Lebens. Das Buch vermag die gegenseitige Durchdringung der moralischen und der emotional-psychologischen Dimension im Denken Kants plastisch vor Augen zu führen. Zugleich betrachtet sie die Gefühlstheorie Kants als sehr hilfreich, sowohl für die moralische „Integration“ der Gefühle als auch für die Abwehr von reduktionistischen psychologischen oder naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien der Emotionen. Die deontologische Ethik Kants wird oft im Gegensatz zur eudaimonistischen Ethik des Aristoteles gesehen. Eines der sekundären Ziele des Buches von Williamson ist es zu zeigen, dass die Differenz auf den zweiten Blick wesentlich geringer ist, als es auf den ersten Blick den Anschein hat.

Das Resultat: Das moralische Leben ist immer auch emotional geladen, und unsere Gefühle sollen stets in eine moralische Perspektive eingebunden werden, aus der sie beurteilt und richtig eingeordnet werden können. Es gibt laut Williamson keine Moral ohne Gefühle und unsere Affektivität muss stets moralisch evaluiert werden. Dass uns dies die kantische Philosophie lehren kann, das hat die Autorin in ihrem sehr differenzierten und detailliert ausgearbeiteten Buch brillant gezeigt.

Comparing Kant and Sartre. Ed. by **Sorin Baiasu**. London/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 262 pp. ISBN 978-1-137-45452-2.

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Despite the many references to Kant in his posthumously published *Notebooks for an Ethics*, and despite the fact that he called his last major work *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, the young Sartre did not generally situate Kant as a prominent interlocutor. Indeed, his attitude toward Kant in *Being and Nothingness* is, if anything, one of discrete dismissal. Why then choose rapprochement between Kant's and Sartre's philosophical systems as an organizing topic for a volume of essays?

It is as important to consider Kant's impact on philosophical systems from the eighteenth century onwards as it is to trace the historical development of his ideas. Phenomenology, and Sartre's work in particular, are fruitful areas in this regard. Three core characteristics of Kant's practical and theoretical thinking played a significant role in Sartre's project, and each of these are thoroughly developed in the essays included in this volume. To begin with, what in Kant was a crucial inheritance from the Protestant worldview – the ascription of great moral significance to everyday experience, as against heroic, supermeritorious

deeds – would, in a desacralized vein, later impact Sartre's phenomenological descriptions of the daily lives of individuals. Sartre also borrowed from Kant's philosophy the notion that our fundamental ethical dispositions are formed by an original act of voluntary choice – one that is located 'outside of time', detached from the agent's environment, and that renders intelligible all individual choices and personal character. Finally – and crucially – it is from Kant that Sartre acquired the critical notion that any attempt at self-knowledge is obliterated by the continuous withdrawal of an 'I' with the capacity to reflect.

Building on these organizing insights from critical philosophy, *Comparing Kant and Sartre* proceeds by addressing thematically the affinities between the two thinkers. Following an extensive introduction, the volume is divided into three thematic sections on metaphysics, metaethics and metaphilosophy, respectively.

In the opening chapter of the first section, Baiasu further develops claims he had previously established in his comparison of the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception and Sartre's pre-reflective consciousness of self (Baiasu, S., 2011: *Kant and Sartre: Re-discovering Critical Ethics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan). He defends them against two objections. According to the first, both of the formal conditions of subjective world-apprehension are too thin to have any moral relevance. Baiasu claims that they are fundamental epistemological conditions even for experiences as primitive as having the sensation of red. Furthermore, and against the objection that he construes Kant as arguing that such basic sensorial inputs are pre-objective elements of experience, Baiasu defends the transcendently critical claim that the experience of red presupposes a certain synthesis, which renders that fragmentary element of experience a partial effect of the *object* upon sensibility. Were this not so, Kant could be accused of offering a traditional form of idealism. And this brings us to the core of the second objection, which stresses the possibility of a problematic overlap between epistemological and ontological concerns in Baiasu's argument. By starting with both thinkers' conceptions of the subjective conditions that determine the apprehension of phenomena and then isolating the ontological status of sensation, Baiasu seems to want the best of both worlds, or so the objection goes. Moreover, by concentrating on the ontology of sensation as conceived by Kant (whose main concerns in the first *Critique* seem to have been purely epistemological) while still comparing this with Sartre's primary framework for self-apprehension, the author might be read as imposing an epistemic bias on Sartrean ontology. Baiasu defends himself by insisting on the crucial point that, because Kantian metaphysics does not rely on things in themselves, there is no contradiction in pursuing the ontological conditions of empirically real phenomena.

The second essay, by Daniel Herbert, analyses Kant's and Sartre's views on temporality. Herbert begins by reminding us of both philosophers' forceful rejec-

tions of the view that time is an objective event. Despite this common point of departure, however, Herbert goes on to show how the differences between the two philosophical systems outweigh their similarities. Because of their radically different methodological starting points – laying the subjective foundation of mathematical sciences, grounding the spontaneity of human agency – Kant and Sartre reach equally divergent conclusions regarding temporality. Three such differences stand out. First, Kant roots temporality in the cognitive workings of the transcendental subject, and Sartre thinks that this precludes reasonable disclosure of the internal processing of temporal phenomena. Second, and because of this initial separation between the transcendental and the empirical subject, Kant attempts to explain alteration over time as a set of changes undergone by a persistent substance; this, according to Sartre, erases the radical ontological difference between temporality and substantiality, or, in his own terms, between being-for-itself and being-in-itself. Finally, Sartre believes that Kant's insistence on dichotomies pushed him to a contradictory notion of free will. To the extent that Kant viewed determinism about natural phenomena as compatible with noumenal freedom, he posited a non-temporal source of spontaneity as the ultimate ground of practical agency, thus undermining subjectivity itself – which is only possible, for Sartre, as a temporal non-self-identity.

In 'Kant and Sartre: Psychology and Metaphysics: The Quiet Power of the Imaginary', Thomas Flynn considers the intertwinement of distinctive features of Sartre's moral psychology and the broader metaphysical structures from which it stems, the main connecting thread being his notion of the *imaginary*. From his earliest writings onward – even in the 1927 *Diplôme d'études supérieures* – Sartre intuits the potential for radical freedom associated with a consciousness capable of imagining, and thus of negating its present moment. Flynn shows how, in his more 'marginal' works (where Sartre gathers material for bigger, more systematic pieces), two elements from Kantian philosophy continually re-emerge, reshaped in existentialist terms: the function of the ego and the categorical imperative. The most significant outcome of this dialogue with Kantian philosophy and his phenomenological predecessors is, for Sartre, the undermining of any sharp distinction between the purely normative and the purely descriptive. Flynn's argument reveals the impact that Sartre's early defence of an 'egoless conscience' had on his later selective agreement with Kantian universal decision-making: choosing for all men with each individual decision makes no sense, for Sartre, unless that choice is accompanied by a strong element of risk on the part of the protagonist.

In the last chapter in this section, 'Drawing on Sartre's Ontology to Interpret Kant's Notion of Freedom', Christian Onof analyses Kant's and Sartre's treatments of freedom. One initial difficulty with this comparison consists in reconciling Kantian compatibilism – i. e. the critical claim that transcendental freedom

is compatible with determinism in the natural realm – with the Sartrean view of radical, non-negotiable freedom as the very being of the for-itself. Onof's proposal for solving this apparently irreconcilable clash is original and challenges current interpretations. After examining several notions and developments that led up to Kant's forceful defence of transcendental freedom via the fact of reason, Onof argues that both the solution to the conundrum of the human moral situation (human agency's being ascribable neither to the realm of appearances nor to the realm of the in-itself) and the Kantian and Sartrean models of freedom can be traced to *Willkür* qua 'negative transcendental freedom' or 'spontaneous consciousness' of choice. Significantly, it is Sartre's view on freedom as the essential vocation of the for-itself that inspires a more harmonious, less dichotomous model for interpreting transcendental freedom. At the close of the essay, the author stresses the importance of negativity in both Sartre's account of human consciousness and Kant's views on conscious spontaneity, which grounds practical self-determination in possibility rather than actuality.

Leslie Stevenson's 'Self-knowledge in Kant and Sartre' opens the second thematic section of the volume, the focus of which is metaethics. Here, Stevenson stresses not the cognitively pure structure that enables objective knowledge but the ontological grounds of self-knowledge, which both philosophers take to have practical and emotional consequences. Stevenson begins by drawing attention to the contrast between animal and human mental structures, where the latter but not the former allow the subject both to become positionally aware of herself, her relationship to the environment, and her mental landscape as whole and to linguistically articulate this awareness. Stevenson proceeds by briefly considering the Sartrean opposition between pure and impure reflection and finishes with a longer section on the relationship between self-knowledge and freedom in both systems of thought. The perhaps overly broad scope of issues raised in this text prevents Stevenson from examining in more detail what I think is a crucial point of convergence between Kant's and Sartre's views at a practical level: the refinement of this pure reflection, which can make the subject aware of the *precariousness* of the reasons grounding her actions and conscious choices. The daunting dilemma when comparing both philosophers' views on *self-knowledge* is not primarily one of aligning two apparently irreconcilable standpoints on the self – Kant's epistemic angle versus Sartre's preoccupation with radical self-choice. If only in radically sceptical terms, their views meet; the impossibility of apprehending our own motives, which for Kant lies in the threat of self-love as a veiled incentive, is for Sartre characterized by the very scissiparity at work in the cogito: the self's non-coincidence with itself is the only mode of consciousness.

Peter Poellner's 'Action, Value and Autonomy: A Quasi-Sartrean View' attempts to extract Sartrean lessons for contemporary debates on practical ration-

ality. Poellner begins by making explicit the Sartrean account of autonomy as a feature of consciousness, in which both self-determination and reason-sensitivity play a central role. He further summarizes the most significant aspects of Sartre's view of freedom, insisting that, far from imposing a metaphysical model, it is all about the 'practical reality of action' – and that therein lies the parallel with Kant. The next and more complex step in Poellner's argument deals with what he terms the Sartrean 'completion thesis', i. e. the constant lack which defines consciousness and its pointless attempts at self-coincidence. Poellner rightly sees that a link can be drawn between this ontological feature of self-consciousness and a similar desire for completion that is characteristic of practical deliberation. Affinities with Kantian ethical theory emerge at the level of what has sometimes been called the latter's constitutive 'perfectionism': just as consciousness bears intrinsic value insofar as it aims at unqualifiedly valuable ends, potentially encompassing all conscious beings, so Kant's morality is crafted as a continuous quest for the *summum bonum*. The essay is not as successful as it could be because of its highly analytic, systematic approach to Sartre's views on the conditions for action (drawn from Parts One and Two of *Being and Nothingness* and elsewhere), because of which it cannot adequately deal with the phenomenological texture of Sartre's analysis. The result of this methodological reversal wouldn't be so unfortunate if the author didn't also object – after what he terms 'rational reconstruction' – that a 'contentful' account of consciousness's attempts at completion would require a level of phenomenological thickness that Sartre fails to provide.

In 'Kantian Radical Evil and Sartrean Bad Faith', Justin Alam brings together two of the most puzzling accounts of acting against oneself in the history of philosophy, suggesting that Sartre's views on bad faith might help to solve some of the paradoxes associated with the Kantian account of evil. When dealing with the intractable problem at the centre of the *Religion* – how to make sense of someone's choosing an evil supreme maxim – Alam draws on nuanced Sartrean views of the kind of self-deception at work in cases of bad faith. Sartre's distinction between lying to others and lying to oneself makes it possible to avoid both the Belief Paradox and the Deceiver Paradox, both of which are said to threaten the Kantian account of radical evil. The subject in cases of bad faith does not simultaneously believe P and not-P, since the interpretation of poor evidence for not-P allows him to voluntarily treat it as its opposite. Because he manipulates the bare epistemic evidence, the subject is not split into deceiver and deceived in one and the same experience. On the contrary, and because bad faith is a form of faith, what is necessary is that the subject be able to take evidence supporting a given view of himself as evidence for an alternative picture that better suits him. Alam suggests that a formally similar process happens when it comes to the Kantian agent's choice of an evil maxim: insufficient evidential resources lead the agent

to use a false notion of freedom (compared to genuine freedom as autonomy) as a license for self-indulgence. What remains unexplored in this paper, however, is the interesting parallel between evil as a *Denkungsart* or conscious mode of thinking and bad faith as an individual project.

Concluding the section on metaethics, Michelle R. Darnell's 'The Pursuit of Happiness' considers both thinkers' views on the purposiveness of action. Existentialists commonly criticise Kantian ethics with regards to its formalism, its lack of concern for the concrete features of human facticity, its rootedness in a kind of noumenal freedom that prevents positive normativity, and, as a consequence of these features, its inability to provide a true model of *practical* reason. Darnell reminds us of two features of Kant's account of morality that jointly answer these charges: the role of happiness as an indirect duty supporting moral ends and the account's teleological form. Once we rightly understand these positive aspects of Kant's ethics, we can see how Sartre's attack can begin to be refuted. In response to existentialist critiques, it is important to stress the communitarian role played by the highest good as a final goal of moral action and to maintain its balance with the distinctly Kantian norm of autonomy. Finally, Darnell draws a positive view of happiness from Sartre's sparse ethical remarks – one purified of the most salient traces of bad faith. She argues that its connection to authenticity, in which the subject's actions become building blocks in the constitution of a meaningful world, allows us to conceive of Sartrean happiness as playing a positive role. Comparative questions remain, however, the most obvious one bearing on the contrast between this quasi-revolutionary view of happiness and the Kantian teleological framework sketched above.

The opening essay of the book's third part is Katherine Morris's 'Sartre's Method: Philosophical Therapy or Transcendental Argument?' Although brief, the paper sets itself the ambitious aim of making sense, in terms of philosophical method, of Sartre's descriptions of everyday experience in BN :). Two approaches are examined – one transcendental, the other therapeutic – and the first is rebutted in part via Morris's deployment of the conceptual resources made available by Sartre's analysis of bad faith, which are here expanded to include a form of intellectual prejudice. The transcendental reading of Sartre's examples – e. g. the approach taken by Mark Sacks and Sebastian Gardner – grounds the kind of daily situations described by Sartre in undisputed premises about subjectivity, whereas the therapeutic reading, which Morris proposes, views Sartre as disputing the incontestability of these premises. The latter view construes both well-known Sartrean descriptions of figures living in bad faith – the coquette, the 'homosexual', etc. – and the daily situations that shed light on the role of negativity in human experience in terms of a phenomenological problematization of certain shared paradigms used to describe experience. In a further twist,

Morris charges defenders of the transcendental model with succumbing to bad faith themselves to the extent that their intellectual approach to Sartrean bad faith results in dogmatic views of experience. At this level, a therapeutic reading of Sartre could perhaps connect his view on the sharp contrast between appearances and reality in the descriptions of human experience with contemporary renderings – such as Heidegger's – of what Kant saw as 'the scandal of philosophy': our failure to have secured a solid argument against scepticism. Although the suggestion is historically plausible, it would involve reading Kant through a Heideggerian lens, a proposal many would shy away from.

The book closes with a rich essay by Richard E. Aquila, 'The Transcendental Idealisms of Kant and Sartre', which again construes both philosophies as transcendental projects. Aquila's starting point is a detailed examination of the opening section of *Being and Nothingness*, 'The Pursuit of Being'. Situating his inquiry in the tradition of Kant-inspired phenomenology, Sartre considered detailed examination of the ontological status of appearances themselves an absolute priority. Aquila takes this goal seriously and construes the main thematic affinity between Kant and Sartre as a form of transcendental idealism, which he calls 'transcendental phenomenism'. The key idea here is that, given the multivocal ontological nature of appearances, any judgment about the reality of an appearance can, without contradiction, affirm its objectivity as a phenomenon from one point of view while affirming its inscription in an infinite series of appearances that makes up the very phenomenon in question from another. As Sartre convincingly shows in BN, the ontologically open status of appearances as consciously available objects in no way amounts to a denial of their importance to the world as subjectively disclosed. Thus, any empirical judgment will involve an appeal both to the infinite series of appearances of the phenomenon in question and to the being-in-itself of its object. In the experience under assessment, however, objects are considered not as things-in-themselves but from a transcendental point of view; hence the affinity between Sartre's phenomenological ontology and the Kantian framework for describing experience.

As my synopsis of the book's various essays makes clear, Sartre's metaphysical system inherits from Kant what we might call the problem of the subject, in both its epistemological and practical varieties. *Comparing Kant and Sartre's* most relevant contribution to Kant scholarship is therefore its compelling demonstration of how Kant's commitment to the primacy of practical reason in self-constitution and objections levelled by critical philosophy against reifying and substantializing takes on subjectivity found new life in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, whose existentialism pushed these Kantian themes in ever more concrete directions.