Walter Brogan’s discussion of Ἐπαγωγή in Aristotle and Heidegger: The Twofoldness of Being, pp. 27-30. Cf., Joachim, H. H., Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. A commentary, p. 53, Ἐπαγωγή (‘induction’) is the method of leading a man to recognize a universal truth as involved in the particular forms of it with which he is already familiar. The word is probably connected with ἐπάγειν in the sense of ‘leading a man on’, ‘persuading him’. Burnet in his Introduction (§ 23, p. XXXVII) says ἐπαγωγή ‘literally signifies the citation of witnesses in a court of law’. But if so, and if Ἐπαγωγή is derived from ἐπάγειν in the sense of ‘adding witnesses’, passages like AP a 71a21, a24, 81b5, become untranslatable.” Cf. NE, 1098b 3-4, VI, 1139b 14-1141a 9.
that underlie Heidegger’s teleological account of Dasein as time, pressuposing we are aware of the passive meaning of κίνησις, that each Dasein, as every other being, contains an intrinsic source of motion, but also that every living thing, plant, and animal can be moved by another, i.e. two kinds of motion: self-motion, and motion by means of another. Thus things that are by nature and the elements contain a cause of being moved even if not an “active” cause of their motion, that is, even if they only “suffer” motion. What we understand as an intrinsic source of motion is the unique active orientation of a thing towards its own being – it can be potency, moved, to the actuality of being moved. Τέλος is the coming to appearance of the εἶδος of a thing in its ability to be fulfilled such that it comes to full presence. Εντελέχεια is the ἐν that comes to full presence as having-itself-in-its-end. The αἴτιον is the ground responsible for bringing being into appearance.

This seems to be the underlying idea in the first lines of chapter VI of the Physics:

“Since to know (εἰδέναι) and to know (ἐπιστασθαι) come together (συμβαίνει) in the way we go after the (μεθόδους) principles (ἀρχαί), grounds (αἴτια) and elements (στοιχεία) it arises (γνωρίζειν) from those (we think (δόμεθα) we have knowledge when we have found its primary grounds (αἰτία) and principles (ἀρχαί), and followed it back (μέχρι) to its elements) [that] clearly, then, knowledge about nature must start with an attempt to settle questions about principles.”

This trajectory is, as noted, a movement from what is clearer to us (ἡ ὁδός) to what is clearer by nature (ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῆς φύσει). Now, this same trajectory seems, I believe, to be at play in Heidegger’s words “death is Dasein’s

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318 PHY, 184 a 16-18.
319 PHY, 184a 16-18. Ross claims that proceeding from what is clear to us to what is clear by nature is the opposite of a scientific proof that would proceed from nature and then to Man, which is the reverse of τῆς φύσεως καὶ γνωριμοτέρως τῶν γνωριμιτέρων ἡμῖν. He affirms that this is the opposite of the scientific proof implied in AP I, 2. However to advance the possibility of a proof at this stage is already implicitly anticipating a path which has not yet been undertaken. Ross is still assuming that a method is a technique, a purely theoretical tool to confirm a theory which is already taken for granted. Method is not a technique for Aristotle. Rather it is a manner of inquiry that remains faithful to the matter of thought itself. The transition from τῶν γνωριμιτέρων ἡμῖν to τῆς φύσεως καὶ γνωριμοτέρως comes from the same fold of φύσεως ἡμῖν καὶ κινήσεως and this is the reason why Aristotle indicates so clearly in the beginning of PHY the εἰδέναι and ἐπιστασθαι: in order to point out the presencing character of being – which Heidegger thematizes: κίνησις as σύνοσις – presencing: WBP, p. 283. Cf. the same point in Heidegger’s later Freiburg, Winter Semester 1955/56 essay, Der Satz vom Grund, p.111 and the reference to μεθόδος in Parmenides (GA 54), pp. 87-88, Aristotle, META, 982b 11-21.
ownmost possibility. Being toward this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-being, in which its very being is at stake” and further, “advancing turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-being – that is to say, the possibility of an authentic existence.” This implies that Dasein’s potentiality-for-being (Seinkönnen) is authenticity.\(^\text{320}\) Dasein can be (Sein-können) authentic. Seinkönnen thus signifies that Dasein has the power, the ability (können) to be authentic. This analysis thus suggests that “advancing” brings one to the threshold of authenticity by disclosing the possibility of an authentic existence. Precisely on this point I believe that, in view of all these elements, Heidegger had to uphold a radical distinction between the ontological constitution of Dasein and that of beings different from Dasein, by basing it on the consideration that Dasein is the only being ontologically constituted as Zu-Sein. Upon this distinction he had to rely on Aristotle’s Topica VI, 4 and Metaphysica VII, 3 as it seems a natural conclusion for him in his Platon: Sophistes course (GA 19), being the idea that we only gain access to the particular because we already have a καθόλου (universal) perspective, lato sensu. In other words, a καθόλου perspective corresponds to the way the whole, ὅλου, of that which encloses (περιέχου) reveals itself in each particular, (ἐκσαστοῦ) so that it works as the way of revealing Dasein as gathered together as a whole holding itself as such in relationship to what is common, κοινον as the separate, χωρίς. This is itself the pure appearance of the ἐιδέναι as prior condition of knowledge and this may explain why at this point in the text Heidegger’s claims that Dasein merely understands that it can be authentic; it has not chosen yet authenticity as a project, resolved on its authentic possibilities, or constituted an authentic self. The point to be stressed in the discussion of inauthenticity is yet not that I can choose, that I can be my extreme possibility as a human being, but rather that an authentic existence is not achieved, subsumed or completed by an authentic running ahead of death. In other words, that an authentic being-towards-death discloses to Dasein its potentiality-for-being by individualizing Dasein in the knowledge of its possibility thus freeing one from immersion in the das Man self.

I have been drawing attention to the central role that Aristotle’s analysis of motion plays in Heidegger’s notion of Sein zum Tode (being-towards-death) in

\(^{320}\) SZ, p. 262.
connection to *Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit*. So far I have concentrated on the meaning of *vorlaufen*. I would like now to concentrate on *Möglichkeit* as possibility/potentiality.

We have seen that *Dasein*’s capacity to be authentic lies in the fact that *Dasein* has a potentiality, that is, has change, *can* change which brings us back to the general meaning of *μεταβολή* distinguished by Aristotle through the use of *ἀλλοιωσις*\(^{321}\). A closer examination of this meaning reveals that every change is a change from something to something from the out-of-which of the place of every being to the being-toward-something in appearance – “a change is always from something to something” as Aristotle states in various steps of *Physics*: “πᾶσα μεταβολή ἐστιν ἐκ τινος ἐξ τινός τινός”\(^{322}\). But behind Aristotle’s words there is for Heidegger a subliminal question: what is the true meaning of this “something” from which we change, i.e. how can authenticity take place from inauthenticity and how is inauthenticity already presupposed by its potential correlate? (i.e. how can a young person age, how can the not-yet be already included in being, how can I endure, no longer be and not-yet be?) Heidegger knows that the essence of *μεταβολή* is only attained through observing that in every change there is something absent that comes to presence, and that every instance of motion is an *ἐντελέχεια* of the thing moved (*κινούμενον*) such that in the generation of something to something there is already movement, *κίνησις* that comes into appearance with the changing thing\(^{323}\). In an analogous sense, the distinctive possibility of death and authenticity depend on *Dasein*’s capacity to be (Seinkönnen) and individuation. Heidegger claims that an authentic being-towards-death, first, conceives death as its *ownmost* possibility. The effect of this disclosure is described in the following terms in *Being and Time*:

> “Death is *Dasein*’s *ownmost* possibility. Being toward this possibility discloses to *Dasein* its *ownmost* potentiality-for-being, in which its very being is at stake. Here it can become manifest to *Dasein* that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from das Man. This means in advancing *Dasein* can have been wrenched

\(^{321}\) Cf. Heidegger’s illustrative example of the tree and the fox where *ἀλλοιωσις* – as change, alteration – is contrasted with the “rest of non-alteration” [Ruhe der Unveränderung] and therefore a type of movedness, *WBP*, p. 249.

\(^{322}\) For example, *PHY*, I, 225 a 1, Also the same sense in IV, 234 b 11, 252 a 10.

\(^{323}\) *WBP*, pp. 249, 285.
away from das Man already. The understanding of this ‘can’ (Könnens) first reveals its factical lostness in the everydayness of the das Man self.”

This sense of taking over one’s ownmost possibility provides a paradigm for projecting one’s own self-chosen possibilities. The term ‘ownmost’ is a direct translation of Heidegger’s investigations of the ὀλον of ἐκαστὸν in Aristotle’s Physics. This change is already pointing out to the unity of beings, the συνεσθαίναι, that unites and separates beings in the enduring character of presence. Aristotle thinks of being in terms of their endurance, that is, in the sense that movement is continuous and gathered in the arrival of being and bound therein to its proper place. In μεταβολή there is a kind of movement and hence continuity that withdraws beings from what they have been and yet makes them resist to their what-is-to-be: “Ἡτοι ταύτων ἐστι τὸ μεταβάλλειν καὶ τὸ ἀπολείπειν, ἡ ἀκολουθεὶ τῷ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἀπολείπειν, ἡ ἀκολουθεὶ τῷ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἀπολείπειν” (“everything that changes withdraws from [ἀπολείπειο – to leave behind, to forsake, to be absent] that from which it changes; and withdrawing, if not the same thing as changing follows it (ἀκολουθεῖο).”

It is precisely this withdrawing-emerging, μεταβολή, that holds together the manifold and lets it belong together as one, such that all to know roots in this transition in the sense of a sudden turning involving presence and absence. In Being and Time this same idea of change (μεταβολή) seems to be present in the determination of ἀληθεύειν itself as ‘withdrawing/individuation’, as previously seen, and a way of carrying through the disclosing: “it means in advancing any Dasein can have wrested itself away from das Man already.”

The understanding of this I ‘can’ (Könnens) first reveals its factical lostness in the everydayness of the das Man self” is what is at stake in the process of knowledge: the trajectory of knowledge presupposes that there are things that are clearer to us and things that are clearer and more knowable by nature. In order to presuppose that a thing is clear to us we must somehow have already recognized the thing in its presenting to us, in the way of its appearance. The same applies for a thing which is clearer by nature, a thing that by its presence stands out by itself.

324 SZ, p. 263.
325 PHY, I, 1, IV; META V, 26, Topics VI, 4.
326 PHY, V, 235 b 9-11.
In either case the visibility of a thing is possible because it is in a place and is determined by its being in place. The Seinkönnen disclosed by death is factual, that is, it means to be the from-out-of-which and being-toward of change: being. In other words, when Heidegger speaks of Seinkönnen he is stressing that here is an alreadyness of being given in our access to the world. The being towards which Dasein stands in relationship to the practical reference of Zu-Sein is always the very being of Dasein itself, and it is for this reason that Heidegger attributes it the character of Jemeinigkeit (being in every instance mine). I surmise that with this determination Heidegger is rethinking and giving an ontological interpretation of the meaning of a characteristic which belongs to the knowing of φρόνησις and which Aristotle formulates when he says “φρόνησις μὲν οὖν τι ἄν εἶν γνώσεως τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι.” A practical example of this is when we think of, i.e. a library where we immediately see books, shelves, carpet, windows… as a whole, not as isolated objects, because of the synthesis of recognition operating in our perspective. Aristotle’s operator “to know” is crucial for this aspect for it makes the transition of a being καθόλου rooted in the γνώριμον ημῶν that itself is a γνώριμον τῇ φύσει. For Heidegger this knowledge is the capacity to project one’s own existence (“can” signifies here: can choose and project one’s possibilities). Advancing in one’s ownmost possibility thus discloses that one is free, and is able to choose and project one’s own possibilities. On the other hand, the possibility of choosing in every being translates the unity of beings, the συνεσθούναι, that unites and brings together beings in the enduring character of presence. To endure in the sense that movement is continuous and gathered in the arrival of being and bound therein to its proper place. There is a kind of movement and thence continuity in μεταβολή that withdraws beings from what they have been and yet makes them resist their what-is-to-be.

327 In his Heidegger Dictionary, pp. 9, 171, Inwood makes a strong case of Seinkönnen as “ability, capacity/potentiality” as different from “possibility” which I unreservedly adopt in my own reading.

328 NE, VI, 1141b 31-34, “Now knowledge of oneself will indeed be a kind of practical wisdom, but different from other kinds.” This sentence comes in the sequence of VI, 2, 1139b 7-11 and III, 5 where Aristotle discusses the futural structure of action.

329 This transition is connected with the nature of what is τὸ σαφές, the clear, the manifest and therefore with that from which φύσις speaks of: Sein. Φύσις is the showing of the manifest such that the being of beings points itself out of the very own way onto itself. Cf. Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, p. 113.
Heidegger retrieves this same sense of μεταβολή as resistance in *Being and Time* by regarding an authentic being-towards-death which experiences its own death as a non-relational, distinctive possibility which discloses that one is on his own, abandoned to himself.\(^{330}\):

“*Vorlauf*en allows Dasein to understand that potentiality-for-being in which its ownmost being is at stake, must be taken over by Dasein alone. Death does not just ‘belong’ to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death *lays claim* to it as an *individual* Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in *Vorlauf*en individualizes Dasein down to itself.”\(^{331}\)

In explicating the individualizing impact of the experience of one’s own death, we encounter the phenomenon of κίνησις working through the absorption-breakdown-disclosing of anxiety through μεταβολή. Undercutting Heidegger’s claim that “to understand itself in the being of the being so revealed – namely to exist” is the re-reading of Aristotle’s κίνησις as ἀρχή μεταβολή thus unfolding the teleological structure of *Dasein* in existence: the ἐν of the εἴδος with the τέλος that holds itself, ἔχειν, that is, as Heidegger puts it “the end where the movement of seeing first gathers itself up and essentially in movedness” is understood in terms of the process of potency and actuality as a source of being moved and being at rest.\(^{332}\)

At this stage of Heidegger’s interpretation this κίνησις/μεταβολή is interpreted ontologically as: *Dasein can be, “has to be” (zu-Sein), Dasein is in anticipation of his ownmost possibility of being authentic, meaning Dasein discovers its cause (αἴτιον) in the overlapping appearances of motion (inauthenticity) and their fundamental character of μεταβολή (change). According to Heidegger, before my ownmost possibility of death I find all my relationships to the environment and to the others are dissolved, therefore the tasks of the work world and the roles of the public world have no relevance to my confrontation of my own death; for in standing before death alone, I face my death “primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude.”*\(^{333}\) This experience reveals that my possibility of being-a-self is something that I must take over on my own:  

\(^{330}\) Cf. pp. 70, 135.  
\(^{331}\) *SZ*, p. 263.  
\(^{332}\) *VWB*, p. 285.  
\(^{333}\) *SZ*, p. 250.
“Dasein can only be authentically itself if it makes this possible for itself on its own accord (von ihm selbst).”

Thus, authentic being-towards-death withdraws me from das Man and individuates me, disclosing that I have my own potentiality-for-being that only I can take over.

Authentic being-towards-death, thirdly, discloses one’s finitude, for it is the possibility that is “not-to-be-out-stripped” (Unüberholbare). This makes death a powerful disclosive experience, for when one understands one’s finitude there is no option but to surrender oneself to the impending end, giving oneself up to death’s “honesty”. Heidegger argues that this “giving oneself up” (Selbstaufgabe) frees one to take over and choose one’s own authentic possibilities by freeing one from the inauthentic possibilities of das Man.

Authentic being-towards-death shakes one up sufficiently to break through one’s complacent, self-assured immersion in das Man which kept one entrenched in inauthenticity:

“Vorlaufen discloses existence giving itself up as its uttermost possibility and thus it shatters that tenaciousness and rigidity (Versteifung) of whatever existence has been reached.”

In this interpretation, the realization of finitude jolts one out of his complacency, shakes away some of one’s illusions, and makes one view one’s world with a penetrating, piercing eye that puts into question the familiar everyday world. Let us be clear about the impact authentic being-towards-death has on our current life. An awareness that death is not to be outstripped “shatters one’s tenacity”, shaking Dasein out of its absorption in das Man. To use Sartre’s metaphor, the disclosure of death brings one up against a wall.

But in Heidegger’s analysis one does not impotently and helplessly collapse at the face of this wall (as Sartre condemned political prisoners for in his story Le Mur), but rather one’s das Man self shatters upon crashing against finitude, and, to continue the metaphor, the individualized self bounces back from the collision and comes back to the individualized Da, to his here, to the place from which an authentic...
being-towards-death projects itself into its own finite future. Everyone has an awareness of one’s future death. An authentic being-towards-death endures in this apodictic determination of being human and advances in the possibility of choosing to be authentic from its individualized self. For, in working out the ἄληθεύειν of anxiety and death, Dasein discovers what it has been missing in das Man and that it projects itself into possibilities that it chooses as his own possibilities that are decisive for rescuing itself of a lost, inauthentic existence for an authentic way of being-in-the-world.

Hence, Heidegger suggests that authentic being towards the possibility that is not-to-be-outstripped, combines freedom and surrender. Surrendering myself to the uttermost possibility of existence, I free myself to choose from factual possibilities which I will take over and appropriate. However, one must constantly guard against falling behind the free choice of one’s project and thus fall back into das Man. Only by continually projecting oneself into one’s potentiality-for-being does one not “become too old for one's victories”339, for one remains steadfast and constant in one’s choice of authenticity. Hence, Heidegger’s intention in calling for “self-surrender” (Selbstaufgabe means “giving oneself up” and “self task”) reveals itself as a means to choosing a life project that is authentic (one’s own), and not as a means of withdrawing oneself from worldly being, thus clarifying this aception of the term “Selbstaufgabe” from certain religious notions that I have to leave unexamined here. The central point I wish to stress though is that Heidegger is explicitly arguing that authentic being- towards-death frees me not only in order to take over the possibility of death but also frees me to choose those factual possibilities with which I can exist authentically. One can say, perhaps, that authentic being-towards-death is a means to authenticity and not an end in itself. This point is important to understand in order to avoid the type of interpretation that takes authenticity as a constant confrontation with death, and takes Vorlaufen as a death oriented activity that is constantly projecting or running towards death as if death were its own (and only) inalienable authenticity. I would like to insist that Heidegger nowhere claims that death is our sole authentic possibility. One is invited, I believe, to distinguish between death as one’s “pure” or “distinctive”

339 Heidegger’s quotation of Nietzsche in SZ, p. 264.
possibility, and those “authentic” possibilities which I choose to express my authentic resolve (the nature of which will be addressed in the next chapter).

Grasping death as the possibility that is not-to-be-outstipped leads one to recognize that one’s possibilities of existence are inalterable finite.\textsuperscript{340} Heidegger does not develop the existentiell consequences of this disclosure, but it could be argued that only through an awareness that one’s possibilities are finite do one’s involvements become urgent and pressing.\textsuperscript{341} Thus a thoroughgoing awareness of finitude could impart a new seriousness to one’s existence and could quicken one’s sense of life, inducing one to carry through one’s projects with a new impetus to act and create decisively. While the disclosure of finitude could endow one’s own projects with a new importance, it could also present das Man’s possibilities by revealing them as merely finite, provisional, nonabsolute. In this way, one could gain a new perspective on life viewing social possibilities as non-essential, passing, finite, and one’s own choices and projects as essential to living one’s own unique existence. Our immediate access to the world, the way we see the world, is affected by the phenomenon of immediate encounter of the things presented. To see a person, a flower, a star… is not problematic even if we can’t see all the aspects of each precisely because the transition from the recognition of the generic nature of an object to the recognition of its specific nature is synthetic a priori (to use the Kantian formulation) in finitude. Furthermore, authentic being-towards-death makes one aware of death’s certainty. The certainty disclosed in authentic being-towards-death is not a Cartesian certainty, that is, generally speaking, it does not derive from observing numerous samples of i.e. cases of death in the res extensa, and confront it with the theoretical certainty of analytical statements produced by a res cogitans. Rather, the certainty of death comes about through one’s seeing in the

\textsuperscript{340} SZ, p. 264.

\textsuperscript{341} For example, Herman Hesse in his novel Narcissus and Goldmund writes that the fear of death is the source of art (and thought), and what the artists project is to create something solid, stable, enduring in a transitory world of passing in and out of existence, p. 157: “He [Goldmund] thought that fear of death was perhaps the root of all art, perhaps also of all things of the mind. We fear death, we shudder at life’s instability, we grieve to see the flowers wilt again and again, and the leaves fall, and in our hearts we know that we, too, are transitory and will soon disappear. When artists create pictures and thinkers search for laws and formulate thoughts, it is in order to salvage something from the great dance of death, to make something that lasts longer than we do.” If we give a second thought to Hesse’s point in connection to Heidegger’s claim that authentic being-towards-death discloses the finitude of one’s possibilities, one could suggest, though Heidegger does not make this explicit, that an awareness of death is the source of one’s resolve to act, to achieve, to create, to do something more than search for minimal conditions of existence.
world that being-in-the-world is finite, and that one can live one’s life in the truth of this certainty. Heidegger holds that the existential certainty of death is the “highest certainty” because: 1) it is a truth of Dasein’s existence; 2) it is rooted in an authentic understanding of being-in-the-world and not merely in a propositional attitude, and 3) it makes possible the “full authenticity of its existence”.

Finally, authentic being-towards-death is aware of the indefiniteness of death’s certainty. In understanding the certainty of death Dasein must hold itself open to the constant threat of dying at any moment. This threat cannot be toned down and must be steadily faced if Dasein is in its authentic being-towards-death. The threat is most strongly revealed in the mood of anxiety:

“*The mood which can open up the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized being, is anxiety. In this mood, Dasein finds itself face-to-face with the nothing of the possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety is anxious about the potentiality-for-being of the being so determined and in this way it discloses the utermost possibility.*”

In this passage we can see the interconnection between death and anxiety as an withdrawing-liberating \( \alpha \lambda \rho \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \nu \). In fact, Heidegger writes, “being-towards-death is essentially anxiety.” The implication in this claim is that being-towards-death and anxiety most radically and concretely individualize Dasein, and that anxiety is both the constitutive mood of authentic being-towards-death, and the experience which most forcefully discloses one’s finitude and opens up to the possibility of self-being. The important point to grasp is the disclosive-liberating role of anxiety and death. Heidegger’s analysis of death and anxiety is sometimes trivialized as expressing German anxiety over death and defeat in World War I, or is criticized as engaging in morbid sensationalism or as a pessimistic nihilist. These remarks fail to elucidate the \( \alpha \lambda \rho \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \nu \) at stake in death and anxiety and Heidegger’s distinctive analysis of these concepts from a re-reading of Aristotle. I have been attempting, on one hand, to show how death and anxiety provide a break or a rupture in one’s absorption-dispersion in *das Man* and disclose one’s lostness,

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342 This being-certain as a way of being meets Kierkegaard’s criterion of subjective existential truth that is appropriated and lived, and not merely cogitated. Cf., *SZ*, p. 263.
343 *SZ*, p. 265.
344 *SZ*, p. 265.
345 *SZ*, pp. 265-6.
346 *SZ*, p. 266.
347 The strongest and most detailed criticism of this kind was made by Heidegger’s contemporaries Lukacs in *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* and Adorno in *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit*.
not-at-homeness, alienation from one’s own self, and abandonment to one’s own self, and, on the other, how these extreme experiences in our lives set one free for authenticity which is experienced as a potentiality (Seinkönnen) which one owns and can be.

One might then ask, can death and anxiety really be taken in this seemingly beneficial way Heidegger is recommending? Are the concepts we have been examining really ontological modes of ἀληθεύειν? Or are they not just “natural facts” instead, that are a hindrance to the pursuit of a happy life? To answer the last question we would need to embark on a long journey with both Aristotle’s analysis of εὐδαιμονία in the Nicomachean Ethics and Heidegger’s account on δαιμόνον on his Parmenides course (Ga 54), but our purpose is more modest here and we are simply making appeal to the text of Being and Time and some specific passages of Aristotle that underlie Heidegger’s concepts in his Daseinsanalytik.

The point of bringing up our relationship to our own death is to show that the possibility of action, and human activity as such, presuppose a difference between end and activity, for if the basic function of ends is to make our activities possible, then when regarding death as such an end the meaning of τέλος is in some sense lost, since death as τέλος annihilates our existence. Therefore the analysis of death “throws us back” to the explication of life. Although I have not yet reached a thematic discussion of ἀληθεύειν in connection to the temporality of Dasein, I have been underlining that it is already at play in the discussion of Uneigentlichkeit under the ontological foundation of its possibility.

On this point I have shown the presence of Aristotle in Heidegger’s account of Uneigentlichkeit and I have contrasted a number of notions that appear in Aristotle’s Physics which Heidegger reworks and ‘elevates’ to ontological rank. The main point was to show Heidegger’s development of many transitional determinations of the being of Man as an agent of action, by transforming these notions, sometimes ambiguously, and inserting them in the more profound and existential description of Dasein. For Heidegger, definitions hold the key to understanding the basic concepts in their development as concepts. In Being and Time we are finding the same exploratory process of new terms re coined from Heidegger’s research on Fundamental Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (GA18)

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348 GAP, p. 4.
where the way of proceeding from a definition to a concept lead Heidegger through Aristotle’s concepts of λόγος, σύστασις, τέλειον, δόξα, ήθος, πάθος, ἐξίς, ἐντελέχεια, ἐνέργεια, δύναμις and κίνησις. Each concept points to something that one is not always able to express. It lies beyond one’s power to express as it points out a state of things rather then contents, it points to the basis from which the basic concepts develop, and how they develop. This means they bear a relationship to their specific conceptuality, through a definition.\(^{349}\) In the account of inauthenticity Heidegger is pursuing his analysis of mogelijkheit “possibility” as an inquiry into the human finitude of existence, taking the same line of approach he began in Marburg (GA 18) by pointing out Aristotle’s own remark in Metaphysics that “in a transferred sense, one also speaks about death as an end, since they are both something ultimate. For also the ultimate ‘for the sake of which’ is an end” (“διὸ καὶ ἡ τελευτη ἑκατά μεταφορὰν λέγεται τέλος, ὅτι ὁμοίω ἐσχατα: τέλος δὲ καὶ τὸ ὄν ἕνεκα ἐσχάτου.”)\(^{350}\) This insight has lead Heidegger through paragraph 53 of Being and Time in that authentic being-towards-death, unlike inauthentic flight and evasion, understands and endures death in its existential reality. It is thus the authentic way of being-towards-death that is grounded in the phenomenon of death itself and in an authentic understanding of human existence, or in Heidegger’s formulation back at Marburg “With this transference, τέλειον, τέλος shows itself as a character of Dasein.”\(^{351}\) Authentic on this analysis would then describe a way of being grounded in the explication of life, and would in no way indicate a subjective preference or personal judgement. Thus, by showing how Vorlaufen is a way of authentic being-towards-death, Heidegger shows that this way of being is not an arbitrary construction, but is rather a way of being grounded in the way of κίνησις.

f) Conscience and the Call to Authenticity

Heidegger’s goal in his analysis of conscience is to find an existential phenomenon (im Sein des Daseins ihre Wurzel haben) which will provide the

\(^{349}\) GAP, p. 13.
\(^{350}\) META, 1021b 28-30, and Heidegger’s translation of this sentence in GAP, p. 82.
\(^{351}\) GAP, p. 87.
evidence required to confirm the possibility of authenticity, and which further shows that Dasein demands authenticity from itself. His task is to demonstrate that this confirmation is not merely an accidental experience that just happens to occur, but that it has its source in Dasein’s grasp-of-being (Seinsverfassung). The aim of the analysis is to show that Dasein has an authentic potentiality-for-being-a-self. We have examined Heidegger’s claim that the self is to be determined as a way of existing, and that for the most part I am not myself but das Man self. It has also been noted that authenticity takes the form of an existentiell, individual modification of the das Man self. What we must now determine is the nature of the modification and the conditions of its possibility.

In this analysis, inauthentic Dasein in following das Man forfeits its possibility of choice and thus loses its authentic possibilities of self-being. The modification of this choiceless, other-directed das Man existence, Heidegger claims, “make up for not choosing” (Nachholen einer Wahl). That is, in order to withdraw oneself from inauthenticity one must choose to modify one’s inauthentic ways of being. This choice to choose must make up for the neglect of one’s authenticity in fallen everydayness. What is required is a choosing to bring oneself back (Sichzurückholen) from lostness in das Man so as to choose to make one’s own choices and hence to modify one’s inauthentic being-in-the-world. “In choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes possible first and foremost its authentic potentiality-for-being.”

Hence, “choosing to choose” is not an empty formal choice for the sake of choice, but is rather the choice of oneself, of authentic ways of being, for the sake of authenticity.

In order to find and choose its authentic self, Dasein “must be ‘shown’ to itself in its possible authenticity.” It needs to be confronted with this possibility of becoming oneself and must have this possibility existentially confirmed if it is not to be an ideal. The possibility of authenticity is attested, according to Heidegger, in what we commonly know as “voice of conscience”. However, can we rely on the disclosure of conscience for the actualization of the possibility of authenticity? Is conscience a reliable source of evidence? For is not conscience “veiled with obscurities”?

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352 SZ, p. 267.
353 SZ, p. 268.
354 SZ, p. 267.
Heidegger answers:

“That the very ‘fact’ of conscience has been disputed, that its role as a higher court for Dasein’s existence has been variously assessed, and that ‘what conscience says’ has been interpreted in manifold ways – all this might only mislead us into dismissing this phenomenon if the very ‘doubtfulness’ of this fact – or of the way in which it has been interpreted – did not prove that here a primordial phenomenon of Dasein lies before us.”

Heidegger proceeds to give his interpretation of this phenomenon stressing that conscience, like death, is not to be interpreted as an event that occurs within experience, but is rather to be conceptualized as part of Dasein’s ontological structure. If it is the case, as Heidegger claims, that conscience “gives us something to understand”, then it is to be interpreted as an ἀληθεύων. Conscience is thus interpreted by Heidegger as part of Dasein’s “disclosing”, i.e. one of the ways in which Dasein discloses itself to itself. Disclosing includes, as we have seen in the first chapter, speaking in its structure of ἀποφαίνεσθαι, and since Heidegger characterizes conscience as a call (Ruf) it is in the mode of speaking that we may interpret it. The call is interpreted as an appeal (Anruf) to everyday Dasein lost in the ways of being of das Man to return to itself, and as a summons (Aufruf) to authenticity. Moreover, all modes of speaking have a “possible way of hearing” – as we learnt from Aristotle’s presentation of φωνή σημαντικη (meaningful sound) in de Anima – which in the analysis of conscience “unveils itself as wanting-to-have-a-conscience.”

The call of conscience and the “wanting-to-have-a-conscience” that hears the call provides the basis for the choosing to be oneself that Heidegger calls Entschlossenheit.

The analysis of conscience should show that the individual who has undergone withdrawing-individuating experiences of anxiety and death is summoned from his individuated solitude (solus ipse) to his potentiality-for-being-a-self. What is needed is to see how the possibility of authenticity first arises from an awareness of the lostness in das Man as a way out of an inauthentic existence. I would like to focus briefly on Heidegger’s remarks on the “appeal” that help clarify the temporal

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355 SZ, p. 268.
357 SZ, p. 270.
concept of Seinkönnen. On page 280 of Being and Time Heidegger tells us that “the appeal to the das Man self signifies summoning one’s ownmost self to its potentiality-for-being (Seinkönnen) and to be sure as Dasein – that is, as concernful being-in-the-world and being with others.”

This passage emphasizes that Seinkönnen does not refer just to certain phenomena of self-being such as death, anxiety, and guilt, but rather encompasses the totality of Dasein’s concernful, solicitous involvement in the work-world and public world. This is an important point to note as a warning against equating Seinkönnen solely with Dasein’s “being-guilty” (or its being-towards-death) as Heidegger seems to suggest in some passages. To counter this restrictive and, I believe, distorted interpretation of Seinkönnen with authenticity I wish to stress the potentiality (können) for a way of being that is descriptive of Dasein’s relatedness and involvement throughout the Umwelt and Mitwelt. Thus I am not restricting Seinkönnen to death, anxiety, conscience, and guilt. I stress that Seinkönnen, Dasein’s being-able-to-be-authentic, comprehends all of Dasein’s ways to be and explicates Dasein’s being-able to choose authentic possibilities.

Moreover, Heidegger makes it clear that the authentic Seinkönnen cannot be explicated in terms of any specific existentiell possibilities, for “in interpreting existentially that toward which the call summons us, we cannot seek to delimit any concrete single possibility of existence as long as we understand the methodological possibilities and tasks which such an interpretation implies.”

It is clear therefore that Heidegger does not intend to legislate any specific prescriptive oughts, or to project existentiell possibilities of existence. Rather, his project is, as he describes, to set forth and analyse “what belongs to the existential condition for the possibility of the existentiell factical potentiality-for-being.” In other words, he is setting forth the existential conditions for the possibility of authenticity by analyzing that which makes authenticity possible. In this sense, an authentic understanding of the call does not give one a universal command that one must fulfill as a moral imperative, but rather appeals to “that which has been currently individualized and which belongs to that particular Dasein.”

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358 SZ, p. 280.
359 SZ, p. 280.
360 SZ, p. 280.
361 SZ, p. 280.
situation constituted by my possibilities of understanding and disclosure. For while the call points forward (Vorruf) to one’s potentiality-for-being, that is, authenticity, it also calls one back (Rückruf) to one’s situation as a thrown being delivered over and abandoned to one’s own ‘here’. Hence, one is called back to my own thrown individuation out of which one can choose one’s authentic possibilities. The call, then, has a double movement calling us back (to our current situation) as it calls us forth to authenticity. This double movement preserves one’s individuality while at the same time calling one to the humanity of its being – a call yet to be explicated. Authenticity can be said to preserve one’s individuality while simultaneously calling one to be fully human.

“When Dasein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility, this includes becoming free for the call – its readiness for the potentiality of being appealed to. In understanding the call, Dasein is in thrall of (hörig) its ownmost possibility of existence. It has chosen itself.”

I wish to conclude with some remarks concerning the notion of “choosing oneself” which will be developed in the next chapter. When the call reaches the inauthentic self, one chooses to become free from one’s withdrawing and individuation from das Man so that one can carry through the modification of the das Man self, which Heidegger claims requires “being free for one’s ownmost being-guilty.” He stresses that “wanting to have a conscience” does not mean willing conscience into existence, but signifies becoming ready for the transformation to authenticity. Understanding the call means that Dasein lets its ownmost self take action in terms of its potentiality-for-being which it chooses to take over and constitute. Only now is it responsible for its action. The responsibility here is responsibility to oneself. Heidegger notes that “any taking action is necessarily ‘conscienceless’”, which indicates that wanting to have a conscience is to want to develop one’s own conscience, wanting to be authentic.
This way of being is “conscienceless” from the standpoint of *das Man* for the self is “in thrall of its ownmost possibility of existence”, that is, “taking action in itself” is removed from the restrictions of *das Man’s* conscience (similar to Freud’s *superego*) which tells one what he should not do. Heidegger’s call of conscience, however, is not restrictive but **positive**:

“When the call is rightly understood, it gives us that which in the existential sense is the ‘most positive’ of all – namely, the ownmost possibility which Dasein can present to itself, as a calling-back which calls it forth into its factical potentiality-for-being-itself in the world. To hear the call authentically, signifies bringing oneself into a factical taking action.”

Understanding the call of conscience indicates that one is **ready** and **wants to choose authenticity**. Letting oneself be summoned to authenticity means **becoming free for authenticity**. This means that *Dasein* has now withdrawn his self from *das Man* and is individuated as a potentiality-for-being-a-self. *Dasein* is now ready for the choice of authenticity which Heidegger calls *Entschlossenheit*.

*He is on the way towards authenticity.*

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instead of this radical externalization – individual consciences – that is to say, consciences – would again be powerful.”

367 SZ, p. 295.
PART TWO

3. CHAPTER III: PROJECTING DASEIN: ΑΛΗΘΕΥΕΙΝ AND THE INTERPRETATION OF EIGENTLICHKEIT

a) Resoluteness: The Choice of Authenticity

I have examined the grounds upon which Heidegger supported his account of everydayness and Uneigentlichkeit and have analyzed some notions of Aristotle’s teleology that Heidegger investigated back at Marburg and on a later course on Aristotle’s Physics. The task was to see how Heidegger secured in Being and Time the ΑΛΗΘΕΥΕΙΝ of inauthenticity from his inquiries at Marburg (GA 17, 18, 19) which permitted him to base the mode of Uneigentlichkeit in Being and Time.

I hope to have clarified the importance of Heidegger’s retrieval and transformation of some of the notions of Aristotle’s teleology (as exhibited in Aristotle’s De Anima, Eudemian Ethics, Rhetoric, Nicomachean Ethics back in Marburg) to Heidegger’s modes of everydayness in Being and Time and to have described their articulation by making appeal to its ΑΛΗΘΕΥΕΙΝ, namely by exploring the notions of withdrawing and individuation from an inauthentic existence.
I have focused more strongly on the distinction of two modes of ἀληθεύειν: ποιήσις (production) and πράξις (activity). To Aristotle, as noted, the being of ποιήσις is imperfect, primarily for teleological reasons: its movement is incomplete and its end is external to it, since it is a process involving change. Heidegger’s idea in the description of everydayness and inauthenticity was not only to exhibit Aristotle’s sense of ποιήσις as production of works but to take it in the wider sense of bringing something about, making the point that it is still a matter of achieving a result, something of use. The idea was to show that this model had become decisive to our way of relating not just to things of everyday life but also to human beings. Heidegger argued, however, that at this level of absorbed concern, ποιήσις and τεχνη (know-how) are inappropriate modes of disclosure of our comportment towards and understanding of other human beings, for they disclose humans as the means, as something which can be controlled and calculated upon as in das Man, instead of free agents whose interaction is always one of challenge and change. In this regard, Heidegger’s account of anxiety suggested, at the level of inauthenticity, that human being can and should be indeed understood in terms of its πράξις, that is in terms of its human interaction so that it becomes open to the possibility of self-understanding which comes with such interaction. That is to say, through interaction, one develops an understanding of what it means to be human, which then is reflected back on one’s self-understanding. However one perhaps has also sensed difficulties in conceiving of action without recourse to production, not least since it has been thought that Aristotle himself tended to understand πράξις in terms of ποιήσις. In this connection Heidegger could be regarded as someone who has overcome the “poietic” notion of Man by showing how this idea has its roots in human existence. Against this, Heidegger has pointed out the possibility of authentic existence, which is action governed by φρόνησις, the authentic understanding of one’s self.

368 This is Sarah Broadie’s view in Ethics with Aristotle, chapter 4, III, that although Aristotle was not as confused about the distinction between τεχνη and φρόνησις as one usually has claimed, he tended to think of the τέλος of φρόνησις in terms of the τέλος of τεχνη, and therefore he failed to see that the former is empty, i.e. that εὑπραξία (well-performed action), has no specific content, for it concerns well-performed action in general.
The task now is to provide an interpretation of Heidegger’s *Eigentlichkeit* from Aristotle’s main determinations of *εὐδαιμονία*, *φρόνησις* (practical wisdom; *Nicomachean Ethics* I, III, and VI, 2, 1139b 7-11 GA19), *βουλευτική ὁρέξις* (deliberate desire) and *νοῦς* (discernment) in the *Nicomachean Ethics* so that it can be shown how Aristotle understands these notions philosophically and in what ways Aristotle helps Heidegger to think through (and in some cases to coin) the ontological/temporal conceptuality of authenticity such as *Die Sorge* (care) and its modes – *Besorgen* (concern), *Fūrsorge* (solicitude), *Zu-Sein* (has-to-be) *Seinkönnen* (potentiality-of-being-a-self) *Worumwillen* (for-the-sake-of-which).

William MacNeill has pointed out that “Eudamonia, as the ultimate end and completeness of human existence, constitutes, as Heidegger describes it, ‘the authenticity [*Eigentlichkeit*] of the being of human Dasein.’”369 I would like to keep this idea in view and clarify the shift of perspective from inauthenticity to authenticity. I will supplement my proposal in this chapter by appealing to some of Aristotle’s principles of motion in the *Physics*, the *de Anima* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* so that I can exhibit the temporal notions upon which Heidegger is able to work out his main operator of authenticity: *Entschlossenheit* (resoluteness). I argue that the concept of *κινήσις* is the ground of resoluteness, the key of authenticity. It is shown how on the basis of this interpretation authenticity cannot be determined, nor exhausted by being-towards-death but, rather, by the possibility of historicity.

My proposal in this chapter also aims to clarify some of the doubts that may arise regarding the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity and exactly how action, as an end, is of fundamental importance to Heidegger and Aristotle in this connection. I would like to recall that there is a problem with the potential view that everydayness and inauthenticity root in *ποιήσις* and *τέχνη* and authenticity in *φρόνησις* and *πρὸςείς*, though, and this is that Heidegger wants – indeed by appealing to Aristotle – to articulate a basic notion of human existence, in terms of which not only everydayness but also authenticity can be understood. If one

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identifies everydayness solely with production, while reserving action for resoluteness and authenticity, it is difficult to see how the latter could be a modification of the former. Thus the question is not primarily whether ποίησις and τέχνη belong within the domain of everyday life, but whether this phenomenon can be accounted for without the help of φρόνησις and πρᾶξις. The answer is no: if τέχνη represents an understanding of how to bring things (i.e. the three modes of everydayness) about and φρόνησις the ability to see what is good for one’s life (inaugurated with the notion of Angst), they are both needed to explain the form of conduct that is characteristic of everydayness. In Being and Time Heidegger seems indeed, as we have seen, to draw upon both τέχνη and ποίησις, since he describes how man in his everyday dealings makes things with a view to an external end, which is the basic trait of ποίησις.370

The idea to be grasped here is that Heidegger needs to work out his own notion of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time from νοῦς ἀληθεύειν and φρόνησις.371

This is the methodology Heidegger, as we have seen in the first chapter, starts to outline from the inquiries on λόγος and φαινόμενον in Aristotle’s de Anima (GA 17) and develops in relation to modes of ἀληθεύειν in the Nicomachean Ethics (GA19) so that in Being and Time he articulates Dasein’s ἀληθεύειν as disclosive-being in-the-world. With the impossibility of dealing in this study with all the determinations implied in ἀληθεύειν I have selected the notions of νοῦς, φρόνησις and εὐδαιμονία (happiness/man’s proper being) since these help us to further on the implications of Heidegger’s analysis of Aristotle’s teleology in GA 18 from the shift of perspective of inauthenticity to the perspective of authenticity in Being and Time.

It is my hope that this analysis will help to clarify why exactly the problem of authenticity has been subject of so many controversies by a generation of Heidegger interpreters. I aim to show what those controversies are and propose a philosophical path for thinking through them by appealing to the role of Aristotle’s

370 When Heidegger focuses on the aspect of concern, I draw a parallel between Besorgen (absorbed concern) with both τέχνη and ποίησις just like Sorge (care), as we will see in this chapter, captures aspects of both φρόνησις and πρᾶξις, depending upon what perspective taken. When Heidegger’s focus is on the aspect of understanding, I refer to τέχνη and φρόνησις, but when it is a question of the teleological structure of Besorgen and Sorge, I compare respectively these concepts to ποίησις and πρᾶξις.
371 This argument is to be worked out from SZ, pp. 220-221 and DA, 430b 26-31.
I wish therefore to show how Heidegger’s interpreters have read certain passages in the text of Being and Time which they have bound together into a doctrine of authenticity as being-towards-death. This interpretation restricts Eigentlichkeit with being-towards-death with a solipsistic existentialist connotation.

I intend to show how this interpretation glosses over the whole of the Eigentlichkeit problem in Being and Time, slides over the key structures of Eigentlichkeit in the historicity sections and seems to be oblivious to the movement of authenticity from the withdrawn ἀληθεύειν of the individuated self (solus ipse) to the resolute movement and struggle for authenticity in the historical world. Therefore, in this chapter I will make appeal to the standard interpretation of Eigentlichkeit and the translation of key determinations of Heidegger’s thought. Most of the available literature makes Eigentlichkeit dependent on being-towards-death. To counter this view I will next develop the full structure of Eigentlichkeit that is addressed in more detail in the next chapter on ‘Temporality and Historicizing.’

I would invite us now to very briefly recall and review some of the positions set forth by some of the first Heidegger scholars in Germany in the late 1920s and 1930s which became widespread with the popularity of the so-called Existenzphilosophie, and to critically confront and challenge their claims in the course of this chapter (Beck, Demske, Marck, Löwith, Pöggeler, Sternberger, Wach, Delp, Lehmann, Rahner, Brecht, de Waelhens, Sartre, Buber, Biswanger, Ricoeur, Marcuse and Adorno).
The interpretation of Eigentlichkeit as a way of being-towards-death was set forth by some of the first Heidegger scholars in Germany in the late 1920s and 1930s, and became widespread with the popularity of the so-called Existenzphilosophie. During the 1930s, the publication of Heidegger’s Was ist Metaphysik, with its emphasis on anxiety, death and nothingness, gave impetus to the notion that authenticity was a nihilistic confrontation with death. This interpretation passed over to France through the works of de Waelhens and Sartre in the 1940s, and has dominated literature on authenticity up until the present day. De Waelhen’s influential interpretation was no doubt a prime vehicle for transmitting the notion that authenticity was a way of being-towards-death. All of the French literature on authenticity that I have read agrees in its essentials with the following remarks in de Waelhen’s La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger:

“Authentic being regards death as an index affecting each of its actions and each modality of its being. It lives in the incessant anticipation of death. [p. 148] (…) A rather more explicit examination had described it as the silent and anguished comprehension of the most extreme possibilities (these being the avowal of one’s fundamental guilt): the two expressions are perfectly equivalent. [p. 175] (…) The acceptance and the being-for-death defines the authenticity and ultimate possibility of Dasein [p. 178] (…).”

The following passages make clear the importance assigned to being-towards-death in Sartre’s interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity in L’Être et le Néant:

“Authenticity and individuality have to be earned: I shall be my own authenticity only if under the influence of the call of conscience (Ruf des Gewissens) I reach out toward

374 For early examples of the explication of authenticity as a way of being-towards-death, cf. Beck, M., Referat und Kritik von Martin Heidegger: ’Sein und Zeit’, especially pp. 31-44; Marck, S., Die Dialektik in der Philosophie der Gegenwart, pp. 153-6; also Karl Löwith who put forth this interpretation in two articles in the 1930s and kept it all his life, “Grundzüge der Entwicklung der Phänomenologie zur Philosophie und ihr Verhältnis zur protestantischen Theologie” Heft 1, p. 26ff., and Heft 5, p. 33 ff.; “Phänomenologische Ontologie und protestantische Theologie”, pp. 58-62; Heidegger:Denker in dürftiger Zeit, and Die Frage Martin Heidegger. I will specifically cite and examine Löwith’s interpretation in this section.


death with a resolute decision (Entschlossenheit) as toward my own most peculiar possibility. At this moment I reveal myself to myself in authenticity, and I raise others along with myself toward the authentic [p. 246] (…) it is by projecting itself freely towards its final possibility that the Dasein will attain authentic existence and wrench itself away from everyday banality in order to attain the irreplaceable uniqueness of the person [p. 534] (…) Death has become the peculiar possibility of the Dasein, the being of the human reality is defined as Sein zum Tode. Inasmuch as the Dasein determines its project toward death, it realizes freedom-to-die and constitutes itself as a totality by the free choice of its finitude [p. 533] (…) we cannot stop at those classifications of ‘authentic project’ and ‘inauthentic project of the self’ which Heidegger wants to establish. In addition to the fact that such a classification, in spite of its author’s intent, is tainted with an ethical concern shown by its very terminology, it is based on the attitude of the subject toward his own death [p. 564].”377

In the 1950s a notion became popular that Heidegger’s thought has undergone a Kehre (turning) which was, for example, interpreted by Walter Schulz as a turn away from the “subjectivist-voluntarist-nihilism” of Being and Time, which was supposedly ‘overcome’ in the later philosophy of being.378 Also in Germany in the 1960s, a decade in Europe known for its social and revolutionary movements, some books have reinforced and propagated the interpretation of authenticity as a way of being towards death. Examples of these are Demske’s Sein, Mensch und Tod and Pöggeler’s Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers. One of the more accessible books in English which maintains this interpretation is still the ‘classic’ Spiegelberg’s The Phenomenological Movement where he claims that Heidegger “identifies and characterizes death as the most authentic possibility of human existence”, and that death is thus “Man’s only authentic possibility.”379 He concludes that:

“Much about Heidegger’s interpretation of man’s attitude toward death as the ultimate possibility which ends all possibility and about his attempts to escape it, is impressive. Nevertheless, one wonders why facing this possibility in stern resoluteness should be his one and only authentic possibility.”380

377 Sartre, Jean-Paul, L’Être et le Néant, p. 303.
378 Schulz, W., Über den philosophiegesechichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers, pp. 65-93 and pp. 211-232. But it was Löwith who first spoke of a turn in Heidegger’s thought, cf., Laurence Hemming’s, Heidegger’s Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice, p. 80, “In 1951 Heidegger’s former pupil Karl Löwith announced the discovery of a turn in Heidegger’s thought, with which he begins his characterization of Heidegger’s betrayal of the central thesis of Sein und Zeit (central, because he did not care for the beginning and the end, believing it to be too much like his later work. (…) The very postulation of this turn arose out of Karl Löwith’s initiation of the first Heidegger controversy, concerning Heidegger’s political engagement with Nazism, with the 1946 publication in French of a piece translated as “The Political Implications of Heidegger’s existentialism.”


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This interpretation generally holds that authenticity is equivalent to being-towards-death, in which Heidegger’s notion of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit (anticipatory resoluteness) is explained only as a way of being-towards-death that determines authenticity. For example, Demske writes:

“‘Outside of’ authentic being-towards-death, there is for Dasein no other authenticity. Authentic being-towards-death and Dasein’s authenticity in general are thus one and the same: advancing resoluteness.”

Developing this explanation of authenticity as authentic being-towards-death, it is claimed that the culmination of Being and Time (or its ‘summit’) is reached in the concept of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit and that death is the “highest court of authority” for the existing Dasein. This interpretation implies that authenticity is exclusively constituted by being-towards-death, thus death becomes one’s single authentic possibility. On this basis Marcuse claims that Heidegger has a “death ethic”, de Waehlens argues that authenticity takes death as its only value and is a “nihilism unconditionally defeatist”, Adorno claims Heidegger has a “theodicy of death” which Körner claims is “Heidegger’s private religion.” These notions have contributed to creating a generally distorted interpretation of authenticity as a form of “heroic nihilism”, or of Heidegger’s authentic Dasein as a “solipsistic egoist.”

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381 Demske, James, Sein, Mensch und Tod, p. 50.
384 De Waehlens, A., La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger, p. 78.
386 Körner, Heidegger’s Privatreligion, pp. 30-41.
387 This is the idea of Delp, Brecht, De Waehlens, Demske and Schulz, who characterized SZ as a “subjectivistic-voluntarist-heroic nihilism”.
388 This label was applied by Buber and will be challenged in the next chapter. Having said this, we also find more recent general studies extremely helpful and faithful to the notions of eigentlich and Sein-Zum-Tode and the phenomenological correlations of these with Heidegger’s early writings and the text of Being and Time. One example is the most recent 2008 study of Kisiel and Sheehan, Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927 that complements the already published Supplements. The discovery of an anonymous manuscript from Heidegger’s 1924 lecture tour, specifically on the lecture Heidegger gave on December 3 at Cologne in front of Max Scheler, the new head of Kant society there, is of particular interest because it collects the familiar readings of the NE 6 and De Int with remarks on RET. Another newly discovered lecture on “truth” from 1926 provides a contemporaneous formulation of the material dealt with in paragraph 44 of Being and Time that contains the thematic description of truth in this work.
According to Adorno, Heidegger's writings, which try to conceal their promiscuous relation to reactionary, “merely ontical” forces, are infected with the ideological thrust of a vocabulary that thrives on ambiguity. Heidegger shirks responsibility for the claim inherent in the word “authenticity” to be presenting a positive doctrine of the good life, when he insists that he is using the word as a value-free technical term, even whilst exploiting its fascination. That the alleged meaninglessness of life invalidates all principles of how to live serves only to attract people to a certain way of life. Adorno's book analyzes this process whereby the concepts of the jargon manage to give the pretense of dealing radically with the crucial issues of life, society and philosophy, while they merely substitute the aura of connotation-laden words for the required content. Their false appearance has, according to Adorno, led to the surprising appeal of Heidegger's Being and Time and of the existentialism which it encouraged. The Jargon of Authenticity is more focused. Unlike Negative Dialektik (Negative Dialectics), which addresses itself to the central topoi of Heidegger's thought as a whole, Jargon seems to limit itself to an area of questionable importance, although it brings to bear an impressive array of considerations. Dealing only peripherally with Heidegger's “question of being”, Jargon is preoccupied by the accompanying doctrine of man. Further, it focuses on terms and themes which Heidegger himself dropped after SZ. Thus, of the four sections of Adorno's essay (beginning on pages 3, 49, 92 and 130), the first reflects on the jargon in the hands of Heidegger's predecessors, colleagues and followers, barely mentioning Heidegger himself. The next section puts Heidegger into this picture, but notes that Heidegger protects himself against the imputation of the jargon's worst offenses even while exploiting its appeal. Another part is devoted to the concept of authenticity, which Heidegger never again used so freely after the reaction to his first book. In the final pages, the choice of the analysis of death as an illustration of Heidegger's procedure involves Adorno in the non-intuitive argument that men might overcome death in a future social arrangement. Even if this is possible – and in Jargon it remains a rather empty possibility – Heidegger has still articulated the importance of finitude as an essential feature of the human
condition as we know it. Concentrating as he does on the social consequences of Heidegger's concepts of authenticity and death, Adorno seems to miss the role these play in Heidegger's ontology. For authentic being-towards-death is less a moral stance in Heidegger's phenomenology than a condition of the possibility of valid ontological reflection.\(^{389}\)

In order to counter the standard interpretation of authenticity I now wish to develop an analysis of resoluteness in which I will consider Heidegger’s interpretation of the self-other relationship which I believe avoids the interpretive pitfalls in which many interpreters of authenticity have become entangled. I will confront the common interpretation of authenticity which explains it as a way of being-towards-death and presents authenticity as a form of subjectivism, or an irrational voluntarism, or a solipsistic egoism, by offering an analysis of the meaning of *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* in connection to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s *φρόνησις* and the basic traits of action *προαίρεσις* (*Metaphysics*, book IV, νοῦς πρακτικός – *Verstehen, Seinkönnen*). I propose to show that an understanding of resoluteness and the notion of authentic caring-for-others undermines superficial attempts to apply derogatory labels to Heidegger’s concept of *Eigentlichkeit*.

b) Resoluteness, Self-determination and Being-a-Self and the reading of Aristotle’s *εὐδαιμονία* (*NE*, I-5,6) and φρόνησις (*NE*, X, 7, 1077 a17)

Let us begin by seeing how resoluteness completes the withdrawal of *Dasein* from inauthentic everydayness, and enables one to modify and transform one’s inauthentic existing. In the hope of clarifying how the phenomenon of resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) is the key to authenticity I will first present the main passages of *Being and Time* that may help us to acquaint ourselves with this notion before attempting a close reading of Aristotle’s book I, 5-6 of *Nicomachean Ethics* in an

\(^{389}\) Cf., Adorno’s, T., *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit* and *Negative Dialektik*. 
effort to disentangle the multiple connections at stake in Heidegger’s equation of Eigentlichkeit and Entschlossenheit.

In order to explore the concept of Entschlossenheit and how it works as a way of self-determination and being-a-self I invite us to focus on the traits of the Aristotelian notion of φρόνησις (X, 7, 1077 a17) which I believe to be at the heart of Heidegger’s coinage of Entschlossenheit (by appealing to προσώπος) and articulating the whole notion of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time. Among the passages which attest to this, the one which seems to be particularly significant occurs in the pre-Being and Time WS 1924 course Platon: Sophistes where Heidegger sees a tendency towards the separation of θεωρεῖν (to see, behold) from πρᾶξις that can be seen especially in book X of Nicomachean Ethics.\(^{390}\)

Furthermore, I would tentatively show that Aristotle’s account of φρόνησις is also meant to ask the question of authenticity understood as the highest good of human life: “τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία” (I, 3, 1095 b 14, ff.) and that this question is developed by Aristotle from a τέλος (end) hierarchy that results in the primacy of θεωρεῖν over πρᾶξις. We find that Aristotle’s emphasis on the tendency of θεωρία to become an independent πρᾶξις results from the prioritizing of the θεωρεῖν which, according to the arguments Heidegger lists from Book X, is the Greek tendency toward understanding being as “absolute presence”: “For the Greeks the consideration of human existence was oriented purely toward the meaning of being itself, i.e. toward the extent to which it is possible for human Dasein to be everlasting. The Greeks gathered this meaning of being, being as absolute presence, from the being of the world.”\(^{391}\) Along with Heidegger’s contention, I align my position here with McNeill’s question in his recent study on Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory in the context of what I take to be his reading of this same passage: “(...) if the authenticity of human existence, on this reading of Aristotle, is to be aligned with an implicit understanding of being as “absolute presence”, with a striving for immortality in a direction divergent from the mortality of human praxis amid its worldly activities, then is it not part of the subsequent project of Being and Time to relocate the authentic being of human Dasein in the midst of mortality and to understand

\(^{390}\) Cf. also p. 64.

\(^{391}\) PS, p. 178. Also, pp. 173-179.
Dasein’s most proper way of being otherwise than in terms of pure presence? To understand it, rather, in terms of the Augenblick which here in the Sophist course is understood as intrinsic to phronesis? Reflecting upon this question I aim to show by the end of this chapter how Heidegger, reflecting in depth upon the Aristotelian structure of προδεξιες and the teleological determinations it contains, draws therefrom many fundamental determinations and displacements which he no longer considers particular moments of action but as ontological characteristics of human life. This will lead us to the relationship of φρονησις (Nicomachean Ethics I, III, and VI, 2, 1139b 7-11) with the assimilation in the notion of Gewissen (conscience) (paragraphs 54-60 of Being and Time.)

Heidegger’s term Entschlossenheit suggests that resoluteness ‘unlocks’ the possibility of Eigentlichkeit, and that it is the opening to an authentic existence. The German roots of Entschlossenheit suggest the ‘key’ image as well as the metaphor ‘unlocking’. The similarity between Entschlossenheit and Erschlossenheit suggests the interconnection between resoluteness and disclosedness that will prove to be enlightening in Heidegger’s explanation of resoluteness. Much of Heidegger’s suggestiveness, however, is lost in the Anglo-European languages (English: resoluteness; Portuguese: resolução or decisão precursora; French: résolution or decision précuseure; Spanish: resolución; Italian: resoluzione; Dutch: resolutie; Hungarian: igéret…).

We have seen that, thrown into its world, every Dasein takes over those possibilities that are handed down to it and imposed on it through publicness. In this way one loses one’s self in the ways of being of das Man and the routines and conventions of the everyday world. Heidegger argues that: “To this lostness one’s

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own Dasein can appeal and the appeal can be understood in the way of resoluteness.\textsuperscript{393} The experiences of anxiety, one’s own impending death, conscience, and guilt shake human being’s existence, undermine the authority and domination of \textit{das Man}, and puts into question everyday inauthentic ways of being. “This reticent self-projection upon one’s lost being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety, we call resoluteness.”\textsuperscript{394} Responding to the disclosure of inauthenticity resolutely means that one’s relationships with the world, the other, and one’s self are authentically disclosed and that this disclosing (\(\alpha\lambda\theta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu\)) leads to a modification of one’s relationship to and involvement with tasks one performs in the work-world, and one’s self-understanding,

“This authentic disclosing modifies with co-originality both the way in which the ‘world’ is discovered, and the way in which the co-existence of others is disclosed. The ‘world’ which is ready-to-hand does not become another one ‘in its content’, nor does the circle of others get exchanged for a new one; but both one’s being toward the ready-to-hand understandably and concernfully, and one’s solicitous being with others are now determined in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-being-their-selves.”\textsuperscript{395}

It should be noted that resoluteness and authenticity do not refer to a ‘subject’ in self-reference to itself, that is, they do not merely refer to an attitude the self takes toward its self by way of death, guilt, and anxiety. Rather, authenticity refers to the totality of being-in-the-world, and to a way of being-in-the-world and therefore it arises out of Dasein’s struggle to disclose its involvement in the world: the \(\alpha\lambda\theta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu\).\textsuperscript{396} Heidegger clearly does not ‘subjectivize’ authenticity as the self’s relation to the self: “Resoluteness as authentic being-one’s-self does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating ‘I’.\textsuperscript{397} Resoluteness is authentic being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{398} Resoluteness brings Dasein out of its lostness in \textit{das Man} and out of the solicitude into which it withdrew during the withdrawing-individuation in \(\alpha\lambda\theta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu\) by bringing it back into its threefold relationship to the work world, social world, and selfhood, so that its

\textsuperscript{393} SZ, p. 297.
\textsuperscript{394} SZ, pp. 296-297.
\textsuperscript{395} SZ, pp. 297-298.
\textsuperscript{396} SZ, p. 297.
\textsuperscript{397} SZ, p. 298.
\textsuperscript{398} SZ, p. 298.
relationships to its world are modified. As the passage previously cited indicates, authenticity is a matter of being in relation to something or ‘being toward’ and involvement (‘being active with’) in which one’s concerns are determined not by das Man, but “in terms of Dasein’s own most potentiality-for-being.” Withdrawing itself from das Man “in the light of the projected field (Worumwillen) of one’s self-chosen potentiality-for-being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world.” Aware that it can take over and project its ownmost potentiality-for-being and become its own master, resolute Dasein projects itself onto its own self-chosen possibilities. Freed from the tyranny of das Man, resolute Dasein has chosen to become a self. Heidegger is also reinterpreting here, I suggest, the themes of autonomy and self-determination. The issue here concerns the determination of one’s choices and the constitution of one’s life. Inauthentic Dasein does not determine itself, for it either blindly follows das Man, evades decisive choice by losing itself in distraction or curiosity (Neugier) or ineffectively surmises what it should do (ambiguity, Zweideutigkeit). Heidegger calls this submission to das Man and forfeiture of self-determination and being-a-self irresoluteness. Irresolute Dasein surrenders to the way things have been publicly interpreted and falls into the ways of being that are prescribed and recommended by das Man, thus both its thought and action are controlled by its submission to publicness. Bemused by das Man it loses itself in publicness and its social roles and masks itself by playing a prescribed role in the banal drama of everyday existence. Heidegger argues that inauthentic Dasein’s failure to resolve and choose its own possibilities and self-determination is an allowing of oneself to become ensnared in the routines and roles of public existence. The argument that failing to choose is a choice to remain inauthentic is suggested here. Heidegger’s point is that everyday Dasein, in surrendering itself to das Man has forfeited its freedom to make its own choices and decisions, and thus loses its individuality. The section we are analyzing

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399 SZ, p. 298.
400 SZ, p. 298.
401 Michael Zimmerman has already well pointed out in his Eclipse of the Self – The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, p. 129, that “his [Heidegger’s] concept of authenticity as resoluteness is evidently affected by Aristotle’s notion that the human being is naturally capable of perfecting himself to some degree; by the ideals of autonomy and self-determination so important to Enlightenment thinkers such as Leibniz and Kant; and by the voluntarism of Nietzsche. The strain of subjectivism-voluntarism in his early notion of authenticity is tempered by the suggestion that authenticity is ontological, not just a personal, event.”
402 SZ, p. 299.
elucidates the importance of choosing to choose, and makes sense of Heidegger’s notion of “making up for not choosing”. For we now see that resoluteness is choosing to choose: a decision to withdraw oneself from an irresolute mode of existence, “in which nobody resolves anything but which has always made its decision” (i.e. to conform to and follow das Man).

For das Man the situation is closed off (ληθη), concealed (λαυθάννου), for irresolute everydayness knows only the “general scene” (allgemeine Lage), losing itself in those “opportunities” that are thrust upon it (i.e. joining the armed forces, becoming a well paid and self-satisfied employee or settling down to a life of tranquillized desperation in the suburbs). Immersed in the general scene, inauthentic Dasein adjusts itself to whatever is happening, and views as “accidents” whatever catastrophes happen to inflict themselves on its tranquillized everydayness (i.e. wars, political disasters, “credit crunches”, social repression, and violence). However, what everydayness considers as accidents occurring in the “general scene”, resolute Dasein sees as events falling-into (zu-fallen) its situation – events which are to be accepted, combated, adjusted to or denied according to one’s own resolute project. Hence, whereas everyday Dasein’s existence and the general situation are constituted by the opportunities thrust upon it by the public and the accidents which occur daily, resolute Dasein constitutes its situation by choosing or rejecting those possibilities and events, which its involvement in the world provide as the currently available material for creating its own existence. Resolute Dasein in its struggle for authenticity thus creates its own situation by making its own choices and by combating the tendencies and events in the general situation which oppose resistance to its resolves, refusing to surrender its self-determination to das Man.

Resoluteness then, is an act of freed, individuated Dasein which resolves upon the project of self-determination. Yet, resoluteness is not just a determination of consciousness for, “resoluteness ‘exists’ only as an understanding self-projecting resolve”, that is, to be resolute one must choose and carry through specific resolves. Upon what must I resolve? Upon what should I choose and act? Heidegger answers:

403 SZ, p. 300.
404 SZ, p. 298.
“But upon what does Dasein disclose itself in resoluteness? On what is it to resolve? Only the resolution itself can give the answer. One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one should want to suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them. The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time. To resoluteness, the indefinitiveness characteristic of every potentiality-for-being into which Dasein has been factically thrown, is something that necessarily belongs. Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself.”

Resoluteness is a process of self-determination carried out by a particular individual, in a particular place, in a particular time with particular possibilities. Since indefiniteness belongs to my own potentiality-for-being, since I am, and each one of us is, a unique individual with its own capabilities, possibilities, limitations, and personal choices to make, we must make our own choices without reliance on external guidelines, that is, social conventions or moral principles. This conception puts the burden of responsibility and guilt squarely upon the resolving individual’s shoulders, for “only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself.” In other words, only the act of resolving and the carrying through the resolve will disclose whether my choice was truth: \( \text{ἀλήθευς} \). The notion of the “self taking action for itself” and the freedom from external constraints and restrictions indicates that resoluteness takes one out of the sphere of conventional justifications and assurance for one’s actions. The notion of the indefinitiveness of the resolve is the final consequence of Heidegger’s starting point and presupposition that the being of \textit{Dasein} “is in every case mine” and that “the essence of \textit{Dasein} lies in its existence”. Because existence is unique, mine, yours, each one of us, we must make our choices on the basis of the projection of our own self-constitution, which means that every \textit{Dasein} stands primarily by itself alone.

This notion may perhaps upset those who aim to find in \textit{Being and Time} concrete ethical directives or absolute moral principles and seems perhaps to raise the specter of “moral anarchy”. For if resoluteness has no determinate content is it not an empty and indefinite command to take action and resolve to be whatever one arbitrarily decides to become? Is resoluteness merely taking any action

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405 SZ, p. 298.
406 SZ, p. 298.
407 SZ, p. 42.
whatsoever? Is Heidegger advocating total ethical permissiveness? Does resoluteness have any definitiveness or is it purely empty and formal, an encouragement to be and do whatever one resolves upon?

Heidegger’s answer is that although there is an existentiell indefinitiveness that adheres to the content of the resolution, there is an existential definitiveness that defines its structure.\textsuperscript{408} I have provisionally indicated this structure by contrasting resoluteness with irresoluteness. Perhaps, a further explication of the structure of resoluteness and \textit{φρόνησις} would mitigate some of the most obvious objections to Heidegger’s analysis.

Indeed, one of the crucial tasks in working out Heidegger’s concept of \textit{Eigentlichkeit} is a clarification of \textit{άληθεύειν}, the disclosing of the end or purpose of human existence and whether or not it fulfils the criterion of \textit{ευδαιμονία}, as the ultimate and most complete possibility of human existence, that is, the authenticity of human being.

As we may remember, Aristotle presents us with the context of involvements of human action where every particular end in our lives receives its specific character when it is synthesized with (but simultaneously divorced from) the “context of involvements” thereby becoming a factical end. For only on the basis of a foregoing access to meaning is it possible to direct oneself to an end as meaningful in a concrete situation. As Heidegger puts it, “The survey which illuminates one’s concern receives its ‘light’ from Dasein’s potentiality for being, \textit{for the sake of which} concern exists as care.”\textsuperscript{409} One way to motivate the shift from everydayness to philosophy is to point to the necessity of exploring the most far reaching and distinctive aim of disclosure (\textit{άληθεύειν}), which for Aristotle is \textit{ευδαιμονία} (man’s proper being: \textit{εὖ-δαίμον}) and for Heidegger is authenticity worked out through \textit{άληθεύειν} of \textit{φρόνησις}.

Let us then begin by examining how Heidegger introduces resoluteness, so as to provide a starting point for the desired elucidation of \textit{φρόνησις} at the heart of \textit{Eigentlichkeit}.

In his introduction to the chapter on conscience, Heidegger writes:

\textsuperscript{408} SZ, p. 298.
\textsuperscript{409} SZ, p. 359.
“To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing. Our understanding of the appeal unveils itself as our **wanting to have a conscience**. But in this phenomenon lies that existentiell choosing which we seek – the choosing to choose a kind of being-one’s-self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call **resoluteness**.\(^{410}\)

Resoluteness is thus introduced as a special kind of choosing – namely, a decision to become a self. We have also seen that “resoluteness ‘exists’ only as a resolution which understandingly projects itself”\(^{411}\), and that “as resolute Dasein is already **taking action**.”\(^{412}\) – makes clear the action characteristic of resoluteness. To supplement this point, I note that on page 297 resoluteness is described as a mode of \(\omega \lambda \eta \theta \varepsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \upsilon \nu\) – indeed, a “primordial uncovering” of the “truth of existence”. This “disclosing” or “uncovering” is, however, not a detached cognitive act from the world, for we next discover that “this **authentic** disclosure modifies with equal primordiality both the way in which the ‘world’ is discovered and the way in which one’s co-existence with others is disclosed.”\(^{413}\) This analysis allows us to exhibit resoluteness as an \(\omega \lambda \eta \theta \varepsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \upsilon \nu\) that carries out a disclosure of Dasein throughout two interconnected determinations: understanding and action.

Firstly, as a mode of understanding, resoluteness refers to **seeing through** (durchsichtigkeit) das Man’s concealments and distortions, and one’s situation being **transparent**, and one can thus **see into** one’s relationship to the das Man self and **see the way out** to authenticity; i.e. one can see authentic possibilities, alternatives. Hence, resoluteness is a clarification of one’s understanding, a seeing through das Man and a seeing into possibilities for modification. Secondly, though, resoluteness includes the act of carrying out the modification of fallen inauthenticity, the \(\omega \lambda \eta \theta \varepsilon \upsilon \varepsilon \upsilon \nu\) constituted in a **choice** of specific resolves, and in this sense it refers to taking action in the situation, \(\pi \rho \alpha \xi \iota \varsigma\). On page 300, Heidegger writes:

> “As resolute, Dasein is already **taking action**. The term ‘action’ (Handeln) is one which we are purposely avoiding. For in the first place this term must be taken so broadly, that ‘activity’ will also embrace the passivity of resistance.”\(^{414}\)

\(^{410}\) SZ, pp. 269-270.  
\(^{411}\) SZ, p. 298.  
\(^{412}\) SZ, p. 300.  
\(^{413}\) SZ, p. 297.  
\(^{414}\) SZ, p. 300.
I have not been avoiding the term action and activity, or πράξεις in this interpretation. Rather, I have first circumscribed some of the determinations at stake in the teleological structure of πράξεις in the account of inauthenticity in order to present the specific discursivity of Dasein in everydayness. Now, in this specific step of Being and Time Heidegger tries to maintain Aristotle’s conceptuality – with the help of Aristotle himself. That is, he seeks to engage us readers and himself in the task that he set himself in the analysis of Aristotle’s teleology back in Marburg: “If the conceptuality is rooted in Dasein itself, [then] Dasein itself must in some sense be this conceptuality.”\textsuperscript{415} Firstly, in the analysis of resoluteness and authenticity, Heidegger tries to explain thematically the nature of action by applying Aristotle’s account to Aristotle’s thereby letting Aristotle to perform a kind of self-analysis with which it should be possible for Heidegger to work out those ways in which acting, projecting possibilities and self-determination are essential features of the activity of self-modification, through which one passes from inauthenticity to authenticity through Entschlossenheit..

Secondly, resoluteness requires a radical act: a wrenching of oneself away from inauthenticity to an activity of self-transformation that radically modifies one’s ways of being-in-the-world. To account for this possibility, however, one has to start with life’s own self-explication with the help of πράξεις in one’s everyday “poietic” conduct in order to describe human existence from the point of view of concern, since it is this absorbed concern that corresponds to the perspective of everyday life itself. Now we should be able to show how Heidegger proceeds from the ἀληθεύειν of inauthenticity to the level of care, showing that with this step the truth of human existence is uncovered. Heidegger stresses that:

“Even resolutions remain dependent upon das Man and its world. The understanding of this is one of the things that a resolution discloses, inasmuch as resoluteness is what first gives authentic transparency (durchsichtigkeit) to Dasein.”\textsuperscript{416}

This passage from Being and Time certainly parallels Heidegger’s analysis of φρόνησις (practical wisdom) back in Marburg where he argued that:

\textsuperscript{415} GAP, p. 271  
\textsuperscript{416} SZ, p. 299.
“Insofar as the human being himself is the object of the aletheueien of \( \varphi \rho \omicron \nu \eta \varsigma \varsigma \), the human being must be in a situation of being covered over from himself, of not seeing himself, so that an explicit \( \alpha \- \lambda \lambda \theta \nu \epsilon \eta \epsilon \nu \nu \) is required in order to become transparent [durchsichtig] to oneself.”

A failure to see resoluteness as a form of \( \pi \rho \alpha \zeta \varsigma \) promoted by the carrying through of Dasein’s \( \alpha \lambda \lambda \theta \nu \epsilon \eta \epsilon \nu \nu \) relative to the practical situation bears the consequence of reducing authenticity to a psychological phenomenon, a special form of self-consciousness, a purely contemplative way of seeing. As suggested above, one question in this connection is whether, in Heidegger’s view, \( \varphi \rho \omicron \nu \eta \varsigma \varsigma \) displays an everyday inauthentic or an authentic mode of existence. The truth is, I believe, that both alternatives are correct. To make this clear, we should first consider the central steps of Aristotle’s own characterisation of \( \varphi \rho \omicron \nu \eta \varsigma \varsigma \) so that we clearly understand what kind of \( \alpha \lambda \lambda \theta \nu \epsilon \eta \epsilon \nu \nu \) it is and how it underlies Heidegger’s notion of Entschlossenheit:

“It seems as if the person who is \( \varphi \rho \omicron \nu \mu \omicron \omicron \) has the power to deliberate on that which is good for himself and beneficial to him, and this is not a single part of his life, e.g. regarding his health or strength, but in what concerns the good life as a whole (\( \pi \epsilon \nu \rho \iota \ \tau \alpha \ \alpha \omicron \upsilon \tau \omega \ \alpha \gamma \alpha \theta \alpha \)).”

According to Aristotle, the capability to see what is good for one’s life is dependent upon practice. Aristotle considers the task of ethics to be to find out what is specific (\( \iota \delta \iota \omicron \omicron \)) to Man as Man, in order to uncover and disclose from there on the different possibilities for human action and thinking. In what might seem to resist Heidegger’s line of interpretation, Aristotle claims that this ethics is of “practical utility”. He asserts that its aim is not so much knowledge as action, for the inquiry should really enable us to be good and not just know what good is in an abstract way. Further the Ethics point out what virtuous behaviour is, namely the ability to achieve the mean while avoiding extremes, and Aristotle also gives concrete examples of such behaviour. In this way, the scope of Aristotle’s Ethics

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417 PS, p. 51.
418 NE, 1140 25-28.
419 NE, 1094 a1-3.
420 NE, 1097 b34ff.
421 NE, 1095 a5-6, 10-11.
422 NE, throughout book IV.
appears quite different from Heidegger’s existential analytic of *Dasein*. However, Aristotle also makes it clear that when it comes to ethics, one must be content if one succeeds in indicating the truth in broad outline, and this is also all that the audience should expect from his investigation.\(^{423}\) For the human good is of such a changeable nature “that it might seem to be determined by custom only and not by nature.”\(^{424}\) Virtue is situation-bound, and therefore, the meaning or content of the ability to achieve the mean must be settled by the circumstances. Accordingly, it is not possible to give unqualified rules for action, but only to point out what elements can constitute (successful) action. Of equal importance for Heidegger’s interpretation is that Aristotle achieves his concept of virtue through concrete phenomenological work. For the virtues, as they are dealt with by Aristotle, are not imposed on Man “from above”, i.e. they are not governed by pre-determined, eternal values. For virtue as we encounter it in the Greek text of Aristotle is first of all a matter of “viability”, the capacity to live one’s life in a sensible way, in accordance with human nature. In this view nothing other than life itself provides us with the philosophical foundation of virtue, which means the aim of ethics, as opposed to that of the sciences, is to clarify the “that” (of virtuous action) rather than the “why”.\(^{425}\) The key to this interconnection of virtue and the capacity to exist is Aristotle’s notion of \(\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\upsilon\) (good). To Aristotle, the *Ethics*, as we have seen in the first chapter as an inquiry into the nature of human good, or more specifically into the nature of the good life, is simultaneously an investigation of life as such, since it is peculiar to life as such to aim at something good, as the first sentence of the *Ethics* tells us.\(^{426}\) Heidegger is anxious now – as he was already four years before writing *Being and Time* when teaching Aristotle at Marburg – to point out that Aristotle is the first to achieve a strictly ontological understanding of good, in accordance with which good is not so much conceived as a moral property or as some kind of value, but rather as a limit and end which determines human activity as such.\(^{427}\)

This line of thought appears to be working in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1143a b6-13 where Aristotle seems to regard \(\varphi\rho\omicrond\upsilon\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma\) as a gift of nature. Aristotle

\(^{423}\) *NE*, 1094 b19-23.  
\(^{424}\) *NE*, 1094 b16.  
\(^{425}\) *NE*, 1095 b6-7. Cf. also Heidegger’s comments on this passage in *GAP*, p. 77.  
\(^{426}\) *NE*, 1094 a1-3.  
\(^{427}\) *GAP*, p. 43; *PS*, p. 123.
remarks, a few lines before 1141 a26-28, that one can even say of some animals that they are φρύνιμος prudent ones in this sense of the word, namely those that have the power of foresight or precaution, which lets them see what is good for their lives. Furthermore in the Politics it is stated that it is νοῦς determines the ends of our nature, therefore our habits must be regulated with a view to them. So conceived, understanding of good is common to all men, though it can be less or more perfect. In this way, Aristotle’s description oscillates between φρόνησις as that understanding which guides human beings lives by necessity, and as something which only belongs to sensible men. This oscillation is present also in Heidegger’s interpretation of φρόνησις and one can see similarities between Aristotle’s description and Heidegger’s handling of both everydayness and authenticity:

In this regard, if we compare and contrast respectively the above quoted passages of Heidegger (p. 300, SZ) and Aristotle (1140 25-28) we verify that Heidegger has not copied Aristotle’s conceptuality but affirmed some if its basic traits and tried to develop these further. Insofar as φρόνησις represents for Aristotle an unthematic understanding of good that can be interpreted as a kind of self-understanding on the part of the agent which makes action possible, it is no doubt useful to Heidegger’s development of care in its everyday mode. More important for Heidegger though is to see how the concept of φρόνησις admits of a more “authentic” form of understanding as compared with what Heidegger terms the inauthentic adherence to public development sustained by das Man. In what way though might Aristotle’s discussion of φρόνησις have influenced Heidegger’s notion of care (die Sorge), the self-other relationship? How can we counteract the eventual criticism that one’s resolve is made therefore as a blind, gratuitous act neither merely a form of understanding nor purely voluntary? The notion of φρόνησις as Gewissen (consciousness) and authenticity will allow us to uncover the level of care between situation and end, the understanding that presupposes a “light”. This “light” is the unconcealment of being promoted by what Heidegger refers to as disclosedness or disclosing (Erschlossenheit/αχληθεύειν) in Being and Time and prefigured, as we will see next, in the Aristotelian notion of νοῦς in de Anima.
c) The Self and the Other. Aristotle’s νοῦς and βουλευτική ὁρεξίς (NE, 1113a 10-11) and Heidegger’s *Die Sorge* and its modes.

Heidegger’s analysis of resoluteness and being-a-self has often been criticized as an egoistic, solipsistic withdrawal from all forms of community, in which the self-sufficient individual, relying solely on himself, utterly disregards the other, social relationships, and communal participation, in relentlessly projecting his own authenticity. In fact, almost all of Heidegger’s critics and commentators stress or regret a deficiency in Heidegger’s analysis of social/communal being.\(^{428}\) While there are certainly grounds for distress, some of the criticisms are misdirected from what the text is actually saying.

In regard to this point I would like to clarify what I consider to be a prevalent misinterpretation of the question of authentic Dasein’s relationship to others, and the corresponding distortion of authenticity which characterizes authentic Dasein as lonely, isolated, egoistic, death-haunted and being totally torn away from communal life. In the present section I wish to argue that Heidegger does not advocate a radical egoism in which one’s self-determination is all that is of interest and importance. Although Heidegger states that only through freeing oneself can one properly relate to others, he does not neglect the problem of authentic being-with-others, but rather indicates that only *resolute Dasein* can be authentically with others. This is made clear in this striking passage:

“Dasein’s resoluteness toward itself is what first makes it possible to let others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for-being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates (*vorspringend-befreienden*). When Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of others. Only by authentically being-themselves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another—not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in das Man and in what ‘they’ want to undertake.”\(^{429}\)

\(^{428}\) For an overview of the negative evaluation of Heidegger’s account of human relationships I refer to the books by Barret, Buber, Binswanger, Grene, Heinemann, Langen, Löwith, Macomber, Sartre and Versenay. In my interpretation of the self-other relationship I will briefly cite Buber’s critique found in *Between Man and Man* as an exemplary case of what I consider a misinterpretation of the relationship between *Mit-sein* (being-with) and authenticity. Buber’s criticism is probably the most influential attack on Heidegger’s supposedly solipsistic, authentic Dasein – I shall argue that it is one-sided and is a dubious interpretation based on a misreading of the text of *SZ*.

\(^{429}\) *SZ*, p. 298.
This passage indicates that authentic being-with-others is not dominating and prescribing, but is rather “leaping forth and liberating”, which frees others for their onewmost potentiality-for-being by disclosing authentic possibilities. Only by first becoming resolute oneself can one serve as an example and help others to liberate themselves. Far from supporting a solipsistic withdrawal, authentic Dasein is clearly concerned with relating to other people authentically.

Heidegger’s remarks that he opposes a sharp dichotomy between practical and theoretical ways of behaviour (Being and Time, pp. 300-1) lends credence to my proposal that we should interpret the lines of action of resoluteness as a specific reading of Aristotle’s νοῦς (de Anima 429 a 21-22, E.N., 1142 a 25-30) and βουλευτική δρέξις (deliberate desire) (Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a 10-11) that includes understanding and action as inseparable and interconnected determinations of the way of becoming authentic.430 Hence, in making this ‘separation’ of the two main features of resoluteness I do not intend to evoke any sort of dualism or make a contrast between the theoretical and the practical. Rather, I wish to exhibit these notions as the basic trait of anticipatory choice (προαιρετικός) that is the outcome of the deliberation process involved in the account of φρόνησις and which comprises the teleological structure of προαιρετικός and βουλή (resolution, decision). On this account I suggest that the choice involved in Entschlossenheit is the origin of action connected with the origin of movement. From here it can be shown that Heidegger’s chief aim is to find a way to account for human conduct without establishing a division between action and thinking, and to confirm that he believes that Aristotle’s conception of action is precisely what he needed. For even though Aristotle makes a conceptual distinction between action and thinking (e.g. between πρᾶξις and βουλή) he never moves from this aspect of understanding when discussing action. Since it is important for Heidegger to show that the situation of action cannot be strictly divided into deliberation and its conclusion, as if they were understandable in isolation from each other, he must show that the latter is actually included in the former. This is Heidegger’s task, as we will now see, with the fusion of these notions in terms of their ontological appearance in human being. As this makes

430 SZ, pp. 300-1.
clear, it is not primarily the end of action that resoluteness chooses, but rather the “how” of its enactment that Heidegger will choose to address as vorlaufende Entschlossenheit – a claim to be focused on the following point: decision, projection and disclosure are for Heidegger related to understanding and activity.

In order to substantiate the present proposal, it is necessary to exact the grounds for Heidegger’s articulation of resoluteness in terms of his analysis of die Sorge and to confront the notion of βουλευτική ὀρεξίς with einspringende-beherrschende Fürsorge (leaping-in and dominating solicitude) and vorspringende-befreiende Fürsorge (leaping forth and liberating solicitude) and the notion cited on page 26 that concerns a contrast between authentic and inauthentic ways of being-with-others and, that works in the text as Heidegger’s attitude toward ethics.431 The present analysis of the authentic being-with-others will show that Heidegger does not ignore the problem of authentic human relationships and that it is unfounded to characterize his concept of authenticity as a self-regarding, radical egoism or solipsism. I will argue that it is unfair to attack Heidegger’s imputed non-concern for, or condemnation of, interpersonal relationships until one has carefully examined his notion of fürsorge (solicitude) in order to see if Heidegger does or does not allow for the possibility of human relationships.432 Taking the Aristotelian notion of βουλευτική ὀρεξίς and citing, as an interpretive clue, the resoluteness that co-discloses the possibility of authenticity ‘in the solicitude which leaps-forth and liberates’, I now propose to examine Heidegger’s concept of solicitude in relation to the question of the involvement of authentic Dasein with others. I will argue that this analysis indicates that Heidegger does not ‘condemn’ resolute Dasein to a solipsistic alienation, does not exile Dasein from communal participation, nor is his authentic Dasein a ‘role-model’ of selfishness, egoism, or un-involvement.

This three-dimensional reference of resoluteness is, I believe, central to Heidegger’s analysis and as noted is connected with his concept of Seinkönnen which would thus signify not only “can understand” but also “can do”. If this is the case, then authenticity describes the capacity of a human being to carry out the ἀληθεύειν of his existence in terms of the truthfulness of his insight and

431 I have addressed this connection more explicitly in a paper (unpublished) entitled: “The (im)possibility of an ethical interpretation of Sein und Zeit.”
432 SZ, pp. 121-125.
integration, of seeing and doing, thus describing it as an “understanding activity of self-transformation.”

The idea that Heidegger thinks his own notion of ἀληθεύειν as prefigured in the Aristotelian notion of νοῦς, may be found in his inquiries on Aristotle back at Marburg (GA 18) when he realized the importance of ἀληθεύειν in the research of factual being in the world:

“The kind of being in the world, characterised by the uncoveredness of νοῦς, is only possible insofar as νοῦς is determined by a νοῦς which uncovers the world in general. I can intend something only insofar as this thinkable something is disclosed as such. Νοῦς παθητικός is only possible on the basis of νοῦς ποιητικός, on the basis of a νοεῖν which uncovers the world.”

In other words, Heidegger feels confident that νοῦς in its pure form – on the basis of an original νοεῖν that articulates νοῦς παθητικός and νοῦς ποιητικός – is a natural consequence of Aristotle’s conception of being and motion or movement, for it alone can work out ἀλήθεια by fulfilling the nature of movement of every being as coming to an end, full presence (ἐντελέχεια).

According to Aristotle in de Anima, human νοῦς is defined precisely as a δύναμις, as no actual existence until it thinks.

This same claim is also taken up to the Nicomachean Ethics:

“(…) ὁ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἑσχατοῦ καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προοίμωσις ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἐνέχει αὐτῷ· ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστά γὰρ τὰ καθόλου.” (“that [sc. νοῦς] which has to do with action grasps the ultimate, the possible, the minor premise. These things are principles in the sense of being that for the sake of which one acts, for from these particulars the universal is won.”)

It is at this point that νοῦς enters into Heidegger’s analysis in Being and Time, for as Aristotle’s passage refers, the task of ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς is to see the circumstances of action. As Aristotle has raised the issue of ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς in the de Anima 433a ff. in terms of a phenomenology of seeing, of truth as ἀληθεύειν in what concerns the showing of the world and the articulative

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433 This activity will receive its fullest explication in the last chapter on authentic historicity.
434 GAP, p. 326, (my italics).
435 Heidegger had this insight onto Aristotle as early as 1922 in his manuscript, PIA, p. 263 and also in his then unpublished lecture course of 1922, available now as PIA (GA 62), pp. 25-26.
436 DA, 429 a 23-25.
437 DA, 1143 a35-b10.
speaking of being in the world (φανώμενον and λόγος) and developed it further in the *Nicomachean Ethics* in terms of human beings ἀληθεύειν, so Heidegger adopts the same phenomenological strategy. Firstly, as we have seen earlier, by exhibiting the notion of νοῦς in his inquiries on the *de Anima* (GA 18; cf. chapter 1), then working it out in terms of the ἀληθεύειν in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (GA 19) and now taking it up in *Being and Time*, condensing his previous investigations in the term Entschlossenheit, aligning νοῦς and ἀληθεύειν in human beings capacity to be authentic.

Can we interpret Aristotle, though, as just saying that seeing what is proper here and now is not a part of the process of deliberation itself (resoluteness for Heidegger) since it is presupposed by it? I believe we can, and the above quotation seems to lend credence to this position in the sense that in *Being and Time* νοῦς is necessary to express the particular experience of Dasein in its capacity to choose and be(come) authentic. It is precisely this aspect which stands at the centre of Heidegger’s interpretation and equation of Entschlossenheit with Sein-zum-Tode so that this specific apprehension of the particular, of the unique, within a situation in which we are compelled to deliberate, is shown. Such a seeing could indeed make a starting-point for deliberation, as it apprehends the τέλος (end) of action. Heidegger, however, is more concerned with how νοῦς works at the end of deliberation, and he describes it accordingly as a “simple grasp” (schlichtes Erfassen) of determinate circumstances or of the bare “fact” of the situation: a νοεῖν. “Such νοεῖν is a matter of simple presentifying of something, so that it speaks purely out of itself and no longer requires discourse or a demonstration on our part. Here it can still be said: φανεῖται, the things that show themselves in this way. The only possibility here is to look on and, in looking, to grasp.”

As Aristotle sees it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, action has the following constituent elements: its first stage is λόγος and ὁρεῖς of that for-the-sake-of which the action is to be performed. This is the ruling principle of origin (ἀρχή) of one’s choice of a specific course of action, in such a way that given the purpose why of action, one deliberates on how to perform it. Eventually, the deliberation terminates in a conclusion concerning how the action should be performed. When

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438 *PS*, p. 161.
439 *NE*, 1139 a 31-33.
we have reached this conclusion, our desire is in accordance with the deliberation, and this governs our choice. As noted, this προσαίρεσις is the outcome of the deliberating process from unfounded to founded desire, and Aristotle defines it accordingly as βουλευτικὴ δρέξις. Now, if we come back with Heidegger to his Marburg course on the research on Aristotle’s ἀληθεύειν in the Nicomachean Ethics (GA 19), we see that indeed he calls our attention to the question of how to understand the relationship between the actual course of action and the deliberating that makes it possible. As noted, this is because he wants to find an explanation for human conduct without establishing a division between action and thinking, even though Aristotle makes a conceptual distinction between action and thinking (i.e. between πράξις and βουλευσις) he never abstracts from the aspect of understanding when discussing action. The implication is that Aristotle wants to show both a “subjective” and an “objective” side to action in the agent who performs it. For Heidegger it is important to see how this action or activity is accessible to others in the world. In Aristotle’s view, in deliberation, the agent sets out from a given end and deliberates until he reaches the first principle of action, which he leads back to himself in order to make clear that the end is possible for him. Hence, with this principle, which concludes the deliberating act, the action begins. On the other hand Heidegger’s point is to show that the situation of action cannot be strictly divided into deliberation and its conclusion, as if they were standing in isolation from each other. His concern is to show that the latter is actually included in the former. He interprets this situation as follows in the Nicomachean Ethics:

“This βουλεύεσθαι, to have deliberated, is enacted as λογίζεσθαι (…) The conclusion of βουλεύεσθαι is the action itself; it is not some kind of sentence, nor a kind of knowledge, but the breaking loose of the agent as such.”

Instead of νοεῖν or φρονεῖν we find Heidegger to be retrieving the philosophical content of Aristotle’s notions by thinking through the phenomenological sense of the Greek voices that not only are revelatory of the philosophical importance of Aristotle’s description of the temporal determination

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440 NE, 1112 a18-1113 14.
441 PS, p. 150.
of human action, but also permit Heidegger to work out his notion of resoluteness. The perfect (that is past) infinitive βουλεύεσθαι: ‘to have deliberated,’ is often translated as present infinitive, ‘deliberation or resoluteness=βουλη’. It is translated as ‘deliberation or resoluteness’ because it contains a reference to what is (presently) known only because it conforms to what is already seen (the past sense of the perfect tense of the verb), in other words we act because we recognize it (we already knew what to look for in seeing what we now see) and so we are en-acting. That is, we are acting from what we have-seen-already, and so what we are ready to look for (looking by knowing what to look for already, in advance), with the present action. We know we are acting because we are already projected in the action. In Greek this infinitive βουλεύεσθαι appeals to an ειδέναι, a knowledge, but as Heidegger suggests in this passage (and in the first lines of the Physics, as we saw in connection to ειδέναι and επισκασταί) both βουλεύεσθαι and ειδέναι are not a kind of knowledge for they have no present indicative form, no form for ‘I am (now) deliberating or knowing’. The infinitive always employed in the present tense to indicate seeing is ὁράω, a verb which always has a specific connection not with the seeing of νοεῖν and so knowing by working out (thinking), but the seeing of the eyes, and so looking, on-looking, looking-out-for, uncovering: ἀληθεύειν.

It is this same passage from Aristotle that is taken now to Being and Time and is underlying Heidegger’s account of concern in page 26 of Being and Time to contrast Dasein’s ways of relating to others, and contrasting positive and deficient modes of caring-for-others (Fürsorge). Specifically Heidegger indicates what happens if one abstracts action from the moment of deliberation warning us of the consequences of believing that the conclusion of our deliberation is some kind of statement: it will “take away care from the other” and take over caring for him.442 In Heidegger’s terminology, this mode of solicitude is designated leaping-in for the other (einspringen). Leaping in and taking over leads to domination and is determinative, in a large part, of human relationships. A common example in this day and age would be some parents “leaping in” and making major decisions for their children, structuring their lives into socially acceptable roles. Another example of this way of relating to others can also be found in literature,

442 SZ, p. 122.
Dostoevsky’s *Grand Inquisitor* or Machiavel’s *Prince*. Often the domination alluded to in “leaping-in” is hidden and implicit sometimes disguising itself in forms of altruism, as in the case of Dostoevsky’s novel. Heidegger’s point in referring to a *einspringend-beherrschende Fürsorge* however is to exhibit solicitude’s common trait that “leaping-in” treats the other as an object that one is “concerned with”, or as something ready-to-hand that must be guided, manipulated or acted upon: “This [kind of solicitude] pertains for the most part to the concern of the ready-to-hand.”

In this *einspringend-beherrschende Fürsorge* (leaping-in-taking-over concern), the other is dehumanized, treated as a thing, and therefore denied his autonomy to choose and make his own evaluations and commitments. Hence Heidegger concludes that such a solicitude that takes over one’s care, in fact takes one’s care away, and is thus described as “leaps-in and take-away ‘care.’”

In this first trait of solicitude the deliberation does not make the situation of action accessible at least to the other to whom the action is performed for it does not involve articulation, a “conclusion” in the form of a chosen action. Rather, we slide back to a pure synthetic/diairetic relationship in absorbed concern. In fact, letting someone “leap-in” and “take over” is descriptive of any surrender of one’s own freedom and responsibility to another person, to a collective institution or to a set of any unquestioned moral principles or beliefs. This taking over of a set of moral, political, or philosophical beliefs and principles as “finished and at one’s disposal” and as something that can be mechanically applied to concrete situations is the way everyday *Dasein*, on the whole, relates to *das Man*.

In contrast with this mode of caring-for that leaps in and dominates, we find Heidegger suggesting in the same passage, a positive way of caring-for that *leaps ahead* of the other (*ihm vorausspringt*) and discloses possibilities that enable him to take over his own care, proceeding to authenticity: *vorspringend-befreiende Fürsorge* (leaping forth and liberating solicitude). This θευέαν of authentic possibilities enables one “to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.”

Whereas the mode of leaping-in for someone sees him as something ready-to-hand which must be guided and manipulated, the way of leaping forth, or leaping ahead and revealing possibilities respects his integrity as a

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443 *SZ*, p. 122, (my italics).
444 *SZ*, p. 122, (my italics).
445 *SZ*, p. 122.
person with his own potentialities and autonomy. Thus Heidegger does not seem to share the Grand Inquisitor’s viewpoint – we may call it dictatorship, fundamentalism, the stock-market – that man’s basic incapacity for freedom and autonomy requires that one leap-in and take over his care. For, in contrast, *vorausspringen* indicates a “leaping forth and liberating” that I believe characterizes what can be interpreted as an authentic way of being-with-others which Heidegger recommends.

This way of leaping forth and liberating, I suggest, not only indicates what Heidegger himself is doing in *Being and Time* in regard to his projection of authenticity as an alternative to inauthentic everydayness, but also indicates one of the major tasks of philosophy: to indicate the way a human being may find his own way to fulfilment in the world, the path to Man’s εὐδαιμονία, the way authentic *Dasein* relates to other people. *What is at stake is the liberation of the other from the bonds of das Man*. Most people, most of the time, in Heidegger’s analysis, live in a state of bondage, trapped in the inauthenticity of *das Man*. An authentic being-with-others thus helps free from his bondage the other with whom one shares the world and in this sense attests to authentic care for the other’s authenticity.

I have argued so far how a βουλευτική ὁρεξίς promoted by a νοῦς ἀληθεύειν presents the opportunity to act by directing itself to a determinate end and suggested one of the possible consequences of isolating strictly deliberation with conclusion: taking the other as an object, dominating him with einspringend-beherrschende Fürsorge (leaping-in and dominating solicitude).

Now I wish to see Heidegger’s description of the way of caring-for that leaps ahead (*vorausspringen*) as a liberating way of being-with-others that gives one back his care “authentically as such for the first time”– an indication that authentic being-with-others is concerned with liberating the other and enabling him to engage in the project of authenticity. We read that “this kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of others, not to a ‘what’ with which one is concerned.”

This passage suggests that authentic care treats the other as a human being and not as a thing, thus it is but a short distance to Kant’s maxim “treat the other as an end, never as a means”. Hence, the guideline in Heidegger’s analysis of authentic solicitude is that an authentic being-with-others

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446 SZ, p. 122.
is a way of liberation that treats the other as a human being, and never as a thing, an object, a “what”.

Heidegger next stresses that these various ways of caring-for-others have importance for one’s own “authentic being toward oneself.”\(^{447}\) This statement implies that the way in which one relates to others is fundamental in determining how one seizes upon one’s own possibilities for being. Hence it is clear that an account of authenticity cannot overlook being-with-others. Indeed even in the chapter on authentic being-towards-death in which Dasein undergoes his most radical individuation, Heidegger stresses that authentic being-towards-death “enables Dasein, as Mitsein, to have some understanding of the potentiality-for-being of others.”\(^{448}\) Therefore, Heidegger suggests that individuation helps one to understand and to authentically relate to the other. Further, although he claims that much everyday being together indicates deficient modes of caring-for (i.e. distance, reserve, impersonality, mistrust, hostility, etc…), Heidegger does not limit the possibilities of Mitsein to negative modes. In fact, he even speaks of being authentically bound together in a devotion to a common cause which each individual Dasein has chosen as an authentic possibility.\(^{449}\) This interpretation is supported by Heidegger’s analysis of authentic solicitude in Being and Time page 122 to which we will now appeal in connection to Aristotle’s προσίτεσις and the concept of φρόνησις.

Heidegger seems to have taken to Being and Time the idea of φρόνησις that he explored back in Marburg (GA 19) when he stated that “what φρόνησις (practical wisdom) deliberates upon is not that which whereby a πράξις reaches its end. A result is not constitutive of the being of action, but only the εὖ, the ‘how’.”\(^{450}\) Aristotle’s indication of the εὖ of action is its τέλος, εὐπραξία, successful action.\(^{451}\) Heidegger, though, is more interested in showing what binds our deliberations by showing that Aristotle’s conception of φρόνησις and πράξις indicates that he regards Man as the ultimate “for the sake of which” of his own existence and hence the reason why he proceeded with caution in his Aristotle

\(^{447}\) \(\text{SZ, p. 122.}\)
\(^{448}\) \(\text{SZ, p. 264.}\)
\(^{449}\) \(\text{SZ, p. 122.}\)
\(^{450}\) \(\text{PS, p. 51.}\)
\(^{451}\) \(\text{NE, 1111 a3-5.}\)
course (GA 18) at Marburg in showing that πρᾶξις is not a particular activity opposed to ποίησις, but simply our existence, i.e. care, which, however, may be enacted in different ways: “πρᾶξις does not mean ‘activity’ as such in the general meaning of the word, but a determination of the being of Man. Ποίησις and πρᾶξις are two possibilities that often point out to different modes of appropriation.”\(^{452}\) Now, in Being and Time, Heidegger furthers this idea by arguing that for a group to have authentic togetherness it is necessary that each individual be aware of his personal commitment and ownmost potentiality-for-being so that the “right kind of objectivity” is operative “which frees the other in his freedom for himself.”\(^{453}\) Only in this way can an individual preserve his own freedom as he works to secure freedom for others. To what is Heidegger referring when he speaks of a desired “right kind of objectivity”? For we now know that to be aware of our own personal commitment to our ownmost potentiality-for-being-a-self and for freeing the other, the desired end must already be understood as something. Heidegger mentions “rechte Sachlichkeit” emphasizing the point that only on the basis of a foregoing access to meaning is it possible to direct oneself truly to an end that is meaningful in a concrete situation. Again, more than speculating, Heidegger is again referring to προαιρεσις offering a strict ontological exegesis of Nicomachean Ethics 1112 a15-17:

“η γάρ προαιρεσις μετά λόγου και διανοίας. ύποστημαίνει δ᾿ έσοικε καὶ τόνυνομα ώς ὑπ᾿ πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετοῦ.” [The choice is about speaking and thorough thinking (διανοίας). Even the name seems to indicate that something is taken before something.” \(^{454}\)

To choose is to take a possibility or end “before” the others, and to do so means to “take apart into pieces”, to cleave (διαίρειν) the present situation, distinguishing one possibility within the situation. We find such examples as engaging in a piece of scholarship or science, in charitable activity or defense of one’s religious beliefs as instances of an authentic being bound together. It is also important to stress, however, that this means an authentic being bound together

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\(^{452}\) GAP, pp. 188-189.

\(^{453}\) SZ, p. 122. In the final chapter on historicity I will confront the question of the group by challenging Löwith’s claim that Heidegger’s political ‘mistake’ in the 1930s is a consequence of his thought.

\(^{454}\) NE, 1112 a15-17.
which requires first individual awareness, choice, and commitment. Blind submission to the group is not, I believe, suggested by any aspect of Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity. A widespread misconception of Heidegger’s philosophy, which I hope the preceding analyses have helped clear away, is that there is no emphasis on a self-regarding, solipsistic analysis of \textit{Dasein} in \textit{Being and Time} nor is authentic being-with-others excluded from the project of authenticity. One source of this confusion is Martin Buber who, with an influential essay of the time entitled \textit{Between Man and Man} promoted the idea that Heidegger’s \textit{Dasein} was essentially non-relational and that there was no room in Heidegger’s thought for a real togetherness of I and Thou.\footnote{455 Buber, Martin, \textit{Between Man and Man}, p. 168 and 171 in the Heidegger section of the essay, “What is Man?” Buber writes, “Heidegger’s \textit{Dasein} is monological (…) Heidegger’s self is a closed system”, p. 168. Though there is truth in Buber’s claim that for Heidegger one’s self-projection is of fundamental importance in the quest for authenticity, it is also the case, which Buber has unfortunately failed to discern, that one’s relations with the other and the world are also a fundamental part of authenticity so that a solipsistic or “monological” interpretation of resoluteness is clearly erroneous. Moreover, Buber fails to grasp that Heidegger’s analysis of being-with-others purports to work out the structures of human existence and is not concerned with prescribing or delineating an ideal of subjective psychological relations such as Buber’s I-Thou relationship. I might also note that Buber’s I-Thou concept was taken over from Feuerbach: “Not ‘I’ but ‘I and Thou’ is the true principle of thought. The most real relationship between I and Thou is love”, cf. this passage \textit{apud} Löwith’s \textit{From Hegel to Nietzsche}, p. 78.} There is no doubt that Heidegger holds no solipsism in \textit{Being and Time}: “In clarifying being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject without a world is ‘never’ proximally, nor is it ever given. And so in the end an isolated ‘I’ without others is just as far away as from being proximally given.”\footnote{456 \textit{SZ}, p. 116.} The claim that \textit{Dasein} is a “closed system” in which intersubjectivity has no significance is simply false underlined by his emphasis in \textit{Mitsein} and his notion of authentic solicitude involved in the \textit{ὧν} of the world and others.\footnote{457 Heidegger acknowledges the influence from Max Scheler on the question of intersubjectivity, in p. 116.} For we have seen indications that authentic being-with-others is an integral part of authenticity, and that this is a recurring theme that is adumbrated in the chapter on death, stressed in the sections on resoluteness and historicity, and is grounded in the context of Heidegger’s analysis of solicitude which was just examined.

So far I have presented some passages that indicate that Heidegger’s resolute \textit{Dasein} is not a self-regarding, solipsistic being and hope to have developed Heidegger’s analysis of resoluteness as the condition of possibility of self-determination, as a leaping forth and liberating and authentic being-with-others.
Throughout this presentation I have provided the basic traits of action as understood by Aristotle with the terms νοῦς and βουλευτικὴ ὀρεξία and coined by Heidegger in several steps of Being and Time with the notion of Entschlossenheit, einspringend-beherrschende Fürsorge and vorspringend-befreiende Fürsorge that involve a contrast between authentic and inauthentic ways of being with others and therefore challenged widespread tendencies to label authenticity as a form of subjectivism, voluntarism or solipsistic egoism.

In the next section, point a) I propose to exhibit the notion of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit while keeping in mind the Aristotelian grounds examined. Significantly, this notion is perhaps in large part the origin of the misinterpretations of authenticity. I will attempt to analyze and exhibit the issues that vorlaufende raises concerning what we already know of Entschlossenheit and the interpretation of authenticity. This proposal will take as its theme the concept of authenticity in Being and Time and review the interpretations that equate authenticity as being-towards-death, specifically by exhibiting some of Aristotle’s principles of motion in the Physics and the Nicomachean Ethics thought to be underlying the notions of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit and Sein-zum-Tode.

d) The interpretation of Authenticity

A major task in developing Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is to question the connection between authenticity and being-towards-death in order to clarify the grounds of this association. In paragraph 62 Heidegger brings together the results of his analysis of authentic being-towards-death and resoluteness which he combines in the notion of advancing resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit). This notion is often taken as the “summit” of Being and Time, as the culmination of Heidegger’s hermeneutic of authenticity. Further, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, advancing resoluteness is often interpreted solely as a way of being toward death which is said to constitute authenticity. Demske, for example, writes:
Outside of authentic being-towards-death, there is for Dasein no other authenticity. Authentic being toward death and Dasein’s authenticity in general are thus one and the same: advancing resoluteness.”

To uncover the interpretation of authenticity one must first question its interpretation by those who argued that death is ‘the highest court of authority’ for an authentic existence, and that Dasein’s own death is its ultimate constitutive possibility. On this basis it has been claimed that Heidegger has a ‘death ethic’ (Marcuse), a ‘theodicy of death’ (Adorno), which is said to be a ‘nihilism unconditionally defeatist’ (de Waehlens), that is ‘Heidegger’s private religion’ (Körner).

At this point I would like to show that the interpretation that equates authenticity with being-towards-death cannot be maintained as the development of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity without violating to the text of Being and Time. I argue that this interpretation is put into critical question by a careful study of Heidegger’s reading of the ἀληθεύειν in his pronouncements on authentic historicity which I will examine in the next chapter. I would like to argue in the last chapter of this study, that in the section of historicity indeed we find a continuation and development of the concept of authenticity that we have been working out throughout this study, and claim that this concept of authenticity, developed from resoluteness, receives its most subtle and important formulation in the much neglected sections on historicity. This strategy would suggest that most interpreters of authenticity did not go far enough into Being and Time before reaching their conclusions as to what constitutes authenticity. For it is in ἀληθεύειν that we find

458 Demské, James, Sein, Mensch, und Tod, pp. 50, 115, 183, 188, 190, 192. I should note that Demské’s position toward a clear identity between authentic being-towards-death, advancing resoluteness, and authenticity, on page 65 where he seemingly indicates – in contradiction to the passages he develops later [quoted above] – that death is not to be over-valued nor taken as the exclusive constitutive structure of authentic self-being, strongly contrast with his interpretation on pages 49-51 and the summary of his argument on pages 183-192, where he indicates an identity between authentic being-towards-death and advancing resoluteness.

459 One of the reasons that these misunderstanding arises is, as Thomas Sheehan pointed out in the 1970s, pp. 287-318, that “Heidegger’s scholarship is haunted by a tendency to hypostatize being into an autonomous “other”, separate from entities and from human being. (…) But it is sure that being is not a thing or event set off by itself (cf. Phy B, 1, 193b 5: ou choriston on) but rather is only the disclosive structure of entities, distinguishable from entities but neither separate from nor reducible to them.”
the key to every mode of revealing of existence, *Dasein*, made thematic in *Being and Time*.\(^{460}\) I hope to correct this omission in the second half of this study.

On this point in section a) I will provide evidence that the interpretation of authenticity – the most widely held view expounded by Heidegger scholars in Europe and the United States of America – cannot be clearly and unambiguously retrieved from the texts of Aristotle and Heidegger.

For this purpose I would first examine paragraph 62 where Heidegger brings together the analyses of resoluteness and authentic being-towards-death which combine to produce *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* and attempt to show the connection of these notions to the teleological interpretation of change in some of the passages of Aristotle’s *Physics*.

I will argue that to interpret Heidegger’s analysis as maintaining that *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* is solely a way of being-towards-death which constitutes and is the condition of possibility, the ‘criterion’ of authenticity, implies a reinterpretation of resoluteness which is radically different from the interpretation worked out in paragraph 62.

I will finally suggest that *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* itself is not to be taken exclusively as a way of being-towards-death, but is rather a structure of authenticity that includes but is not subsumed or exhausted by being-towards-death.

From here I will move on to point b) where I will briefly contrast my own inquiries on *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* with the standard interpretation that takes it as exclusively as a way of being-towards-death that is the sole character of authenticity. I can finally show the consequences of holding the equivalence between authenticity and authentic being-towards-death for the interpretation of authenticity and in *Being and Time*.

e) Death and Resoluteness: advancing resoluteness (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*) and Aristotle’s principles of motion.

\(^{460}\) *SZ*, pp. 139-140.
In *Being and Time*, paragraph 62, Heidegger asks, “to what extent does resoluteness ‘thought through to the end’ in corresponds to its ownmost tendency of being lead to authentic being-towards-death?” This problem raises a series of questions:

“How are these two phenomena of advancing and resoluteness to be brought together? Has not our ontological projection of the authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole led us into a dimension of Dasein which lies far from the phenomenon of resoluteness? What can death and the ‘concrete situation’ of taking action have in common?”

Heidegger does, it is clear, wish to bind these phenomena together and in so doing raises some further quite puzzling questions:

“What if resoluteness, in accordance with its own meaning, should bring itself into its authenticity only when it projects itself not upon any random possibilities which lie just ahead of every factical potentiality-for-being of Dasein, and, as such, enters more or less undisguisedly into every potentiality-for-being of which Dasein factically takes hold? What if it is only in the advancing toward death that resoluteness, as Dasein’s authentic truth, has reached the authentic certainty which belongs to it? What if it is only in the advancing in death that all the factical provisionalness of resolving would be authentically understood – in other words, that it would be caught up with in an existential way?”

In this passage, Heidegger suggests that this interconnection between resoluteness and being-towards-death can be worked out by taking resoluteness as the point of departure and asking: “Does resoluteness, in its ownmost existentiell tendency of being, point forward to advancing resoluteness as its ownmost authentic possibility?” He argues that all existential phenomena should be “thought through to the end”, and that this “thinking through” will present us with the phenomenon of advancing resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit). Finally, this interpretation will, Heidegger claims, “liberate Dasein for its uttermost possibility of existence”: death.

This procedure may cause perplexity for it would seem to move the place of authenticity from the resoluteness of taking action in the situation (self-
modification and self-determination) to a resolute projection upon one’s uttermost possibility (death). This would move the focus of resoluteness from life to death, and would suggest that, indeed, the “authenticity of resoluteness” is not found in the projection “upon any random possibilities that lie closest”, but rather lies in the projection upon “that uttermost possibility.” This interpretation would seem, then, to answer the question, “what do I resolve upon?” with a definite answer: “my own death.” Then, death becomes my authentic resolve, and the basis, the source and criterion of an authentic existence would be one’s resolute being-towards-death. If this were the case, then Heidegger would maintain a type of “death ethic” as Marcuse has claimed. However, can we really accept this interpretation?

Firstly, this interpretation is highly dubious for it implies a reinterpretation of resoluteness that directly contradicts the elucidation of resoluteness found in paragraph 60 of Being and Time, which I have set forth in the last point as a fundamental structure of authenticity. This contradiction can be shown by examining pages 298-9 where one encounters clear indications that resoluteness refers to taking action in the present situation in which one does choose from those “possibilities that lie closest”. The following excerpt should confirm this point:

“Resoluteness, as authentic being-one’s-self does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free floating ‘I’. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosing [ἐληθεύειν], is authentically no other than being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its current concernful being – alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous being with others. In the light of the projected will (Worumwillen, literally: for-the-sake-of-which) of one’s self-chosen potentiality-for-being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. Dasein’s resoluteness toward itself is what first makes it possible to let the others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for-being (...) Resoluteness by its ontological essence, is always the resoluteness of some factical Dasein at a particular time (...) The resolution is precisely the disclosing projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time (...) What one resolves upon in resoluteness has been prescribed ontologically in the existentiality of Dasein in general as a potentiality-for-being in the manner of concernful solicitude (...) Even resolutions remain dependent upon das Man and its world (...) In resoluteness the issue for Dasein is its ownmost potentiality-for-being, which, as something thrown, can project itself only upon definite factical possibilities. Resolution does not withdraw itself from ‘actuality’, but discovers first what is factically possible for it as its onwmost potentiality-for-being in das Man.”

467 SZ, p. 302. See note 426.
468 SZ, pp. 298-9.
I have quoted at length from paragraph 60 to demonstrate that resoluteness has been worked out in detail as a projection upon factual possibilities in which one chooses authentic resolve from one’s “world” to constitute one’s situation. Before I can exhibit the Aristotelian grounds of this central passage I would like to run through the interpretation where resoluteness is shown to tend toward being-towards-death and show how interpreting the passages on pages 307-9 as a re-interpretation of resoluteness as, exclusively, a way of being-towards-death leads to one contradiction after another. Then I suggest that the actual (and harmless) consequence of bringing together the analysis of being-towards-death is shown to be a mode of resoluteness, one of the ways of being resolute. Heidegger’s strategy in bringing together being-towards-death and resoluteness is to run through seriatim the determinations of the existential concept of death (i.e. ownmost, non-relational, not to be outstripped, etc.) in order to show that resoluteness also “tends” toward these same features through disclosing Dasein’s potentiality-for-being in the same terms, thus supposedly indicating a correspondence between being-towards-death and resoluteness. I would invite us to follow Heidegger’s interpretation on pages 307-9 of Being and Time in order to relate it to Aristotle’s Physics in so as to test and challenge the grounds of this strategy and see how this contradicts a reinterpretation of resoluteness which would make authenticity equivalent to authentic being-toward-death as advancing resoluteness vorlaufende Entschlossenheit. This proposal, however, does not force upon us a radical reinterpretation of resoluteness that would reduce resoluteness to a way of being-towards-death.

On the top of page 307 Heidegger writes:

“Understanding the call of conscience reveals the lostness in das Man. Resoluteness brings Dasein back to its ownmost potentiality-for-being-its-self. One’s ownmost transparent in understanding being-towards-death as one’s ownmost possibility.”

In this paragraph and throughout paragraph 62 Heidegger is reaffirming the importance of death in the constitution of authenticity. His claim is that through being-towards-death Dasein is most radically individualized, implying that

\[469\] SZ, p. 307.
resoluteness should “tend toward” authentic being-towards-death so as to make *Dasein*’s individuality, its “ownness”, “wholly and authentically transparent.” However, from this claim someone, as for example Demske, who supports advancing resoluteness *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* as the exclusive determination of authenticity, jumps to the conclusion that resoluteness is only authentic as resolute being-towards-death, thus greatly restricting the scope and role of resoluteness. What in my view is questionable here is that resoluteness in its authenticity passes over “factual possibilities” and confines its authentic resolve to the choice of death. If the argument is that resoluteness must choose and take over one’s finitude and project all factual possibilities upon the horizon of one’s inevitable dying, then the point is plausible. However, if one takes one’s resolute choice of death as one’s ultimate possibility that constitutes an authentic existence, this implies that death is the sole authentic aim of resoluteness. I hope to show that the latter position is a misinterpretation and distortion of authenticity and resoluteness that is denied in the sections on historicity in *Being and Time*. The source of this misleading impression is the rather difficult section of *Being and Time* that I will now examine.

In page 307, paragraph two Heidegger refers that:

“The call of conscience passes over in its appeal all Dasein’s ‘wordly’ prestige and potentialities. Relentlessly it individualizes Dasein down to its potentiality-for-being-guilty, and exacts from it that it should be this potentiality authentically. The unwavering precision with which Dasein is thus essentially individualized down to its ownmost potentiality-for-being, discloses the advancing toward death as the possibility which is non-relational. Advancing resoluteness lets the potentiality-for-being-guilty, as one’s ownmost, non-relational possibility, be forced wholly into the conscience.”

If one takes this passage as stating that resoluteness is non-relational, then one contradicts the analyses of resoluteness in paragraph 60 which portrays resoluteness as a *way of relating* to the world and one’s concernful solicitude. There, resoluteness, far from breaking off one’s relationships, brings *Dasein* back into authentic relatedness and involvement in the situation. We see here the dubious results of assimilating resoluteness in the analysis of being-towards-death,

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470 SZ, p. 307.
for on Heidegger’s account it is anxiety, conscience, and being-towards-death which breaks off Dasein’s relationships to das Man, and resoluteness which brings it back into authentic relatedness and involvement in the situation, which includes concern and solicitude: relationships. Thus, although it is the case that authentic being-towards-death is non-relational and individualizes Dasein within itself, so that a resolute choice of being-towards-death would continuously individualize one, is it not also the case that resoluteness still requires that Dasein chooses factical possibilities with which it will work out the disclosing of its unique being-in-the world? Although Dasein’s non-relational solicitude – that is, in the sense of a withdrawal – is necessary as a pre-condition for taking action in the situation for Heidegger, I do not see how it alone can constitute authenticity, for it is clear in the text, in paragraph 60 (and some later scattered passages) that Dasein must return to the everyday and must choose possibilities that are currently and factically available, in order to achieve an authentic existence. Hence, despite a formal resemblance in the individualization of death and resoluteness, there is the fundamental difference that whereas authentic being-towards-death makes one aware of one’s individualized self-being (solus ipse), resoluteness brings Dasein back into the situation so as to resolutely take action in the spheres of concern and solicitude, and is therefore relational.  

I suggest we must avoid any conclusion that might lead us to take authentic being-towards-death as providing the only certain possibility with which we constitute an authentic existence. If one takes the passage cited as proposing that on the basis of death as an ultimate certainty (finitude), we can choose authentic possibilities, then the point is plausible. Conversely, if one takes advancing resoluteness as a constant projection upon death as one’s sole authentic and certain possibility, then one not only contradicts Heidegger’s earlier analysis of resoluteness, as we have seen, but one also contradicts Heidegger’s analysis of authentic being-towards-death where Heidegger argued that he was not endorsing a ‘brooding over death’, and that vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit, as we have seen through some of Aristotle’s determinations, was an advancing in Dasein’s finitude, such that one entertained death as a possibility, but was not fixated upon death as  

\[471\] Cf., pp. 70, 135, 147.
an event and actuality. Hence, taking *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* as a way of authentic being-towards-death that constitutes authentic existence through a projection upon death, would reverse the focus of being-towards-death from relating a pure possibility (as Heidegger recommends) to fixating on death as an ever present actuality activated in human life, becoming an end in itself προδοξίς, and would thus result in a mode of ἀληθεύειν that was rejected by Heidegger as an inappropriate way of relating to death. For if we were to accept that our choice to be authentic would inevitably be a *dead-end* literally the-way-of-being-towards-death, how could an end in itself still promote existence? For as such, προδοξίς is not a form of κίνησις as κίνησις does not have its end immanently, but, rather, has the mode of being of ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια. For within life, death exists or has meaning only as a possibility and this is the way the possibility of death reveals particularly clearly the meaning of possibility as such (as we have seen with the notion of *vorlaufende in die Möglichkeit* in the perspective of inauthenticity) but furthermore it shows that ends make action possible precisely by virtue of their potentiality, that is, insofar as they are not actualized but *anticipated* as possibilities.

This sense of *death as possibility and not an end in itself* seems to be exactly the idea underlying the following passage, half way through *Being and Time*, page 308:

“When resoluteness is transparent to itself, it understands that the *indefiniteness* of one’s potentiality-for-being is made definite only in a resolution as regards the current situation. It knows about the indefiniteness by which a being that exists is dominated through and through. But if this knowing is to correspond to authentic resoluteness, it must itself arise from an authentic disclosure. The *indefiniteness* of one’s own potentiality-for-being, even when this potentiality has become certain in a resolution, is first made wholly manifest in being toward death. *Vorlauf* brings Dasein face to face with a possibility which is constantly certain but which at any moment remains indefinite as to when that possibility will become an impossibility.”

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473 SZ, p. 261.
474 For the idea that προδοξίς in the proper sense cannot be a form of κίνησις (motion), see also Meta, 1048 b 18-27.
475 SZ, p. 308.
Reinterpreting resoluteness on the basis of this passage would rest on an equivocation of different senses of *unbestimmt*. Death is *unbestimmt* in the sense that it is “indefinite in its certainty”, i.e. it is possible at any moment; this seems to be the unambiguous connotation Heidegger had in mind. *Unbestimmt*, though, also means “indeterminate, vague, undefined, undecided”, and certainly it is this sense of *unbestimmt* that refers primarily to the “indefiniteness of one’s potentiality-for-being” that is made definite in a resolution. Moreover, this sense of *unbestimmt* cannot unambiguously refer to death which is clearly for Heidegger *Dasein*’s most determinate possibility which defines its being as finite, individual, guilty, etc… Hence an equation of the *unbestimmt* character of death and the potentiality-for-being that is resolved on in resoluteness would deceptively appeal to two senses of *unbestimmt* (indefinite and indeterminate), which renders equivocal the claim that it is the advancing in the *unbestimmt* (indeterminate) nature of one’s potentiality-for-being. For it is clear that in the context of Heidegger’s analysis, *unbestimmt* refers to two distinct phenomena that have no visible connection beyond a coincidental ambiguity in language. Furthermore, the following passage may help us to clarify the more convincing connection between death and resoluteness:

“The indefiniteness of death is primordially disclosed in anxiety. But this primordial anxiety strives to exact resoluteness from itself. It moves out of the way everything which conceals the fact that Dasein has been abandoned to itself.”

Does it not follow from this passage then that anxiety over death induces the advancing in death to become resolute, so that we resolutely choose our death as one of our possibilities? Indeed, in confirmation of the proposal that the bringing together of authentic being-towards-death and resoluteness serves to make advancing a mode of resoluteness, we find Heidegger stating that advancing has been made possible and promoted by resoluteness and makes it explicit in the following passage:

“In our interpretation of the ‘connection’ between resoluteness and advancing, we have first reached a full existential understanding of advancing itself. Hitherto this could amount to no more than an ontological projection. We have now shown that advancing is not a fictitious possibility which we have forced upon Dasein; it is a mode of an existential

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476 *SZ*, p. 308.
potentiality-for-being that is attested in Dasein – a mode which Dasein exacts from itself, if indeed it authentically understands itself as resolute.\footnote{477}

I certainly concur with this conclusion and have been proposing throughout this section that advancing is a mode of resoluteness, and that when in resoluteness Dasein chooses authenticity, one of the ways in which Dasein resolves upon authentic self-being is in resolutely advancing forward in its death as a distinct possibility. In fact, Heidegger himself suggests this interpretation in saying that advancing ‘is’ not some kind of free-floating behaviour, but it is a possibility hidden in resoluteness and thus attested therewith.\footnote{478} However, we should not conclude that advancing resoluteness is the only authentic mode of resoluteness, or that death is the sole authentic resolve, or that authenticity is constituted of an equivalent to authentic being-towards-death, for this would make being-towards-death the fundamental constitutive of authenticity – an interpretation, I am trying to show, that cannot be extracted from the text of Being and Time without difficulty.

Furthermore, the concept of resoluteness, as suggested at the beginning of this point, seems by all accounts to present a recovery of Aristotle’s principles of change and movement in the Physics. However, it would not do justice to such a connection just to enumerate the principles of change and then contrast these with some of the notions echoed in the passages of Being and Time. The notion of Entschlossenheit seems to condense and make thematic the being of change and movement, the meaning of moving from a potential state (\( \delta\nu\sigma\mu\epsilon\eta\)) to an actualized state or full presence (\( \varepsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\chi\epsilon\alpha\)) as the becoming of a thing in itself.

With the phenomenology of Dasein in Being and Time Heidegger is presenting Aristotle’s greatest achievement: that there is a presence that is \( \alpha\cdot \tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\xi\), or in other words, that it is possible to be present as being on the way towards an end.\footnote{479} It is this discovery by Aristotle himself that drives Heidegger to the notion that may best express and comprise the being of change and movement in human Dasein: Entschlossenheit.\footnote{480} As noted, insofar as Heidegger does not intend to formulate

\footnotetext{477}{SZ, p. 309.}
\footnotetext{478}{SZ, p. 308.}
\footnotetext{479}{GAP, pp. 321, 328.}
\footnotetext{480}{I may not offer here a proper and desired clarification of the aspects at play in PHY and a fully fledged account of the teleological determinations that could eventually lead us to a full confirmatory study of the connection between \( \kappa\nu\nu\sigma\tau\varsigma \) and Entschlossenheit. However, one faces a complex crossroad at this stage of the text together with Aristotle’s intricate temporal notions, in the}
just another version of Aristotle’s thought in the *Daseinsanalytik*, it seems that even his attempt to liberate Aristotle from that tradition requires that he turns against Aristotle as well and interprets his thought in the light of κίνησις as its proper self-explanation, that is, coming back to what philosophy had always been: Aristotle. \(^{481}\) To Aristotle, the question is: how beings that are through σώσις can have movement κίνησις as their way of being – their way of presencing. κίνησις is the phenomenon that opens the access to the being of beings as the self-concealing revealing (αληθεύειν).

In the interpretation of *Eigentlichkeit* we are confronted with a question about the temporal structures of the in of the hereness of Dasein presupposed in, and worked out from the teleological structure of human action in the concrete situation. \(^{482}\)

Precisely for this reason, the phenomenon of situation is a constituent of the existential attributes of *Entschlossenheit*. \(^{483}\) As Heidegger says, “Just as the spatiality of the ‘here’ is grounded in disclosedness, the situation has its foundations in resoluteness. The situation is the ‘here’ which is disclosed in resoluteness – the ‘here’ in which the existent being is here.” \(^{484}\) Now we can ask: how is Dasein determinate in the ‘here’? From where does the resoluteness that helps us Dasein face its end come? Does not our being here in the world depend on the fact that we will cease to be? How can we make sense of “what can death and the ‘concrete situation’ of taking action have in common?” It seems clear for Heidegger that in resoluteness we experience a distance between ourselves and the object of our concern which gives us a clearer view of the limit of the situation which we have already understood in an unthematic way. Now, the question about what τί (what this one Dasein?) seems to be working out for Heidegger as it seemed to work for Aristotle, that is, not a phenomenological question, and not an ontological question – in concentrating only on the extantness of what is and its

\(^{481}\) This is a point made earlier in *GAP*, pp. 272-273. Heidegger points precisely to this concept to show what it means to frame a proper conceptuality.

\(^{482}\) Heidegger would make this question thematic later in *EM*, p. 46.

\(^{483}\) The term situation has a shade of special significance which is also present in the here of *Dasein* but it is based on place and not space, I suggest that *Dasein* works out his existence for whom disclosedness is a basic determination. Cf., *SZ* p. 299.

\(^{484}\) *SZ*, p. 299.
presence, it overlooks and so ignores the question for whom, the question of the emerging presencing of beings and the question of the “who?” for whom they appear: if the same being shows itself in the same way to each one, then each one to whom the being appears would be the same as any other ‘each’ – but this is not true. Aristotle knows this from the Nicomachean Ethics – beings appear in the same way but differentiate for whom with respect to who, the actual being of the one to whom the being appears. Thereby, the constancy of presence comes from the very own solicitation of presence such that the actual being of the one concedes to every particular being the “gift of presence” – to use a terminology from the latter Heidegger – and therefore present is that which gives Man the awareness of what is manifested in all letting-be-present. Beings can show themselves as they are in such a way that we can know beings in their being through having already recognized them by their reaching over presence to us. Heidegger learns from Aristotle that to limit a thing is not to render it weaker or less determinate, but on the contrary: “ἐστι γὰρ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὁρὸν πρὸς ὃν τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς συναπτεῖ” [“a common boundary in relation to which points conjoin.”].

On the other hand, Heidegger writes that:

“He [Aristotle] thinks for the first time of the individual being as the actual (Jeweilige), and thinks of its ‘lasting’ (Weile) as the distinctive manner of presencing, of the presencing of eidos itself in the most extreme present of the indivisible, that is, no longer derived, appearance (ἄτομον ἐἴδος) [the outward look that can be dissected no further, literally un-cut, ]”.

Keeping in view that for Aristotle place has a “δύναμις: ἔχει τινὸς δύναμιν”, Heidegger, as we see in this passage, refers us to Aristotle’s understanding of being as “the actual (Jeweilige), and thinks its lasting (Weile) as the distinctive manner of presencing.” In other words, a being is only actual insofar as it achieves its potentiality-to-be in its ‘being unmoved’, in its “ἄτομον ἐἴδος” [the outward look that can be dissected no further, literally un-cut], that means its proper potentiality to be. Heidegger states that “the resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time

485 Aristotle, Categoriae, 6, 5 a 2.
487 Phys., IV, 1 208 b 10 ff.
In this sentence we find the words “disclosive projection” and “what is factically possible” whilst in the Physics Aristotle states that:

“δηρημένου δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστον γένος τοῦ μὲν ἐνετέλεχεια τοῦ δὲ δυνάμει, ἢ τοῦ δυνάμει ὤμος ἐνετέλεχεια, ἢ τοιοῦτον, κινήσις ἐστιν, (…)” [“Since in every genus there is a difference between that which is in actuality and that which is in potentiality, change is the actualisation of a potential being as such [i.e. as potential], (…)”].

If we translate the Greek literally, we find that what makes up the difference between what is actual and potential is κίνησις as change (μεταβολή) for in order to have a potentiality for something, beings must already be something, and thus existing in the mode of ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια. In other words, that being which has potential or possibility must already be where it is, or present (gegenwärtig). This peculiar union of κίνησις with ἐντελέχεια permits Heidegger to work out “what is factically possible at the time” in the sense that a being that is potential (δυνάμει) is not only already something, thus being marked by its ἐντελέχεια, but is also “not yet” something thus being the “disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time". Although, for the most part, Heidegger translates κίνησις as movement/motion (Bewegung) rather than μεταβολή, change (Veränderung = μεταβολή), the fact that the general meaning of μεταβολή is “change, alteration” distinguished by Aristotle through the use of ἀλλοίωσις – demands a closer examination, for every change is a change from something to something from the out-of-its situation and being-toward-something in appearance – a change is always from something to something as Aristotle states in various steps of the Physics “πᾶσα μεταβολή ἐστιν ἐκ τινος εἴς τι” (Phys., I, 225 a 1). What is though the true meaning of this “something” out of which we change, i.e. how can a being attain its potential?

488 SZ, pp. 298-9.
489 Phys., III, 201 a 9-11.
490 GAP, pp. 295, 299-300.
491 Cf. Heidegger’s illustrative example of the tree and the fox where ἀλλοίωσις – as change, alteration – is contrasted with the “rest of non-alteration” (Ruhe der Unveränderung) and therefore a type of movedness, WBP, p. 249.
492 Cf. the same sense in Phys., IV, 234b 11, 252a 10.
Heidegger observes that the essence of \( \text{μεταβολή} \) is only attained after observing that in every change there is something absent that comes to presence and that every instance of movedness is an \( \text{ἐντελέχεια} \) of the thing moved (\( \text{κινούμενον} \)) such that in the generation of something to something there is already movement, \( \text{κύνησις} \) that comes into appearance with the changing thing.\(^{493}\)

Heidegger is here suggesting, I believe, that every being to which potentiality or possibility belongs is already in motion – for to be in motion is to relate to something absent – presupposes a presence. On the other hand the sentence “When resoluteness is transparent to itself, it understands that the \text{indefiniteness} of one’s potentiality-for-being is made definite only in a resolution as regards the current situation.”\(^{494}\) This seems to equate “potentiality-for-being” with “current situation”, condensing Aristotle’s particle \( \dot{\text{ἡμ}} \) of \( \text{ἐντελέχεια} \), of a being not in relation to its outward phenomenal appearance but in relation to the \( \text{τέλος} \) of the being that is, in relation to its own understanding of what is in full presence: the \( \dot{\text{ἡμ}}-\text{τέλος}-\text{ἔχειν} \), coming to a limit, reaching a point of completion – \( \text{ἐντελέχεια} \): full presence.

The point in bringing these passages to light and contrasting them with the specific steps from \textit{Entschlossenheit} and being-towards-death is to show that insofar as \textit{Dasein} is movable (\( \text{κινητός} \)) it is also the moved (\( \text{κινούμενον} \)) whose outward look (\( \text{ἐδοξός} \)) is always determined by a \( \text{πρός τί} \), that is, a relationship to something. This is the question that articulates Heidegger’s notion of resoluteness as the operator of \textit{Eigentlichkeit}. In other words, while on one hand, Aristotle inquires into the coming of a being to the present as full, complete presence (\( \text{ἐντελέχεια} \)) which is presupposed by \( \text{κύνησις} \) and \( \text{μεταβολή} \), Heidegger, on the other hand, retrieves this idea in \textit{Being and Time} in order to inquire about the point when the exact course of action presents itself and one decides what to do \textit{out of the situation as it is settled}. If we are to understand how the idea that death as a possibility \textit{actually} affects in fact the moved \textit{Dasein} (\( \text{κινούμενον} \)) we should realize that death as an end lets \textit{Dasein} be present but precisely in its \textit{being towards something}; it does not essentially determine \textit{Dasein} as such, for the possibility of death itself is in turn dependent upon its relation to the presence of \textit{Dasein}: death

\(^{493}\) \textit{WBP.} pp. 249, 285.

\(^{494}\) \textit{SZ}, p. 308.
comes forward only insofar as it lets the \( \kappa i\nu\omega\mu\epsilon\nu\omega \) become present in its already being present.

The equation of being-towards-death as determinant of my resoluteness and what I am looses its weight when I discern that the situation is settled and there is no longer any question of how to act or what that means: “in such \( \nu o\epsilon i\nu \) it is a matter of a pure making present of the thing itself, so that it speaks purely out of itself, and there is no longer any need of an address or making manifest on our part.”\(^{495}\) We cannot therefore determine \textit{Entschlossenheit} from \textit{Sein-zum-Tode}. By positing \textit{Entschlossenheit} with \textit{Sein-zum-Tode} we incur the risk of equating the origin of change in death, namely accounting for the possibility of \( \kappa i\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma \) by positing death as a mover. To know movement in human beings is to know how beings come to presence for it is only on the basis of the latter that the former is accessible, thus including death, \textit{as a distinct possibility}. Hence, I suggest that death is certainly related to something towards which beings are moving (\( \pi\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\iota \)) but it is also a mode of incomplete presence insofar as beings are already moving toward their own \( \tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma \) themselves and the others (\( \pi\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\iota\ \kappa\omicron\iota\ \tau\nu\omicron\varsigma \)).\(^{496}\)

In this section I have shown the source of the dominant identification of authenticity with \textit{vorlaufende Entschlossenheit}, interpreted as a way of being-towards-death, and have appealed to the problems and contradictions this interpretation forces upon us. An understanding of the roles of \textit{vorlaufende} (advancing) and \textit{Entschlossenheit} in connection to Aristotle’s principles of motion and the constitution of authenticity was suggested in order to help us avoid reducing authenticity to being-towards-death. \textit{Vorlaufen} is a structure of all authentic choice, for resoluteness is a projection into the future (advancing) of self-chosen possibilities. On page 262 of \textit{Being and Time} Heidegger notes that a human being is always future oriented (\textit{sich vorweg}) and is always moving forward to its eventual death. Therefore, an authentic way of comporting oneself towards the future would be to be aware of one’s advancing-towards-death and to resolutely take over being-towards-death as an authentic possibility. Moreover, since all authentic choice takes place under the shadow of death and resolves upon finite possibilities, \textit{Vorlaufen} is a structure of every human being’s authentically resolute

\(^{495}\) \textit{PS}, p. 161.
\(^{496}\) \textit{GAP}, (Handschrift), p. 388.
choice. Resoluteness, on the other hand, is a resolving of the situation, a constituting of one’s self-being through engaging in an informed activity of self-transformation. This includes a taking over of one’s thrownness and past (this activity will be analyzed in the next chapter) and a constituting of one’s present situation through one’s future projections. Thus vorlaufende Entschlossenheit contains the structure of “advancing” and “resoluteness”, and far from being merely future oriented, advancing-towards-death contains the three temporal dimensions of the human being and interconnects the structures of advancing-towards-death and projecting one’s self-chosen resolve into the future (thrownness, guilt, past).

f) Vorlaufende Entschlossenheit, φρόνησις and Gewissen.

I now wish to contrast briefly the suggested interpretation of advancing resoluteness (as so far developed) with the widespread interpretation that takes advancing resoluteness as a way of being-towards-death that constitutes authenticity. In order to do this I propose to advance my interpretation of advancing resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) by evoking some steps of Aristotle’s φρόνησις (Nicomachean Ethics I, III, and VI, 2, 1139b 7-11) in order to see the ways in which Heidegger works out and assimilates Aristotle’s findings in the concept of Gewissen (conscience) (paragraphs 54-60). I will also quote

497 Demske, after seemingly equating vorlaufende Entschlossenheit solely as a way of being-towards-death that constitutes authenticity (cf. HCA, p. 168), surprisingly makes much the same point of Heidegger, that advancing resoluteness has a “triadic structure”, p. 165. But in opposition to Demske, I would like to argue that advancing resoluteness is not equivalent to authenticity for although it is a fundamental notion it does not subsume or exhaust the concept of authenticity. Demske’s mistake, which every interpreter of authenticity I have ever encountered has made (exception made to Michael Zimmerman), is that he fails to see the necessary and fundamental role of authentic historicity in the constitution of authenticity. Thus Demske and the “standard” interpretation stop with the structure of advancing resoluteness, believing they have found the concept of authenticity. On this basis they draw the conclusion that authenticity is a dead ethic or that death is human being’s only authentic possibility besides creating the impression that, eventually, Heidegger’s philosophy is perhaps slightly self-regarding. I again would like to argue that the way out of isolating authenticity in the empty cul de sac of being-towards-death is to show the role of authentic historicity in the constitution of authenticity and the relationship between the teleological structures of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit and authentic historicity in the constitution of authenticity. This task will be dealt with in the next chapter.
below the passage in which Heidegger defends his concept of advancing resoluteness against ‘the grossest perversions’ (SZ 310). I would like to comment on this passage in detail to show further inaccuracies in interpreting advancing resoluteness solely as a way of being-towards-death, and to assert that doing so commits one to restrictive and dubious positions that are called into question by other sections of *Being and Time*, and the interpretation developed here.

Heidegger writes:

“Advancing resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the ‘overcoming’ of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which gives death the possibility of assuming power over Dasein’s existence, and of basically dispersing all fugitive self-concealments. Nor does wanting-to-have a conscience determined as being-towards-death signify a kind of seclusion in which one flees the world; rather, it brings one without illusions into the resoluteness of ‘taking action’. Neither does advancing resoluteness stem from ‘idealistic’ exactions soaring above existence and its possibilities; it springs from a sober understanding of what are factically the basic possibilities for Dasein. Along with the sober anxiety which brings us before our individualized potentiality-for-being, there goes an unshakeable joy in this possibility. In it Dasein becomes free from the entertaining ‘incidentals’ with which busy curiosity keeps providing for itself.”

The ‘this-worldliness’ of Heidegger’s notion of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit is stressed in his claim that “advancing resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the ‘overcoming’ of death.” Rather, advancing resoluteness “gives death the possibility of assuming power over Dasein’s existence, and of basically dispersing all fugitive self-concealments.” An ambiguity and two conflicting possibilities of interpretation arise from this phrase. For one could argue that advancing resoluteness gives death and death alone the power over one’s existence so that advancing resoluteness is seen as a teleologically death-centered condition such that an authentic modification of das Man would only consist in one’s relation to death. In this case “dispersive fugitive self-concealments” would signify breaking through one’s evasion of death and resolutely confronting it – and in this way individuating one’s self from das Man. On the other hand, though, one could argue that advancing resoluteness rather gives one the power to be in the face of death. If this power to be is for the sake of one’s authentic existence then one receives a boon that increases one’s power of being. Then the phrase that

498 SZ, p. 310.
advancing resoluteness “disperses all fugitive self-concealments” could indicate that being-towards-death helps effect a transparency of one’s ἀληθεύω, a breaking through, making transparent and thwarting the concealments, illusions, and evasions (false consciousness) with which das Man tempts Dasein to tranquilize itself in its protecting shelter, and thus alienates one from one’s ownmost potentiality-for-being-a-self. In this case being-towards-death would be one of the means of reaching authenticity, or one of the conditions of the possibility of authenticity.

Even if one of the ways of “wanting to have a conscience” (resoluteness) resolves on authenticity as advancing-towards-death, this does not mean they are equivalent. Rather, there is a reciprocal connection between the various determinations of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit. Indeed, if one takes the phenomena of resoluteness and being-towards-death as equivalent, how can we make sense of the statement that advancing resoluteness is not a “kind of seclusion in which one flees the world? Rather it brings one, without illusions, into the resoluteness of taking action.” Do we not find a clear elucidation of the resoluteness of taking action in Being and Time, paragraph 60, which emphasizes choosing factual possibilities and projects in the situation? Perhaps Heidegger is implying that the authentic resolve-towards-death brings one resolutely back into the situation so that one can take action without illusions. What does Heidegger mean by “action without illusions”?

I suggest that Heidegger – when he states explicitly ‘taking action without illusions’ – is implicitly thinking through φρόνιμος (the wise one) and φρόνησις in order to translate this concept into Gewissen in the sense that one must have the practical wisdom in order to know and “want to have a conscience”.

Let us take a closer look at this connection by appealing to Aristotle’s account of φρόνησις in some specific steps of the Nicomachean Ethics so that I can show how Heidegger works out some of these passages in GA 19 and finally takes up the term to Being and Time as Gewissen.499 I will complement this reading by taking up a position regarding Joachim’s exegesis of the term in his commentary to the Nicomachean Ethics.

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499 Cf., pp. 66-69.
In the classic commentary of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, Joachim argues that “The ἑρωικός is the man whose action is intelligent, controlled by reasoning, i.e. true deliberation. His ἑρωικὴ is ἔξους διοίκητι – an established power of reasoning or deliberating – which expresses itself in syllogisms whose conclusions are προοιμεῖσις (purposes), or (Aristotle says this is the same thing) actions.” Joachim is here appealing to Aristotle’s relation of σοφία ‘wisdom’ to ἑρωικὴ as intrinsically valuable forms of human excellence (or virtue in his translation of ἀρετή) but he says that “ἑρωικὴ implies moral virtue and complete moral virtue implies ἑρωικὴ.”

Joachim translates ἡττικὴ ἀρετή (NE, 1144 b 30-32 and 1178 a 16-19) as ‘moral virtue’ and ἑρωικὴ as correctness of reasoning, rightness of deliberation, isolating Aristotle’s findings in 1144a 20-2, 1145 a 2-6 and 1178a 16-19 and warning that there is no real separation of the two elements in good character itself. The point Joachim is driving at is to show that, although ἑρωικὴ calculates the means to the ends, it does not determine those ends themselves, for the right end is more than ἡττικὴ ἀρετή (moral virtue) or more accurately a “disposition toward excellence”. Rather, Joachim concedes that “this must be treated as a lapse on Aristotle’s part from the truer conception of the function of thought in conduct.”

I believe Joachim is right when he says that ἑρωικὴ cannot determine the ends themselves for the right end is more than a ‘disposition towards excellence’ but I do not think that this is a lapse on Aristotle’s part for it can only be considered as such if we accept, like Joachim, that ἑρωικὴ is “correctness of reasoning” and ἡττικὴ ἀρετὴ is ‘moral virtue’ – that is, if we take ἑρωικὴ to be speaking about correctness in relation to disclosedness involving an uncovering of a specific being, and admits to truth and falsity. This is a problematic point, for disclosedness, the openness of truth (ἔξους ἀληθεύειν) involves its own counterpart, a concealment (that Heidegger calls, as noted, *Vorschlossheit*). The only way to make sense of the ἑρωικὴ limitation, as Joachim rightly points out, is not taking it as he does, as correctedness, adequation, calculation, that contrasts it a right or wrong ‘moral’

end, as a mark of truth or falsity. Rather on the contrary, it is to find a phenomenological legitimate connection that clarifies the unstable equation of \( \text{φρόνησις} \) as practical wisdom with its corresponding \( \text{εξίς αληθεύειν} \), that is, \( \text{τό πρακτικόν όγαθόν} \) (the good in activity) that lends credence to Heidegger’s proposal that \( \text{φρόνησις} \) is \( \text{Gewissen} \), as we will now see.

Let us take a closer look at the term \( \text{πρακτική} \), and the importance Heidegger attaches to it so that we realize the implications of \( \text{εξίς αληθεύειν} \) and provide a clear picture for the desired elucidation of \( \text{φρόνησις} \) as \( \text{Gewissen} \) in \( \text{Being and Time} \).

According to Heidegger in his \textit{Platon: Sophistes Marburg course} (GA 19), the term \( \text{πρακτική} \) does not have in Aristotle the sense we commonly give it – practical as opposed to theoretical, that implies no major reflection – but rather, means that it pertains to activity or action concerning matters and affairs that undergo change \( \text{(τα πράγματα)} \). Following from this we see that a human being can become transparent to himself in hand. As Aristotle seems to suggest in the end of chapter V book 6 of \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, “\( \text{εξίς αληθής μετὰ λόγον πρακτική πέρα τά ἀνθρώποι ἀγαθά καὶ κακά} \)” admitting therefore that this definition is not exhausted in its essence but it is something more than an openness or disposition \( (\text{εξίς}) \).\(^{503}\)

Heidegger explains that Aristotle distinguishes between \( \text{ἐπιστήμη} \) and \( \text{φρόνησις} \) and says that we can forget what we know, what we have learnt, i.e. it can fall back into concealment \( (\text{λήθη b28}) \), but such forgetting is not possible for \( \text{φρόνησις} \). With our “practical wisdom” we are always confronted with new, singular situations that have to be considered \textit{ab ovo}. Practical life is concerned with “that which can accept otherness [literally, something that can be otherwise]” \( (\text{τό ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχει}) \) [and] is directed at that which is always the way it is.\(^{504}\)

Heidegger comments on this passage from \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} (b29) as follows:

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\(^{503}\) \textit{PS}, p. 50.

\(^{504}\) \textit{PS}, p. 55. \( (\text{NE}, 1140 \text{ b27}) \).
“Φρόνησις (practical wisdom) is nothing other than conscience/conscientiousness set into motion which makes an action transparent. Conscience/conscientiousness cannot forget [let slip into concealment]. However, that which conscientiousness uncovers can be allowed to become distorted and be made ineffective by moods and passions. Conscience makes itself felt insistently.”

Here the connection with the play and strife of closing/disclosing or covering/uncovering (ἀληθέυειν) is plain once again. Φρόνησις understood as conscience is a ‘happening’ in Dasein which does not allow the transparency of our actions to somehow ‘slip’ into concealment. Rather, what reveals itself to conscience is allowed to become distorted. We find an excuse by allowing the matter at hand to appear in a different light. We can't be bothered and set up a smoke screen of diffuseness. Conscientiousness would then seem to be characterized by being clear and transparent regarding what we are about in the πράγματα (matters) of daily life, whereas all sorts of muddiness, prevaricating and unclarity, creep in and disguise us in our own actions thus making us unconscientious. Thus non-conscientious people often excuse themselves with “Oh, I forgot”, whereas they mean “I disregarded the matter long enough so that it disappeared.”

Heidegger must have arrived at the conclusion that if it is more than an ἔξις it must be a characteristic of the soul or discernment itself (νοῦς), and the way he explains it in terms of Dasein is to give an ontological interpretation of consciousness that enables Dasein to attain the realization of its authentic existence. Thus the only way to make sense of this situation would seem to be the openness to the calling of what Dasein needs to do in a situation or with its life: Entschlossenheit. Heidegger, as we have seen, refers to such a calling as the “voice” of conscience” emerging from the muddle of existence and brings a (sense of) direction into existence. I have argued that this sense may be authenticity or inauthenticity, which means whatever ἀληθέυειν Dasein is both cast and casting, its uncoveredeness is essentially limited in scope, i.e. it is never the (absolute)

505 PS, p. 56.
506 Cf., Joachim, H. H. and Rees, D. A., Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics: A Commentary, p. 168, it is said that “In Book VI Aristotle brings out the nature of this thinking: the identity of end which characterizes it, and also the different forms which it assumes in realizing that end in the various spheres of man’s activity. The Φρόνημος, the artist, and the philosopher, qua exhibiting intellectual virtue, all think truly, attain truth: truth is the function and end of the thinking soul.”

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‘master of its own destiny’, nor is it merely divine.\textsuperscript{507} We come to the realization that Heidegger has $φρόνησις$ in view when he speaks of ‘taking action’ and assumes it as $Gewissen$ aiming at what we could call a $εύπραξία$ (well living) in \textit{Being and Time}.\textsuperscript{508}

This elucidation has brought us again, on one hand to the centrality of the theme of $άληθεύειν$ in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, and on the other, to a substantial conclusion to the problems and contradictions of equating authenticity with being-towards-death and lastly to the importance of the mode of $άληθεύειν$ $φρόνησις$ as the mode of disclosing a situation of authentic solicitude.

My main concern in this section was to retrieve from the text the grounds upon which Heidegger supports his account of authenticity, specifically when he speaks of resoluteness and authenticity by showing the difficulties and contradictions of an interpretation of authenticity which reduce the temporal determinations of \textit{Dasein} as a projecting being-towards-death. I have been exhibiting the \textit{aletheic} dimension of $φρόνησις$ as a moment of uncovering (unmasking) a situation in any proper (authentic) caring-for. The “un-” indicates a negative, painful movement. Initially and for the most part, human being is hidden to himself. The other is his friend when he unMASKs his self-obfuscation. The mode of $φρόνησις$ is seen to call into question the possibility of caring-for in the notion of care. This would imply that genuinely caring for the other involves the \textit{aletheic} strife between closure and disclosure, but what does $φρόνησις$ disclose?

Heidegger states that:

\textsuperscript{507} Here, Heidegger certainly faces a problem which he does not solve in \textit{SZ}. For if in falling, one discloses its inauthenticity, it seems that one has to pose an independent correlate, to which to be disclosing ($άληθεύειν$) would relate in a more or less correct way, but it was precisely such a pre-phenomenological notion of truth that Heidegger wanted to escape. However, if falling is interpreted as the inner finitude of $άληθεύειν$ (to be disclosing, making-true), there is no need for such correlate. For this problem see also, Tugendhat, E., \textit{Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger}, pp. 295-298, 328-330, 356-362.

\textsuperscript{508} Michael Zimmerman in his \textit{Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity}, points out Heidegger’s ‘eureka’, p. 175: “Once, several of Heidegger’s students were trying vainly to interpret the following passage from Aristotle’s \textit{Ethics}: ‘a state of that sort [a reasoned state] may be forgotten but practical wisdom cannot.’ Finally Heidegger exclaimed: ‘That is conscience!’”. Cf. also, \textit{NE}, 1140b 29-30.

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“Neither does the advancing resoluteness stem from ‘idealistic’ exactions soaring above existence and its possibilities; it springs forth from a sober understanding of what are factically the basic possibilities for Dasein.”

The αληθεύειν at stake is φρόνησις/Gewissen and concerns the “the basic possibilities” of Dasein. Are these strictly restricted to the choice of finitude, that is, are these an apodictic truth of the human condition? Or do these include a broader sphere of the choice of possibilities for doing and being? Two conditions seem to be implied here. Firstly, authenticity is not a self-regarding, visionary ideal of the human existence demanding adherence to illusory exactions which demand that Dasein transcend its finite humanity. Secondly, it is clear that authentic Dasein is free from illusions in the sense that it does not cling to the myth of immortality in its existence, for Dasein is finite. Dasein may only long for immortality but itself is finite. Still, it is also the case that in Heidegger’s account of authenticity, resolute Dasein does not strive for “perfection” or “fulfilment” in the sense of an ascetic labour nor does it believe in the tranquilizing reassurances of das Man that “one must live as one does”, or conform or do what “people” or the “government” say. Rather it has a “sober understanding” of its situation: its finitude, thrownness, fallenness, guilt, alienation, evasiveness. Heidegger emphasizes as well that understanding that average everydayness is irresolute and inauthentic leads one to resolve to modify its inauthentic way of being-in-the-world. Authentic Dasein thus understands that its “basic possibilities” are inauthenticity and authenticity, and that its life’s tasks are to resolutely withdraw itself from its fascinated absorption in das Man. The term “sober understanding” appears to be a reminder that the shift to authenticity is not something that is meant to avoid and reject das Man as if das Man was the cause of inauthenticity. Rather, Heidegger is taking us back to the point where in das Man Dasein is not primarily related to the world as a knower to the known but with a relationship of concern and solicitude. We have already found traces of this relationship when appealing to the equipmental context and to the referential teleological structures at play in the modes of everydayness. However, I have not yet focused properly on the role of others in this relationship of Dasein to the world. I would like to emphasize the point that when Heidegger speaks of choosing to engage oneself in the world so as to create one’s unique self-

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509 SZ, p. 310.
being in the face of the overbearing pressures of the social world, and in spite of
the anxiety and uncanniness that are part of one’s being-in-the-world, he speaks of
‘freeing others’ and he does not mean that the ‘I’ stands in opposition to the
‘others’:

“By ‘others’ we do not mean everyone else but me – those [others] over against which
the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not
distinguish oneself – those among whom one also is. This being-here-too (Auch-da-sein)
with them does not have the ontological character of a being-present-at-hand-along-‘with’
them within the world. This ‘with’ is something of the character of Dasein; (…) By reason
of this with-like (mithaften) being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share
with others. The world of Dasein is a with-world (Mitwelt). Being-in is being-with
(Mitsein) others. Their being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with
(Mitdasein).”

Dasein is essentially being-with, which does not depend upon the factual
presence of other Dasein’s. Even in being alone, Dasein is being-with. “The other
can be missing, only in and for a being-with.” At the heart of the shift from
inauthenticity to authenticity is human being’s capacity to understand what kind of
solicitude is at stake in everyday life by facing the possibility of a solicitude that,
instead of jumping in for the other, rendering the other dependent and subordinate
(even though this fact may remain implicit and outside one’s awareness), rather
jumps ahead. As Heidegger argued earlier in paragraph 26, “anticipating the other
in his existenziell potentiality-to-be (Seinkönnen), not in order to relieve him of all
‘care’, but really to give it back to him as such, as his own ‘care’, for the first
time.” This is the authentic solicitude which enables the other “to become
transparent to himself in his care, and to become free for it.” These manifestations
of the disclosing of one’s solicitude, the one interfering and dominating and the
other anticipating and liberating, are the two extreme possibilities between which
our everyday being-with-others oscillates. It is the second possibility I am
analyzing now in order to make sense of how vorlaufende Entschlossenheit
discloses Dasein’s authenticity and how this does not come without difficulty.
Here, ‘transparency’ and ‘freedom’ are brought into an essential relationship with

510 SZ, pp. 154-5.
511 SZ, p. 157.
512 SZ, paragraph 26.
each other. Relating these two terms back to Heidegger’s interpretation of ἀγάπη, it means that _eigentliche Fürsorge_ (properly caring for) has to do with being attuned to the moods of the other in such a way that the other’s moods, which befuddle their self-transparency, their own place in the world, are enlightened in such a way and to such an extent that the direction of their own existence becomes clearer. If one thinks, for example, of depression as a prevalent illness of our times that cripples our existence, a cure for it must be thought of in terms of lighting the fog that conceals the clearing in such a way that the path on which to proceed becomes visible.

The theme of freedom recurs slightly earlier in the text, which concerns not the distinction between caring-for proper and improper, but that between being-together-with-one-another in a proper or improper sense.

“The being together with one another of those who are employed to do the same thing often feeds only on distrust. Conversely, committing oneself in common to the same cause is determined by each person having taken hold of his own individual existence. Only such a bondedness in the proper sense can enable a genuine devotion to the matter at hand which releases the other into his own freedom for himself.”

A genuine bond is enabled only by each _Dasein_ having discovered (uncovered) the sense (of direction) of its very own individual path and having grasped the possibility of proceeding down that path. Individuality (indivisibility) is the basis of sharing existence with another. The transparency about _Dasein_’s very sense of direction is to be taken in the first place as an ontic matter. An uncovering of the ontological dimension of beings as such is another matter (for thinking). An uncovering of the ontological dimension amounts to showing that existence (_Dasein_) is always-already shared, no matter whether we have something to do with each other or not. The opennessness is already shared merely by being _Dasein_.

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513 SZ, p. 122.
514 If a thinker such as Heidegger is a _Fürsprecher_, he is also a _Fürsorgender_ whose leaping ahead paves the way for Mankind to awake to _Dasein_. This paving the way is the opening of historical possibilities through a shift in the way we understand ourselves- we will explore this thread in the coming chapter. The prefix “für-”, which is related to the prefix “vor-”, allows another German word to come into play here: “Vorhut”, the scouting party, or, literally, the _avant-garde_. The _avant-garde_ has the task of opening up the territory ahead by gaining cognisance of it (reconnaitre). “Opening up” in German is “erschließen”, i.e. an ‘aletheic’ happening. And, further, if authenticity means becoming clear about who I am, then the student, the master, the professor, may be someone who paves the way to this self-transparency. In line with Heidegger’s proposed interpretation of ἀγάπη, this self-transparency means gaining clarity about one’s own actions.
To interpret this passage so as to unambiguously retrieve a death projecting authenticity, one would have to limit what are factically the basic possibilities of *Dasein* to death, thus making each *Dasein*’s death its only “basic possibility”. Yet, Heidegger does not show explicitly nor does he seem to imply anywhere in the text that he takes this restrictive position.\(^5\) Hence, for now, the question of *Dasein*’s basic possibilities is an open one which cannot be restricted to death for lack of textual evidence that this was Heidegger’s intention.

Finally, we read that:

“Along with the sober anxiety which brings us before our individualized potentiality-for-being, there goes an unshakeable joy in this possibility. In it *Dasein* becomes free from the entertaining ‘incidental’ with which busy curiosity keeps providing itself.”\(^5\)

But how does “sober anxiety” in the face of individualization bring one “unshakeable joy”? Do we feel unshakeable joy in resolute being-towards-death, or in the achievement of liberating oneself from *das Man*? If one equates one’s “individualized potentiality-for-being” with the individuated self in being-towards-death, then the unshakeable joy results from one’s confrontation with one’s own death. Is Heidegger here translating as “joy” the New Testament’s concept which signifies the accompanying mood of the celebration of salvation in Christ’s triumph over death? In Bultmann’s words, “in ‘joy’, care and anxiety are indeed ‘overcome’ (aufgehoben), i.e. annulled and preserved.”\(^5\) Heidegger, however, has clearly stated above that *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* is “not a way of overcoming death”, therefore it is unlikely that the unshakeable joy refers to the Christian joy in the sense of hope and promise of salvation (overcoming death) and eternal life. This would suggest that the unshakeable joy would be ecstasy over one’s individuation, over one’s liberation from *das Man*, and one’s choice of authenticity. On the other hand, I can see how this is not incompatible with the Προάξις of Christian virtues on earth. Rather the point is that Heidegger is offering

\(^5\) In the next chapter I will argue that an interpretation holding that death is our only basic or “authentic” possibility is denied in Heidegger’s sections on historicity.

\(^5\) SZ, p. 310.

a phenomenological analysis of Dasein in the world whether we regard this joy as a spiritual elevation or peak of experience that one enjoys in the world when embarking on a new project, or when one has released himself from a constricting bond. It could be something as simple as setting off on a long journey home. It could be finding love, embracing a vocation, being accepted for postgraduate studies or a new position; or something as profound as having undergone a conversion to, say, Catholicism, or standing on the threshold of a new way of life. Joy over one’s individualized being would therefore not seem to be joy in advancing over death or finding a religious vocation but rather joy over liberation and the possibility of leading an authentic existence in whichever form it may take for every Dasein.

The issue of liberation leads us to the final point where I ask what it means to say that individuation “frees us from the entertaining ‘incidentals’ which busy curiosity provides for itself.” Could we interpret this sentence as holding that vorlaufende Entschlossenheit would lead Dasein to withdraw from the concerns of everydayness? Here again I face the problem raised earlier in several contexts that authentic Dasein does not “die to the world”, but rather modifies the understanding of its involvements in the world. Furthermore, there would be a possible lack of tact in this claim, for does not the confrontation with death often cause one to plunge into a whirl of worldly activity and immersion in distracting ‘episodes’… to flee and forget? Nevertheless, I must ask how one’s authentic being-towards-death can free one from the entertaining distractions of everydayness. What is the problem of everydayness? Does our involvement in everydayness have to be wrong? If it is a matter of priorities, depending on the priorities of each person, then one could argue that modern life has reversed authentic priorities, forgotten ultimate concerns, not least how to undertake a genuine questioning of life and world, since today mankind is immersed in tasks and events of the public world. Even if this reversal is both necessary and beneficial, though, why should one scorn worldly involvement? Furthermore, the many passages cited stressing a deep involvement in one’s world indicate that Heidegger is not supporting a withdrawal from das Man and everydayness. The point is that the concealments, as it were, the opacity of beings from which one is freed are not worldly being as such but are indicated by the specific involvement of Dasein in everydayness. As we have seen,
the thrownness of Dasein is disclosed as thrownness into a world of beings (i.e. equipment, natural beings, etc…) revealing its inseparable relationship with them. In other words, it discloses Dasein’s “to-be-in-the-world”, by which Dasein shows itself not only as “that-it-is” (thrownness), but also as “that-which-it-has-to-be” (thrown existence). In everydayness the world stares at Dasein. My proposal throughout the concept of Eigentlichkeit and the question of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit is that these ontological notions are meant to crown the findings of the teleological structure of Dasein that Heidegger found in his Aristotle courses back at Marburg and developed under the notion of Uneigentlichkeit. Evidence for this is, as we have seen, contained in Heidegger’s research into ἀληθεύειν that led him to the previous re-readings of notions of Aristotle’s teleology back at Marburg, which we now find to be unthetically underlying the account of the modes of everydayness, inauthenticity and authenticity. The question that motivated this account is, as noted, the potentiality-for-being-a-whole that Heidegger found under the auspices of ἀληθεύειν which he retrieved from the Nicomachean Ethics (GA 19). In resoluteness is revealed the primordial truth of existence. Corresponding to the truth, there is always a “holding-as-true” (Für-wahr-walten). Insofar as that which is disclosed is appropriated or held-as-true, it becomes the task of ἀληθεύειν to uncover “the primordial truth of existence [which] demands an equiprimordial being-certain, in which one maintains oneself in what resoluteness discloses.”

I wish to highlight a point that I take to be a major problem in the research into ἀληθεύειν of authenticity: the connection between resoluteness and being-towards-death precisely in order to draw out some untenable consequences which I believe is implied by the standard interpretation of authenticity as a way of being-towards-death. I have attempted to work out the passages in the text that elicit a strong presence of Aristotle’s notions. I hope to have shown that one cannot establish the equivalence between authentic being-towards-death and authenticity from the notion of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit in Being and Time without distorting Heidegger’s text and the grounds of Aristotle contained therein. So far I have only established that vorlaufende Entschlossenheit is but a means to authenticity, one of the conditions of its possibility, and is not itself alone identical

518 SZ, p. 307.
with an authentic existence. Now I will argue that Heidegger takes this position in his analysis in the crucial section on authentic historicity and will develop this next.
I have dwelt on the central Heideggerian themes in the concept of *Eigentlichkeit* and explored its genesis from the phenomenological possibilities of Aristotle’s thought, namely from the modes of ἀληθεύουν that articulates *Dasein*’s authentic being-in-the-world.

In order to motivate the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity Heidegger has pointed out the necessity of exploring the most far reaching possibility of ἀληθεύουν, which is authenticity, in which life becomes truly itself or *Eigen*. We have already seen how Heidegger, in trying to let Aristotle’s ἀληθεύουν explicate itself, has touched upon the limits of Aristotle’s project on several occasions, for example when he equated φρόνησις with *Gewissen*.

In this final chapter ἀληθεύουν will be interrogated with respect to its own most original or far-reaching possibility, where its limits should supposedly be visible. It is precisely in this connection that Heidegger’s philosophical pursuit of Aristotle’s ἀληθεύουν in *Being and Time* may be properly established and becomes clear as a philosophical theme in its own right. In the chapter on Historicity Heidegger offers a thematic description of the notion that has been driving his *Daseinsanalytik*: retrieval, going back, appropriating authentic possibilities, making-true, disclosing: ἀληθεύουν.

I would contend that Heidegger’s analysis of authentic historicity yields an authenticity of self-transformation, and hope to show conclusively that Heidegger does not identify authenticity with authentic being-towards-death. I suggest that the movement toward authenticity originates from the withdrawal of the individuated person from *das Man* and inauthenticity to resolute struggle for authenticity in the historical world. I will argue that the phenomenon of authentic historicity explicated the whole, complex structure of authenticity and comprehends the interconnection of all its fundamental determinants. In this context I hope to
supplement and review some of the previous interpretations of authenticity by explicating the importance of authentic historicity for the analysis of authenticity.

In order to do this, I will firstly point out the centrality and importance of the analysis of historicity for Heidegger’s existential ontology and hermeneutic of authenticity. I will offer an examination of Dasein’s determinations of authentic historicity, such as a) authentic historicizing and b) Repetition and authentic temporality.

I will conclude this section with a proposal delineating the structure of an authentic existence and summarizing the interpretation of ἀληθευέω and authenticity worked out in this study.

I will then examine Heidegger’s concept of the authentic self, suggesting that Selbständigkeit and individuality are criteria of authentic selfhood.

In order to do this, I will first see a) how Heidegger’s analyses of ‘Historicity and Selfhood’ account for traditional views of selfhood, and provide the explication of the structure of the authentic self. I will also provide, b) an interpretation of the autonomy, self-determination, self-knowledge, and self-reliance of the authentic self.

a) Historicity and Authenticity

On page 313 of Being and Time Heidegger asks: “Has being-in-the-world a higher court of authority for its potentiality-for-being than its own death?”

Previous interpreters seem to have concluded unambiguously that death is the “highest court of authority” for authenticity, and that authenticity is equivalent to an advancing resoluteness towards death. Löwith expresses this point of view revealingly. He quotes the above stated question, and answers:

“In this rhetorical question that receives in Being and Time an unquestionably positive answer, the decisive ‘presupposition’ of the ontological interpretation (of human Dasein) reaches explicitly and openly its summit (...) This explicit establishing of death as the highest court of authority of Dasein reveals itself as the final consequences of the initial starting point of the interpretation of Dasein as ‘in every case mine.’”

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519 SZ, p. 313.
520 Löwith, K., “Phänomenologische Ontologie und protestantische Theologie”, p. 60.
Counteracting this interpretation I would like to argue that the analysis of authentic historicity, authentic resolve, and the authentic self give us an understanding of authenticity that goes far beyond a way of being-towards-death, and would show that death is not the ‘highest court of authority’ for Dasein. I will further argue that Being and Time and the analysis of authenticity do not reach their “summit” until the chapter on ‘Temporality and Historicity.’ In this chapter, Heidegger provides the most original foundation of his Daseinsanalytik, for he argues that by the term ‘everydayness’ we mean no other than temporality, while the “temporalization structure of temporality reveals itself as the historicity of Dasein.” After showing the interconnection between temporality and everydayness in Division Two, Chapter IV, Heidegger confesses that this “bewildering phenomenon” (verwirrenden phänomen) reveals the “inadequacy” of the foregoing Dasein analysis. For this analysis has been “static”, focusing on Dasein “immobilized in certain situations” (i.e. being-towards-death) and has overlooked its “stretching through life.” The grounds of the previous analyses are put into question on pages 371-2 in Heidegger’s quest for an analysis of historicity in which “this being has been interpreted in a way which is sufficiently primordial.” The last 3 paragraphs of Being and Time, especially paragraph 71, contain indications that the analytic of Dasein is incomplete as it stands and requires an analysis of historicity to provide an “adequate” and “sufficiently primordial” interpretation of human being. In this regard, the importance of the chapter on historicity for the interpretation of Eigentlichkeit can hardly be exaggerated.

521 In order to avoid confusion with the English translation of SZ, I might note that I am translating Geschichtlichkeit as historicity, rather than adopting Macquarrie and Robinson’s neologism “historicality”, which in this case does not seem to be the most effective translation since Geschichtlichkeit is not a special coining of Heidegger’s but rather is an important philosophical term (employed i.e. by Hegel, Dilthey…) for which Heidegger is now offering his own analysis.
522 SZ, p. 371.
523 SZ, p. 371.
524 SZ, p. 371.
525 SZ, pp. 371-2.
526 Heidegger had been prepared for its philosophical appropriation by his encounter with the dimension of the historical through an intensive study of early Christianity and the religious thought of Augustine. It is not a coincidence that Heidegger’s analyses on the Phenomenology of Religion while he was a Privatdozent at Freiburg University were delivered after the GAP, WS 1920/21
For in this chapter, Heidegger gives his final and “most primordial” conceptualization of human being, authenticity, the authentic self and Dasein’s totality. In order to bring back the totality of Dasein in the world as authenticity regarding its being-a-totality retrieved through ἀληθεύειν Heidegger asks:

“Although up to now we have seen no possibility of a more radical approach to the existential analytic, yet, if we have regard for the preceding discussion of the ontological meaning of everydayness, a difficult consideration comes to light. Have we in fact brought the totality of Dasein, as regards its authentically being-a-totality, into the fore-having of our existential analysis? It may be that a formulation of the question as related to Dasein’s totality possesses a genuinely unequivocal character ontologically. It may be that as regards being-toward-the-end the question itself may even have found its answer.”

I would now like to propose that the concept of authenticity receives its completion and fully articulated structure in the section on historicity.

b) Authentic Historicizing and the philosophical scope of ἀληθεύειν

Heidegger begins Being and Time paragraph 74 with the search for a “kind of historicizing” that “determines existence as historical”. Historicity is a “concrete working out of temporality”, and temporality was “first revealed with regard to that way of authentic existing which we characterized as advancing resoluteness.” He then asks: “To what extent does an authentic historizing of Dasein lie in advancing resoluteness?” If advancing resoluteness is Dasein’s “authentic historizing”, and if advancing resoluteness is taken as a way of being-towards-death, then

\[\text{(GA58) and immediately before the present course on Aristotle’s phenomenology (GA17) and three years after this in Heidegger’s only book SZ. This dimension of historicity essential for such a retrieval was opened up not only by Aristotle himself but by Heidegger’s intense preoccupation, at this time, with the work of Dilthey and his friend count Paul York of Wartenburg (that perhaps not surprisingly is quoted at length in the chapter on ‘historicity’), thinkers who themselves were on the trail that led beyond metaphysics but even long before this, as Pöge...}\]

\[\text{Cf., EPF, p. 91, and Pogeller, Sein als Ereignis, p. 604 and Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, Also, PGZ, paragraphs 4 and 13.}\]

\[\text{\textit{SZ}, pp. 372-3.}\]
\[\text{\textit{SZ}, p. 382.}\]
\[\text{\textit{SZ}, p. 382.}\]
\[\text{\textit{SZ}, p. 382.}\]
authenticity and authentic historizing are constituted as a way of being-towards-death:

“Resoluteness gains its authenticity as advancing resoluteness. In this, Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-for-being, and it does so in such a manner that it will go right under the eyes [or into the jaws of] death in order to take over its thrownness that being itself is, and to take it over wholly. The resolute taking over of one’s factical ‘here’, signifies, at the same time, that the situation is one which has been resolved.”

However, is death Dasein’s authentic resolve? Is authentic being toward its death Dasein’s authentic possibility that constitutes authenticity? Heidegger’s answer has been overlooked by a generation of interpreters and is set forth on pages 383 and 384 of *Being and Time*. Although the existential analytic is not to prescribe a specific content for the authentic resolve, nor project specific factical possibilities, “nevertheless, we must ask whence, in general, Dasein can draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects itself.” That is, what is the source of one’s authentic possibilities? Is it one’s finite subjectivity? Am I myself in my individuated finitude the only source of my authentic possibilities? If this is the case, then Dasein’s authentic resolve does have a specific content, and thence the resolute choice of death would constitute an authentic existence. If this is the case, we are then forced to accept death as the source, place and content of Dasein’s authenticity. But – and this passage is crucial – Heidegger’s answer is that death is not the source of human being’s authentic possibilities, and thus does not provide the content for human’s authentic resolve:

“Those possibilities of existence which have been factically disclosed are not to be gathered from death. This is still less the case when one’s advancing in this possibility does not signify that one is speculating about it, but signifies precisely that one is coming back to one’s factical ‘here’.”

Heidegger makes it clear that authentic being-towards-death is not to be a speculation about death or an explicit focus on it, but rather a coming back to one’s “factual ‘here’” (*Mitsein, In-der-Welt-Sein*) out of which one must choose authentic possibilities. The question is where does one discover one’s authentic

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531 *SZ*, pp. 382-3.
532 *SZ*, p. 383.
533 *SZ*, p. 383.
possibilities? We recall that Dasein is thrown into a world and at first and for the most part surrenders itself to das Man and becomes lost in average everydayness. Understanding itself in terms of das Man’s understanding, one is cut off from one’s own possibilities of understanding, interpreting, and talking: “The existential understanding cannot withdraw itself from the way of interpreting that comes down to it”, but “it is out of this interpretation, against it, and yet again for it, that the chosen possibility is seized upon in resoluteness.”\textsuperscript{534} Where then do authentic possibilities arise and from where does one appropriate authentic possibilities of understanding and interpreting, from where does one work out, make-true of the world?

Heidegger answers:

“The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing and discloses them out of the heritage which that resoluteness as thrown takes over.”\textsuperscript{535}

Heidegger’s claim is that one’s historical heritage is the place of possibilities which provides the authentic possibilities that are to be resolved, and is therefore the source of authenticity. Thus it is clearly not the case that Dasein’s finite subjectivity alone provides one with his authenticity. History is the source of authentic possibilities. One must go beyond advancing resoluteness toward death and project authenticity by taking action in one’s historical situation to win authenticity. It is clear right from the early Freiburg 1924/5 PS course (GA 19) and throughout his writings that Heidegger considers a de-structuring of Aristotle’s works to be essential if philosophy and thinking are to be set free for their proper tasks.

If we may recall the report Heidegger sent to Paul Nathorp, between September and October 1922, in support of his candidacy for associate professor at Marburg we verify that Heidegger is already pointing out that our conception of philosophy will determine the attitude we have towards its history and that Aristotle is a privileged interlocutor in this regard.

\textsuperscript{534} SZ, p. 383.  
\textsuperscript{535} SZ, p. 383.
Walter Brogan, opening up Kisiel’s findings in the 1980s, has very recently argued in his Heidegger and Aristotle book about the crucial importance of this essay in understanding the genesis of Being and Time, for not only its composition resembles the bipartite structure of the original plan of Being and Time (a first “constructive” part about Dasein followed by the destruction of the ontological tradition) but it also presents what Heidegger regards as an unthematized phenomenology in Aristotle.536 Walter Brogan’s study provides, in my view, an especially clear exposition of parts of Heidegger’s Aristotle interpretation study and I certainly subscribe to one of the main points of his book: that Heidegger’s relationship to Aristotle should be explicitly faced as a problem and its consideration taken up to the point where Aristotle (but also Plato and the Greeks) left it unexamined with all its fateful implications.

Throughout this study, I have been seeing that, in Being and Time, Heidegger does not find the need to run explicitly through Aristotle again but rather aims to develop his own phenomenology out of Aristotle’s phenomenology. In this sense, Heidegger gives voice to Aristotle in the idea of the understanding appropriation of the past in the situation of a living present.

I am arguing, in this last section on “Historicity”, that expressions such as “out of the heritage” and “taking over”, constitute the scope of ἀληθεύειν in the concept of Eigentlichkeit that, in Being and Time, make up for the revision of the historical/philosophical grounds upon which the Daseinsanalytik lies.

I would like to mention two later courses that further the historicity findings in Being and Time, for example, On the Way to Language (1965) where Heidegger states that: “We do not aim at advancing further. All that we want is just really to get where we already are”.537

536 Heidegger started his report with an “Indication [anzeige] of the hermeneutical situation” which tells us that our conception of philosophy will determine the attitude we have towards its history. The clarification of the hermeneutical situation as the line of sight into which the past can be set is one of the major ideas explored by Kisiel in The Genesis of Being and Time, p. 253. “(...) Philosophical research is of its nature something which a “time” can never borrow from another; nor will it be able to claim to lift the burden and distress of radical questioning from future generations. The possibility of influencing its future can never be located in the results of a past philosophical inquiry, but instead in the originality of the questions which a time attains and concretely develops. As a paradigm for eliciting problems, philosophical research, through the [revolutionary power of] renewal implicit in that interrogative radicality, has the capacity to become the living present [κοινωνία] ever anew.”

537 US, p. 12, For Heidegger, at this later stage, this meant to bring about the “unthought” of that which has been already thought by philosophy – what Heidegger calls the gedacht – and the matter
Also in *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935) Heidegger argues that:

“To ask the question about being means nothing less than to recapitulate (*wiederholen*) the beginning of our historical-spiritual existence, in order to transform it into a new beginning. This is possible. It is in fact the authentic pattern of historicity, for all history starts with a fundamental happening. We do not repeat a beginning by reducing it to something past and now known, which we may simply affect and ape. The beginning must be begun again, more radically, with all the strangeness, the darkness and the insecurity that attend a true beginning. Repetition as we understand it is nothing but an improved continuation of what has been up till now by mediation of the up-till-now.”

Although these two examples of Heidegger’s later courses demonstrate Heidegger’s concern with tradition and historicity in a rather more thematic fashion than in *Being and Time*, I should emphasize once more that since so much of Heidegger’s work in the twenties was focused on Aristotle, it stands to reason that Aristotle is a hidden interlocutor in this section on historicity in *Being and Time*. For, in *Being and Time* Heidegger is conducting a research on αληθεύειν of human existence and therefore he is specifically focused on how one makes true of the world, takes over and resolves its situation by being-authentic, and how in the light of a social-cultural-historical tradition one “hands down to oneself (*sich überliefern*) the possibilities that have come down [to one].” These “handing down to oneself” possibilities from the heritage are a critical act of questioning, evaluating, and appropriating. For we have realized how unproblematic it is for everyday Dasein to accept the norms, rules and prescriptions of the social order as valid without a genuine critical reflection. Hence, everyday Dasein does not authentically choose or determine its own possibilities, although it can make choices and take decisions as it takes on board whatever possibilities and ways of being are current, and floats from possibility to possibility according to whatever is now demanded or accessible. Authentic Dasein, on the other hand, sees all the current possibilities as arising out of the heritage, and sees that the specific ways of being and conventions are rooted in a particular historical context. Thus

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538 *EM*, pp. 29-30.
539 *SZ*, p. 383.
authentically appropriating possibilities requires that one must “hand down to oneself” (sich überliefern) those possibilities that one critically and openly takes over from the heritage as his own authentic possibilities. For Heidegger, this possibility is not a simply unquestioning acceptance of the tradition and neither does his proposed destruction have a negative import. Rather it is a critical dialogue in which one questions the heritage and then chooses which of those possibilities is conceived of as constitutive for his own existence: the task of αληθεύειν. Indeed textual evidence abounds to lend credence that Heidegger’s return to the tradition by means of its destructuring or destruction is concerned with how we stand in relation to the tradition:

“Destruction is rather the authentic way in which the present must be encountered in its own basic movements, and encountered in such a way that thereby the ständige Frage, the persistent questioning, breaks out of history to the extent that it (the present) is concerned with the appropriation and interpretation of the possibility of a radical and fundamental experience.”

The “possibility of a radical and fundamental experience” in Being and Time is being open to one’s temporal dimensions, that is, making-true, disclosing and choosing authentic possibilities from one’s heritage, so that one can project one’s own future. The fundamental importance of heritage and the resolute choice of possibilities for authentic existence out of the heritage is stressed in the following passage:

“If everything ‘good’ is a heritage and the character of ‘goodness’ lies in making authentic existence possible, then the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness.”

If, as this passage implies, authentic existence is constituted by the choice of possibilities from the heritage handed down in resoluteness, what is the role of death and being open as αληθεύειν in one’s finite future?

Heidegger answers:

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540 PIA, p. 35.
541 SZ, p. 383.
“The more authentically Dasein resolves – and this means that in advancing to death it understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibility – the more unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence, and the less does it do so by accident. Only the advancing to death drives away every accidental and ‘provisional’ possibility. Only being-free for death gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Grasping the finitude of one’s existence tears one out of the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one – those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly – and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate.”

This passage explicates the relationship between authentic being-towards-death and anticipating resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) from the resolute choice of authentic possibilities from the heritage. As already noted, authenticity was understood by an entire tradition to be a concept in strict dependence on Sein-zum-Tode, precisely because it could be easily linked to an object so as to justify an assumed proper response to inauthenticity and also to “betray” a purported philosophical/ethical “gap” in Heidegger’s analysis. This, then, could be promptly used to label, for reasons stated, Heidegger’s phenomenology as “anti-other” or “anti-ethics”. As we have seen though, by appealing to the phenomenological layers of Aristotle’s temporal notions in the text, this claim does not stand up. Now, we find ample support in the text that the heritage, and not death, is the source of one’s authentic possibilities, and that the resolute choice of possibilities from one’s heritage constitutes one’s authentic historizing:

“This is how we designate Dasein’s primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen.”

Dasein’s authentic historizing is therefore not “advancing resoluteness” (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) taken as a way of authentic being-towards-death (eigentlich Sein-zum-Tode), but is rather the resolute choice of possibilities from the heritage. Thus, I suggest that Heidegger’s concept of authentic historizing and the heritage opens up the scope of authenticity from the ontological structure of finite-individuated Dasein worked out through ἄληθεύειν, in the current

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542 SZ, p. 384.
543 SZ, p. 384.
historical situation which is indeed seen to be the motivation of resolute choice and the summit of authenticity.

Resoluteness not only chooses authentic possibilities from the heritage, but projects them into the future in the way of vorlaufend, advancing. Dasein is always ahead of itself (sich vorweg), throwing itself into possibilities which are determined by the structure of being-towards-death as finite.\(^{544}\) In this sense, all authentic possibilities are “chosen under the eyes of death”, so that one unambiguously chooses finite possibilities. Heidegger argues in this passage that “grasping the finitude of one’s existence tears one out of the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one – those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly.” That is, awareness of the finitude of one’s existence, the limited time at one’s disposal, the possibility that death may come at any moment, imparts a new seriousness and urgency to one’s choices. The point of this analysis is that Vorlaufen is a structure of all authentic choice and projecting, and thus being-towards-death enters into (but does not subsume or exhaust) and determines as finite all of one’s resolves. Thus Vorlaufen is the authentic way of comporting oneself towards the future in which the individual actively and creatively chooses and projects its authentic possibilities. This way of being is contrasted with an inauthentic putting oneself at the disposal of das Man and waiting for the outcome of what is currently happening.

This interpretation suggests that by “accidental and provisional” possibilities, Heidegger means those possibilities of today, the present age. The German vorläufig connotes ‘provisional’, tentative and temporary which conveys the meaning that Heidegger suggests: today’s possibilities are merely provisional, will soon pass away, and then will be replaced by another set of provisional possibilities. One could perhaps make a distinction between the provisional possibilities of today and the authentic possibilities of the heritage. If “everything good is a heritage” then our authentic possibilities are to be resolutely appropriated from the heritage so as to free us from dependence on and domination by possibilities of today. We have seen Heidegger suggesting that this appropriation from the heritage is not for private use, for making something our own. Rather it is the authentic way in which the present must be encountered in its own basic

\(^{544}\) SZ, p. 264.
movements, and encountered in such a way whereby the *ständige Frage*, the persistent questioning, breaks out of history. The implication is not that everydayness is to be avoided but that one is able to choose from and let go the dependence of its possibilities in one’s life. By opening ourselves up to the heritage we broaden our horizons of choice and are able to choose authentic possibilities and escape the compulsion and domination of today.

In this next step of the text of *Being and Time*, the constitution of an authentic existence implies that the resolute choice of authentic possibilities is promoted by αληθεύειν of one’s heritage. I wish therefore to stress the importance of Heidegger’s concept of taking over, handing down, and appropriating possibilities from the heritage which has been previously overlooked in this analysis, and in those of the commentators who ‘attach’ exclusively the project of authenticity to being-towards-death.

c) Repetition and authentic temporality

Recalling Heidegger’s 1923/24 *Introduction to Phenomenology* course (GA 17), addressed in the first chapter, we realized that he found much common ground in Aristotle’s phenomenological description in *de Anima*, especially regarding Man’s standing in the world in relation to the thinking and appearance of this same world. When exploring the meaning of phenomenology from specific passages from the *de Anima* we have focused on Heidegger’s exegesis of Aristotle and the question of the perception of the world as a mode of seeing. In this course, Heidegger worked through the meaning of a specific passage from Aristotle’s *de Anima* to show what kind of phenomenon was accessible in the seeing that sees. Indeed, Aristotle maintained: “What is perceivable in seeing is the visible.” (“Οὐ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ δύσις, τοῦτ’ ἐστιν ὅρατον.”) Heidegger furthered this examination into what is made accessible in this seeing and how that related to the perception of the perceived: “What is seeing, what is it that is perceived in such

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546 *DA*, B7 418 a26.
seeing, how is it that that which is accessible in seeing is characterized with respect to its content and perceptibility?\textsuperscript{547} The reason why I am now revisiting this early Marburg course is to show that Aristotle’s phenomenological description of human being is operating at this stage of Being and Time in terms of Heidegger’s analysis of the disclosure of the presence of the world at the level of the Augenblick (moment-of-vision).\textsuperscript{548}

We have seen to a certain extent, in the discussion of authenticity that this seeing corresponded to an immediate grasp (νοῦς) that would consist of a return to, and apprehension of that which had already been disclosed and understood in an unthematic way. I have suggested that νοῦς could indeed be working as Heidegger’s conceptualization of the “pre-objective” ἀληθεύειν of authenticity and how this helped Heidegger through his notion of Entschlossenheit, a notion that could best render and condense the temporal determinations of ἀληθεύειν of authenticity: κίνησις, φρόνησις as Gewissen. With hindsight, though, if resoluteness corresponds to a choice, that is, if authenticity is still grounded in a discursive νοῦς ἀληθεύειν then how are we really able to express ἀληθεύειν without objectifying it?

A response to the question of authentic ἀληθεύειν cannot be exhausted by the disclosedness of νοῦς in deliberation; not only because deliberation is directed towards its end in such a way as to disregard the present, but also because the end is not grasped as such. Bearing this in mind, Heidegger needed to move beyond the confines of everyday action, as authentic as it may be. In Heidegger’s view it is necessary to lay bare the conditions of possibility that would open up to a more far-reaching vision, represented by the Augenblick, which no doubt picks up certain traits of νοῦς but simultaneously points beyond such an ideal: authentic historicizing.

Authentic historizing is connected to authentic temporality in its three-dimensional ‘ecstatic unity’. This analysis suggests that authentic being-towards-death is but one of the three temporal conditions of authenticity and that the Augenblick as the original ἀληθεύειν gives directives for the nature of

\textsuperscript{547} EPF, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{548} I merely indicate it here. I have explored this theme elsewhere in connection to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return of the Same. Cf., Santos Vieira, Miguel, “The Augenblick (Moment-of-Vision) in Nietzsche’s Eternal Return of the Same”, pp. 287-297.
authenticity and philosophical understanding as well. After analyzing the other important constitutive structures of authenticity, I will summarize the results of the previous interpretation and bring together the fundamental structures of that which I will call the authenticity of self-transformation, a portrayal of Heidegger’s analyses which I believe presents a cogent and complete concept of authenticity.

Our analysis of authentic historicity takes us to the resolute choice of possibilities from the heritage. In the past section I have examined the taking over of heritage and the resolute handing down of authentic possibilities to oneself. I will now examine how one chooses and takes over, retrieves past possibilities (Wiederhölung), and the way this choice is constituted in one’s projection toward the future. In this way I will prepare for an explicit analysis of authentic existence and exhibit the grounds upon which Heidegger’s works out his concept of authentic self.

This activity of authentic historizing presupposes a condition of authentic temporalizing in which one is open to the three temporal dimensions and which hold together these dimensions in the unity of the structure of authentic temporality. For, according to Heidegger, only a being who is open to his future in such a way that he takes over his individualized finitude can come back to his situation and take over his throwness. Only a being who is open to his past can take over his heritage and choose authentic possibilities in order to resolve his present situation. Thus, only a being that is open to its future and past can “by handing down to itself the possibilities it has inherited take over its throwness, and be in the Augenblick for ‘its’ time.”

I wish therefore to work out the importance of being open to the past, and the authentic way of taking over one’s past, to stress the importance of all three temporal dimensions in the constitution of authenticity. I put particular emphasis upon this point for it seems as if many of Heidegger’s interpreters in the past have placed exclusive emphasis on one’s relation to the future in the mode of authentic being-towards-death (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit), and thus de-emphasize and dim down the importance of one’s relationship to the past. In order to clarify this one-sided temporal emphasis, I will now show the fundamental role of one’s way of authentic being towards the past in constituting authentic historicizing.

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549 SZ, p. 385.
Therefore I will argue that the three temporal dimensions are equally important in the constitution of authentic existence and will propose that we hold on to this, and do not sacrifice it for an exclusive emphasis on one’s being-towards-death. In this way I hope to illuminate a dimension of authenticity that I believe has been pushed into the background by previous Heidegger interpreters, and thus make clear the full temporal-historical structure of authenticity.

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Authentic temporalizing in the past is called \textit{Wiederholung} by Heidegger.\textsuperscript{550} \textit{Wiederholung} is an important and complex term that is of methodological importance for \textit{Being and Time}, as well as of major import for authenticity. Here I will focus into how \textit{Wiederholung} places the research on Aristotle’s \textit{\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\epsilon\nu\nu} in the wider project of retrieving past possibilities, in order to disclose its ontological grounds and so as to constitute authentic historizing. I would like to suggest that \textit{Wiederholung}, in the context of choice from authentic possibilities from the heritage, is the key to authentic resolve and presents us with the full scope of \textit{\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\epsilon\nu\nu} as a philosophical notion of \textit{retrieval} and \textit{repetition}. This proposal grounds the philosophical connection between \textit{\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\epsilon\nu\nu} and \textit{Eigentlichkeit} by suggesting that one must first retrieve possibilities from the heritage by making a resolute choice of authentic existence possibilities from the ‘Dasein that has been here’. Then, after choosing, retrieving, working out, uncovering the possibility that has been handed down, one must \textit{repeat} one’s choice by remaining loyal to one’s resolve in one’s struggle with \textit{das Man}. This process, or movement if we like, of retrieval-repetition is Heidegger’s very own illustration of the purpose of \textit{\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\epsilon\nu\nu} operating in \textit{Eigentlichkeit} and it is enunciated in the following passage of \textit{Being and Time}:

“The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the retrieval-repetition (\textit{Wiederholung}) of an existence possibility that has come down to us. \textit{Repetition is the explicitly handing-down}, that is, the going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has been there. The authentic repetition of a past existence possibility – that Dasein itself chooses its hero – is grounded in advancing resoluteness; for in it one first

\textsuperscript{550} SZ, p. 385.
chooses the choice that makes one free for the struggle of loyalty and the struggling succession of the repeatable.\textsuperscript{551}

In this passage one “chooses its hero” from the past by a resolute repetition of authentic possibilities and repeats its choice in a “struggle for loyalty” in the “succession of the repeatable”. The “repeatable” are authentic possibilities (the nature of which will be further clarified shortly), and the “struggle for loyalty” refer to the repetition of one’s choice in the present situation, such that one is true to one’s resolve by standing by and remaining steadfast in one’s projection of authenticity, that is, such that one keeps \(\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\alpha\) as the sense and purpose of its disclosing. “Choosing one’s hero” from the heritage is not choosing a role model in which to represent one’s own hopes and dreams or to gossip about, but it has the requirement that one consciously and resolutely makes one’s choices out of the heritage of possibilities. For example, after careful consideration of one’s potentialities and possibilities (what one is capable of, what is open to one), one can choose, say, philosophy as one’s authentic possibility, and can choose Plato, or Aristotle or Leibniz, as role models for one’s philosophical labour. Hence in making authentic resolve, one takes over one’s heritage and retrieves possibilities for authentic existing.

The choice of one’s authentic possibilities leads to a “struggle for loyalty” referring to the repetition of one’s choices in the present situation, such that one resolves to stand by and remain steadfast to one’s projection of authenticity. The criterion for loyalty is, I suggest, \textit{Selbständigkeit} which we will see is one of the fundamental determinations of the authentic self. \textit{Selbständigkeit} refers to Dasein’s standing by itself and means self-constancy. This criterion applies only to the authenticity of resolute \textit{Dasein}, for only the individual that has chosen its authentic possibilities and constantly repeats his choice has achieved the “steadiness” and “steadfastness” of self-constancy, by taking its stand for its authenticity. Seizing on a definite possibility and loyally standing by it, refers to an activity of \textit{commitment}, or that which has been popularized by Sartre as \textit{engagement}. This loyal repetition of one’s possibilities can be contrasted with the irresoluteness of \textit{das Man}, which hops from possibility to possibility without ever committing itself to anything (\textit{Neugier}), and which covers over, conceals its resoluteness with ambiguous idle talk. Hence, Heidegger’s suggested way of transforming a dispersed, alienated

\textsuperscript{551} \textit{SZ}, p. 385.
inauthentic existence is the resolute repetition of authentic possibilities, followed by a struggle for loyalty in which one remains true to one’s choice in spite of the pressures and prescriptions of *das Man* and publicness (öffentlichkeit).

Heidegger’s remarks suggest that commitment takes place in the struggle for loyalty, implying that this, and resolute repetition are conditions of the possibility of commitment. This struggle for loyalty is the struggle against falling back into irresoluteness – a struggle against *das Man*’s tranquilizing temptations, ways of alienation, and against “backsliding” into inauthenticity. Therefore, the project of authenticity requires a commitment to one’s authentic possibilities to overcome the irresoluteness of non-committed everydayness.

This description of “choosing one’s hero” and the “struggle for loyalty” in authentic choice and commitment takes us even further than being-towards-death, by bringing us back into the historical situation, which we now see is the place of authenticity. Again I would like to underline the centrality of *Wiederholung*, for authenticity makes it clear that the source of the authentic resolve is history. As I have already suggested in this study, Heidegger does develop his notion of *Eigentlichkeit* on the basis of Aristotle’s inquiry into ὅν ὃς ἀληθείας as the analysis of *Dasein*’s ways of being-in-the-world. This finding permitted Heidegger to retrieve the phenomenological character of Aristotle’s thought by releasing this thought out of its ontological presuppositions. However, the return to Aristotle in Heidegger’s *Daseinsanalytik* and in the repetition of past possibilities, the choice of Aristotle (among the Greeks) from the heritage is not a backtracking that seeks to imitate one of the greatest philosophers of all time. The following passage makes it clear that resolute *Dasein* does not choose possibilities of the heritage merely to resurrect past heroes or for the sake of a romantic yearning for what has been:

“Arising, as it does, from a resolute projection of oneself, repetition does not let itself be persuaded of by something what is ‘past’, just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual, may recur. Rather, the repetition replies (erwirrtet) on the possibility of that existence which has-been-there. But when such a reply (Erwiderung) is made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made in a moment of vision; and as such it is at the same time a retraction (Widerruf) of that which in the ‘today’, is working itself out as the ‘past’. Repetition does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress. In the moment of vision authentic existence is indifferent to both these alternatives.”

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552 *SZ*, p. 386.
This passage makes it clear that the appropriation and making one’s own of the tradition takes place for the sake of authentic existence, and not simply to revive what had once been a living age. That is, for the purposes of the analysis of authenticity and the presence of Aristotle’s phenomenology in Being and Time, Heidegger is neither supporting a cultivation of the tradition for its own sake, or an aesthetic appreciation of one’s heritage, but rather accounting for Dasein’s disclosive movement towards an authentic existence and Aristotle’s phenomenological help in this regard. Thus, there is no appropriation of the heritage as such, nor can one simply label Heidegger as destructuring the tradition in order to make it his own, or appropriating its findings for the ontological analysis of Dasein. Rather, these key concepts suggest Heidegger to be engaged in an active dialogue with the past, specifically in order to release Aristotle himself out of a tradition that has interpreted his thought metaphysically. Regrettably, I am not able to address here the implications of the metaphysical appropriation of Aristotle in the middle-ages and the Aquinas interpretation, although I hope to have raised some reflections in the first chapter in connection to the traditional interpretation of λόγος as judgment. For the present purposes my aim is to see how these two terms cement the current proposal that Heidegger is indeed offering a twofold reading of historicity that not only fully grounds the concept of Eigentlichkeit but also stretches out the philosophical significance of ἀληθεύειν in Being and Time.

If we take a closer look at the etymological meaning of the term Erwiderung und Widerruf we eventually exhibit more clearly what both terms express philosophically. An Erwiderung is a reply, answer, or rejoinder that suggests an active dialogue with the past, rather than a simple imitation. Widerruf in conjunction with Wiederholung-Erwiderung expresses the twofold nature of the resolute repetition of past possibilities; it is also a retraction of how these have been traditionally interpreted. That is, authentic repetition is both a taking over and rejecting of the past, for it refers to an oscillating way of retrieving, interpreting and appropriating. Thus, one’s relationship to the heritage is not a simple, unproblematic “taking over” as such, as it can not be fixed by a straight comparative look. The retrieval of the authentic possibilities from the heritage is
adumbrated early on in *Being and Time* on pages 20-21 where Heidegger argues that *Dasein* not only falls into the world, but also falls into its historical tradition, which can “take away from one his own leadership, questioning, and choosing.”

This suggests that tradition and heritage are not just taken over as a substitute for Heidegger’s concerns for today, for:

“When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, at first and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed (…) *Dasein* has had its historicity so thoroughly uprooted by tradition that it (…), despite all its historiological interests and all its zeal for an interpretation which is philologically ‘objective’, no longer understands the most elementary conditions which would alone enable it to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively its own.”

I suggest that the “elementary conditions” that “alone make it possible to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively its own” are found in the analysis of taking over one’s heritage and in the resolute repetition of authentic possibilities. This contention should help elucidate Heidegger’s own twofold relationship to the tradition which he wishes at the same time to “destroy” and “preserve”. The same relationship, I believe, is indicated by the *Wiederholung* that is at the same time retrieved by, and a repetition of, ἀληθεύειν in the concept of *Eigentlichkeit* and the notions of *Erwiderung* and *Widerruf* as signposts to Aristotle. Therefore, I believe I can with some approval claim that Heidegger’s “destruction of the history of ontology” and the project of going back to Aristotle is “positive in its aim” and that “its critique aims at today.”

The “authentic present” within which one retrieves and appropriates authentic possibilities is called by Heidegger, as noted, the “moment of vision” (*Augenblick*). Since the “moment of vision temporalizes itself in a resolution” it depends on an openness to the past, in which one sees authentic possibilities in the heritage that free it from the dependence and conventions of the ways of being of *das Man*. The term *Augenblick* suggests a flash of insight, a sudden understanding, a disclosure that illuminates the situation, such that one can choose authentically. Although this moment of vision removes one from one’s immersion in present concern and

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553 SZ, p. 21.
554 SZ, p. 21.
555 SZ, p. 22.
556 SZ, p. 386.
provides a break or rupture in which a radical disclosure takes place, one must always return to everydayness: “Existence can in a moment of vision master the everyday, although of course often only ‘for a moment’, but it can never extinguish.”\(^{557}\) Hence, after the moment of vision, the authentic present gives way to the “struggle for loyalty” and repetition of one’s resolve.

I would now like to consider the structures that make possible authentic historizing and see how these relate to each other in the constitution of authenticity. I stress this point since in order to work out the full structural complexity of \(\text{άληθευμα} \) and Eigentlichkeit, I believe it is important to grasp the articulation between being-towards-death, the resolute repetition of authentic possibilities, and one’s authentic being towards the past. The analysis of the structure of authentic temporality in paragraphs 65 and 68 of Being and Time indicates that what Heidegger calls the three temporal ecstases (present, past, future) all play a constitutive role in making possible the \textit{unity} of authentic temporality. Moreover, since authentic temporality finds its concretion in authentic historicity, the structures of authentic temporality and historicity come together and play a co-original (\textit{ursprünglich}) role in the constitution of an authentic existence. Failure to see this can result, once again, in a collapsing of authenticity into being-towards-death, and an overlooking of the importance of historicity for the constitution of authenticity. Demske, in common with past interpreters of authenticity glosses over Heidegger’s questions on pages 371-3 of Being and Time which question the originality or primordiality of the previous analyses of everydayness, temporality, totality, the self and authenticity, and he skips over the point of the section on authentic historicity that provides the final and I believe most authoritative formulation of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, as well as the most original foundation of the \textit{Daseinsanalytic}. Demske greatly overemphasizes the role of being-towards-death and even where he rightly stresses the triadic structure of an authentic existence (which he articulates as being-towards-death, taking over guilt, resolving in the situation)\(^{558}\), he does not address the connection between temporality and historicity in the constitution of authenticity, thus providing only a

\(^{557}\) \textit{SZ}, p. 371.
\(^{558}\) Demske, \textit{Sein, Mensch und Tod}, p. 65.
partial account of authenticity which finds its explication in the structures of authentic temporality and historicity.

A brief look at Heidegger’s existential ontology and methodology might provide a schematic clarification of what is meant by claiming that authenticity is a unitary structure composed of co-original determinations. Heidegger’s ontology aims at disclosing and developing “unitary primordial structures” composed of co-original determinations. He argues that it is important in ontology to conceptualize the constitution of complex phenomena in terms of co-original structures, and not to reduce the phenomena in question to a ‘ground zero’ from which one goes to more complex, derivative structures. For example, Heidegger begins his existential analytic with an analysis of the unitary structure of being-in-the-world, and then analyzes its constitutive co-original structures: being-in, world, and the self who is in the world. Then Heidegger takes the unitary structure of being-in (In-Sein) and analyzes it in terms of its co-original determinations (befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Rede). He then brings together his analyses in an interpretation of “Care as the being of Dasein”, which provides an analysis of an original unitary structure of πρῶτης τις within which the constitutive structures already analyzed find their interconnection. Care is “not simple in its structure”, Heidegger notes, but it is “structurally articulated”. The second part of Being and Time is a search for more primordial unitary structures which are the primary characteristics of existence that in Heidegger’s language make up the “being of care”. The more primordial structures are disclosed in the analysis of temporality and historicity. Perhaps a convincing analogy for the interpretation of authenticity may be drawn and developed from this characterization of Heidegger’s phenomenological method in Being and Time. For authenticity, like being-in-the world, is, I am arguing, also a unitary, primordial structure composed of co-original determinations. I have analyzed the notions of anxiety, death, conscience and resoluteness in the constitution of authenticity and have shown how Heidegger brings together his previous analyses of Aristotle in GA 17, 18 and 19, so that I

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559 SZ, paragraph 1, pp. 53 and ff., 130 ff.
560 SZ, pp. 131-132.
561 SZ, paragraph 41.
562 SZ, p. 196.
563 SZ, p. 305 ff.
could show the articulation of the modes of ἀληθεύειν which, like care, articulate Heidegger’s analyses. Taking a different stance to previous interpreters I am arguing that authenticity is not identical to advancing resoluteness, but that Heidegger, as in his ontological analysis of care, goes beyond his preliminary formulation and seeks structures that more concretely characterize the phenomena of ἀληθεύειν and Eigentlichkeit in question.

On this point I have argued that it is not authentic being-towards-death, but the interconnected temporal structures of the mode of ἀληθεύειν at stake in advancing resoluteness and authentic historicity, that are the fundamental constituents of authenticity; that the summit and culmination of Being and Time and the concept of authenticity is not exhausted in section 62 on advancing resoluteness but suggests a further reading of authentic historicity.

Regarding the above I have seen that the project of authenticity requires an authentic resolve chosen from the heritage such that the individual can take action in the situation and can thus carry out the modification of the das Man self to a self-transformation.

d) The Authentic Self

The first criterion of authentic selfhood for Heidegger, already noted in the discussion of the struggle for loyalty, is Selbständigkeit (constancy of the self).

“In terms of the authenticity of care the constancy of the self (Selbständigkeit), as the supposed persistence of the subjectum, is clarified. But the phenomenon of this authentic potentiality-for-being also opens our eyes to the constancy of the self in the sense of its having achieved some sort of position. The constancy of the self, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the authentic counter-possibility to the non-self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling.”  

The second criterion that Heidegger uses to explicate authentic selfhood is individuation (individuality). He writes:

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564 SZ, p. 322. Heidegger’s German reveals the connection between the many occurrences of the root stand and authentic selfhood. The term Selbständigkeit builds therefore on the basis of the word stand whose root works out likewise in English meaning standing, and suggesting in this case a standing by one’s authentic resolve. Heidegger uses the word stand in various combinations to stress the self-constancy of authentic selfhood that takes its stand in das Man and remains steadfast and loyal to its resolve for authenticity.
“Dasein is authentically itself in the primordial individuation of the reticent resoluteness which extracts anxiety of itself. As something that keeps silent authentic being-one’s-self is just not the sort of thing that keeps on saying ‘I! I!’ but in its reticence it ‘is’ that thrown being which it can authentically be. The self which the reticence of resolute existence unveils is the primordial phenomenal basis for the question of the being of the ‘I’.”

The challenge we face on this point is to discern what constitutes Dasein’s Selbständigkeit and individuality. Those interpreters who explicate authenticity as a way of being-towards-death – the most explicit argument being found in Adorno – argued that one’s individuality is constituted by choosing one’s death as one’s own, or inalienable, individualizing possibility and that Selbständigkeit is a constant repetition of the choice of being-towards-death. In challenging this interpretation, I would like to argue that individuality and Selbständigkeit are achieved through the repetition of authentic resolve and not merely through being-towards-death, and that the section on historicity and the authentic self which I will examine next, provides the basis with which to think through authentic selfhood and which can account for the unity and totality of the self in terms of authentic historicity and αληθεία. Thus I suggest that Heidegger does not intend to interpret Selbständigkeit and individuation solely as a function of being-towards-death, and to underline this point I will indicate an alternative interpretation that intertwines the authentic self with the authenticity of self-transformation.

e) Historicity and the Authentic Self

In Being and Time, page 332, Heidegger writes:

“The ontological structure of the being, that in each case I myself am, centers on the self-constancy (Selbständigkeit) of existence. Because the self can be conceived neither as a substance nor as a subject, but is grounded in existence, the analysis of the inauthentic self, das Man, has remained wholly in the context of the preparatory interpretation of Dasein. Now, though, after selfhood has been explicitly taken back into the structure of care and temporality, the temporal interpretation of Selbst-ständigkeit and Unselbst-ständigkeit takes on its own importance. It requires a separate, thematic carrying through.

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565 SZ, p. 323.
This interpretation, however, not only first gives the right kind of insurance against the paralogisms and the ontologically inappropriate questions about the being of the I in general, but at the same time it is in accordance with its central function, a primordial insight into the temporalizing structure of temporality. This reveals itself as the historicity of Dasein.\textsuperscript{566}

This passage indicates that the temporal interpretation of the authentic self requires a working out of its temporalization structure, which “reveals itself as the historicity of Dasein”. Again we see and emphasize the importance of historicity analysis for Heidegger’s hermeneutic. I suggest that in Heidegger’s discussion of the interconnection of historicity, selfhood, and authenticity, we encounter Heidegger’s final and most penetrating account of authentic selfhood.

In this section I will examine Heidegger’s claim that authentic and inauthentic selfhood are based upon possible ways of historicizing. I will show that time and history are fundamental keys to the being of the self which are not to be understood as subject/object relationships, which are in time and history, but for Heidegger are instead a way of being-in-the-world that is temporal and historical. For time and history in Heidegger’s interpretation are not an abstraction in which beings are “there-inside”, nor are they forces that act upon the self from “outside”, but are rather constituents of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, ways in which Dasein exists, dimensions of its projections and disclosure. This intimate relationship between human being, time, and history is one of the striking characteristics of Heidegger’s thought, and one of the keys to interpreting his concept of authentic self.

The problem of the self arises in connection with the question of the “connectedness of life”.\textsuperscript{567} What is at stake is the kind of “stretching along, movement, and persistence which are specific to Dasein.”\textsuperscript{568} This movement in which “Dasein stretches itself along and is stretched along (erstreckten Sicherstreckens)” is Dasein’s historizing (Geschehen, Being and Time, p. 375), which, as we have seen, provided the concretion of everydayness, and the place of Dasein’s totality and authenticity. I now ask how it is that Dasein maintains itself as one and the same Dasein in the course of its moving through life. Although this

\textsuperscript{566}SZ, p. 332.
\textsuperscript{567}SZ, p. 373.
\textsuperscript{568}SZ, p. 374.
seems to be just a restatement of Hume’s problem of how one’s experiences are to be unified in the person who maintains a constant and self-same identity, we shall see that far from being an epistemological dilemma, for Heidegger the problem of the self becomes an existential problem of identity that is central to the conception of an authentic existence.

Heidegger offers a critical approach to the problem of the “connectedness of the self” that presupposes a “stream of experience” in which one’s experience supposedly succeeds the other in a temporal sequence. He argues that this approach is founded upon an inadequate concept of experience that renders the question of the connectedness of the “moments” of experience an unsolvable epistemological dilemma. For this problematic must explain how a sequence of experience can be organized into the unity of one self-same being. How, though, is this “self-sameness” to be defined and what is its relationship to the changing experiences? If we take experience to be a succession of “nows” that must be tied together, are we not basing our efforts on an ontology of the present-at-hand that reifies Dasein’s being into a subject/object distinction, thus covering over and distorting the phenomenon of the human self? If we reject the notion that Dasein’s being consists of a sequence of experiences, how are we then to formulate the problem of its “connectedness”?

To avoid these difficulties, Heidegger uses the phenomenon of Selbstständigkeit in the context of authentic historicity to account for these traditional characteristics of selfhood. His strategy fits ingeniously into his concept of authenticity so that an authentic self can be defined as one that maintains its identity, connectedness, and individuality throughout the course of its experience, whereas an inauthentic self lacks these characteristics and loses its potentiality-to-be-a-self by dispersing itself in inauthentic ways of being. The task of formulating and working out a concept of authentic selfhood in the context of authentic historicizing should provide a final contrast between authenticity and inauthenticity. Once again I would like to dwell on the disclosing of authenticity so that I can show how most people “historize” themselves so as to forfeit the possibility of having an authentic self.

Taking this point it will be possible to exhibit the conditions (and criteria) of the possibility of having an authentic self, and to show how inauthentic Dasein
does not in this analysis ‘qualify’ for authentic selfhood, for its ways of being lack the essential characteristics of selfhood. I will then show how having an authentic self is bound up with the resolute repetition of authentic possibilities and the struggle for loyalty, as already described.

Inauthentic Dasein absorbed in the dealings of concern and dispersed in the ways to be of das Man is “driven about its affairs”. The fall into das Man was the starting point of our description of the αληθεύειν of inauthenticity and for the search for authenticity, and we later saw that irresolute Dasein falls into the “general situation” and fails to choose and constitute its own situation. We now discover that everyday Dasein also falls into world-history and dissolves its own historizing in the “state of affairs of the world”. In this way everyday Dasein loses the possibility of creating its own identity and individuality by becoming dispersed in the affairs and events of the everyday world, much as it has lost its possibility of authenticity through its absorption-dispersion into the ways to be of das Man.

In this sense, irresolute Dasein falls into world-history as it falls into das Man and therefore falls away from authenticity. If Dasein wishes to retrieve itself from its fall into inauthenticity and if it wishes to attain authentic self-being, it must withdraw itself from its dispersed absorption in worldly affairs and choose authenticity as its way of being. As Heidegger puts it, “If it wants to come to itself, it must first pull itself together away from the dispersion and disconnectedness of the very things that have ‘come to pass.’” The source of everyday Dasein’s disconnected, dispersed, fragmented absorption in multifarious tasks and events is, Heidegger claims, irresoluteness. This irresoluteness manifests itself as a non-constancy of the self (Unselbständigkeit des Selbst), a failure to stand by oneself, a tendency to lose oneself in distractions, diversions, novelties and the latest trend, social masks and games people play. Irresolute Dasein has no real identity because it is always hopping from happening to happening (Neugier), veiling, concealing its possibility of authenticity by a constant engagement in gossip, dissemblance, frantic escape, and evasion. This lack of stable identity leads to what we currently speak of as an “identity crisis”.

569 SZ, p. 390.
570 SZ, pp. 299-300.
571 SZ, p. 390.
This possibility of inauthentic historizing is also, Heidegger claims, the root of the misconceived “pseudo-problem” of the “connectedness of the self”. Heidegger claims that this question can only arise because everyday Dasein is disconnected and dispersed in das Man. As regards to the problem of identity, the more revealing question is not, Heidegger suggests, “how can the discrete experiences of the self be connected within the unity of one selfsame, identical self”, but rather, “in which of its own kinds of being can Dasein lose itself in such a way that it must, as it were, only subsequently pull itself back together, be embraced.” The answer is, Heidegger suggests, that Dasein can be dispersed and fragmented only if it is absorbed in das Man and world-affairs and then faces the problem of seeking and finding unity and identity out of its dispersion. The solution to one’s “identity crisis” is not pulling together one’s dispersion into a unity held together by willing, or thinking oneself into an identity that one has subjectively fabricated. Rather, “the self’s resoluteness against the inconstancy of distraction is in itself a steadiness which has been stretched along (erstrekte Stätigkeit).” It is resoluteness and the constant loyalty to one’s authentic resolve that constitutes one’s authentic self, thus providing one with a unique identity and self-constancy.

We see therefore that Dasein’s authentic selfhood is made possible by a choice grounded in the resolute repetition of the project of authenticity. One who is engaged in the possibility of self-transformation strives to withdraw himself from the dispersed irresoluteness of everydayness and chooses those authentic possibilities with which it can work out its authentic self. By handing down to itself those possibilities it has inherited from its tradition, the resolute individual repeats the monumental possibilities of human existence, thus constituting its authentic historicity as a steadiness that resolutely stretches itself along by being constantly loyal to its choice. In the fateful repetition of authentic historicity, resolute Dasein projects its death and takes over its thrownness. Hence, by projecting itself into its future and retrieving its past, Dasein’s birth and death, past and future, are caught up into its existence so that “Dasein is indeed in a moment of vision of what is world-historical in its current situation.” Heidegger concludes therefore that the whole of existence is “caught up” and “stretched along” in authentic historicity “in

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572 SZ, p. 390.
573 SZ, p. 390.
574 SZ, p. 391.
a way which is primordial and not lost and which has no need of connectedness.”
Thus, it is authentic historizing that constitutes the authentic self and therewith its identity, self-constancy, totality and unity. In this analysis, since only the authentic self has the characteristics of selfhood traditionally attributed to self-being, then only authentic Dasein can be said to possess a self. Therefore, only the authentic self can provide us with the “primordial phenomenon of selfhood”. Clearly, this seems to be Heidegger’s argument.

We can now see why Heidegger claims that only authentic Dasein can have an identity, for Heidegger interprets identity in terms of authentic resolve and one’s resolute repetition of authentic possibilities. We should also be clear that “identity” in this analysis is remarkably different from the epistemological identity sought by Hume’s atomism and the self-identical sameness sought by the Idealists in a transcendental ‘I’. The unity of the self is conceived in terms of the structure of authentic temporality, which is held in the past, future, and present in the ecstatical unity of the “moment of vision”. This structure contains the totality of Dasein’s being, for authentic historicity in its resolute stretching itself along, holds together the past, present, future and the heritage, project, and situation. Inauthentic historicity, on the other hand, has forgotten its past, evades its future, and only concentrates on the making present of today. Hence, the temporality of inauthentic historicity is flat, fragmented, one-dimensional. Inauthentic historizing (and thus inauthenticity) is then founded in an inauthentic mode of temporalizing. Lost in the making present of today, inauthentic Dasein ignores the future and views the past as a depot of “old” dead relics. Dispersed in its current concern, one-dimensional Dasein cannot settle on any definite possibility for it is always hopping from one affair to another:

“In awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten the old one. Das Man evades choice. Blind to possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and receives

575 SZ, p. 390.
576 SZ, pp. 390-1.
the ‘actual’ that is left over, the world-historical that has been, the leavings, and the information about them that is present-at-hand.\textsuperscript{578}

By seeking the latest, evading choice and commitment, fleeing from death and authentic possibilities, forgetting about its heritage and the possibilities that have been, and by falling away from itself and its authenticity, irresolute, inauthentic \textit{Dasein} loses itself in the concern of the moment, and is closed off from its past and future, for “from its authentic historicity as projective, repetitive moment of vision, it deprives the ‘today’ of its character as present (\textit{Entgegenwärtigung des Heute}) and weans one away from the conventions of \textit{das Man}”.\textsuperscript{579} Therefore, it is the withdrawing from \textit{das Man} and the choice project of authenticity that make possible authentic selfhood. Bearing this in mind, let us now examine more closely the main traits of authentic selfhood.

\begin{itemize}
\item[f)] Being a self: self-autonomy, self-knowledge and self-determination
\end{itemize}

In the course of this last chapter we should have become increasingly aware of the close connection between selfhood and authenticity, and should be clearer about how Heidegger can maintain that only authentic \textit{Dasein} can be said to have a self. Heidegger’s argument is broadly: identity, unity, individuality, substantiality, and personality have been traditionally taken as criteria of selfhood. These contentions, despite being taken within an unclarified ontological horizon, have nevertheless a certain validity that must be elucidated and secured. An examination of everyday \textit{Dasein} discloses that most human beings cannot be said to possess identity, unity, individuality, and the other determinations of selfhood, for they are dispersed into many disconnected roles and absorbed in fragmented activities, thus exhibiting no continuity, constancy, or steadfastness. If this is Heidegger’s claim in \textit{Being and Time} paragraphs 127, 288, however, an examination of his account of

\begin{itemize}
\item[578] \textit{SZ}, p. 391.
\item[579] \textit{SZ}, p. 391.
\end{itemize}
the determinations of an authentic existence discloses that a resolute individual holds the traditionally accepted determinations as criteria of selfhood, hence we could say that the term *self* describes a way of being-in-the-world opened up by the projected authenticity and does not stand for any unobservable being or psychological construction.

In this concluding point I would like to retrieve the notions of the authentic self-autonomy, self-knowledge, and self-determination from Heidegger’s analyses, and will give a final interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of the authentic self as the key phenomenon of the authenticity of self-transformation.

I have noted that *Selbständigkeit* can be taken as the criterion of authentic selfhood. This term suggests an *autonomy* of the authentic self which I wish to elucidate. Macquarrie and Robinson write in a footnote on page 369 of *Being and Time*: “In the following sentence the noun *Selbständigkeit* which ordinarily stands for autonomy, independence or self-subistence, is similarly expanded to ‘*Selbständigkeit*’ – ‘Self-constancy’.” Again we can see the richness of Heidegger’s language whose coinage builds both on common usage and adds new senses and contextual associations. The addition of the concept of autonomy to Heidegger’s notion of the authentic self is an important contribution that provides a new analysis of an extremely important presupposition of many traditional and current ethical theories. This being so, I will now cover briefly a concept of autonomy from Heidegger’s analysis of the authentic self.

Autonomy generally signifies a capacity to make one’s own choice, to be one’s own legislator. Hence it has an interesting linguistic connection with *eigentlich* which suggests the ownness of choice, the selfhood (αὐτό) of decision, and a first person singular evaluative act of resolution. For Heidegger, “autonomy” presupposes the individual’s freedom of choice and evaluation: *freedom* from the domination of *das Man*, and freedom to create Dasein’s own way of being-in-the-world.  

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580 This is Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation, p. 369. Cf., also this meaning in Inwood, M., *A Heidegger Dictionary*, p. 103.
581 In a later course, *Von Wesen des Grundes* (GA 9), pp. 101-2, Heidegger makes the claim that autonomy (here described as the “freedom of transcendence”) is the *ground* of all freedom, implying that “spontaneity”, “libertas indifferentiae” and so on are founded in a “primordial freedom”, thus reversing the generally accepted account that would take causal indeterminacy as a presupposition for autonomy. I may also note that in Heidegger’s later writings freedom becomes a
Autonomy in this context means the recognition that human being is its own legislator, the awareness that all choices are the humans own, and that human projects and resolves originate in their own choices and decisions – which further suggests (although Heidegger does not make it explicit) that human beings assume responsibility for their acts and commitments. Throughout Being and Time there is a contrast between authentic Dasein as the one who initiates choice, and inauthentic Dasein who blindly follows das Man or irresolutely hops from one concern to another without “really” having decided on or chosen anything. For Heidegger “responsibility” is not being-answerable to others, or being-accountable for one’s actions to others, nor does it refer to taking over responsibility in certain situations (as a good citizen does by virtue of his roles, work relations, position…). In fact, there is no mention or indication of a responsibility to others in Heidegger’s account. Whether there is absolutely no basis for such a notion in Heidegger’s ontology, and whether the lack of a concept of social responsibility to others is a gap in Heidegger’s “authenticity” remains an open question. What we do find in the text is a delineation of a way of being, a being-responsible in the structure of authenticity. This notion has to do with the responsibility for who you are, rather than what “one” does in certain situations, and therefore indicates a self-responsibility: an answerability to one’s ownmost self for one’s way of being. The presuppositions for this analysis are self-choice, a choosing to be a self, which we now see includes a taking over of responsibility for one’s self-being. This further includes a choice of self-determination, a taking over responsibility for being one’s own legislator – thus the connection with the autonomy of the authentic self. Further still, this being-responsible requires resolute repetition, for if one does not repeat the choice of authenticity, one will slide back into irresponsibility.

Finally, autonomy is an act (or feat) of having resolved upon self-determination. Since we are elucidating autonomy in terms of Selbständigkeit, clearly “autonomy” does not refer only to a disposition or capacity, but also to an achievement of resolved Dasein, an actual way of acting, or mode of being. This interpretive use of self-determination should, however, not be taken on the basis of a Kantian model of pure reason struggling to control and determine experience. For

concept of increasing importance which he links with transcendence, Seinlassen, truth, language, originative thinking and poetive creation.

582 SZ, pp. 127, 288.
Heidegger the struggle is between finding a balance between the individual and society, between choosing one’s own possibilities and “determining” one’s own ways of being. Secondly, for Kant, self-determination refers to pure reason as a moral legislator that creates its own laws which are aimed at determining the whole of human life. In the formulation of these laws, pure reason must “abstract” from all personal desire, inclination and self-interest, and act as a rational being (i.e., in the sense of a purely objective, impersonable, universal manner). The self-determination, though, in the sense it has been used to explicate the autonomy of Selbständigkeit, refers to a unique individualizing act of the authentic self that helps determine the individual as individual. Reversing Kant’s idea I contend that an autonomous act of self-determination in the Heideggerian analysis “abstracts” from the das Man self and is thus a personal individuating act of the authentic self. Hence, whereas Kant seems to explicate responsibility in terms of reason or rationality as it were, Heidegger makes responsibility a trait of the individualizing activity of the authentic self.

The notion that authenticity consists of a project of self-transformation explicates a characteristic of Heidegger’s concept of project (Entwurf). The basic function of understanding is, on Heidegger’s account, to project possibilities. Entwurf, though, does not simply mean throwing oneself into something but rather means designing, sketching, and planning, for the German Entwurf literally means “design, plan, project, scheme, blue-print”. These various meanings suggest that the central characteristic of human understanding is to sketch and project possibilities, to choose projects and weigh alternatives, conceive of what is possible, decide how one can best carry out one’s resolves and so forth. Hence, the clear connection with autonomy that presupposes an ability to choose between alternative possibilities and the capacity for creative choice. That which is made by virtue of the authenticity of self-transformation that projects authenticity is the authentic self. The self is a constitutive part of human Dasein discovered through resoluteness which is made possible by ἀλήθευς – from the uncovering that withdraws and individuates, making possible the choice of Dasein to project authenticity. The self can be seen in Heidegger’s Being and Time as an achievement that stands by its resolves and remains constant regarding its choices. The self is not a being, a thing, a psychological construction, but a way of being-in-
the-world characterized by resoluteness, identity, constancy and steadfastness (Selbständigkeit), loyalty and commitment, responsibility, independence and autonomy. All these characteristics of selfhood are structures of authenticity and refer to a way of being-in-the-world attained by the resoluteness of self-transformation.

I would like to underline one final idea in the intricate and complex nature of the fully articulated structure of the authentic self. In this concluding summary I wish to single out three main traits or characteristics of the authentic self which should help make clear the rich and varied clues of αληθεύειν to Heidegger’s analysis of the self, which I believe contradicts the often simplistic readings which have been imposed upon it by many Heidegger interpreters. My proposal is that, like authenticity, the authentic self is to be interpreted as a complex, articulated structure that comprises many of the fundamental structures of being human.

I would appeal to the characteristic of self-transparency or disclosing, that presents Heidegger’s coinage of the main term that has been leading us throughout this research: αληθεύειν. This notion guards Heidegger’s analysis against a concept of selfhood as a pure will to power which resolves arbitrarily on whatever it pleases, and therefore it guards us from the specter of anarchy. Concerning the emphasis on self-transparency, disclosing and making-true indicates that insight and understanding are the conditions of possibility of action; before the self can act authentically, its being-in-the-world must be disclosed and transparent; i.e. it must understand its situation, its place and be open to the full range of its possibilities if it is to choose in a “moment-of-vision”, that is fully open and aware to what is possible and appropriate. We have seen how this structure was articulated in terms of νοῦς αληθεύειν that sheds light on Heidegger’s analysis of resoluteness and authenticity and the reference to the problem of self-knowledge.

In Being and Time, page 146 in a discussion of the various kinds of “sight”, Heidegger writes:

“The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence, we call ‘transparency’ (Durchsichtigkeit). We choose this term to designate ‘knowledge of the self’ in a sense which is well understood, so as to indicate that here it is not a matter of perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the ‘self’, but rather one of
Firstly, this passage suggests that “self-knowledge” appears as a making transparent “the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world” throughout all its essential constitutive moments – or, in other words, making transparent the structure of care, temporality, and one’s threefold relation to the self, other and world. The key term is Durchsichtigkeit which indicates a seeing through, thus presenting an activity of insight (νοοῦς ὁληθεύειν). In this sense, self-knowledge according to Heidegger indicates a gaining of insight into one’s being-in-the-world. Seeing through distortions, illusions, concealments and gaining insight into the being of Dasein is the task of ὁληθεύειν, the pre-requisite for achieving authenticity and constituting an authentic self.

Secondly, the authentic self is self-determined. It is defined in Being and Time as the “self that has been taken hold of in its own way (eigens ergriffenen).” Heidegger uses the term “ergreifen” (to seize upon, take hold of) to describe the taking over and grasping hold of one’s possibilities; one’s own Dasein; the disclosing of being-in-the-world; being with others; everydayness, being guilty; finitude; the problem of existence; and one’s Worumwillen. These are the main themes comprised by the term ergreifen which indicates a process of self-determination that extends throughout the totality of being-in-the-world. Therefore, the authentic self is not an idealistic way as a “pure disclosure”, but rather ergreifen seems to be describing the withdrawing aspect of ὁληθεύειν in human action, a disclosing, a making-true that not only accounts for how the meaning of a thing reveals itself but how a human being can seize hold of its most authentic possibilities: authenticity. Truth is precisely this revelation.

583 SZ, p. 146.
584 SZ, p. 129.
585 SZ, pp. 20, 38, 86, 144, 153.
586 SZ, pp. 122, 188.
587 SZ, p. 146.
588 SZ, p. 162.
589 SZ, p. 179.
590 SZ, p. 291.
591 SZ, p. 384.
592 SZ, p. 235.
593 SZ, p. 193.
Thirdly, the authentic self is characterized by a self-constancy and steadfastness. Such concepts as repetition and loyalty indicate that the self stands by its choices, defining itself in terms of self-chosen possibilities, which it takes over as its own. Heidegger maintains that identity and individuality are not matters of acting in eccentric or peculiar ways, or detaching oneself from the world, as one constitutes one’s self from the monumental possibilities of heritage.

Heidegger has chosen his figure: Aristotle. It is within Aristotle’s philosophy and the discovery that there is a ἀληθεύων that belongs to factical life and makes up for Dasein’s uncovering of itself and the world, that Heidegger gets the motivation to clarify the many modes of disclosing being and knowing in the world, and gains the insight to describe the most extreme possibility of human being: authenticity.

g) ἀληθεύων, Possibility and Authenticity

Authentic possibilities are at stake in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. These exist in the historical heritage and are to be taken over and made one’s own by an act of resolute repetition which aims at self-transformation. I would like to inquire into the kind of possibilities that might be considered authentic by Heidegger, and will provide an explanation for the sense of “ἀληθεύων” in the concept “authentic”. I will raise some final questions and remark on this connection that motivated this research.

The possibilities to be resolved in the project of authenticity are the historical possibilities of one’s heritage that are to be retrieved and repeated. On this point I hope to have elucidated the concept of historicity for it helps us to give expression to an understanding of what it means to go back to the past, to retrieve possibilities of Aristotle’s phenomenological bent that gave direction and planning to the central planks of Being and Time. The point Heidegger makes in the concept of historicity, paragraph 68 of Being and Time, is only comprehensible in terms of his analysis of authenticity, and would appear rather disconnected if removed from the context of his uncovering of authenticity. Heidegger claims that the act of historical research discloses “the Dasein that has-been-there (dagewesenes) as a repetition of an
This implies that not “facts” but possibilities are the authentic field of historical research. Indeed, Heidegger claims that “factuality” is constituted by the projection of possibilities upon a chosen potentiality-for-being, hence “that which authentically has-been-there ‘factually’ is the existentiell possibility in which fate, destiny, and world-history have been factically determined.” Hence, for Heidegger, the task of historiology is not to record simple facts in a chronological, social, economical or political dimension but to disclose the “quiet force of the possible.” For Heidegger, writing history discloses possibilities that have existed, since history is the place of authentic possibilities that can be retrieved and repeated. The historian makes manifest the possibilities inherent in one’s heritage, and if he wishes to meet Heidegger’s philosophical proposal of authentic historiology, he will need to focus on his task as the disclosure of concrete possibilities for existing in the past of Dasein “that has been here”: “Only by historicity which is factual and authentic can the history of what has-been-here, as a resolute fate, be disclosed in such a manner that in repetition the ‘force’ of the possible strikes home into one’s factual existence, in other words that it comes toward its existence in its futural character.”

An authentic existence is founded upon authentic historicity which in turn is made possible by the three-fold unity of temporality exemplified in advancing, repetition and the Augenblick, all promoted by ἀληθεύειν. It is thus authentic temporality and historicity in its unity that constitutes authenticity, and not merely the projection of death. Furthermore, it is the resoluteness that withdraws one’s self from das Man, resolves on the project of authenticity, and chooses authentic possibilities from the heritage that is the center and core of an authentic existence. The point I have been trying to establish is that the place of Dasein’s authentic possibilities is history. This insight takes us a step further than being-towards-death as the fundamental structure of authenticity. This point is made clear by Heidegger in a passage overlooked by the supporters of the standard interpretation:

“Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own self. As resoluteness which is ready for anxiety, this loyalty is at the same time a possible way of revering the

594 SZ, p. 394.
595 SZ, p. 394.
596 SZ, p. 394.
597 SZ, p. 395.
sole authority which a free existing can have – of revering the repeata-

ble possibilities of existence.”

This passage indicates that the “sole authority a free existing can have” are the “repeata-

ble possibilities of existence”. I take this passage as a decisive testimony that authentic possibilities from the heritage and not death are the “highest court of authority” for human existence in Heidegger’s analysis. Therefore, I believe that Heidegger answers affirmatively the rhetorical question posed in Being and Time, page 313, “Has Dasein a higher court of authority than its own death?”

A clue as to what might qualify for Heidegger as ‘monumental’ authentic possibilities is found in a passage on Being and Time, page 400, where Heidegger, quoting Count Yorck, calls attention to “those great realities of Homer, Plato, and the New Testament which ‘put to shame everything that is superficial’ in the modern world”. Is Heidegger here suggesting that philosophy, poetry, and religion offer one authentic possibilities? Is it the case that those are the possibilities which Heidegger himself has chosen as his authentic possibilities?

What we do know is that Heidegger explicitly refers to the fact that the delimitation and working out of specific authentic possibilities goes beyond the scope of his ontological inquiry, and is the task of a philosophical anthropology. Heidegger therefore leaves the question open as to which of the possibilities the individual should choose. This option is in line with his conception of ontological inquiry and his avoidance of “prescriptivism”:

“The existential interpretation will never seek to take over any authoritarian pronouncement as to those things which, from an existentiell point of view are possible and binding.”

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598 SZ, p. 391
599 SZ, p. 400. Cf. the term ‘monumental’ in pp. 396-7. The section of SZ where Heidegger quotes profusely from an interchange of letters between Dilthey and Count Yorck (pp. 397-404) provides a valuable contribution to these thinkers, both in explicit approval of their ideas (pp. 377, 397), and in the fact that Heidegger included a sampling of quotations from these thinkers. I suggest that the passages quoting Count Yorck’s ideas offer an important clue to Heidegger’s own thinking of historicity and authenticity. Cf., the Dilthey-Yorck correspondence in SZ, paragraph 77.
600 SZ, p. 301. Cf., also, Francoise Dastur’s The Critique of Anthropologism in Heidegger’s Thought for example, p. 125, “(…) it becomes clear that [in Sein und Zeit] the question of man, as far it constitutes the ground of metaphysics, cannot be an anthropological question, since anthropology already presupposes a concept of man and does not inquire into the being of man.”
601 SZ, p. 312. Also pp. 156, 280, 301, 383.
Earlier I noted that authentic being-with-others was what Heidegger called “leaping forth and liberating”, and I suggested that this described his thinking of Aristotle’s βουλευτική ὑπεξις in the context of the disclosure of care. It would be incompatible with this inquiry on authentic being-with-others to lay down factual prescriptive possibilities.

What is at stake is liberation from the domination of das Man, so that one can appropriate and develop one’s possibilities. Heidegger’s aim is perhaps best expressed in Being and Time with the help of Count Yorck. 602 Heidegger’s concern is with the “moulding of individuality” in a dialogue with the tradition of Aristotle’s thought marked by Wiederholung, Erwiederung, and Widerruf. This individualism is “responsible” for some criticism from such Marxist-oriented thinkers as Lukacs and Adorno who saw in here a radical individualism and a tendency for withdrawal from society. 603 As noted earlier, authenticity cannot be reduced to a struggle in the solitude and isolation of withdrawal, but rather its challenge begins right in the context of one’s work world and society. To be more precise, there is a tension in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity within the characteristic of the αληθεύειν itself as the uncovering that works between involvement and withdrawal (concealment). Authenticity should, however, in no way be taken as a project of withdrawal from worldly being. For Heidegger constantly argues that one never overcomes one’s being-in-the-world, his everydayness, or his historicity, and therefore authentic historizing (that is to say, authenticity), leads one into the permanent life challenge of working out the truth from the concealments of das Man, in one’s historical world. 604 Further, the challenge and the struggle never end, for not only must the choice of authenticity be constantly repeated, but moreover repetition takes place through the Augenblick which is open to the situation, and is therefore constantly called upon to change, modify, or abandon its choice if the situation so requires:

“Resoluteness, as fate, is the freedom to give up some definite resolution, and to give it up in accordance with the demands of some possible situation.” 605

602 SZ, p. 403.
603 Again, this idea is expressed in SZ through another citation of Yorck, p. 401.
604 This is perhaps a note that strikes a slightly different chord from the later Heidegger where the struggle for authenticity in das Man recedes as a thematic concern, and where Seinslassen stretches further the notion of Seinkönnen.
605 SZ, p. 391.
I have appealed to this short passage so as to argue that authenticity and authentic selfhood are no perfect, final, complete ideal of human existence. Heidegger never speaks of fulfillment, completion, perfection, or even “self-realization”, as if the self were something to be “realized”. Authenticity is a way of being which includes disclosing, discovery, movement and change. This seems to be clear in the above passage as it puts the emphasis on the freedom to “give up” a definite resolution which was mentioned in an earlier passage citing that the resolve must remain “free and open” for a possible “withdrawing” or “taking back one’s resolve.” The authentic resolve is not, Heidegger argues, stiffen (Versteifen). Moreover, it is a central point in Heidegger’s analytic that Dasein alternates between authenticity and inauthenticity, unconcealment and concealment – truth and untruth – resoluteness and irresoluteness, and never exists in a possibility where the other is excluded, in a mode of being in which inauthenticity, untruth and irresoluteness are excluded. What is at stake then is that choosing authenticity, truth, and resoluteness as ways of being, in so far that it is possible, transforms one’s inauthentic ways of being. Although authenticity and inauthenticity can be interpreted as two “ideal” poles of being-one’s-self and not-being-one’s-self, one never, strictly speaking, reaches “pure authenticity”.

Although Heidegger does not work out any clear lines of demarcation between a large number of authentic as opposed to inauthentic ways of being, and does not explicate normative principles with which one could judge if acts x y z are authentic or not – I believe, nevertheless, as suggested in the 2nd Chapter, that there are guidelines, indications, and suggestions in Being and Time as to what constitutes authentic and inauthentic ways of being (understanding, interpreting, talking, relating, etc…). Authenticity is in Heidegger’s admission “circular”, but the hermeneutic circle, if it is ontologically grasped, encompasses that which is fundamental to being human. Being human in Heidegger’s analysis is to be

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607 For these reasons it is, I believe, inconsistent to explicate authenticity and the authentic self merely as “owned existence”, an inalienable “self-possession”, as if with the choice of authenticity one suddenly owned a self which would henceforth be one’s everlasting “possession”. Cf. chapter II, footnote 140 and also this claim in Schmidt, Richard, Martin Heidegger on Being Human.
uncovering and maintaining being in the possibility of its uncoveredness, in its truth: trueing. ⁶⁰⁸

I have argued that the project of Dasein and authenticity in Being and Time was first envisaged and prepared in Marburg with Heidegger’s inquiry into Aristotle’s research of factual being-in-the-world and the retrieval of an intrinsic αληθεύειν. In the Daseinsanalytik, αληθεύειν is the phenomenon that articulates the choice and appropriation of authentic possibilities for human existence.

Throughout this study I have shown that these possibilities constitute ways of being-in-the-world. Dasein’s retrieval and repetition of possibilities from the world is a making-true, a disclosing of one’s own ways of speaking, interpreting, understanding, acting and being, that enables one to work out, to disclose the truth of existence from the “groundless and nullity of inauthentic everydayness”. These concrete possibilities come together to form the existential interconnection of an authentic existence that alone can bring human being to the source of truth: αληθεία.

⁶⁰⁸ Cf., p. 12.
CONCLUSION

In this study an appraisal has been made of the phenomenological character of Aristotle’s thought in Heidegger’s own phenomenology. I have followed Heidegger’s attempt to retrieve and exhibit the phenomenon of \[\dddot{\text{\lambda} \text{\nu} \text{\theta} \text{\epsilon} \text{\upsilon} \text{\nu}}\] (to be disclosing, uncovering, making-true) in the inquiries on Aristotle’s teleology at Marburg and how this notion could also be said to govern the concept of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time.

One way to describe the motives behind Heidegger’s encounter with the Aristotelian \[\dddot{\text{\lambda} \text{\nu} \text{\theta} \text{\epsilon} \text{\upsilon} \text{\nu}}\] was to point out the ambition of understanding his own work to be informed by an implicit phenomenology in Greek thought (as exemplified by Aristotle) and how that phenomenology had become explicit in Being and Time. By retaining the original insight of Being and Time— that truth is \[\dddot{\text{\lambda} \text{\nu} \text{\theta} \text{\epsilon} \text{\upsilon} \text{\nu}}\]— and by reflecting deeply on the various determinations of Eigentlichkeit, I have approached Heidegger’s project from several perspectives.

In the first half, I have shown Heidegger’s research into Aristotelian notions from the Nicomachean Ethics, de Anima, and the Physics most of which were first explored by Heidegger before Being and Time in the Marburg period, and then retained in Being and Time, either transformed and remade under new conceptuality, or deposited in argumentative connections. The linguistic procedure presented a double challenge in exhibiting a phenomenological analysis of Aristotle’s notions in terms of Heidegger’s research into \[\dddot{\text{\lambda} \text{\nu} \text{\theta} \text{\epsilon} \text{\upsilon} \text{\nu}}\] and in the philosophical import of this theme for Heidegger’s ontological notions in the Daseinsanalytik.

In the second half, I have exhibited Aristotle’s modes of \[\dddot{\text{\lambda} \text{\nu} \text{\theta} \text{\epsilon} \text{\upsilon} \text{\nu}}\] as underlying the articulation of Heidegger’s concept of Eigentlichkeit in terms of two
central planks of Being and Time  A) Everydayness and Inauthenticity  B) Authenticity and Being a Self.

In A) It was noted that Heidegger made use of his analysis of everydayness in Being and Time in order to reveal precisely the ‘everyday’ phenomenal basis upon which Aristotle thought of being even though Aristotle himself supposedly was not able to thematize and turns to him for help in this analysis. The question of the everyday ἀληθεύειν was addressed in Being and Time to a great extent as a question concerning the theme of Eigentlichkeit in its potential form, that is, in the inauthentic ways of being.

I have shown the ἀληθεύειν of everydayness: τέχνη (know-how) and ποίησις (production) and exhibited the specific concern-care structure of inauthenticity. I have argued that anxiety worked as a liberating-disclosive phenomenon that withdraws Dasein from its lostness in das Man (the ‘they’, world of everybody and nobody) and individuates it for the choice of authenticity, and have suggested that Heidegger was able to support his claim from what he read in Aristotle and made explicit in the analyses of his terms in his GA 18 course, namely by appealing to the Aristotelian βουλευσις (anxiousness) and προαιρεσις (anticipatory choice), πράξις (activity) and κίνησις (motion) in the notion of Angst, Jemenigkeit and Zeit.

In B) I have suggested that all the structures of authenticity indicated were unified in one unitary structure which Heidegger progressively developed in the course of his analysis with ever more determinations worked out from the modes of ἀληθεύειν: νοῦς (pure discernment) and φρόνησις (practical wisdom/consciousness). A guiding assumption has been that when developing his notion of Entschlossenheit (resoluteness) Heidegger was in fact rethinking Aristotle’s concept of κίνησις.

However, Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle and Eigentlichkeit themselves, could to some extent be regarded as a confirmation of the theme of ἀληθεύειν and he also seems to have entertained this idea himself in the section on historicity. My idea has been that in the account of historicity Heidegger presented ἀληθεύειν as a philosophical theme in its own right within his own ontology. The emergence of historicity appeared from the first chapter in which the reflection on Heidegger’s early courses on Aristotle and the study of Aristotle’s
In Heidegger’s concept of authenticity showed that, from the beginning, this was an investigation that brought out an historical and literary gain. Expressions such as “out of the heritage” “taking over” and “appropriating” demonstrate in Being and Time the need for revision of the historical/philosophical grounds of which Eigentlichkeit could be a part of, and a reflection on the labour of the research into Aristotle’s αληθεύειν at Marburg. Since the analysis of αληθεύειν and Eigentlichkeit was steered from the beginning towards the notion of historicity – within Heidegger’s project of examining the ‘historical’ presuppositions of Aristotle’s thought – we could also say that I was viewing Heidegger’s relationship to Aristotle through this crowning theme both before and in Being and Time.

This investigation that, therefore, aimed at exhibiting the phenomenological nature of Aristotle’s thought that underlies and makes possible Heidegger’s own phenomenological description of Dasein was overdue. I have attempted such a study, not merely out of academic need, but mainly because of the paramount importance of the impact that Heidegger’s discovery of an αληθεύειν underlying Aristotle’s research into being had in the ontological-existential account of the concept of Eigentlichkeit in Being and Time. Being convinced, therefore, of the ‘why’ of this study how shall I now proceed?

The first task concerns the proposal that authenticity works as an ideal of human existence, projecting alternative ways of being, which stimulate and guide the modification of inauthentic ways of being. Heidegger confirms this proposal that authenticity projects an ideal of human existence in the following passage: “Is there not, however, a factical ideal of Dasein, underlying our ontological interpretation of Dasein’s existence?” Heidegger’s answer: “That is so indeed.” Heidegger then states that while there is an ideal of existence (and authenticity) underlying his analysis: “not only is this fact one which must not be denied and which we are forced to grant; it must also be conceived in its positive necessity, in terms of the object which we have taken as the theme of our investigation. Philosophy will never seek to deny its ‘presuppositions’, but neither may it simply admit them. It conceives them, and it discloses them with more and

609 SZ, p. 310.
610 SZ, p. 310.
more penetration, both the presuppositions themselves and those for which they are presuppositions."\textsuperscript{611}

In working out the concept of authenticity, Heidegger operated on the principle that \textit{Dasein} has an understanding of an authentic existence that can be made explicit and transparent by philosophical clarification, thus arguing that his presuppositions are part of \textit{Dasein}'s pre-ontological comprehension of his own being. Thus, far from being an arbitrary ideal, the idea of existence guiding Heidegger's analysis is claimed to be grounded in human being's capacity of discovering itself, the other and its being-in-the-world which is the task of his existential ontology to “disclose with more and more penetration”.

The second important task to be performed is the further development of a philosophical questioning of society. Heidegger's critique of \textit{das Man} can contribute to this endeavour, for it provides an ontological framework that contains a radical critique of \textit{das Man} and publicness, a dissection of inauthentic ways of being, and an hermeneutic of authenticity which works to “dissolve public opinion” and to rescue human being from the domination of “today” in order to provide a “critique of the present.”\textsuperscript{612}

Today, human being has been thrown into a heritage of pluralism in which there exists a myriad of conflicting possibilities for authentic existence. The task for philosophy in appropriating one’s own possibilities requires putting one’s tradition into question, discerning which possibilities are appropriate to one’s capabilities and potentialities, which possibilities will free one from domination by \textit{das Man} and which possibilities will enable one to constitute an authentic self. This requires an increased awareness of the activity of making-true, not to ‘adjust’ the world to one’s ‘truth’ but alert oneself to the possibilities of today that ensnare one in inauthenticity and alienate one from its authentic, true self. In a so called “global world” there are many competing possibilities, some of which are constricting, alienating and life-negating. These inauthentic historical possibilities bring about tension, contradiction and conflict with liberating authentic possibilities, which are also found in one’s current heritage, and which the resolute choice of authenticity then takes up and repeats as authentic possibilities. For example, one might

\textsuperscript{611} \textit{SZ}, p. 310.
\textsuperscript{612} \textit{SZ}, pp. 391, 397.
conclude that the current deep world economic crisis with its chronic unemployment, financial speculation, discrepancy between rich and poor, power elite and the spectre of a social upheaval requires a revolutionary change in the economic system. Disillusionment with Western society could lead to choices that represent a total negation of consumerist life such as early Christianity, withdrawal from the world into a monastic life, or an Eastern faith. Thrown into history, das Man, and existence, one is urged to come to terms with the condition’s of one’s being, and resolve to choose those historical possibilities which have come down to us as live options for existentiell commitment. Although Heidegger provides a general characterization from which every individual in every society must liberate himself, this further requires an examination of the specific phenomena that are keeping human beings in bondage in a particular society in a particular age.

The phenomenology of Aristotle in Heidegger’s thought has the merit of raising the importance of authenticity, truth and finitude in its appearing to Mankind.

For this profound insight into reality as temporal-historical keeps Heidegger’s own phenomenology dynamic and open by reaffirming the need to go back to its foundations, to Aristotle. An original unveiling of human being’s pathway to being.

A new beginning:

*It is necessary to surpass Aristotle – not in a forward direction in the sense of a progression, but rather backwards in the direction of a more original unveiling of what is comprehended by him.*

*(AM, p. 69)*
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