Abstract

This dissertation addresses the problem of the sources of associational life and civic engagement. I develop a new theory of the origins of associational life by a comparative historical study of popular sector/lower class associations of urban and rural populations in a set of Western European countries during the period of the 1870s-1970s. The countries under study are Sweden, Norway, Austria (strong civil society); Germany, Netherlands, Belgium (medium to high associational life); Britain (medium associational life); Italy, France, Spain and Portugal (weak to very weak associational life).

Three political and institutional factors have shaped civil society: 1) Timing of state building and/or international status in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The latter the process of state building and/or the lower international status in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the stronger will be political parties and civil society organizations in the twentieth-century. In states that consolidated fully during the mid and late nineteenth-century and/or had been secondary states in the international system in the eighteenth-century, the pre-modern corporatist structures (e.g. guilds, religious corporate bodies) survived up to the early twentieth-century, because the pressures for resource extraction from state-builders were weaker. This in turn promoted a stronger popular sector organizational life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

2) State-capacity: the stronger state capacity, the stronger will be voluntary associations. States with high capacity are able to implement policies and establish goals autonomously decided by rulers. In the late nineteenth-century, one of the main functions of the state became the promotion of economic development and nationalist mobilization. For this purpose states have established partnerships with associations. This has empowered associations, through two mechanisms. First, associations have received resources, legitimacy and public status from the State, being thus able to recruit more members through the distribution of selective benefits (welfare, pensions). Second, since high
capacity states are more able to impose a uniform jurisdiction and control over a territory, this will make easier for associations to expand through the whole national territory, to connect different geographical areas and more easily develop encompassing peak associations.

3) Democratization: the stronger the degree of democratization of the regime between the 1880s and the 1930s, the stronger associational life. Democratization is measured by two dimensions: 3.1) the extension of rights of participation, debate, and assembly; 3.2) the degree of parliamentarization of the regime. This refers to the control by representative bodies of the formation, decisions, personnel and policies of the executive. The stronger the parliament, the more associational leaders will seek to influence and establish links with MPs and political parties and build their own agenda according to parliamentary cycles. Since strong parliaments represent the whole nation, associations will tend to become national in scope, and as such more coordinated through the territory, with associational leaders creating links and alliances that run through several regions of the country. Moreover, in a strongly parliamentarized system parties will be also more interested in creating permanent and not episodic links with associations in order to have a higher reach to the electorate.
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Contents

Part I. Patterns of Associational Life in Western Europe, 1800-2000

Introduction: Research Question

Chapter 1: Conceptualization. Patterns of Associational Life in Western Europe, 1800-2000
  1.1. Collective Action, Associational Life and the Voluntary Association
  1.2. Patterns of Associational Life, 1930s/1940s-2000

Chapter 2: State of the Art I: Competing Theories of the Origins of Associational Life
  2.1. Socioeconomic Modernisation
  2.2. Political Culture and Values
  2.3. Religion

Chapter 3: State of the Art II: States and Regimes
  3.1. The State
  3.2. The Regime

Chapter 4: An Alternative Theory: The Historical and Political Origins of Associational Life
  4.1. The Legacy of Premodern Corporate Representation
  4.2. Democratization and Parliamentarization
  4.3. State Capacity
  4.4. Conclusion: A Theory of Associational life

Part II. Paths of Associational Life in Western Europe, 1800-2000

Chapter 5: From Medieval Corporations and Guilds to Modern Associational Life
  5.1. Medieval and Premodern Associational Life
  5.2. Transformations of Associational Life in the 18th and 19th centuries
  5.3. Variations of Associational Life in the 1920s/1930s

Chapter 6: Hegemonic Associational Life: Scandinavia
  6.1. Paths towards Hegemonic Associational Life
6.2. Old and New Corporatism
6.3. Early and Strong Parliaments
6.4. State Capacity fostered by Church Incorporation
6.5 Conclusion

Chapter 7: Dominant Associational Life: Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands
7.1. Paths towards Dominant Associational Life
7.2. Old and New Corporatism
7.3. Variations in Parliamentarization
7.4. State Building and Religious Conflict
7.5 Conclusion

Chapter 8: Divided Associational Life: England
8.1. Paths towards Divided Associational Life
8.2. The Elimination of Pre-Modern Corporatism
8.3. Early and Strong Parliament
8.4. State-Building: Territorial and Religious Conflict Over Ireland
8.5 Conclusion

Chapter 9: Disjointed Associational Life: France and Italy
9.1. Paths towards Disjointed Associational Life
9.2. Common Patterns of State Building: Religious Conflict and Clientelism
9.3. Variations in Corporate Legacies
9.4. A Higher Parliamentarization in Italy
9.5 Conclusion

Part III. Associational Life in Iberia, 1800-2000

Chapter 10: Antecedents: Associational Life, 1800-1870s
10.1. The end of the guilds and the first modern voluntary associations
10.2. Weak Parliaments
10.3. State Breakdown, Militarization and State-Church Conflict
10.4. Outcome: A Localistic, Individualistic and Radical Associational life
10.5. Conclusion

Chapter 11: Critical Juncture, 1880s-1918
  11.1. Failed Parliamentary Regimes and Weak States
  11.2. Radical and Uncoordinated Associational Life: Republicanism and Anarchism
  11.3. Variations of Associational Networks in Iberia: Regionalist, Socialist, and Catholic
  11.4. Conclusion

Chapter 12: The Mass Age, 1918-1940s
  12.1. Mass Politics in Iberia: Variations
  12.2. Deep-Rooted and Violent Conflicts in Associational Life
  12.3. Outcome: Disjointed Associational Life under Authoritarianism
  12.4. Conclusion

Chapter 13: Associational Life in Iberia, 1940s-2000
  13.1. Associational Life during and after Authoritarianism: problems and issues
  13.2. Variations of Associational Life in Portugal and Spain, 1980s-2000s

Conclusion and Implications

Appendix: Research Design and Methods
  1. An Historical-Structuralist Approach
  2. An Institutional and Organizational Focus
  3. Data and Sources

Bibliography
Introduction: The Research Question

In the political development of Western Europe, since the late eighteenth century collective action started to be organized through voluntary associations. As Philippe Schmitter argued, «the propensity of actors for forming, joining, or participating in permanently administered secondary groups» increasingly became the main form for Europeans to «advance or defend a specific set of interests that explicitly advance or defend a specific set of interests».¹ Collective action in previous eras had taken the form of social networks and organizations such as clans, families, villages, communities, royal families, ethnic diasporas or churches. Although they were never dominant, forms of proto-associations existed. For instance, one thinks of the professional associations and craft guilds during the Renaissance or the organizational forms of the Protestant sects during the Reformation. Yet, it was only after the French revolution that collective action became increasingly associational.²

This new situation was brought about by profound societal and political changes. Societal transformations included the emergence of capitalism and the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, which stimulated the appearance of new social groups, like the bourgeoisie and later the proletariat, and of new professional categories and economic sectors. Politically, state-building processes (e.g. the extension of administrative and coercive capacities of the state over populations) led to growing pressures from elites for the extraction of resources from subject populations which in turn stimulated organized democratization pressures from below. The growth of the national state implied the establishment of ties to a large-scale political unit, which by itself pushed for the rebuilding or dissolution of for example such primordial social identities as the community or the family. Moreover, political transformations, like the French revolution, created mass-based ideological left-right cleavages and paved the way for the development of struggles over the definition of rights and obligations between the rulers and the ruled, namely of the meaning of citizenship.

¹ Schmitter, 1971, p. 6.
² Tilly, 1976, p. 7.
As a consequence of the emergence of new social groups and political identities, the traditional estate-based organisation typical of the Ancien Regime was unable to continue to be the institutional site for the resolution of such conflicts as for instance those pitting labourers against owners and employers or those over the definition of political issues like the extension of suffrage or the rights of assembly. Although there were variations within Western Europe with respect to the survival of premodern institutions like corporations, the self-organisation of new political and social forces through formal voluntary associations was a much more efficient organisational device.\(^3\)

Nevertheless, from the very onset of modernisation, we can note differences between European societies with respect to the way the modern organisation of the voluntary association established itself, its political role, national levels of membership or coverage, and variations in the types of associations. For instance, as Reinhard Bendix stressed, in countries like France, social movements were mainly based on networks of informal solidarity, whereas in England they were mainly constituted through networks of formal associations. Also, the right to form associations varied immensely in the nineteenth century Western Europe. While England and the German states had very restrictive laws about associational life, although they were directed mainly against working class organisations, France’s Loi Le Chapelier set a pattern of state repression and harassment of voluntary associations. In turn, the Scandinavian states and Switzerland (although here with cantonal variations) were more tolerant and allowed more freedom of association.\(^4\)

After the 1930s/1940s until very recently these differences tended to stabilize, thus creating varying institutionalized patterns. For instance, contemporary levels of citizens’ membership in voluntary associations in Western European countries show great variations between 1945 and 2000. European countries tend to form clusters, with rankings stable over time. The first cluster is formed by countries like Iceland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and Finland, where between 60% to 80% of the population is affiliated

\(^3\) Gouldner, 1980, pp. 355-373.
with associations; West Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, and Austria, with a percentage between 50% and 60%, form the second cluster; Ireland and Switzerland, with an approximate percentage of 40%, constitute the third cluster; and lastly, Italy, France, and Portugal share an approximate percentage of 30%, while only 20% of Spain’s population is affiliated with associations.\(^5\)

Voluntary associations in Western European democracies also vary in many other dimensions, like the degree to which they are integrated into peak associations (federations and confederations), influence the design and implementation of public policy, the degree to which they form parts of networks of policy implementation, or are favored partners of a state.\(^6\)

This dissertation proposes to develop an explanation of variations of associational life in Western European democracies, applicable to a set countries composed of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, France, Portugal, and Spain. I discern a combination of factors that lie in the genesis and spread of the voluntary associations and that account for national variations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I make three types of comparisons. First, between the above mentioned of countries from the nineteenth century to the 1970s. I argue that national patterns of associational life became established and stable during the period starting from the turn of the 1940s and lasting until the late twentieth century. In looking for an explanation, one should study the antecedent period of interwar Europe, namely how the push for mobilization and associational expansion of the interwar years interacted with institutional legacies, processes of state building, and previous patterns of associational life inherited from the past (since at least the eighteenth century) to produce the patterns that stabilized after 1945.

In this respect, I make a contribution to the contemporary debate on the supposed decline and/or transformation of associational life. Many argue that traditional forms of participation and civic engagement are in decline, one


\(^6\) Schmitter, 1999; Wessels, 1997, p. 201.
protagonist being Robert D. Putnam with his *Bowling Alone*.7 More recently, Philippe Schmitter and Alexander Treschel have contributed to this debate with an analysis of the countries of the Council of Europe, putting forward many hypotheses that could explain variations in levels of associational life, from more cultural and societal transformations like globalization, immigration, individuation, and mediatization to political causes like European integration and changes in state capacity. Moreover, as their study demonstrates, Putnam’s conclusions on the decline of associational life are typical only in the United States. In many European countries, there are varying trends, even with the rise of participation in voluntary associations in many countries. Rates of affiliation with voluntary associations by the national adult populations are not declining and show even a predicted rise. Union density has declined in Western Europe, but only slightly, while there has been a major decline in the United States.8

Yet, the contemporary debate suffers from gaps. To understand the causes of the supposed decline/rise/stability of associational life, we must understand first the causes of the emergence of associational life and the mechanisms that consolidated it in various national patterns. Only after establishing a historical theory of the origins of associational life in Western Europe, we can explain the more recent transformations. The same set of factors that contributed to the varying patterns established in the so-called historical era, or the mass age period of associational life (1870s-1970s), should be taken into account before embarking in explanations of contemporary changes.

Second, I compare Portugal and Spain between the 1970s and 2000. Here, I use the two Iberian democracies to debate contemporary theories of post-authoritarian civil societies. Portugal and Spain have the weakest and least developed associational life in terms of rates of affiliation, organizational development, and federative structures. This is a legacy of the long period of authoritarianism, which itself was the product of the conflicts of the interwar age and the mass age period. The push for associational development in the 1920s

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and the 1930s interacted with previous patterns of state and institutional building that produced by the late 1930s a pattern of associational life stabilization by state-corporatist authoritarian regimes that left a legacy of localistic, individualistic, passive, and uncoordinated voluntary associations that have lasted until the present day. In this sense, civil societies that develop in democracies after authoritarian regimes, as opposed to some other form of previous regime (e.g. oligarchic-competitive liberalism or mobilizing dictatorships) will be weakly developed. Yet, not all post-authoritarian civil societies are condemned to be weak, and there are significant differences between post-authoritarian democracies. In this sense, I compare Portugal and Spain in order to isolate the factors that could explain varying patterns of associational life in post-authoritarian democracies. This is a significant contribution, since many argue that third wave democracies have more difficulties, because of the experience of authoritarianism, to develop a democratic and participatory citizenry. Thus, to know when this kind of civic engagement emerges is a fruitful contribution to the debates on the quality of recent democracies.

Finally, I make a third comparison between early and late democratizers. By comparing two periods of historical development (from the late nineteenth century until the 1930s and from the 1970s until 2000), I propose a general theory of associational life, valid for modernity, and having the Western European continent as units of comparison.9

In the first part of this dissertation I theorize about associational life in order to distinguish its component properties and dimensions. I argue that national patterns of associational life vary in their degree of density (the propensity of individuals to affiliate in voluntary associations) and coordination (the degree to which associations tend to form peak associations). Variation between Western European democracies is then established according to these dimensions in order to establish types of associational life in the post-1930s-1940s period. These patterns of associational life constitute the variation to be explained. I examine critically existing theories that account for varying patterns

9 Similar approaches have been attempted for issues like democratization. See Collier, 1999.
of associational life and propose my own theory. I argue that patterns of associational life are the result of the varying combination of three factors: 1) the degree to which by the late nineteenth century in Western European pre-modern corporate forms of associational life in the economy and in politics (e.g. guilds in government) still existed (which itself was the result of state-church relationships established after the peace of Westphalia, in 1648, timing of state building, and international status of the country by the late eighteenth century); 2) the degree of democratization of the regime between the mid-nineteenth century until 1918, especially the role and strength of the parliament; 3) the degree of state capacity. The higher a country is ranked in each of these items, the stronger (denser and more coordinated) would be voluntary associations within that country. Varying mixes of these factors contributed to different types of associational life in the period from the 1930s until 2000.

To some degree, the theory developed here should be seen as a contribution to theories of neo-corporatism, more specifically as a historical explanation of the origins of state and societal corporatism in Western Europe. I argue that there is no unified theory on this topic. The major theorists of neo-corporatism (Schmitter, Streeck, and Lembruch) have focused mainly on the properties and effects of neo-corporatism but much less on its origins. I build on their suggestions, combining them with the ideas of other schools that have also analyzed voluntary associations (welfare state theories and historical-institutionalism), in order to provide a historical comparative approach that looks for causal configurations and combinations of causes that interact to produce these varying patterns of associational life. This will be the subject of parts II and III of this dissertation, where my theory is demonstrated with the help of a historical analytical narrative of the group of Western European countries mentioned above. Finally, in part IV I explain variations between contemporary Portugal and Spain. I argue that differences in associational life between these two neo-democracies are the result of three factors: 1) legacies of state-corporatism inherited from the authoritarian period, in particular the form the dynamics of liberalization of the dictatorships (mid-1960s until mid-1970s); 2)
processes of regime-building, in particular during the process of transition from authoritarianism (mode of transition) (mid-1970s until early 1980s); 3) institutional configurations of the new democracy, namely the degree to which welfare state institutions have been set up as well as the degree that political parties and associations have created links with each other.
Part I: Patterns of Associational life in Western Europe, 1800-2000
1.1. Collective Action, Associational life, and Voluntary Association

The representation and intermediation of societal interests by voluntary associations is something new of modern societies. Before the modern age societal groups were mainly represented by other institutions and organizations like churches, corporate groups, or kinship networks. In the course of modernization, which implied the building of states and markets at the national level, they were progressively replaced by formal organizations that aggregated preferences at the territorial (political parties) and functional (associations or interest groups) levels.\textsuperscript{10}

In this sense, voluntary associations are one of many forms for «people [to] act together in pursuit of shared interests».\textsuperscript{11} It is a form of collective action; to participate, affiliate, obey, support, or found a voluntary association is a matter of collective action, the ability of groups of individuals to agree to pursue courses of action on the basis of a perception and construction of common interests.\textsuperscript{12} At this level of abstraction, the dilemmas and constraints that individuals face when deciding to participate in a voluntary association are generically conceptualized under conditions of collective action.

Mancur Olson was the main contemporary theorist linking the issue of collective action with the general theme of the formation and affiliation in voluntary associations. Olson argued that associational life does not come naturally out of rational action. Individuals pursuing their self-interest will not necessarily form or engage in associations. This varied inversely with the probable number and dispersion of participants. For instance, the higher the pool of prospective members of association, the less impact the effort of one particular individual will have on the participation’s outcome, and thus, it is rational to free ride. According to Olson, only when groups are small and/or compact, and as a

\textsuperscript{10} Rokkan, 1966.
\textsuperscript{11} Tilly, 1978, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{12} Olson, 2000.
consequence the effort of one individual will actually make a difference in the outcome of participation, people will voluntarily participate in associations. In contrast, people would participate in bigger groups only if coerced to the association (either by the state, e.g. legal rules that specify that an individual must be affiliated in a union if he wants to enter a certain profession, or by strong moral pressures from the community, usually the situation in small compact groups), or if selective benefits were presented by the association itself (e.g. insurance schemes or travel prizes provided by a union so as to attract membership).13

Olson’s perspective was an improvement in relation to previous theories which predicted that whenever there was a perceived common interest or a context of social disturbance, a decision to be involved or to found a voluntary association would follow rather automatically.14 According to traditional pluralist thinking, people join groups naturally, in order to support common goals. The process of evolution from social interests to self-organization through associations is unproblematic. Individuals who have common interests would form formal groups which then transmit these interests to the political system. Voluntary associations are considered to emerge naturally from the simple existence of different groups or aggregates of individuals with potential and real differences of interest.

Olson’s theory, however, is unable to account for certain aspects of voluntary associations. Several theorists have revised Olson’s theory with new assumptions about the criteria that structure individual choice in participating in associations. For example, Terry Moe has argued that when an individual calculates her costs and benefits she may think that her contribution will make a difference. In this sense, she may have a «perception of efficacy». These motivations are not necessarily economic; instead, they are a «purposive sense of satisfaction from the act of contributing itself». In fact, there are several types of motivations for individuals to participate that are not accounted for by the exclusively rationalist line of thinking in Olson’s contribution. Some of these are motives of solidarity,

14 As argued by Truman, 1971.
like the ones arising out of friendship, feelings, social status identification, or the need of social acceptance. Others are purposive, more related to ideological, moral, and religious principles. These motivations constitute in many historical contexts the main basis for joining and forming associations.\textsuperscript{15}

Moreover, James Q. Wilson developed further Moe’s theory of incentives. The first type of motivation/incentives, Wilson argued, was the material incentives that push individuals to participate. Money rewards, like the possibility of getting a wage raise or a job, would be higher when entering an association that somehow controls the distribution of these resources (e.g. trade unions with closed agreements). Similar to Moe, Wilson considered also solidarity incentives. These can be specific, in the sense that the rewards are endogenous in the act of participation and given to particular individuals, like offices, honors, and deference, or they can be exogenous, namely that the satisfaction derives from doing things collectively. In the latter case, participation is an end in itself, and the more people participate, the more each individual will benefit. Many associations are of this latter type; consider for example the various status clubs and fraternal organizations. Finally, purposive incentives derive from «the sense of satisfaction of having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile cause». In many historical contexts, the motivation to associate was ideological, even altruistic, in the sense that nonmembers could also benefit from the fulfillment of the association’s goals. For instance, ideological conceptions of justice are a case in point. Here an individual’s participation depends on the others’ participation. Ideological bonds that foster strong solidary and common cooperation are created (e.g. specific goals like pro- and anti-abortion movements or ideological goals like parties and religious sects).\textsuperscript{16}

A second aspect that Olson ignored was the role of leaders and founders of associations. Moe already touched on that subject when he argued that leaders must be sensitive to a group’s preferences or risk becoming isolated. This hinted at the partial autonomy of the leaders of a particular association in the sense that they are not the mere representatives of the members’ interests. First and in a very

\textsuperscript{15} Moe, 1981, pp. 536-537.
\textsuperscript{16} Wilson, 1973, pp. 18-25.
material sense, leaders invest the resources they have or are able to gather in the initial founding of an association. Second, leaders have also margins of action that allow them to shape the inducements for collective action. Robert Salisbury pushed this point further when he argued that the associational entrepreneur pursues first and foremost his private interests and does not necessarily always take into account the views of the other members in his actions. Members’ views are only considered up to the point where they do not compromise the viability of the association as founded by its leader.¹⁷ Moreover, as Wilson argued, as organizations grow in membership, there is usually the need for the existence of a staff to coordinate joint actions, which gradually becomes a group with its own interest in maintaining its position within the association. In turn, associations tend to develop distinctions between administrative and leadership positions and the rank and file members.¹⁸ In this sense, associational leaders, founders, and staff are mobilizers and demobilizers, meaning that they are the very agents who define the collective interest of a given social group. In a sense, group interests do not exist before somebody, usually an associational entrepreneur and founder, articulates them. As Salisbury argued, it is the entrepreneur that sets in motion the demand, and before he offers his benefits for the association, we cannot really speak of interests.

Yet, these theories are incomplete in many respects. First, there is an excessive focus on individual motivations. Instead, we should move beyond the individual in the core analysis and complement it with an attention to the social and political contexts. Although it is true that individuals are rational, they do not live in a societal void. Groups exist in historical settings and they are shaped not only by their internal dynamics but also by inherited traditions of collective action and previous patterns of associational life as well as by cross-cutting social and political processes intersecting with the groups’ dynamics. Second, organisational persistence is not explained by these theories. One is left with the impression that organisations tend to lose membership and hence cease to exist if they base their appeals exclusively on “erroneous” definitions of individual

interest. But what makes individuals to be responsive to solidarity and purposive goods? Moreover, what makes these organizations persist over time, when frequently the intensity of mobilization based in solidarity or purposive incentives has faded away? Associational persistence is determined to a large degree by the historical origins of an association and specifically by the way an association could become embedded in the social and political structures.\(^9\) In sum, earlier theories are too general, ahistorical, and oblivious of context.

To go beyond these the existing approaches, it is necessary to develop an institutional and historical theory that locates associational formation, persistence, and transformations in socio-political contexts, and that is attentive to historical variations.\(^{20}\) Societies differ in their so-called degree of associational life: the extent to which the expression of interests will take the form of voluntary association, the social movement and the party or will take any other form that is non-associative. Thus, to understand the particular role of associational life in a given society, it is necessary to compare the organisation of associational life with other institutions concerning the expression of interests. This is what Tocqueville meant when he wrote that «wherever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association».\(^{21}\) Alternatively in Philippe Schmitter’s words, «associational life never completely monopolises the interactions between the state and the individuals, firms and clans, but operates alongside these interactions in differing mixes of efforts to influence the course of public policy».\(^{22}\)

In this enterprise, the first task is to situate collective action through voluntary associations within the overall patterns and diversity of forms of collective action. First, one needs to specify and understand the different modes of collective action, so as to be able to situate the voluntary association within the universe of forms of collective action. Moreover, one must define the dimensions

\(^{21}\) Tocqueville, 1994, p. 106.
\(^{22}\) Schmitter, 1997, p. 240.
under which collective action varies. It is my argument that collective action should be discussed in two important aspects. The first aspect to discuss is the nature of those ties that connect an individual to the course of action, and they can be formal or informal. The second aspect is the degree of exit from those ties, varying between high and low.

Collective action can be organised under formal or informal ties. It can take the form of organised and formalised organisations, involving some kind of organisational creation and degree of bureaucratisation, or subsist over already established social networks and relationships and be based on non-written shared understandings and rules. Informal collective action can take the form of protest actions bringing together disparate groups and communities, like in strikes or in riots; or it can be the expression of interests through such institutions as the church, primary social groups (the community or family), personal followings, plain gatherings of people, networks like bureaucratic factions, diplomatic and civil service cercles, clientelas, gangs of criminal entrepreneurs like the Mafia, followings under warlords, social banditry, or communal chiefdoms. Informal collective action is always based on personal ties of trust, it has a tendency to be local and territorial, and in its simplest forms (e.g. street gangs) it arises out of the «habitual association of the members over a long period of time». Formal ties are typical of modern voluntary associations but also of other modern institutions like the state. They vary in the degree of freedom that partners have to disengage from these relationships, but at the core there is a written definition and specification of rights and duties of the actors engaging in collective action, like the definitions of the role of the member of an association or a political party specified in the statutes of these organizations, or the definition of rights and obligations of citizens vis-à-vis the state, in laws, constitutions, and so on.

This distinction was first formulated by Ferdinand Tönnies in his conceptualisation of forms of social life. Tönnies distinguished between two ideal types of society. The first, Gemeinschaft, is equated with community life and involves all kinds of social co-existence that are «familiar, conformable and

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24 White, 1964, p. 113.
exclusive». It manifested itself in what Tönnies called communities of blood, social relationships between mother and child, man and woman, brothers and sisters, but also in communities of place (the neighbourhood, and the village) and communities of faith (religion). These are durable relationships that are based on people having lived long together and/or having possessed goods in common (like land), which produce as a consequence strong bonds of friendship and loyalties. In its purest form, it implies common friends and common enemies.

The other ideal type of society is *Gesellschaft*, which is a characteristic of modern urban and industrial society. Individuals establish contractual relationships and voluntary agreements between free-willing agents that are neither determined nor previously established by the habit of living together in the same village or by being a member of the same family. Here, individuals do not possess previous bonds but rather, they establish contractual bonds that are meant to serve mutual advantages.²⁵

Although I was inspired by this conceptualisation, I depart from it because these ideal types are identified with types of society, with whole societies, whereas I restrict the level generalisation to types of social relationships, to a specific dimension of social life which I consider relevant to the problem at hand.

The second dimension is the facility of exit from those ties. Once within a network of collective action, individuals face varying degrees of freedom in leaving the network, if they feel that are not receiving the expected benefits.²⁶ In other words, this dimension refers to the degree of control that a network and its leaders have on members’ actions. Several means can be employed by them, like having the power to distribute valuable goods for the members that cannot be found anywhere else (monopolistic access to valuable goods) or through sanctions, whether psychological (e.g. excommunication in the church) or physical (coercion, threat to physical integrity and even life).²⁷ This means that networks of collective action, associational or not, are providers of goods and enforcers of compliance that urge a cost/benefit calculation on members who

contemplate whether to stay in or leave a network. Both formal and informal
technologies of collective action do this. They refer to «mechanisms whereby
pertinent individuals are induced to join, and stay involved» in these collective
action networks.28

Extreme cases of very high costs of leaving are totalitarian parties criminal
groups that eliminate their dissidents or states that control vehemently their
borders. According to Hirschman, organisations like the church, the family, the
tribe, and the state are cases where the exit option is very costly.29 Informal
associations like the family give access of emotional and material support
benefits; communities of territory give self-identification and public recognition
of status; criminal networks, through high risk (physical) adventures give access
to fast and vast material goods; political parties give members the benefits of
purposive benefits, of the sense of fulfilment of the civic duty of participation
under a common ideology and access to resources of the state; and voluntary
associations give members identification benefits and access to selective goods
(e.g. welfare benefits channelled through professional associations to the
individuals in a certain productive sector). In many contexts there is also some
degree of coercion involved. Leaders and officials of a voluntary association have
an interest to coerce members to stay in the association, for example by raising
the costs of access to certain goods making it harder for people to leave the
association. In these situations, we can talk of non-voluntary membership or
participation.30

The dimensions of collective action can be formed into a typology of
collective action. I propose the following:

30 The notion of non-voluntary associational life is central in Streeck and Schmitter, 1985.
Table 1- Forms of Collective Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Exit</th>
<th>Bus Line</th>
<th>Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Informal</td>
<td>Gathering/Crowd</td>
<td>Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Formal</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The upper left quadrant refers to those forms of collective action that are informal and with high degree of exit. A pure form is the occasional meeting between two strangers that engage in short-term collective action for some immediate purpose with their interaction finishing rapidly after both or one of them considers that her aims have been achieved (e.g. helping someone change a tire on a country road). Cases a bit more coherent are the common phenomena of gatherings and crowds, when people that accidentally or by some predetermined routine are put together in the same context and because of an external stimulus and based in implicit codes of behaviour pursue local and short term common action (e.g. bus line). Other cases are short-term peasant rebellions that mobilize many people but end soon, and that are unable to sustain themselves for a long time period because individual defection happens very soon.\(^{31}\)

The lower left quadrant refers to forms of collective action whose ties are informal and the exit possibility is low. In most human societies, the family is the typical form here; it is based on affective feelings of belonging that are not written but whose costs of leaving are very high, both materially (especially in the first two formative decades of the individual in modern societies) and

\(^{31}\) For peasant rebellions see Scott, 1976, p. 33.
emotionally (it is possible to break with one’s family completely but at cost of running into high emotional loss).

The lower right quadrant refers to those collective action forms where exit is low and ties are formal. Historically, the state has provided a clear example. It is a formal organization that attributes differentiating status to the individuals within its territory according to legal and predefined criteria (e.g. tax-payer categories, citizenship statutes, or nationality attribution), and that determines this formal attribution of status from an individual’s birth to his death. Moreover, it is coercive, and in this sense it is a high-exit organization. It has a panoply of instruments (police, army, and officials) to coerce individuals to give it their resources (e.g. taxes), time (e.g. civil service) and even their life (e.g. military conscription in periods of war).32

The upper right side of the typology refers to the high exit and formal ties forms of collective action. Several forms of modern voluntary associations fall in this quadrant: political parties, associations, and movements. They are formal in being groups that are set up specifically to define and promote sets of interests, but whose apprehension does not derive from the patterns of relationship transmitted by tradition and by almost self-evident and spontaneous associations of individuals, like in the family or in the community. On the contrary, these are forms of collective action set up with the purpose of promoting and defining interests that are non-ascriptive, somehow “artificial”, connected by ideology, shared by a profession or a class, and that bring together individuals of otherwise different backgrounds. As Otto von Gierke argued, the emergence of the modern voluntary association is a hallmark of modernity, what he called the «spirit of association». These were forms of collective action that in his opinion were formed for single purposes (whereas the family, the community or medieval corporations absorbed the whole person). In other words, they were specialized formal organizations. Moreover, according to Gierke, they are also based on the free choice of individuals, thus imposing low exit costs on the members. The same individual can belong to a plurality of associations of different purposes

(charity, political, and professional) and many combinations are possible for each individual. More recently, Pizzorno argued in a similar vein: a voluntary association is a formal group «created through the free choice of their members, who can leave whenever they desire, and which pursues specific, declared goals by means of collective action».34

We call this the sphere of Associational life. Still, there are variations to consider in this form of collective action. First, one should not assume that the degree of exit is the same in every association or during each historical period. Associations and their leaders raise the costs of exit when they are able to possess a monopolistic control over the access to certain goods, especially when they have been able to secure a privileged representative role in their constituencies vis-a-vis the authorities and the state. In these contexts, associations frequently become vehicles of state policy. In fact, historically it has been common that the state legislates mandatory or quasi-mandatory membership in certain associations. This is especially true of a subset of democratic countries after the 1930s-1940s: the northern European neo-corporatist civil societies (the Scandinavian countries, Austria, and the Netherlands are examples of this).

Second, one should also consider the political party as a modern form of associational life. The difference with other forms of associational life is that voluntary associations formulate and express interests based on class, sectoral, and professional interests, while political parties are associations devoted to conquering and ruling the state apparatus. The former is functional, the latter is territorial. A voluntary association is a self-organised intermediary group that is relatively independent of authorities and of informal groups of collective action, and it has «a clearly definable membership», a «consciously adopted name», and it is «capable of deliberating about and taking collective actions in defence or promotion of their interests or passions». On the other hand, a

33 Gierke, 1990, p. 118.
34 Pizzorno, 1918, p. 256.
37 Wilson, 1995, p. 31.
political party is a «political association whose principal objective is to control the recruitment» to the state, and whose political objectives are less specific than those of associations.\(^3^9\) Parties are mainly oriented to competition in elections for the occupation of political office and the formation of governing elites.\(^4^0\) Civic groups, unions, trade associations, NGO’s, and neighborhood commissions are all examples of voluntary associations.

As will become evident later, the relation between party and voluntary association can be also cumulative. It is interesting to explain the variations between and within societies given the relative importance of voluntary associations and parties. In some societies parties dominate all the associative landscape; in others, affiliation and participation in events organised by voluntary associations (broadly defined as social movements) monopolise associational life outside the party arena. A good example is provided by democratising Poland, where democratic consolidation was achieved through loose networks of associations in the form of social movements, which acquired some degree of institutionalisation but had very weak links with parties.\(^4^1\) In some societies voluntary associations have strong mobilising capabilities, and they are numerous and perform various activities, while in others none of this happens. Moreover, the associational dynamics between a party and a voluntary association can be in some contexts mutually reinforcing, whereas in others they can be conflictual.\(^4^2\) These sometimes contradictory, sometimes compatible paths between parties and voluntary associations should be related to the changing nature and types of parties and associations during the twentieth century.

Obviously, the borders between these types of collective action are neither fixed nor clear-cut, and I keep distinctions for analytical purposes. Some associations have evolved and prospered using resources from these previous informal types (e.g. a sports club based on a local community) or a formal organisation may evolve into informal collective action (terrorist groups that

\(^3^9\) Schmitter, 1971, p. 9.
\(^4^0\) Rucht, 1996, pp. 186-187.
\(^4^1\) Ekiert, Kubik, 1999, p. 197.
\(^4^2\) We would advance the observation that early twentieth century processes of European democratization fit the first situation, while late twentieth century democratization the second.
originated in political organisations). Examples abound. In the nineteenth century France, the mode of organisation of unions and the preferred modes of collective action (strikes and collective violence) were highly correlated. In this respect, a major causal factor was the legislation on strikes. In situations where there was restriction on the freedom of association, collective action tended to assume non-formal and non-legal forms, like secret societies (e.g. masonry), and to occupy the informal spaces of sociability (e.g. religious ceremonies, funerals as well as theatrical events). Another example is the Solidarity union in Communist Poland that was simultaneously a trade union and a citizens’ committee, and that during the phase of democratisation originated from both parties and associations.

From this typology, and in order to develop a theory of associational life, two crucial implications follow. First, the forces that push for the development of associational life, that is formal easy-exit units of collective action, are the ones that undermine informal collective action. In societies where parties, interest groups, and voluntary associations are weak, we should expect the state, communities, political networks, gangs, families, and gatherings to be the more common venues of collective action. This is a way to conceptualise the need that a theory of associational life formation must also require a theory of non-associational life formation, to see which institutions in society perform the roles of aggregating preferences and identity formation that we would expect parties and associations to perform. Moreover, most societies are a mix of the above mentioned forms of collective action, and their internal dynamics are processes of tension and adaptation between these forms. Societies are composed of different mixes of formal and informal collective action, and with differing degrees of integration within the state. Some societies have a higher role for informal collective action, while others are more formalized with such an encompassing role for associations that they become one of the main pillars of social order. In sum, the tensions and agreements between these clusters of collective action

43 della Porta, 1995.
44 Tilly, 1997a, pp. 74-77.
46 On the notion of Associative Social Order see Streeck and Schmitter, 1985.
shape a society. With this conceptualisation I go beyond the usual division between modern and traditional societies and avoid the teleological reasoning that implies that modernisation necessarily evolves in the direction of associational life. Moreover, I argue that modernisation dynamics in one society may even strengthen informal collective action, while in another society they may produce formal collective action. The difference arises from the ways in which social dynamics interact with historical and institutional legacies.47

Second, what explains variations in the strength and the role of voluntary associations in societies? Assuming a common tendency towards the development of voluntary associations in modern societies since the eighteenth century, which is usually called the associational life sector, what explains its different levels across countries? In order to answer this, one must narrow the level of abstraction and find dimensions to compare and classify national civil societies. This is the topic of the next section.

1.2. Patterns of Associational life, 1930s/1940s-2000

Descriptively speaking, associational life is constituted by the number of, and the interactive dynamics between, voluntary associations that exist in a particular setting. It is a «set or system of self-organized intermediary groups that» deliberate and promote their interests, ideologies and conceptions of individual and/or collective interests through collective action.48 It is «organized social activity that occurs in groups that are formed outside the State, the market, and the family».49 But it is composed of that part of associational life which is not political parties.

Associational life is a difficult concept to operationalize and to identify. First, it does not have one specific institutional setting but several, depending on the associational arena in question (e.g. religion, human rights, neighbourhood committees, or trade unions). In this sense associational life is «internally

49 Pharr, 2003, p. xiii.
The diversity of associations can be classified according to many criteria (e.g. types of interest pursued or self-declared classification). Major classifications have been based on direct imputations of the interests and identities that associations declare to pursue. Accordingly, associations are classified as organizations representing social identities (race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or class), special-interest groups (mercantile and commercial associations, manufacturers, employers, boards of trade, or chambers of commerce), elite social clubs, professional associations (teachers, lawyers’ guilds, or doctors), neighborhood associations, civic clubs, citizens’ groups, and labor organizations. Another classification is the one opposing traditional and old organizations (unions and professional) and new associations (peace, environmental, or animal rights). Yet another classification distinguishes associations from social movements by the degree they defend public or private interests, whether groups are open to everybody or impose restrictions on membership. Offe and Fuchs have recently proposed a typology, but it suffers from such generality and includes so many lines of classification that it is simultaneously about everything and nothing.

Second, each sector’s size and relative importance in the national polity, density, mobilizational capacity, relations between associations (competition or

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50 Ekiert, 2001, p. 84; Ekiert, Kubik, 1999, p. 85; Stepan, 1988, pp. 3-4.
51 On these difficulties see Schmitter, 1977, p. 8.
52 Kaufman, 2002; Rothstein, 2002, p. 309; Wessels, 1997, p. 120.
54 In their classification, there are five potentially useful typologies: substantive domains associations: religious, charitable; the degree of formalization of the membership role; inward and outward looking/public regarding associations; universalist vs non-universalist; political and non-political. Offe and Fuchs, 2002, pp. 195-196.
cooperation), and institutionalization vary to a good degree. Erik Olin Wright has argued that class is the major issue around which associations are formed, so that the most important associations are capital and labor organizations. As Schmitter argues, although "the emergence of associational life can assume a wide variety of organizational configurations", the "range that is viable in any given polity is likely to be considerably more restricted". \(^{55}\) But there is still the need to explain associational diversity. \(^{56}\) For instance, many of the functions that are done by unions in some settings are done by religious associations in other settings. \(^{57}\)

One way to bypass these difficulties has been to equate associational life with civility. For Edward Shils, the organizations that constituted associational life serve the function of spreading refined manners in the citizenry: they are a civil society. \(^{58}\) Almond and Verba take this argument even further, because a "civil" associational life is a necessary condition for a democratic regime; one could even say that these authors equate civility with liberal democracy. \(^{59}\) More recently, social capital theories have reiterated this argument by claiming that the more developed an associational landscape, the more citizens learn to cooperate with each other, develop trust relationships, and this by itself spills over into government. \(^{60}\) Democracy is seen as a consequence and as determined by inter-individual relationships that breed trust. It is not always clear whether it is the levels of trust that exist in a society that determine the level of associational development of that society or vice versa. Furthermore, there is some circularity in this argument, since the causes are confused with the effects of civility. Be that as it may, these theories are too psychological. Associational life is the result of socialization processes and cultural attitudes. Methodologically, these approaches tend to focus on individual characteristics of the citizenry as gathered from public opinion surveys and by drawing from them direct assumptions about the character, density, and quality of associational life and democracy. The level of

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\(^{55}\) Schmitter, 1996.
\(^{56}\) Almond, 1963, p. 398.
\(^{57}\) Swaan, 1988.
\(^{58}\) Shils, 1997c, pp. 320-321.
\(^{59}\) Almond, Verba, 1963, p. 5.
analysis remains at the individual motivations of the citizenry, and in this sense individual psychological traits are thought to pre-exist and determine the formation of the associations themselves: the expression of interests is always prior to the associational institutionalization of those interests.61

These approaches have also other problems. First, associational life is perceived as a purely social phenomenon and as separate from politics, public institutions, and the state. Second, conflict and competition are absent; it is as if associational life is the realm of only peaceful interactions. This may be true for some historical periods (e.g. the neo-corporatist institutionalized partnerships and negotiations between capital and labor in 1960s in Austria) or types of associations (e.g. tea clubs). Even if one admits that there are few power struggles in the more peaceful and institutionalized trust networks involving associations (and even that it is not so clear, since for instance small-town elite clubs may be internally divided by factional fights), these theories forget that these exchanges were the result of power struggles between organized social groups in a society. Associational life is an arena where struggles for power develop. As Gramsci argued, «class struggle is organized on the terrain of active society or civil society».62 Associational life is an arena through which groups and classes compete for resources and power. In this sense, its character is political.

Furthermore, these approaches do not account for political realities and historical variations. They tend to idealize Anglo-Saxon civil societies, namely Great Britain, with its supposed history of aristocratic-bourgeois compromise and gradual integration of pressures from below,63 whereas countries with a weaker sense of trust and lower levels of associational membership are regarded as having weaker, less civic political cultures (e.g. France or Italy). Temporal variations are poorly explained. For instance, the recent debate about the decline of social capital since it focus on attitudes tends to extrapolate from it interpretations of decline almost automatically, romanticize the past, and see the

62 Burawoy, 2003, p. 213.
future as bleak without considering that the historical meaning of the supposed decline of civic engagement may be very different.\textsuperscript{64}

In this sense, a historical approach is required. Associational life is neither good nor bad in itself; this is to be determined by historical research.\textsuperscript{65} For the present purposes, associational life is a historical concept, it should reflect historical realities, and it should capture paths of organizational and institutional development. For instance, associational life can be dominated by democratic or anti-democratic organizations, but usually it is portrayed as always acting «within pre-established rules of a "civil," i.e. mutually respectful, nature».\textsuperscript{66} In fact, a major drawback in associational life theories is their a-historical character. Consequently, no distinction is provided between a theory of the origins and types of voluntary associational life and a theory of the effects of associational life, namely its contribution to democracy. In such approaches, associations are usually portrayed as always concerned with public rather than with private ends, as never performing political functions (which implies that they can never have some form of integration within the State), and they are given functions that lack empirical support (e.g. to monitor and restrain the state in democracies and to democratise authoritarian regimes). Other definitions equate voluntary associations with the rule of law.

Existing approaches, since they usually rely on culturalist assumptions, fail to put the organizations themselves at the locus of analysis. Since it is assumed that interests exist before the development of associations, there is little need to study associations as such, since they are only an outgrowth of attitudes. Yet, as I have argued, it is the very process of historical associational formation that creates identities, formulations of collective as well as group and individual interest that frequently contrast other associations and groups. One needs to explain why the definition of interest formulation is in some contexts (both between societies and between groups in the same society) almost a monopoly of voluntary associations and in other contexts stays in the hands of other agencies (e.g. the family or the

\textsuperscript{64} For criticisms see Fiorina, 2002, pp. 512-516, 526 and Levy, 1999, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{65} Kaufman, 2002, p. 6.
From this perspective, it seems clear that analysts should move from attitudes and surveys to other dimensions and aspects in their studies.

In order to explain variations between modern democracies in their degree of associational life, two tasks are necessary. First, one should excavate dimensions of variation in order to compare civil societies at the national level. This serves to identify national patterns of associational life. Second, the concept of associational life should be disaggregated and a specific set of associations should be chosen for the study. In turn, their path of development should be followed while explaining their varying degrees in representing, recruiting, and mobilizing their constituencies. One should ask which groups are organized and how they became to be organized as well as which associations are more successful and why in mobilizing their constituencies.

Of particular interest are associations that in the historical development of modern societies based their appeals on vast constituencies and tried to have influence at the national level through the creation and organization of big and broad categories of individuals. In this context I argue that three types of mass associations were central in modern societies: unions, agrarian, and religious (sometimes also ethnic based) associations. The urban and rural mobilization of the popular classes, with appeals to class, sector of production, and religious attachment, have been rival strategies of mobilization in the era of mass politics, especially after the 1870s. The first type refers to wage earners, people in a common situation of deriving income from the sale of their labor. They have existed in many historical times, but as a mass of people they are a modern phenomenon, the result of the marketization of societies and technical specialization. The second type, or agrarian associations, has been a similar movement to the industrial workers unions, fighting for improvements in the status of farmers, tenants, and the rural proletariat in the modern conditions of market agriculture. In addition, religion has been one form of resisting the spread of modern liberal market societies. Here the important associations are lay associations, formed by religious lay people that chose to defend and promote the

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interests of a particular religion by setting up a voluntary association. These associations should be distinguished from many other religious associations which are not voluntary but are an intrinsic part of a commitment that is accepted and not (usually) chosen. Therefore, one must look for variations in these attachments across different national polities in order to explain variations in associational life.\(^6^9\)

Regarding the first aspect, it is necessary to establish dimensions with which on can compare across national countries. Despite the difficulties discussed above, it is possible to conceptualize civil societies at the national level, as is supported by some of the literature. As a first cut, there are regularities in associational membership levels of adult populations that are stable over time. These point to structural factors and invariants behind individual decisions to become a member of associations. Moreover, associations tend to appear in waves. Earlier research shows that there are periods of high associational growth and periods of consolidation of previous patterns.\(^7^0\) Furthermore and more importantly, one should examine the core of what constitutes a voluntary association and extract properties that are invariant among all voluntary associations. In this respect and following Schmitter and Streeck, I argue that associations are caught between two logics: the logic of membership and the logic of influence. Associations are created by entrepreneurs, but in order for them to survive they must be able to recruit a clear membership and adapt to the institutional environment they face, including relations with other associations.

Associations are «producers of group interests» and not just «the passive recipients of preferences put forward by their constituents and clients». «Interests are not given but emerge as result of multifaceted interaction between social and organizational structure». To a large extent, the leadership and the staff of an organization determine interest formation and definition, as well as the properties of the association.\(^7^1\) As Gierke noted in the 1860s with reference to unions, the stronger unions were the ones that were able inbue the masses with a unified

\(^7^0\) Stinchcombe, 1986.
\(^7^1\) Streeck and Schmitter, 1985, p. 130.
Thus, associations are not reducible to members’ interests, and they both respond to members and the dynamics within the association and are shaped by their social environment. As James Q. Wilson has argued, «the behavior of persons who lead or speak for an organization can best be understood in terms of their efforts to maintain and enhance the organization and their position within it». Hence, organisations seek survival by «securing essential contributions of effort and resources from members» and some form of equilibrium with the environment. One of the more important aspects of the environment are the other associations: their number, their operating logic, their reciprocal interaction, and specifically the «existence of networks» between associations and the degree to which these networks facilitate co-operation among them.

From this definition of association it follows that the two major aspects that structure an association’s life are: 1) the need for a supply of membership, and 2) the relationships with other associations. This is similar to what Philippe Schmitter has defined as coverage: the degree to which social groups «have available for their interests’ defense the existence of formal organizations». As the dimensions of the concept, Schmitter includes the number of associations, their geographic scope, the degree to which associations form federations, and their functional scope (the diversity of interests that are mobilized and aggregated by the associations).

Yet, Schmitter’s definition suffers from too many dimensions. It is preferable to focus on a smaller number of dimensions while considering the rest as possible independent variables. For instance, what Schmitter calls functional scope of associational life can be subsumed under the idea that associations representing diverse societal interests form coalitions and that some of these coalitions are promoted by political parties. This means that parties should be taken into consideration, not as a part of the outcome to be explained but more as a part of a causal theory, or as an independent variable.

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75 Heinrich, 2005, p. 218.
76 Schmitter, 1971, p. 11.
I focus on two aspects, namely density and inter-organizational dynamics. These two dimensions capture associational life at national level. They capture the encompassiness of associations and their presence in shaping people’s lives (the degree to which an association encompasses its potential members) as well as their role as independent bodies with partial autonomy from their members and constituencies interests: forming cohesive links with other associations, and promoting mutual consultation for common actions and policy implementation.

The concept “density” refers to the degree to which associations have the capacity to recruit individuals from the groups they seek to represent (from a total failure to situations of an almost monopoly of representation). It is usually measured by membership of the adult population in voluntary associations, or in specific sub-sectors (e.g. union density), the proportion of that category that is member of the association(s) claiming to represent it. Membership (like subsidies, fees, grants, and sales) is an association’s resource and an indicator of the degree to which associations shape individual’s life in such areas as politics, work, or leisure.

A focus on membership is important also for other reasons. In the history of modern voluntary associations, it has been object of struggle for long periods, with sometimes violent clashes between rulers and ruled over the right of forming voluntary mass associations. As a political right it was not easily acquired or granted, and it linked to struggles over the role of the ruled and the rulers in a polity.77 Early pluralist thinkers, although overly optimistic of the potential of associational life in democracy, captured this link between integration in national polities and membership associations. According to Almond and Verba, «the member, in contrast with the nonmember», appears to approximate more closely what we have called the democratic citizen. The member is competent, active and open with his opinions»78. Even passive membership was related to some sense of political competence.79

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77 Howard, 2005, p. 231.
In the contemporary debate on the significance of membership, it has been suggested that formal membership is no longer central, and that it is being replaced by informal and fluid forms of identification, especially within social movements. Allegedly, there has been a decline of traditional formal and large associations with socioeconomic, class, and sectoral interests, which are being replaced by social movement activity and loosely organized groups. In Melucci’s terms, since the 1980s civic engagement is characterized by “movement areas”, networks composed of a multiplicity of groups that are dispersed and fragmented. They mobilize people periodically, according to the emergence of new issues. Memberships tend to be temporary and disrespectful of the logic of discipline familiar in older mass associations. Yet, this seems like an exaggeration both empirically and theoretically.

Regarding the theoretical concern, even if we assume that there is a decline of membership in the traditional associations within contemporary societies, especially since the 1970s, and even if it is being replaced by other forms of associational life, we would still need a theory that explains variations in membership that would use the standard of membership as the criteria for comparisons. This is particularly important for the period where formal membership was one of the main objects of claim-making (together with suffrage extension and welfare benefits) of the popular classes (notably during the nineteenth and the early twentieth century) and when affiliation became a routine form of civic engagement (1930s/1940s-1970s). But this has not yet been attempted. We still lack a general theory of associational membership for Western Europe. Only after this theory has been developed, we can develop a hypothesis on the supposed decline of membership and its replacement by other forms of civic engagement. As Dahl noted in 1982 (although he did not provide an explanation for it), between the 1940s and the 1980s variations «in organizational membership are great … in the advanced industrial countries».

In the early stages of associational life there was already much variation. Many contributors noted that already in the nineteenth century, when the modern

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80 Melucci, 1989, pp. 73-74.
voluntary association appeared, there was wide variation, which became even higher during the interwar years, with Germany and Sweden in the path of becoming full associational societies and France being a case of low membership and where citizens preferred informal identifications. Recent research on American associational life by Theda Skocpol, especially on large federated associations, concludes that associations were for the most part of their history avenues of upward social mobility, places to find jobs, a husband or a wife, and providers of social welfare for members.  

Moreover, since it is such an important good, associations have sought to create situations, usually with the help of the state, where membership becomes almost mandatory, thus creating situations of semi-voluntary membership. As Schmitter has argued, «organized interests in the political life of Western democracies» have as well been characterized by «monopolies of interest representation». «Membership in associations is not always voluntary and a wide range of de facto as well as de jure arrangements exist both to bind members to their associations and to prevent the emergence of competing ones». Membership is still the best measure of density of associational life, or of penetration in a society by voluntary associations, and of their capacity to even indirectly socialize publics by the distribution of goods. It can also be seen as a measure of organizational consolidation. As Collier argues, the higher the levels of membership in associations the more able are associations to organize sustained mobilization and to develop strategies. In this respect, membership is an important resource of associations and its leaders will try use a variety of inducements to co-opt people, with selective incentives that make the distribution of certain goods cherished by the public only available through membership of the organization.

In addition, there is little empirical evidence supporting claims of a membership decline in associations. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, with the exception of Spain, all Western European countries show a rise in affiliation.

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82 Skocpol, 2003, pp. 79-85.
85 Collier, 2006, p. 133.
Interestingly, the rise after the 1980s has been higher in the countries which already had the higher rates of membership in the previous decades, just very small in the countries which had a medium level of membership, and there is a decline in the countries that were actually the weakest in terms of density before the 1980s. For instance in Denmark and in the Netherlands, which had some of the highest rates of membership in the 1968-1983 period (70.3% and 69.3% respectively), during the 1990-2002 period membership rose to 86.5% and 82.5% respectively. Italy and the United Kingdom, which in the first period had average rates of membership in European terms, maintain that position in the post-1980 period with only a small increase (37.3% and 53.3% respectively), thus lessening the gap with the countries on the top of the table. Finally, the countries with the lowest rates until the 1980s saw their lower position evolve even more to the bottom during the following decades. Spain declined from 33.5% to 30.5% and France from 43% to 40%. Evidently, something must have happened in the mid-1970s and the early 1980s that contributed to the widening of the gap between the Western European countries. The ranking of the countries is the same as in the decades before, after the 1980s there are growing differences between low, medium and high ranking countries. To explain this would be a fascinating topic, yet beyond the scope of this dissertation, and despite some studies have dealt with it, there is still no general explanation.\footnote{Schmitter, Trechsel, 2004; for the USA trends since the 1970s see Pierson and Skocpol, 2007.}
Table 2: Membership in Voluntary Associations (% adult population affiliated)

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<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>79.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>62</td>
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Table 3: Membership in Voluntary Associations: growth between 1968 and 2002 (%)

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The supposed decline in membership seems to be restricted to the United States since the 1970s. In a recent study, Dekker and Broek concluded that between 1980 and 2000 in a selected group of countries there was no evidence supporting a decline in levels of membership in associations, although there is an even deeper variation in paths. They observed a small decline in membership in countries like France, Spain, and Germany and growth in the rest of western European countries. My data challenges such conclusion, because there is growth, although at different rates, in all western European countries. Moreover, the general tendency is for a growing distance between existing patterns, with the countries which had a high associational life until the 1980s now showing even more growth, whereas the countries with lowest score before 1980s stabilizing or having very low growth rates. This becomes evident from the two ways in which

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the authors counted membership. First, they considered membership in all types of associations with the exception of religious groups and parties. Here there was growth in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, and decline in Ireland, (West) Germany, France and Spain. When parties and religious associations were included, the patterns of growth and decline were similar.88

For the most part, the existing data does not show also that individualised and expressive forms of participation are replacing forms of involvement in traditional associations.89 There has been some rise in membership in social civic associations and some decline in political forms of associational life, but this does not mean that social associations are on their way to become the sole type of organizations of Western citizenry or that political associations are on the road to extinction. The contemporary situation is better described as one where political and social organizations share space in the polity, which before was mainly a monopoly of political associations. As Schmitter and Trechsel argue, «the universe of associations is becoming increasingly specialised. More and more associations, movements and foundations are chasing after members and funds to support ever more specific definitions of collective interest and passion».90

As can be seen from Table 4, the picture is more complex. Since the 1970s, there has been a rise of both political and social organizations in some countries with clear cases being Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. In the case of Denmark, between 1977 and 1998 membership in political organizations rose from 73% to 90% and in social organizations from 59% to 89%. Other countries show a decline in membership in both types of associations. This is the case in Belgium and particularly in France, where membership in political associations declined from 64% to 15% and in social organizations from 64% to 43%. In the remaining countries (Austria, Germany, and Great Britain), there is a decline in political organizations and a rise in social organizations, although in these countries the rise of political associations is not too deep and the rise in social organizations is not much higher from previous levels. For instance, in Germany

88 Dekker, Broek, 2005, p. 49.
political membership declined from 38% to 23% and levels of membership in social organizations have maintained the level of 52%. It is in Italy where one notices marked differences between the two types of associations, with a fast decline in political organizations (from 54% in 1977 to 18% in 1998) and a substantial rise in social associations membership (from 19% to 34%). Finally, in the two southern European countries, Portugal and Spain, social associations have higher membership rates than political associations, but both at very low levels and showing a pattern of relative stability between 1990 and 1998. Portugal has rates of 9% in political membership and Spain from 9% to 10%. In social membership, Portugal has rates of 26% and 25% between 1990 and 1998 and Spain of 23% and 26% during the same period.

Table 4: Membership in Type of Association: Political and Social

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</tbody>
</table>

(sources: Eurobarometer: 1977-nº 8, 1983,-nº19, 1990-nº34.0, 1998-nº50.1; social associations: groups that provide social welfare, personal health, education, art, music and culture, youth,
sports, recreation and entertainment; political associations: unions, professional associations, local community groups, political parties, movements for human rights, peace, Third World development, resource conservation, environmental protection, gender equality.

Finally from the data on union density (Table 5), one notices varying evolutionary patterns. Between 1970 and 1997 there has been a decline of union density in countries like Austria (from 57% to 39%), France (20% to 10%), Germany (32% to 27%), the Netherlands (37% to 23%), Great Britain (50% to 43%), Spain (26% to 17%), and Portugal (from 52% to 26%). Moreover, this decline has been big in some countries. Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal have all more than a 10 point fall. In other countries the decline has been less dramatic (Great Britain and Germany). At the same time, there has been a rise in union density in other countries. Some of them are Belgium (42% to 50%), Denmark (62% to 76%), Norway (50% to 55%), and Sweden (67% to 86%). Italy has maintained an average of 41% during this period (37%).

Table 5: Net Union Density (% of active labor force)

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In sum, from the analysed data, one can draw the conclusion that affiliation or membership is still a decisive aspect of associational life, in spite of its recent transformations. Since the objective here is not so much to explain recent transformations but instead to explain the variations for the whole post 1930s/1945 period, I will suggest rankings between western European societies. As an indicator, I use the levels of membership of the adult population in voluntary associations. By using Table 2, I examine the degree to which Western European countries tend to co-vary and form clusters. Although a crude measure, it constitutes a starting point in order to classify countries. This indicator measures the degree to which associational life encapsulates the population of a given polity.

Several clusters of countries emerge when comparing levels of membership of the adult population of Western European countries for the period 1968-2002. First, high density countries that show levels of membership consistently above 66% are Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands. The lowest density group (below 33%) is composed of Spain and Portugal. A third group, of medium density (between 33% and 66%), is more heterogeneous. Nevertheless, it is composed of two subgroups. One is closer to the lowest density group. It has percentages always below 50%, and it is composed of France, Italy, and Switzerland. The other group is closer to the higher group (percentages between 50% and 66%) and is composed of Austria, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Using these measures, I have classified the countries in the following way:
Table 6: Membership in Voluntary Associations, Western Europe-1968-2002.

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The second dimension of associational life refers to the main type of interaction between voluntary associations. The pluralist theoretical tradition has emphasized this aspect. In particular, it has been emphasized that associations, almost by definition, compete with each other in each particular arena of interest. Max Weber noted this when he argued that religious sects in the United States were more competitive and that this spurred a process of organizational diffusion. To Weber this process stimulated the growth of associations because sects, contrary to churches, are voluntary associations of «those who, according to the principle, are religiously and morally qualified. If one finds voluntary reception of his membership, by virtue of religious probation, he joins the sect voluntarily».  

Moreover, as James Q. Wilson argued, «all voluntary associations, like all retail firms, compete with each other – they struggle to

obtain scarce resources from a population of prospective contributors (or customers) who in a sense are allocating their money, time, and value of their names between associational and non-associational uses and, within the former ones, among a variety of alternative associations». 92 This is especially true in organizations that have similar objectives or belong to the same ideological area. Associations compete with each other more intensely especially if they are in the same functional, sectoral, geographical, or ethnic arena, because the pool of resources and members is the same and less between associations that oppose each other (e.g. labour unions versus employers). 93

Still, competition between associations is more a question of degree. Associations are not competing all the time, and sometimes they even restrict competition and cooperate with each other. Empirically this is demonstrated by the fact that competition is especially intense in the formative and early years of an association, when the organization does not yet have a defined jurisdiction and arena of intervention. When associations achieve these, they tend to compete less. 94 Weber, although noting that in America there was the «proselytizing of souls by competing sects», also observed that the same sects sometimes formed «cartels for the restriction of proselytizing». 95 In neo-democracies it has also been noted that after the period of transition from authoritarianism, where a plurality of associations with competing aims emerges, competition is replaced gradually by the question of «collective action among or across organizations with compatible interests and agendas». 96 Oxhorn demonstrated the validity of this argument when he studied Chilean neighborhood movements and showed how these associations had to coalesce in a broader and novel social movement in order to achieve leverage and success. 97

One also encounters arguments that associations seek mainly to develop a specific area of intervention and competence, have a regular clientele, and an

94 Wilson, 1995, pp. 264-266.
96 Collier, 2006, p. 130.
97 Oxhorn, p. 288.
undisputed jurisdiction over a function, service, goal or cause». To James Q. Wilson, competition is subordinate to these aims. Associations will compete only to the extent that it ensures their survival. Sometimes associations, especially the associational leaders and staff, will seek an accommodation and even declared alliances with other associations. In this sense it is necessary to look at the horizontal relations of organizations with each other. An important form of institutionalization of associational cooperation is the construction of confederation structures (especially at the national level). Gierke was one of the first to note that early nineteenth century associations evolved from small-scale and localistic organizations dedicated to the defense of a small portion of the working classes (brotherhoods, burial, and self-help societies) to large-scale and nationwide organizations that linked these associations to one another. These confederations were able to amass fees to establish union funds, structured internal institutions for the coordination of collective action (e.g. organization of strikes) like central committees and national congresses. Also Simmel argued that in some circumstances associations promote the creation of federations, which are associations of associations, or in his words «coalitions of coalitions». Even more, this trend for the creation of confederal structures is the central dynamic of contemporary association building of groups like the industrial workers, the mercantile class, and women. According to Simmel, the particularistic divisions within each societal group, like the divisions in the merchant class or between workers of different branches of industry, was something of the past. Groups now sought to consolidate alliances and build cohesive groups. For instance, Simmel considered general strike as an example of how workers from different arenas considered themselves as members of the same class.

More recently, Philippe Schmitter’s work on neo-corporatism has emphasized this aspect. According to Schmitter, in many western European

101 Stepan, 2001, p. 103.
103 Simmel, 1964, p. 175.
countries the associational landscape is composed mainly of «singular, concentrated, differentiated and hierarchical associations» and not of «multiple, dispersed, non-hierarchical» ones. Even more importantly, Schmitter suggested that these aspects of centralization (themselves deriving from monopolies of representation by the associations), have historically emerged before acquiring high levels of membership. The same argument has been applied to political parties. Lipset and Rokkan argued that Western European political parties during the period from the 1920s until the 1970s consolidated themselves first as organizations in the 1920s and only later, after the 1930s and 1940s, started recruiting members on a mass scale.

Following these insights, I argue that societies vary to the extent that associations are concentrated in peak associations, unified under a single leadership who is responsible for negotiating in the name of the several associations within the network. I call this dimension the degree of coordination of associational life and use data from national union movements as an indicator to assess the degree of coordination of associational life. It is constituted by two sub-dimensions: monopoly and centralisation. Regarding monopoly, this sub-dimension captures the degree of concentration in a single peak organization of the multiple associations that compose a sector (unions, capital, a sector, an industry, a class, a region, and a state). I use as an indicator of the degree of monopoly of associational life the monopoly of the main union confederation, measured by the known percentage of unions affiliated to the main confederation. In theory, monopoly makes coordination easier by replacing competition between associations with inter-organisational dialogue and pact-making. Still, this is not necessarily so, and so it is necessary to look at the second dimension, centralisation. Centralisation measures the degree of control

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107 Lipset and Rokkan, 1985, p. 238.
109 Schmitter, 1999, p. 438; Katzenstein calls it concentration, but its meaning is the same as monopoly, the proportion of a certain category (farmers, workers etc) that is organized by the confederations organizations. Katzenstein, 1985, pp. 32-33, 89.
and capacity for coordination of the peak association over its members. Although there are many monopolistic associations, some have low capacity to make members comply with a peak level decision; sometimes members have large degrees of autonomy of action, including financial autonomy.111

To use the degree of the union movement’s monopoly and centralization as the measure of coordination of associational life could be stretching the indicator too far by wanting it to mean something that it is unable to reveal, namely the coordination level of other arenas of associational life. As mentioned before, associational life is composed of many sub-arenas, and it is plausible that they have different logics and hence different coordination levels. Still, as a first step to assess the level of coordination of associational life it is a useful indicator for at least two reasons. First, because workers’ movements have been identified with the history of associational life as such and historically has occupied the central role in associational life.112 Second, several researchers have observed a process of institutional homology between associations. In the countries with high union centralisation other associations will tend to acquire that form. According to Schmitter, «where workers’ associations are highly centralized and monopolistic, other interests will be correspondingly organized».113 And as Peter Katzenstein argues that «trans-sectoral coordination» in unions extends to other groups in a society. This happens because monopolistic and centralized union confederations have been the result of full integration of these union confederations in the formulation and implementation of public policy (issues like full employment, economic growth), and this makes them have an impact on other interests that accordingly will try to imitate this organizational format.114

In Table 7, I have condensed information relative to the degrees of coordination of associational life in Western European democracies for the period 1950-1990. I have gathered data on the degree of monopoly of the main union confederation in each country and the percentage of unions that are affiliated in

112 Katzenelson and Zolberg, 1986.
114 Katzenstein, 1985, p. 92.
the main confederation. I have relied on the classification of Colin Crouch on the degree of centralization of main confederation, the degree to which it has the power in relation to its affiliates in terms of control of strike funds, strike calls and wage demands, and classified the countries in terms of high (H), medium (M), or low (L) centralization.

Table 7: Western Europe: Coordination of Labor Unions, 1950-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>M/H</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>M/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>M/H</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>M/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>M/H</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>M/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>M/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>M/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Mon: monopoly; Cent: centralization; *% of the universe of affiliated labor force that belongs to the main confederation; Sources: Crouch, 1993, pp. 177-283; Schmitter, 1995, p. 294)

As is evident from the last table, for the most part of second half of the twentieth century, between 1950 and 1990, Western European countries exhibited wide variations in monopoly and centralization, the two dimensions of coordination. Some countries have high monopoly and centralization. Here union confederations include most of the existing unions in the polity (usually above 70%) and have the capacity to coordinate their actions. Denmark, Norway, and Austria are the clearest examples. Sweden and Germany are very close, although with less centralization. Then a second Medium to high monopoly (marks between 40 and 70%) and centralization are the cases of Belgium and the
Netherlands followed by a category of high monopoly (above 70%) and low centralization, represented by the Great Britain and Ireland. Finally, there is a group of cases that rank low in both dimensions: France, Portugal, and Spain. Their levels of monopoly are usually below 50%. Italy is a borderline case where centralization and the degree of monopoly (around 50-60%) is higher than in the other southern European cases.

In Table 8, I have ranked the countries in these two dimensions and aggregated them in order to arrive at a general ranking of coordination of associational life. For each year between 1950 and 1990, the composite rank order for monopoly is the following: 0-50% equals 3, 50-75% equals 2, and 75-100% equals 1. For centralization, L equals 4, M equals 3, M/H equals 2, and H equals 1. As can be seen from the table, Austria, Germany, Denmark, and Norway rank between first and third in the level of coordination. I hypothesise that most voluntary associations belong to federations/confederations, and that these peak organizations are able to speak and act in the name of its associates. Countries with medium to high levels of coordination are Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Medium to low levels include Italy, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Low levels of coordination are typical of France, Portugal, and Spain.
Table 8: Coordination of Associational life, 1950-1990. Ranking Order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: ranks in parenthesis means that data was not available. It was given the same value of the year before; *since Portugal and Spain are only democratic since the early-mid 1980s, there was not available data for the previous decades. The ranking of these two countries was thus calculated within a comparison with the other countries just for the year 1990; Sources: Crouch, 1993, pp. 177-283; Schmitter, 1995, p. 294)

Moreover, as can be seen from Table 9, in Western European countries the levels of coordination and density of voluntary associations are clearly positively related. The denser a country’s associational life, the more it will be coordinated, and vice versa. As the table shows, the countries with the highest rankings of coordination (between 1 and 7) have also similar rankings for the levels of density. Sweden, Norway, Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands are all in this pattern. Next, there is a middle level of density and coordination: the United Kingdom and Ireland. Italy is again a borderline case,
marking the frontier between this group and the cases where density and coordination are both low (France) and very low (Spain and Portugal).

Contemporary Switzerland is the only case where a medium level of coordination is related to low levels of density. This is the most interesting finding for two reasons. First, it indicates that the two dimensions need not to co-vary in the same direction. In fact, this relationship is only valid for the post-1945 period. As will be demonstrated in chapter 6, the interwar period was much more varied in the combinations of these two dimensions. Table 27 (p. 165) shows that in the interwar period there were countries with high levels of coordination and density (Austria, Denmark, and Sweden) as well as countries with high levels of coordination and low levels of density (Norway and France). Moreover, Italy and Belgium were countries with high density and low coordination, while Portugal and Spain were countries with low scores on both dimensions.

Second, what comes first, density or coordination? There are several theories that attempt to answer this question, and I will analyse them in chapters 2 to 5. Bottom-up theories would argue that density comes first, since people start forming and join associations first and later, if they so agree, form peak associations in order to coordinate common actions thereby restricting competition. Top-down approaches argue counter-intuitively that associations establish relationships with each other (of cooperation or competition) whose outcomes (mergers, pacts, and so on) are not determined by members’ expectations, or even by their interests, and that frequently they have been led to create large and encompassing networks that only recruit large memberships. This is most frequent in contexts where associations are forced to moderate their competitive drive and rationalise their structures within larger associational wholes by pressure of external agents, usually the state, that in exchange guarantees the association’s monopolies of representation.\textsuperscript{115} The validity of these competing claims will be analysed in chapters 2 to 5.

\textsuperscript{115} On this debate see Schmitter, 1982.
Table 9: Coordination and Density of European Associational Landscapes, 1945-2000. Ranks.

The two constitutive dimensions of associational life, density and coordination, can be combined in order to generate a general ranking of associational life for the period 1945-2000. Although theoretically both dimensions could be seen as independent of each other, their juxtaposition is justified in order to arrive at a denser measure of associational life organization. In the next chapters, I demonstrate this and argue that the degree of coordination of associations and the creation of federative structures were first set up (often in coordination and facilitated by the state) and only afterwards associations started recruiting members. Before doing this, it is sufficient at this stage to construct a global ranking of civil societies that is attentive to variations and that measures the degree of associational life in each society. This ranking can be grouped in types of associational life, which will consist in the outcomes we want to explain.
Table 10: Patterns of Associational Life, Western Europe 1950-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Global Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By aggregating the two dimensions of associational life, one arrives at a conceptualization that captures their characteristics at the national level. I propose four types of associational life. The denominations proposed capture the simultaneous intertwining of embeddedness and recruitment by associations of the population, the degree to which they saturate their potential publics, and also the degree to which associations are linked to each other. The ideal types are the following: 1) Hegemonic (very high recruitment of the population and strong inter-organisational links); 2) Dominant (high in both recruitment and inter-organizational links); 3) Divided (medium in both: there is a division in both the sense that a part of the population is inside the associational networks but a substantial part is outside, and at the same time associations compete with each other and have weaker links); 4) Disjointed (a very small part of the population, usually middle and upper classes, is included in associations, and there is a big
The first set of countries, where associational life is highly dense and coordinated, is composed of the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) and Austria. In these countries, the organizational field is very dense, the population is very much engaged in associations and its activities, and groups in society mainly define their self-interest through associational representatives. There are strong opportunities, incentives and resources to participate, which in turn lead to high membership rates, probably high volunteering and participation within associations, strong autonomy and independence of associations. In Sweden, for instance, there is an indistinction between the terms “association” and “society” in the popular vocabulary. Moreover, associational leaders or elites accept to cooperate with each other, have a culture of mutual respect and agreement which is the result of institutionalized cooperation within the framework of peak associations. Associational leaders exchange information, have regular contacts and agreements, and have the power to talk in the name of a number of secondary associations. Moreover, at the inter-organizational level there is a junction between national and local associational life. Relevant here is that associational life absorbs to a large extent the interactions and exchanges between individuals and other collective actors, and that associational leaders have a leading role in the direction and definition of interests and in the maintenance of social and political order. In this sense organizations and their leaders are hegemons. This has resulted in voluntary and informal co-ordination of conflicting objectives through continuous political bargaining between interest groups.116

The cases of medium-high levels of encompassness of associational life are Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. These cases can be called Dominant. Here, associations are highly institutionalized, frequently developing networks that expand through the whole territory, but not as extensive and powerful as in Scandinavia. Also, density is not as strong in these countries. Still, associations

constitute basic pillars and motors of society and shape much of citizens’ preferences, life, and identity. Yet, contrary to the hegemonic cases people are less engaged in associations and these are less monopolistic and centralized. In other words, although associations still achieve a high degree of density and coordination, there are some divisions between them that inhibit a full coordination at the national level. These divisions may be related to ethnicity, religion, an urban-rural cleavage, or socioeconomic issues, but in any case they have prevented the development of fully encompassing and monopolistic associations. On the other hand, associations still perform a main role in citizens’ lives, more so than communities, the state, or the family, and they are strongly coordinated with each other. Although networks of associations are not as nationally encompassing as in Scandinavia and Austria, there is still the formation and decisive role of peak associations working as associational private governments, with associational elites having power over members’ preferences. The cultural concept here is more around the notion of subsidiarity than of a fusion between society and association.

In the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Ireland there are medium levels of encompassigness. I call this the divided pattern of associational life. The levels of density and coordination of associational life are around the European average. No more than half of the adult population is affiliated in associations, associations are highly autonomous from peak associations, and the associational landscape is characterized by single purpose associations who act autonomously, and as a consequence more competitively, from similar associations belonging to the same sectoral domain. Existing peak confederations have weak monopoly and concentration over members’ units, and a low capacity to make members comply by their directives. Associations do not shape much of individual’s lives.

Finally, in countries like France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal associational life has reached low and very low levels of encompassigness. These are disjointed associational lives. There is a combination of low density and weak vertical links between organizations. Associations are few, and most of the population is unaffiliated with associations and not engaged in their activities.
Associational entrepreneurs found associations, define and redefine interests (even in the name of the general population or of specific sub-sectors of the population), but these organizations exist for themselves to a large degree. The identities and the interests of the population are defined outside the associational field. Although there are internal variations (Italy is a borderline case, where as I argue the levels of membership and coordination are stronger than in the other three cases), associations in general reveal an inability to engage in common tasks of coordination due to their ideologies and activities.\(^{117}\) In this pattern, associational life tends to be fractionalized, localistic, and selectivist in the sense that the state develops partnerships only with selected single associations based on ad hoc and particularistic criteria. In Italy, for instance, the so-called third sector, the network of associations providing health, educational, and poverty eradication programs are low. Only 12% of the population is affected by it and 70% of its volunteers are organized by a single organization.\(^{118}\) People’s identities and interests are mainly defined and intermediated by institutions like the family, the church, informal networks of *compadrio* and neighborliness, or directly interpreted by the state. There are, still, subgroups to consider. In France and Italy the density and coordination of associational life is higher than in the Iberian countries.

Having outlined the prevalent patterns, I analyse next I discuss several theories that have attempted to explain variations in associational life within the process of political development of Western Europe. The aim is to develop a theory that explains these outcomes, the stable patterns of associational life in Western Europe between the 1940s and the 1980s, a period that could be called the golden age of European associational life.

\(^{117}\) On modes of collective action of Portuguese capitalists and industrialists see Schmitter, 1995, p. 311.

\(^{118}\) Ranci, 2001, pp. 74-75.
Chapter 2: Competing Theories of Associational life I

One set of theories on the origins of associational life is based on the idea that societal dynamics shape the propensity of individuals to affiliate and participate in associations, in organizational development, and in interactions between associations. Societal theories have in common a bottom-up focus, in the sense that it is society that shapes politics by making more available and widespread sets of resources and/or cultural attitudes that allow for an easier formation of associations. These theories are of three types. The first, socioeconomic modernisation, argues that the more economically developed a society is, by improving the economic condition of individuals and groups, the more associational life will expand. The second and third sets of theories are more cultural in the sense that they argue that particular attitudes (e.g. levels of inter-personal trust) and religious beliefs (e.g. Catholicism or Protestantism in the European context) predispose individuals in varying ways towards civic engagement. I analyse each of these theories next.

2.1. Socioeconomic Modernisation

The spread of capitalism, industrialisation, and urbanisation during the nineteenth century Europe propeled, in the terms of Tönnies, the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft: the interactions in a society went beyond the level of the community as the economy changed from household to trading.119 This structural transformation of European societies had two consequences. First, it made new groups appear and contest the established elites: capitalists and the middle-class versus the land-owning nobility, and later the labouring classes opposing capitalists and the middle–class.120 Second, this transformation, in the words of Karl Polanyi, originated a «catastrophic dislocation of the lives of the common people» in the sense that the expansion of commerce and markets

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120 Tilly, 1986, pp. 5-7.
undermined the social bases of power and status of traditional classes, because money and expertise, instead of tradition or land, became the new basis of status and power.121 Proletarisation of work implied the declining control of households over their own means of production and the increasing dependency of workers on the sale of their labour power.122

This rise of new groups and professions, new definitions of interests, and new social division of labour produced social and political mobilisation. It increased the self-awareness of groups and intensified existing social problems that eventually became the sources of organisation and associational development.123 This process was observed in many geographical settings, since the evolution from a closed and static economy to a dynamic market economy stimulated associational life. An example is the growth of rotating credit associations in many countries facing development in Africa and Asia.124

Inversely, low levels of economic development have been associated with weak associational life.125 At the level of individuals’ traits, some data seem to corroborate this hypothesis. The more economic resources one has, the more one tends to participate and join associations: high-income individuals tend to participate more in voluntary associations than low-income individuals.126

But once we look at the origins, timing, and changes of specific types of organizations, study patterns of the development of associational life over long periods of time, or focus on the differences between Western European industrialized countries, the socioeconomic argument becomes less compelling. There are numerous deviant cases that are unaccounted by this theory. Country variation in levels of unionisation in Europe since World War Two is not explained by the development of the economy. There are huge variations between countries with similar extent of economic growth: the Swedish working class is six times more unionised that the French, much more than their economic

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121 Polanyi, 1944, p. 33; see also Tilly, 1997a, pp. 62-74.
differences would predict. Urbanisation levels are not a better explanation either. In 1859, Portugal, with a weak associational domain, had the same urbanisation level as the Netherlands and Belgium. In China, associations are stronger in the countryside than in cities. In late nineteenth and early twentieth century United States, the fastest growth rate of associations was in rural and small town areas, not in urban places. Although one could argue that levels of economic development make their impact through threshold effects, it is unable to explain types of associational configurations and the degree of coordination of associational networks. Also for the period between the 1880s and the 1920s, the extent of economic development does not correlate positively with types of associational life.

Individual-level data has shown that the lower the social class and the income of an individual, the lower will be the level of participation. Nevertheless, working class people do in fact affiliate. The relation of income and political membership, for instance, is not linear. For instance, in West Germany income level is not significant, while in Sweden it is the opposite with individuals with extreme income (both the very rich and the very poor) more willing to join organizations than the middle-income people. The correlation of social class to participation is high in Southern European and Anglo-Saxon countries and almost insignificant in Scandinavia.
Table 11: Socio-Economic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrialization</th>
<th>Economic Growth</th>
<th>Pattern of Assocional Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880-1990</td>
<td>1960-1980 (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 11 shows, socio-economic variables are not good at predicting the development of associational life. Levels of industrialisation vary immensely within and between patterns of associational life. Both hegemonic and disjointed civil societies, the most developed and the least developed (in terms of density and coordination), have had historically low levels of industrialization, with the exception of the medium levels of industrialization in Sweden. Germany and France, the first a case of dominant associational life and the second a case of weakly dense and coordinated associational life, have similar rates of industrialization. For instance, in 1930 the percentages of population engaged in
agriculture were quite close (20.1% and 28.8% respectively). Within the dominant pattern of associational life there are cases of high (Germany) and medium industrialization (the Netherlands).

The socio-economic hypothesis is also unclear about which specific type of collective action is the outcome of social change. In some contexts, urbanisation, capitalism, literacy, and industrialisation are associated with informal collective action and not with formal associational life. If it is true that backward societies are less mobilised, in some of these societies socio-economic modernisation strengthened clientelistic relations, namely when local caciques were integrated within national parties. As a consequence, machine politics grew with socio-economic growth. In Latin America and Africa, formal and informal organisations have grown together. Finally, clientelistic practices are not a common phenomenon in all economically underdeveloped societies, while they can also be found in prosperous ones: «Examining societies where clientelism is practiced, one finds that the poorest are not the most common practitioners». In fact, authors stress that «clientelism is more of a social and political phenomenon than an economic or cultural one and the Greek experience suggests that it does not automatically disappear with economic development».

Moreover, the socio-economic hypothesis is unclear about the public status of parties and associations. One would expect associations, in the sense that they are not an outcome of political changes, not to have any public status. But developed countries have great variations in this aspect, ranging from contexts where associations are strongly integrated in the national bureaucracy, corporatism, to others where pluralism is the norm. This theory does not predict all types of associations; only associations that are directly related to the economic sphere and the division of labour (like unions, interest groups, and professional groups) are logical outcomes of this hypothesis.

135 Papakostas, 2000, p. 6.
136 Schmitter, 1981.
137 Wessels, 1997, p. 203.
It has been argued also that the roots of new social movement associational life that appeared in Western democracies in the 1960s are in changes in the economy. Specifically, the transition to an economy based on the service sector led to the emergence of a new style of politics in Western democracies that was based less on large-scale membership organizations and more on informal networks, protest actions, direct action activism, and the domination of new single issue associations (the environmentalist, women’s issues, and so on). Nevertheless, these changes in associational life were not gradual but sudden, appearing mainly in specific periods during the 1960s and the 1970s, whereas the socioeconomic trends were gradual. Many argue that the explanation lies in the institutions of Western democracies, namely how the links between the state and associations have been affected by changes in the nature of the political system, like the changing nature of catch all parties, or of the welfare state.

In order to go beyond these shortcomings, one possible strategy is to conceptualise different types of capitalist development. Countries like France, Italy, or Switzerland, where traditional family-based small business is still a central part of the economy, have maintained a type of worker-employer relationship which is direct and informal, with labour being frequently recruited in the family or from the immediate communal networks of the employer. As a consequence, personal and informal attachments tend to prevail over formal-professional ones. The family as a form of collective action is favoured over other types of collective action, like voluntary associations. Also, horizontal links between the people of the same professional category are more difficult to create. Since this type of industrialization is based on the maintenance of particularistic and localistic producing systems, it tends to reinforce a strong separation of urban and rural society, each with its own logic, living as if in two separate worlds. Several consequences follow. Rural and urban elites feel no need to develop

139 Berman, 1997a; Kriesi, 1999.
common ventures of organisational mobilisation.\textsuperscript{141} Popular groups’ class-
conscience is inhibited, and attempts at broad associational networks face strong
barriers.\textsuperscript{142} Even though this hypothesis does not explain variations between
countries that experienced this type of capitalist development, like France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, it is a strong predictor of the differences between this cluster of countries and other clusters at the level of citizen affiliation.

One should also consider the timing of urbanisation relative to industrialisation: The earlier urbanisation (before industrialisation), the more the growth of cities will be the result of large internal migrations and function as a safe valve for the pressures from rural exodus. This inhibits associational life and the development of voluntary associations because when industrialisation arrives it faces already well-established elites that have the control of organisations of mass mobilisation that were generated in the previous process of urbanization, and that tend to be representative of only the urban classes.\textsuperscript{143} Yet, this hypothesis does not predict variation within early urbanisers in Europe. In the famous European city-belt, the urban world of the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, we find many variations in today’s forms of associational life, namely in national levels of citizen’s affiliation. There are strong differences between (central and northern) Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands, although all of these countries belong to the early urbanisation category. I will return to this topic later in the following chapters when I analyse the legacies of pre-modern city corporations and guilds.

Another hypothesis is the timing of industrialisation. The later a country enters the development race, the less autonomous is the development of economic entrepreneurs and more likely a state initiative. Late developers have shaped their development strategies by comparing themselves with early developers, and as a consequence they tend to have a stronger political conscience of their “underdevelopment”. The whole process of economic development tends to be state induced, so there is a much smaller margin for

\textsuperscript{141} Schmitter, 1971, pp. 369-375
\textsuperscript{142} Bartolini, 2000, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{143} Mouzelis, 1996, pp. 229; Schmitter, 1971, pp. 369-375.
private initiative to take place. As a consequence, there is a smaller impetus and less room to the formation of autonomous voluntary associations, since political space is already occupied by the state.\textsuperscript{144} Yet, this hypothesis is unable to explain empirical variation. For instance, some late developers and industrialisers like Norway or Finland that have approached the level of the first developers have high membership and participation rates. Evidently, a successful agricultural modernisation was crucial in this regard. There was the creation of a decisive internal market for industrial goods, which by its turn stimulated strong linkages the between primary and secondary sectors. Moreover, the interventionist state coordinated the joint modernisation of agriculture and industry.\textsuperscript{145} This indicates that we should examine also the nature of the rural society in each society and its reciprocal links with the State.

Many theories argue that peasants and farmers are more difficult to organise for collective action than are industrial workers, because of their isolation, dispersion, and reliance on family labour.\textsuperscript{146} One should expect rural European society to show differences in their potential for collective action through the formation of associations. Here, one should look at differences in land tenure and rural stratification. Societies with great inequalities in the distribution of the land usually rely on cheap labour, frequently supplied by semi or fully coercive means (e.g. the late nineteenth century patterns of land work in the southern Iberian latifundia, servitude in the big estates of Prussia, and slavery), and this inhibits the development of voluntary associations in the countryside, thus making the industrial organizations the only ones possible in the whole polity. Industrialisation in societies with more equal land possession patterns should facilitate associational ventures. Dahl has classified the former peasant society, the later farmer society.\textsuperscript{147} Some historical patterns confirm this hypothesis. In the history of suffrage extension in large estates, the popular vote tended to reflect the semi-imposed influence of landowners (consider for instance the nineteenth century England and France). In other cases patterns of elite-mass

\textsuperscript{144} Schmitter, 1971, pp. 369-375.
\textsuperscript{145} Mouzelis, 1996, pp. 227-228.
\textsuperscript{146} Marx, 1955, p. 219; see also Finegold and Skocpol, 1995, pp. 33-35.
\textsuperscript{147} Dahl, 1971, pp. 82-104.
clientelistic exchanges determined high rates of participation of rural popular classes, but that contributed to maintaining hostility to broad class peasant associations (e.g. Portugal, Russia, and Italy in the early twentieth century). Inversely, in the early twentieth century Scandinavia, an area characterised by an equalitarian farmer society, there was a strong associational mobilisation of the free peasantry against state centralisation and the dominance of urban elites.

Nevertheless, this hypothesis leaves some aspects of the voluntary association domain unclear. First, it does not account for variation both within the peasant society group (Portugal, Spain, and Italy) and the farmer society group (Austria, Scandinavia, and Switzerland). Second, the type of associations is left unspecified. How should we explain the emergence of industrial, ethnic or religious associations?

Finally, this implies that we should focus not on such patterns as land property or of distribution but on communal and representative institutions in the countryside that may have fostered association building. Traditional community structures and patterns of land possession must be placed in interaction with other variables so as to produce the emergence of the voluntary association. Even more, we must see how local and national politics interact. National elites can mobilise people through parties and associations, and national political institutions can provide opportunities for participation in associations. In this respect, a good example is India’s caste associations. Because of India’s context of competition for power in the aftermath of the democratisation process, they served as vehicles of political organisation of traditional groups and in the process became integrated actors in the struggles for power in the polity. One should look at political factors, especially when studying late industrializers.

2.2. Political Culture and Values

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149 Rokkan, 1966, p. 262.
The hypothesis relating political culture to the development of voluntary associations was first formulated by Tocqueville when he suggested that “mores”, «the manners and customs of the people» or «the whole moral and intellectual condition of a people», were the key to associational life.\textsuperscript{151} Almond and Verba in the 1960s and more recently Robert D. Putnam have reiterated this hypothesis when arguing that the value system of a population, especially its degree of trust (however defined), determines levels of associational life and in particular associational membership.\textsuperscript{152}

Countries with low levels of interpersonal trust, where trust is restricted to the near family and with high levels of distrust of others in general, are considered a poor context for associational life. Inversely, high trust fosters associational life. Banfield classified the situation of low trust as “amoral familism”.\textsuperscript{153} People who are amoral familists have a sense of solidarity only with the very immediate family, and they consider others as instruments and resources to be exploited according to the interests of the family. In this sense, there is no possibility of creating broader, impersonal and ideological ties of solidarity which are essential for associational ventures to succeed.\textsuperscript{154} Southern Europeans, namely the Italians, the Portuguese and the Spanish, were thought to maximize the material and short-run advantages of the nuclear family at the expense of any other definition of interest.\textsuperscript{155} According to the anthropologist Julio Caro Baroja, the Spanish had «deeply personalist attitudes» who saw «each person as isolated (beginning with himself) with a series of distinct characteristics and has no scruples about abusing some and favoring others, since he sees them all inherently different, some of them sympathetic and attractive to him, and others not».\textsuperscript{156} Inversely, high levels of trust in others in general will enable the emergence of voluntary associations.

\textsuperscript{151} Tocqueville, 1994, p. 299.
\textsuperscript{152} Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993.
\textsuperscript{153} Banfield, 1967.
\textsuperscript{154} Reis, 1998, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{155} Banfield, 1971, pp. 78-79.
\textsuperscript{156} Quoted in Payne, 1978, p. 203.
Table 12: Interpersonal Mistrust, 1981 and 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Pattern of Associational Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Torcal and Montero, 1999, p. 174, based on European Values Survey 1981 and World Values Survey 1990; % of the population who say they do not trust other people)

There is some correspondence between trust and types of associational life. As is evident in Table 12, people from disjointed civil societies tend to have higher levels of mistrust, between 62% and 76%. One case of Hegemonic associational life, Denmark, has the lowest score on interpersonal distrust. Still, not all variation is explained. Belgium, with a denser associational life than England, has higher rates of mistrust (in 1991, 63% and 54% respectively). And the variation, for instance, within the type of dominant associational life is too big, between the Netherlands, whose values never surpassed the 40s%, and Belgium, above 60%.

The problem with this line of argument is that it is unable to explain interregional variations in southern European countries, differences between southern European countries and temporal variations. There were periods when in Southern Europe voluntary associations did develop, in waves as strong as in any other country (e.g. the late nineteenth century or during the 1970s in Spain). The only difference is that these associations were, for some reason, unable to become institutionalized and often had a short life (although trust levels and political culture remained constant). Italian and Spanish labour movements, for instance, tended to be volatile with abrupt shifts from revolutionary aims to reformism and
in levels of membership.\textsuperscript{157} In fact also other countries, like contemporary Poland, with high levels of distrust have had high levels of collective action through voluntary associations.\textsuperscript{158} By implication, mass attitudes and individual behaviour are not a sufficient the explanation, since these changes happened too abruptly. Even more, scholars have argued that distrust, not trust, grows with associational life. If voluntary associations are organisational weapons to advance subordinate interests, the more groups push for their interests, the more distrust will increase. In this sense trust may be considered more a symptom of passivity, the inability to act collectively.

Second, it does not discriminate among types of trust and varying dimensions of political culture. Which type of trust is best for the emergence of voluntary associations, interpersonal or political trust? The latter could be good for associational activity, while the former bad because it inhibits co-operation between individuals. Also, certain aspects of political culture, like interest in politics, are not related to political membership in some countries (Belgium); whereas in others only people with interest in politics are members of political associations (in Southern European countries). In fact, people who are members of political associations in Southern Europe tend to discuss politics more than in Scandinavia. Finally, individuals with post-materialist values in Western European countries tend to be members of all types of associations.\textsuperscript{159}

Third, even assuming that this proposition is true, it would still be difficult to apply it to all the dimensions of voluntary associations. It could be useful for explaining levels of membership and participation density either in individual associations and at national levels, eventually the number of associations in a given society, but it is unclear about membership in different type of associations, social or political. We would only expect associations that favour high membership and participation, and that offer strong solidarity goods, because these promote more interpersonal interaction and so develop the emotional and personal attachments necessary for trust. But the role of associations that rely

\textsuperscript{157} Malefakis, 1995, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{158} Ekiert and Kubik, 1999.
\textsuperscript{159} Ulzurrum, 2004, pp. 214-220.
primarily on the distribution of material incentives is less predicted by this hypothesis. Also, trust theory, at least in its recent formulation, argues that non-political associations are the more important form of associational life.\textsuperscript{160} Yet, some recent work has contradicted this argument and advanced the thesis that non-political associations are usually less supportive of democracy, despite higher levels of trust between members and better organisational skills.\textsuperscript{161}

Fourth, this theory mistakes correlation for causation, and it is not able to specify the causal direction. Is it trust that causes associational development or the inverse? For instance, Verba and Almond’s work on civic culture,\textsuperscript{162} whose findings were based on surveys of attitudes and opinions, never addressed this question.\textsuperscript{163} I argue that values and trust are an integral part of what should be explained, and less of a prior and external factor to inducing participation in voluntary associations. Individual attitudes do not pre-exist the formation of associations, that is, the expression and institutionalization of interests. Mores, culture, and ideas are not decisive, but they need to be grounded in organizations that inculcate interests.\textsuperscript{164} In contemporary advanced democracies, a major variable between individual attitudes and voluntary associations is the state, specifically due to the way it regulates and institutionalises the spheres of work, welfare and family,\textsuperscript{165} all of which are the crucial areas that shape individuals’ perceptions of society and other people.\textsuperscript{166} Certainly, parties and governments should also be taken into account.\textsuperscript{167} A major shortcoming of the culturalist approach is that it establishes direct connections between individual attributes and associational activity without paying attention to history, political context, and intervening variables.\textsuperscript{168} Almond and Verba do not provide any information about the real life agents and organisations that embody the different political culture of the countries under scrutiny.

\textsuperscript{162} Almond and Verba, 1967.
\textsuperscript{163} Rustow, 1970, p. 338.
\textsuperscript{164} Rueschemeyer, 1998, pp. 277-278.
\textsuperscript{165} Tarrow, 1996.
\textsuperscript{166} Tilly, 1978, pp. 16-18.
\textsuperscript{167} della Porta, 2000, pp. 203-204.
\textsuperscript{168} Tilly, 1997.
The political culture argument implies also a consensual model of society, with more attention given to attitudes than to temporal variations or to specific and sometimes decisive events and interaction between social groups.\textsuperscript{169} For this reason, this theory is unable to understand for example why, although being classified as a highly passive political culture, Italians since the nineteenth century tended to be active in particular forms of collective action like land occupations, strikes, or revolts, all of which do not necessarily imply membership in associations, and at the same time showing levels of associational membership much higher than in any other southern European country.\textsuperscript{170}

2.3. Religion

Religion may be related to voluntary associational life, either by promoting or inhibiting it. First, the very values of each religious doctrine may facilitate or inhibit associational life. In this respect and within the European context, the more important division is the one between Catholicism and Protestantism. Second, the institutional organisation of the churches themselves may pose varying stimulus or obstacles to the formation of associations.

Some theories have argued that the values advanced by a particular religion have a direct relation to voluntary associations. Specifically, this argument claims that Catholicism inhibits the emergence and participation in voluntary associations, and that Protestantism promotes it.\textsuperscript{171} As Tocqueville argued, Puritanism was «not merely a religious doctrine but corresponded in many points with the most absolute democratic and republican theories».\textsuperscript{172} Furthermore, according to Max Weber’s definition, in Protestantism the strong conflict between «two structural principles – of the church as a compulsory association for the administration of grace, and of the sect as a voluntary association of religiously qualified persons» served as a stimulus for the creation

\textsuperscript{169} Tarrow, 2000, p. 274.
\textsuperscript{170} Tarrow, 1997, p. 211.
\textsuperscript{171} Weber, 1970.
\textsuperscript{172} Tocqueville, 1994, p. 32.
of voluntary associations. The dissident sects tended to be forms of proto-associations, mobilizing the faithful through national territories in order to change the principles and practices of the established national church.

Although Protestantism did not always promote democracy, and there are differences between Lutheranism, Calvinism and the non-conformist sects, the fact remains that Protestantism introduced a new organisational form. The modern religious leaders of Protestantism secured a following through societies of correspondents and religious brotherhoods solidified by secret codes and rituals. These were in fact the earlier forms of voluntary association. This promoted a more participatory ethos. As Ernest Gellner has argued, Protestantism is based on the observance of rules (dictated by God) and not on a loyalty to intermediate agents, like priests but also the family, the employer, or the state. Consequently this is a favourable ideology for the «participatory self-administration of the sect». Catholicism, instead, with its acceptance of the authority of the Pope and the priests as agents of intermediation between God and the faithful, inhibits the development of voluntary associations.

As the table below shows, this argument does not explain variation and deserves some comments and criticisms.

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Table 13: Religion and Patterns of Associational life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Pattern of Associational Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>P Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>P Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>P Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>C Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>M Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>M Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>M Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>P Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>C Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>C Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>C Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>C Divided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Flora, Kuhnle, Urwin, 1999, p. 56; P: Protestant; M: mixed; C: Catholic)

First, there are unexplained variations between Protestant European societies. Scandinavian countries and England are all Protestant societies but in England the levels of density and coordination of associational life are much lower. This suggests that Protestantism per se is insufficient to promote the development of voluntary associations, but that it needs to operate alongside other causal factors. For instance, Tocqueville argued that for the United States, it is Protestantism plus a colonial society without a feudal past plus a decentralised administration that produced the spread of voluntary associations.

Moreover, Catholic Austria belongs to the type which was defined as hegemonic, whereas many of other Catholic countries are in the Disjointed type (Spain, Portugal, and France) and in the Hegemonic type (Belgium). In fact, variation within the Catholic subgroup is even wider. Moreover, at the level of values they espouse, Catholicism in the nineteenth century Belgium promoted a democratic Catholic associational life, (although it was initially anti-democratic)
and accepted parliamentarianism whereas in Italy, as authors argue, it performed a heterogeneous role, aligning not only with the most conservative forces but also with syndicalists who defended equality against rural landlords. On the contrary, twentieth century Latin America Protestantism has been related to authoritarianism and Catholicism to liberalism and associational life, especially in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council of the 1960s.  

Another argument states that the greater the religious pluralism, and consequently religious competition in a given society, the denser associational life will be. This argument claims that where religion arrives at an accommodation with the state through a guarantee of a monopoly of religious representation it will produce a weak associational life, because there is no competition between rival denominations, and hence no need to organise followers within organisations. It suffices to rely on the coercive mechanisms of the state, especially for mandatory religious education, for the established church to have a supply of members. An established church will claim easily a monopoly on associational life and establish alliances with the state in order to prevent the emergence of competing religious organisations. This pattern can be observed in such Catholic countries like Portugal and Spain but also in Italy and to a lesser extent in France. In fact, these countries form a cluster of low density of associational life. Inversely, the more pluralist the religious arena, in which religious organisations compete with each other for members and resources (e.g. the Netherlands), there should be a stimulus for the development of voluntary associations. Each religious denomination will develop its own associational network for that purpose, and consequently a process of organisational emulation will take place.

Yet, the data does not support this hypothesis. Countries like Norway and Portugal, the former with one of the most dense civil societies in Western Europe and the latter with one of the least dense, are both religiously unitary. Germany and Austria have similar levels of associational life density, but one is religiously

178 Dominguez, 1994, p. 87.
diverse (Germany) while the other is homogeneous (Austria). Also, the hypothesis fails to explain variations both within the group of Catholic countries and within religiously pluralist countries, where between 43% and 60% of the adult population has been affiliated in voluntary associations (Table 2). Moreover, the competition hypothesis may be good for predicting the number of associations (should be comparatively high), but it restricts the topology of associations to religion. Finally, at the individual level, research has shown that religion has varying effects. If we look at membership in religious associations in Protestant countries, their members tend to belong also to political associations (the exceptions are Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) unlike in Catholic countries.181

I have argued against using directly indicators of individual attitudes and culture to social and political outcomes. As in political culture and trust theories, there are neither agents nor history in these theories, and direct assumptions are made from values to actions. But as is evident in the case of Catholicism, majority identification with a religion in a country does not result automatically in more religious organisations. The example of Christian democracy is a case. France, with a majority of Catholics, does not have mass religious parties, whereas Germany, with a much smaller Catholic population, has the Christian democratic party.182

A third type of arguments looks at the church’s institutional structure, since much of pre-modern European associational life was in fact religious life. In this dimension, since the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there are already established organizational and institutional differences between Catholic and Protestant Europe. Protestant societies were inclined toward higher organizational development. Calvinist groups were formed on the principle of voluntary association, beyond the family and local or regional community, and they tended to produce leagues of the faithful, congregations, and conferences that spread through national or regional territories.183 This was

182 Kalyvas, 1996.
183 Walzer, 1966, pp. 1-3, 8-17.
favored not because of its ideological principles but because of organizational developments. The structure of the Calvinist church was «an inclusive organization of professing Christians, saints and hypocrites alike, governed by a select committee of ministers and laymen», who relied on recruiting laymen for the development of church tasks. As a consequence, the form of church government was based on bonds of fellowship between laymen, between laymen and priests, and between the assembly of ministers and elders.\textsuperscript{184}

In Catholicism, by contrast, blood ties and feudal principles were still dominant.\textsuperscript{185} Social control was more in the hands of the clergy hierarchy than in the hands of laymen. Moreover, in each national setting, the Catholic Church is divided by dioceses which are based on medieval boundaries and strongly dependent on patrons, the bishops nominated from Rome, thus making coordination between parishes difficult. Diocese life tends to be self-secluded, contributing thus to the stronger localism of Catholic countries’ civil societies, all other factors being constant (dense civil societies can emerge in Catholic countries and counteract the effects of the structure of the national church if other factors are present, as I show later).\textsuperscript{186}

Since in Protestantism inter-territorial coordination is easier, each new wave of religious dissent within the Protestant church tends to spread easily in the national territory. In fact, in Protestant countries since the sixteenth century the church became a state church, or it was directly supported by state authorities to a much larger extent than in Catholic countries. This promoted the conditions for a pattern of state-society relations where future mass movements of religious reform from below directed themselves at reforming the state as well. Ideologies of religious mobilization became more easily also political ideologies. Moreover, once these movements were able to secure political gains, they developed and expanded partnerships of social welfare institutions, like in the Netherlands after their revolution against Spain.\textsuperscript{187}

\textsuperscript{184} Walzer, 1966, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{185} Gouldner, 1980, pp. 359-362.
\textsuperscript{186} Warner, 2000, pp. 8, 45.
The missing link here is the institutional interaction behind support for religious values. The struggles between the churches for the defence of their corporate rights and the claims of the nation-building elites between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries shaped future associational life. Historically, churches have had a monopoly or a high level of control of education of the population and of representation of local communities, in both Catholic and Protestant countries. It is not religion per se, or their degree of pluralism in a specific setting that explains the associational domain, but how they are related to processes of national unification. When state-church relations have promoted the development of cross-local and cross-sectional functional divisions (instead of territorial divisions), associational life has tended to increase. The contrary would inhibit the development of the voluntary association.

This implies an analysis of both the institutional organisation of the church and the relations between churches in their diverse state settings. The historical patterns of conflict/accommodation between a state and a church shaped voluntarism or contributed to involuntarism. During the early modern period, leaders of dissenting churches attempted to impose limits on the state and on monarchs’ power, and this promoted the growth of associations. In the eighteenth century, the scientific academies and associations for knowledge where made against the church, as the republican and social-democratic upheavals in the nineteenth century Europe were also partly based on conflicts over religion.

Two patterns have emerged in Europe: either the church identified with the project of nation- and state-building (e.g. Belgium and Ireland) or it was against this project (e.g. France and Spain). After the reformation, in countries where Protestant reform produced the early nationalisation of the territorial culture, this favoured the process of mobilisation from below. Moreover, the close relation between the state and the church and the incorporation of the church in the state diminished the potential for future state-church conflicts. In turn, this helped a clearer definition and identification of the centre against which the opposition of outsiders could be directed. In most Catholic countries, the
supranational character of the church tended to favour a mobilisation from above by Catholic hierarchies and the late increase in levels of literacy, thus making it more difficult to mobilise the lower classes. These conflicts were mainly over the educational system but also involved the gathering of data, such as the number of births and deaths of the population at the parish levels, the dispensation of welfare services and so on.\textsuperscript{188} Only where some form of national unification is achieved do we find religion producing a stronger push for associations. In Lutheran countries this was possible because churches had become national churches and agents of the state in the educational and welfare initiatives. This shaped future religious movements that would emerge in the nineteenth century for the reform of the church: since the church was part of the state apparatus, mobilization for the reform of the church was also mobilization for change of the state and it implied political discourse.

Moreover, this institutional structure of an alliance, almost fusion of the state and the church, made it easier to create alliances of religious reform movements with secular political movements, like for example with liberals or with socialists, in some cases in the mid and late nineteenth century. The Left movements, like the socialists, were able to form alliances with church dissenters and nonconformist groups and sects. In other words, religion would not be a cause of division between the lower classes fighting for inclusion and suffrage in the national polity. In Catholic Europe, the Counter Reformation had made the Catholic Church strong and at the same time autonomous from the state, in the sense that national Catholic churches owed their loyalty mainly to the Holy See. This left these countries, all other conditions being equal, with a high degree of localism, either in the form of nationality or region, because the church put a strong barrier to state expansion. This localism would promote higher barriers to the establishment of alliances between religious and secular movements.

In this sense, I argue that it is necessary to look at how centre-periphery relations are established in particular settings. By implication, one should consider the state apparatus and the institutions of the regime. Where nation-

\textsuperscript{188} Bartolini, 2000, pp. 551-552.
building was able to include the church, it was easier to mobilize religion on an associational and political way and so associational life tended to become stronger and easily institutionalised. Inversely, countries where the church and the state opposed each other were instead characterized by an alternation of periods of high mobilization and periods of quiescence. Especially in the southern European countries, the strong opposition of the church agents against compulsory liberal-secular education by the state and commercialisation of its land provoked reactions from the church as a defensive localistic corporate body, but not as an associational body, resisting the expansion of the state and rejecting its legitimacy and thereby delaying associational formation.

Still, there was variation between Catholic countries. Later on, between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the church tended to sponsor parties and associations of religious defence and mass movements and gain loyalty among the working classes. This process included the creation of associational Catholic subcultures based on educational societies and schools, youth movements, sports clubs, and so on.\textsuperscript{189} In some contexts (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy), this was successful whereas in others less so (France, Spain, and Portugal). In these later places the strength of anti-clericalism and the state-church conflict were so endemic since the early nineteenth century that the church refused to participate in the national polity through associations and party building. In the former cases the pattern of state and regime building allowed for inclusion of religious identities and actors. In Belgium, for instance, Catholicism identified with the new state because that implied independence from the Dutch Protestant rule in the 1830s.\textsuperscript{190}

\textsuperscript{189} Flora, Kuhnle, Urwin, 1999, pp. 286-288.
\textsuperscript{190} Nord, 2000, pp. xxiv-xxv.
Chapter 3: Regimes, States, and the Political Origins of Associational life

3.1. The State

One of the major advances in the social sciences since the 1970s, in particular in the study of associational life, was the change of focus from socioeconomic to political and institutional factors, a change which highlighted the role of the state. To be fair, the pluralist school had some insights as well, and the importance of the state was recognized by some studies in this tradition when they analyzed the processes of consultation between state agencies and interest groups. In the case of Italy, Lapalombbara called this processes clientela and parentela.\textsuperscript{191} Still, these patterns never led to changes in the basic assumptions of the pluralistic theory. The process that drove the formation of associations was still economic and societal modernization, and the cases where the state was seen as shaping associational life as much as the market forces, were seen more as anomalies and exceptions, denominated simply as processes of capture of a state agency by a particular association or in the more neutral designation of occasional delegation on the association of some public tasks.\textsuperscript{192} In the American case, Lowi called it the end of liberalism; and Beer for the case of England denominated it the collectivist age.\textsuperscript{193}

The neo-corporatist school that appeared in the 1970s was the first line of thinking in contemporary political science to put the state as a central theme in theories of associational life. The state’s role in promoting or inhibiting associational life was much more than just the passive pattern of being captured by associations or through neutral sectoral partnerships, but now it was the main factor shaping the dimension of civic engagement and the pattern of associational life. In the words of Philippe Schmitter, the state is not only «an arena for which interests contend or another interest group with which they must compete, but a

\textsuperscript{191} LaPalombara, 1964.
\textsuperscript{192} Streeck and Schmitter, 1985, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{193} Beer, 1969; Lowi, 1969.
constitutive element engaged in defining, distorting, encouraging, regulating, licensing and/or repressing the activities of the associations». 194

Many aspects were considered by this school that had been previously left untouched. The state not only licensed and legally recognized associations, but it also created associations and promoted particular interests by giving associations monopolies of representation of such social groups like the working class or producers like middle-sized farmers. This affected the density of associational life in the sense that the more the state granted a role for policy for associations, the more they became representational monopolies and as a consequence they were able to attract more members; in fact, in many contexts the state made contributions quasi-compulsory, thus promoting membership in associations. Moreover, the state also affected the coordination level of associational life. States promoted links between societal associational actors, in order to improve the quality and accountability of the policy-making process. This tended to generate encompassing and hierarchical associational structures in the form of national level peak associations. Schmitter and Lehmbruch emphasized this aspect when they examined the role of associations in policy-making. For Lehmbruch, in order to achieve a role in policy-making (e.g. shaping and implementing policies of employment, monetary stability, balance of trade and income etc), associations must be strongly empowered by the state by being granted a place, decision capabilities and veto power through specific institutions like tripartite councils, economic and social councils (e.g. the Netherlands), chambers of representation (Austria), advisory committees, or consultation procedures. 195 This tends to facilitate the coordination activities of associations between themselves, since participation in these bodies is frequently conditional on the fusion of previously competing associations and through the devolution of power to peak organizations. 196

Curiously enough, when it came to developing a theory of the origins of associational life in the neo-corporatist school, the state was absent as an

196 Streeck and Schmitter, 1985, pp. 128-129.
independent variable. The state was only seen as an important factor when scholars in the neo-corporatist school were describing the traits and the facilitating conditions of modern associational life. This resulted from the debate on corporatism that it has been more interested in the consequences of the different systems of interest intermediation (on employment, welfare, salaries, protest) than on its origins. But when a dynamic (or historical) analysis of modern associational life was attempted in order to assess the causal factors behind corporatist systems, the state receded back and societal and economic factors were given primacy. According to Schmitter, the spread of corporatism was «related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources. Differences in the specific nature of these imperatives or needs at different stages in the institutional development or needs at different stages in the institutional development and international context of capitalism, especially as they affect the pattern of conflicting class interests, account for the difference in origins between the societal and state forms of corporatism».

In the same vein, Lehmbruch argued that corporatism was «related to problems of economic policy-making which arise in a rather advanced stage of capitalist development», it «appears to serve such imperatives (of capitalism) by regulating the conflict of social classes in the distribution of national income and in the structure of industrial relations».

Admittedly, Schmitter also mentions the role of political factors in the emergence of modern associational life. He includes factors like the growing bureaucratisation and oligarchisation of the modern state since the late nineteenth century state to World War I in establishing state-society partnerships and fostering a concomitant impact in interest associations, thus making them centralized and oligarchic; prior party-interest group linkages; the international

199 Lehmbruch, 1977, pp. 95-96.
context, especially wars; traditions of civil service and public administration; a liberal-pluralist past in the sense that prior to the interwar years the countries where corporatism developed had a competitive party-system, a parliament where grievances could be addressed and a history of autonomous associations. But these factors were considered mainly in an ad hoc manner and they were external to his theory of corporatism.

Nevertheless, I will follow these leads and argue that some of these factors are very important and may constitute the starting point for a unified theory of the origins of associational life. This is developed in the next chapters. A historical perspective on the state is needed, and it should be attentive to the extended process of state development and how this, in turn, has shaped associational life both directly and indirectly.

Since the peace of Westphalia, European polities became organized mainly around national states. According to Tilly, state makers were initially sets of noble families that since the end of the Roman Empire competed militarily with other noble families and polities (cities, the church, and tribes) for the control of a territory and the population within it. After the seventeenth century an international political system developed in Europe with the state being the main organization in international affairs with claims of control, legitimacy, and resource extraction from populations and territories. Other organizations that have long rivalled with states (city-state leagues, churches, communal bodies, principalities, feudal structures, and empires) lost much power to them.

In sum, the state is an organization that controls a well-defined territory and population through the monopoly of coercion. States make claims on resources and people on a certain territory and use force to constrain, educate, and extract resources from these populations. In this sense, although with variations, the state is an autonomous bureaucratic organisation not reducible to the interests of

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201 Tilly, 1975, p. 45; Tilly, 1986.
204 Tilly, 1975, p. 27.
economic and social groups, namely the dominant groups/classes in the capitalist process. 205

The process of state formation shaped collective action, organized interests, and movements of protest. State-building processes generated more self-conscience and stressed primordial ties of the primary groups that got involved in conflict with the state. 206 The first functions of the state were the extraction of taxes, the confiscation of grain and other agricultural products to feed armies, and the forced conscription of peasants in national armies. Initially, this led to widespread revolts and rebellions, which were common in Europe until the late nineteenth century (e.g. Carlist wars in Spain in the 1870s). 207 Initially these were just social revolts directed against the state and assumed a simple reactive character, a rejection of what was considered imposition and unfair resource extraction from above.

Gradually, however, as states became consolidated and took over the full control of the territory, the character of collective action also changed. Claims by the population evolved from being just sheer localistic resistance to actions meant to influence the decisions of state makers. Moreover, different groups started to establish links and alliances for this purpose, cross-cutting different geographical areas and sometimes achieving organization and mobilization that was national in scope. 208 As the tasks of government became more complex, reached more strata of the population, and the state became the single coordinating military agency in a territory, the more the individual lives were affected by it and as a consequence organized in a way to influence its policies. 209 As the state became more centralised and with a higher control over a territory, groups evolved from a localist and reactive resistance and conflict pattern of collective action, and used the voluntary association for the purpose of fighting the state. 210

205 Tilly, 1975, p. 22.
206 For the regions of Africa and Asia see the arguments about the emergence of tribal unions, caste organizations, religious associations and ethnic fraternities in settings like Lagos, Beirut, Bombay, Geertz, 1993, pp. 270, 276.
207 Tilly, 1975, pp. 22-23.
208 Tilly, 1975, pp. 32-33.
210 Tarrow, 1997, p. 117.
In this sense, all other things being equal, a strong state fosters the development of associational life. Recently, Skocpol has argued that in the United States the periods of major associational boom were periods of expansion of state power, not the inverse (periods of war or of the expansion of welfare state initiatives). Yet, the context of war has been decisive in fostering associational life as becomes evident if considering the interwar period in Western Europe. The need of governments to rely on the citizenry for the war effort, either by military conscription, by the mobilization of organized labour for production directed for war, and by the simple necessity of keeping labour unrest at low levels in order not to disrupt the productive process, led to the development of state-associational partnerships that resulted in the empowerment of voluntary associations. Initiatives like the authority given to the ministries of munitions to negotiate war contracts spread to other spheres: grievance committees for workers or factory committees were institutionalised in France, Italy, and Germany in 1918-1919; the state fostered agreements between labour and capital to regulate the labour market (e.g. Sweden in 1938). In sum, as Charles Maier has argued, «after the mass political mobilization that followed … the world war, authoritarian and democratic national political economies alike perceived the imperative for dealing with collective interests in the market place as well as in government agencies … Modernization was a corporate task and no longer an individualist possibility». World War II pushed this trend even further.

States promote associational life when certain conditions exist. First, patterns of war-making that do not lead to collapse and breakdown, or when the territorial borders of the state are not questioned, favor associational life because it is easier to connect groups with claims to the centre of political life and elites are more successful at mobilizing the citizenry for war-making tasks. Moreover, when individuals and groups begin to be connected to the centre (because of job opportunities, same educational programs, and being together a part of the military machine), the resolution of local issues begins to be a question of getting

211 Skocpol, Munson, Camp and Karch, 2002.
212 Maier, 1984, pp. 42-44.
213 Maier, 1984, p. 46.
214 Kestnbaum, 2005.
resources from and by influencing the centre. For instance, associations find it easier to spread through the territory using state resources (roads, tax policies, postal systems, and so on).\(^{215}\)

Second, strong states make for the nationalisation of politics, that is, for the absorption of peripheral regions under the same centralised authority. This fosters national alliances. Strong states are able to pursue and implement their declared goals. States with high capacity have at their disposal an organisational and bureaucratic apparatus that allows them to implement policies and establish goals autonomously decided by the government in spite of resistance from actors in society. In this sense a high capacity state has a body of functionaries or state officials, managers whose goals and interests are independent from societal forces.\(^{216}\)

Strong states encourage the nationalisation of conflict, because they increase the importance of national institutions and national conflicts and so make for higher relevance of associational organisations and to a bigger push to draw these organisations to the political debates and conflicts.\(^{217}\) Groups will use the resources of the state to foster their associations: railroads, mail offices and services, and schools which tend to imitate the internal structure of the state. The voluntary association can thus transcend the locality and to organise collective action on a vaster scale (national). Tarrow locates the origins of this process in the eighteenth century England, where the first associations were promoted by the resistance to indirect taxes.\(^{218}\)

Third, since a strong state has the instruments and resources to deliver goods sought by groups (e.g. through public polices), the more eco-functional conflicts tend to prevail over other divisions like territorial ones, and this tends to stimulate associational life.\(^{219}\) States that are weak, unwilling, or unable to extract

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\(^{216}\) Evans, 1995, p. 10.  
\(^{217}\) Schattsneider, 1983.  
\(^{218}\) Tarrow, 1997, pp. 105-108.  
resources from the population do not need to develop bargaining with populations and tend to repress associational life development.\textsuperscript{220}

In weak states associational life tends to be less active because it is mainly local. For instance, Nancy Bermeo concluded that in the early twentieth century patterns of state-building that had high asymmetry between national and local politics (Italy, Portugal, and Russia) state legitimacy was weaker and so it eroded connectedness between institutions and citizens.\textsuperscript{221} Philip Nord has argued that the failed integration of the countryside (or periphery) in the civic life of a nation inhibited associational life. According to Nord, in France this was achieved in the Third Republic in 1882 (when the regime was able to rally small town constituencies) and in Great Britain by the late eighteenth century, but not in Portugal, Russia, or Italy. Consequently, the political behaviour of the peasantry in the periphery was unknown and so political forces refrained from mobilizing it.\textsuperscript{222} Other examples are found in Latin America, where sometimes the “profound crisis of the State” in countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, according to Guillermo O’Donnell, have not produced popular mobilisation and association-building but rather the increasing consolidation of non-democratic, autonomous, clientelistic, and semi-authoritarian territories, which he labels “brown areas”.\textsuperscript{223}

Moreover, a weak state makes it easier for clientelistic elites to become the main power figures and for the links with the masses to be established through corrupt exchanges. In weak states, the flow of resources is more easily appropriated by private agents (e.g. cliques, political machines, bureaucratic clienteles, and feuds). Consequently, it is harder to consolidate other networks and forms of collective action or to allow only for the emergence of a narrow and selected set of privileged associations rather than widespread networks of associations. In some countries, namely in Portugal and Spain, a solution has been the establishment of state-corporatist systems, but even here associations

\textsuperscript{220} Contemporary cases are states that rely mainly on resources from external sources like foreign aid, or natural resources like oil. Tilly, 2006, pp. 23-24.

\textsuperscript{221} Bermeo, 2000, p. 245.

\textsuperscript{222} Nord, 2000, p. xxiii.

tended to rely more on patronage goods and less on collective goods to mobilize constituents.\textsuperscript{224} Responsible and collective goods oriented associations, as well as parties, should be able to produce long and sustained civic participation through time unlike parties that rely on patronage. In fact, countries with low (France or Italy) and very low (Portugal, Spain, and Italy) density of associational life have historically had patronage oriented parties. On the other hand, countries with medium to high density levels of associational life (Great Britain, Germany, and Sweden) have had collective goods oriented parties.\textsuperscript{225} Would-be and potentially mobilizing political and social elites and coalitions when faced with an inefficient state will face more obstacles in adopting public policies that promote associational life (e.g. partnerships government-associations for the distribution of social welfare resources, or the attribution of public status and funds to associations).

Finally, weak states are prone to situations of collapse and crisis and in these situations associational activity expands sometimes, but it tends to be short-lived. It expands only in periods of administrative collapse, creating in this process both the opportunities for the emergence of associations and new claimants and the impetus for new ruling elites to mobilize the citizenry in support of a new political order. Scholarship on revolutions has stressed this aspect.\textsuperscript{226} In fact, there is a strong relation between a weak state, or a “coup prone” state, and a weak associational life. On the basis of Belkin and Schofer’s analysis of 108 countries between 1948 and 1967, «weakly institutionalized societies are far more likely than those with highly developed institutions to suffer (...) political interventions by the military».\textsuperscript{227} Moreover, these cycles of mobilization and association building after a state collapse tend to be short-lived, and voluntary associations find in the short -term many barriers to their institutionalisation, while individuals have few incentives to join associations. These civil societies oscillate between explosions of participation and periods of apathy. As Harry Eckstein has argued, this happens because what is at stake and in conflict is the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{224} Schmitter, 1999.
  \item \textsuperscript{225} Shefter, 1994, pp. 7-12.
  \item \textsuperscript{226} Goodwin, 2001, p. 37.
  \item \textsuperscript{227} Belkin and Schofer, 2003, pp. 605, 613.
\end{itemize}
very definition of central power in a society, the «very location of formal power and consequently civil society becomes the center of all concern or of no concern at all». 228 In sum, the more developed a strong state is, the stronger its associational life.

State strength seems to be a fair predictor of the density of associational life over time. For instance, dense civil societies exist in the strong welfare states of Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Finland, and the lowest density in the weakest social welfare states of Portugal, Spain, Italy, and France. Thus, associational life seems to vary positively with states with strong redistributive and extractive capacity. Also, societies with a history of rational and efficient state bureaucracy have the densest civil societies. Comparative historians and sociologists have identified the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, and Great Britain as bureaucratic since the late eighteenth century, whereas the pattern of state development and type of bureaucracy that developed in Iberia, France (until the 1950s at least), and Italy has been defined by comparative sociologists as patrimonial. 229 The case of England has been revised lately. Although in England in the eighteenth century the state was much still a proprietary state where officials had property rights of their offices, recent research has shown that England developed modern and rational forms of state administration much earlier than it was thought. Thomas Ertman, for instance, has argued that in England already in the eighteenth century existed a rational-legal state apparatus. It’s fiscal and administrative infrastructure was bigger in absolute and relative terms than Prussia 230.

Especially in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Belgium the state maintained its autonomy and cohesion, which made for a smoother mode of transition from pre-modern to the modern period. In Scandinavia it allowed the pre-modern corporations to be transformed into modern institutions, and in Belgium and in the Netherlands the liberal regime had the ability to sustain and integrate pressures from below in the form of religious, ethnic and socioeconomic

228 Eckstein, 1971, p. 327.
229 Ertman, 1999.
230 Ertman, 1999, pp. 11-12.
mobilizations. Inversely, countries with a weak state have the least dense civil societies: Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy, and, partially, France. What is crucial here is that the state be strong and somehow united around a national centre (independently of a centralized or decentralized regime structure, e.g. being federal or unitary).

By using taxes as percentage of Gross National Product as an indicator of state strength, one can see a homology, although imperfect, between state strength and associational life development. Countries of hegemonic civil societies have the highest rates of taxation, all between 38% and 43.7% (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Austria). Also, countries in the Dominant associational life pattern have high rates of taxation: Germany (35%), Belgium (39.7%), and the Netherlands (41%). England, the case of Divided associational life is immediately below, although at the same level as Germany (35.3%). In the case of Disjointed associational life, taxation levels are lower (Spain, 29.9% and Italy 32.3%), but there are two cases that stand out. France, with a level of 39.3%, has levels higher than Germany and Austria for instance. Furthermore, Portugal is quite surprising, with a 36.1% rate, that puts it in second place within the Disjointed cases and even slightly ahead of Germany and England.

Table 14: State Strength, 1965-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern of Associational life</th>
<th>Taxes as % of GNP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
<td>Sweden: 43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway: 42</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark: 4.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>Austria: 38.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany: 35.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands: 41</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium: 39.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>England: 35.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy: 32.3</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Value</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>36.1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Although important, the state strength hypothesis, however, is insufficient to explain all the variation between western European civil societies, both in understanding situations where strong states are associated with associational life and where weak states have fostered weak civil societies. In fact, very strong states can also lead to the development of totalitarian regimes and not to democratic citizenship and participation. Strong and autonomous states, especially with a high coercive apparatus, may use this strength to repress autonomous associational life or to mobilise it through single and regime sponsored associations (e.g. Fascist Italy), as is confirmed by many highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes.\(^{231}\) Also, this predictor is not able to fully explain existing variations. It does not account for variations within the groups of dense and weak associational life. Countries like Belgium, Ireland, Austria, and West Germany, all with medium to highly dense civil societies, have nevertheless major differences. The same applies to Italy and Portugal, both countries with a less dense associational life in comparison with the previous group, but also with different degrees of encompassiness of associational life. Second, temporal variation is also left unexplained. A case in point is Finland with an affiliation rate of the adult population in voluntary associations that evolved from 40% to 86% in a very short period.

In fact, the relation of states to associational life seems ambiguous. On the one hand, high repressive capacity has historically inhibited formal collective action and channelled it through informal paths. In contexts of high restriction of freedom of association, collective action tended to assume informal dynamic either through secret societies (e.g. the masonry in certain countries like France),

\(^{231}\) Tilly, 2006, p. 24.
or to be based mainly on informal sociability (e.g. churches, funerals, theatrical performances, and local personal networks). Moreover, the higher the state repression, the more associational life organizations preferred radical and violent forms of action like, for instance, in Spanish Andalusian anarchism. On the other hand, the fact that a state is strong in coercive capacity does not mean that coercion will be used against associations. The ideal states are the ones that have «the strength and capacity to deliver policies sought by social interests and that are at the same time neither so strongly beholden to social forces with vested interests in the status quo nor so autonomous from society at large that they can and will ignore broad-based demands».

Beside the character of the state, also other factors shape associational life. Recent research has pointed out the need to consider the regime’s institutions. We should look also at institutions, patterns of institutional development and change, and institutional legacies. State builders have always tried to go beyond the use of sheer repression and become accepted by the population, that is, they have developed claims of legitimacy which foresaw rights and duties of populations over which they claimed to rule. In some circumstances this has led to mobilisation strategies by elites and the creation of links of some sort between state builders and the population. In the process of state building elites also needed more than just the compliance of the population, and they pushed for participation, so that it could be organised for special tasks and to provide the state’s leaders with political support. Since state rulers also need the acquiescence and even the support of populations, they have tended to negotiate with them regarding general rights and duties within the national polity. An important and probably the first issue over which there were these negotiations was military service. State builders exchanged rights and services for the duty of the population to serve in national armies. This idea of citizen-soldier emerged first after the French revolution and it spread soon to other countries.

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235 Finer, 1975, pp. 144-146.
3.2. The Regime

A political regime refers to the formal and informal rules regulating «the organization of the center of political power», «its relations with the broader society», the agents’ ability to «access political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not».\textsuperscript{236} According to Ekiert and Kubik, the size of civil societies and its internal diversity «may decrease or diminish according to the independence they are accorded within the legal framework of the regime».\textsuperscript{237} National political institutions and their changing configuration determine and influences ways people perceive their experience and «affect the capabilities of various groups to achieve self-consciousness, organize, and make alliances».\textsuperscript{238}

In this section, I analyse the degree to which different institutional configurations that regulate access and distribution of power in polities is related to associational life. Federalism, a political system based on the division of power between central and regional governments has long been associated with strong and dense civil societies. This argument, initially developed by Tocqueville and based on the American case, argues that federal systems provide more opportunities for autonomous self-rule by communities and consequently they promote organization-building and mobilization.\textsuperscript{239} In contrast, it is often argued that unitary states do not provide such opportunities.

The data, however, show no direct relation between federalism and associational life. Although true that in federal countries like Germany, Belgium after 1993 and Austria, and with the exception of Switzerland, associational life tends to be medium to high in terms of density, in the semi-federal countries we find Spain (weak associational life) and the Netherlands (very dense associational life). Moreover, the unitary countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy) show many variations in terms of associational life.

\textsuperscript{236} Fishman, 1990, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{237} Ekiert, Kubik, 1999, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{238} Skocpol, 1996, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{239} Crowley and Skocpol, 2001.
The division power between central and local government may also be a causal factor that shapes associational life. The degree of political decentralization of the regime has usually been advanced as a major cause of density of associational life. This hypothesis argues that the degree of political centralisation – the way relevant decisions are structured from local to national powers – shapes the character of collective action. This is an argument that goes back to Tocqueville. The more decentralised a state, the more there is a stimulus to the development of local voluntary associations. There is a positive correlation between the number of associations – the stronger and «more numerous» «local powers» – and the level of decentralisation of the administration. Tocqueville developed this idea in order to explain the extreme proliferation of newspapers in America, but it could be applied to associations as well. As Tocqueville wrote, «the extraordinary subdivision of administrative power has much more to do with the enormous number of American newspapers than the great political freedom of the country and the absolute liberty of the press». Inversely, a more centralised state inhibits associational life.

Nevertheless, the data shows that there is no correlation between the level of centralisation and associational density. High density Austria is as centralised as low affiliation Portugal and France. Similarly, decentralised Sweden has much higher levels of affiliation than decentralised Germany. Countries with denser associational life, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, are decentralised but the Netherlands is centralised. In the group of medium-high associational life, Belgium (after 1993) and Germany are decentralised, but Austria is centralised. On the other hand, all cases of medium and low associational life are centralised: the medium cases (Great Britain and Ireland), the low density cases (France and Italy) and the very low cases (Portugal, Spain, and Greece).

The electoral system, whether proportional or majoritarian, has also been connected to associational life. Many have argued that proportional systems promote a high density of associational life because it leads to an egalitarian

representation of all political identities and currents existing in society, thus giving minorities equal rights of representation and opportunities of access to power. Proportional representation makes for encompassing government coalitions and so for a broader associational development. Conversely, majoritarian systems favor a winner take all situation and so to generate very few political winners.  

Nevertheless, the electoral system is not directly related to associational life development, because there are many variations between societies with similar electoral systems. For instance, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Ireland have all proportional systems, though the first country has low density, the second has high, and third has medium dense associational life.  

Note also that the degree of multipartism, namely the effective number of parties in a given polity, is not related to the degree of density of associational life. On the one hand, the more parties exist, there are more political identities and agents for mobilization, and so associational life is expected to be denser. On the other hand, bipartism may also be related to denser civil societies, because it offers clear cut political alternatives, a clearer delimitation of ideological and policy alternatives and promotes stronger political competition. But there are many empirical variations, so this variable must operate together with other causes. Both the United Kingdom and Greece have a very low degree of multipartism, but the former has a medium dense and the latter a weakly dense associational life. Also, Portugal and Sweden have similar levels of multipartism, but the latter has one of the densest civil societies in Europe, while the former has one of the least dense.  

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244 Katzenstein, 2000, p. 138.
245 Katzenstein, 2000, p. 162.
246 Lijphart, 1999, pp. 76-77.
Table 15: Institutional Variables and Associational life in Western Europe, 1945-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>P</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>P</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>U/F</td>
<td>C/D</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>U/F</td>
<td>C/D</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. K.</td>
<td>Plural</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: Portugal and Spain refer to the period 1981-2000; electoral system: P refers to proportional representation, M to majoritarian; Socialist rule after 1945: H: high, M: Medium or L: low (Portugal and Spain refer to the period 1981/82-2000; Party system: M refers to Multiparty, B to biparty; source: Lijphart, 1999)

A democratic regime will foster the development of associational life when its institutions promote and give strong incentives for citizens’ participation
in the electoral arena. This is for instance when they foster broad and equal
citizenship (extensive rights in the social and economic arena), and rely on
mechanisms of permanent consultation between the government and citizens for
public policies, public forums of state-society co-decision.\textsuperscript{247} I argue that these
functions of democratic regimes should be looked for in the following arenas: 1)
national level corporatist structures of policy making, 2) mass political parties,
and 3) welfare state types.

Associational life is impacted greatly by the type of system of interest
intermediation institutionalized in a democratic regime. Democratic systems of
interest intermediation in Western Europe can be corporatist or pluralist. In a
corporatist system of interest intermediation the state encourages directly and
indirectly associations in order to have interlocutors with whom to discuss and
implement social policies and to achieve social peace by making conflict interests
develop an interest in permanent consultation. The state gives public authority to
associations.\textsuperscript{248} Corporatist structures appeared historically first as sites for wage
settlements or bargaining between workers and employers. They were a
qualitative change from previous historical experiences where wages were
determined after the defeat of one part (usually the workers) or by direct state
determination. Gradually these negotiations spread to other sectors of the
workforce, especially during World War I because of the need for cooperation by
all sectors in the war economy, and they were vastly experimented between the
wars and solidified in many countries after 1945, in particular in Austria’s system
of social partnership, and in Sweden, West Germany, and the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{249}

This facilitated the development of both density and coordination of
associational life. Corporatist institutions lead to higher associational density
because the state granted associations a «deliberate representational monopoly
within their respective categories».\textsuperscript{250} By doing so, they were able to raise their
capacity to recruit members. Furthermore, coordination was facilitated because
the state, by wanting the participation and inclusion of associations in policy,

\textsuperscript{247} Tilly, 2006, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{248} Schmitter, 1974, pp. 93-94.
\textsuperscript{249} Lehmbruch, 1984, p. 63; Maier, 1984, pp. 39-40, 48-49.
\textsuperscript{250} Schmitter, 1974, pp. 93-94.
made them reduce their competition and find common programmatic grounds, which in turn made them have a single voice. In interest group corporatism, there are regular meetings between the government, unions, and employer organizations in order to foster agreement on socioeconomic policies. This is usually referred to as concertation or tripartite pacts. In this sense they become under the leadership of a hierarchical peak association, since that facilitates negotiation. In a pluralist system the state does not foster or call associations for partnerships in the implementation of economic and social policies. Associations are not integrated into policy-making procedures, and as a consequence they have a smaller capacity at coordination and at recruitment of possible members, or in other words a lower density. Instead, associations compete with each other for resources and members.251 Examples of this are Britain, France, and Italy where, for instance, wage bargaining procedures are more conflictual.252

By looking at a recent classification by Lijphart in 1999, one can note how a pluralist system of interest intermediation is negatively associated with density and coordination of associational life. The more pluralist countries tend to have weaker civil societies. Moreover, the cases of medium and low density civil societies (Great Britain, Ireland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece) are all pluralist, and the medium-high (Austria, Germany, and Belgium) and high (the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries) are all corporatist. This important finding stresses the fact that where states and regimes are strong, develop inclusive institutions, and recognise public status to associations, associational life will tend to grow, encompass a higher proportion of the population and consequently to be denser.

252 Lehmburc, 1984, p. 63; Maier, 1984, pp. 48-49.
Table 16: Interest Group Pluralism, 1960s and 1980s. Rank and Indexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Pattern of Associational life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>Plural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Lijphart, 1999, p. 177)

Still, corporatist theory presents some weaknesses if we want to use it to explain national patterns of associational life. First, it is restricted to occupational groups; in particular, it is biased towards unions and the working class. Associations from the countryside, like agricultural associations, that historically make also religious claims seem to be much less integrated in corporatist structures, and the pattern of relationship with the state is mostly pluralist.\(^{253}\) Why this is so remains still a puzzle, especially because historically speaking

\(^{253}\) Truman, 1951, pp. 525-526; Lehmbruch, 1977, p. 96.
associations in the primary sector were more corporatist, whereas in industry and services associations were more competitive.²⁵⁴ For instance, in Sweden religious associations based on the countryside were integrated in the regime with public policy functions (also in the parliament, the Riksdag) in alcohol consumption and education policies.²⁵⁵.

Second, historically agrarian and middle-class associations have had a decisive role in the creation of conditions propitious to corporatist development, especially because they were central in alliances with workers in the context of the late nineteenth century, alliances which were decisive for corporatist implementation. In fact, the emergence of corporatism in Western European societies is not only a result of the mobilization and institutionalization of the working class but also of cross-class coalitions involving many different actors, like farmers, and also sectors of the business community. It is then necessary to explain the success and failure of these coalitions in different settings and how they were shaped by institutional legacies and processes of state transformation (e.g. a coalition of employers exposed to foreign competition allied with farmers and low wage workers for the growth of social welfare in Sweden).²⁵⁶

Third, western European societies were weakly urbanised until at least the 1920s, and most of the population lived in the countryside. In this sense, one should look at the initiatives for association building that were being developed in the countryside. In this context many associational ventures emerged, much before the emergence of the first mass industrial unions during the late nineteenth century. Many of these first associations in the countryside were religious organizations (temperance societies in Scandinavia, Christian associations in the Netherlands, and so on), and were also strong social movements for both political and religious reform.²⁵⁷

Another neglected aspect in corporatist theories is the political party, and its links with interest associations. Because of an excessive focus on delimitating the properties of the systems of interest intermediation as being different from the

²⁵⁵ Nedelmann and Maier, 1977, p. 43.
²⁵⁶ On this see also Swenson, 1991 and Baldwin, 1990.
²⁵⁷ Nedelmann and Maier, 1977, p. 43.
party system, there was a lack of attention to the degree that these two channels could be linked and empower each other. More specifically, it is crucial to know the degree to which the party system affects density and coordination of associational life organizations. This aspect was considered crucial by early scholars of political parties. Stein Rokkan called it the degree of *Verzuiling* of the two systems of interest intermediation. In his words it refers to the «degree of interlocking between cleavage-specific organizations active in the corporate channel and party organizations mobilizing for electoral action».258

The relation of political parties to associational life is an ambiguous one. Tocqueville discussed this subject in a chapter of *Democracy in America* aptly titled the «Relation of civil to political associations».259 His argument was that if political associations were prohibited, civil associations would also be rare. There was a double relation between these two types of associations. Civil associations facilitated political associations in the sense that associationalism per se makes men mingle for the same purposes and so it was easier to advance their common association in the political sphere. Political associations «strengthen and improve associations for civil purposes», because politics is a sphere where there is always a need to cooperate. As Tocqueville put it, «political life makes the love and practice of association more general».260 More recently Lehmbruch linked neo-corporatist theory with the development of political parties, arguing that the two subsystems are complementary. In his words, societal corporatism, or dense and highly coordinated civil societies and what I have called the Hegemonic and Dominant patterns of associational life, shows «strong links between interest associations and the party system».261

Previous research suggests that associational life tends to grow in tandem with political parties: The stronger the parties, all other things being equal, the stronger will be associational life. Liberal parties during the whole nineteenth century were the first cases (although only in some contexts) in promoting associational life. Liberals championed the creation of membership organisations

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in order to be able to get the vote in political systems that were becoming increasingly more competitive. Gradually interest groups developed links to political parties and helped them recruit and propose candidates for elections (e.g. by proposing a union or religious organisations leader in an electoral list), channeled monetary support, and publicly supported the party through demonstrations, petitions, and press campaigns. A situation emerged in competitive liberal party systems where double affiliations were common; individuals were members of both the party and its ancillary voluntary associations.\textsuperscript{262} The majority of associations became «structured along partisan cleavages», «associated with one of the parties».\textsuperscript{263} One of the first examples occurred in England with the Liberal Party in the mid-nineteenth century, and it was soon imitated by the Conservative Party.\textsuperscript{264}

This model would be later copied by other parties, especially by religious parties (both Catholic and Protestant) and by socialists/social-democrats, by the end of the century. Parties evolved to what is now called the mass party, an ideologically coherent organization with a permanent body of functionaries and professional politicians, internally centralized, bureaucratic and representing a specific associational subculture within a society (for example the Socialists milieu or the Catholics).\textsuperscript{265} Austria was an exemplary case, where party membership is historically very high and associational life as well. There were strong links between a party and unions, both in the Left (the Socialist party) and the Right, through the Peoples’ Party links to agrarian interest groups and Catholic associations. In the 1960s, one third of the socialist electorate was affiliated in parties.\textsuperscript{266}

After the transition to democracy, these links between associations and political parties allowed associations to have easier access and influence to policy making, to be recognized as partners in policy, and to receive state support in the form of corporatist inclusion, which allowed them to grow in density and to

\textsuperscript{262} Epstein, 2000, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{263} Daalder, 1966, pp. 58, 64-66; Manin, 1995, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{264} Epstein, 2000, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{265} Pizzorno, 1981, p. 250.
\textsuperscript{266} Epstein, 2000, p. 119.
achieve a higher coordination capacity. For this to happen, as Lehmbuch argued, the empowerment of parliament was vital. In fact, studies have shown that the cooperation between capital and labor at the national and cross-industry/sectoral levels needs the support of the parliamentary sphere and the backing of politics represented by parties in parliament. In Weimar Germany, the ZAG (Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft), an attempt in concertation of business and labor, depended on the party support so as to avoid intra-organisational tensions within the unions and the employers’ associations. In contemporary Austria, the strong delegation of an almost legislative power to associations of labour and capital is sustained by a «close and mutual penetration of party and interest organizations».267

Where parties are weak as organisations, also associational life tends to be weakly developed. France is a case in point, since there mass parties always found it difficult to consolidate and build networks of voters across the country. Politics has always been highly characterised by localism. The representatives from the countryside tended to see themselves more as representatives of localities rather than as defending a political ideology for the whole country. After 1945 only the Communists developed an organisation along the mass party model, whereas the other parties, the socialists and the Right, were still organized around the cadre/elite models (the UNR).268 During the 1970s transitions to democracy in Southern Europe, parties and associations were weaker than in past transitions to democracy. The transitions to democracy have encouraged parties in the founding moments of the regime to avoid competition with each other and to rely mainly on the distribution of offices as a way to become rooted in the society.269 In Portugal and Spain (and in France but less so in Italy), this pattern dates back to the late nineteenth century.270

As can be seen from the next table, where party membership is higher, also associational life tends to be higher. The countries within the Hegemonic pattern of associational life, with the exception of Denmark, have the highest

267 Lehmbuch, 1984, p. 74.
268 Epstein, 2000, pp. 121-122.
270 Skocpol and Amenta, 1986, p. 140.
rates of membership in political parties (10% to 14% of the adult population), followed by the countries in the Dominant associational life type (between 6% and 10%). Divided associational life (England) has middle levels of affiliation in parties, 6%. And the cases of Disjointed associational life all fall between 1% (Spain) and 6% (Italy).

Table 17: Membership in political parties, 1990-1993 (% adult population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Pattern of Associational Life</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>U.Kingdom</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Ulzurrum, 2004, p. 309)

Finally, the strength of the welfare state seems to be strongly and positively correlated to the density of associational life. Voluntary associations have had historically an important role in the promotion and provision of welfare, and this aspect has been neglected in many studies, where the public role of associations is considered to be only in the participation in economic and industrial policies. Still, one could even argue that historically the primary role of associations was the provision of welfare for its members. Many contemporary voluntary associations grew out of the ancient regime corporations and guilds that
were abolished by the nineteenth century liberalism and the expansion of free markets. This process left many professional groups and local communities on the verge of destitution and these associations provided mutual assistance and self-help. Gierke called these associations’ economic fellowships or co-operatives. They were risk and insurance associations with the aim of fighting against the economic misfortune of its members, for the «economic rights of citizenship» of the popular/working classes. 271 These organizations provided mutual aid through collective funds collected from members (to finance burials, provide for unemployment, sickness, and housing and sometimes even old age and widow’s survival pensions). 272 Note that many of these associations were not only workers’ organizations, like the compagnonages in France, but also religious associations. Historically, several churches in Western Europe had been the main providers of welfare. 273 In fact, «the parish did not exist prior to, and independently of, the collective charitable fund». 274 In the modern age, many of these religious endeavors for welfare were transformed into modern voluntary associations. 275 In some places these associations were very successful. It is estimated that by the mid-nineteenth century the percentage of people affiliated in self-help associations and mutualities comprised almost half of the male population in England, two million members in France, and that 45% of the population of Prussia was ensured for sickness with each association with about one hundred members. 276

At the same time, most welfare voluntary associations faced severe difficulties. They had problems of coordination that left many still poor; they were mainly local; and had problems in recruiting members. Usually only a small minority belonged to welfare associations, and most of the time it was only the better-off sectors of the working classes. The larger share of the population was left outside because they constituted a heavy financial burden on an association

273 Wuthnow, 1991a, pp. 21-22.
274 Swaan, 1988, p. 20.
275 Rabinbach, 1996, p. 54.
and consequently a risk for the association’s survival. Thus, the ones who needed more protection were usually excluded. But because of this, associations tended to stay very personal, small in membership and capital, and highly dependent on a single community, say, of the same residential or occupational area.\textsuperscript{277} Self-help associations tried to cope with this by creating broader networks at the national scale and by engaging political issues.\textsuperscript{278} Many unions evolved from these mutual help associations, tried to fight for universal suffrage, and represent workers vis-à-vis employers and the State, while maintaining the original aims of mutual support of its members.\textsuperscript{279}

Problems of coordination, funding and recruitment still existed though, and self-help associations tried to cope with this by engaging with the state in order to receive support and funding. In the 1860s, as argued by Gierke, free voluntary associations dedicated to self-help were compatible with «contributory state aid», and «a claim on state aid, indeed, is not the working classes privilege but their right».

\textsuperscript{280} This state empowerment of the role of associations should even go beyond the protection and the legitimation of rights of the working classes, like the prohibition of hiring workers below a certain ages or the restriction of work hours, but by giving associations a role in the distribution of material resources (old age, widower funds, investment, and relief funds) and as agents of intellectual and technical formation.\textsuperscript{281}

In fact, the more states used these associations for the implementation of welfare measures, the stronger was membership in associations and their coordination role. What in the twentieth century became the welfare state has its roots in these associations that existed everywhere in Europe and that were successfully integrated within the state apparatus as providers of benefits. This increased both membership/density of associational life as well as coordination. First, density grew because of the use of associations, namely unions and charitable organizations, to dispense services, and resources to the subsided

\textsuperscript{277} Esping-Andersen 1998, pp. 24-25; Swaan, 1988, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{279} Gierke, 1990, pp. 218-219.
\textsuperscript{280} Gierke, 1990, p. 216.
\textsuperscript{281} Gierke, 1990, p. 217.
population made them have higher incentives for potential members to affiliate. In many contexts, membership became even compulsory as these services became mandatory: examples were health care, social security, pensions, and education. Second, the state established central coordination agencies for welfare relief, and this made associations coalesce in national and hierarchical networks. The more nationwide plans for compulsory welfare and national collective insurance schemes for wage earners were enacted, the more associations became coordinated by peak associations and were able to include local, sectoral, and industry-specific self-help associations. Moreover, the availability of state funds and the legitimacy of a public role provided associations with security, thus making them more viable and ensuring their survival.

Between 1883 and 1932, these state-associational partnerships for welfare were attempted, becoming, with varying degrees, institutionalized in the interwar period. In the post World War II period, they stabilized into distinct types of welfare state. Furthermore, the more encompassing and developed welfare states seem to promote a higher density of associational life. Hegemonic associational life grew in the "social democratic" and more equalitarian welfare states of Scandinavia. These welfare states were based on the idea of universalism. Everybody in the polity was entitled to the same economic rights, independent of economic and social status. Full economic equality, employment and protection was the aim of these regimes. Although they were implemented by the Scandinavian social democratic parties after 1945, these programs were designed to serve the interests of the urban and rural middle-class while at the same time putting the workers’ benefits at the level of this middle class. The dispensation of welfare services to the whole citizenry thus asks for the assistance of broad and encompassing associations.

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The "corporatist" welfare system in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, where the state supplies welfare assistance but preserves many of the status differences of premodern society, is related to dominant associational life.\textsuperscript{287} It continues the conservative welfare systems initiated in late the nineteenth century Germany where there were different welfare systems for different groups, especially because of the objective of maintaining the privileges of civil servants (\textit{Beamten}) differentiated from the manual workers. It is a welfare state that has large services and uses many voluntary associations, especially unions and church related organizations, for the dispensation of welfare services. In fact, many modern associations evolved from pre-modern rigid corporate bodies and guild structures. But since it is not based on the idea of universalism, different programs are adopted for different social classes and occupational groups, each having its own set of rights and privileges. Thus, the level of density and coordination of associational life organizations is smaller than in Scandinavian cases.\textsuperscript{288}

The "liberal" welfare state system of Anglo-Saxon countries (Great Britain and Ireland) is characterized by limited assistance with very specific entitlement rules. It clearly rejects the idea of universalism, and it is means-tested, that is, the potential recipients of welfare have to demonstrate their economic need. Social-welfare transfers from the state are low, and they cover only the lower income population. In this sense, this type of welfare state does not rely much on voluntary associations. It fosters a medium dense associational life, or what I have called a pluralistic associational life. Associations are not fully integrated in state networks for welfare dispensation, only occasionally at very local level and in particularistic ventures. In fact, this kind of a welfare state is mainly based on the notion of voluntarism, and historically it continues the poor relief tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that was based on giving to the neediest as a charitable act, not as a right of the recipient.\textsuperscript{289}

\textsuperscript{287} Salamon and Anheier, 1998, pp. 228-230.
\textsuperscript{288} Esping-Andersen, 1998, pp. 24, 27.
The statist model of welfare state is typical of countries like France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and it is associated with the weakest civil societies. According to Manow and Pallier, they are characterised by «long-time absence of an unemployment insurance», «the dominance of pension payments in public social spending», frequent clientelism in the attribution of benefits, fragmentation of social welfare provision, and high status-differentiated policies. In these countries, the ideal of universalism never really took root, the inclusion of the lower classes by welfare benefits was less developed, and the policies that were enacted were mainly in response to periods of extreme workers’ mobilisation after prolonged phases of exclusion and repression. This was clearest in the two Iberian cases, where welfare state measures arrived only in the 1970s after prolonged periods of authoritarian rule.

Here the state seldom uses voluntary associations for the design and implementation of social policies, and when it does, it is very selective and channels resources through one association or a small subset of carefully chosen organizations. Unions are unable to participate in the design and provision of welfare funds, and it is the government that alone formulates and manages policies. Because of this, family strategies of welfare provision have become widespread and substitute state and associational action. Also, in spite of being almost wholly Catholic countries, even church associations have a very small role in welfare policy.

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290 For France see Manow and Palier, 2007, p. 148.
291 For Italy see Lynch, 2007, p. 92.
292 Castles, 2006, p. 54.
294 Although funding might not be provided by the state, but by employers. Garcia and Karakatsanis, 2006, p. 114
295 Esping-Andersen had initially classified the cases of France and Italy as corporatist because he assumed a high role for the Catholic church, which subsequent research showed it was not true. Lynch, 2007, p. 92.
Table 18: Types of Welfare State and Patterns of Associational life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare-State</th>
<th>Pattern of Associational life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Social-Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Social-Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Social-Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Corporatist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Corporatist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Corporatist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Corporatist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Statist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Statist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Statist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Statist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note that it was not party ideology that determined the type of welfare state. Some scholars have argued that where social democracy was strongest, welfare state was the strongest, and consequently, associational life was also the densest. The social-democratic model posits that where working-class parties and
unions were able to exert effective political power, they established the most comprehensive welfare states, promoting benefits and rights as a political right. This implied that working-class based organisations gained control of the state institutions, via corporatism, centralised and encompassing unions organising workers for political mobilization and also for the delivery of social benefits and for their coordination with macroeconomic policy (social insurance programmes, welfare transfers, public housing, etc).296

Yet, social-democratic rule is not always related to a strong associational life. It is true that in the cases of stronger associational life rule by social-democrats has been usually long. In 1980, social-democrats had ruled Sweden during 30 years, 28 in Norway, 25 in Denmark, and 14 in Finland. But the Netherlands, a country which also has a very dense associational life, only had 8 years of social-democratic rule between 1945 and 1980. In fact, this country had more Christian-democratic years of rule between 1945 and 1980 than any other country in Europe (22 years). Austria had more social-democrats’ rule (20 years) than Finland, and Belgium had the same number of years as Finland. But their civil societies are less dense than Finland. Great Britain had also more years of labour rule than Finland, but she has a much weaker associational life. Moreover, socialists have ruled in Spain and in Portugal for many years, but had demobilising strategies and promoted a timid welfare state. In Spain in the late 1980s, a socialist government was unable to make for full labor participation in pacts with employers. The communist trade union refused to participate and the socialist UGT was ambivalent, while the factory councils pursued a position independent of both trade union federations.297 In sum, the argument that socialist incumbency and strong social-democratic parties and unions have produced strongly institutionalised civil societies does not apply to the clear cases where socialist parties and unions are weak as organisations. Inversely, in the Netherlands, with a very dense associational life historically, but weak socialist rule; finally there is the case of Great Britain where there are strong Socialist

unions since the mid-nineteenth century but associational life is less denser than the Netherlands.²⁹⁸

Also, there are many instances where Christian democratic parties have promoted associational life and welfare state development, mobilising in the process important segments of the working class. Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany represent this pattern. In fact, Catholic political and associational life has taken two forms in Western Europe. Catholic mobilization by Christian democratic parties (ideological egalitarianism, able to govern in coalition, or to establish pacts with left-wing parties) or the form of a right-wing party (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain), which mobilise only when responding to spurts from the left and working class mobilization, but that in general refrain from a mobilisation strategy.

To conclude, the previous discussion suggests that the levels of associational life development in western Europe in the period after the 1930s/1940s, from the highest type (hegemonic) to the lowest (disjointed), rest on a specific balance and interaction between the state, the regime institutions, and the associations. The more these three dimensions empower each other, the stronger is the associational life in a given country. Associational life will be stronger and become more institutionalized when a strong and high-capacity state is combined with a set of very inclusive institutions: corporatism, equalitarian welfare state, and mass parties. As the more recent research on voluntary associations has showed, the services and institutions of state regulation, in both welfare and economic and industrial policy-making, shape associational life. The mechanisms through which they can empower voluntary associations range from the easiness of granting public status and material resources to associations and by deciding which groups should be present in the policy-making process (producers or consumers; business or labor, and so on).²⁹⁹

Table 19: Facilitating Conditions of Patterns of Associational life, 1945-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Interest Group System</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Welfare-State</th>
<th>Associational Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>C/M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>C/M</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Interest Group System: C: Corporatist, P: Pluralist; Parties: M: Mass, C: Cadre; Welfare-State: SD: Social-Democratic, C: Corporatist, L: Liberal, S: Statist)
Chapter 4: An Alternative Theory. The Historical and Political Origins of Associational life

The fact that density and coordination of associational life in democratic regimes grows with welfare state, corporatism, and mass parties means that the state and institutions of the previous regime were open and elastic enough to recognize the legitimacy and public role of these associations and to integrate them in policy making and welfare state services networks. In this sense, specific patterns of associational life in democratic regimes are the result of the institutionalization of past negotiations, and conflicts between ins and outs, between excluded populations that organize through associations and elites that control regime institutions for the definition of the meaning and scope of citizenship. As Reinhard Bendix stressed, the origins of the diverse types of associational life in Western Europe lie in how the «civic integration» of the lower classes was negotiated in the transition from a traditional to an industrial society.\(^{300}\) In order to discover the causal factors, one should examine how during the previous regime and during the process of transition to democracy pressures from below by associational life organisations interacted with processes of state building, elite strategies, and institutional legacies to produce different patterns of associational life in the democratic period. To this end, there are two complementary tasks.

First, associational life in democracies is partly the continuation of the previous regime forms of associational life, networks of solidarity, and forms of collective action. The stronger the previous traditions of associational life, the more autonomous these networks were, and the more they had resources for collective action, the stronger was the push for institutional integration and autonomous action before and during the transition to democracy. The extent to which populations formed dense networks of interaction, especially the existence of strong associational and/or communal ties, made it easier to act collectively

and to form organizations.\textsuperscript{301} Accordingly, one should look at the processes of change and continuity of the previous pre-modern institutions as well as patterns of interest representation, namely the urban guild system, and religious and peasant forms of corporate representation, and social organization.

Second, associational life does not develop in a void. In this respect, the social and political contexts matter, and we must research how traditions and forms of collective action have interacted with regime institutions, processes of state building, and elite strategies. As Lipset argued, different pre-democratic regimes reacted differently to lower class mobilisation, which in turn conditioned the capacity for organisation and the degree of radicalism of the ideology of the lower classes. More specifically, Lipset argued that the more closed a political system was to pressures for inclusion (in terms of political, civil, and economic rights), the more radical was the opposition to the system, leading in some contexts to the consolidation in those classes of revolutionary ideologies (e.g. Marxism and Anarchism).\textsuperscript{302} In closed and non-inclusive institutional settings, elites refrained from creating linkages to the lower classes through organizations. Instead, they formed stronger links with each other, thus erasing the boundaries between political cleavages. Particularly decisive is whether elites collude or compete during the transition period to the new democratic regime. If elites pursue a deliberate strategy of demobilisation in the moment of transition to democracy, this will set a pattern of elite interaction that will shape the character of the subsequent regime for years to come. More competition between political blocs at the moment of transition to democracy (the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom) had the inverse effect. Open and inclusive institutional legacies at the moment of associational development will produce competitive elites in the political arena that will have an interest in mobilizing the citizenry through party and civic channels in order to accentuate their differences.\textsuperscript{303}

\textsuperscript{301} Tilly, 1978, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{302} Lipset, 1992, pp. 304-305.
\textsuperscript{303} Duverger, 1971, pp. 242-244; Offe and Schmitter, 1995, p. 513.
To conclude, in order to explain patterns of associational life established after the stabilization of European regimes between the 1930s/1940s and the 1970s, it is necessary to look at how varying patterns of associational life developed during the previous non-democratic regimes and interacted with processes of state and institutional change in the polity. In this sense associational life in the post-1930s/1940s era was shaped by larger dynamics in the decades before. Voluntary associations fought for inclusion and recognition between the mid-nineteenth century until the 1930s, but by the interwar years, I argue, the specific patterns of associational life were already taking shape and they were consolidated after 1945. The highest case for the development of a dense associational life in the interwar years was when a strong and mobilized associational life pressuring from below and organizing for protest encountered open and inclusive institutions (Scandinavia). The weakest case for associational life development was when already weak associational life associations in the interwar period faced highly closed institutions (Iberia). I argue that there were three causal conditions present in the European polities between the years 1800-1930s that were important in explaining this variation.

4.1. The Legacy of Pre-Modern Corporate Representation

Pre-modern European associational life was mostly organized in three pillars, sometimes interchangeable: urban guilds, religious corporations, and the aristocracy. In the Scandinavian case, there was a fourth pillar: the peasant estate. These pillars were ascriptive in the sense that birth determined future rank in society, and that these groups were closed communities that determined specific codes of behavior, political position, and economic condition.\textsuperscript{304} There were two important arenas of associational life: the oligarchies of mercantile and independent municipalities, and the free peasant communities. Both had enjoyed rights of self-rule versus landlords, the church, and kings. In the countryside there were community courts, elective communal bodies like assemblies, and the right

\textsuperscript{304} Moore, 1978, pp. 126-127.
of self–taxation. Both were forms of almost democratic self-rule, but they were based on corporatist rather than individualistic principles. These localities, both urban and rural, had often the capacity to raise taxes, and they sometimes negotiated and fought for their freedoms. Thus, they were able to conquer rights of self-rule and gain immunities.

The modern principles of individualism propagated by political and economic changes (the French and industrial revolutions) tended to dissolve these corporate bodies and the idea that individual identity existed only within a collective body. In the countryside, state centralisation and the expansion of commercial forms of agriculture led to the subdivision of property, the end of communal lands, and the elimination of the institutions of self-rule. As Gierke noted, «in villages and among groups of peasants, the right to free assembly» had been «withdrawn from the communities».

There were still, as Schmitter has argued, «differences in the nature of premodern associational life» in the sense that already before the French revolution there were societies that were more corporate structured than others. Moreover, societies in the course of modernisation were differently affected by the modern economic and political conceptions of individualism. This had several forms. First, communal and corporate forms of organisation of lower classes still existed in many parts of Europe. According to Gierke, by the end of the nineteenth century there were still many cities in western Europe, especially in Germany, where the form of rule was guild-like, cities were democratically ruled by the craft guilds, or the guilds had so much power that it was committees of citizens that ruled the city. Also, the peasantry was able in certain settings, especially in the Germanic lands, Scandinavia, and central Italy, to set up organizations and institutions in order to resist landlords’ and capitalists’ attempts of expropriation of common lands by transforming the old communal associations of the countryside into modern associations. This led to the

308 Schmitter, 1977, p. 34.
formation of rural associations, of which two types were of particular importance: first, associations for the independent smallholders, with the role to gather capital, distribute goods, and organise joint production; and second, the rural worker or rural wage-laborer associations that was used to promote political freedom.\textsuperscript{310} Importantly, this organisational capacity of peasants and middle proprietors was determined less by the type of property existing in the countryside and more by the institutional recognition and status attribution within the local and/or national political regime. Historically, similar classes of peasants (e.g. middle-class proprietors, smallholders, or rural proletarians) have been mobilized by voluntary associations to varying degrees and with very different ideologies, ranging from left-wing moderate socialism to extreme right-wing reactionarism. In France, middle proprietors have a stronger tradition of leftism, whereas in Italy the small proprietors of Tuscany are more conservative, historically supporting Christian democracy. As Juan Linz argued, it was more the «organization of labor than the property structure as such that seems to correlate with politics».\textsuperscript{311} Still another important factor is the degree to which established religion has a political influence in the countryside. Where there was still a strong nobility and church with some degree of control of local life, Linz argued, peasants’ political behavior tended to be conservative.\textsuperscript{312}

Second, the upper classes, like the nobility, or elites like the church had a form of corporate representation. There would be local, and later national, parliaments where the representation of societal interests was to be done by corporate groups: the church, the nobility, urban guilds, and the peasantry. In sum, corporate bodies and corporate or group-like forms of representation were still vibrant and recognized by the political regimes in many countries in the late nineteenth century. In many European countries until the late nineteenth-century there was the revival (even in contexts where they had been moribund) of forms of estate/corporative assembly representation, something that Gierke considered

\textsuperscript{310} Gierke, 1990, pp. 219-220.
\textsuperscript{311} Linz, 1976, p. 424.
\textsuperscript{312} Linz, 1976, pp. 385-396.
the «territorial estate bodies», as opposed to individualistic representation. This can be seen clearly in the processes of representation in national parliaments in the late nineteenth century. Throughout Europe elites sought to maintain power, but the specific forms through which this was achieved varied greatly and could be termed either corporatist or individualist. For instance, if looking at misrepresentation devices at periods of suffrage extension, in order to limit the impact of majorities in electoral processes in some places, elites did that through forms that maintained group representation. These were: 1) indirect voting: the electorate voted for a grand elector and not for particular candidates, and then the grand electors chose the representatives for parliament; 2) plural voting: wealthy and/or well educated citizens or representatives of certain institutions like churches or universities would receive extra votes, and especially; 3) curia/estate voting: this system gave a highly disproportionate number of seats to the upper estates, usually wealthy families, the nobility, and the clergy. To explain, the first estate had direct representation by male heads of noble families, the clergy estate was represented by high-ranking clergy, the burgher estates were filled with elected representatives by plural voting and by burghers with certain professional and income qualifications, and the peasant estate was elected by indirect voting by independent farmers.

I argue that the more intermediate bodies and forms of corporate representation survived up to the early twentieth century, the denser and the more coordinated associational life would be in the remaining part of the century.

Hypothesis 1:
The higher the degree to which traditions of estate and corporate representation existed in the late 1800s-early 1900s, the stronger associational life was in the twentieth century.

314 Tenants and laborers were excluded from voting to the peasant estate. Bartolini, 2000, pp. 349-351.
315 For an early observation on the need to do more research on this factor see Fernandes, 2003.
As Colin Crouch has argued, in societies where the institutional configuration of the polity in the late nineteenth century was organised in a corporate and functional manner (Ständestaat), the more the state used and recognised collective representation and encompassing voluntary associations for the establishment of «social order». These organizations (e.g. guilds) served as precursors to modern associability.\textsuperscript{316} The more polities were corporate in the late nineteenth century, the stronger associational life would be in the period between the 1930s/40s and the 1970s.

Several mechanisms were at work here. First, from the point of view of the communities, the higher the tradition of corporatism from feudal Europe was, the higher became group and/or class consciousness in the modern period, and the more cohesive were lower class groups like urban workers or farmers. It was easier to engage in collective action by these groups and by transforming this identity in formation of strong associations.\textsuperscript{317} In the case of rural associations, it was the legacy of this institutional structure that gave the peasantry capacity for autonomous action that by the mid-nineteenth century, when state rulers promoted again state centralisation and unification, the peasantry could negotiate from a better position their entry into the national state in certain societies. Because the peasantry was organised around protected enclaves like rural parliaments, councils, and assemblies that defended their group liberties, it managed to negotiate better with state builders its position within the polity.\textsuperscript{318}

In fact, at the core of this issue was also a process of institutional homology between groups competing for power and influence in the polity. Although corporate representation was meant to consolidate the power of existing traditional elites and to crystallize political differences by corporate criteria, at the same time it provoked the consolidation of corporate organisation in the excluded classes, thus augmenting their solidarity as a group and subsequent higher capacity for collective action. Moreover, the struggle for incorporation would be done through fighting for the recognition of the popular classes’

\textsuperscript{316} Crouch, 1989, p. 189.
\textsuperscript{317} Lipset, 1992, pp. 304, 336.
\textsuperscript{318} Gouldner, 1980, pp. 359-362.
aspirations as group aspirations, not as individual claims. Citizenship was to be of a corporate form. For instance, in the countries where guilds still existed in the late nineteenth century, employers/capitalists would have a strong degree of organisation as a group, and this tended to make workers and lower classes have a stronger impetus for organisation building as a corporate group, in order to counteract the power of employers. In contrast, countries where corporatism did not exist in the nineteenth century, when pressures for inclusion appeared at the end of that century, they would be institutionalized according to the contractualist, liberal, and individualistic principles already inscribed in state and regime rules and norms.

Second, the fact that corporate differentiating criteria were seen as legitimate by the regime, and the more these corporations had survived liberalism and economic freedom during the nineteenth century, the more likely it was that modernising states would integrate them, in the context of modernisation from above in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, into policy-making networks of welfare and economic policies, thereby recognizing the «autonomy, jurisdiction and self-administration» of voluntary associations. This, then, stimulated a process whereby corporate groups, guilds, and others were transformed into modern associations with relative ease, hence generating a modern associational life with high density and coordination levels, which would grow in partnership with the state until the 1930s and serve as the antecedent of the hegemonic and dominant types of civil societies in the post-1945 democracies. This hypothesis was first coined by Gerhard Lehmbruch, who argued that the post-1945 corporatist systems (or what he calls corporatist concertation), operating at a national level and encompassing several industries, were facilitated by the existence in the late nineteenth century of traditions of what he calls «sectoral corporatism». These were the partnerships developed by the state, guilds, chambers for economic (protectionism), and welfare policies, initially at the local level. In the case of welfare policies, the state used the self-help associations of artisans and craftsmen, and it regulated their compulsory

319 Gierke, 1990, p. 112.
membership, self-regulation autonomy, and forms of protection for members, thus promoting centralized and monopolistic sectoral associations.

These policies were preferred in Austria and in Germany, where social insurance (social insurance elected boards, welfare ministries) was pioneered but with the aim of maintaining traditional society. In the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and the Pope’s territories in central Italy guilds and corporate forms of representation survived until almost the early twentieth century. According to Gierke, after the French invasions most German states and Austria were able to preserve the old trades’ corporations as associations in public law, thus transforming the old system of craft guilds. German states attributed authority to these associations in matters of commerce and gave them corporative rights. But it was after 1848 that workers’ associations were integrated in the system of public institutions and given a public role in the provision of services and goods for status groups (Stand) and professions. German employers’ associations (then the German Trade Congress) were also the almost unbroken continuation of guilds, trades’ corporations, chambers of commerce, and commercial associations.

Urban and rural autonomous forms of corporate representation were preserved in Germany and Austria. Rural communities in Germany were freer than in the rest Europe, according to Gierke. There was a continuation of the old forms of rural fellowships in the states of Nassau, Hanover, Frankfurt, and Schleswig-Holstein. Old autonomies were preserved through protection by imperial courts, by territorial estates, or by the writing of chartered corporations. They allowed the community to have more autonomy and even financial self-administration in matters like religion, teaching, and poor relief.

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322 Lehmbuch, 1984, p. 63.
325 And sometimes even with the character of compulsory association, like Austria and Bavaria until 1868. Gierke, 1990, pp. 193-194.
maintained their autonomy in relation to the central state and allowed for the participation of organised interests in city affairs. For instance, in Austria «the communal ordinance of 1849» stated that «the free community is the basis for a free state». In the Netherlands, also, «there was an almost unbroken continuity with the medieval system of corporations», and both there, in Belgium, in parts of Italy, and in Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain the urban self-rule and guild-like administration of medieval times by a competitive capitalist elite continued until the late nineteenth century. This was the pattern also in Scandinavia, where groups of merchants, peasants, and urban workers were represented in estates and city councils (although to a much larger extent in Denmark than in Norway and Sweden).

By the early nineteenth century, Britain, France, and the Iberian countries had abolished corporate representation and the guilds. In France the absolute monarchy had given them a serious blow, and the revolution of 1789 finally eliminated them. In particular in France, the subsequent laws on associational life were very restrictive, with the several penal codes stipulating that associations of more than twenty individuals would need the approval of the government, and as a consequence the formation of modern associations was harder. England was the pioneer in Europe in abolishing corporate representation in the parliament by individual representation already in the seventeenth century. The English parliament was never a body of estates.

If looking at suffrage misrepresentation devices, one can see that corporate forms of misrepresentation existed in most of the same countries where guilds and corporations were maintained. In Austria, Norway, and Sweden indirect voting existed until the twentieth century. In Austria, between 1861 and 1901 in the fourth curia and after 1897 in the fifth curia. In Norway and Sweden until 1906 and 1908 respectively (although in Sweden the vote was only partially

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332 Lipset, 1992, p. 311.
335 Caramani, 2004, p. 27.
indirect after 1866). In Sweden, due to indirect voting in 1900, approximately 150 noble families had the voting power equal to 23,469 burghers and 10,184 peasants. In Prussia, indirect voting lasted until 1918 (although not in the imperial elections).\(^{336}\) In the Netherlands, indirect voting existed until 1848.\(^{337}\) Plural voting existed in Sweden until 1866, in England it existed also but had a very small impact (only for 7% of the electorate in 1911), but it was important in Austria and Belgium. In Belgium, plural voting existed between 1893 until 1919. House owners and owners of real estate above a certain value received an extra vote and people with college education received two extra votes. Although the franchise was broadened in this period in Belgium, at the same time the richer classes received extra votes. The curia and estate system existed in Sweden until the reform of 1866, in Prussia until 1918, and in Austria until 1906. In 1897, Austria reintroduced a fifth curia with universal suffrage to male citizens above twenty-four years of age. At the same time, all the electors of the second curia gained a second vote, and so between 1896 and 1907 40% of all Austrian males cast two votes.\(^{338}\) Countries like Denmark, France, Italy, and Britain did not have any of these institutional suffrage conditions.\(^{339}\)

Adding these regime and societal characteristics together, one can build an index of degree of corporatism for the period encompassing the turn of the twentieth century. I do this by dividing the countries between a high, medium, and nonexistent degree of corporate representation. Each classification is the result of a combination of four indicators of corporatism: the existence of urban corporate bodies, of rural corporate bodies, of plural/indirect vote, and of the existence of curia system. Countries with a positive score in all four indicators will be classified with a high level of corporatism, with positive score in just two or three will be classified as medium, and with none with inexistent corporatism.

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\(^{336}\) Bartolini, 2000, pp. 349-351.
\(^{337}\) Bartolini, 2000, pp. 351-352.
\(^{338}\) Lipset, 1992, p. 309.
\(^{339}\) Bartolini, 2000, p. 353. In France, plural voting (double vote) existed only between 1820 and 1830; and in England, university graduates and certain businessmen (albeit a very small percentage of the electorate) had more than one vote until 1948. I owe this information to Pedro Tavares de Almeida.
Table 20: Strength of Corporate Bodies of Interest Intermediation and Corporate Representation in late nineteenth-early twentieth centuries (1860s-1920s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Urban Corporate Bodies</th>
<th>Rural Corporate Bodies</th>
<th>Plural/Indirect Vote</th>
<th>Curia System</th>
<th>Degree of Corporatism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Y: Yes; N: No; H: High; M: Medium; I: Inexistent Corporatism; sources: Bartolini, 2000; Ebbinghaus, 1996, pp. 60-62; Ertman, 2007, p. 44; Gierke, 1990; Hobsbawm, 1999; Flora, Kuhnle, Urwin, 1999; Lipset, 1992; Note: indirect voting existed in the Netherlands and in Portugal, but was abolished in 1848 in the former and in 1852 in the latter.

One could ask still, why countries showed such varying levels of corporatism in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries? I argue that these varying patterns were dependent of processes of state building, namely the timing of state building and/or the international status of the region/country where the corporate structures existed. More specifically, I argue that the later the process of state building occurred and/or the lower the international status of the country was, the higher was the continuation of corporatist structures up to the early twentieth century. Early state builders, countries that consolidated their borders already by the mid-seventeenth century and/or that were major international powers in the period between the seventeenth and early nineteenth century, tended to eliminate corporate bodies much earlier. This was because state centralisation was achieved much earlier, and there was a quest for
resources to wage war since very early on, which made these states more predatory of the resources of the corporate bodies. Also, market unification and capitalist accumulation was achieved earlier (especially in England), thus eliminating the internal geographical and corporate barriers to trade and capital mobility.

This is the case in countries like England, Spain, Portugal, and France, in contrast to the corporatist cases which were mainly the late state builders (Norway, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands) and peripheral areas not subject to so much war (Scandinavia). Sweden is a dubious case in this respect because it was an early state builder, but after 1700 it has been only a small regional power. What differentiates England, France, Spain, and Portugal from the rest was their much higher international status, and as a consequence their exposition to war. Since the sixteenth century, all of these countries were naval empires that fought for global domination, fighting major wars over America, Africa and Asia. Inversely, the remaining countries were peripheral areas or small regional powers (Sweden). Austria was a stagnated continental empire that started to participate more in international affairs only after the French revolution, and until then it had been a crusading frontier empire. Germany (although unified under the Holy-Roman Empire) and Italy were at the time only a collection of small states. Norway had been under Danish and Swedish rule until 1905. Belgium was under Austrian rule until 1794, under French rule between 1794 and 1815, and rules by the Dutch until 1830. The Netherlands were only a small maritime commercial power if compared to England or Spain.\(^\text{340}\)

Two mechanisms were at work here. First, early state builders (from the mid-1600s until the early 1800s) and/or states that were major players in the international military competition for power in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries were subject to higher military pressures. As a consequence, they tended to expand a uniform administration and to crush autonomous bodies in


their demand for resources to finance war. In this sense, these countries abolished the guild system and corporatist structures much earlier, and as a consequence guilds had already disappeared by the late 1800s. An extreme case are the Iberian countries, in particular Spain, where by the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries the process of state-building led to «the curtailing or even elimination of privileges enjoyed by powerful institutions and groups like the monarch, the Church, noblemen and corporations».

Second, the state apparatus of the early state builders or international major players became more centralized and dirigiste since it was formed in a context of military conquest. An important case is Spain, whose bureaucracy was made for the armed conquista of the Americas. Their state apparatus (army, fiscal capacities, and so on) was created in and for this context. Consequently, the relationship of these states with societal organised interests in the future, namely in the context of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, would be more based on imposition from above and less on partnership with organisations. The forms of linking the state with pressures from below became mainly bureaucratic control (France and Iberia) or local notable control through parliament (England). Statism would be, especially for the cases of Iberia and France, the future form of dealing with organised interests. This refers to an organisation of political authority where the political center is remote and buffered from society. Society is considered «an arena» of «particularity and conflict of interests» that represents a private sphere subject to State tutelage», which is a «sponsor of a higher moral order». Society and politics must be «grounded in an “objective” search for national interests. Individual activism is considered partisan and threatening», and consequently the society and the state stand in an antagonistic relationship. This legal tradition emerged in societies with strong militaristic and theocratic traditions, and it is exemplified in both the centralised monarchical state of pre-1789 France and post-1789 Napoleonic era.

341 The Netherlands is an exception here. Although it was a major power in international commerce in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it never developed a military apparatus that could be used to crush autonomous bodies and proto-forms of urban and religious associational life. Tilly, 1998, pp. 90, 152.
342 Ertman, 2007, p. 50.
In both contexts, local rulers’ state agents, called *intendants* and later *préfets*, were nominated by the central government, and they were the main actors mediating between the state and the society. A system of field services was coordinated by state representatives (the prefectural system) and hierarchically subordinated to the government in a «quasi-military manner». Local and smaller administrative and political units are seen as the administrative emanation from the central power and their reason for existence is to «implement national policy».343

Inversely, late state builders and peripheral countries developed a different state structure. The political center accepted more easily, recognized legally, and incorporated societal interests. Interest formation, representation, bargaining, and politicking were seen as legitimate. «Authority lies in a public». The Scandinavian countries fall into this pattern. The rule of law is identified with the sovereignty in society, and so «access to the public sphere is less restricted».344 Late state building also shaped the strength of religious mobilization, in particular Christian democracy. As Caramani showed, religious mass parties appeared mainly in late state building countries. These countries consolidated only in an era when pressures from below for political recognition where at their climax (e.g. when socialists and workers pressured for inclusion), and consequently they were less capable of repressing these demands. The political Right saw here an opportunity to counter-mobilise against the Left. On the contrary, in early state builders, the political Right already was consolidated before, and less through mass organisations but more through informal networks and/or conservative parties.345

Table 21: International status and timing of nation-building in Western Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>International Status (18th century)</th>
<th>Timing of State Building (before or after the 1830s)</th>
<th>Pattern of Associational life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(P: Peripheral; C: Central; E: Early; L: Late; Netherlands and Belgium achieved independence in the 1830s, Italy in 1861-1870, Germany 1867–1871 and Austria Ausgleich was in 1867)

4.2. Democratization and Parliamentarization

The degree of democratization of a polity refers to the degree that laws and institutions attribute broad rights of participation and of protection from arbitrary state power for popular sectors.\(^{346}\) In the context of the modernisation of western European societies since the nineteenth-century, three aspects have been crucial: 1) the expansion of voting rights towards universal (first male) suffrage; 2) civil liberties like freedom of thought, speech, association, and assembly; and 3) an autonomous parliament. These aspects do not necessarily go together and

\(^{346}\) Tilly, 2006, p. 21.
have not emerged at the same time. For instance, as Ziblatt argues, in Bismarck’s Germany universal male suffrage was introduced in 1867 and 1871, but the powers of parliament were much lower, whereas in the late nineteenth century England there was restricted suffrage but a strong parliament.\textsuperscript{347} Also in southern Europe, for instance Spain had an institutionalised universal suffrage in the late nineteenth century, whereas Portugal had not, although both countries tended to institute very repressive laws of associability.

The more a polity is democratised and parliamentarised, the stronger will be its associational life. Polities and contexts of extension of the rights of suffrage and association tend to promote strong associations at the national level. Lower-class groups are more empowered, associations form more easily alliances and bridging social cleavages.\textsuperscript{348} As Skocpol argues, «national elections enhance civic engagement … because they encourage popular involvement and build national solidarity».\textsuperscript{349} Crowley and Skocpol found that the degree of electoral competition is positively correlated with the foundation of voluntary associations in American states between 1860 and 1920.\textsuperscript{350} Inversely, where the legislation on these rights is more restrictive, by giving for instance more power to police interference towards organisations and movements or by giving authorities discretionary powers over the internal life of the associations (e.g. permission to hold meetings, the degree to which legal rules are clear or ambiguous, and as a consequence allow more easily for manipulation by authorities), the less participation in civic associations will grow and the more associations will represent only parochial interests, not develop horizontal links with other associations, and in extreme situations evolve into small sect-like organisations devoted to political violence.\textsuperscript{351}

Within this group of rights, the parliament plays a decisive role. It could be argued that semi-presidential and presidential systems foster higher participation, since they provide more points of institutional access to societal

\textsuperscript{348} Estévez-Abe, 2003; Schwartz, 2003, pp. 32-35.
\textsuperscript{349} Skocpol, 2003, p. 283.
\textsuperscript{350} Crowley and Skocpol, 2001, p. 818.
\textsuperscript{351} della Porta, 1995, pp. 56-58, 71-73; see also Schwartz, 2003, pp. 32-35.
claimants and organised groups, and as such they could promote higher mobilization. On the other hand, these systems also provide more points of blockage, where mobilization could be stopped or reverted.\textsuperscript{352} The degree of parliamentarization refers to the relative powers of the parliament in relation to the government or the executive, in particular its ability to make government responsible to parliamentary majorities in a lower house. This means that the parliament has high control of the formation, decisions, personnel, and policies of the executive.\textsuperscript{353}

There are several mechanisms at work here. First, the stronger the parliament, in the words of Philippe Schmitter, the more they become arenas where «appeals could be addressed»,\textsuperscript{354} the more associations will seek to influence parliamentarians, to establish links with the MPs and political parties, and build their own agendas according to parliamentary agendas and cycles. Since strong parliaments represent the whole nation, associations will tend to become national in scope, and as such more coordinated through the territory, with associational leaders creating links and alliances that run through several regions and localities of the country. As Tilly observed in relation to England for the period from 1758 until 1834, as the parliament became the more important political institution, it also became the target of popular contention and association building. The issues debated in the parliament became more important to individuals, and since these issues were national in scope, association building shifted from the local to the national level. Inversely, weak parliaments were less procured by associations, and as such associations have tended to be of smaller scale, narrower in scope, local, and particularistic, since their main are the asking of favors from local administrators or trying to influence directly the executive and the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{355}

Second, stronger parliaments present higher opportunities for lower classes and common people to influence politics. Consequently it is easier to form associations to that effect. Stronger parliaments give a stronger role in the

\textsuperscript{352} Crowley and Skocpol, 2001, p. 818.
\textsuperscript{353} Bartolini, 2000, p. 336.
\textsuperscript{354} Schmitter, 1974, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{355} Tilly, 1997b, pp. 219-221, 225.
polity for party and associational entrepreneurs. Tocqueville noted this when he was referring to France and noting that in the regions where after 1789 representative estates were maintained (Bretagne and Languedoc) the third estate had a much higher participation in the debates of the affairs of the community. Also Gierke has argued that strong parliaments «contributed directly and substantially to the consolidation and deepening of the people’s conviction of the necessity of popular participation in the system of the state, by means of popular representation».

Since the electorate is decisive in a politician’s choices in a strongly parliamentarised system, it is easier for associations to establish links to political parties, while political parties will be more interested in creating permanent and not episodic links with associations in order to achieve a higher reach among the electorate. As Weber argued, with high parliamentarisation, parties become more interested in mobilisation, and as a consequence they tend to be more competitive with each other, to become more bureaucratic, professional, national in scope (tending to create a national party bureaucracy over the whole territory to coordinate political action and mobilization), stable in their leadership, develop mass propaganda, and consequently develop stronger connections with associations. During early party development, this implied the creation of party youth organisations, cooperatives, consumers associations, and unions.

This had been the case of some workers’ movements. In fact, to strengthen the powers of the parliament has historically been always one of the aims of the workers’ movements, together with proportional representation, because it has been seen as a way to gain influence in the polity. In contexts of strong parliamentarism, workers built later alliances with liberal parties in order to induce universal welfare state and universal suffrage.

356 Tilly, 1997b, p. 225.
357 Tocqueville, 1969, pp. 269-272, 279.
Inversely, weak parliaments inhibit party development, party competition and associational development. In contexts of executive predominance, plebiscitary or even caesaristic tendencies tend to be stronger, since the center of power lies mainly with the executive leader. As a consequence, parties and associations are less able to develop permanent links with each other, and elites refrain more easily from mobilising newcomers to the political system. This has been the case of the Iberian countries from the late eighteenth century until the 1930s.

Hypothesis 2:
The higher the degree of democratisation of the regime (in particular its level of parliamentarisation), between the 1880s and the 1930s, the stronger was associational life between the 1930s/40s and 2000.

Europe has exhibited much variation in the power of parliaments since the middle ages. The first parliaments emerged in Europe in the middle ages as places of deliberation and control over the monarch, and where the main sectors of society were represented (monarch, aristocracy, burghers and clerics and sometimes the peasants). The main issues under debate were the maintenance of group and corporate liberties, privileges, and especially the control of taxation, and declarations of war. By the late eighteenth century there was already variation in Europe between countries’ relative powers of parliament. According to Ertman, there were two types of monarchical regimes in Europe. In absolutist monarchies, the monarch had both executive and legislative powers, and consequently parliaments had very low power. This was the situation in France, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, and the kingdoms of Savoy, Tuscany, Naples, the German principalities. In constitutional monarchies, the legislative power was

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364 Downing, 1992, p. 28; Tilly, 1975, p. 22.
shared by the monarch and a representative assembly, Britain and Sweden being the examples. 365

There is a debate about the degree of continuity between these pre-modern bodies and modern conceptions of parliamentarism. According to Huntington, in the places where these medieval assemblies survived the period of absolutism, populations gained a higher control of the actions of the sovereign and they could have had stronger opportunities for autonomous participation. England, Sweden, some of the German states, and Catalonia in Spain are examples here. 366 Gierke, although arguing that modern parliaments «did not spring form the estate-based constitution», also affirms that for Germany «the influence which the remnants of the constitution of the territorial estates exercised on the emergence and formation of the principle of representation» «cannot be underestimated». 367

Still, for the period from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century we may rank European polities according their degree of parliamentarisation. Cases of high degree of parliamentarian power were Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries (especially in the two countries where there was continuity of pre-modern to modern parliaments), Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. 368 In Britain, full parliamentary control of government was established at least by 1832, and the power was gradually extended to the lower classes in 1867, in 1884, and by the reforms resulting in universal male suffrage in 1918. In Sweden, in the old regime the powerful four estate riksdag was transformed into the two chambered Riksdag in 1866. Governments resigned frequently because of parliamentary pressure, even in spite of the king’s opposition, and in 1917 the parliament gained full power. Universal suffrage was instituted in 1921. In Denmark in the 1890s, governments depended for their continuation in power mainly on the parliament’s will, and in 1901 the king accepted full parliamentarisation of the regime, which led to universal suffrage in 1915. In Norway, full government responsibility to parliament (the Storting) was established in 1884. Universal male suffrage was established in 1898. In the

365 Ertman, 1997, pp. 6-7; see also Tilly, 1975, p. 22.
367 Gierke, 1990, pp. 151-152.
368 On the case of Switzerland, not analysed here, see Barber, 1974.
Netherlands parliamentary government was established in 1848, with the transformation of early corporate representation in a modern parliament. The king’s actions became fully controlled. Finally, in Belgium since the independence in 1831, the main power was in the elected chamber and the king never interfered with daily political affairs.\textsuperscript{369}

The cases of medium parliamentarian power are Italy, Germany, and Austria. In Italy parliamentary control of the government was instituted in 1852 in the kingdom of Piedmont, and after Italian unification governments always depended on the results of elections and on the will of the chamber deputies. Universal male suffrage was instituted in 1919. Still, according to Bartolini, the influence of the king and the royal house was constant. Prussia had also elements of high and low parliamentarian power. After German unification in 1866, the new 26 states of Germany maintained their sovereign powers, were able to elect representatives to the upper house of the federal parliament, and could veto legislation of the lower house, the Reichstag. In this sense there was a high degree of parliamentarisation, especially at the federal level. Gierke called Germany at this time a «system of shared sovereignty».\textsuperscript{370} At the same time, Prussian power within the German state inhibited parliamentarisation at the national level. It corresponded to three fifths of the territory and population, the King of Prussia was the German emperor, and the prime minister of Prussia was the national prime-minister (chancellor). Moreover, it was the emperor who appointed the chancellor, and the dissolution of the parliament was common. Finally, in Austria the provincial estates were recognised as regional parliaments, and the notion of constitutional government was established in 1860. At the same time, the dissolution of the national parliament, the Reichsrat, by the emperor was common.\textsuperscript{371}

Cases of very low parliamentarism are France, Portugal, and Spain. The estates general of 1789 and the national assembly conventions of 1792 and 1793 instituted full parliamentarisation, but France was for most of the century

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{369}] Bartolini, 2000, pp. 338-340.
\item[\textsuperscript{370}] Gierke, 1990, pp. 154, 158.
\item[\textsuperscript{371}] Bartolini, 2000, pp. 340-344.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
alternating between periods of autocracy and explosions of full democracy by social movements, in the words of Aristide Zolberg (1830, 1848, and 1871).  

Finally, in 1875 with the creation of the so-called third republic (1875-1941) parliamentary sovereignty and universal suffrage were instituted, but the regime of the third republic rested always on shaky foundations; the threat of a military conspiracy to restore monarchy was always looming in the background, and it was subject to presidential dissolution of the lower chamber (e.g. the president MacMahon dissolution of the lower chamber in 1877, the coup attempt by general Boulanger). Until the 1930s, there were permanent conflicts between the lower chamber and the senate.  

Portugal and Spain, much like France, experienced alternating periods of extreme parliamentarisation with the radical constitutions of the 1820s, but even more than in France these were very short lived experiences. By the late nineteenth century until the 1930s in Portugal and until the 1920s in Spain, elections were always dishonest, the king was the main center of politics (the poder moderador) – although in Portugal only until 1910 - and dismissed at will governments without consulting with the parliament.

Table 22: Degree of parliamentarization of European regimes, 1870s-1930s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parliamentarization</th>
<th>Associational Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3. State Capacity

My third hypothesis posits that states with strong capacity will have an impact on associational life that will make them stronger and to have higher density and coordination levels. The higher a state’s capacity, the higher will be associational life density and coordination, all other things being equal. According to Peter Evans, state capacity refers to the «extent to which state goals, however determined, can actually be carried out». States with high capacity have at their disposal an organisational and bureaucratic apparatus that allows it to implement policies and to establish goals autonomously decided by the government in spite of resistance from actors within the society. In this sense a high capacity state has a body of functionaries or state officials, managers whose goals and interests are independent from societal forces. These state officials must have developed an ethos of career advancement and promotion based on merit; they must be professionalised. The state itself must have developed an autonomous capacity for resource extraction (taxes), for military and police control that applies the law over the territory (coercive power), easy communications over the territory, and what Mann calls infrastructural power, which means the power to coordinate associational life.

There are two mechanisms at work here. First, states with high capacity are more able to impose a uniform jurisdiction and control over a territory, and they will produce associations that imitate their pattern. In this sense, it is easier for associations to develop through the whole territory, to connect different geographical areas, and to be coordinated by peak associations. A unified state encourages associations to spread networks and to make alliances easier with other points and other associations within the national territory. Inversely, states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Disjointed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Disjointed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

375 Evans, 1995, p. 10.
with lower capacity are states that coexist with claims of self-rule in regions or parts of the territory. Consequently, associations will tend to be more local, regional, and as such less able to form coalitions with each other from different geographical areas. Consequently peak associations will not emerge or they fail to crystallise. As Martin Shefter has argued for the case of political parties, deep regionalism has been established in countries that have been subject to state collapse, which has made for later party developments producing less national oriented parties and more parties that control specific territorial bastions. This inhibits mobilization, because no gains will be achieved by trying to mobilise in other regions, because victory in the rival’s bastion is always almost impossible.377

Moreover, more centralised and high capacity states will paradoxically allow for associational coalitions representing the interests of the lower classes to form, since these projects will not be encumbered by territorial barriers. It will be easier for associations to spread through the territory, as consequently to form coalitions. Lower classes, in countries where the state has lower capacity, will tend to become more local and secluded in specific areas, less likely to form peak associations, and they remain attached to local issues, be used by local powerlords or churches. The historical meaning of this coalition for the nineteenth and the early twentieth century was the project of a coalition of the lower urban and rural classes. This is what happened in Scandinavia, and it was in fact Gramsci’s hypothesis for the building of a counter-hegemonic emancipatory associational life.378 In the Scandinavian countries social democratic regimes were the product of coalitions of the working classes with small producers’ and farmers’ organisations.379 The importance of this alliance was stressed by Juan Linz when he argued that the possibility of contact of the peasantry with urban unions and ideologies favours the creation of broad class alliances. In some contexts outside Scandinavia, it was possible to mobilise a reformist agricultural movement allied with center left and left and with the urban

377 Shefter, 1994a, pp. 8-9; see also Tilly, 1978, pp. 190-192.
working class unions. In Catalonia, the *Rabassaires* of the 1930s were a movement of prosperous share tenants (small and medium landowners and some farm laborers), affiliated with the Unió de Rabassaires (21,542 members) and linked to the Catalan Left, the Esquerra.\(^{380}\)

Gramsci was right in a theoretical sense. He had these hopes for Italy, which only proves that all societies have similar potentialities within them, as Marx argued, but for historical reasons some alternatives are preferred to others. Gramsci developed these ideas in two fascinating essays on Italy. For Gramsci, the end of capitalism would only come about if an alliance of workers and peasants could be created, but as he argued, in the case of Italy this was conditioned by a particular history and social structure, which he subsumed under two questions. The first was what he called the southern question, or the situation of the southern peasantry. He argued that the poorest and the neediest peasants in Italy inhabited the south, an area of «extreme social disintegration». Paradoxically, noted Gramsci, because of this the peasants «have no cohesion among themselves», and the «southern peasants are in perpetual ferment, but as a mass they are incapable of giving a unified expression to their aspirations and their needs».\(^{381}\) The point that Gramsci was making is that for peasant self-organisation to develop it must come from a context of already secured autonomy from elites in the countryside, namely the Catholic Church (a powerful landowner in the south) and landlords. This did not exist in southern Italy, and consequently the peasants felt more isolated and weak. He made this point more explicitly in his essay on the Vatican question. In some contexts, Gramsci noted, peasants could have more autonomous power basis and as consequence be capable of self-organisation. In the northern Italian countryside, he argued, the church was strongly separated from the state and was not a strong property holder, thus allowing the peasants more room for autonomous action (e.g. the late 1800s peasant insurrections).\(^{382}\) It was at this point that the peasants faced the decision to ally with the industrial workers, organised in cooperatives and factory

\(^{380}\) Linz, 1976, p. 412.

\(^{381}\) Gramsci, 2000, p. 42.

\(^{382}\) Gramsci, 2000, pp. 30-32, 44.
councils, for a cross-class alliance. His hopes were for a context where «the peasants of the south and the workers of the north (would rise) simultaneously, even if not in a co-coordinating manner».³⁸³ But this program failed in Italy and the peasantry of the south was unable to coordinate its actions with the workers, and the peasants of the north were partially co-opted by the Fascists after 1918.³⁸⁴

Second, high capacity states are more able to establish partnerships with associations for the development, for the coordination and implementation of economic and welfare policies, and for political mobilisation. Since the late nineteenth century, when one of the main functions of the state became also the promotion of economic development and capitalist accumulation, or modernisation policies, states have established partnerships which empower associations that give public policy functions to associations.³⁸⁵ Schmitter and Streeck call these PIG’s, or private interest governments. Modernisation policies of states will be more successful if economic agents and their representative associations develop their activities in an environment where the state administration is efficient, the army and the state officials are loyal, the tax system is predictable. States will more likely be able to count on the support of the population, especially of labor, if they are able to deliver welfare policies and implement social and economic rights. To this end, they need an efficient administration capable of collecting and generating revenue to fund those policies. Moreover, as Schmitter and Streeck argue, for these policies to be successful, it is necessary that the state be strong in the sense that «one important mechanism by which private interest governments are kept responsive to wider societal needs is the threat by the state to intervene directly if the group fails to adjust the behavior of its members to the public interest. In this sense, the public use of private interests requires a strong rather than a weak state». The more associations have public functions, the stronger the state has to be and to have the

³⁸³ Gramsci, 2000, p. 37.
³⁸⁴ Gramsci, 2000, p. 45.
³⁸⁵ Evans, 1995; Huntington, 1996, p. 156.
capacity to «design, monitor, and keep in check the new self-regulating systems». 386

Hypothesis 3:
The Higher the State Capacity, the Stronger Will be Associational life

In the process of development in Western European history two factors have shaped state capacity. The first was international and geopolitical competition with other states. Processes of international competition, which have lead to war and made the state suffer collapse, defeat in invasion, or foreign occupation, have promoted a weak state unable to control its territory. These states were more likely to suffer from pockets of regional/local resistance to the center jurisdiction, low tax extraction capacities, quasi-autonomous regionalism, politicisation of the civil service, and the establishment of non-professional clientelistic networks. As Tilly has argued, failure in war meant the failure to homogenize the population. 387 Several aspects in this process have undermined state capacity. The first was the degree to which the army was divided by political allegiances.388 If army officers became permanently involved in politics, becoming political agents in their own right, a situation was created where state failure was permanent, and the common state of affairs was multiple sovereignty and fragmented national leadership. Extreme cases in Western Europe in the nineteenth century were Spain and Portugal in the aftermath of the Napoleonic invasions, where localism, caudillismo, and military fighting between regions set a pattern of military involvement in politics that would last until the 1930s.

As recent research has shown, extending Weber’s and Tilly’s early insights, victory in war makes for the emergence of nationally broad associations because governments will use more easily associations for national mobilization. Moreover, besides from war, other aspects of the international context, like the

386 Streeck and Schmitter, 1985, p. 134
387 Tilly, 1975, p. 42.
388 Huntington, 1996, p. 159.
economic competition among states and the distribution of wealth in the international economy, shape the degree to which interest groups are coopted and inserted into policy-making networks, especially in the areas of industrial policy.\textsuperscript{389}

The second factor is state-church relations during the process of modernisation. The higher the degree to which the church has posed a barrier (especially territorial) to state expansion, the less likely it is that the state will develop a strong capacity. If state and church elites are allies in the process of nation building, the easier it will be to achieve national territorial unification, because the state uses church resources, personnel, networks, and apparatus for the implementation of state policies. This produces a more efficient state administration since this empowers the state capacities to monitor, gather information, and control several areas of the country. Moreover, as Crouch argues, it creates a predisposition in the state apparatus for the consolidation of a partnership ideology with societal forces that was used in future relationships with associations during the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{390} Historically, the church was the institution whose links with the populations were closer and went to the more micro level; the church was an organisation present at the level of the local community. The resources of the church were put to the education of the souls at the community level, and for this the church developed a network of educational, welfare, and even statistical services. The more states in the future could use this legacy, the more they become empowered, thus achieving a higher capacity.

This is a new approach to the role of religion in the modernisation of western societies. Old theories equalled modernisation with secularisation, but an approach more attentive to spatial and temporal variations has undermined this claim. A major finding, first argued by Colin Crouch, noticed that the more state and churches fought each other before the emergence of modern voluntary associations, the more authoritarian the state would become in the decades after the 1870s to new forms of mobilization from below.\textsuperscript{391} In fact, the church can be

\textsuperscript{389} Katznelson, 2002, pp. 10-15. 
\textsuperscript{390} Crouch, 1989 and 1993. 
\textsuperscript{391} Crouch, 1986, p. 182.
considered to be the first form of proto-associational life. Mobilisation by the church was earlier than the emergence of modern ideologies like liberalism and socialism and broad societal transformations like industrialisation.

Moreover, state capacity was also shaped by the religious conflicts and settlements in the aftermath of the early modern European wars of religion. After the reformation, growth of state power was fostered by religious reforms, especially by Lutheranism and Calvinism (though less Catholic countries). The wars of religion in the 1500s promoted the building up of state administrations for the modernisation of the military. After the religious wars, rulers incorporated the churches in the state apparatus and used the church apparatus for purposes of poor relief and education.392

Finally, this doubled attention to the church led scholars to look for periods and critical junctures where patterns of state-church relations were established. A major context was the process of political and religious settlement after the European reformation, the religious wars, and the creation of national churches between the 1500s and 1648. This context determined the degree to which the churches were incorporated in the regime, whether they became national or territorial, and the future ability of states to incorporate voluntary associations. Given the validity of this perspective, I argue that the origins of variations in levels of associational life encountered in the nineteenth and the twentieth century Europe are partly explained by even more remote historical legacies, by ones that go back to the early seventeenth century.393

In western Europe, contexts of high conflict between the state and the church were the cases of France, Spain, Portugal and to some extent also Italy. The best known case is post-revolutionary France with its violent clashes between the state and the Catholic church over education that led to the emergence of an inaccessible and repressive state that later made labour movements radical in the forms of anarchism and communism.394 Other Catholic countries, however, reached some agreement between the state and the church,

like in the Hapsburg empire (the epicenter of the counter-reformation even) or in Belgium. Still, even in Austria the civil war between Reds and Catholics in the 1930s is to some extent a state-church conflict. Other countries reached an accommodation with the church. In Prussia, the Lutheran church was part of the state apparatus, although in unified Germany there was the persecution of Catholics during Bismarck’s rule. The Anglican church of England, since early on, reached an accommodation with the state, although there was also conflict over religion in Catholic Ireland. Finally, Lutheran churches in Scandinavia and in the Netherlands were more accomodative.

In sum, I argue that if religious bodies were able to maintain their autonomy and corporate status until the 1870s, then, all other things being equal, associational life was to be stronger in the next century. For instance, Skocpol and Crowley found a positive correlation between the strength of Protestant denominations and the expansion of associational mass federations. In the American states, where between 1800 and 1860 Protestant denominations were numerous, in the period between 1860 and 1920 mass political federated groups tended to be stronger. The fact that religious communities were stronger meant also a stronger solidarity between group members (social capital in Putnam’s words or what Tilly calls «structures of commitment», relations among people that «promote their taking account of each other»), and a higher possibility of collective action. In the words of Varshney, they reduce transaction costs, since «it is less difficult to get people together on grounds of similarity than difference». Moreover, these corporate pre-modern bodies could be transformed also into modern forms of associability and be conciliated with individual conceptions of participation. As Varshney argued for the case of India, there is no necessary contradiction between modern individualism and traditional group identity. This is, first, because traditional identities can be flexible enough to be transformed into modern associations. Second, because the idea that pre-modern corporate groups based on religion (of locality or ethnicity) are totally ascriptive is only partially true, there is also an element of modernity, since they

395 Crowley and Skocpol, 2001, p. 819.
can be used to perform modern functions (political participation, gathering resources for the members of the group to enter modern professions, and acquiring a modern education).  

Second, it was easier for states to develop strong bureaucracies and use associations or religious bodies as partners for welfare dispensation and policies, if they could count on traditions of partnership with the church and many approaches developed in pre-modern era by the church towards the poor. The case of social democratic, corporatist-conservative, and liberal welfare states followed the pattern of state-church fusion: Scandinavia with extensive social care, where the Lutheran church achieved a higher accommodation with the state; then Calvinism in liberal regimes. Here, as opposed to most Catholic countries, there was stronger tradition of partnership between state and societal interests, namely in the building of welfare states.  

In the next table, I combine these two predictors of state capacity – civil-military relationships and state-church relationships – in order to classify western European countries in terms of the potential for state capacity. The higher the level of conflict in these two arenas, the lower will be the state capacity.

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Table 23: Conditions of State Capacity in Western Europe, 1800s-1930s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Civil-Military Conflict</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>State-Church Conflict</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Global Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(High equals 1, Medium equals 2, Low equals 3; sources: Bailey, 1975; Ebbinghaus, 1996; Flora, Kuhnle, Urwin, 1999; Janowitz, 1960; Lipset and Rokkan, 1985; Stepan, 1988; Tilly, 1998)

All western European countries with the exception of France, Portugal, and Spain achieved almost full civilianization in the late 1800s. Militaries became professionalised and subject to civil authority and elected governments. This civilisation was part of the process of state modernisation and professionalisation of the bureaucracy. In most countries, the military saw themselves as serving the state, not political ideologies and not as political actors.399

Regarding state-church conflict, I argue that the more this conflict was directed against the state as such, the more intense were the rivalries between modernising states and the churches. Scandinavia was where the intensity of this

conflict was lowest. Since the state and the church were almost the same, the movements for church reform that emerged in the nineteenth century were at the same time directed at reforming the state, not opposing it. In Austria as well, there was a close partnership between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the Catholic church of Austria. Countries with intermediate levels of state-church conflict were Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Great Britain could be considered a similar case to the Scandinavians, since the Anglican Church was part of the same apparatus to the same extent. Yet, in England there was a kind of state-church conflict in the form of the Irish quest for autonomy until the 1920s. The British state was in conflict with the Catholic church in Ireland, and this inhibited the rural classes (mainly in Ireland, and Catholic) from allying with the urban lower classes, who were mainly Anglican, or other denomination, and English. Also in Germany there was a fusion of the state and the Protestant church, but as in Britain a conflict developed with the Catholics during the Kulturkampf in the 1870s. In the Netherlands the same happened with the state Calvinist church serving as the backbone of the state and the Catholic church opposing its dominance. In Belgium, the Catholic church opposed liberal-secular policies, especially in education since the 1850s, but it accepted the legitimacy of the Belgium monarchy since it could find self-expression through political parties and associations. In this sense the liberal Belgium regime accepted the church as legitimate. Finally, the Iberian cases, France, and Italy are cases of permanent and serious conflict, with a clear military dimension especially in Iberia and France, where the church rejected the new regimes and boycotted the liberal policies. Although in late nineteenth-century liberalism in Portugal, the Church personnel and territorial apparatus played a crucial role in various aspects of the process of state building and of implementation of government policies (several leading members of the clergy played an active role in liberal politics, both as Cabinet ministers and as parliamentarians), these were mainly episodic eceptions if we look at the long political development of Iberia in the 19th and twentieth centuries. The liberal and
later republican governments tried to undermine the church’s power even through such repressive measures like the compulsory confiscation of its property.400

4.4. Conclusion: A Theory of Associational life

In the next table I have summarised my explanatory hypothesis or causal factors behind the types of associational life I have theorised. Hegemonic associational life (Scandinavia and Austria) is the result of the combination of high degrees of corporate representation, parliamentarisation, and state capacity. Austria is a borderline case, since its levels of parliamentarisation were not as high as in the Scandinavian countries. Still, these factors allowed for a dense and highly coordinated associational life to emerge by the 1920s-1930s that was the background for the post-1945 fully democratic period. The dominant associational life cases (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany) were the result of medium (Belgium and the Netherlands) to high (Germany) traditions of corporate representation, medium (Germany) to high levels of parliamentarism (Belgium and the Netherlands), and medium state capacity. Divided associational life, England, was the result of very low levels and legacies of corporate representation, medium state capacity, and high parliamentarisation. Finally the cases of Disjointed associational life had the worst conditions for the development of dense and coordinated civil societies. Corporate representation was abolished very early in the political development of these societies. The parliaments had almost no power for most of the period, and the state had very low capacities. Still, one must differentiate these cases between themselves. State capacity in France was generally higher than in the others, and the levels of parliamentarisation and traditions of corporate representation that served as legacy for associations were higher in Italy. It was especially in Portugal and in Spain that these factors were the most adverse. Nevertheless, when compared to Portugal, Spain had a slightly higher state capacity, parliamentarisation, and

legacies of corporate representation at the regional level, in particular in the Basque country and in Catalonia.

Table 24: Causal Factors Explaining Associational life in Western Europe, 1800s-1920s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Corporate rep.</th>
<th>Parliamentarization</th>
<th>State Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low/Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My methodology gives primacy to the organisations themselves (see the appendix on methodology). This means looking at their long-term organisational developments as intermediaries between societal groups or constituencies and state and regime institutions, and to examine their size, number, services provided, membership traits, leadership profiles, and the degree to which they form peak associations. The present aim is to introduce a new and broader
comparative approach to the origins and effects of modern voluntary associations. I link my work to historical-institutionalist comparative debates in contemporary political science\textsuperscript{401} and to the discussion on the role of elites and organized masses in the transition to democracy.\textsuperscript{402}

The explanatory strategy that I pursue is historical. Many interesting political processes take long to develop, and there are unforeseen consequences (path dependency). Voluntary associations usually survive long after the contextual conditions of their emergence have long disappeared. Moreover, associations tend to appear in waves; there are periods of immense foundation of associations, and others of much slower growth.\textsuperscript{403}

\textsuperscript{401} Ragin, 1987; Steinmo, Thelen, Longstreth, 1998.
\textsuperscript{402} Collier, 1999 and 2006; Morlino, 1998.
\textsuperscript{403} Stinchcombe, 1986.
Figure 1: Causal Conditions and Intermediate Variables of Associational Life

Causal conditions

Regime Democratization / Parliamentarization

Timing of State building / Country international status 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries

State Building and Military Competition: Degree of State Strength

Intermediate Variables

Strength of Political Parties + Links between Parties and Voluntary Associations

Estate Traditions: Guilds, Corporations + Degree of State-Church Partnerships

Type of Welfare - State

Pluralist or Corporatist Policy - Making Institutions

Associational Life
Part Two: Patterns of Associational life in Western Europe, 1800-2000
In this chapter I analyse the common backgrounds and causes for variation between Western European associational structures from the middle ages until the 1930s/1940s. Western European countries shared a common background of corporate associational structures from the middle ages to the late eighteenth century (in the countryside and urban worlds). This served as a basis for association building in the nineteenth century, but this legacy was differently incorporated by states during the years between the 1870s and the 1930s due to variations in state strength and regime building (in particular, the dynamics of democratisation), thus producing the diversity of paths of associational structures that I identified in the previous chapters.

5.1. Medieval and Pre-Modern Associational Life

Between the late medieval period and the eighteenth century, popular associational life was composed of three forms of organisations: urban guilds, corporate rural bodies, and religious congregations. These were forms of associational life in the sense of being secondary associations that gather together people through formal ties, on a basis beyond family and community, and with varying degrees of exit possibility. They had functions of aggregation and intermediation of interests, representing them to the authorities, namely to kings and territorial princes, and they were the result of past struggles for the emancipation of the lower classes in urban and countryside settings. Initially they were organisations that fought for workers’ and artisans’ social recognition, economic rights of self-regulation, and they were behind many urban revolts in medieval Europe. Eventually, forcing their acceptance in the polity, they became institutionalised as governance bodies, especially in urban settings. They had collective rights and duties, took care of the welfare of their members, and controlled the allocation of resources for production as well as the production to the market.

Urban guilds appeared first in twelfth century Italy, the Rhine area, and the Low Countries. It was a form of social organisation that united groups of craftsmen (e.g. shoemakers, printers, etc.) in order to regulate their professional activities and

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404 There were also elite associational life organizations, like universities, secret societies and fraternities.
405 Gierke, 1990, pp. 1-96
production for a larger market. Guilds were primarily responsible for the regulation of production and commercialisation of goods (regulations for hiring and firing people, of selling and product quality, of apprenticeship rules, and for the maintenance of prices).\textsuperscript{406} In this sense guilds were monopolistic bodies, since in each city or town all the members of the same trade had to belong to the same guild. Competition was strongly regulated in order to maintain quotas of the market for each guild. There was a strict control over members’ behaviour which led to regulations fixing the economic territory of each guild, competition, and entrance into occupations.\textsuperscript{407} Guilds had also welfare functions. In periods of stress they had the role of taking care of the education and welfare of its members and their families.\textsuperscript{408} They had a budget to fund insurances to support individuals in sickness, disasters, old age, and death. This was strongly fused with a religious ethic.\textsuperscript{409} Initially, guilds had a communitarian ethos of celebration but gradually they became Christianised. Guild members would organise their organisation under the protection of a saint and organise festivities in his honour. In the countryside, rural corporate bodies developed, and they shared similar functions.\textsuperscript{410}

The establishment of guilds faced initially the opposition of landlords, monarchs, and the Catholic Church hierarchy, but gradually in some areas they were incorporated into the polity and given a role in the management of the cities.\textsuperscript{411} In some cities, being citizen of the city was synonymous with being a member of one of the guilds.\textsuperscript{412} In cities the guilds were the basis for political factions, and they would compete for power and fight among themselves for market shares in the city. Groups without power experienced pressure to form guilds, like the unskilled labourers and newcomers to certain professions, against the monopolistic and established artisan guilds’ elites. Conflict was common between masters and apprentices and day-laborers, which led to the formation of new guilds.\textsuperscript{413} In the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries these organizations were fully recognised as associations possessing collective

\textsuperscript{406} Durkheim, 1996, pp. 19, 22-23, 26.
\textsuperscript{407} Moore, 1978, pp. 127-131; Sewell, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{409} Black, 1984, pp. 4-6; Durkheim, 1996, pp. 19, 22-23.
\textsuperscript{411} E.g. like the preservation of public order. Black, 1984, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{412} Weber, 1958, pp. 29-31.
\textsuperscript{413} Black, 1984, pp. 7-11.
privileges, rightful monopolies of production and representation, and fully incorporated in the administrative structures of the regime.414

5.2. Transformations of Associational life in the Eighteenth and the Nineteenth Centuries

In the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, new dynamics of state and market building clashed with the privileges and position of the guilds, corporate bodies, as well as with the privileges of the church and the old freedoms of the peasants. Monarchs, state officials, and liberal politicians in these centuries envisaged plans for national aggrandisement that involved the creation of a single unified polity and market, and the consequent end of all juridical, political, and economic particularisms, exemptions and privileges. First, monarchs sought the creation of a single unified national market. This meant putting an end to privileges, particularisms and corporate or geographical barriers to the free circulation of labour and capital, and the desired maximisation of resources. Since work was now seen mainly as a commodity, guild paternalism should end, and instead workers should be subject to individual contracts.415 In the nineteenth century these pressures became even stronger. The emergence of a full capitalist system based on the freedom of commerce implied the end of the system of artisan production and protected monopolies, and affirmed greater mobility for capital and labour. Moreover, it implied the end of artisan control of the production process and the loss of freedom in the workplace. It was replaced with the factory system where workers could be subject to closer production surveillance.416

Second, processes of state centralisation and expansion favored the elimination of corporate bodies, particularistic forms of self-jurisdiction, and autonomous governance. These bodies were subject to a common body of law and to pressures by the state for extraction of a bigger share of their revenue and resources in the form of taxes. This was first attempted by absolutist monarchs in the eighteenth century and later by the liberal regimes in the nineteenth century. It sought to expand an individualistic citizenry through the end of the privileges (which culminated in the prohibition of political and associational bodies between the individual and the state in

French revolutionary ideology) of corporate and religious bodies in order to promote conceptions of freedom of conscience, religion and commerce. By the end of the nineteenth century, the pressures for the elimination of guilds and corporate privileges existed almost everywhere in Europe, thus risking withdrawing any protective mechanisms against economic misfortune from most of the working classes (although there were lots of variation). At the same time these regimes, in the name of freedom of commerce, did not allow for the legal formation of associations to represent the interests of popular classes in the new polities.

Initially, the reactions of the guilds and corporate organisations were purely oriented to the reposition of the old norms of justice, privileges, and the ancient status quo.417 These were conservative and backward-looking reactions, and they did not propose a new form of organisation of society where their autonomy would be secured under the new capitalist-liberal order. As Bendix has argued, instead it took the form of milenaristic rejections of the world, non-cooperation with authorities, social banditry, and populist monarchism (legitismism) in which peasants appealed to the king to restore the old ways.418

Gradually, however, artisans and guild masters mobilised in order to influence and shape government decisions, rather than just trying to overthrow it.419 Especially after the mid-nineteenth century the repertoires of protest changed from local defensive actions to formally organized groups.420 Urban and rural craft workers, who had lost economic security with the end of guild privileges and rural-religious corporate welfare protections, tried to organize for mutual aid, sociability, charity, religious, or professional purposes by using the remains of the organizational resources of the old guilds.421

Moreover, these associations became increasingly active in contemporary political issues, as they tried to promote changes in the existing distribution of power. Especially after 1848, industrial and rural workers started to organize in order to influence government decisions within national politics, namely through pressures for

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417 Bendix, 1996, p. 82.
419 Bendix, 1984, pp. 95-105.
suffrage extension, freedom of assembly, and association.\textsuperscript{422} In order to achieve these political objectives, associations began to establish links with each other. One of the most debated issues after 1848 (and until the interwar years in the twentieth century) was the question of solidarity between sectors of associational life, namely the issue of labor unity. How to evolve from craft, small, local, and particularistic associations to a national organization defending all workers?\textsuperscript{423} How to organize the unskilled workers, who were becoming very numerous in the new factory system? How to unite the interests of rural and urban workers in a common political platform?\textsuperscript{424}

A wave of associational formation occurred between the 1870s and the end of the first world war in 1918. Most analysts agree that this was the essential period of organization building and consolidation of modern forms of associational life. The sheer number of associations was overwhelming. For instance, in the city of Roanne in France, of the 275 associations formed between 1860 and 1914 ninety per cent appeared after 1890.\textsuperscript{425} The existing associations for charity, housing, of producers’ or workers’ self-help, cooperatives, and unions grew in size and number, as Gierke has noted.\textsuperscript{426} The diversity of types of associations augmented as well. As Kenneth Boulding put it, from the «Audubon societies to the Zoroastrians», the variety of interests is enormous.\textsuperscript{427} Examples referred to by Gierke and which appeared during this period included the following causes: war veterans, professionals, trade, women, languages, fire brigades, protection of immigrants, stage actors, lawyers, the press, teachers, landowners, family defense, and care for children.\textsuperscript{428} It was also a period when associations tended to acquire a mass scope and more encompassing national scope. They became professionally run and bureaucratized. After the 1880s, we can see the formation of major mass and large associations of employers, of workers (unions, who now encompassed both skilled and unskilled workers), and of religious groups as well as new associations in the agrarian world.

There were several causes behind these transformations. First, there was a more open climate towards freedom of association. In the second half of the nineteenth century and especially after the 1870s, elites started to think gradually that it might be
more useful to grant and promote freedom of association as a device to control pressures from below and to rely less on sheer coercion. After the guarantee of minimal rights of association in the decades after 1848 (although it was very uneven), it became more difficult for elites to rest their power only on personal connections. Instead, it became obvious that they needed organizations to establish links with the population in order to integrate them in the political system in manners not contradictory with the maintenance of the traditional elite’s political supremacy.429 In this context, after the decades of 1860 and 1870 the establishment of the first laws legalised associations and unions. In the case of unions, for instance, in the 1870s they were more tolerated in Belgium, France, Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom.

In this period, associational freedom generated a process of elite competition for the mobilization of the lower classes that in turn stimulated more association-building. New elites appeared, especially the socialists and the new politico-religious leaders. The liberals had been the first to mobilize, in order to counteract the traditional status and sources of the power of the conservative groups. But then both liberals and conservatives responded to the new threats posed by the socialists and the new religious parties by creating mass party organizations and by supporting associations linking them to workers, rural proletarians, and the lower middle-classes of the cities. Conservative elites began to use associations for political mobilization and nationalistic purposes.430 For example, the German Conservative Party established links with the Agrarian League (the association of the Junker East Elbian rye producers); the Italian Nationalist Association of 1910 was under the control of Ligurian steel producers and evolved into a party.431 Important cases were the new leagues of peasant associations that were either conservative or leftist depending on the context.432

Parties of all orientations were able to attract the masses. The cadre or elite networks of notables were replaced by large mass associations with interlocking links to interest organizations. This was the period when most European socialist parties were created: Germany (1863/75), Denmark (1871/78), Belgium (1877/85), France (1880), Switzerland (1880/88), the Netherlands (1881), Norway (1887) and Sweden (1889), Austria (1889) and Italy (1889).433 Christian democratic movements, comprised of

429 Anderson and Anderson, 1967, pp. 275, 294; Tilly, 1975, p. 34.
430 Hoffmann, 2003, pp. 287-293.
431 Maier, 1981, pp. 43-44.
433 Ebbinghaus, 1993, p. 46.
parties, unions, and associations for religious defense, appeared also during this period, thus replacing the previous forms of religious associational life based on the local elite charity associations. Now religious leaders promoted mass associations, parties, and unions that opposed clearly and through popular mobilization and protest the secularization policies of liberals. Of special importance were educational issues. According to Ebbinghaus, the «school dispute mobilized religious communities against the secular Nation-State and gave rise to the formation of parties of religious defense, out of which Christian-Democratic parties grew».

Changes in the nature of the state after the 1880s led associations to coordinate their activities at the national level. This was promoted by the new geopolitical context in the last third of the nineteenth century. There was an increased military and economic competition between states, especially after the German and Italian unifications in the 1870s. Europe started to be divided into two opposing camps. Germany made an alliance with Austria and Italy, and Great Britain with France. These two blocs increased their competition for territorial control (e.g. the scramble for Africa) and economic primacy, and this need of economic and military self-assertion in the international arena led states to expand and to develop like never before. Now, not only did states put higher fiscal demands on their populations but there was also a need to promote economic development which made them establish the first economic and social regulative measures, like tariffs protecting national industries and agriculture. States expanded their transportation and communications networks. This was linked to growing military objectives, like the need for rapid deployment of troops, and the manufacture of arms in great quantities. Militaries and officers become increasingly professionalized. Their size increased dramatically, especially after the 1870 Franco-Prussian war. If in 1870 the French army had 250,000 men, in 1874 it was composed of 1,750,000 men. Laws of universal compulsory military service were approved in some countries: Britain in 1916, France in 1889 (military service for two years), Germany in the 1870s. Ideas of nationalism started to be spread by the national elites in order to convince and mobilize the populations into these new collective endeavors. Finally, states developed new specific agencies with clear mandates for direct policy-making.

437 Finer, 1975, pp. 157-162.
they implemented the professionalization of the bureaucracy higher, and they introduced civil service reforms.

This led to a qualitative change in the nature of the state. The state evolved from an organization that was mainly devoted to coercion and war-making to an organization that tried to promote economic development directly, that redistributed economic resources among groups, that operated as an authoritative referee of disputes among members of the polity, and that was a direct mobilizer of collective identification through the idea of nation. This process led to the expansion and complexification of interest organizations and associational life in general.

Indirectly, state expansion stimulated the creation of mass organizations. Since the state became more active in policy-making and more interventionist in many people’s affairs, this stimulated the organization of groups to support, to stop, or to influence the state’s policies and initiatives. Many groups were created that were dedicated to influence public policies directly by pressuring the bureaucracy, by lobbying directed at state agencies and parties, but also by linking to political parties, and through campaigns in order win over the public opinion. Issues like tariff policies, the creation of the first social welfare measures, taxes, and public works become the objects of major political disputes.

Directly, the state influenced the formation of organized interests. State bureaucrats and politicians used the administration to directly co-opt, include, and coordinate societal interests in policy-making efforts, for political mobilization purposes and for nationalistic socialization. In this respect, several mechanisms were introduced. The first was in the arena of welfare policy directed towards the lower classes, or the productive classes. Liberals and conservatives in many European governments implemented welfare benefits that were to be administered by partnerships between the state and associations. Unions and workers’ brotherhoods became vehicles for dispensing state resources in the form of pensions, insurances, and so on. These measures were meant to secure the solidarity of workers serving in national armies and producing for the new organized capitalist system and to avoid their mobilization by socialists, Anarchists, radicals, republicans, and religious extremists. In this respect, mass mobilization for war was a direct cause for these welfare measures. The state needed healthy men for its armies and to this effect arranged for the large-scale

provision of services in food and healthcare during wartime. After armies were
demobilized, many of these services were maintained, and even enlarged like in the case
of the administration of veterans’ pensions. In France in 1926 these pensions accounted
for thirteen per cent of total government expenditures.\textsuperscript{440}

Associations had also another role. Especially capitalists, industrialists, agrarian
producers started to participate directly with the state in policy-making efforts. In the
words of Alfred Chandler, this happened because the «volume of economic activities
reached a level that made administrative coordination more efficient and more
profitable than market coordination».\textsuperscript{441} In general, state initiatives in welfare and
economic policy promoted the growth and the legal recognition of associations, but also
their incorporation into state structures. In turn, this attribution of public functions
fostered their rationalization, capacity for inter-organizational coordination, and
monopolistic representation. Where these efforts succeeded, associations achieved
national scope and became part of larger networks of associations (federations and peak
associations) that were the direct interlocutors with the state and that spoke and
intermediated the interests of a vast group of smaller organizations.\textsuperscript{442}

5.3. Variations of Associational life in the 1920s/1930s

Although most European states experienced the challenges described in the
previous section, they would respond to them in varying ways during the interwar years.
In particular, the different forms of response would lead to differences in the level of
encompassingness of associational life and degree of civic engagement of the citizenry. It
would be in the interwar years that this process of full incorporation and recognition of
associational life would achieve, in some countries, its full expression, and in others,
fail completely.

The degree to which the workers’ movements and many other interest groups
became involved with governments in the First World War efforts (1914-1918) would
shape state-associational partnerships in the ensuing years. Where it was successful,
labor was recognized as a national partner for collective bargaining in a system
coordinated and supervised by the state (in labor courts and bodies for the mediation of

\textsuperscript{440} Swaan, 1988, p. 177.
\textsuperscript{441} Quoted in Clemens, 1997, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{442} Pizzorno, 1981, p. 258.
industrial conflict) and in arenas for the dispensation of welfare. In comparison with the decades before the war, the main difference was that now welfare and collective agreements became national in scope, not restricted – as before – to specific regions, industries, sectors, or groups.\(^{443}\) Previous trends for the inclusion of the workers in policy-making became even more acute with the needs imposed on states during the war. When the war ended, workers had become so empowered that they started to protest immediately for full political recognition, and especially for political rights. The establishment of universal suffrage became – for some countries permanently, for others momentarily – a norm in the interwar years.\(^{444}\) The right to strike also became universal in this period.\(^{445}\)

The interwar years are what David and Ruth Collier have called an incorporation period.\(^{446}\) It is a period in the history of societies when the interaction between regime elites, parties, and economic interest groups representing interests from below worked in a way so as to produce varying forms of mutual recognition and partnership that became stable over time and reproduced their properties for decades to come.\(^{447}\) This was the context when national patterns of associational life that lasted well into the 1980s became established. As Lipset and Rokkan have argued for party systems, the cleavages of European democracies around which party identities and competition were structured between 1945 until the 1970s reflect the cleavages established in the 1920s.\(^{448}\) Stefano Bartolini has argued that the post-1945 rankings of union membership were already established in the 1920s.\(^{449}\) Carolyn Warner has a similar position regarding religious associational life. It was in the 1920s and in the 1930s that associations and parties organized around religious identities that were linked to the masses, which was deepened after 1945. In France, the Catholic Church preferred to maintain informal links with the established political elites rather than to mobilize around an explicitly religious identity, whereas in Italy and Germany religious parties

\(^{443}\) Although some countries had already a tradition of collective bargaining. Denmark instituted the first national bipartite agreement in 1899, Norway in 1902, Sweden in 1909. Ebbinghaus, 1996, pp. 62-64; Katzenstein, 1984, pp. 24-25; see also Crouch, 1993; Ertman, 2000, pp. 155-156; Deth, 1997, p. 5.

\(^{444}\) Although some countries had already enfranchised adult men, like France in 1877, Germany in 1871, and Austria in 1907. Bartolini, pp. 209-215.


\(^{448}\) Lipset and Rokkan, 1985, p. 238.

\(^{449}\) Bartolini, 2000, p. 284.
were the preferred strategy. Both strategies, however, were established already in the 1920s. Finally the national, institutionalized systems of exchange between ministers, employers, labor, and farmers with simultaneous functions at the level of coordinating the economy and implementing welfare measures that characterized many European democracies after 1945 (neo-corporatist and social-democratic and corporatist welfare states) were established also during this period for the first time. Sweden’s Saltsjöbaden agreement in 1938, Norway’s 1935 Basic Agreement, and Germany’s use of labor courts and arbitration under Weimar are the examples of this process. In other countries these institutions, although there were plans for their development, did not achieve the same levels of extension as in Scandinavia or in Germany. The extreme cases were the Iberian dictatorial state-corporatist systems that resorted to the bureaucratic imposition from above, and to the police and the military for the control of pressures from below.

In the case of associational life, I argue that these suggestions are only partially true. For some countries, one can already observe in the 1920s and in the 1930s the same rankings in both density and coordination that these countries occupied later in the post-1945 period. For other countries, their relative position was very different for what would become after 1945. Here the critical juncture was the context of the World War II and its immediate aftermath.

In fact, it becomes evident from Table 25, on the values of union density for the period 1920-1940, that some countries’ ranking position resembles the post-1945 rankings for density of associational life (in the absence of data of levels of affiliation of adult population in voluntary associations, I have used union density). The countries that rank higher are Austria and Denmark, both above 40%. They are followed by Sweden, Belgium, and Germany. Great Britain, as in the postwar period, is already ranking in the middle of the chart. Last come the cases of lowest density of associational life (less than 20%), which include Spain and France. Still, there are important exceptions. Italy ranks together with the first set of countries with very high levels of membership (Austria, Denmark). Norway and the Netherlands, which in the post-1945 era ranked higher, have values close to the two Iberian cases.

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450 Warner, 2000, pp. 3-4.
452 Maier, 1984, pp. 44-46.
Table 25: Approximate Union Density Rates 1920–1940. Values (%) and Rankings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Mann, 1995, p. 20; Density: percentage of total labor force who is union members; In Portugal the labor force was composed of 2516692 individuals in 1930, and the number of unionized workers was 263000 in the mid 1920s. Freire, 2006, pp. 19-20, Rosas, 1994, p. 25)

The next table looks at indicators of coordination of the labor movement, monopoly (here the percentage of the labor force affiliated in the main union), and centralization (the degree to which it the main confederation has the power in relation to its affiliates in terms of control of strike funds, strike calls and wage demands) for the year 1938. Again, Denmark, Austria, Norway, and Sweden occupy the main position in terms of coordination of associational life at the end of the interwar period. The exception is France, which ranks equally to these countries, but this could be the occasional effect of the Popular Front government. Then there is a heterogeneous group composed of the UK, Germany, Italy, and Belgium. Of these countries, Belgium and Germany reached higher coordination levels and Britain and Italy lowered their position in the postwar years. Again, the explanation here resides in the events during and immediately after WWII. Finally, as predicted, Portugal and Spain already have the weakest coordination levels of associational life, although accompanied by the Netherlands which would raise immensely in the postwar years its coordination levels.
Table 26: Coordination of Labor Unions, 1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mon. Rank</th>
<th>Cent. Rank</th>
<th>Combined Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>86.6*</td>
<td>H*</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>65*</td>
<td>M*</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>76.9*</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Mon.: Monopoly; Cent.: Centralization; *Italy: refers to 1914; Austria and Germany refers to 1925; sources: Crouch, 1991; Portugal: data refers to 1925. Of the 263000 unionized workers only 70000 were affiliated in the main confederation (CGT). Freire, 1992, p. 204; In Spain the Anarchist CNT in 1936 has one million and six hundred thousand members out of a total union membership of 2.5 million. Maura, 1971, p. 74; Pérez-Díaz, 2000, p. 8)

As can be seen from Table 27, the two dimensions of associational life that are highly positively correlated after 1945 do not show such a close relationship in the interwar period.
Finally, by combining the two dimensions of associational life (coordination and density), it is possible to group the countries by patterns for the interwar years. Again, the cases of higher associational life strength after 1945 were established already during the 1920-1940 period: Austria, Denmark, and Sweden. Similarly, the cases of weakest associational life after 1945 were established as well: France, Portugal, and Spain. Norway and Belgium occupied the medium-high position they would later have (although Norway has had a higher position after 1945). The anomalies are Italy (too high in relative terms when compared to its postwar position), and Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, all too low when compared with their postwar position. Certainly in these countries the decisive events that made them change their relative position reside partially in the context of the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. In the next chapters, I analyze each pattern of civil order in order to highlight the factors that caused these national differences.
Table 28: Patterns of Associational life, Western Europe, 1920-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Global Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6: Hegemonic Associational Life. Sweden, Norway and Denmark

The pattern of associational life classified as highly encompassing, and which is composed of the Scandinavian countries, had the best conditions for the growth and expansion of voluntary associations. In these countries, there was a continuation of corporate forms of representation in cities and the countryside until the late nineteenth century. The power of parliaments, both pre-modern and modern, was always high and state capacity was also strong. Since early modern times, the Scandinavian countries had developed a competent and professionalized bureaucracy fostering a self-conscious body of civil servants that were used to promote partnerships with associations for the implementation of policies at the local level.

6.1. Paths Towards Hegemonic Associational Life, 1800s-1970s

In Scandinavia, the peasantry constituted a strong, independent body since the early nineteenth century. Especially from the 1860s onwards, peasants organized themselves for political action, namely through puritan religious-cultural social movements opposing the established Lutheran church, which was considered too corrupt by its closeness to political power. These movements defended pietist and fundamentalist doctrines, but they were also a form of critique of national politics and of the established elites. They were centered on networks of associations at the national level, composed of folk high schools, philanthropic organizations, agrarian cooperatives, and temperance societies.453

In Norway, associational life was dense and well organized from the start. Since the early nineteenth century, there was a strong social movement activity based on a dense network of associations. There was a strong historical connection between associations and social movements that lead to the principle that every form of participation must be formalized and organized.454 The agricultural movement, labor, temperance, religious, and Norwegian language and culture were all associationally based social movements. The Thrane movement emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century, and it was composed of workers, poor peasants and small impoverished landowners. Between 1848 and 1854 it included 273 associations with

453 Rokkan, 1966, pp. 75-79.
454 Norris, 2002, p. 177
In the late 1800s, peasants organized in the Friends of the Peasants Movement (1865-1879), a national network of traveling lay preachers and cooperatives ventures that covered the whole territory and had 21,000 members.

From early on, Denmark had a very dense associational life. In the 1840s, there was an expansion of several types of associations. Its main elements were the cooperatives in agriculture (which became state subsidized but at the same time remained locally autonomous), schools and cultural associations of the local life, and agrarian-religious social movements. All social classes were organized in associations, and business and employers’ associations among self-employed master artisans continued the earlier guild structures.

Also in Sweden there was a historically strong tradition of estate representation of the farmers, who were very autonomous and self-conscious as a political group. Here we see the development of the same pattern of religious-agrarian social movements since the early nineteenth century, representing the middle classes (like non-noble ironworks owners, wholesalers, non-noble landed proprietors, and prosperous farmers), the labor movement and the peasantry. The main movement in the 1860s was the Free Church Movement that aspired towards the creation of a more equalitarian Christian society and the democratizing reform of the aristocratic and clerical political system. It was made of a network of libraries, temperance movements, newspapers, publishing houses, co-operatives and unions. Approximately one third of the population was affiliated in these movements. By the end of the nineteenth century, these popular movements had become national mass organizations with a strong national center and with a strong penetration of local society to the extent that this period was labeled the age of associations.

In the 1880s, these movements of agrarian-religious reform allied gradually with the urban liberals (composed of reformers and radicals in the cities, like artisans, teachers, and lawyers) in a program for the extension of suffrage. In Norway, they formed the Left, or the Venstre. This alliance gained power in the parliament in the 1872 and 1882 elections. At the same time the Right counter-mobilized and formed the Conservative Party. The fight between the Left and the Right was bitter, and according
to Dahl the country was on the verge of civil war. Rumors had spread that the king was about to dissolve parliament and to use the army to repress the mobilization of the peasantry. In fact, the opposite happened and conflict was channeled through existing institutions. The parliament was a solid organization within the political system, and this meant that political struggles would be contained within the law and according to the principle of parliamentary rule. In 1884, a coalition of farmers, liberals, and urban radicals in the *Venstre* formed a government for the first time, and in the governments of 1897-1902 it instituted universal suffrage. Independence from Sweden came in 1905.

In Denmark the same alliance occurred. As Collier refers, a middle-class movement for reform, of students and in connection with the bourgeois in the Wholesale association and the farmer’s movement (who fought for local self government since early on) created in 1840 the Society of the Friends of the Peasants. Also, as early as the 1840s, a party of liberal-agrarians, the *Venstre* or United Left, won the lower chamber elections under a program for social and tax reform.

In Sweden, competition continued for the extension of suffrage and the attribution of more powers to the parliament after the 1866 reform, which replaced the four estates parliament with a bicameral parliament. Much like in the other Scandinavian countries, farmers joined with urban liberals to form the *Venstre* or agrarian party in the mid-1800s, which was their native version of the liberal movements.

The final push for extreme mobilization and association building came with the formation of the labor parties after the introduction of universal suffrage in late nineteenth century and with the creation of lib-lib alliances. In Norway, the Labor Party was created in 1887 (initially was very small, had only 0.6% of the votes in the 1897 elections), and it allied with the *Venstre* for universal suffrage. The party started to mobilize both urban and rural workers. Gradually, it inherited the associations that were in the orbit of the *Venstre*, becoming so powerful that the old agrarian leftist divisions started splitting, resulting in 1921 in the emergence of the Agrarian Party, representing the interests of commercial farmers. In the 1927 and 1933 elections the Labor Party was supported by the Agrarians though, and the subsequent governments institutionalized

461 Collier, 1999, p. 36.
programs of support of workers and supports for the agrarian economy. An agreement for welfare state, full employment, and subsidies for agriculture was settled in 1935. They were to be fully implemented afterwards in successive sessions of collective bargaining.\textsuperscript{462} A new cleavage emerged, between labor allied with small parties like the agrarians against the old Left, now the liberals, and the Right, or the conservatives, which lasted well until the 1960s.\textsuperscript{463}

In Denmark this alliance of liberals and rural classes opened to the workers movements in the late nineteenth century. In the 1870s, the Social Democratic party was formed and many workers’ associations appear as well. By 1898, it was able to get twelve seats in parliament. In 1901, although now in control of government, the liberals suffered from a split that founded the Radical party (\textit{det Radicale Venstre}), more clearly defensive of the small farmers interests, and which afterwards became an ally of the social democrats. In 1913 both parties formed the government, and the social democrats became gradually the leading party in this coalition of workers, town and country entrepreneurs, and rural workers. In 1915 the coalition implemented universal suffrage.\textsuperscript{464}

Again in 1929 there was a coalition of social democrats and radicals, which was broadened in 1933 to include the \textit{Venstre}, which was then the second largest party in parliament. The inclusion of the farmers’ interests represented by the \textit{Venstre} in the government coalition, which was led by the social democrats and the radicals, allowed for the enactment of measures to support both agricultural and workers’ interests. The former received protectionist policies for agriculture through agricultural funds, tax relief, loans, and artificial price increases. The latter received industry support measures, public works in order to generate employment, and welfare state supported relief and house subsidizing.\textsuperscript{465} This political coalition dominated the political system up to the 1970s.\textsuperscript{466}

In Sweden, the labor movement that emerged in the late nineteenth century became very well organized. It was based on the leadership of the Social Democratic party, that led a network of associations of consumers’, tenants, workers’, educational

\textsuperscript{462} Katzenstein, 1991, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{463} Collier, 1999, pp. 67-68.
\textsuperscript{464} Berezin, 1990, pp. 188-194; Christiansen and Lammers, 1990, pp. 185-188.
\textsuperscript{466} Christiansen and Lammers, 1990, pp. 185-188; Collier, 1999, p. 81; Goldstein, 1983, pp. 266-267; Kersbergen and Manow, 2007, pp. 23-24
societies, charities/self-help, pensioners, funerary, and youth (e.g. scouts).\footnote{Rothstein, 2001, p. 212.} In the late nineteenth century the Venstre suffered a split, as in Denmark, when its left-wing sector, which was mainly based in rural working classes, the Free Church movement and in some sections of the urban liberals, formed the Liberal Party. Gradually, this party moved towards an alliance with the socialists.\footnote{Anderson, 2007, p. 219; Bartolini, 2000, p. 418.}

The coalition of liberals, workers, and agrarians was consolidated with the implementation of political and social welfare measures already by the turn of the 1900s. In 1912, the National Board for Social Affairs was created to implement policies of worker safety and social housing, all in partnership with labor representatives. This institution had a national scope, and it broadened many of the policies already existing at the local level. In 1902 there was the implementation in city councils of deliberative bodies with representatives of labor and employers with more than just an advisory function to authorities but also of implementation and supervision of labor policies. In 1912 the chairman of the main union confederation, the LO, and the employers association leader, SAF, were given seats in the agency, as well as in other subcommittees.\footnote{Rothstein, 2001, pp. 212-214.} The 1913 pension reform introduced an universal right to income support in old age (for both industrial and rural workers) and it was provided by the state with the help of a system of tax transfers.\footnote{Anderson, 2007, pp. 225-226.} The Law on Poor Relief was approved in 1918; the Ministry of Social Affairs was created in 1921. Liberals had a fundamental role in the implementation of these reforms through the CSA, the \textit{National Association of Social Work}, a reformist association that had the main role in the first three decades of the twentieth-century in the establishment of central state institutions in the field of social welfare.\footnote{Anderson, 2007, pp. 226-227.} Finally, this coalition implemented universal suffrage in 1918 (although conservatives in 1907 had first instituted universal suffrage for the lower chamber).\footnote{Collier, 1999, pp. 84-85; Goldstein, 1983, pp. 268-269.}

In the 1930s, this coalition ended and the social democrats, who became now the strongest party, allied with the Farmers’ Party in 1933. Between 1937 and 1939 both parties agreed to a policy of support for agriculture through state loans and price measures, and for support of industrial workers through unemployment benefits and active labor market policies. A general universalistic policy of welfare was created for
all citizens in areas like social legislation on old age and disability benefits, free
maternity care, rent allowances, and dental care.473

In sum, between the 1920s and the late 1930s powerful party alliances of
workers, farmers, and sections of the middle-classes institutionalized the participation
of associations in centralized partnerships with the state for the provision of welfare
benefits and for the governing of the political economy (especially in employment
policies and the regulation of the labor market). This system was institutionalized as a
corporatist system, including business, government and labor. Gradually, this
integrative system extended to all types of organized interests through active state-
sponsored policy programs that were implemented in partnerships with associations.
Social welfare subsidies, unemployment relief, unemployment insurance, old age
pensions, all forms of workmen’s compensation, debt relief programs, and subsidies to
farmers were all channeled through associational life organizations.474 This meant that
the creation of highly inclusive organizations intertwined closely with the regime and
the state institutions, and it was institutionalized through a regular exchange of
information, and negotiations.475 Norway’s “Basic Agreement” of 1935, Sweden’s
Saltsjöbade agreement of 1938, and Denmark’s post-war settlement were all based on
the principle of organizational concertation, and they extended organizational
membership to the majority of citizens.476

Since the 1900s, there has been a context of high associational engagement of
the population in Scandinavia. Associational life became thus hegemonic in the sense
that the organizational field was very dense, the population was highly engaged in
associations and its activities, societal groups defined their self-interest mainly through
associational representatives, and associations tended to form hierarchical confederative
structures. There were strong opportunities, incentives, and resources to participate,
which lead to high membership rates, high volunteering, strong autonomy, and
independence of associations. But more importantly, associational life absorbed the
interactions and exchanges between individuals and other collective actors.
Associational leaders historically have a leading role in the direction and definition of
national interests and in the maintenance of social and political order. In this sense

474 Bartolini, 2000, p. 479.
476 Rothstein, 1998, p. 133; Selle, 1999, pp. 149-150
organizations and their leaders are hegemonic, and as such they constitute the basic pillars and motors of both political order and change.

In these countries, associations function as pillars for social order through the principle of organizational concertation. As Peter Katzenstein argues, the compromises between business and labor, and the willingness to achieve compromise and share power have led to the emergence of social concertation, bargaining, interest accommodation, and the development of a shared ideology of social partnership. This principle of corporatist integration was not restricted to industrial organizations (unions and employers/business associations), but it extended to civic and religious organizations. Small business associations were responsible for the implementation of support funds from the state; farmers associations channeled subsidies for farmers. In Sweden, the temperance movement has functions at the level of municipalities and in the parliament (within supervisor’s bodies) regarding alcohol consumption. In fact, in the 1970s, 74% of government agencies had corporatist arrangements and one third of all members of agency boards were representatives of organizations. In general, the people leading or working in voluntary associations or in charity organizations received a representation post or even a job in government agencies. Moreover, most of the associations are in large measure funded by the state since the 1930s. In Sweden, Youth organizations and adult educational societies, for instance, derived 70% of their resources from the state in 1987. In today’s Sweden, study circles involve 40% of the adult population, of which about half are covered by public funds.

In contemporary Sweden, state commissions on a variety of policy areas have always representatives from the parliament, civil service, independent experts, and associations of the areas affected by the policy. Associations view these commissions as the main arena to influence policy, and in general policy decisions try to accommodate the views of all members of the commissions. This procedure exists also at the level of local governments and in specific supervisory boards of the state administration. For instance, the advisory delegation for the National Traffic Safety Office has representatives from the union of transport workers, of the automobile transport employers association, of the home and school association, of the abstaining drivers

477 Crouch, 1993, pp. 314, 331-332; Katzenstein, 1984, p. 28.
478 Boli, 1991, p. 95.
482 Selle, 1999, pp. 148-149
association, of the Federation of Swedish farmers, and of others up to a total of fifteen different associations.\textsuperscript{483}

Also in Norway, organizations have been historically very close to the public sector through partnerships to implement government policy.\textsuperscript{484} Organizations are entitled to participate in all phases of government policy-making as representatives of specific interests. In about a thousand government committees, organizations are represented in 50\% of them, even in the ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. Many of these associations are economic interest groups (trade unions, employers, fisheries, and agricultural associations), but it is also very common for religious, cultural, humanitarian, youth, sports, and recreation groups to be represented.\textsuperscript{485} These organizations, like environmentalist groups, implement policies, serve as interlocutors between the government and the citizens, and generate proposals for the parliament.\textsuperscript{486} The nature protection groups emerged in the early 1900s, and since 1934 they have been funded by the government when the ministry of church and education gave financial support to the Conservation Society.\textsuperscript{487} Since 1987, a movement for sustainable environmental development has been supported by the state through the Environmental Home Guard, an institution formed in 1991 which serves as an umbrella federation in which other groups may affiliate.\textsuperscript{488} In sum, this incorporation has not been restricted to associations in corporatist arrangements (unions and employers) but it has been open also to new social movements, single–issue, and citizen initiative groups.\textsuperscript{489} Particularly important have been the associations in the health and social sectors, which have grown together with the expansion of the welfare state.\textsuperscript{490}

Because of the full integration in national-level networks of peak associations, of their governing functions, and of the support from parties in broad coalitions, associations tend to become bureaucratic, and to have a high recruitment capacity. In Sweden, about 75\% of all associations are members of national peak associations and only 25\% are purely local.\textsuperscript{491} Associations have easy access to become represented in

\textsuperscript{484} Stepan, 1986, pp. 66-67
\textsuperscript{485} Luebbert, 1986, pp. 34-37.
\textsuperscript{486} Dryzek, pp. 24-26.
\textsuperscript{487} The first Norwegian association goes back to the late 1800s, the Norwegian Mountain Touring Association. There was also the National Association for Nature Preservation (1914) which in 1963 changed its name to Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature. Dryzek et all, 2003, pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{488} Dryzek et all, 2003, pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{489} Daalder, 1971 [1966], p. 8
\textsuperscript{490} Boli, 1991, p. 95
\textsuperscript{491} Boli, 1991, p. 100.
state bodies, and they are able to redistribute state resources. Also, they have a high recruitment capacity. An important point to note is that unions control unemployment funds.\textsuperscript{492} This has promoted the growth of the number of associations. After the 1940s, the founding rate of associations increased: 3,000 organizations in 1940, 6,000 in 1990. If in 1940 there was one organization for 49 inhabitants, in 1990 the ratio was one to 33 (many after the 1960s are choral and leisure).\textsuperscript{493}

Looking at the figures regarding the adult population’s affiliation in voluntary associations, these countries have the highest records. In Norway, in 1968 it was 70%, in 1983 61%, in 1990 77%, and in 1997 75%. Sweden has had the highest level of membership, always above 80%, and with smaller differences in terms of class participation associations.\textsuperscript{494} Moreover, the population not only joins associations and participates actively in them, but it also has the highest figures for unpaid work in associations.\textsuperscript{495} In Sweden in 2002, 33% of the population was affiliated with a sports club, 32% with consumers’ cooperatives, 27% with tenants’ organizations, and 12% with cultural organizations. The study circles that are organized by associations devoted to popular education are also very popular in Scandinavia. They are small groups of adults who study and debate a diversity of subjects from politics to food and languages. In Sweden the average number of participants is 8.6, and about 75% of the adult population attends one of these groups regularly.\textsuperscript{496} Finally, existing research does not show that membership in associations is declining. In Sweden even more people are now members of more than one association, and membership in all types of associations has grown with the exception of the temperance movement.\textsuperscript{497}

In this respect, unions have been very important. In Denmark, union density has actually grown, which is explained by the fact that since the post-war era Denmark has had a highly centralized collective bargaining and union-managed unemployment insurance schemes.\textsuperscript{498} If we look at Table 4, union density in Denmark has been in continuous growth since 1970. In 1970 it was 62% of the labor force, in 1980 and 1990 81%, and in 1997 84%. In Norway, it has grown from 57% in 1970 to 63% in 1980, to 66% in 1990, and to 68% in 1997. In Sweden it was 67% in 1970, 78% in 1980, 82% in

\textsuperscript{492} Katzenstein, 1984, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{493} Boli, 1991, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{494} Rothstein, 2001, pp. 222-223.
\textsuperscript{495} Lelieveldt, 1997, p. 184
\textsuperscript{496} Rothstein, 2001, p. 216.
\textsuperscript{498} Putnam, 2002, pp. 394-396
1990, and 84% in 1997. In Sweden, 36% of all employees have participated at least once a week in union meetings, and 14% of LO members have served as elected representatives.

6.2. Old and New Corporatism

As seen in Scandinavia, associational life was already very strong by the mid-nineteenth century. In this part of the world there was the continuity of corporate forms of representation in the urban and rural worlds until the late 1800s. This meant that the transformation of pre-modern urban guilds (which were especially strong in the Hansa cities) and corporate village organization could easily be transformed into modern associations. Strong continuity, inheritance of the corporate collective resources and rigid status demarcations gave the lower classes both a secure identity and capacity for collective action. Until the reforms of the 1860s, the Scandinavian countries preserved four estates: noble, clergy, burgher, and peasant. Relevant here is the decisive presence of a form of institutional representation for peasants in Scandinavia, or the fourth estate of autonomous peasant representation that led to the spread of strong self-organized social movements.

In Sweden, already by the seventeenth century the crown and the nobles did not possess much land and had to share power and land with independent farmers. The peasant estate was vital in the political alliances of the period, and it allied often with the clerics or the kings against the nobility. Until 1866 the peasantry was represented in the parliament as a fourth group in addition to the clergy, nobility and burghers, and it was from this class of peasants and small farmers that the liberals emerged in the nineteenth century as well as from the dissenting religions that allied with social democrats and unions for universal suffrage. In the second half of the nineteenth century, this strong mobilization of the peasants made it possible to control liberal policies of the state through the creation of farm and agricultural cooperatives that became very successful in using the market for the preservation of the autonomy of the independent farmers. Initially, these organized peasants for the collective purchase of food or fertilizers but soon successful participated in capitalist ventures through the

production of butter, cheese, flour, and potatoes, and they were the basis of equalitarian and democratic political organizations. After the end of corporate representation in 1866, the first peasant associations and parties were formed easily. The Lantmannaparti (Ruralist Party) was represented in the lower house already in 1868. It was a more conservative organization, and it merged with one of the antecedents of the Conservative Party in 1912. But in 1913 the Farmer’s Party (Bondeförbundet) was formed, representing mainly the interests of smallholders, and in 1915 the more conservative National Association of Farmers (Jordbrukarnas Riksförbundet) was created. They would merge in 1921 to create the Farmers’ Party that later allied with the social democrats.

In Denmark since 1834, there were consultative assemblies of city burghers, rural estate owners, and small farmers. In Norway the constitution of 1814 recognized voting rights to four categories of citizens: the burghers of the cities, the peasants (freeholders and leaseholders), citizens in cities defined by a minimum real estate, and officials of the national government. This institution was decisive because it granted Norway’s autonomy from Sweden through an indirectly elected parliament (Storting), empowered a considerable part of the population (45% of all adult males could vote) and so it made it easier for the rural classes to mobilize and organize against the elites. Rural classes were able to fight and resist big landowners, bourgeois and the bureaucratic elite interest in acquiring land and expand taxes for the building of the army and state apparatus.

In the urban world, there was a simultaneous transition to the modern form of state and the use of existing corporate institutions in order to modernize the country. The transfer of resources from the old corporations to new forms of organization like unions and employers’ organizations was easier, and it tended to create fewer divisions in the labor movement, like for instance the ones that became deep in Southern Europe between socialists and anarchists in the late nineteenth century. Functional interests were seen as legitimate, as sources of advice to the government and as institutions for participation. As a consequence, strong trade associations emerged in the late 1800s. Moreover, employers maintained a cooperative attitude. Unions and employers, since

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505 Collier, 1999, p. 36.
508 Crouch, 1993, pp. 314, 331-332.
the early twentieth century, established bargaining at the national and cross-branch level. Remarkable is that in some cases the employers’ strong organization preceded unions’ organization and pressed unions to get organized before they negotiated with them (Sweden). Moreover, the employers who were more organized were the ones who had already based their resources in the guild trade associations.\(^{509}\)

In Norway, the guilds were abolished in 1869 but they were incorporated in the government structure.\(^{510}\) As Eckstein has argued, contemporary Norway «has derived from premodern life … traditional corporatism».\(^{511}\) In Sweden, the four estates’ division lasted until the 1850s reforms (noble, clergy, burgher, and peasant), and the commercial bourgeoisie was powerful in the cities of Stockholm and Göteborg since the eighteenth century.\(^{512}\) In Denmark from 1870s until 1910, the organizations that continued the guilds representing all trades and branches were able to form at the national and regional levels in all towns (the Danish Federation of Artisans and Industry, the Federation of Copenhagen Office Workers Union, and the Danish Retailers Federation). They acted as pressure groups in the parliament against the workers represented by the social democrats. In Denmark in the 1890s, the union movement developed on the former guild basis and employers were able to centralize and coordinate also at the national level.\(^{513}\) According to Bartolini, by 1895 almost all former guilds had adopted the trade union form of organization.\(^{514}\) In sum, the new regimes were able to adapt the corporatist structures of absolutism into a «corporatist style of reformism».\(^{515}\)

6.3. Early and Strong Parliaments

The second decisive factor in Scandinavia was the fact that parliaments constituted a major counter-power vis-à-vis the king, and that they were politically central institutions. Strong traditions of parliamentarism were continued through a gradual transition to modern parliamentarism. By the seventeenth century, Sweden’s parliament, the Riksdag, was «probably the most democratic parliament in all Europe»

\(^{509}\) Crouch, 1993, pp. 70-75, 118-119.
\(^{513}\) Berezin, 1990, pp. 188-194; Crouch, 1993, pp. 317-318.
\(^{514}\) Bartolini, 2000, p. 245.
\(^{515}\) Mann, 1987, p. 344.
with a chamber for burghers, nobles, clerics, and peasants, and where only tenants of noble lands were excluded. The *Riksdag* dates as far back as the local village parliaments in Germanic times that represented the free peasants of the village. It had many powers, and already in the fifteenth century it administered justice, public works, and charity initiatives, and it was in full control of every tax. The seventeenth and the eighteenth century wars did not curtail its power, as happened with many parliaments in Europe (France or Brandenburg-Prussia), but it grew stronger since participation in the wars was also dependent upon the *Riksdag*’s permission. The parliamentary reform in 1866 replaced the old estates system with a two chamber parliament while increasing the representation of independent farmers. Although until 1884 the government was not accountable to the parliament and the executive authority was in the hands of nominated officials, in 1884 an alliance of peasants and other groups (doctors, teachers, and lawyers) gained a majority in the parliament and founded the first political party, the *Venstre*, which forced the Swedish king to yield to the primacy of this institution. Although in 1917 there was still the fear that conservatives and the king would use the army to repress the workers’ movement, the king never broke with the principle of parliamentary responsibility to the lower house.

In Denmark, although until 1895 the conservatives ruled by decree with the support of the king, and although after 1871 with the fears created by the Paris commune the conservatives became more authoritarian (between 1870 and 1900 unions are outlawed), the counter-mobilisation from the Right would be developed under democratic auspices and the Right never attempted a real change in the nature of the political system. The Conservative People’s Party was formed in 1915, as a reorganisation of the old Tory party, and its aim was mainly to mobilise the middle-class under a mass conservative movement. In general, the Right was unable to mobilise lower classes, both urban and rural. Instead, the social democrats made this coalition of workers, town and country entrepreneurs, rural workers, and office workers, and it was

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516 Downing, 1992, p. 190.
517 Downing, 1992, p. 188.
519 Rothstein, 1998, p. 135
institutionalised in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{522} Universal suffrage was established in 1898 in Norway, in 1907 in Sweden, and in 1915 in Denmark.\textsuperscript{523}

The political centrality of parliament in the nineteenth century made these institutions the focus of political disputes, and it facilitated the organisation of the lower classes into national social movements and associations. At the same time, the existence of strong parliamentarism secured conservatives’ survival and the possibility to coexist in the new system. The established parties competed for an alliance with many associations in order to gain mobilisation capacity, develop associational subcultures, and once they gained power they used the associations to strengthen their own power.\textsuperscript{524} Moreover, dominant parliamentarism meant that freedom of association was gradually granted. In 1846 and 1864, the Swedish parliament eliminated any laws banning unions. By 1890, the rights of organisation were fully recognised, and as a consequence even the radicalisation of the workers movement after World War I was not repressed.\textsuperscript{525} Moreover, there has never been a legal limitation on strike or on unions.\textsuperscript{526}

The struggle over parliamentarisation pitting liberals against conservatives in national parliaments was typical of this century, and it made the liberals seek alliances with lower class groups, thus allowing for the gradual inclusion of lower class groups by established elites and facilitating the expansion of organizations for lower class interests. This tradition of political accommodation under new forms made the Left reformist, the Right accommodative, and the center Liberals mobilizing.\textsuperscript{527} This gave birth to a form of liberalism that was strongly oriented towards mass mobilisation and the building of party and associational organisations. Strong liberal parties were a common trait in these societies, and they should be seen as a result of solid parliamentarism. From early on in Denmark, cross-class coalitions were formed, and from 1849 to 1864 the country was ruled by a coalition between the National Liberal Party of the urban middle-class and the peasant \textit{Venstre}.\textsuperscript{528} In Sweden, strong parliamentarism ensured that by the early 1900s the liberals were the largest party in the Parliament, and from 1920–1932 the pivotal party in any government.\textsuperscript{529}

\textsuperscript{522} Berezin, 1990, pp. 188-194; Christiansen and Lammers, 1990, pp. 185-188.
\textsuperscript{523} Dovring, 1978, pp. 146-147, 152.
\textsuperscript{524} Ertman, 1998, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{525} Bartolini, 2000, pp. 323-324.
\textsuperscript{526} Rothstein, 1998, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{527} Katzenstein, 1984, pp. 32-33.
\textsuperscript{528} Collier, 1999, pp. 67-68, 81.
\textsuperscript{529} Anderson, 2007, pp. 216-217.
The centre-orientation of mass liberal parties provided a fertile ground for the implementation of inclusive reformist policies oriented towards the amelioration of the working class condition. Liberal associations were concerned with the so-called social (or labour) question, and they were very influential in the liberal parties. These associations were composed of upper middle-class politicians, bureaucrats, and economists, some of which would later staff the welfare state apparatus. In Sweden, the main organisations were the *Verdandi* founded in 1881 by Karl Staaff, a liberal deputy and later Prime Minister; and the *National Association of Social Work*, founded in 1902 and that promoted the values of self-help and philanthropic activities but complemented it with a call for a stronger role for the state in poor relief.\(^{530}\) The first sickness fund with state subsidies was adopted in 1891 after a proposal by agrarian and liberal deputies, and it was extended to both rural and urban workers.\(^{531}\) According to Bartolini, at this point half of the industrial workers (in 1885) were members of insurance associations.\(^{532}\)

Finally, parliamentarism made possible a strongly mobilized working-class pressuring from below in order for it to be seen as a possible ally for the coalition of farmers and liberals against the conservatives since the late nineteenth century. In Sweden, the liberals and the social democrats fought together to expand universal suffrage and to legislate social welfare measures, that later included the agrarian parties.\(^{533}\) These red-green coalitions emerged in all Scandinavia, constituting in the early twentieth century such a united front against conservatives that it was impossible to repress without risking civil war.

As a general consequence of high parliamentarism, the links between parties and voluntary associations became adamant from the 1920s until the 1970s. Between the early twentieth century and at least until the late 1970s, the creation of voluntary associations like unions, business associations, co-operatives, agricultural pressure groups, educational associations, temperance groups, and dissenting sects was forged with strong links to parties and party blocks.\(^{534}\) In this period, Swedish parties were divided into such fully integrative blocs that, according to Boli, they had achieved a

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\(^{531}\) Anderson, 2007, p. 223.

\(^{532}\) Bartolini, 2000, p. 419.


\(^{534}\) Pestoff, 1977, p. 43.
«comprehensive party politicization» of society. The tendency of the population to have a high degree of participation within associational life organisations and to be active within them went hand in hand with the solidification of parties and of party blocks, and with parties being the main actors in a society. In Sweden the strong linkages between the social democrat party with the major blue collar union, the LO, ensured that the LO leadership was usually members of the parliament. The same was true of the white collar unions who had closer ties with the liberal and center parties, and the business organisations provided some MPs for the conservatives. Voluntary associations were even seen as party-integrative organizations. They had the political function to integrate the electorate into the party network, to support a parliamentary ally by providing manpower for the leadership and a party cadre, and to contribute with financial resources. New organizations and social movements that were formed without any links to parties tended to create those links in time.

Party profiles resemble associational profiles and the preferences of the rank and file of voluntary associations. Pestoff argues that in nine organizational types identified as potential party-integrative organizations six have party-specific norms, while the other three have strong bloc preferences and they function as supporting organizations only at the elite level. Associations tend to be divided by party preferences. In the 1970s, the political norms of unions in Norway and Sweden favoured the social democrats. The political norms of producer co-operatives have favoured the Centre Party in the two countries. Academic and professional associations’ bloc preference was for the Conservative Party in Norway, and the liberal and conservative parties in Sweden.

Moreover, individual political attitudes and behaviour tend to be shaped by these networks. There are indications that individuals who belong to voluntary associations abstain less in national elections. In contrast, non-members of associations have the highest proportion of failure to indicate party preference or vote in Norway, Finland, and Sweden, while members of party-integrative associations express the higher rate of vote and party preference. Party newspapers are also important in these countries.

537 Lehmburch, 1984, p. 75.
539 Pestoff, 1977, p. 43.
Readership figures are high in Sweden, and they are seen to complement the daily press.  

At the elite level, the data suggests that there strong linkages between parties and associations. A study on nominees for parliament found that organizational membership is an important criterion for selection. Deputies have usually higher associational memberships than the average voter, and frequently they occupy leadership positions in these organizations. Most labor candidates are members of blue collar unions, some in white collar, and a few in farm or producers’ associations. The conservative parties’ candidates had at least one member in religious or temperance organizations while only one third of them had members in organizations common to other parties.  

Finally, state characteristics in Scandinavia allowed for a rapid expansion of associations at the national level. First, almost from the start, the state had a very strong capacity that allowed for an empowering of societal organizations through the use of these groups as vehicles for resource transfers, as sources of information, and as partners in coordinating state policies. There was a high capacity state available when inclusive policies started to be designed in the late nineteenth century. Historically, state agencies have been staffed with competent experts and professional bureaucrats, and the Scandinavian bureaucracies could be counted to implement fairly accurately the economic, labor, and social policies between the late nineteenth century and the 1930s. These bureaucrats were simultaneously professional but also autonomous from political pressures. Policy implementation was in the hands of semi-autonomous boards that were not under the direct control of the ministries, and as such bureaucrats were agents in their own autonomous right.  

6.4. State Capacity Fostered by Church Incorporation

Territory in the Scandinavian countries was strongly unified since at least the sixteenth century, and it was almost fully controlled by the central state administrations. This trait, combined with the high parliamentarism of the regimes, allowed for the development of networks of voluntary associations at the national level. They connected different regions of the countries and promoted the emergence of central coordinating

543 Rothstein, 1998, pp. 139-140.
peak associations in order to run the common affairs of associations from different points of the country. It made possible links and alliances of disparate interests in order to influence the national center. The waves of partisan and civic mobilization that emerged in the nineteenth century were centered mainly on the definition and aggregation of citizens’ interests towards the state and not in questioning the state’s and the regime’s authority and legitimacy.544 Social movements assumed easily a national form.

These state characteristics were the result of long-term paths of development dating back to the sixteenth century, in particular state-church relations. As Anderson argues for the case of Sweden, during the Reformation King Gustav Vasa confiscated the church resources and incorporated the church into the state apparatus. Lutheranism became the official state church in Sweden after 1593, and the «identification between the state and the church was total».545 This tight fusion of the state and the church led to a high administrative unification of the territory from the sixteenth century on, because the state could now use the church parishes to control and to implement policies at the local level. For instance, a system by which to register the population and its resources was established early on by using the parish organization of the church, which facilitated the collection of taxes and simultaneously created direct relations between the state and its subjects. The church was also used by the state to administer the school system.546

This shared responsibility for policy implementation between the state and the church, favored by the Lutheran model, served later as a model through which corporatist and welfare policies were implement during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.547 It was seen already as legitimate that the state could rely on secondary bodies for policy coordination. As a consequence, in the late nineteenth century almost no obstacles existed within the state bureaucracy to use unions and cooperatives for the implementation of social insurance laws in old age pensions, sickness, accident, and unemployment.548 Moreover, because of the state-church fusion, any religious reform or dissenting movement that emerged to reform the established state religion (in Denmark and Sweden the pietists and Moravians in the eighteenth

546 Morgan, 2007, pp. 60-64.
century) was also inevitably directed against the state itself. Consequently, religious/agrarian movements spread easily through the territory, and when the workers’ movement appeared in the late nineteenth century, it was easier to form an alliance since both were interested in changing the central state; both had a common adversary. Religion was not a source of division between rural and urban workers.

6.5. Conclusion

The Scandinavian countries had the best conditions for the development of a fully developed and encompassing associational life. In Norway, Sweden, and Denmark traditions of estate and corporate organization survived until the late nineteenth century especially in the countryside, and a very efficient state that relied on partnerships with the Lutheran church for policy implementation. Also, the state was highly unified and had a high control of the territory. These two conditions promoted a strong capacity for collective action and organization building during the first two thirds of the nineteenth century, especially in the form of religious and agrarian reform movements. In the context of growing workers’ mobilization from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s, these movements were able to become receptive to workers’ demands and to build broad coalitions crossing class boundaries: farmers, workers, and sectors of the liberal elite (representing more progressive and open economic sectors). This was possible because strong parliaments and an open legal system created incentives for popular classes to address their claims to the parliament, and elites became more open to pressures from below since rival claims could be accommodated within the national parliament without the need to resort to repression and violence. Finally, this broad alliance conquered national government in the 1930s as the coalition promoting the transition to democracy. Because it was so hegemonic, it could use the traditions of state-church partnership to build an extremely broad welfare state and corporatist partnerships in industrial policy that to this day sustains a highly participating citizenry.

Chapter 7: Dominant Associational Life in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands

In the pattern of dominant associational life, there was also the survival of pre-modern forms of corporate representation until the late nineteenth century and their integration through cooperation with the state in policy making. Although stronger in Germany than in the Netherlands and Belgium, parliamentarization was lower in Germany and higher in the two other cases. The cases of dominant associational life rested on a mix of high corporatism and medium parliamentarism (Germany) or high parliamentarism and medium corporatism (Belgium and the Netherlands). Still, both had in common a state with medium capacities. Although staffed by professional bureaucrats and composed of autonomous agencies, the state could rely only partially on a tradition of cooperation with religious bodies. This was achieved only partially in Germany and in the Netherlands with the fusion of the state and the Protestant churches, but it failed to attain a complete control of the territory because a part of it was controlled by the Catholic church. In Belgium, although at the beginning of her independence both liberals and the Catholic church had supported independence from the Calvinist Netherlands, later liberal policies alienated (which were stronger in the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands) the Catholic support for the state, and a conflict (although expressed through party channels) was ever present. In this sense the state could not develop as much as in the hegemonic associational life cases, inhibiting full territorial control, and as a consequence social movements and efforts at association building were more regional/local. Hence, there were higher barriers to an alliance of urban workers and the rural middle and lower classes.

7.1. Paths Towards Dominant Associational Life

In Germany, from the late eighteenth century to the late nineteenth century associational life was already well developed. The field of middle class/bourgeois Protestant associational life was strong, and Protestant territories had the highest associational densit. 550 Urban merchants, wealthy artisans, entrepreneurs, and professionals were organized in professional associations (e.g. the Association of

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550 Tenfelde, 2000, pp. 89-90, 91.
German Scientists and Doctors was founded in 1810) and in local cultural and recreational clubs (male choirs, musical academies, shooting societies, beer and wine drinking societies). Many of these associations were nationalistic, since they were created in the aftermath of the French invasions. For instance, the widespread gymnastics associations were created to show the “love of fatherland through gymnastics”.551

By the end of the nineteenth century, Protestant middle-class associational life was very strong throughout Germany. From the 1880s to the 1930s middle-class Protestant groups were mobilized by nationalism, populist anti-Semitism, popular conservatism, and later by fascism.552 Patriotic societies emerged all over in the Kaiserreich after the 1870s. The new state’s nationalist project of imperial affirmation led to the creation of organizations like the Pan Germanic League (1886), the German Army and Naval Leagues, and veterans’ associations.553

Workers’ associational life started to appear in the 1830s in the form of charities, clubs, funeral societies, mutual aid societies, and fire brigades.554 The 1840s witnessed the emergence of a strong wave of workers’ protests, namely by the guildsmen and handicraft laborers, who formed the basis of the German labor movement.555 In 1848, they organized a trade convention of tailors, printers, sailors, and stevedores demanding the creation of benefit funds for the disabled and the sick, the right to conduct their own affairs. Moreover, they declared opposition to economic freedom and a return to a corporate form of organization. In June 2-4 1849 there was the national congress of all German guilds in Hamburg that demanded that work conditions should be set by local guilds, that they be appointed to municipal councils, that members of the guilds be appointed in state legislatures to advise on manufacturing policy, and that announced the creation of a national craft assembly regulating the affairs of all trade organizations side by side with parliament.556 After 1848, some of the restrictions of associations were removed in many German states which lead to the formation of many new associations until the 1860s: the cooperative movement, mutualities, and workers’ educational clubs.557

551 Mosse, 1975, p. 128.
554 Tenfelde, 2000, p. 91.
555 Hamerow, 1972, p. 141.
557 Tenfelde, 2000, pp. 93-94.
By the late 1860s, workers’ associational life was heavily based around networks of associations for leisure time, sports, choirs, and unions. In 1875, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was created and it established itself in the guild movement. It evolved from 300,000 members in 1890 to 2.6 million in 1913.\textsuperscript{558} In 1912 it had 8.5 million workers as members of the trade unions associated with it. Still, less than half of the industrial workers were unionized in this period. The social democrats had their ancillary singing, cycling, sports, nature, mutualities, and youth associations as well as popular theaters.\textsuperscript{559} According to Panebianco, the SPD was «a powerful bureaucracy, self-financed, centralized, with a bureaucratic structure extending from the centre to the periphery and ensuring the dominant coalition's tight control over the party».\textsuperscript{560}

These organizations were persecuted and prohibited, especially in Prussia and Saxony. From 1878 until 1890, antisocialist laws were in place, although mutualities and choral clubs were allowed to continue, and there was a socialist faction in the Reichstag.\textsuperscript{561} With the fall of Bismarck in 1889-90, the socialist movement recovered to its full force again.

The Catholics of southern Germany were organized in associations after the 1870s. The process of German unification by Bismarck was identified with a Protestant state church, and this politicized the Catholic identity. Moreover, Bismarck declared that Catholic culture was to become illegal. The \textit{Kulturkampf} (1871-73) was thus initiated by Bismarck against the Catholic Church in order to control their schools and property. Although not very successful, it pushed the Catholics to the mobilization of German workers. From these networks of Catholic associations, the Center Party was created, lay associational life expanded at both regional and national levels, and the first Christian unions are created in the 1890s.\textsuperscript{562} In the 1870s and the 1880s, support for the Center Party grew. It was able to win 20\% of the seats in the Reichstag in the 1873 election. In the regions of Rhineland and Westphalia, the Catholic party had 63\% of the vote. Moreover, it was a very sub-cultural vote, because Catholics in Germany hardly voted for any other party.\textsuperscript{563}

\textsuperscript{559} Mosse, 1975, pp. 170-179.
\textsuperscript{560} Panebianco quoted by Ebbinghaus, 1993, p. 47; Tenfelde, 2000, pp. 95-96.
\textsuperscript{561} Tenfelde, 2000, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{562} Tenfelde, 2000, pp. 96-97.
\textsuperscript{563} Gould, 2002, p. 78.
By the 1870s, the German state started to promote corporatist policies that implied the recognition of some organizations in the state structures. Associations became semi-administrative bodies. Fire brigades were funded by city authorities. Business and employer organizations were co-opted in order to support the state’s policies of industrialism through tariffs and cartels. Workers’ associations were included within the state administration in order to implement welfare policies (and to curb workers’ radicalism). Under Bismarck, labour was given a role in the management of local sickness funds, which were run by elected boards. Unions started to run for these boards, and they became soon dominant. The employer’s Liability Act of June 7 1871 established the first laws for compensation of accidental death or injury. The 1883 sickness insurance law stipulated that sickness funds should be financed by employers’ and workers’ contributions and managed by committees with a two thirds representation from the workers. In June 1884, the first broad and comprehensive system of obligatory insurance for public accident, sickness, disability and old age insurance was established. The insurance was administered by a body composed of civil servants, deputies, workers’ and employers’ representatives. The handicraft protection law of 1897 created a nationwide network of chambers of artisans with authority to control and oversee the apprenticeship program. The chambers had authority to certify craft exams, to revoke a firm’s decision to hire a particular worker if his training was not considered sufficient, and to set limits to the number of trainees. After the accession of Willhelm II to the throne in 1890, antisocialist laws were repealed to the satisfaction of the Catholics.

By the early twentieth century, Germany had developed such an associational life that it was said to suffer from Vereinsmeierei, or «associational fetishism or mania». The workers’ movements, both socialist and Catholic, were cohesive subcultures organized around dense networks of a party and its ancillary unions, cooperatives, and cultural organizations. The policy of cooperation with the state continued. Because of these state policies, workers’ associations (both Catholic and

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565 Tenfelde, 2000, pp. 98-100.
567 Rueschemeyer and Rossem, 1996, p. 140.
569 Swaan, 1988, pp. 188, 190-192.
569 Swaan, 1988, pp. 188, 190-192.
570 Rabinbach, 1996, p. 54.
socialist) became more centralized and expanded their membership. Moreover, coordination was extended to the relationships of unions and employer associations. This promoted the specialization, bureaucratization, and nationalization of associations. Now, associations were more focused in influencing institutions like the parliament and the bureaucracy in order influence the market by determining prices and welfare policies. Associations evolved to more hierarchical national-level organizations organizing conventions of representatives that chose the directive boards. Associational leaders became more professional.

Although dense and coordinated, German associational life was also separated and growing aggressively antagonistic. Catholics and socialists formed two separate subcultures. Moreover, the Protestant middle and lower middle classes, with their own strong traditions of associational life, were separated from the other lower classes, and they became very nationalistic and xenophobic. This was a consequence of the regime’s characteristics. After 1890, the regime started to mobilize workers and Germans in general through a unified right-wing platform. This never led to the creation of a unified right-wing party, but in the early 1900s all parties, with the exception of the social democrats, supported Germany’s expansionist policy (including the Catholic Centre, which became part of the government and the progressive liberals) and its main vocal organization, the Pan-Germanic League.

The associational life that developed in urban and rural Belgium and in the Netherlands was almost as powerful as in Scandinavia, with early mobilization from below transforming itself into well institutionalized networks of associations. At the same time, a religious cleavage ran through these organizations. In the Netherlands this meant that associational life was based on an equilibrium between the divided religious cultures, Catholic-Calvinist, because each one was run separately by and for the different groups. In these countries, delegating state functions to associations could be done but at the same time it would not be as developed as in Scandinavia. An alliance of liberals-farmers-workers would not develop here because these groups were divided by religious issues. Belgium and the Netherlands emerged out of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, founded in 1814-15, that comprised the independent

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574 Tenfelde, 2000, pp. 97-98
575 Haas, 1997, pp. 234-236
577 Idem, pp. 177-178
provinces of the northern Netherlands and the former Habsburg provinces of the southern Netherlands. They were created by England, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Russia to form buffer states against Napoleon’s France. Initially this regime was absolutist and similar to Austria’s monarchy. The executive branch was mainly in the hands of the monarch, although the lower house had members chosen by the provincial estates, organized in the three orders system. The regime had the internal opposition in the 1820s of a group of French-speaking liberals (lawyers and professionals) and of the Catholics in some of the Dutch provinces, who both opposed the role of the Dutch Calvinist church. The Catholics aspired to freedom of education from the Protestant controlled system, while the liberals were antagonized by the monarchy’s economic policies and pressed for freedom of the press and ministerial accountability to a more representative parliament. Although the liberals were fearful of an alliance with the Catholics, they began to unite under the Belgian Union of Oppositions which fought for religious and political pluralism through the mobilization of the population, petitions, and street demonstrations. The 1830 July revolution in France sparked a radical uprising in Brussels in August of 1830 which led to the formation of the new state of Belgium.578

The Netherlands instituted a liberal constitution in 1848 with a limited franchise, and the pattern of competition was set around a liberal-conservative cleavage. Calvinism was the official religion, and it was supported by the conservatives. The Dutch elite was mainly Protestant, although it was liberal in its political views.579 In the 1860s, a religious-secular cleavage emerged when the liberal governments tried to dismantle the policies of public funding of religious schools. Seen as an attack on religion by the religious establishment, the Calvinists rejected any religiously neutral national system of education. For the defense of these prerogatives, the Protestants but also the Catholics (whose church had been reestablished in 1850) started to build strong associational mass movements in order to curb the liberal governments’ policies.580

A movement of Calvinist reformists and puritans separated from the dominant Protestant state church (the Dutch Reformed Church). It was led by the reverend Abraham de Kuyper, who had founded the Anti-School Law League in 1872, a working class organization called *Patrimonium* in 1876, and the Anti-Revolutionary Party in 1879 which became soon a mass party. This party fought for Calvinist rights which

578 Ertman, 2000, pp. 157-158.
were seen as the liberty to maintain autonomy and even self-rule in the spheres of the family, the church, and the school. This movement was able to mobilize the orthodox lower middle classes and it also fought for their enfranchisement. Between 1888 and 1913, it occupied about twenty per cent of the seats in parliament. 581

Kuyper’s puritan movement triggered Catholic association building. In the 1890s, Catholic associations formed a common political platform, the General Union of Catholic Electoral Associations. 582 Although a Catholic party, the Roomsch Katholieke Staatspartij (RKSP), was founded only in 1926, until this date the Catholics had an important role in several coalition governments, both with the Anti-Revolutionaries or the orthodox Protestants between 1888 and 1940. 583

In the 1860s, the pattern of competition in the parliament arena was structured around Protestants/Calvinists (in the Anti-Revolutionary party that replaced the conservatives as the main party), liberals (who had a capacity to mobilize the working class), and Catholics. The common interest of Calvinists and Catholics in state subsidized religion made them cooperate in parliament against the liberals. In 1888-1891, 1901-1905 and 1908-1913 they formed a series of coalition governments. 584 On the average, the Catholics occupied 26 per cent of the seats in the parliament between 1888 and 1925. 585

In 1881, the socialists appeared in the political arena and they became a serious adversary to the liberals. Based on the previous tradition of mobilization of artisans and workers already mobilized by self-help societies and unions, they demanded universal suffrage. Until 1918, they fought for democratization through protests, union and association building, and petitions to the parliament. 586 Finally, facing competition from the religious parties and from the socialist Left, the liberals developed a mass organization, although in 1911 they allied with the socialists against the religious parties.

By the eve of World War I associational life in the Netherlands was strong but it was structured around a religious cleavage. It was composed of four blocs: liberal,

582 Bartolini, 2000, pp. 82-83, 425-426, 462-463.
socialist, Catholic, and Calvinist.\textsuperscript{587} Workers were mobilized by both labour socialist unions and religious unions like through the Organizational Office of Crafts (Catholic), the Christian national federation of crafts (Protestant), and the Dutch federation of trade unions (socialist).\textsuperscript{588} The extreme Protestant and Catholic movements set up their own denominational schools, whose attendance grew from 20% in 1860 to more than 40% in 1917 (and 75% in 1975).\textsuperscript{589}

As in the Netherlands, Belgium’s associational life between the late 1800s until the mid-1960s was characterized by ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic groups organized into separate societies that were composed of associations and parties. This pattern came to be defined as pillarized (\textit{verzuiling}), when self-defined sub-cultural groups acquired sovereignty in their own circles by building separate networks of churches, schools, newspapers, associations, and parties.\textsuperscript{590}

After Belgium’s independence in 1830, there was a growing competition within the rules set by the new liberal constitution of two forces, the Catholics and the liberals. They developed party and club associations in the 1840s that became increasingly dense and coordinated, as the competition between these two parties grew. Liberals sponsored and established links with many mass associations, but they were mainly restricted to the urban centers, whereas Catholics were stronger in the countryside.\textsuperscript{591} Between 1848 and 1884, the two parties competed for the mobilization of the electorate and alternated regularly in government.\textsuperscript{592}

Also after 1848 working class groups started to organize and demand universal suffrage. Based on craft associations, mutual aid societies, and consumers’ cooperatives in Wallonia by the 1870s they were based on a strong network of class associations. The Labor Party was formed in 1885. Gradually, liberals allied periodically with socialists against the Catholics and implemented government policies of subcontracting the administration of social welfare to associations, which led to an expansion of mutualism. In 1893 the Belgian Labor Party elected thirteen MPs to the parliament.\textsuperscript{593}

\textsuperscript{588} Crouch, 1993, pp. 106-107, 118-119.
\textsuperscript{589} Swaan, 1988, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{590} Ertman, 1998, p. 10; Lijphart, 1999, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{591} Gould, 2002, pp. 34-37.
\textsuperscript{592} Zolberg, 1978, pp. 118-120.
\textsuperscript{593} Deschouwer, 2002, p. 69.
In 1890s massive strikes are organized by the socialists for suffrage enlargement, but this was instituted only in 1918.\textsuperscript{594} 

At the same time, the Catholics launched a network of associations to compete with the socialists for lower class support and to press for universal suffrage. This associational network was based in part on the previous network of the Flemish movement, a social movement that emerged in the 1850s for the recognition of the Flemish language and that usually allied with the Catholics against the liberals.\textsuperscript{595} They were able to defeat the liberals in the 1884 elections, thus becoming the dominant party in Belgium’s governments until 1914. In the government, Catholics instituted an educational system where religious denominations acquired a public role. The local communes decided whether to have a Catholic or a secular school. In cases of religious schools, Catholic voluntary associations were called in to provide the teaching.\textsuperscript{596} 

During the interwar years, voluntary associations in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany acquired important policy-making functions, and they were incorporated in state-sponsored networks of governance. During World War I, government-associational partnerships become decisive in sustaining the war effort, and this led to the centralization, increased membership, and coordination capacity of peak associations. In Germany the pre-war business peak associations, the Central Association of German Industrialists (heavy industry) and the Federation of German Industrialists (medium and small size firms and light industries) were incorporated and centralized into one single organization. This unity was provoked by the government, since it needed the associations for the allocation of raw materials, and to fix prices and to control exports and imports, activities which become centralized and coordinated at the national level in a tighter manner during the war.\textsuperscript{597} Also in 1914, socialist workers’ unions collaborated with the government in the war effort through the auxiliary service law.\textsuperscript{598} 

With the end of the war and the brief full democratization of Germany as the Weimar Republic, there was a consolidation of dense associational-party networks. Complete parliamentarization and freedom of association and the continuation of corporatist public policies contributed to this outcome. Weimar governments deepened
the previous trend to use peak associations as instruments of public policy.\textsuperscript{599} For instance in the arena of welfare and educational policies, the SPD governments instituted the Youth Welfare Act in 1922 that gave a role for Christian organizations in education; and in the 1920s, Heinrich Brauns, a Catholic \textit{Zentrum}'s Minister of Labor instituted a system of state-funded welfare services that used religious voluntary associations for implementation purposes.\textsuperscript{600}

The working classes were organized around the Social Democratic Party, and they had a strong sense of identity and a dense associational field. In general terms, most workers, the unemployed, and the new electorate were mobilized and voted for the left.\textsuperscript{601} A Catholic bloc was represented in the Center Party and its Bavarian affiliate, the Bavarian People’s Party. The Protestant middle and lower classes (especially in the rural small towns) organized small associations (the old nationalist male choirs, musical academies, and sharp shooting societies). With the desegregation of centrist and liberal parties, they were mobilized by a deeper cult of nationalism and homeland (\textit{Heimat}) represented by the Nazi Party.\textsuperscript{602} The Nazi Party was able to mobilize the Protestant associational milieu during the Weimar republic. A study of Thalburg, a small Protestant German town densely populated with associations and clubs (choral societies and hunting clubs among others), shows how the community consciously rejected the social democratic party and accepted Nazism.

Between 1933 and 1945, Germany was ruled by a National-Socialist dictatorship that curtailed liberties and repressed associations. Still, many of the centralized and comprehensive peak associations of the Weimar period survived, and this model was even broadened to include more groups for policy-making purposes. For instance, the model of nationwide networks of associations existing in the chambers of artisans was extended to commerce and industry.\textsuperscript{603}

Just before the First World War, the Netherlands had started to develop patterns of collective bargaining and a broader inclusion of associations in policy-making. Full democratization arrived in 1917 when the new constitution introduced universal suffrage.\textsuperscript{604} A pact between liberals, socialists, and the religious parties was established

\textsuperscript{599} Anheier, 1991, p. 8. 
\textsuperscript{600} Morgan, 2007, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{603} Levy, 1999, pp. 302-304.
\textsuperscript{604} Kersbergen, 2007, p. 125; Morgan, 2007, p. 75.
in the 1917 Constitution to provide state support to religious schools. In agriculture it was institutionalized among top bloc leaders' annual summit meetings between the leaders of the three farmers associations for negotiations and mutual consultation in 1922.605 Welfare measures that were initiated in the late nineteenth century received a boost after 1918. The Act of 1901 had been passed by a liberal-conservative government, was inspired in Bismarck’s legislation, and aimed at compulsory collective insurance. The handicapped and old age pensions were instituted in 1919, and sickness insurance law in 1913 (although it was fully enacted only in 1930).606 Finally, a labour insurance with parity of representation of employers and workers was enacted in 1920.607

These measures promoted the growth of density and coordination capacities of the Dutch associational life, although in lower levels than in the Scandinavia countries, because of the religious cleavage in the Netherlands (as in Germany and Belgium) that ran deep in society. This was a pattern of associational life organized around strongly separated networks of associations based on religion, each with their own religious educational system, as well as on the non-religious sector, the socialists.608 In 1926, the Catholic Party was formed (Roomsch Katholieke Staatspartij-RKSP), and it became the center of the confessional pillar, thus coordinating a vast network of associations. It also became an electorally decisive party achieving an average of 30 percent of seats in the parliament between 1929 and 1940 and introducing in the 1930s measures to support agriculture (fixed prices, quotas, direct financial support). 609 In 1939 the social democrats were invited to the government, but contrary to Scandinavia they never became the dominant party in government coalitions.610

Belgian democracy arrived in 1919 with a pact between the king, Catholics, Liberals and socialists to introduce universal suffrage.611 Because of the war experience the dominant parties of the system, the Liberals and the Catholics, invited the Socialists to form a grand coalition after 1917. This pattern of broad coalitions were common

606 Swaan, 1988, pp. 210-211.
608 Swaan, 1988, p. 108.
609 Kersbergen, 2007, p. 125. It should be noticed that in the elections of 1918, 1922 and 1925, the Catholic Electoral League won about 30% of the seats, being the largest party in the Tweed Kamer. I thank Pedro Tavares de Almeida for this information.
611 Collier, 1999, p. 92. Although Belgium had introduced full manhood in 1893, it was but unequal suffrage. Plural voting was replaced by the principle “un homme, une voix” in 1919. Pedro Tavares de Almeida called my attention to this aspect.
during this period (1917-1921, 1925-1926, and 1935-1945). In turn, this allowed for broad state intervention in the economy and the society, and it contributed to a trend accommodating the interests represented by the coalition partners.\footnote{Deschouwer, 2002, pp. 71-72.} A global program of public spending in public works was instituted during this period, and government involvement was strong in the economy, while the civil society used associations (both religious and non-religious) to implement public policies. The government started to subcontract state services, like the provision of unemployment and health insurances, working class housing, and subsidies to union networks and mutualism societies in the Socialist and Catholic arenas. In 1921 the Catholic partial control of the education system was fully recognized.\footnote{Strikwerda, 1990, p. 215.} Again, as in Germany and in the Netherlands, this led to a stronger vertical integration and membership density of the subcultures through the expansion and coordination of the ancillary organizations of Catholic and socialist pillars with the state,\footnote{Deschouwer, 2002, p. 70.} a process that Strikwerda has called «subsidized liberty».\footnote{Strikwerda, 1990, p. 211; see also Katzenstein, 1991, p. 144.}

These patterns became more solid after the Second World War with the strengthening of interlocking ties between parties, interest groups, and associations, although not in a strong manner as in Scandinavia. In Germany after the allied occupation in 1949-1950, many interest organizations dissolved by the Nazis were re-established and strengthened, in particular employers’ and business organizations, and unions.\footnote{Offe and Fuchs, 2002, p. 203.} Trade, industry, employers, and workers all organized themselves into encompassing associations that played a public role in industrial relations, welfare and economic policy. According to Anheier, all firms were represented in industrial business associations, employers’ associations and chambers of commerce and industry, which by their turn were vertically integrated in peak associations. Ninety percent of all industrial companies were represented in the BDI (peak association for industrialists) and 80% of the BDA (peak association for employers).\footnote{Anheier, 1991, p. 79.}

The principle of providing social services through voluntary associations became stabilized in the area of social and welfare policies. It was called the principles of \textit{Wohlfahrtsverbände}, and associations had the task of implementing social and health services. They received for this purpose about one third of their resources from federal and state budgets. This allowed the growth of the number of such agencies from
382,000 to 937,000 from 1970 to 1993. Both secular and religious associations were important in this arena. After 1950 the two churches, Catholic and Protestant, were granted legal status and ecclesiastical law was made equivalent to public administrative law. In fact, churches formed corporations of public law. At the same time, they were exempt from many taxes, and they were funded by a state-imposed religious tax, which allowed them to develop educational and welfare activities. Cases in point were the institutes of adult education (Bildungsstätten) that were organized in three national peak associations, two religious, one secular: the Council of Catholic Academies, the Council of Evangelical Academies, and the Working Council of German Bildungsstätten for secular and non-political academies. At the local level, the two religions had almost a status of official religion, and local governments channeled the public funds aimed at welfare purposes through religious associations. Moreover, the two largest German religious peak associations – the Protestant Diakonisches Hilfswerk and the Catholic association Caritas – were able to veto during the most of the postwar period any social policy that they might have disliked.

The medium to high density and coordination of associational life was also related to strong links between associations and parties. The social democrats were organized in the SPD and the Christian democrats in the CDU/CSU, now a party representing both Catholics and Protestants. Each party continued and strengthened the historical links to interest groups. Business and employers’ associations were close to the Christian democrats. The social democrats continued their tradition of links to the unions but they went as far as sponsoring even leisure and sports associations. Both parties also developed strong youth movements that were organized within a national peak association. The Ring Politischer Jugend (Circle of Political Youth) was a peak association for people between eighteen and thirty founded in 1950, and it organized the party youths of each main party (CDU-CSU, SPD, FDP, and also the Young Democrats, who left FDP in 1982). It served an important function of elite recruitment, formation of future party leaders, and as a forum for debate that made it easier to form future alliances and policy consensus across party lines.

621 Stepan, 2001, p. 220.
622 Morgan, 2007, p. 76.
For this reason, associations have had privileged access to the legislative process, and they were frequently represented in parliamentary committees and able to present their claims there.\textsuperscript{625} Surveys on MPs have shown strong links with interest groups. 51\% of the social democrat MPs have reported to have regular contacts with unions, 15.3\% with citizens’ groups, and 24.5\% with business associations. 20.5\% of the liberals have reported contacts with unions and 45.8\% with business, while 21\% of the Christian-democrats have contacts with unions, 60.4\% with business associations, and 33.1\% with religious organizations.\textsuperscript{626}

Although highly developed, German associational life is not as strong as in the Scandinavian countries. The centrality of religion and of status demarcations for the professions and occupational groups inherited from the previous regimes inhibited a full expansion of encompassing associations through the state and the more extensive coalitions between rural and urban lower classes. In federal Germany, the attempts to establish a unitary union system did not fully succeed because the strong presence of the Christian federation institutionalized a less universal welfare state. Also, the efforts for a unified union confederation for blue (DGB) and white collar (DAG) workers failed, because the separate social insurance schemes fostered the independence of white collar workers in a separate union. Finally, also farmers had their own insurance scheme.\textsuperscript{627} The German welfare state became more based on status divisions than on the Scandinavian universal rule, and consequently associational life did not become as encompassing as in the hegemonic type. The postwar plans for a comprehensive and universal social security system failed because of the determined opposition from employers, particularistic regulations of certain categories of employees and for the self-employed and professions like the doctors, represented by the remaining parties except the SPD. The Christian-democrats’ (CDU/CSU) victory in the 1949 elections ensured that the new welfare state came to be «squarely based on the pre-Nazi structures», with different funds and schemes for different groups and occupational categories. The influence of the churches in the CDU gave birth to a health and social service regime that was based on the principle of «subsidiarity» and not on the idea of universalism.\textsuperscript{628}

Also in the Netherlands after World War II, the inclusion of associations in the state and the links with parties were strengthened. The German occupation of the

\textsuperscript{625}Anheier, 1991, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{626}Wessels, 1998, pp. 221-222.
\textsuperscript{627}Huber and Stephens, 2001, pp. 147-148.
\textsuperscript{628}Huber and Stephens, 2001, p. 148; Wessels, 1998, pp. 241, 244-245.
Netherlands during the war built on the existing labor-management pacts and regulated on corporatist lines for instance the sickness funds. In 1945, the Foundation of Agriculture was created, and in 1950 the Social and Economic Council with representatives of socialist and religious labor unions, employers, and of the government (15 for each, 45 total members). The Council had a comprehensive statutory organization to be established in all branches of industry, it made rules with that had the force of law for industry (two thirds of the members had to approve), it possessed an almost decisive advisory power, and it acquired a permanent staff. 629 There was also the STAR, the Foundation of Labor, where social partners met in the absence of the government. In 1952 compulsory state unemployment insurance was enacted, thus strengthening the prewar system of consultation between workers and employers.630 In education, Calvinist and Catholic schools received state jurisdiction, and in the 1950s they taught 47% of all Dutch non-college students.631 This pattern can be seen at the local level as well. In the Netherlands, in the city of Zwolle a survey found that between 1993 and 1995 most associations stayed in touch with the administration (72%), that associations with paid staff were more in contact with local government than associations without it, and that the majority of contacts between organizations and municipality were initiated by both sides (56%).632

Party links strengthened this as well. The close links of socialists and Catholics with networks of voluntary associations continued after the war, and they were even strengthened in an encompassing consensual system that had became the norm for inter-elite relations during the war, when the experience of exile brought political elites together.633 This formed the basis for broad government coalitions during the period between 1946 and 1958 and the full consolidation of the three political-associational subcultures of socialists, Catholics, and Calvinists.634

As a consequence, unions and employer organizations became stronger in the next decades, and they had a higher recruiting capacity and comprehensive national level structures.635 Between 1951 and 1960 there were approximately 340 unions and 2000 employers’ and trade associations, which were all reunited in sub-sectoral, sectoral

630 Maier, 1984, p. 50; Swaan, 1988, pp. 210, 214.
631 Stepan, 2001, pp. 219-220.
633 Swaan, 1988, pp. 214-216
635 Crouch, 1993, pp. 218-222; Maier, 1984, p. 50; Swaan, 1988, pp. 210, 214.
and peak associations, but until the 1970s they were divided in pillar lines. There existed three peak union associations, for instance, for the Protestant, Catholic, and socialist pillars.636

Although the religious and socialist pillars may have become weaker since the late 1970s, there is still a strong associational life in the Netherlands and a strong Dutch inclination to form associations. There are still many unions, employers’ associations, artisan guilds, health care and social welfare associations, housing corporations, school associations, literary societies, environmental associations, and sports clubs that now merged not based on the previous Catholic, Protestant, socialist and/or liberal identities but through a process of associational professionalization of staff and leadership. Still, new organizations tended to structure in a pattern similar to the old pillar organizations: hierarchically organized, with a strong leader authority over followers, rules of consensus and mutual tolerance, and proportionality in advisory bodies to the government.637 Also new social movement organizations have had access to state decision makers by subsidization and incorporation in advisory bodies.638 These new associations have «autonomous jurisdiction» guaranteed by the state and enforce and administer state policy in areas like health policy, public housing, and the environment.639

As in Germany, the welfare state did not develop like in Scandinavia. The pivotal role of religious parties in the governments after 1945, either liberal or social democratic rule, did not allow for a coalition of rural and urban workers.640 This had an impact on associational life, which became less dense and coordinated as in Scandinavia, since full social democratic policies, like full employment, were never pursued. Although the Dutch welfare state was a highly generous system, it never pursued active labor market policies. It became based on a mix of Catholic (importance of the male bread winner and resisting the entry of women to the labor market) and social democratic principles, the parties who ruled the country after the war until 1958 in the so-called Roman–Red coalition.641

The Belgium experience after World War II was also one of strong links between parties and associations, and with a public role for associations in the welfare

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636 Waarden, 2002.
637 Waarden, 2002, pp. 44-68.
639 Waarden, 2002.
state and policy-making. It became a political system where socialist, liberal and Catholic associational party networks were used, vastly financed, and coordinated by the state in paritaire commissions for the implementation of health, unemployment benefits, and other collective goods.\(^{642}\)

Voluntary associations have achieved a degree of strong institutionalization within the state and the regime by acquiring the character of a public authority.\(^{643}\) For example in the Netherlands, during the German occupation the experience of exile led to cooperation between Liberals and Socialists for a future common government with a strong consensus basis, which became decisive in the promotion of agreed policies of wages, prices, and welfare after the war.\(^{644}\) The “Social Solidarity Pact” of 1945 was the starting point for this. It implemented the principle of organizational concertation and tried to extend organizational membership to the majority of citizens.\(^{645}\) The National Labor Council was created in 1952 with the functions of advising the government in social policy and with a permanent place for equal representation of labor and capital organizations. Until the late 1970s, the Labor Council determined issues like working hours, maternal care, and holiday pay. The negotiations at the Council were then applied by sectoral committees, who passed them to paritaire committees to debate the implementation details. At each level social partners were represented and the Council’s decisions were binding to all actors.\(^{646}\) Finally, in 1958 the three parties signed the school pact, where both the state and the Catholic school systems received equal funding and were granted equal autonomy.\(^{647}\) A specific combination of three factors made associational life in these countries strong and coordinated but not at the levels found in Scandinavia.

7.2. Old and New Corporatism

In all four cases the pre-modern tradition of corporate organization through guilds, estates, corporations of burghers, lawyers, and merchants survived well into the twentieth century (although it was stronger in Germany than in the Netherlands or in

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644 Maier, 1984, p. 50.
645 Birnbaum, 1988, p. 41.
647 Deschouwer, 2002, p. 73; Gould, 2002, p. 44.
Belgium. In Germany, the corporate form of organization became fully established in 1648 in the cities of Münster and Osnabruck, the main cities of the Holy Roman Empire, that granted privileges to the three existing denominations (Catholicism, and the Lutheran and Calvinist varieties of Protestantism) and established the representation of Catholics and Protestants as corporate bodies in the constitutional structure of the empire. This relationship was guided by the principle of parity and equality between religions that were represented in two religious bodies in the imperial diet. Divergences of interest could only be decided by deliberation and not by majority vote.

With the Napoleonic invasions, and end of the empire, and the formation of the new German states after 1815 (Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Saxony, Württemberg) the principle of religious parity was maintained (although in Prussia Catholics were strongly discriminated). In the 1850s, the rulers of the German states resorted to guild regulations to resolve the “social issue” by creating a state-dominated social welfare system with the churches. This agreement was ultimately embodied in the concept of "subsidiarity" that was considered as the guiding principle of social policy. Consequently, the German states were strongly predisposed to have close working relationships with secondary organizations, namely voluntary organizations.

The modern Reich was created by maintaining the autonomy of the previous corporate bodies that existed in the smaller states annexed by Prussia. No law ever fully destroyed the existence of old corporate bodies like it happened in France with the Loi Chapelier or in England with the general combination act of 1799. Especially the status groups (stände) of commerce and the crafts remained intact. The guilds were formally abolished in 1869, but they suffered a rapid transformation into modern voluntary trade and industrial associations. The journeymen formed mutual aid societies who now replaced the welfare functions of the guilds. In fact, in the 1870s the new socialist organizations took the form of old guild structures. For instance the cutlers organization had a statute similar to its guild antecedents (it replicated the 1789 statute) and applied guild practices, like the existence of only one apprentice and one

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649 Moreover, public offices, especially the Imperial courts, had to be filled equally with representatives from both religions. Lehbruch, 2002, p. 180.
652 Salamon and Anheier, 1998, p. 227
653 Anheier, 1991, p. 68.
655 Tenfelde, 2000, p. 88.
journeyman per master. In the white collar professions, like the civil servants, there was also a continuation from eighteenth century corporate structures. The middle classes saw themselves as part of a stand or a corporate group with a sharp separation from the working classes.

Also the Dutch maintained their guild structure until the late nineteenth century. As Crouch argued, especially the urban guilds continued in the Netherlands. Although they were eliminated in the late nineteenth century, their cameral structures remained as the urban basis of the country. Employer organizations became densely organized because they continued the trade corporations. Finally, rural communities were powerful independent bodies of self-rule that dominated the Dutch provinces and part of Belgium’s Flanders since the sixteenth century. Here landlords, monarchs, and the state had to share sovereignty with these bodies, with long established traditions of local liberties. Still, the tradition of corporate structures was weaker than in Scandinavia and Germany, especially for urban workers and artisans. In Belgium mutual aid societies appeared after the dissolution of the guilds in 1818, which was earlier than in the other cases. In any case, the first unions, formed in 1857 by the cotton spinners of Ghent, were based around the corporate form of organization. Also in the Netherlands workers’ associational life was difficult to organize. The first union movement appeared only in the 1880s, and although many mutual aid societies were allowed to exist during the century, to replace the former guilds, workers’ combinations were persecuted until 1872. In Belgium and in the Netherlands, corporate power was more in the hands of the commercial oligarchy; city organization was less democratic than in Scandinavia although still allowing for a high degree of freedom.

As a consequence, the tradition of state reliance on associations to develop public policy never disappeared in these countries. It was common for associations to receive representation monopolies from the state and policy functions, and this in turn made these states, especially the Bismarckian state, regimes rooted in corporate bodies. In the context of the late nineteenth century, the plans of these states for national economic and military expansion were more easily based on the existing societal forces, which had a corporate form. In the case of Germany, the plans for industrialization

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659 Crouch, 1993, pp. 118-119.  
empowered, although in a stratified way, these corporate groups by co-opting them to the state. For instance, industrial workers were given a special status in terms of higher job security and welfare benefits.\textsuperscript{662} In turn, this promoted the self-organization of associational life and the political mobilization of groups.\textsuperscript{663} Between 1890 and 1912 union membership affiliated with the SPD rose from 100,000 to 900,000.\textsuperscript{664}

7.3. Variations in Parliamentarization

While Germany had stronger traditions of corporatism than Belgium and the Netherlands, these two states had higher levels of parliamentarization. In Germany universal suffrage was introduced early, in 1867 by Bismarck, in order to ensure greater popular support for the conservatives against the liberals, and the SPD even achieved democratic representation in the Reichstag. After 1890, approximately 20\% of the seats in the Reichstag were won by the socialists (in the 1890s the SPD won between 9\% and 14\% of the seats, and in 1903, when reached about 30\% of the votes cast, the SPD was able to win 20\% of the seats in the Reichstag). In 1912 the SPD became the largest party in the Reichstag, and its membership rose from 500,000 to 2.6 million by 1912.\textsuperscript{665} At the same time it was barred from entering the government.\textsuperscript{666}

The problem was that the Reichstag was not politically responsible; the government did not depend on it. It had some powers over legislation and the budget, but the chancellor and the ministers were alone responsible to the emperor. The monarch had despotic tendencies, and personal liberties and rights could be suspended arbitrarily. The majority of ministers came from civil bureaucracy or the army, and the government used parliament mainly for attempts of plebiscitary acclamation.\textsuperscript{667}

Political parties, then, in particular the liberals, in Germany became very weak because they could not develop links to the masses and depended more on the good will of the emperor to stay in power. The parties that were represented in government (the German Conservative party, the Free Conservatives and the National Liberals) did not depend on the electoral results to conquer power but more of the direct links with the bureaucracy and the army. As a consequence, at the same time that the Catholics and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{662} Kocka, 1981, p. 68.  
\textsuperscript{663} Kocka, 1981, p. 69.  
\textsuperscript{664} Goldstein, 1983, pp. 320-325.  
\textsuperscript{665} Goldstein, 1983, pp. 324-325.  
\textsuperscript{666} Lipset, 1992, p. 333.  
\textsuperscript{667} Goldstein, 1983, pp. 320-325; Mann, 1993, p. 341; Shefter, 1994b, p. 39.}
the socialists were growing their implantation in the electorate, the parties remained for long as mere collections of notables without links to the masses. Moreover, their potential electorate drifted away to the more aggressively mobilizing extreme right parties: the anti-Semitic Christian Social movement, the Farmer’s League, and especially the anti-Catholic Protestant League that was founded in 1887 to fight the Center Party, that became the largest lay Protestant organization with about 500,000 members. In 1906 an iron-rye coalition of National Liberals and conservatives supported the expansionist colonial policies.

As a consequence the route of gradual inclusion from below was closed for workers and farmers fighting for inclusion. The National Liberals and the Left Liberals opposed equal, direct, and secret voting for the Prussian parliament. Moreover, freedom of association could not be defended as strongly as in other countries because few if any pushed for it in the government or the parliament. In this sense, there existed weak incentives for the parties of the system to establish cross-class collaboration and alliances like in Scandinavia between the liberals and/or farmers and the social democrats. This was reflected in the arena of associational life through sharp cleavages. Until 1933 the organizational worlds, so to speak, of the middle and the working classes were divided by profound barriers. No single workers’ peak organization was ever able to encompass both blue and white collar unions. Instead, these organizations looked for extreme differentiation. Especially white collar unions desired not to be seen as workers and gradually evolved to espouse an anti-Semitic and nationalistic ideology, like the case of the German National Union of Commercial Employees.

The level of parliamentarism was very strong in Belgium and in the Netherlands. Belgium was highly parliamentarized since its inception as a country. The 1830 constitution, molded to the aims of liberals and the Catholics against the old regime forces, stipulated that the real power resided in parliament. There has never been in the nineteenth century any monarchical interference. In the Netherlands since the medieval period parliaments were powerful. They established the rule through independent charters in the medieval and early modern cities. There were also provincial parliaments.

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668 The only exception was the Agrarian league in 1893. Anderson and Anderson, 1967, pp. 371-373, 379.
669 Gould, 2002, p. 83
that had control over the laws, taxes, and matters of war and peace. By the seventeenth century, these provincial parliaments started to send representatives to a national parliament, the states-general of Holland, which became the main institution.\textsuperscript{673} The transition to modern parliamentarism in the mid-nineteenth century was peaceful and the early rights to resist unlawful action of the sovereign were maintained with the first modern parliament in 1848.\textsuperscript{674} The Netherlands became a peaceful parliamentary monarchy between 1848 and 1868.\textsuperscript{675}

As a consequence, in Belgium and in the Netherlands there was elite openness to social movements, who were free to address the parliament, to seek allies in the party elites, and to create links with the political parties. This environment also created more competitive elites. In Belgium the initial parliamentary competition between liberals and Catholics spilled rapidly to the mobilization of the disenfranchised. With the emergence of socialists later on, mobilization and competition between parties became even stronger. The extension of the franchise from the 1880s to 1910s leading to universal suffrage was consequently a more or less peaceful process.\textsuperscript{676} Moreover, freedom of association was established early, just after the 1848 revolutions, and absolute freedom of religion and unions was legal already in the 1860s.\textsuperscript{677}

7.4. State-Building and Religious Conflict

In all these societies the characteristics of the state made it possible to establish partnerships with associations that empowered associational life to a high degree, but they were less inclusive and encompassing than in Scandinavia, especially because of divisions created by religion. The German state is an extreme example. It was able to implement these welfare and corporatist programs because it could rely on efficient state machinery. State formation in Prussia since Frederick the Great in the late 1700s left a legacy of state efficiency, unitary administrative institutions, efficient taxation, and the inexistence of corruption or patrimonialization as in France.\textsuperscript{678} Prussian bureaucracy became so strong during the \textit{Hohenzollern} dynasty (1640-1786) that the

\textsuperscript{673} Downing, 1992, pp. 212-215.
\textsuperscript{674} Bartolini, 2000, pp. 335-338.
\textsuperscript{675} Swaan, 1988, p. 211.
\textsuperscript{676} Bartolini, 2000, pp. 323, 328.
\textsuperscript{677} Zolberg, 1978, pp. 110-113.
\textsuperscript{678} Gillis, 1978, pp. 319-322.
Prussian state became almost synonymous of the notion of bureaucracy. In 1806, examinations were introduced in the recruitment of civil servants. This tradition was strengthened during the second empire, and Bismarck’s rulership in the nineteenth century survived the Weimar and the Third Reich periods and continued during the federal republic. In contemporary Germany a law prohibited parties to place their agents in a civil service career.

This was the legacy of a pattern of state development where there was partially a fusion between the church and the state as in Scandinavia. In Germany, as discussed above, those partnerships both with Catholic and Protestant churches were used since the seventeenth century to implement social policies. Also in Belgium and in the Netherlands religion was partially used by the state to empower the bureaucracy’s capacity. In the Netherlands, the fusion between the state and the Calvinist church allowed for the creation of national social movements directed at both the state and the official church and aimed at reform. A case in point is the Calvinist reform movement, also known as the Society for the General Good, an association that in the early 1800s planned to introduce educational reforms of a brand of the reformed pietism. Liberal-minded rulers used this association to establish a nationwide school system, namely public schools for the poor. In Belgium the initial alliance of Catholics and Liberals for independence in 1831 saved the country from religious conflict, and a state crisis was avoided. The state was used for fostering sometimes the church interests, other times the church served the state. But Catholic elites were a constitutive element of the Belgian constitutional order. This tradition allowed for later institutionalization in the interwar years through public policies and state-association partnerships for the distribution of collective goods.

At the same time, state-church relationships were not as pacified as in Scandinavia. The cases of dominant associational life may be said to be characterized by a mixed pattern of state-church relationships. In Germany with the proclamation of the Second Empire in 1871 conflicts started between the state and the Catholic Church (the Kulturkampf) which lasted until 1891. The state tried to crush the church’s autonomy over such issues like education, culture, and welfare while at the same time

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679 Fischer, Lundgreen, 1975, p. 509
681 Shefter, 1994b, p. 44.
682 Swaan, 1988, pp. 105-106.
promoting the Protestant church. Bismarck reacted to the 1870 dogma of papal infability by abolishing the Catholic department of the ministry of religion, banning the Jesuits, and imposing political control on Catholic education. This crystallized a cleavage between Catholics and Protestants that did not allow for lower class alliances and the middle class remained mostly in the Protestant field, thus reinforcing patterns of high associational development but within separate and antagonistic fields. It laid the foundations for the conflicts during the period 1918-1923 that were only pacified after 1945 with the creation of a single Christian party: the CDU.

In Belgium and in the Netherlands over the nineteenth century religious conflicts emerged gradually. In Belgium, it was between the liberals and the Catholics, and between the liberals, the Catholics and the Calvinists in the Netherlands. The religious cleavage in these countries pushed the working classes to ally either with the liberals or with farmers/religious actors, but they were never able to form a massive front. For instance, in the nineteenth century Belgium, the Workers Party after decades of struggle and six general strikes found support in the Christian wing of the Catholic Party which was based among working class Catholics. But this alienated the middle class liberals. In the Netherlands, the Catholic Party was always torn between its Christian democratic wing, which represented unions and farmers against the upper class in its own party, and a tendency to ally with the social democrats. A coalition of all three forces – urban workers in the social democratic parties, rural workers in the religious parties, and middle class professionals represented by the Liberals – could not be done because of religious differences. This divided the lower classes and produced an associational life less extensive than in Scandinavia. Consequently it promoted a less developed welfare state, one that was less focused on a universal notion of rights but more on maintaining religious differences through public policy.

This made a totally unified state church, like in Scandinavia, impossible and maintained the religious cleavage that inhibited both higher state capacity and possibility of alliances of all lower class groups. The state could not develop as much as in Scandinavia because of the fact that religion was still a divisive issue for elites and

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689 Strikwerda, 1990, p. 216.
690 Kersbergen, 2007, p. 120.
masses. As consequence, these religions had to be run by themselves and thus the attribution of public status, first to religious organizations, afterwards to other pressures from below like the socialists, could not be as extensive. Inclusive policies were not as extensive as in Scandinavia and had a smaller role for associations, in particular unions. Although the state maintained its powers intact, it could not be used to impose stronger social democratic policies because the coalition behind it was not as hegemonic as in the Scandinavian countries.

7.5. Conclusion

The pattern of dominant associational life rests on a particular combination of variables. As in the pattern of hegemonic civil society, there was also the continuation of corporate forms of interest intermediation inherited from the pre-modern period that were modernized since the late nineteenth century to build modern societal corporatist states, but these were more denser in Germany (and Austria) than in Belgium and in the Netherlands. On the other hand, these two countries had a higher level of democratization, which allowed for popular classes to be represented in the polity and to form organizational links with elites, especially with the liberals. In Germany, however, parliaments were weaker, a point which made liberal elites immune to pressures from below. Additionally, in all these countries there were deep traditions of state-church partnership, but not as deep as in Scandinavia. In all of these cases, there were religious conflicts with state builders in some periods. Especially Catholics were antagonized by rulers for long periods, which led to weaker patterns of incorporation of the church and as a consequence divided the popular classes, especially after the appearance of the workers’ movement at the end of the nineteenth century. Workers were mobilized either by religion, or by socialism, but it was never possible to form a broad coalition of religious reformists and dissenters with the workers and sections of the liberal elite as it happened in Scandinavia. After the transition to democracy in the 1930s and the 1940s, these societies built less comprehensive welfare systems and corporatist institutions for policy-making, thus not promoting civic engagement as the levels found in the pattern of hegemonic associational life.
Chapter 8: Divided Associational Life – England

8.1: Paths towards Divided Associational Life

In the eighteenth century England, there existed a rich associational life. Clubs, lodges, and brotherhoods (like the Masons), friendly societies and craft unions, Protestant associations (like the societies for the suppression of felons, watch’s and ward societies, and the society for the suppression of vice) were common in this period. Because of the fear of a spread of revolutionary ideas from France after 1789 and the war with this country that followed the French revolution in 1789, there was a brief period of repression of associational life. Between 1790 and 1819, six combination acts are directed against unions and political associations, which were very much similar in purpose as the Chapelier law in France.691 Yet, soon enough unions became legal, as well as workers’ mutualities and brotherhoods (burial societies, sickness and insurance, and educational associations).692

Since the late eighteenth century, there was a strong current of popular associational life that was based on radical craft unions, and many of them were sympathetic to the Jacobin ideals of the French revolution.693 The Owenites appeared in the 1840s and were a social movement composed of hundreds of thousands of artisans and laborers. They resisted a machine dominated productive system, and instead fought for a society based on the principle of co-operation and structured around a network of co-operatives societies.694 The Chartism movement was more political, and through demonstrations and the presentation of petitions to parliament it sought to secure universal male suffrage, a charter of people’s rights, secret voting, and the payment of MPs. After the 1848 revolutions in Europe these movements, although they failed to achieve the extension of the suffrage, were able to secure special work legislation for women and children, and the ten hour work day.695

These movements had also a religious basis. The dissenting sects of the Anglican Church that appeared in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries defended a kind of radical associational life of artisans and middle classes, and they

called themselves the “industrious classes”. Dissenters amounted to about 10% of the population and 20% of the regular church attendees, and they developed associations that were networks of local-regional cross-class coalitions, including both workers and many liberal politicians who depended on the sects’ support to get elected. Since very early on, the churches stimulated the development of cross-class and cross-regional cooperation.\textsuperscript{696} In 1820, Thomas Chalmers, a Scottish evangelical minister, defended voluntary associations as vehicles that would bring stability to industrial society.\textsuperscript{697}

In the last third of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, England had a varied associational landscape. Many groups and classes were strongly represented by associations, like business leagues, professional organizations, and unions. Closer relations with the government and the bureaucracy became important channels for representation in addition to voting, and negotiations between interest groups were widespread.\textsuperscript{698} The labor movement was sizeable in comparative terms but at the same time also decentralized, still very much just based on the mobilization of skilled and prosperous segments of the working class, and it was unable to mobilize the unskilled workers.\textsuperscript{699}

Until the early twentieth century the expansion of associations was heavily fostered by the political centrality of the parliament. Already in the 1810s most associations emerged in order to influence and put new themes on the parliamentary agenda. The so-called Subscribers’ Societies were associations of the urban middle classes, whose members paid monetary dues and organized cash subscriptions from the general public to receive additional funding. It was the first model of a modern voluntary association in England. Their members debated frequently in public spaces, and they were organizationally proficient, for instance with the publication of the first annual reports and the creation of coordinating committees. Their model was later copied by other associational ventures, like the Leagues of the Chartists, the anti-slavery movement, and the Anti-Corn Law Movement. Also dissenting religious groups from the Anglican Church, like the Unitarians, tried to influence the parliament and even used it as associational model.\textsuperscript{700}

\textsuperscript{696} Mann, 1993, pp. 104-107.
\textsuperscript{697} Morris, 2000, pp. 117-115.
\textsuperscript{698} Thomas, 1978, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{699} Bartolini, 2000, pp. 70-72; Crouch, 1993, p. 337.
\textsuperscript{700} Morris, 2000, pp. 115-117.
In the second half of the nineteenth century most social movement efforts were directed at influencing the parliament. A combination of voter mobilization, mass meetings, demonstrations, petitioning, and lobbying of the members of parliament were the tactics of groups like the Fabian Society, the Anti-Corn Law League, the Liberation Society, The National Education League, and the UK Alliance. The reform league had similar aims as the chartists, and it was able to establish links with the existing parties, the liberals and the conservatives, who saw the extension of suffrage and mobilization from below as a rewarding strategy for their mutual competition. In fact, also because there was intense elite competition within the parliament, there was an increase in voluntary associations. Two main groups competed for power in the first half of the nineteenth century: the conservatives or Tories, a section of the elite recruited more in landowning families and close to the established church (Anglican), and the Whigs or liberals, who were more supportive of the dissident churches and more urban based. 701 In 1867 the liberals expanded suffrage rights to the upper strata of the working class. Afterwards, political parties evolved definitely from collections of notables to mass associations. 702

The British version of the continental socialists or social democrats was the Labor Party, founded in 1900 by a federation of independent unions. Still, when compared to the socialist parties in Scandinavia or in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, the party-union network was weaker. It depended on episodic alliances with the liberals to get MPs elected to the parliament; levels of individual membership were low, and they were introduced only in 1918. 703 Most unions, reformist workers’ organizations, and dissenting religious associations had closer links with the liberals.

As in the rest of Western Europe, the early twentieth century and in particular the context of World War I was a period of implementation and planning of social and welfare reform. As was discussed in the previous chapters, states started to intervene in the economy and in the promotion of the welfare of their citizens. Liberals were particularly important in this respect, as they were the forerunners of the first measures of social solidarity implemented in the modern world, much before social democrats became real players in electoral politics. 704 Between 1905 and 1914 the liberal governments of Lloyd George planned to create state-sponsored social services in order

701 Morris, 2000, p. 123.
703 Ebbinghaus, p. 48.
to gain the working-class vote.\(^{705}\) The funds were to be derived from the tariffs collected from trade with the British overseas empire and from the savings of the old poor law. The pension act of 1908 was built on a coalition between the government and the workers. It was financed through tax transfers, and it was paid to every individual over seventy years age and below a certain income. Universal unemployment coverage was also planned in 1908. A network of 1,200 labour exchange agencies was designed to implement it, and they would be the places where benefits were paid and would be run by the unions (and with some funding from employers also).\(^{706}\)

As in other European countries, during World War I and its immediate year’s labour movements became even more important for the government. First, the war effort needed successful mobilization for the armed forces and the cooperation of the unions in the war effort. Some integrative measures were taken in this period, like the introduction of social insurance schemes, works councils in factories, and consultative agencies at the national level. Already by 1914 Lloyd George’s budget used charities to channel government resources like maternity support, child care, home help, or work with the blind. In fact, by 1934 thirty percent of the income of charities came from the state.\(^{707}\)

In the immediate years after World War I the competition between the organized parties within the system for lower class support increased even more. The creation of the National Federation of Professional Workers and of the MUC, the Middle Classes Union who are strongly anti-workers movement and anti-left, represented the success of the conservative party in the mobilization of lower class segments. Those liberals who were closer to the conservatives organized an antisocialist coalition led by Lloyd George, while those closer to the labor party, like the group around former Prime-Minister Asquith.\(^{708}\)

Still, comprehensive welfare programs and corporatist intervention in the economy like in Scandinavian or in German models became never institutionalized in Britain. The universal unemployment coverage of 1908 was never capable of financing directly the mass of the unemployed, and Britain soon turned to the old methods of poor relief.\(^{709}\) The first labor governments of 1924 and 1929-1931 tried to implement it again

\(^{705}\) Hall, 2002, pp. 40-42.
\(^{706}\) Swaan, 1988, pp. 194-197.
\(^{708}\) Jeffery, 1990, p. 76-82
\(^{709}\) Swaan, 1988, pp. 194-197.
but failed. With the conservatives’ victory in 1931, middle class mobilization and integration of the lower classes was no longer pursued. Welfare measures became again basically synonymous to charity dispensation, through the activity of networks of purely voluntary localistic efforts dominated by the conservative sectors of the suburban gentry, and professionals. The government exploited the divisions between lower class associations. Though in 1932 the NFPW started to pressure for social and medical insurance and unemployment benefits, other lower middle class association like the Over-Forty Fives Association endorsed the principle of self-help against the extension of social insurance which was seen as taxation.\(^7\)

In sum, the voluntary associations responsible for welfare were not unions, craft brotherhoods, or religious mass organizations as in the cases of hegemonic and dominant associational life, but mainly middle-class private charitable organizations with the aim to educate the poor with middle-class values. The values associated to their action were not of the welfare as a universal right, as in Scandinavia, or as the consolidation of status of a particular group, a collective right, but an entitlement which fell on individuals who could not support themselves in the market society. In this sense it became associated with individual social, moral, and economic failure. An important network organization in this respect was the Charity Organization Society that insisted that all welfare aid should be combined with moral reform.\(^1\)

Moreover, the government was unsure and hesitant in expanding welfare measures directed to the lower classes because that would mean to empower indirectly the Irish cause. After 1919, Ireland escalated into a civil war, with the Irish nationalists fighting for independence from the British. In 1922, Ireland was partitioned into two, with the north staying under British control while the rest of Ireland had an autonomous status similar to Canada and South Africa. Still, the south declared its independence from Britain in 1937. The fights over the Irish question between 1919 and the 1930s had an impact on the degree to which British governments would favor fostering lower class interests through the expansion of welfare measures. First, because it diverted resources and time from the British state that were used to crush the rebellious Irish, and second, because too much expansion of lower classes rights could favor the Irish cause. Finally, it estranged the English lower classes and the Irish lower classes from each other because of nationalism and religion (Catholics in Ireland, Anglican and/or dissenting in

\(^{7}\) Crouch, 1993, pp. 124-128; Jeffery, 1990, p. 76-82.
\(^{1}\) Swaan, 1988, pp. 194-197.
England). As a consequence it was not possible to form a broad class coalition between rural (mainly in Ireland) and urban workers (mainly English) as it happened in Scandinavia.\footnote{Tilly, 2004, p. 161.} For all these reasons, interwar associational life, in particular the labour movements, was not very strong but instead fragmented and weakly centralized, and in contrast to countries like Sweden or Germany.\footnote{Ebbinghaus, 1995, p. 83.}

Only in the years between 1945 and 1951 did governments introduce more serious state sponsored welfare measures and intervention in the economy.\footnote{Thomas, 1978, pp. 88-89.} After 1945 there were again plans for a universal welfare state by the labor government (1945-1951). Measures in this sense were the Family Allowance Act of 1945, the National Insurance Act of 1946, the National Health Service Act of 1946, the National Assistance Act of 1948, and the nationalization of key industries for the redistribution of wealth.\footnote{Beckford, 1991, pp. 36-37.} Still, a full-fledged welfare state failed to materialize and the charitable and philanthropic model continued. There was a permanent shortage of government funds for welfare and the charitable agencies continued to grow alongside the state agencies.\footnote{Beckford, 1991, p. 37; Hall, 2002, pp. 40-42.} The government ended up maintaining and using the already established charity system after the late 1950s by increasing the public funding of the private agencies. This became crystallized in the 1973 Voluntary Services Unit, which made a rigid distinction between public, private and non-profit systems of welfare. There was neither a fully integrated national welfare system as in Scandinavia nor a status group based system but a generous welfare system like in the pattern of dominant associational life, but a not too much funded and pluralistic welfare system, with at least three divergent logics. The three welfare agencies were the state providers of services, the voluntary sector that sometimes was subcontracted by the state, and a sector composed of private citizens that acted independently in the development of charity initiatives.\footnote{Beckford, 1991, p. 39.}

In sum, although labor was early recognized as a legitimate actor in British politics, the expansion of forms of associational representation within the state apparatus for the dispensations of welfare rights and the participation in economic policy-making was much weaker than in the previous cases. Collective negotiation has been almost non-existent, associational leaders cannot speak with authority for a broad
range of issues, and they are not consulted in policy issues. In fact, dispensation of welfare through charities in England has tended to promote deliberately a citizenship that is insulated from political issues and debates, contrary to the hegemonic and dominant types where welfare is channeled through unions and religious associations that have historically been politically engaged. For instance, charities can have their public statute suspended if they engage in advocacy or political issues and activities. Finally, since the structure of the welfare state is not tripartite and public funding is not so generous, this makes it more difficult to encourage the formation of comprehensive and national scope peak associations of whatever kind. Voluntary associations that establish partnerships with the state are usually not sure for instance whether they will continue to be funded.

Consequently, Great Britain’s post-1945 associational life has been less dense than in the previous cases. The origins of this pattern of associational life rest on the interaction of three variables: early elimination of corporate organization, a medium level capacity state, and high parliamentarism. In the next section, I analyse the impact of each of these particular variables in English associational life.

8.2. The Elimination of Pre-Modern Corporatism

In England, such corporate organizations like the guilds were eliminated quite early. Contrary to all of the countries so far discussed, England did not maintain guilds and corporate forms of association into the modern period. After the revolution of 1688, corporate rights were abolished, in particular the peasant rights to communal lands, and village immunities. Any vestiges of an independent farmers’ society were eliminated early in English history, a point which promoted extreme peasant proletarization, and consolidated instead the power of big landowners and the full commercialization of agriculture. In the Irish countryside, the direst situation emerged that resembled southern European latifundia. There, a confiscation of Irish land by big Protestant landowners after 1688 led to extreme poverty and proletarization of rural workers and an early radicalism opposing the British monarchy and the Anglican Church.

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This process continued in the early nineteenth century, and it was accentuated by geopolitical reasons. Between 1790 and 1815 the wars with France in the context of Napoleonic expansion and the American independence led to the expansion of the military and state bureaucracy. A large military was created and a period of repression ensued at home. The costs of war augmented and to face these, taxes were raised from 17 million pounds in 1790 to 80 million in 1815. The need for more resources to finance the war clashed with corporate rights and groups. Price regulations were eliminated by 1800, like the ones on the price of bread, trade monopolies, and protective tariffs were all eliminated by the 1820s. In 1804 a law abolished the guilds, the statute of artisans was repealed in 1813-1814, and in 1820 corporate artisan restraints on wages and apprentice rules were removed. In 1834, the poor law excluded artisans from the old regime paternalistic relief system. This process continued after the 1840s. The Corn Laws were repealed in 1840, and communal and feudal rights were completely replaced by individual property rights. Thereafter any property or goods could be freely commercialized.

After the break of the estate system, freedom of association existed but there was a prohibition of workers’ combinations. Associational life was developed, but it lacked coherence and group identity as in Scandinavia and the northern European cases of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. A very individualistic society replaced the old regime of paternalism, with poverty and economic distress being seen as caused by individual failure and not because of social conditions. In the Irish countryside, instead of association building there was mass emigration, especially to America. The Irish Tenant League, which in the 1850s fought for land redistribution for the small holders and opposed the power of the big English landlords, failed in its efforts of mobilization.

Only in 1871 were the trade unions completely legal, but they were never incorporated into the policy-making bodies of the state, and their role was rather formulated in the general laws of freedom of association. Unions were never included in partnerships with the state. The Trade Union act of 1871 conceived unions as bodies

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722 Tilly, 1997a, pp. 206.
724 Morris, 2000, pp. 112-113.
726 Beckford, 1991, p. 35.
with protection, but it did not extend them rights and positive functions.\textsuperscript{728} The Trade Disputes Act of 1906 reinforced this aspect of English law.\textsuperscript{729} Consequently, the capacity for self-mobilization from below was less strong than in the cases of hegemonic and dominant associational life, both in the rural and in the urban areas, since there were no institutions on which to base collective action, only some church dissenting sects. The only exceptions were very specialized and functionally differentiated groups that could count on identity and resources for associative collective action, like for instance the miners.\textsuperscript{730}

8.3. The centrality of Parliament

Although lacking corporate representation, England shared with the previously analyzed cases of associational life, with the exception of Germany, high levels of parliamentarization. Because of the centrality of parliament in the British political system, associational life developed to medium levels, not as high as in the Scandinavian countries or in the Netherlands, but much stronger than in the cases of southern Europe and France. Parliamentarization promoted the development of associational life in England. After 1688, after many years of civil war and revolution, the parliament became the dominant institution vis-à-vis the monarchy, and the central institution of Britain’s political life.\textsuperscript{731} As early as 1750, the parliament already shaped collective action in decisive ways. It was the parliament that granted permission and legislated the activities of assembly, association, and petition. Elections became rapidly events where assemblies tended to gather, and political debate spilled over to the public, thus becoming a public debate. It was in this period, according to Tilly, that modern forms of participation emerged like the mass meeting, the voluntary association, marches, petitions, and demonstration. Also, the growing electoral competition between factions in the parliament gradually came to involve the common citizenry which was brought into politics by the purposeful act of the elites in the parliament promoting associations to that effect. The opposition mobilized the population against the

\textsuperscript{728} Crouch, 1989, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{729} Crouch, 1993, p. 325
\textsuperscript{730} I owe this sugestion to Prof. Philippe Schmitter.
\textsuperscript{731} Thomas, 1978, pp. 51-52.
government (e.g. John Wilkes and Lord George Gordon) and the supporters of government did the same (e.g. the antirevolutionairies of the 1790s). 

Between the 1780s and the 1830s, the parliament augmented its power even more. In 1835, it became responsible for policing. The municipal police forces had a stable executive leadership but that was accountable to the parliament. Thus, the state became much more pacific, contrary to other western European cases, like France or Spain, where the police depended directly on the ministry of interior and the government. The centrality of parliament continued to promote the expansion of associational life both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, issues like the question of Catholic emancipation lead to Catholic organization building directed at influencing the parliament, and at the same time generating a counter-mobilization by Anglicans, in the anti-Catholic Brunswick clubs, and in the Metropolitan Political Union. Workers in the Chartist movement organized massive demonstrations around the parliament, and many other groups’ direct petitions, like the anti-slavery societies.

Links between voluntary associations and parties also became stronger. Conservatives and liberals looked gradually for support from below in order to win elections. Workers were initially mobilized by the liberal party. Liberal craft unions have been significant from very early on in England, much before the appearance of socialist ideologies. Gradually, lower classes were brought into the system. The 1832 reform act incorporated the middle class; the reform acts of 1867 and 1884 did the same for the working class and enfranchised two thirds of male workers. Many associations created by the liberal party were designed for this purpose. More directly, the Social Science Association, founded in 1857, aimed to promote legislative reforms in the House of Commons on issues like education, penal policy, and public health, and it was led in the 1880s by key members of the liberal party, for example by Gladstone. After 1869 and well into the 1880s, the end of the Reform League gave place to the Labor Representation League for the promotion of working class registration. The freedoms of association, reunion, assembly and the legalization of unions became

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732 Tilly, 1997b, p. 239.
733 Tilly, 1997a, pp. 74-76.
734 Bailey, 1975, pp. 342-343.
735 Tilly, 1997b, p. 236.
736 Thomas, 1978, p. 62, 73.
secured in the 1870s and in the 1880s. This promoted an associational life that was national in scope and well organized.740

Simultaneously, it was an associational life that was never a serious threat to the established elites, and they never faced a really threatening labor movement. After the 1860s, the conservative party transformed itself gradually from a purely elite and patronage party of rural notables who controlled the vote in their constituencies. Party leaders became mainly from the parliament. Disraeli and John Gorst created in the 1870s the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations whose idea was to transform conservatism into a mass movement. It set up a conservative committee in order to select local candidates for parliament that was responsible for the electoral victories in the 1870s and 1880s, thus making the Conservative Party a real mass party since the 1880s up to the mid-twentieth century.

8.4. State-Building: Territorial and Religious Conflict over Ireland

Finally, the process of state building also encouraged the spread of association building at a national scale and allowed for some policy measures but that stopped short of integrating the lower classes and recognizing a public role for associations. The state was not as uniform or of such high capacity as in Scandinavia, although it was professionalized considerably from the mid-1800s. But it was closer to the pattern of medium state capacity of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany because of state-church conflicts, in particular over the Catholic/Irish question.

First, recent research has shown that in England since the 1600s the state developed a strong infrastructural power. By the late 1600s England had already healthy public finances and during the nineteenth century civil service reforms were enacted that reduced the role of patronage in England (the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 and the Reform Act of 1884). The Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 (and the Franchise Act of 1884), transformed radically electioneering conditions by the limitation of electoral expenses and punitive provisions against illegal practices. The major reforms that undermined patronage as a system for access to administrative office were issued by the Orders in Council of 1870 and 1871, which established a hierarchical examination and

open competition for much of the civil service. In the 1880s, only one third of the positions in the Treasury, for instance, were by party nomination.

Another factor that contributed to high capacity in England was the pattern of state-church relations. As in Scandinavia, the Protestant church became a state church. In the sixteenth century the king triumphed over the Catholic Church and «destroyed the dualism of spiritual and worldly power», thus eliminating many obstacles and regionalism in the way of uniform state control. Under Elizabeth I all ecclesiastics were required to make an oath of fidelity to the queen as supreme governor, and disobedient clergy could be dismissed from its ecclesiastical functions. This control of the church allowed for the growth of the power of the state. Church officials became also state officials, paid by central government. The bureaucratic apparatus became more efficient because it had now incorporated the «ancient parish administration» of the church, and used this as a provider of collective goods and as an instrument to gather information. The parishes became an administrative organ that was used for other tasks of policy implementation (poor relief, maintenance of highways, and so on).

This had the effect of making social movements spread easily through the national territory by creating national confederations. The recurrent dissenting sects identified the established church as corrupt, and they aimed at reforming it and the state at the same time, very much like in Scandinavia. Evangelicals were active in humanitarian causes and political reform, and eventually the churches left a legacy of cross-local associational building that was inherited first by the liberals, then by the labor movement and other associational ventures in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.

On the other hand, the pattern of state-church relationships had another source of conflict that diminished state capacity. While within England itself religious conflicts within the Anglican Church and its dissenting sects tended to promote state centralization, the other source of religious conflict, between England and Catholics in Ireland, tended to create territorial strains in the state. Since the restoration of 1660, Ireland was treated as a colony. Catholics only possessed about twenty percent of the land, and the Irish territory was subject to continuous tax extractions in order to finance

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741 I Thank Pedro Tavares de Almeida for this information.
742 Tilly, 2004, p. 145; see also Shefter, 1994b.
744 Mann, 1993, pp. 104-107; 129-130.
the English monarchy. In 1801, the Irish were granted representation in the parliament, but it was restricted only to the Protestant Irish. This divided the lower class movements in the cities and the countryside over issues of religion and territory, something that did not happen in Scandinavia, and which happened only partially in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany where there were religious divisions between Catholics and Protestants but which did not have the form of a territorial separatist movement. In Ireland it had. During the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, lower classes mobilized for the expansion of rights and addressed petitions to parliament, thus acquiring a national scope, links to parties, and an impact in the public sphere, but they were always divided by the Catholic/Irish question. For instance, in the 1700s the Protestant MP George Gordon formed a nationwide Protestant Association against any Catholic autonomy claims in Ireland, while at the same time a national level Catholic mobilization ensued that addressed its issues to the parliament by petitions and marches. In the 1820s, popular movements organized campaigns both for Catholic rights and emancipation (like the one led by the Irish barrister Daniel O’Connell), and Protestants counterreacted with popular mobilization through the Brunswick Clubs.

Moreover, it divided liberals, thus inhibiting the full development of a more progressive liberalism as happened in Scandinavia. The National Liberal Federation, created in 1877, was divided over the home rule issue for the Irish in 1870s, thus making the liberals’ factions that favored mobilization from below less powerful. This had the consequence of making very difficult the alliances between lower classes in the countryside (most of it in Ireland and thereby Catholic) and in the urban world (mainly in England and Protestant). Lower class movements for Anglican reform in England (Quakers, Baptists, and Presbyterians) never allied themselves with Catholic Emancipation movements in Ireland in order to reform the British regime and further democratization. As Morris argues, later in the nineteenth century, the «growth of labor and working-class organizations» was hampered by the divisive issues of religion and the territorial tension with Ireland. This served more to «divide and exclude rather than create true subscriber democracies».

747 Tilly, 2004, p. 150.
749 Lipset and Rokkan, 1985, p. 220.
750 Morris, 2000, p. 126.
8.5. Conclusion

Like the previous patterns of associational life in Europe, also England had some propitious conditions for the development of mass voluntary associations. England possessed an efficient and coherent state, which had been fostered by the incorporation of the Anglican Church and by several anti-corruption acts, and since early on it was a highly parliamentarized polity. These traits fostered national level mass movements, especially of religious reform, but also of craft workers, because national integration made easier the connection and communication of associational leaders within the same social movement. Moreover, the centrality of parliament allowed claims to be debated, and it made viable the entry of the popular classes into organized politics by the creation of links between parties (both the liberals and the conservatives) and associations. At the same time, two other features inhibited the development of associational life in the levels found in the hegemonic and dominant patterns, and instead they pushed for a dualistic society. First, there was the religious issue over Ireland, which gave a fatal blow to an alliance of farmers (mainly Catholic and Irish) and workers (mainly English and Protestant/dissident). Second, the form of the British polity since the seventeenth century was essentially individualistic and corporate, as in the cases so far analysed. This made it impossible to create national level policy-making corporatist institutions as well as a developed welfare state in the 1930s and the 1940s that could have integrated voluntary associations in their social schemes. Instead, welfare and corporatist benefits were weak, dispensed from above by elites and not through organizations, thus promoting a dual and not coordinated associational life where social inequalities strongly determine the civic engagement of the citizenry.
Chapter 9: Disjointed Associational Life: France and Italy

9.1. Paths Towards Disjointed Associational Life

Initially, the aftermath of the 1789 French revolution led to an expansion of voluntary associations. Between 1789 and 1795 French political societies reached the number of 5,500 and spread throughout the country, even in the countryside. They are able to attract both workers and farmers, and they were deeply involved in the political disputes of the day. They were used by the Montagnard government to fight the aristocrats and girondin bourgeois rivals. During the radical phase of the revolution, and especially in 1794, the fact that many of these associations had backed the terror led to a growing opposition to the right of association and the spread of the notion that associations were a hindrance to the national interest. The Declaration of Rights of 1795 put limits on the rights of associations, forbidding them to be named société populaire, to affiliate with each other (or make federations), or to exchange correspondence.\(^751\) In the Napoleonic period, the legal code of 1810 declared that associations with more than twenty members needed a special permission from authorities to be formed, and the government set up a strict supervision of associational life, and extended police control even to the smallest associations.\(^752\)

During the Restoration of the Bourbon monarchy (1815-1830) there was more tolerance regarding the freedom of association. Elections became a procedure for alternation in power which promoted the organization of liberals and loyalists through popular associations and the registration of citizens to vote (e.g. François Guizot created in 1827 the first major association for liberals that spanned over thirty five departments of France). In the July monarchy of 1830-1848 there were even better conditions for the development of associational life. Although it ultimately failed, the new regime was an attempt that for a while tried to institutionalize a liberal constitutional monarchy. The parliament received more powers and the king’s (Louis Philippe of Orleans) prerogatives were curtailed.\(^753\) Elections became part of the routine of daily politics, a fact that pushed for the development of associations by the several political factions, the liberals, the republicans, and the legitimists.

\(^751\) Huard, 2000, pp. 136-138.
\(^752\) Huard, 2000, p. 138.
During this period, republicans expanded much of the existing associational life. Networks of newspapers, workingmen’s brotherhoods (compagnonages) continued the tradition of old corporations. Initially, they were organized not for political purposes but in order to provide welfare and insurance to their members (funds for funerals, unemployment) and as centers of social activity (e.g. drinking clubs). Gradually these organizations became republican and on the left.\(^{754}\) After the 1830s, the mutual aid associations evolved gradually into workers’ associations, when questions of job placement and support for workers in disputes with masters and workers became their main aims. Little by little, they became fertile ground for the spread of republican and the socialist ideas emerging with Louis Blanc and Pierre Proudhon\(^{755}\) and aimed at building such a movement at the national level.\(^{756}\) They achieved also a modern form: they were constituted as voluntary clubs sustained with paid dues from the members and with deliberative weekly assemblies.\(^{757}\) Many of these societies opposed the existing regime and sought its replacement by a republican regime. The regime became very repressive; republicans were severely persecuted in the years 1834-35, and in November of 1834 the government introduced a bill forbidding associations.\(^{758}\) Consequently, associations became very secretive, like the Society for the Rights of Man that was divided into small groups with ten to twenty individuals in each, and that aimed to take direct action in order to overthrow Louis Philippe’s monarchy.\(^{759}\)

With the 1848 revolution there was an explosion of voluntary associations. Initially the revolution was based on an alliance of sectors of the bourgeoisie, mainly republican, and the workers’ movement. For a brief period in the 1848 constitution, the right of association was legitimated. But in June of 1848 this right was already restricted and it was finally abolished with the 1852 coup of Louis Napoleon that ended the brief republic. In 1851 the restrictive Napoleonic legal code was reinstated,\(^{760}\) while at the same time there was a bloody repression of the associational republican-socialist movement.\(^{761}\)

\(^{754}\) Huard, 2000, p. 142; Sewell, pp. 163-166.
\(^{755}\) Sewell, pp. 213, 219-236.
\(^{756}\) Huard, 2000, pp. 141-142.
\(^{757}\) Sewell, pp. 94-100.
\(^{758}\) Huard, 2000, pp. 140-141
\(^{760}\) Huard, 2000, pp. 138, 142.
\(^{761}\) Tilly, 2004, p. 122.
After this period, most attempts to form a national network or confederative structure of workers’ clubs into a national association failed.\textsuperscript{762} Many republican workers’ mutualities became secret societies.\textsuperscript{763} The labor movement saw itself more as a «small republic in the workplace» and as independent from the regime and outside society.\textsuperscript{764} In the countryside guilds and corporations had also been definitely eliminated after the La Chapelier Law. The rural associations that developed in the 1840s, the Chambres, were considered illegal, and existing associations became secretive and semi-clandestine. Associations would become inactive during periods of repression, and when the regime suffered sudden openings, come out into the open in an explosive manner.\textsuperscript{765} There were also some attempts to form Catholic associations in the countryside, but in general they failed when compared to the denser and more solid Italian or Belgian Catholic movements.

Also in the several states in the Italian peninsula after the French revolution, there emerged many republican and Jacobin clubs, the first form of modern associational life in this area too. They were voluntary associations, mainly of craftsmen, merchants and of the lower class professions, and they were democratically organized around a member’s assembly.\textsuperscript{766} A stronger workers’ movement appeared in the 1840s in the form of artisan brotherhoods and self-help societies, especially in cities like Turin, Naples, and Milan. During the revolutionary wave of 1848, these organizations spread all over Italy’s states reaching smaller cities and the countryside in an attempt to create liberal states. Like in the rest of Europe, most of these revolts failed, although in Piedmont a liberal constitution was implemented and a liberal regime secured. In the remaining Italian states, the restoration of monarchical forces was the norm, and during the 1850s and 1860s there was a decline of associative collective action.\textsuperscript{767}

In France during the Second Empire in 1864, strikes were legalized and some restrictions on the freedom of association were eliminated in 1868. The imperial regime attempted liberalization. The possibility of associational meetings for non-political purposes was legalized and political meetings were tolerated at electoral moments. Most

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{762} Sewell, pp. 248, 252-255.
\item \textsuperscript{763} Tilly, 2004, p. 128.
\item \textsuperscript{764} Sewell, pp. 270-276.
\item \textsuperscript{765} Tarrow, 1997, pp. 108-110.
\item \textsuperscript{766} Banti, 2000, pp. 45-46.
\item \textsuperscript{767} Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1997, p. 158.
\end{itemize}
of the associations could exist only for temporary periods.\textsuperscript{768} The war with Prussia in 1870 and the subsequent defeat of France created an opportunity for the republican movements to erupt into the public arena and to declare a republic during the Paris commune on March 28, 1871. Voluntary associations spread enormously in this context. Republican radical governments were established in the provincial French cities, and in Paris the Republican National Guard organized associations of neighborhood committees. During a brief period, republican organizations ruled the city. The Paris municipal government was elected by delegates from each neighborhood, which also elected the National Guard.\textsuperscript{769} The Paris commune would be short-lived though, and on March 14, 1872 a very repressive law of associations was approved that aimed especially at eliminating the workers’ movement in the International Workingmen’s Association. Still, the legacy of the commune would be picked up after the Third republic stabilized in 1877, which meant that it was easier to form associations.\textsuperscript{770}

It was during the Third Republic that associations expanded more freely in France. As in most Western European countries, this was the golden age of modern associational life. A variety of groups were formed, alongside the already established workers’ brotherhoods and leisure associations of the provincial bourgeoisie. Hunting societies, musical societies, fire-fighters, Catholic charities, Catholic workers’ associations, youth organizations (e.g. holiday camps), and popular education societies were all created during this period.\textsuperscript{771} The workers’ movement started to organize also beyond the craft level to include factory workers, and the socialists party was formed.\textsuperscript{772}

Still, the regime continued to pose strong barriers to associations. The government of René Waldeck-Rousseau passed a bill in October 1883 that gave the Minister of Interior the right to prosecute associations engaging in activities considered illegal. The laws on associations were made more liberal only in 1901.\textsuperscript{773} Associations could be created freely, and they were not obliged to declare their foundation to authorities, but on the other hand only the ones who had registered with authorities could acquire civil personality which gave them rights (like the possibility to own

\textsuperscript{768}Huard, 2000, p. 144; Tilly, 1997a, pp. 74-76.
\textsuperscript{769}Tilly, 2004, pp. 122-123.
\textsuperscript{770}Huard, 2000, pp. 142-143.
\textsuperscript{771}Tilly, 1997a, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{772}Tilly, 2004, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{773}Veugelers and Lamont, 1991, p. 141
buildings). At the same time the law put many restrictions on religious associational life and congregations were dissolved in 1901.\footnote{Huard, 2000, p. 150.}

From 1908 to 1938 the number of associations evolved from 5,000 to 10,000.\footnote{Worms, 2002, p. 143.} Most accounts seem to agree that on the eve of World War I France had a weak associational life. Catholic trade unions were created in the early 1900s, but the attempt to create a Catholic party after 1885 failed, and only in 1919 the first federation of Catholic workers appeared.\footnote{Bartolini, 2000, p. 459.}

Contrary to France, associational life seems to have been stronger in Italy in this period. Voluntary associations developed after the unification of Italy in March 1861. First appeared the elite clubs of liberal politicians. Many of them had the aim to mobilize the electorate and to run candidates for office. Very soon after that, workers’ mutual aid societies appeared, first in Piedmont and later in other regions including the south. Although some accounts argue that until World War I associational life was very localistic, short–lived, and that elites were unable to form coherent associations because of permanent factional splits, in the north of Italy the pattern of associational life was much stronger than in the south.\footnote{Banti, 2000, pp. 43-44, 50-51, 54.}

Italian Catholic associational life was more vibrant than in France after the 1860s. The first attempts of Catholic organization building were the calls by the newspaper Unità Cattolica, together with a small number of associations approved by the pope and organized by bishops in the 1860s.\footnote{Kalyvas, 1996, p. 217.} In 1874, the Catholic congress in Venice called for the formation of local associations in every parish to be run by one central national organization. The pope supported this organization called Opera dei Congressi. It had a permanent directive committee, and by 1892 it organized a national network of Catholic associations that was able to establish links with peasants unions and to organize cooperatives, saving banks, and agricultural credit associations.\footnote{Lyttelton, 2000, p. 72.} It was a national organization divided into diocesan and parochial committees following the structure of the ecclesiastical administration. This network included organizations like mutual aid societies, cooperatives, lending libraries, charitable organizations, and savings banks. The Opera was very strong in northern and central Italy. Of the four thousand diocesan centers in 1897, 2,092 were in north, 1,536 in the center, 206 in the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem[Huard, 2000, p. 150.]{Huard, 2000, p. 150.}
\bibitem[Bartolini, 2000, p. 459.]{Bartolini, 2000, p. 459.}
\bibitem[Banti, 2000, pp. 43-44, 50-51, 54.]{Banti, 2000, pp. 43-44, 50-51, 54.}
\bibitem[Lyttelton, 2000, p. 72.]{Lyttelton, 2000, p. 72.}
\end{thebibliography}
south and 144 on the islands. In 1897, it included 708 youth organizations, 554 rural funds, and 688 worker organizations. Moreover, based on this vast social movement, Catholics organized directly for political participation. In 1904, pro-Catholic deputies were independently elected to the parliament, in 1905 they formed the Unione Elettorale to coordinate electoral efforts, and in 1909 they were able to elect twenty-one Catholic deputies (although in an alliance with the conservative wing of the Liberals). Lastly, the first Catholic unions appeared in the 1910s.

In Italy the workers’ movement seems to have been stronger and more organized than in France. Although there is a similarity between the two countries (as with Portugal and Spain), what distinguishes this pattern of associational life is the fact that the anarchist movement became important in both societies.

In France, the anarcho-syndicalists became around 1900 the main workers’ current. The radicals espousing direct action against the state (Jules Guesde) became dominant versus the moderates (Jean Jaurès), who wanted the state to intervene through partnerships with the unions’ confederation, the CGT, for the implementation of non-contributory social insurance. By opposing the state as such and by relying on direct action against the authorities, the workers’ movement in these societies could not grow as in the countries studied in the previous chapters, since partnerships with the state were foreclosed, as I will discuss below. Thus, the labour movement became very self-secluded, and it tended to use the general strike as the main form of collective action.

Also in Italy, revolutionary syndicalism became an important ideology in the workers’ movement, the general strike was conceived as the principal form of political weapon, and in 1904 the first general strike of the world in Milan was organized, as protest against the Camera del Lavoro of Milan because of the deaths of workers who had been protesting. After this incident, the Italian workers’ movement became deeply opposed to the idea of state as such.

In Italy, though, the socialists were very strong as well and more so than in France. In the 1870s and 1880s, there was already an organized labor movement (the Fascia Opera) that was able to spread as a movement with a national scope, taking root in the cooperative and associative networks of urban and rural workers, especially of the

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780 Banti, 2000, pp. 51-55.
781 Kalyvas, 1996, pp. 219-220.
783 Collier, 1999, p. 69.
784 Swaan, 1988, pp. 198-199
center and north. In the early 1890s, peasants started to form associations throughout Italy, like rural cooperatives and self-help societies, that were mobilized by the socialists. These were especially strong in the Po Valley and the North. In 1892, the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) was founded and solidified strong links with workers’ associations, sporting clubs, theater societies, and peasant leagues, thus becoming the head of a vast social movement although concentrated mainly in central and northern Italy. At the turn of the century, mutual aid societies were most important forms of association, including 936,000 members, half of which were in socialist trade unions. In the rural countryside, the socialists were able to consolidate their power with the workers of the Po valley, creating in 1901 a rural workers’ federation: Federterra. Much more than in France, the workers’ movement in Italy was organized into encompassing peak associations like the socialist dominated Confederazione Generale Del Lavoro (CGL). The anarchists also had a strong federation that was especially solid in the south.

In the interwar period, French unions were weakly organized and they had no effective power in bargaining with employers and with the state. The labor movement was able to achieve some mobilization for protest, but in comparative terms its levels of both membership and protest actions were low. According to Crouch, French unions were the least centralized in Europe, in particular because the labour movement was highly divided between communists, socialists and anarchists, and also between these and a conservative, patriarchal current around corporatist-Catholic unions like the General Confederation of French Artisans (skilled tradesmen, masons, blacksmiths, cobblers, and carpenters) that was strong in Alsace. Moreover, these ideological divisions were regionally based. Organized labor in this period only grew in 1938 during the Popular Front government, including up to 5 million members, but it fell sharply in the next two years.

In Italy, the discrepancy between these two currents, socialists and anarchists, reached its maximum point with Italy’s participation in World War I. Unions were divided over whether to support the governments’ war efforts and accept nationalist

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785 Collier, 1999, p. 69.
786 Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1997, p. 145.
787 As the distribution of party affiliates between 1890s and 1914 showed. Banti, 2000, p. 44.
788 Lyttelton, 2000, pp. 71, 77.
mobilization or to take advantage of this opportunity to bring down the state.\footnote{791} With the defeat of Italy in the war and with the state almost on the verge of breakdown, unions and farmers’ associations took the opportunity to protest and acquire property. Italy suffered a wave of strikes between 1919 and 1920, and for the first time there was a simultaneous mobilization of industrial and agricultural workers. The antecedent to the socialist revolt had been the 1917 insurrection of the workers of Turin that had captured neighborhoods of the city. Now they proceeded to an even stronger rebellion. For the first time, the Socialist Party was able to build a national structure incorporating workers and peasants. In Turin in 1920, they sponsored the creation of factory councils (elective organs inside the factory) and pushed the peasant leagues and cooperatives to claim “land for the peasants” leading to many land seizures.\footnote{792} At the same time, anarchist unions tried to direct these revolts into a national rising.

If looking at Catholic associational life, one can see marked differences between the two countries. In France in the 1920s, there was an expansion of a network of Catholic unions, associations, charitable organizations, and leisure time groups. Many of these associations were very strong in the countryside, dispensing credit and insurance for farmers and also mobilizing them for political purposes. Most French Catholic organizations were founded during this period: Confédération Francaise des Travailleurs Chrétienne (CFTC, 1919), Fédération National Catholique (FNC in 1924), Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne (JOC, 1927), Jeunesse Agricole Chrétienne (JAC, 1929), Jeunesse Étudiante Chrétienne (JEC, 1929), Ligue Ouvrière Chrétienne (LOC), Mouvement Familial Rural (MFR), and the conservative Federation Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles, (FNSEA). Also, a Catholic political party was founded, the Parti Démocratie Populaire (PDP) in 1924. Still, Catholic associational life remained weakly organized in general, especially in comparison to Italy. At most only supported occasionally politicians in some parishes and never reached a mass organization. Only in 1931, Action Catholique was established as a national organization.\footnote{793} Moreover, the PDP never won more than 3 % of the vote in the general elections that it participated in the interwar period (1928, 1932 and 1936).\footnote{794}

Contrary to France, Italy had a well developed Catholic associational life that was consolidated after World War I. Catholic unions and agrarian Catholic leagues

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\item \footnote{Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1997, pp. 185-200.}
\item \footnote{Farneti, 1978, pp. 7-18; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1997, p. 151.}
\item \footnote{Warner, 2000, pp. 58-64.}
\item \footnote{Manow and Palier, 2007, p. 159; Warner, 2000, pp. 153-159.}
\end{itemize}
expanded enormously, especially in the regions of Lombardy, Piedmont, and Veneto.\textsuperscript{795} The lay association \textit{Azione Cattolica Italiana} was also used in this period by the church to mobilize and influence voters through the spread of civic committees in the country.\textsuperscript{796} A Catholic political party was formed in January 1919, the \textit{Partito Popolare}, winning 20.5\% of the vote in that year’s election and becoming the centre of a mass Christian Democratic movement.\textsuperscript{797}

Although the freedom of association was finally established in France in this period, associational life remained weak. A case study of the village of Wissous by Robert and Barbara Gallatin Anderson shows that in the 1920s there were about forty associations, but with very few members and very dependent of traditional institutions like the family and the church. Associations did not develop mass membership levels, and they did not engage in inter-organizational cooperation in order to form peak associations. Instead, they remained particularistic and linked to narrow special interests.\textsuperscript{798} This was in part the reason why the French did not develop welfare and corporatist partnerships between the state and the associational milieu. In the 1930s, there were in fact plans for a national and compulsory system of health, disability, and pension insurance that would cover all workers in industry and commerce. About seven hundred and seventy four funds (\textit{casses}) of health, maternity, and death insurance were created and eighty for disability and old age in every region of the country, thus covering ten million workers (60\% of the industrial force). Moreover, the \textit{Casses} were supposed to be managed by workers’ and employers’ representatives. Still, this system was always heavily controlled and implemented directly by the state alone, and it excluded agricultural workers putting them in a different regime (\textit{régime agricole}).\textsuperscript{799} In general, the system’s administration was highly fragmented.\textsuperscript{800}

With the Popular Front government of the socialist Leon Blum (1935-1937), there was a serious attempt to incorporate workers through collective bargaining, Keynesian policies, and welfare state insurance. This coalition was similar to the progressive coalitions that developed in the same period in Scandinavia. It was also based on an alliance of unions, segments of the farmers, and the liberal middle classes. But it failed after 1936. For one, the labor movement was dominated by radical

\textsuperscript{795} Grew, 1978, pp. 289, 293.
\textsuperscript{796} Warner, 2000, pp. 147-150.
\textsuperscript{797} Kalyvas, 1996, pp. 217-221; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1997, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{798} Smith and Freedman, 1972, p. 41
\textsuperscript{799} Swaan, 1988, pp. 198-200.
\textsuperscript{800} Manow and Palier, 2007, pp. 156-157.
syndicalism, represented by the CGT, who only very tenuously supported the government. They disagreed on the issue of private property and over labor co-determination in the workplace. Second, important segments of business showed a very low willingness to deal with unions. These sectors would prove dominant in 1940 because of a third factor, the German invasion and occupation of France. In 1940, business and conservative politicians took advantage of this opportunity and allied with the Germans and imposed a kind of Fascist corporatism, crushing autonomous associations and labour by force. In the new state-corporatist authoritarianism of Vichy, voluntary associational life was repressed.

In post-World War I Italy, there was a dense associational life, namely in the northern and center regions. Mass mobilization was very strong, particularly during the years 1919-1921 which saw workers’ mobilization and rural rebellion. There was the consolidation of two mass movements of party and voluntary associations, the socialists and the communist parties, and the Catholics, around the Popular Party (and after the war the Christian Democrats). These were based on extensive party-associational subcultures of socialists (the PSI) and social Catholic voluntary associations (the Partito Popolare) with trade unions, mutual aid societies, women’s and youth organizations, leisure, that were much stronger than in France. Finally there were also the mobilization efforts by fascist organizations that were able to build militias of ex-soldiers who engaged in violent clashes with the left. Fascists competed with socialists and Catholic unions for the support of modest farmers, laborers, tenants, and small property owners, and they actually ousted these rivals. Fascists enjoyed the support of landowners and bourgeoisie, and they were able to dispense work to farmers, laborers, and tenants. In 1920, the Nitti government used fascist militias to repress workers’ demonstrations. Right-wing associations had been formed before the war, but they were relatively insignificant. Only after 1919 with the support given by the government and the elites in agriculture and in industry, they became strong and able to recruit the middle classes. In 1922 they took over the regime.

The fascist period lasted from 1922 until 1945. It rested on a coalition of rightist parties in the center and on the right that was united under a charismatic leader,

803 Tarrow, 1996.
Mussolini. It was the end of autonomous associational life. Associational life was channelled through state monopolistic organizations designed for class cooperation. The 1927 Charter of Labor stated the principles of associational life organization. All workers and professionals had to organize into unions and professional organizations legally recognized by the state. Still, the political identities of reds and Catholics were strongly restored after 1945.

After the Second World War in the new French democracy, associations continued to have a small role in social and political life. Most associations were small in size, dedicated mostly to local, leisure time activities, and mainly the offspring of informal networks of sociability like neighbourhoods and families.

In the Fourth Republic, there was a division between communists and socialists in the labor movement. Communists were then able to use the 1945 post-liberation purges to control the opposition in the unions and in the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT), to pursue extensive nationalization of the properties of collaborators, and to extend state control to key sectors of the economy (gas, mines, and electricity). Because unions had low access to the state and low membership levels, they tended to assert their power more through industrial conflict (in the street or in the workplace), since negotiation and partnership ventures were rare.

In contemporary France, new social movement associations tended to be also scattered and weak. Less than one percent of adult women belonged to women’s movements. The environmental movement was stronger, organized in a national federation with 850,000 members, and in the 1990s it evolved into two parties, the Les Verts and the Génération Ecologie. Still, these movement-party organizations were weak, they suffered from high fluctuations in membership, and have copied the traditional political party model of organization and less the mass membership organization. As a consequence unconventional protests by new social movement organizations have been rare in France, and protest by old social movements stronger. Between 1975 and 1989, only 36.1% of the protest events were organized by the ecology, peace, nuclear energy, antiracism, squatters, women’s’ and homosexual social movements, whereas in other countries these organized a much higher proportion of

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807 Crouch, 1993, pp. 136-140.
809 Shefter, 1994b, p. 53
protest actions. In Germany they were responsible for 73% and in the Netherlands for 65% of such events.813

In postwar Italy, unions were stronger than in France. Membership density in 1950-1952 was 45% of the active labor force and 39.6% in 1989.814 Also Catholic associational life continued its stronger levels inherited from the interwar period, which seems not to have been eliminated by the fascists. Catholic Action played an important role in society. It was a hierarchical organization, with three million members in the 1950s, and able to be present in almost every parish of the country. Catholic unions were also important, first the ACLI (Association of Catholic Workers), and later the CISL.815 After the war the main Christian-democratic groups became the ACLI, rivalling both the socialist and communist unions and able to dispense welfare functions to its members and thereby recruiting about one million members. It had close ties with Catholic Action also, especially for political mobilization purposes, since both organizations had close links with the confessional party successor of the Partito Popolare, the Democrazia Cristiana (DC). Twelve members of the 144 that composed the National Council of the DC came from ACLI, and when CISL, the Catholic union confederation was formed, the ACLI continued to exist as a Catholic social movement aimed at the Catholicization of workers and farmers and their political mobilization.816

The differing relationships with the state explain much of these different patterns between France and Italy. In France there was a higher predominance of the state over associations in policy formation and implementation. Collective bargaining between the state and organized interests was rare, and economic and welfare policies emanated directly from and were imposed by the state. For much of this period, labor was excluded from wage and macroeconomic policies at least until 1968.817 When it happened that state rulers decided to make partnerships with associations, the process has been historically one of selectively picking one or a small set of associations at the expense of other associations, which are left out and usually complain about and criticize the whole process. As Keeler argues for the case of unions, «the official union is more equal than the others». The state gives it «exclusive access to formal councils, privileged informal access to state officials, devolved authority for the administration of

813 Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, Giugni, 1995, p. 34.
814 Schmitter, 1995, p. 293.
important aspects of public policy, favourable reforms of regulations affecting the sector, and substantial monetary subsidies».818

An example during the Fifth Republic was the place given to the main agricultural union, the FNSEA (Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles). Government agricultural policies recognized the need for the cooperation of farmers for the implementation of policies in the early 1960s. The budget of the Ministry of Agriculture grew 900% between 1960 and 1976, and the FNSEA provided the state with a reliable partner. It served as a bargaining actor and a partner in the implementation of policies. Still, this partnership was only able to serve between fifteen to twenty percent of all farms, and many regions were outside any agreement. This led to reactions by those outside the association or in rival associations. A survey of farmers’ class concluded that fifty five percent thought that the FNSEA was too dependent upon the government. The rival union, the Communist MODEF (Mouvement de Défence des Exploitants Familiaux), channelled this discontent through demonstrations.819 This pattern of state-association relationships just identified for agriculture was somehow typical of France since the late nineteenth century. Workers, the management, and the state have always been unable to start negotiations, and bargaining tends to occur only at peak level and after mass mobilization and strikes.820 As Val Lorwin put it for the French labor movements, it was characterized by a combination of «low immediate hopes and utopian dreams».821

Corporatist and welfare policies in Italy have been more inclusive of organized interests, developing into partnerships between the state and the society. In the 1970s, the unions were able to create fixed roots in the workplace, and together with management they had a decisive say in work hours, work rhythms, internal mobility of labour, and salaries.822 In terms of welfare policies, most old-age and disability pensions, family subsidies, children funds, and some unemployment benefits which were channeled by the national social security administration (INPS) were the result of a permanent tripartite consultation process with unions, religious associations, employers, and the state.823 Moreover, the Catholic associational networks had a decisive role in welfare provision and education policies. During the fascist regime,

821 Malefakis, 1995, p. 43; see also Tarrow, 1996, p. 394; Tarrow, 1995, p. 228; Nord, 2000, p. xviii
Catholic associations and charities were responsible for the social welfare and education programs. For example, the 1929 Concordat with the Catholic Church required religious instruction in public elementary and secondary schools. These functions continued until at least the 1960s.824

The other part of the story related to these different patterns is the relationship between parties and associations. In France, especially during the Fifth Republic, their links were weak. With the creation of a semi-presidential system after 1958, the executive was less dependent on party politics. Ruling was more in the hands of the president himself and the state bureaucracy.825 Parties never developed into the mass pattern typical of the countries analyzed in the previous chapters. In France, party membership levels have been in decline, and the parliament is seen by the public as corrupt and inefficient.826 For instance, the French Christian-democratic party after 1945, the MRP, soon collapsed with the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic. The main party of the right became a cadre party dependent of the president De Gaulle that tried to attract also the Catholic vote, but that did not organize for mass mobilization on Catholic grounds or on any other, and that even opposed many principles of Christian democracy, like the notion of subsidiarity, and preferred a more a technocratic and top-down statist orientation of public policy.827 As a consequence, the Catholic unions, farmers’ associations, youth organizations, and several Catholic groups lacked a party they could address to and establish links to form a national level political movement.828

Contrary to France, there were strong links between parties and associations in Italy that continued the pattern of associational-party red/white subcultures developed in the interwar years. In the 1960s, wrote Joseph LaPalombara, «the conflict between organized Catholicism, on the one hand, and the anticlerical and laical groups, on the other, permeates all aspects of society».829 In issues that divide the distribution of goods in society, like in the spheres of education, civil rights, the arts, agriculture and industry, «each individual group tends to be identified with only one party, either as a structure conditioning what the party does or as mere instrumentality and extension of the party

824 Morgan, 2007, p. 72.
827 Morgan, 2007, p. 69.
828 Manow and Palier, 2007, pp. 149-150.
829 LaPalombara, 1964, p. 45.
As a consequence, voting tended to be determined by the specific associational-party subculture (White/Catholic, strong in the regions of the northeast and eastern Lombardia or Communist/Red, in the center) to which one belonged.\textsuperscript{831}

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) considered itself a party of movement as well as a party of government. Both socialists (PSI) and the PCI had strong links to the Italian General Confederation of Labour, CGIL.\textsuperscript{832} Data of the 1960 PCI congress shows that among delegates there were fourteen national CGIL leaders, 125 provincial leaders, and 59 local union leaders. In the 1960s in the PSI, eight of the ten members of executive committee were CGIL leaders.\textsuperscript{833} Alongside the workers’ movement, Communists provided an institutional framework where new social movements could grow. In the wave of social mobilization of the 1960s, the Communists were able to attract important segments of the urban, feminist, and ecology movements.\textsuperscript{834} The Christian Democratic Party was allied with the Catholic trade union movement in the north, the Italian Confederation of Workers’ Union, becoming a mass party, and that was also connected to the employers association, the Cofindustria. It used the Catholic Action as well as religious associations and the church network as grass roots organizations for its political campaigns.\textsuperscript{835}

A combination of three factors has produced these patterns of associational life in France and Italy. In comparative terms, the two countries belong to the under-mobilized and weakly developed pattern of associational life. Still, there are also differences between France’s and Italy’s associational lives that require an explanation, specifically the denser and more coordinated associational life in Italy. Next, I offer an explanation for both sets of question.

9.2. Common Patterns of State Building: Clientelism and Religious Conflict

In both Italy and France, the state has been characterized by a weak capacity. In both countries’ southern regions, the legacy of the absolutist monarchy was one of a semi-clientelistic state. The tradition of the old regime tax farmers continued in the nineteenth century through widespread corruption (although on a lesser scale in Iberia)
and the use of state resources by government electoral candidates. During the process of Italian unification, the absorption of the bureaucracy of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was achieved by maintaining its patrimonial traits. Since it did not have a strong bureaucracy capable of dominating the other states, the northern regime of Piedmont that unified Italy, had to rely on the old bureaucracies which meant that the consolidation of the new state after unification was achieved through the expansion of clientelistic networks. Moreover, they were reinforced, since the stabilization of the regime required pacts between the northern and southern elites. The south had resisted northern plans of taxation and army conscription through guerrillas and frequent rural insurrections, which tended to be brutally repressed. But after the new regime became an accomplished fact, the northern and southern elites found a new *modus vivendi* through the share of the spoils of the state.

In France, an additional factor was the military’s involvement in politics that affected state capacity. This was especially acute in the Third Republic, which always faced the opposition of the Right and the Catholics, who had links to sectors of the military who thought of bringing down the regime and replacing it with a monarchy.

Also, in both countries there was a deep state-church conflict since early on. In Italy, the first anti-clerical laws had been passed in the kingdom of Piedmont. A 1848 law replaced the church as the sole source of education, and in 1851 the religious jurisdiction of church courts in civil affairs was eliminated. After the unification in 1861, the Vatican lost all of its territories except for the domain within the city of Rome. Other church property like convents and monasteries were taken by the state, religious bodies were suppressed, and civil marriage was instituted in the 1870s.

In France, the state-church conflict had also been a constant of political life even before the revolution of 1789. Thoughout the nineteenth century there were continuous attacks on the church, especially over the issues of its property and its role in education. Church schools were disbanded by force and replaced by a statist laic and republican system, the 1833 Loi Guizot that established universal elementary education. During the Third Republic, the *Loi 1905* finally eliminated the church

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838 Huard, 2000, p. 150.
841 Swaan, 1988, pp. 93-95.
from any direct intervention in social welfare and replaced it with full state responsibility for these tasks. It was the Ministry of Interior that became responsible for public poor relief and health services. Local church charities were expropriated by the state and given to the municipalities.842

The Church in France, deprived of resources and persecuted by the republican authorities, sided with anti-regime forces during the Third Republic. It supported military attempts to the regime, the so-called Boulanger affair in 1887 and the Dreyfus affair in 1894, when a Jewish officer was falsely accused by anti-republican military for being a German spy. Although these attempts to bring down republicanism always failed (contrary to the Iberian cases, which I analyze in the next part), the republicans were counter-attacked by state repression. In the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair, the state dissolved more than one hundred religious congregations, enacted a law separating the state and the church in 1905 and removed the clergy from state payroll. These conflicts between Catholics and republicans would last at least until the 1950s, with the church support even of the German backed authoritarian Vichy regime in 1941.843

Because of deep rooted clientelism and state-church conflicts, this pattern of low state capacity affected associational life in Italy and France, and it is the main factor responsible for these countries having lower density and coordination levels in their respective associational landscapes. State-church differentiation and overt conflict made difficult the institutionalization and incorporation of pressures from below, and they favored instead the localism of associations, since it was more difficult for associations to form national coalitions. The state and the church relations inhibited a complete control of the territory and led to a deep separation of rural and urban societies. The church was closer to local society, but at the same its resources were not put on the service of the state for the delivery of social policies, like in many countries where there was a fusion or a partnership between the state and the church (e.g. England), or where the Catholic Church was integrated in the political process through politico-parliamentary mass parties (e.g. Belgium). As a consequence, associational life was more local. For instance, when Catholic Action was created in France in 1931, it was set in a way by bishops that diocesan groups would be favored, thus keeping it more as a network of local associations, not as a mass national movement.844. Initially, this

844 Warner, 2000, pp. 58-64.
promoted localism in Italy. Although the Church forbade Catholics to participate in national politics, it promoted organization-building in local politics and the formation of alliances with conservative liberals.\footnote{Lyttelton, 2000, pp. 71-73.}

Also, this pattern of state building made the formation of cross-class alliances even more difficult. This was especially true of France during the Third Republic, where the regime issue divided the Catholic population between those who wanted to mobilize as such and accepted the democratic-republican regime (social Catholics like Albert de Mun), and those that were monarchists and relied on a military coup to return to the old monarchic order (the royalist Catholics). The impulse for association building by Mun through the circles of Catholic workers and his party, the \textit{Action Libérale Populaire}, created in 1901, were never very successful, because of these divisions between Catholics.\footnote{Huard, 2000, pp. 148-149.}

Although sharing similarities in the nature of state capacity, Italy did develop a stronger associational life. The reasons for this will be analyzed in the next section, and I argue that they are related to the two other variables I have singled out in my model: the degree of corporate representation inherited from the past and the degree of parliamentarism.

9.3. Variations in Corporate Legacies

Very early in France, there was an elimination of corporate forms of organization. In the eighteenth century traditional forms of associational life like religious confraternities, congregations, and trades corporations were crushed by the \textit{ancien régime} state builders. The absolute monarchs from Louis XVI to Louis XVI expropriated corporate and religious bodies through the nationalization of their property.\footnote{Anderson and Anderson, 1967, p. 179; Polanyi, 1957, p. 66; Tilly, 2004, pp. 126-127.} This process was carried further by the post-revolutionary governments. The \textit{Code Napoléon} reinforced state guidance and supremacy over associations, and the liberal governments continued this process. After the revolution, the estate system ended abruptly, corporations, guilds and feudal privileges like restrictions on the admission to crafts, self-regulation of wages and work hours were abolished in 1791.\footnote{Hamerow, 1972, p. 22; Polanyi, 1957, p. 70.} The \textit{Chapelier} Law in 1791 prohibited journeymen to form brotherhoods, and mutual
funds and all workers associations were banned. In the countryside, the revolution transformed property relations into a very individualistic pattern. Agricultural relationships were simplified into rental contracts, and big portions of the land belonging to the church and the aristocracy were taken by the state, divided, and sold.

In the Italian states during and immediately after the Napoleonic invasions, guilds and premodern corporations were partially destroyed. But this process was less full blown than in France. There was a higher vibrancy and survival of corporate forms and brotherhoods, especially in many regions of the center and north of Italy. First, there were much higher traditions of urban self-rule in Italy that had already been eliminated in France. Guilds were abolished only in 1864 in Italy. Although by the seventeenth century the cities of northern and central Italy were not the republican polities of the middle ages, organizational remnants of these traditions still existed, especially very strong bodies of artisans that were autonomous from political power. These associations, as Putnam argues, were based on

«pre-existing traditions of collaboration and sociability. Often an ancient guild found reincarnation in a pious society in the eighteenth century, which in turn evolved into a mutual aid society, which encouraged cooperatives, which subsequently formed the basis for labor unions and mass-based political parties». 

Lyttelton has the same opinion. In Piedmont, there was also continuity between the workers’ associations of the 1860s and old traditions of corporations and even of religious brotherhoods. In the north, the state and organized capitalists were trying together to induce industrialization.

This made the nineteenth century Italy a fertile soil for the development of associations. As Neufeld argues, «the variety of cooperatives in Italy made that country unique in the world of cooperation». As documented by Putnam, after 1848 there was an exceptional growth of associations in Italy: self-help societies and mutualities

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849 Sewell, pp. 88-89.
850 Sewell, pp. 138-139.
851 Banti, 2000, p. 45-46.
853 Crouch, 1989, p. 192
855 Lyttelton, 2000, p. 69.
856 Crouch, 1989, p. 192.
(illness, accident, and old age), popular drinking clubs, choral societies, charitable and educational societies, and cooperatives of producers and consumers in agriculture (e.g. rural banks) and in industry (labor cooperatives and credit). Membership in these organizations grew fourfold after 1870. Moreover, at the end of the century, these organizations were gradually mobilized by Republicans, Socialists and Catholics. They were brought together, and they were the basis of the emerging trade union movement. It was in the regions where associational life was stronger and where Socialist and Christian-democratic movements became also stronger. In 1883-84 the *Opera Dei Congressi* had 993 parish committees in the north, 263 in central Italy, and only 57 in the south.

Moreover and contrary to France, because Italy was a late state builder, the church’s corporate identity was well preserved. The Italian church had been historically an autonomous state. Although initially the Pope Pious IX did not recognize the new Italian state, the new kingdom of Italy recognized the pope as the spiritual leader of Catholicism and also as a leader of an independent state. Because of this autonomy, the Italian church by the time of the peninsula’s unification had higher resources with which to promote collective action through association building, much as it happened in Germany or in Belgium. The Vatican functioned almost as a corporate entity and as such had a capacity to promote mobilization as the new state was created, and when the pope gave permission for participation in the regime’s political life, Catholic parties and associations were able to mobilize many people. This led to the building of the dense network of associations analyzed in the previous sections of this chapter and to institutional incorporation by the state. As Crouch argues, by the late 1890s there was a reconciliation between the Italian state and the Vatican. For instance, in 1929 Mussolini signed a concordat with the church that recognized the autonomy of the Vatican and gave the church a main role in education in public schools.

In France, the capacity for collective action by both farmers and workers was strongly affected by the abolition of corporate bodies, since it made them economically dependent, institutionally unprotected, and politically repressed. Urban and rural lower

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858 Putnam, 1993, pp. 135-144.  
859 Putnam, 1993, pp. 141-142.  
860 Lipset and Rokkan, 1985, pp. 221-222, 226.  
861 Banti, 2000, p. 50.  
862 Crouch, 1989, p. 192.  
classes had low resources for collective action, and this affected their possibilities for building interest associations. Compared to Germany or Scandinavia, France’s peasantry was economically weak and did not have any political institutions on which to base its claims for collective action. Also the labor movement was weak, when compared to countries like Germany or even England. In the late nineteenth century, unions were weakly institutionalized, and being a member of a syndicate did not mean being an active member, to comply with a coherent ideology, or to even pay dues but just the acceptance of a certain solidarity in the name of workers. Moreover, it divided the labor movement into small and separate ideological groups, almost sects. The fact that social movements on the left were divided organizationally and ideologically, paradoxically made the left as a whole rather weak. This pattern continued until the twentieth century with the split between Communists and Socialists, and made the institutional integration by the state more difficult.

9.4. A Higher Parliamentarization in Italy

The two regimes differed in their levels of parliamentarization. Compared to Italy, the role of parliament in the several French regimes since the eighteenth to the twentieth century has been exceptionally low. During the absolute monarchy regional parliaments were weak from a comparative perspective. Between the early 1700s and 1789 they were only called once, in fact by Louis XVI on the eve of the revolution. The French revolution had the consequence of making the power of the executive and the state apparatus very strong to the detriment of the parliaments. The political system of Napoleon and the Bourbon restoration after 1815 were obvious non-parliamentary bureaucratic dictatorships. These regimes were characterized by a frequent use of the police for political purposes. After the revolution, the monarchy’s rural police was transformed into the republican Gendarmerie in 1791 but it even strengthened its repressive functions as during the monarchy. The police was a semi-militarized body, and it was supported by the army for the repression of public contestation. It was directly responsible to the king and not to the parliament.

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867 Huard, 2000, pp. 135-154.
Since they were strongly repressed, the French would use informal settings for the expression of protest and political networking. Funerary events, coffee houses, the theater, and churches became the main settings for dissent.\textsuperscript{869} Second, associations would gradually develop an anti-state attitude and organize around associations that conspired to bring down the existing regimes. Unity was only found in «resistance practices».\textsuperscript{870} When for some reason repression by the authorities was lifted (e.g. during the Franco-Prussian war of 1871) and the state faced breakdown, revolts would spread through the territory. Collective action tended to evolve in advances and retreats.\textsuperscript{871} Political participation acquired the form of revolutionary shocks, like in the 1830s, in 1848, and during the 1875-76 crises.\textsuperscript{872}

The second institution for societal control that was used by the central government in France since 1789 were the prefects. The prefects were a kind of commissars of the central government in the provinces. They imposed a common administrative rule over the whole territory, and maintained a tight control over village and city life. These agents had usually more power than local elected bodies. They could suspend an elected council and a mayor for a month as well as approve the appointment of the mayor and of municipal officers and the police. They interfered in local affairs frequently. A minister acted as an absolute ruler over his ministry and used the prefectorial system to his advantage in politics. This pattern functioned at least until 1918.\textsuperscript{873} For instance, in 1910 the new law of associations maintained that associations needed to register at the \textit{prefecture} in order to have legal status, recruit members, employ staff, rent buildings, and sign contracts.\textsuperscript{874} Moreover, governments used the prefectorial system to staff the state apparatus with their supporters and then use them as agents to mobilize voters (in particular state employees). This practice was widespread until at least the 1960s.\textsuperscript{875} In contrast, although in Italy the use of the prefects was common, it was less developed through the territory and concentrated mainly in the south.

The Third Republic (1877-1940) was the first parliamentary democratic experience in France. After the defeat of France in the war with Prussia in 1871 and a

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{869} Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1997, pp. 56-62. \\
\textsuperscript{870} Cottereau, 1986, p. 145. \\
\textsuperscript{871} Huard, 2000, pp. 135-154. \\
\textsuperscript{872} Bien and Grew, 1978, pp. 253-254. \\
\textsuperscript{873} Anderson and Anderson, 1967, p. 106. \\
\textsuperscript{874} Worms, 2002, p. 142. \\
\textsuperscript{875} Rueschemeyer, Stephens, Stephens, 1992, p. 87.
\end{flushleft}
period of intense republican popular mobilization, universal suffrage was re instituted in 1877 (France had adopted universal, equal male suffrage in 1848). The new regime was formally democratic, but it was a democracy where the parliament did not count for much. The political class depended on local voters mobilized by regionally based notables established in prefectorial system. The new republican political class used the resources of the state and its agencies (the Ministies of Interior, of Education, of Ponts et Chaussées) to employ their political friends, thus excluding full parliamentary politicians of influence. Moreover, the president could dissolve the parliament (although only with the consent of the senate).

This had consequences for association building. What counted for associations was establishing links within powerful ministries and bureaucracies, and to become part of their clientelistic networks. Since the more important elites were in the state apparatus and the prefectorial system, voluntary associations did not develop as much as they could have. Associations became more dependent of personal favors, preferences of state bureaucrats or powerful politicians, and as such they developed less of a mass character. What counted for their institutionalization was less to mobilize the citizenry through petitions presented to the parliament, for instance, and more the informal links with state bureaucrats, prefects, and powerful ministers.

In Italy there was a much higher level of parliamentarization. Mass liberalism as an ideology and as a political movement was more accepted in Italy. After 1848, the Kingdom of Sardinia, which included the regions of Piedmont, Liguria, Sardinia and Savoy, under the rulership of King Victor Emanuele II, was a fully liberal, constitutional and parliamentary regime that recognized in its founding constitution the right of association. The Kingdom’s constitution became the ideal polity for all Italian liberals. This state gradually spread its institutional form as it conquered other Italian states and fomented liberal revolts all throughout the Italian peninsula. In 1859 Lombardy was taken from Austria, and later the Papal States, Emilia and Romagna, the duchies of Parma and Tuscany and Sicily.

After the unification of the Italian states many radical-democrats did not see the regime as legitimate. In fact, in 1861 the radical-republican opposition was declared illegal. Still, since parliament was strong, after 1861 segments of the democratic-

876 Shefter, 1994b, p. 57
879 Banti, 2000, fn. 9, pp. 47-48, 56.
republican camp split and accepted the regime, forming the constitutional left, which later would evolve to mass socialism. There were antecedents to this in the Kingdom of Piedmont. An alliance between the monarchy and the left Liberals had been established in the 1850s under Cavour. The king needed the Liberals in order to expand his territorial domains, and the Liberals needed the crown to achieve national unity. This alliance that was made possible under a strong parliamentary competition did not give any room for the extreme Republicans on the left (Mazzini) to grow, as well as clerical reactionaries, groups that became much more important in politics in France and especially in Iberia. 880 In sum, as Lyttelton argues, with the unification the «parliamentary regime made possible the successful negotiation de facto of areas of liberty in which associations could function freely». Although sometimes associations were suspended by the prefects, at the same time «the authorities were anxious not to alienate the support of parliamentary deputies, who could protest on behalf of their constituents». 881

In Italy, a higher degree of parliamentarism made possible liberal elite-mass links to a higher degree than in France. The moderate liberal elites everywhere in Italy in the first years after unification helped to promote workers’ associations through links with their own elite clubs and workers’ brotherhoods. Many of these workers associations would thus support the monarchy. 882 Although Italy became (in many respects unfairly) known as a place of electoral corruption, in fact its system was much more competitive than for instance in Spain, where corruption was much more widespread. In Italy, in order to conquer power politicians had to mobilize voters and create majorities in the legislature. By contrast, in Spain, Portugal, and even in the French Third Republic massive electoral fraud was more common. 883 This factor explains why the development of Italian associational life was much higher than in France during the interwar years, as argued at the beginning of this chapter.

This pattern continued after 1945 when both countries made the transition to democracy. In the case of Catholic associational life the Confédération Francaise des Travailleurs chrétienne, second in membership in the French unions, which would have been the MRP’s natural support group, made it clear already in 1946 that it wanted to remain fully separate from the MRP. It even declared that holding a position in the

881 Lyttelton, 2000, p. 68.
882 Lyttelton, 2000, p. 69.
883 Ortega, 1997, pp. 144-146.
MRP would be incompatible with holding a position in the union. The union also eliminated the reference to Christianity in its name and renamed itself into *Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail* (CFDT) in 1964. Also, the Catholic agrarian interest groups like the JAC and the Mouvement familial rural (MFR) did not tie themselves to the MRP in the post-war France but to the more personalistic Gaullist RPF or to other conservative parties. De Gaulle’s RPF included successfully the Catholic vote, but it inhibited Catholics to evolve as a mass movement, since Catholic candidates presented themselves to elections as independent candidates. This promoted associational localism and reinforced the power of local barons, who had the subsequent role in negotiating state subsidies to farmers of their electoral circle through the Mutuelle of the Sécurité Sociale agricole.  

In fact, the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic in 1958 reduced even more the power of parliament. The new semi-presidential political system created a very centralized executive around the power of de Gaulle in the presidency. De Gaulle’s system strengthened the notion of supra-party and supra-factional interest politics. Governments should pursue policies and make decisions that are remote from interest groups and party influences, as represented in institutions like the parliament or the free competition of associations in the public sphere. De Gaulle’s system gave also a stronger role in policy-making to the state bureaucracy, which unilaterally imposed and implemented social policies without any concertation with organized interests.

This had an impact on associational life by making it more local, less dense, and less coordinated. The groups that relied on party brokerage to advance their interests lost power to those groups that were more specialized and small scale. For instance in agriculture, mass peasant organizations like the FNSEA-Federation National des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles lost power to specialized and technical associations of producers that had links to elites in the state administration. Mass organizations in agriculture declined in membership. A second impact was the return of violent protest (e.g. by shopkeepers and artisans). Attacks on tax offices, kidnapping tax inspectors, and fights between the police and shopkeepers became more common.

Italy developed a more parliamentarized regime after 1945. The legislature was a strong institution in the sense that the government depended on it. It elected the

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President of the Republic and a third of the members of the Constitutional Court. Consequently, since they had higher access to parliament, interest groups focused their action there and developed partnerships with political parties.887

Many leaders of associations were members of parliament as well in the 1960s. The DC included leaders of Catholic associations such as Catholic Action, ACLI, CISL, and the Coltivatori Diretti. The Communist and Socialist parties included in their electoral lists representatives of unions (CGIL), women’s associations, and youth groups. The employers’ association, Confindustria, had some spokesmen in PLI and DC parliamentary groups.888 For instance in the 1953 general elections, the CISL was able to place twenty three deputies and one senator in the legislature, and in 1958 one hundred candidates of the DC were coming from CISL. Ten percent of DC’s deputies in 1964 were union, not party, members. The same happened in the left camp. The CGIL, the Communist-socialist union, placed about ten percent of the legislature deputies in 1953 (more than half being in the Communist group).889

Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s the Italian parliament had a system of standing and investigating committees that recognized that alongside bills introduced by the government and the parties, also interest associations (as well as the National Council of Economics and Labour) could initiate legislation. There was not even a limit on the number of private-member bills that could be introduced. This was called the procedure of sede deliberante, which gave associations some decisive influence over the shape of the laws.890

9.5. Conclusion

In disjointed associational life, the conditions for development of associational life were weak. The traditions of corporate representation were extinguished early, parliaments historically had very low powers, and the state had a very low capacity because of protracted territorial state-church conflicts, civil war leading to state collapse, and clientelism. Associational life became local and with weak links to political parties, thus facing high administrative barriers imposed by a distant and all-powerful state. Partnerships with the state for the dispensation of welfare benefits and

888 LaPalombara, 1964, pp. 222-223.
889 LaPalombara, 1964, pp. 227-228.
890 LaPalombara, 1964, p. 222.
corporatist coordination never became the norm of policy-making. The combination of these three variables inhibited the development of a dense and coordinated associational life.

Still, there are differences between these societies that are worth exploring. For now I will leave aside the cases of Portugal and Spain, which will be analyzed in the next part, and summarize here only the important differences between Italy and France. Generally speaking, Italy (especially in the center and the northern regions) has had historically a denser associational life than France. Again, the same set of factors I have pointed out earlier explain the variations between the types of associational life and also distinguish these two cases. When compared to France, Italy has had higher levels of parliamentarism, thus allowing for politics to become more competitive and for parties to create interlocking links with associations. Italy inherited a higher legacy of pre-modern associational life than France. Although corporate organizations were abolished earlier in many parts of Italy, in some regions, because of the fact they were peripheral regions which were not subject to extreme and harsh rule from state builders, it was easier to transform premodern guild associational life in modern voluntary associations. Also, part of the conditions for the promotion of a stronger civic life in Italy can be attributed to the Vatican state. In contrast to the French (or Spanish and Portuguese) churches, when it was incorporated in the new Italian nation in the late nineteenth century, there was a vast body of resources that could be used for collective action and for sponsoring Christian democracy.
Part III. Associational life in Iberia, 1800-1940s
Chapter 10: Antecedents: Associational life 1700s-1870s

10.1. The End of the Guilds and the First Modern Voluntary Association

In both Portugal and Spain, there was an early elimination of corporate religious and socioeconomic bodies. As in many Western European countries, associational life in the old regime was composed of corporations. Urban guilds of the masters and apprentices of the different economic trades with inherent immunities and privileges were common, and they fulfilled religious and welfare functions. The urban guilds of Lisbon, the artisanal oficios, were organized in a major federative structure called the Casa dos Vinte e Quatro (House of the Twenty-Four). It had a set of monopolies and the control of entrance into the professions. Originally a fourteenth century organization of craft and industrial interests, it formed the basis of a new public administration organization also at the local level. Gradually it acquired a strong role in the public and political life by regulating urban political and religious life and by providing health care, elderly care, funeral assistance, help to widows as well as religious services to its members and families.

There were also other corporate organizations for the protection of the needy and for the organization of the crafts. These were called confrarias (brotherhoods), corporações de mesteres (crafts corporations), mercearias, gafarias (church medical assistance units), hospitais de meninos (children’s hospitals), compromissos marítimos (maritime commitments), and confrarias dos mareantes (seamen brotherhoods). These organizations provided services to their members, like health insurance programs or direct assistance, mainly through the creation of hospitals, and sometimes they even provided charitable assistance to non-members. There were also the Misericórdias or Holy Houses of Mercy, charitable organizations of the church. The monarchy supported these institutions and conceded them privileges.

In Spain, there were important guild confederations. The Consulado de Mar, a guild that appeared in the thirteenth century in the eastern coast of Spain, promoted and protected the interests of Aragonese merchants. It set import tariffs, secured trade monopolies, had also functions of charity, and was a co-ruler in many of municipalities.

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891 Smith, 1940, p. 28
of Eastern Spain since the 1400s (in the regions of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia). In rural areas the main organization was the Mesta. The Honrado Concejo de la Mesta was a guild of Castilian wool producers founded in 1273 and that lasted until 1836. In the city of Salamanca, and in the regions of Alta Extremadura and La Mancha, the Mesta since the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century maintained a monopoly of sheep-breeding by an alliance with the crown, giving in return to the king high taxes from the selling of the wool. The Mesta set the prices of the wool products, tariffs over imports, and regulated cattle commercialization.

Since the eighteenth century these corporate bodies started to be attacked by rulers, and by the 1830s they had been eliminated in Iberia. Centralizing absolutist monarchs in the eighteenth century sought to strengthen executive power over society and to expand a common state jurisdiction over the territory that clashed with claims for corporate sectoral rule. States expanded also their fiscal capacities over the lands, properties, and economic activities of these groups and of the church. Lastly, projects of state-directed industrialization for the creation of internal free markets led to attacks on the corporations, which became negatively identified with the idea of “privileges”. The crown had now a more active role in shaping society, in particular for the promotion of capitalist accumulation and a commercial society, and it was understood by the elites of the time that the resources of the corporate goods should be put to a more efficient use. This implied the end of market privileges.

The Spanish absolute monarchy was one of the more powerful European states between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries. The permanent engagement in wars with France and Britain since the sixteenth century left the national treasury without resources. Hence, Spain engaged in a quest for resources in order to finance its war machine since the early 1700s. In 1722 internal barriers to commerce between Spanish regions were suppressed. The merchant guild Consulado Del Mar and the Mesta lost many of their privileges, and they were called to finance the war efforts. Free internal trade of grain affected especially the Mesta. The crown also looked for the

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894 Smith, 1940, pp. 3-4.
896 Klein, 1990, p. 52; Sevilla-Guzmán, 1979, pp. 52-53.
900 Payne, 1984, p. 72.
901 Smith, 1940, pp. 64-65.
expropriation and then the sale of communal and ecclesiastical lands. After 1759 with King Carlos III’s rise to power and his minister Campomanes, many of the *Mesta* lands, free pasture lands, were confiscated by the state in order to be sold. The post of *Entregador*, one of the main officers of the Mesta was eliminated in 1796, and its functions were given to local state officers (*alcaldes*). During Carlos V reign, Minister of State Godoy confiscated the *Gremios* property in 1789 in order to finance the public deficit, and in 1796 all corporate-guild price regulations ended in Spain.

By the mid-1700s, the policies of the Portuguese absolute monarchy, most represented by State Minister the Marquis of Pombal, pursued a similar line regarding organized interests. In 1761, the end of corporate regulations was decreed in the copper industry, and new licenses for industrial production were given to factories that were not subject to the corporate structure. It created an institution to regulate the new industrial factory system, the *Junta do Comércio* (1757), with representatives from the state and business, with the functions that once belonged to guilds, of establishing rules and programs for the factories, tax benefits and the attribution of privileges to companies.

The extension of state authority and extraction of resources to finance war extended also to the Catholic Church. Pedro Campomanes and Gaspar Jovellanos, bureaucrats of the Consejo de Castilla, defended the thesis that church land should be used for commercial purposes in order to improve production. Between 1798 and 1808 one sixth of church property was sold. Also in Portugal, a significant share of church property was confiscated and sold by Pombal. In both countries much of what was confiscated was property of charity institutions like hospitals, *misericordias*, orphanages, monasteries and convents, and brotherhoods.

This process of attacking corporate and religious bodies continued in the nineteenth century. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic invasions, the liberal systems continued this policy. The Napoleonic invasions of Iberia in 1808 terminated the absolutist regimes abruptly. After a bloody guerrilla war against France, and with the support of Britain, the defeat of Napoleon was followed by civil war between Liberals

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903 Klein, 1990 (1936), pp. 85, 139-142.
907 Serrão, 1993, pp. 84-87.
and supporters of old-regime absolutist politics (the Carlistas in Spain, the Miguelistas in Portugal). The restoration of absolutist regimes after the defeat of Napoleon was short lived (Fernando VII in Spain, D. Miguel in Portugal) and only to be followed by very unstable liberal regimes after the 1830s.

The new liberal forces proceed to destroy by force the power basis of the church and such ancient regime institutions like the remaining corporate bodies. In both countries, the periods of monarchical restoration after the defeat of Napoleon had persecuted and condemned to death many moderate liberals, all with the support of the Catholic Church. When moderate liberalism appeared again in the 1830s, the church and many noblemen sided with the militarist neo-absolutist attempts to bring these regimes down. As a reaction, the Liberals expropriated most of the church lands in the 1830s and 1840s. According to Payne, the Catholic Church, the «most important nongovernment institution in Spain was completely alienated from the liberal regime». 908

In Spain, the so-called desamortización in 1837 sold most Church lands. 909 Religious congregations were banned in Portugal in 1834, and a big part of the church property was expropriated and commercialized, a process know as desamortização. 910 Until the 1860s most of the properties of the church (convents, churches, parishes, brotherhoods, hospitals, asylums, and charity bodies) were sold. In the 1868 law, the only church property that could not be expropriated was the priest’s house! 911

The remnants of the guilds and corporations were all abolished also by the liberals. They were declared to be an obstacle to freedom of commerce. In Spain in 1812, the abolition of corporations was declared, and their properties were confiscated and sold by the state, 912 and in a decree on December 6, 1836 the Grémios lost their capacity to regulate professions and commerce. 913 In Portugal the compulsory end of the old corporate and gremial structure came in May 1834. 914

Although there was recognition of the right of petition, assembly and speech in the first phase of liberalism in Iberia, only elite and upper-middle class associations were allowed. The first type of these associations was a fusion between old aristocrats and

909 Pérez-Díaz, 1994b, p. 11.
910 Vargues and Ribeiro, 1993b, p. 224.
913 Alías, 2003, p. 22; Caracuel, 1975, pp. 21-22; Pérez-Diaz, 1994b, pp. 11.
914 Mendes, 1993, pp. 318-319; Oliveira, 1974, pp. 15-16; Serrão, 1993, pp. 94-96.
new liberals. These were places where the liberal proto-parties cultivated their links with provincial elites. In Spain the salons of Madrid become the main influential organizations for literary and political debates. The first, the Ateneo, was founded in 1835, but soon many emerged throughout the country.\textsuperscript{915} These societies of debate, or Academias continued espousing an ideology of state rationalization and free enterprise and commerce.\textsuperscript{916} In Portugal, elite cultural associations and salons of upper-middle class liberals initially appear in Lisbon and Oporto but soon spread to provincial capitals. They were of several types: musical societies (Academia Filarmónica 1838, Sociedade Filarmonica Portuguesa 1840), social clubs (Club Lisbonense in 1840 and in the 1850s the Assembleia Lusitana, Assembleia Lisbonense, and Sociedade da Península),\textsuperscript{917} and theater associations (Coimbra’s Academia Dramatica 1839, and Sociedade União and Sociedade Juventude Recreativa Dramatica created in Porto in 1846).\textsuperscript{918} Elite associational life included also business interests. Merchants and employers’ class associations were created in the 1830s. In 1834 the first associações de comércio (commercial associations) were founded in Lisbon and Oporto. Between 1835 and 1860 commercial and business associations emerge in many other cities (Figueira Foz, Setúbal, Ponta Delgada, and Funchal); in 1849 the Associação Industrial Portuense was founded, in 1860 the Associação Promotora da Industria Fabril, in Lisbon, and in 1860 the agricultural interests in the Real Associação Central da Agricultura Portuguesa-RACAP (the Royal Central Association of Portuguese Agriculture).\textsuperscript{919}

Inversely to middle class associational life, workers’ associations were not allowed by the liberal regimes. In Spain, the constitution of Cádiz (1812) and the penal code of 1822 prohibited trade union organization. The Chapelier Law in France was the main influence of Spanish legislation on associations. The Real Orden of February 28, 1839 restricted the formation of associations only to self-help societies and only under supervision of authorities. The penal code of 1848 submitted all associations to the need of state consent in order to become legal. Strikes were also forbidden under the pretext that they increased the cost of work. Finally, the royal order of August 25, 1853

\textsuperscript{915} Carr, 2005, pp. 205, 208-209.
\textsuperscript{916} Carr, 2005, pp. 81-82; Sevilla-Guzmán, 1979, pp. 60-62.
\textsuperscript{917} Cascão, 1993, p. 532.
\textsuperscript{918} Cascão, 1993, pp. 532-535.
\textsuperscript{919} Mendes, 1993, pp. 318-319.
prohibited associations to have political aims and the formation of national level associations.\textsuperscript{920}

Nevertheless, from the mid to the late nineteenth century workers’ organizations were founded, in spite of being illegal by the existing legislation. Although facing these prohibitions, the remnants of the guilds were used by workers to build their own new organizations for self-protection. In Iberia these have been called by diverse names, like \textit{Cofradías} in Spain and \textit{Sociedades de Socorros Mutuos, Mutualidades} in Portugal or \textit{Cooperativas} in both countries. As a Portuguese advocate and first analyst of associational life said in 1876, «the worker, by associating to worker, taking every week from its pay a small parcel, guarantees resources for his days of sickness».\textsuperscript{921}

These associations had several functions. Some aimed at the protection from risk of their members, providing monetary support for disability suffered at work, and to widows and orphans in the form of pensions. Others were educational societies for the intellectual and moral development of workers. Among these were the instruction societies and temperance association, aimed at fighting workers’ «passion for drinks».\textsuperscript{922} Finally, there were the more economically oriented associations, like cooperatives and workers’ credit associations (\textit{Montes da Piedade} in Portugal) that lent capital at low interest rates for agricultural or industrial ventures.\textsuperscript{923}

In Portugal, the first modern workers’ association was formed in 1839, the \textit{Sociedade dos Artistas Lisbonenses}, by Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira.\textsuperscript{924} In the 1840s in the neighborhood of Alcântara in Lisbon, workers would gather in these associations to party and organize religious ceremonies. Only in Alcântara there were five of these associations.\textsuperscript{925} In the 1840s and the early 1850s, many modern associations were founded by the direct action of Francisco Sousa Brandão, Vieira da Silva, and Lopes de Mendonça, who were professional printers. They were particularly active in one organization, the \textit{Associação Operária}, through which they attempted to organize mutualities, consumption and production cooperatives, libraries, a musical society, and a popular bank. Together they published the newspaper \textit{Eco dos Operários}. The Associação had the form and procedures of a modern voluntary association: every year the fifty members who would take their places in the general assembly were elected by

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{921} Goodolphim, 1974, p. 23.
\bibitem{922} Goodolphim, 1974, p. 27.
\bibitem{923} Goodolphim, 1974, pp. 23-36.
\bibitem{924} Mendes, 1993c, p. 496; Oliveira, 1974, pp. 15-16.
\bibitem{925} Cascão, 1993, pp. 522-525.
\end{thebibliography}
vote of all the associates. In 1852, the *Centro Promotor dos Melhoramentos das Classes Laboriosas* was created, which is considered to have started the modern workers’ movement.\(^{926}\) The *Centro Promotor* espoused the socialist ideals of equality and fraternity, and it affiliated itself in the tradition of the 1848 revolution. It was founded by the first socialist intellectuals (José Fontana, João Bonança, Antero de Quental, Azedo Gneco, and Teófilo Braga) but also included old republicans, radical liberals, and masons. It organized conferences, funded newspapers, and promoted the associational development of workers with the aim of an ideal of a community of small proprietors that were self-administered.\(^{927}\) Still, the accounts at this time say that most workers did not belong to any association; associational life seemed to be restricted to the more prosperous trades like the printers.\(^{928}\)

In 1870, the *Caixa Económica Operária* was founded, that became the more important cooperative of consumption and credit. Yet, in the whole country there were only a few dozen cooperatives.\(^{929}\) In 1871 the working class was organized in the *Associação Protectora do Trabalho Nacional* (which later became anarchist).\(^{930}\) In the early 1870s according to Goodolphim, there was an irregular growth of associations, and in general associations had difficulties in recruiting members. Sources of the time show that at this time in Lisbon the more successful associations were the 85 mutualities that provided disease support funds with about 30,000 members (discounting double memberships). Also the associations of public employees and of commerce employees were relatively strong. The remaining of the associational landscape had low funds, inability to recruit members, and unscrupulous leaders. Fraternities report a lack of funds for the growing need to distribute more benefits to a higher number of members and potential recipients, that the quotas on members were unable to sustain the expenses on burial funds, widow pensions, pharmacy, and medical services. Only a minority received such funds.\(^{931}\) At this time in the whole country, there were about three hundred associations with 70,000 members but with enormous regional variation: they were mainly concentrated in Lisbon and Porto.\(^{932}\)

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\(^{926}\) Mendes, 1993c, p. 496.

\(^{927}\) Mónica, 1985, p. 34.

\(^{928}\) Goodolphim, 1974, pp. 95-96.


\(^{931}\) In order to receive more welfare benefits many workers became members of a lot of associations at the same time. Goodolphim, 1974, p. 200.

\(^{932}\) Goodolphim, 1974, pp. 198-200, 203.
In Spain the first artisans’ associations were created in the Catalan cities. The first textile association appeared in 1835 with the creation of the *Asociación Mutua de Tejedores* by Juan Muns.933 Between the years 1835 and 1855 many other workers organizations emerged in the textile branch whose model of organization was gradually adopted by other professions. In 1854 a confederation of the different branches of the textile industry was created: the *Unión de Clases*. Between July 2 and 12, 1855 it organized a series of strikes demanding higher salaries, and it was able to mobilize fifty thousand workers and to send a petition to the parliament asking for freedom of association that was signed by about thirty thousand people. The strike was severely repressed by the government (Espartero) and the associations had to remain semi-clandestine. In this condition, they organized in 1865 a secret workers’ congress with representatives of forty workers’ organizations, including consumers’ and producers’ cooperatives.934

In the 1870s, Spain had the traits and the potential for the development of a modern associational life. According to Zorrilla, workers’ and lower class associational life spread all over Spain in the form of recreational, mutual-help, and instruction organizations. There were about 2,441 associations in the whole country: 1,568 were recreational societies (65%), 458 mutualities (18%), 305 cultural-instruction societies (12%), and 43 social welfare and beneficence associations, 30 industrial associations (proto-unions), fifteen political associations, fifteen professional and seven were religious associations.935

When comparing Portugal and Spain with this data, already in the 1870s Spain had a density of voluntary associations that was a slightly more than double of the Portuguese. In Portugal, the population in 1878 was 4,160,315 people,936 which gives about one association per 13,867 people. Spain, with a population of 16,622,000 in 1877,937 had one association per 6,808 people. Moreover, some regions had a decisive impact in the emergence of modern Spanish associational life. Especially in Catalonia, but also in the Basque country, it was easier to form modern associations with high coordination capacities, levels of membership, and capacities for collective action. In Catalonia there was a high associational movement of the lower classes both in rural

933 Amsden, 1974, pp. 5-8.
934 Amsden, 1974, pp. 6-8
937 Shubert, 1999, p. 41.
and urban areas that were organized within a federative network of mutual help societies, popular education associations, and cooperatives.\textsuperscript{938} This is explained by the fact that in Catalonia and in the Basque country there was a continuity of pre-modern representative corporate institutions.\textsuperscript{939}

The region of Catalonia had conditions more favourable to the formation of associations. Here the guild/corporate organizations of the old regime were able to transform themselves into modern associations more easily than in most other Spanish regions or in Portugal. The arrival of liberalism did not affect them much. The organizations in the \textit{Associación Mutua de Tejedores} of 1839 were corporative monopolies that had been reconverted in the nineteenth century into a modern association. They maintained the characteristics of the old guilds, like controlling the professional career by keeping the old divisions and career steps of apprenticeship, officer, and master, and they were able to establish price regulations, to avoid imports from other countries and to postpone for long mechanical innovations. Guilds existed at least until the 1860s, and this form of organization was extended to modern industry. Professions (oficios) became monopolistic groups with control over production and raw materials and with a mandatory membership for anyone who wanted to enter it. The guild structure was kept in Catalonia in the many oficios of the city that became work cooperatives. For instance, this was the organizational form of associations like the carpenters of ship-building, \textit{La Maestranza Naviera} founded in 1850, the printers in the \textit{Taller de Oficiales Impresores} founded in 1855, and many other professions. The Hat Makers association in 1860 grouped almost 50% of the class.\textsuperscript{940}

Also in Valencia the legacy of the Grémios was still alive, making it easier to use their resources and patrimony for the creation of artisan’s societies that become \textit{Asociaciones de Socorros Mútuos}. Finally, also in the Basque country there was continuity of the guilds. In the city of Santander the three \textit{Sociedades de Socorros Mútuos} of the mid-nineteenth century corresponded to the old Grémios. Outside these regions, the cities of Cartagena, Palma de Maiorca, and Zaragoza had also similar structures.\textsuperscript{941}

Moreover, the city and regional authorities maintained the integration of these corporate bodies in the local systems of rule. Some crafts (the building crafts, baking,

\textsuperscript{938} Gussinyer, 2003, pp. 108, 115-118.
\textsuperscript{939} Medrano, 1999, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{941} Castillo, 2003, p. 70.
brewing, tailoring, metal, and especially printing) were included in local bargaining structures together with the political authorities. In Barcelona they were in a factory inspection committee, and a bipartite conciliation system, the jurados mixtos, was set up for the textile industry in 1873. According to Amsden, the municipality even channelled credit to the Asociacion Mutua de Tejedores for the continuation and modernization of their activity and its transition to the modern factory system. Later, a consultative Comision Permanente de Gremios was created, renamed later the Junta de Clases, by the city authorities. Finally, most Gremios in the city of Barcelona had a governing role together with the church structure that existed in each parish as organs for the dispensation of charity and welfare.

In spite of the impact of Catalonia, Spain had a weak associational life by the late 1860s and the early 1870s when compared to the rest of Western Europe. There was a tendency for associations not to be political and to remain local. Especially in the countryside, the early abolition of the guilds and the sale of church property benefited only a small portion of the Spanish population, a new middle class of liberal politicians and state bureaucrats that bought the land at very low prices, a point which generated a strong concentration of land. The end of resources for collective action, in terms of land possession, communal privileges, corporatist and/or religious protections against labor market crisis, generated an extreme proletarianization of urban and rural workers. For instance, the 7,300 shelters, 2,200 hospitals, 106 orphanages, and 67 foster homes that the church had in Spain all disappeared with the desarmortización. Rampant unemployment, lack of secure income, seasonal jobs, and above all an extreme poverty became the common existence of a large rural proletariat (especially in the south) and also of many urban workers. This process was similar to the one James Mahoney identified for Central America in the same period, which he calls a radical liberal policy of agriculture modernization. He argues that a sudden, coercive, and highly encompassing land privatization promoted by the state leads to an extreme marginalization of the rural peasantry.

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942 Amsden, 1974, pp. 5-8.
944 Pérez-Díaz, 1994b, p. 11.
946 Payne, 1984, p. 118.
947 For Spain see Balbé, 1985, p. ii; Malefakis, 1970, pp. 135-137. For Portugal see Vaquinhas and Neto, 1993, pp. 334-337.
948 Mahoney, 2001, pp. 13-16.
This created, especially in the Iberian countryside, a population with very low capacity and few resources for collective action and organization-building, but at the same time totally alienated from the new liberal regime and engaging frequently, when external circumstances allowed it, in anti-system revolts.\textsuperscript{949} In the nineteenth century there was a growth of rural banditry (in Portugal \textit{banditismo}, in Spain \textit{bandolerismo}), land occupations (e.g. Spanish province of Malaga in the 1840s), and sudden explosions of revolt against the authorities (e.g. Castilla and Arágón provinces), involving frequently the burning of churches and the killing of animals and sometimes local politicians.\textsuperscript{950} In 1857, a group of peasants in the Seville region burned all state records of the selling of the communal lands; in 1861, Rafael Pérez del Álamo, a republican-socialist who became known as the Spanish Spartacus, lead ten thousand peasants in Andalucía and took the city of Loja and was heading to conquer Granada when he was stopped by the army. In general these social movements were short lived, lacked and did not leave any legacy of organization.\textsuperscript{951}

In the northern lands of Portugal and Spain this process generated reactionary and neo-absolutist rural movements opposing the simple existence of the liberal state: \textit{Carlismo} in Spain and \textit{Miguelismo} in Portugal. The process of land commercialization had expropriated medium and small peasants, making them an ally of the church and of traditionalist elites. In Spain, traditionalist peasants united under the banner of the brother of King Fernando VII, D. Carlos, who claimed the throne accusing his brother of being too liberal. After the death of D. Fernando in 1833, a war started between the supporters of D. Carlos and the descendents of Fernando VII that lasted intermittently until at least the 1880s. Especially in the regions of the Basque country, Catalonia and Navarra, \textit{Carlista} revolts spread to the extent that they were able to control portions of this territory.\textsuperscript{952} In Portugal, a similar process occurred with traditionalist peasants supporting the Causa de D. Miguel, the neo-absolutist reactionary brother of liberal-moderate King D. Pedro. Miguelista revolts in the Portuguese countryside, in particular in the north, continued until the 1850s.\textsuperscript{953}

If the rural classes were highly unorganized, preferring political action through sporadic protest and revolts, the urban working classes were not much better. The

\textsuperscript{949} Vaquinhas and Neto, 1993, p. 334
\textsuperscript{950} Malefakis, 2001, pp. 95-96.
\textsuperscript{951} Malefakis, 2001, p. 203.
\textsuperscript{952} Medrano, 1999, pp. 72-74.
\textsuperscript{953} Bonifácio, 2005.
existing traditions of associational life remained very localistic, encompassing peak associations were always difficult to sustain. Moreover, popular class associational life became anti-regime as well, first being the place for the consolidation of radical republicanism and later anarchism. This is related to the two other variables: weak parliamentarism and state with weak capacity.

10.2. Weak Parliaments

In Iberia, traditions of very weak parliamentarism did not encourage the national spread of associations, their incorporation with political parties, and the acceptance of the legitimacy of the liberal regime. Popular class interests faced many obstacles in being represented in parliaments since the early 1800s in Iberia. In fact, the Cádiz constitution of 1810-1813 introduced extreme parliamentarism in Spain. The king had limited powers, faced strong limitations to his suspensive veto and was checked by the elected Cortes.\footnote{Carr, 2005, pp. 103-106; Payne, 1984, pp. 73-74.} Also in Portugal the constitution of 1821 gave the parliament an important role. Ministers were responsible to parliament, and although the king had the capacity to nominate and dismiss secretaries of state, he had no legislative initiative or the power to dissolve the Cortes.\footnote{Portugal: Canotilho, 1993, pp. 150-153. Spain: Carr, 2005, pp. 139-140.} But these constitutions were short-lived and after intermittent periods of military fighting between Liberals and conservatives, and between the several factions of the liberals, the constitutions that became prevalent in the political system in the 1830s gave little power to the parliament.

In the 1830s, liberal-moderate constitutions aimed to institutionalize the liberal camp and to regulate a peaceful competition between the factions of liberalism, conservatives/moderates, and radicals. The moderate Spanish Estatuto Real of 1834 divided the Liberals into two camps, the Partido Progresista and the Partido Moderado. In Portugal, the 1826 Carta Constitucional was also a moderate document, opposing both liberal radicalism (vintismo) and traditionalism. Still, the several factions competed with each other through the force of arms, and not through parliamentary contradiction and mobilization of electoral bodies. This gradually made the contemporary kings and their rivals for the throne as heads of two military-political bodies, generating thus the dominance of the executive and individual ministries over
society at the expense of the parliament. The early 1810s and the 1830s witnessed fights between Liberals and absolutists that dominated the political scene. In the absolutist periods (D. João VI 1814-1821 in Portugal, and Fernando VII in Spain, 1814-20, 1823-1833) parliaments were abolished, royal authority became supreme, and rule by decree was the norm. The provinces were directly administered by governors (frequently a military) of royal nomination. It was also restored the inquisition.956

In the 1840s the conflicts were between moderate and radical liberals. In Spain, the government of General Espartero, with the support of the queen, the conservatives and liberal moderates in order to repress radicals instituted a form of state where parliament was pushed aside as a centre of power, centralizing power in the hands of government. The head of government ruled directly over the provinces through directly appointed mayors in the provincial cities and prefects over the regions. Since radicals were strong in many cities, municipal freedoms were crushed also.957 In Portugal in the late 1840s, there was a similar trend towards executive and administrative dominance. The Costa Cabral governments created a new administrative code that reinforced the centralism already present in the 1835 reforms of Mouzinho Silveira. In the 1830s Portuguese administration was established on the French model, with the division between provincias (ruled by prefeito), comarcas (subprefeito) and concelhos (provedor) similar to departments (préfet), districts (subpréfet) or arrondissements and communes (maire) in France. All these agents and the courts were nominated by the king.958 In the 1840s, these reforms were deepened, with the creation of seventeen administrative districts ruled by the new post of governadores civis (prefects), directly nominated by the king. Lower administrative territorial bodies, the concelhos and the parish were also coordinated by administrators chosen by the government.959

The center of power of Iberian politics was the executive and the administration, not the parliament. As a consequence, it was more difficult for the popular classes to make their claims directly to politicians, since the parliament did not count for much. Prefects were in fact more agents of social control and repression over societal interests from the center than real intermediaries and facilitators of the organization of interests. The real center of power was the Ministry of Interior and its agents, the prefects. They were the ones to assure public security in the provinces, superintended the police, dealt

958 Marques, 1993, pp. 171-172.
with associations, received organized movements of petitions, and became so powerful that they became gradually the real vote-gathers in the countryside, indispensable for the winning of elections.960

The repression of lower class discontent and the harassment of workers became common practice towards associations, and freedom of association was frequently suspended. The right of association was not easily granted by the liberal governments. Until the late 1860s, most workers’ associations had to remain clandestine in order to survive. Early associations in Portugal, like mutualities and brotherhoods, replicated in their internal organization the structure of parliamentarism with its general assemblies, elections of the administration, and fiscal councils.961 Also, early liberal thinkers and politicians had plans for the development of popular class associational life. In Portugal after the civil war of 1834, there were plans for the development of welfare to be channelled through associations. In 1834, Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira projected a Banco de Socorro e Seguro Mútuo, and in 1840 he had plans for the creation of a liberal sponsored Associação para o Melhoramento das Classes Industriosas. In 1844, the liberal thinker Alexandre Herculano published a book defending the social role of mutualities titled Das Caixas Económicas, where he defended a society where associations, mutualities, and cooperatives had a central role in welfare, politics, and economics. Andrade Corvo, a disciple of Herculano and Minister of Public Works, wrote the first report and proposals for the reform of associations defending a system close to the one operating in Belgium. Associations were to be legal and recognized by the government in order to promote their federalization.962

All these projects failed. In Portugal, Andrade Corvo’s project faced the opposition of the church, especially by the action of the Bishop of Viseu.963 Also in Spain, early twentieth century proposals for freedom of association failed. In the first parliamentary meetings of the Cortes in 1820, the proposal of the deputy Álvarez Guerra to nominate a commission to write a project of regulation of political associations, which had the aim to legalize the sociedades patrióticas, was blocked by the government. In fact, September 16, 1820 patriotic societies were dissolved. The constitution did not recognize the right of association.964 The associations in the liberal area that were

961 Ramos, 1994, pp. 236-239.
962 Goodolphim, 1974, pp. 198-199.
963 Goodolphim, 1974, p. 199.
964 Montequi, 1999, pp. 157-158.
devoted to a coalition with the lower classes had always a secondary role in politics. Other cases were the Institucion Libre de Enseñanza that was created in Madrid in 1875 by university professors and liberal politicians in the spirit of the radical-liberal ideology of the revolution of 1868. It was committed to the creation of a liberal democracy with a dimension of social reform. Another association was created in February 1899, the Liga Nacional de Productores in Zaragoza (province of Aragon), under the presidency Joaquin Costa, and it aimed to mobilize the productive classes against the oligarchs in agriculture and industry. Costa’s aim was the creation of a new class of farmers that would break the power of local caciques. Yet, they were always very marginal in the political process.

Weak parliametarism did not allow associations to develop as much as they could. It was more difficult to institute freedom of association, associations could not be used by parties for mobilization purposes, and cross-regional links between groups and classes did not emerge so easily because the parliament did not debate national issues. Instead, the debate of local and regional issues was made more important by the institutional position of the prefectorial system. Associations become more local ventures and with difficulty spread throughout the territory.

10.3. State Breakdown, Militarization, and State-Church Conflict

The nature of the state strengthened the general traits of Iberian associational life of weak density, weak coordination, and localism even more. Moreover, it added a new trait: extreme eruptions of protest, directed against the system, usually after state failure, and that could not sustain themselves organizationally through time. Voluntary associations erupted only in occasional circumstances. Its general pattern was one of erratic evolution in terms of density and capacity of coordination, marked by sudden advances and deep retreats.

The pattern of state building in Iberia had produced very weak states. Although Iberian states were centralized and even despotic, at the same time they were subject to private appropriation of its resources by political and social agents, bureaucracy was weakly professionalized, and even because of divisions within its armed apparatus (police and the army) they had difficulties in controlling the territory. This produced a

system that combined a strong impetus towards repression of the centre over the periphery (through the police, the army, or the prefects) but that simultaneously let local power holders grow as the main political agents. Thus, extreme localism became a feature of these states.

This was a consequence of the fact that the Iberian states were at a situation of permanent internal conflict, or even civil war, since the early 1800s until the 1870s: first, with the national guerrilla wars against the French during the Napoleonic invasion, afterwards in the several civil wars between Liberals and absolutists, and between moderate and radical liberals. This permanent state of war had several consequences for the traits of the Iberian states that would ultimately influence the shape of associational life. Although both in in Portugal and Spain there were elite settlement that somehow pacified political life (in Portugal between 1851 and 1890) and in Spain in the first decades of the Restauración (Restoration, 1874 and 1923), between 1874 and 1898, what is important to stress is that these settlements failed to produce a competitive and open liberal system and ultimately were unable to cope with external military and geopolitical pressures in the 1890s, which paved the way for their collapse by military action in 1910 (Portugal) and 1923 (Spain).

The first was the consolidation of the power of the military as political and administrative agents at the expense of civilian politicians and party leaders. More precisely, civilian elites, both on the right and on the left, depended on the military to achieve their aims and would cultivate ties with sectors of the armed forces to promote their interests and achieve their objectives. Military men were political agents too, and political factions, from the extreme right to the extreme left, had links with specific sectors of the armed forces.966

The role of the military in politics started with the wars against the French Napoleonic armies. The collapse of the Iberian monarchies put the military as the main arbiters of politics. In Portugal, the court even left to Brazil. In practice, the rule of Portuguese and Spanish territory was left to the military. The invasion had made the state structure of the ancient regime collapse, and the guerrilla war that followed led to the consolidation of the power of regional military officers that gradually assumed the position of political leaders. They were almost sovereign in specific parts of the territory, mobilized the population to resist the French invader in the name of the king

by creating military–guerrilla movements. Sometimes, these military leaders even fought each other and gradually aspired to a more national role.967

After the 1820s and until the 1870s, during the fights between Liberals and absolutists, and factions of Liberals between themselves, the military became the main political actor in politics. As a consequence, armed violence, army coups, and conspiracies became the standard way to resolve political issues. In Portugal, the neo-absolutist claimant to the throne in the 1830s, D Miguel, was a kind of military caudillo against his brother, moderate liberal king D. Pedro IV, who was called the “Rei-Soldado” (“soldier-king”). Both organized military volunteer battalions to fight each other. Gradually, all of the main political men of the Portuguese liberalism who fought the absolutists were also from the military: Marquis of Saldanha, Duque Terceira, and Bernardo de Sá Nogueira.968 In Spain, the neo-absolutists organized a body of volunteers to fight the liberal governments in 1821-23, and the Liberals created their civic para-military organization, the Milicia Nacional, which in 1839 had 173,481 armed and 455,037 unarmed men.969 Finally, after 1836 the divisions within the liberal camp had also a military dimension. In Portugal, it was between moderates and radicals, with the radicals, the so-called Setembristas, being able to recruit many men in the lower ranks of the army.970 In Spain in 1836, the liberal-moderate government was the object of a revolt by radicals led by the sergeants of the army (because of delay in the pay of soldiers).971

The second trait of the Iberian state was its extreme fragmentation. With the state collapse after the French invasions and decades of guerrilla and civil war, the center did not simply have coercive, much less infra-structural, control of the periphery. In each and every part of Portugal and Spain, a local strongman emerged who ruled frequently as an almost sovereign and who competed with other strongmen. The first case of this were the Provincial Juntas that appeared during the French invasions. These were bodies of local/regional defense that resisted the French but that acted quasi-autonomously and without a national strategy. For instance in Portugal, the liberator of the city of Amarante, General Francisco da Silveira Pinto, rivaled with the liberator of the city of Bragança, General Sepúlveda, for the control of the whole northeastern

967 Bebiano, 1993, p. 255.
968 Bebiano, 1993, pp. 258-261.
970 Bebiano, 1993, pp. 258-261.
region of Portugal (Trás-os-montes). The war against the French was in fact a collection of small guerrilla wars fought at the same time against a common enemy but without any coordination. As Payne argues about the war of independence in Spain, it was the «first modern guerrilla war of popular resistance».

This pattern of state fragmentation continued until the 1870s with the civil wars between miguelistas/carlistas, and Liberals in Portugal and Spain. Associational life in the countryside was composed mainly of regional popular-military bands that fought the central government. In Portugal, the miguelistas controlled significant parts of the territory until the 1850s. The Remexido, a regional powerlord, controlled the southern region of Algarve. João Brandão, another warlord, controlled parts of the center and northeast. In the regions of Catalonia, the Basque country and Navarra in Spain, carlistas organized the conservative peasantry, the priests, and sectors of the army into a mass military social movement that fought the central state in the name of the traditional monarchy.

In sum, the Portuguese and Spanish states had very low capacity to control their own territories during most of the nineteenth century. They were also unable to count on the loyalty of their military men. This promoted deep localism. State control of the territory was so weak that local powerful men and caciques were the real agents of power. For instance, in Portugal the bandit João Brandão became in the 1850s a respected local politician whose influence was sought both by the governments and the opposition in Lisbon. The high militarization of the state made it more probable to use repression than cooptation when dealing with pressures from below. The militarization of the state and of the territory extended to the police forces that had been created to control the countryside and which were modeled on the army structure. The Guardia Civil, created in 1844 in Spain, was a national police force that was part of the military and run by army officers. Moreover, also in Portugal police brutality was common.

10.4. Outcome: A Local, Individualistic, and Radical Associational Life

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972 Araújo, 1993, pp. 32-34.
973 Payne, 1978, p. 199
975 Linz, 2006, p. 151.
977 Ballbé, 1985, p. ii; Diamandouros et. al., 2006, pp. 9-14.
Weak parliamentarism, high executive dominance, militarization of politics and low state capacity produced an associational life that was at the same time weak, local, and anti-regime. By the 1860s and the early 1870s, the existing popular classes’ associational life was very individualistic and strongly opposed to the liberal system in the form of radical-republicanism. This was especially evident in Spanish republicanism. It was a combination of anti-system radicalism with the project of a small scale and local democratic society, a project that could gain ascendance only in a regime combining high repression and bureaucratic control of associational life with an extreme localism. In Spain since the 1850s, the workers’ fight for the right of association is so intense that one of the slogans of the period was “Association or Death”. Pi y Margall, the leader of the Federalist Party, was an admirer of Proudhon, and he defended a federal society organized around a network of small self-contained and governing communes. Proudhon’s federalism was since the 1860s very popular in Spain, and it was shared by many liberals and republicans.978

Also in the 1860s, syndicalist ideas started to spread in Catalonia and Andalusia’s countryside. In 1868 Bakunin’s envoy, Giuseppe Fanelli, visited Spain.979 His visit was a success, since he was able to recruit many clubs of workers, like the printers, cobblers, and many craftsmen as well as students, to the anarchist cause. As in radical republicanism, one of the basic ideas was the organization of society around self-autonomous units under the principle of mutual cooperation. Anselmo Lorenzano and Fraga Pellicier organized the first anarchist centers in Barcelona and a federative structure, the Centro Federal de las Sociedades Obreras de Barcelona.980

Republicanism appeared in the late 1840s in Portugal spreading the spirit of the 1848 revolution and organizing in secret societies like the Comissão Revolucionária de Lisboa (or Triunvirato Republicano) and the Carbonária Lusitana that were all soon repressed.981 In 1876, the Partido Republicano (Republican Party) was formed, and soon it acquired a small-bourgeois and workers’ support base.982 Especially in Lisbon and Oporto where political competition was more ideological, the republicans built an efficient network, organized rallies and conferences, and mobilizing citizens during electoral periods. Popular associational life was gradually taken over by the republicans.

979 Joll, 1979, pp. 93-95.
980 Joll, 1979, pp. 210-212.
981 Ribeiro, 1993, pp. 117-119.
982 Mónica, 1985, p 50.
The Republican Party itself, initially called Centro Eleitoral Republicano Democrático, was the result of a fusion of a series of republican clubs, centers, brotherhoods, and lower class popular associations. They were able to penetrate urban centers and urban constituencies: in the late 1860s they had 60% of their clubs in Lisbon, 10% in Oporto.

Associational life was expressed fully and to higher levels only in exceptional circumstances, such as during a state crisis. The period between 1868 and 1874 that created the first Spanish Republic was one of those cases. The Spanish regime between the late-1850s and 1868 was an attempt to stabilize a system of liberal competition under the direction of the Unión Liberal, a moderate/conservative party led by O’Donnell, with a project of social, administrative, and economic reforms, and of extension of liberties (plans for freedom of association and expression). At the same time, the party was based on the old methods of electoral corruption and clientelismo which weakened it in the eyes of the growing number of radical-republicans, especially in the eastern coastal area (namely Barcelona). Furthermore, it was not conservative enough to the extreme right, the carlistas. Occasional Carlist risings and pressures from the extreme left led the monarch to dismiss the government in the autumn of 1864. After three small weak governments, Nervaez, a conservative general of the Partido Moderado (moderate party), was nominated as head of government by the monarch. His rule continued and strengthened the system of electoral corruption (the number of voters fell from 158,000 in 1858 to 418,000 in 1865). This led to the discontentment of the left liberals (progressitas) and the republicans or democratic-radicals who abstained to run in the elections of 1866, who launched an armed attack on the government. The San Gil rising, a military revolt of radical sergeants was brutally repressed in June-July of 1866, but progressive general Serrano rose again in 1868, thus bringing down the Isabeline monarchy. It installed a democratic republic, with the main parties being the Partido Progressista, the Partido Democrata, and the Union Liberal.

In Spain, the proclamation of the first republic marked a high point in associational development. The 1868 military revolt was backed by radical federal-republican civilian associations. It set up revolutionary juntas in parts of Spain, especially in the east, the center, and south. A new government was installed in Madrid, led by the progressive General Juan Prim. The government planned to introduce political democracy. Universal male suffrage was instituted, and a moderate constitutional monarchy was

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established in 1870 with a new king, Amadeo of Savoy. Freedom of association and reunion was declared in the laws of June 20, 1869 and in the articles 17-19 of the 1869 constitution, thus allowing workers’ organizations to become legal. As was declared in the manifesto of the revolution, «the freedoms of reunion and association for peaceful means have been recognized as fundamental dogmas of the revolution».  

Freedom of association, constitutional parliamentarism, and universal suffrage provided an impetus for associational growth. The Centro Federal de Sociedades Obreras, the Spanish section of the International was formed, initially with 7,000 members and 34 affiliated organizations. In 1872 in its congress in Cordoba, it was declared to have 25,000 members and in 1874 50,000. Initially the movement was restricted to Western Andalusia, recruiting 28,000 individuals in the period 1869-1873, although mostly artisans and not peasants. Its ideology was anarcho-collectivist, since the Spanish sided with Bakunin against Marx. In fact, Bakunin’s ideas found in Spain a much more fertile ground, since they almost inversely mirrored the nature of Spanish (and for that matter Portuguese, as I discuss in the next chapter) state and regime: a very repressive polity that at the same time had a weak capacity and that was very fragmented. Inversely, anarchism defended full participatory democracy (as the inverse of extreme statism of the Iberian states) but it was based on small scale organizations (as the direct expression of Iberian fragmentation), and whose implementation arrived by collective action directed at bringing down the state (as a mirror of the extreme repressiveness of the polity). Bakunin espoused the need to overturn the existing polities, by violence if needed, to terminate the state as such, and to replace it with workers’ co-organization in the local craft union, which would become the basic social unit. Then all craft unions would unite in a local federation, which would then get together with other federations in national federal committee. The 1870 congress in Spain remained a federation co-ordinated through area units (local, county, and regional).

The constitutional monarchy and its subsequent federal republic did not survive. First, immediately after 1868, the local juntas spread over Spain and acted almost autonomously, many of them in the hands of extreme radicals and anticlerical mobs that imposed a reign of terror in the moderate middle classes and the church. Church land

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984 Montequi, 1999, p. 163.
985 Joll, 1979, pp. 93-95.
was confiscated and seminars suppressed. The central government also allowed this, with the approval of laws of civil marriage, the secularization of cemeteries in 1871, and the control of the nomination of church bodies. Disappointed with the new constitution, Amadeo resigned from the throne in 1873 and declared it anti-Catholic. The government was weak and fell under a new radical federal-republican advance that inaugurated the first republic.

In sum, the republic was unable to consolidate itself and faced two revolts: first, in Navarre and the Basque provinces the Carlists grew in mobilization (in fact, they had been fighting the regime since 1869). Second, extreme radicals in the republican-federalist camp in southern and eastern Spain set up cantons that declared independence from Madrid. Facing revolts both from the right and the left, in 1874 a new military revolt brings down the republican government.988

10.5. Conclusion

Iberian societies faced the hardest conditions for the development of a dense associational field. First, since the eighteenth century there was a direct attack on any corporate autonomous body by state rulers, first by the absolute monarchy and later by both liberals and reactionaries that much took away resources for collective action and self-organization of communities both in cities and the countryside. Second, there was a pattern of an almost failure of state building that left many areas of the territory out of the control of the center and national rulers, thus promoting local and clientelistic associational ventures. Finally, a very weak parliament, where party competition was largely a sham, left power in the hands of the king and the military. In these conditions, repression over associations was much easier but at the same time promoted associational initiatives directed against the existence of the state itself.

988 Payne, 1984, pp. 92-96.
Chapter 11: Critical Juncture, 1880s-1918

11.1. Failed Parliamentary Regimes and Weak States

After the permanent state of internal warfare between the early 1800s and 1874, the Iberian political systems attempted stabilization in the form of a moderate liberal-constitutional political system at the end of the nineteenth century. In Spain, it was the period called the Restauración (Restoration), which lasted between 1874 and 1923. The main political figure was Cánovas del Castillo, leader of the Liberal-Conservative party (descendent of the Unionistas Liberales), who competed with the Agrupacion Liberal Fusionista, led by Sagasta (the heirs of the old progresistas, democratas, and left unionistas). In Portugal in 1876, the party systems stabilized around the competition of two parties, the Partido Regenerador, the more conservative party, and the Partido Progressista, the more liberal party (founded in 1876 by the fusion of two old liberal radical parties, the Partido Histórico and the Partido Reformista).

Contrary to many Western European countries, like England, Belgium or Sweden, liberalism failed to develop into mass liberalism in Iberia. Liberal parties never really developed competitive dynamics with each other. They remained strict elite organizations and stayed distant to popular sector voluntary associations. The fear and the inability to include popular mobilization led these systems to defensive positions. In Spain in the 1880s, Canovas and Sagasta decided not to push their competition too far in the Pacto Del Pardo in 1881 owing to a fear of giving opportunities for revolt by the republicans and/or Carlists. They inaugurated the so-called Turno Pacífico system, where under the monarch’s supervision each party rotated in office without the need to mobilize the citizenry. In Portugal, also the parties developed a system called Rotativismo, and rapidly the more left liberals, the Progressistas, when in government failed to develop the policy of inclusion that they had promised.989

In fact, the main political institutions of the regime were the king, the state bureaucracy, and the military, not the parliament. Continuing the patterns of the past, in both Spanish and Portuguese constitutions the king was the real centre of power, the so-called poder moderador. Although more so in Portugal than in Spain, and with important consequences, as I explain below, the crown was the main arbiter of political

989 Spain: Carr, 2005, pp. 341, 348. Portugal: Homem, 1993, pp. 139-140. The first Progressista government was in 1876, with Anselmo Brancaamp as PM.
conflicts in comparison with rest of Western Europe, and he decided who would occupy government. The use of power by the king without obeying the parliamentary majorities was common, contrary to most monarchies in Europe. In the Portuguese constitution, valid between 1842 and 1910, the king was the head of the executive power, and could dissolve the chamber of deputies, nominate and dismiss ministers, veto parliamentary legislation, and was even considered as sharing the legislative power with the Cortes.

Government change was more dependent of the will of the king than of electoral competition. As Blakeley argues for the case of Spain, «the king, with the agreement of the incoming government, would dissolve the parliament and call elections». In Portugal in the period 1868-1890, the dissolution of governments by the king was common as a regular form to resolve political crises. Governments became very unstable as a consequence, because they depended to a large extent on the king’s favour. In this period, most Portuguese governments did not end their mandate (only three in twelve), and between 1852 and 1910 it was the country where government instability was highest. There should have been realized only seventeen elections, not the thirty three elections that actually took place.

From the point of view of associations, parliament was a closed avenue to pressure for the advancement of their interests, and parties were distant and incapable to form stable coalitions and inter-locking links. But ironically, for many years, associations were willing to be incorporated through government and party channels. For instance, the Portuguese Fraternidade Operária and the Associação dos Trabalhadores were believers in the value of parliament. As late as 1895, the workers’ newspaper, the Eco Metalúrgico published articles defending the participation in elections and the parliament. But after the mid-1890s, they began to voice many doubts. An article published in April of 1897 claimed that «parliamentarism, that was defended by the most serious and honest men of the beginning of this century is today recognized as a social cancer». And a «bourgeois deputy is the essence of fraud». Another one in 1909 declared that workers should aim at the destruction of the state through direct action. In fact, there had been a decline of representations of interests to parliament in

Portugal. In the early 1880s, there was for a brief period a growing reliance of associations (of many types, like state employees, professional groups, citizens groups, workers, neighborhood, and Misericordias) to present petitions and send representatives to the parliament. In 1888 it received 205 representations, in 1889 135, in 1891 59, in 1892 149, in 1894 60, in 1896 270, in 1897 134, in 1899 290, in 1900 380, and in 1901 175.997

Moreover, traits of a state with a low capacity, in particular its inherent clientelism, did not provide incentives for elites to mobilize the population through competitive parties and ideological appeals. Parties of the system were mainly clientelistic organizations, which used the resources of the state in a private way in order to channel resources to their clienteles. In the late 1870s when these systems stabilized after decades of civil war, many of the old local powerlords and their successors were incorporated in the new liberal political parties, thus becoming agents of the parties in a certain area and serving as intermediaries between the center and the periphery. They were the first notables or caciques, whose power was based on the control of a particular city or village, and who could use that power to deliver support and votes to the elites in Lisbon. Local populations were linked to the caciques by personal ties, not by ideology, and the cacique sold his influence to any party in Lisbon in exchange for public works, tax and military exemptions, and jobs in the state machinery.998 The system became one of widespread corruption, where also state officers like prefects became electoral agents of the government, and whose job was to find electoral support in the peripheries by buying the votes. In Portugal, for instance the Minister of Interior, who controlled the prefects, was called the «grande eleitor» (the big elector).999

This produced a local and small size associational life. Before the mass age, the population was already mobilized by networks of clientelistic relationships, which were mainly individualistic and vertical. The cacique dispensed favors to his clients, but the clients did not have any relationship with each other. This tended to favor a hierarchical and semi-authoritarian inclusion of the popular classes. Many associations in the peripheries, like religious brotherhoods and charities, were mainly instruments of social

998 Anderson and Anderson, 1967, pp. 366-369; Eisenstadt, Roniger, 1984, pp. 72-74, Goldstein, 1983, pp. 20-22. Although there was a modernization of the state apparatus in the 1880s and 1890s, the overall character of the Portuguese state cannot be considered highly rationalized and modern. See Almeida, 2007.
999 Ortega, 1997, p. 141.
control from above and instruments of clientelistic favor. For instance, many popular associations like cultural neighborhood associations were in fact used by local caciques for electoral support, and they were divided between the two main liberal factions of the late 1800s, the Progressistas (the liberal left) and the Regeneradores (the center right). Each locality was organized around a grand cacique, but links between popular classes of different localities were difficult to develop.\footnote{Bermeo, 2000, p. 244; Cascão, 1993, pp. 527-529; Eisenstadt, Roniger, 1984, pp. 73-74.}

11.2. Radical and Informally Coordinated Associational Life: Republicanism and Anarchism

These regimes failed to include and mobilize popular classes. In both Spain and Portugal, most associational life organizations remained without links to the existing elites and evolved into radical opposition to the system. Elites in the party system could not and/or were unwilling to establish links with associations and the citizenry, since mobilization of a broad electorate was not vital for them to stay in office.\footnote{Linz, 1981, p. 375; Maier, 1981, pp. 50-51.} In both countries, associational life became rapidly organized first by republicans and later by left-wing anarchists. Only these groups had an ideological program and capacity for mass mobilization and organization building. The demand for universal male suffrage became a central banner of the republicans, who took this flag from the dynastic left. In Portugal, the Republican Party was mainly based in the big cities, especially in Lisbon. In 1907, 35% of all their clubs were in Lisbon, 21% in Oporto, and 40% in the countryside. In 1883, it was estimated that three thousand people were members of the republican clubs in Lisbon. Based on this network for electoral support, in 1908 the Republican Party was able to wins seats in municipal elections in some small cities of the south and in August 1910 the first seat in the rural district of Alentejo.\footnote{Pinto, Almeida, 2000, p. 13.} In Spain, popular associational life, in the form of cooperatives, mutual aid societies, Casas Del Pueblo (people’s houses), was also republican.\footnote{Riley, 2005, p. 291.} Moreover, republican associational life was growingly anti-monarchical and opposed the regime.\footnote{Almeida, 1998, p. xxiii.} In December 1887, the Portuguese Republican Party of approved the line of the radical faction (led by Manuel
de Arriaga) that defended the total incompatibility and intransigence in the fight against monarchic parties.\textsuperscript{1005}

The Anarchist movement grew in both countries in the 1880s. In Spain in the 1880s, anarchism spread from being just an artisan movement to the rural workers of the southern regions. In 1882, the Anarchist movement had 57,934 members. Of these most came from Andalucia (38,349 out of which 20,915 were rural workers), which was also the place where there was the biggest number of clubs (in 130 cities). In Catalonia, the movement has 13,201 members and in Valencia 2,355.\textsuperscript{1006}

In the 1880s Portugal, some individuals claimed to be Anarchists, supporting the section of the International led by Bakunin. There was a group in Porto led by Eduardo Maia who was linked to two anarchist organizations, the \textit{União Democrática Social} and the \textit{Associação-União dos Trabalhadores}. In 1887 there was a similar group in Lisbon.\textsuperscript{1007} In the countryside, there was some growth of anarchist associations in the southern latifundia region. Rural syndicalism appeared in 1894 when the first rural union in Montemor-o-Novo was founded, followed by an immediate succession of similar organizations in Évora, Santarém, Nelas, Santa Cita and other southern cities, which rapidly were recruited by the Anarchists.\textsuperscript{1008} In 1909, the first national structure of syndicalism was created, the \textit{Comissão Executiva do Congresso Sindicalista}, which was divided into two trends. One was more moderate, preferring to work within the existing political order and in alliance with republican candidates. The other was more radical and opposed any cooperation with the regime and any party. In this period the number of registered unions was 777, and although the records declare that they had a short life-span, the Anarchists are able to gain ascendancy in the workers’ movement, in cooperatives and associations in general, much more than the socialists.\textsuperscript{1009} Still, at the end of the monarchy, the 98 existing agrarian unions had only 10,000 members, less than 1\% of the active agrarian population.\textsuperscript{1010}

Combining this with weak parliamentarism and clientelistic state, Iberian states suffered external shocks in this period that definitely affected their capacity, making the existing elites so insecure of their position, because of competition with other states, that they resorted to even more repression in order to stay in power, thus severing

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1005} Homem, 1993, p. 142.
\bibitem{1006} Malefakis, 2001, p. 207.
\bibitem{1007} Mónica, 1985, pp. 99-100.
\bibitem{1008} Pinto, Almeida, 2000, p. 11.
\bibitem{1009} Freire, 2000, pp. 79-80.
\bibitem{1010} Beyerlein, 2000, pp. 394-396.
\end{thebibliography}
definitely their already weak links with the popular sectors. These external shocks only aggravated this situation in the 1890s, making for weak links between parties and associational life. Portugal clashed with England over their corresponding ambitions in Austral Africa. Both wanted the land between Angola and Mozambique. In Portugal it was called the pink map, an ambitious plan to unite Atlantic coast (Angola) with Indian Ocean (Mozambique). This clashed with English interests to unite Cairo with Cape Town in South Africa. After delayed diplomatic confrontations, England threatened to invade Portugal if she pursued these ambitions. In Spain, it was the military defeat in 1898 inflicted by the USA over Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico.

These external crises shook the power basis of already weak elites and contributed to undermine the legitimacy of the monarchies by providing opportunities for radicals within the loose confederations of associational life to attack the regime. In Portugal, the civic-republican associational life expanded strongly after the crisis of 1890, when the republicans, and to a smaller extent the socialists, started to carry the banner of nationalism after the British ultimatum of 1890. In Porto, the Liga Patriotica do Norte was created in January 1890, a body composed of republicans, radical students and some leftists of the Partido Progressista that even proclaimed a counter-government. Following republican demonstrations in the country, callings for the resignation of the King, and clashes with the police, there was even a military revolt of lower rank officers (sergeants) in Porto promoted by republicans on January 31, 1891. 1011 In 1908, the King was assassinated by radical-republicans of the Carbonária, and in 1910 a republican-military coup ended the monarchy and proclaimed the Portuguese First Republic.

In Spain after the 1895-1898 disaster, there was an opportunity for pressures from below to be directed against the regime. Associational life could expand when the state suffered a crisis induced by external events. In this period UGT grew until 1904 (in 1888 it had 3,355 members, 6,154 in 1896, 34,778 in 1902, 43,665 in 1904). 1012 Many republicans become even more radical, adopting anarchism. 1013 Initially, in their congress in Barcelona in 1881, the Anarchists were divided into two lines: the more moderate Catalan line and the Andalucian that was adept of the use violence for political purposes. The Andalucian tradition was partly based on the ancient claims of

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1011 Ramos, 1994, pp. 39, 104.
the rural workers for the division of the big land properties and of the early nineteenth century radical federalist republicanism. The militants wanted the direct seizure of the land, organizing in 1882 a peasant uprising that became known as the Black Hand episode. Instead in Catalonia, anarchism was called anarcosyndicalismo, its main agent was the union and the preferred tactic the general strike. But Anarchists became more radical with this opportunity of state crisis. There was a spread of the idea that the general revolutionary strike should be the main tactic of the Anarchists, a kind of armed mass rising to prepare the social revolution. In Barcelona in February 1902, 150,000 workers went on strike for a week, and in 1903-1904 rural protests reappeared. Still, the main event was the assassination of Prime Minister Canovas in 1897 by an Italian Anarchist, and in 1906 the killing attempt of King Alfonso XII.

A repressive trend is reinforced by the fact that after the external conflicts with the USA and England, governments fully dispensed with parliament, thus terminating the brief period of pseudo-parliamentarism of the mid 1870s to the early 1890s, and embarked on policies of authoritarian mobilization from above (and especially in Spain, militaristic expansion). In Spain, the plans of modernization by King Alfonso XIII (1899-1909) started in 1902 through the governments of conservatives Silvela and António Maura. Both attempted legitimize the regime with appeals to national Catholicism and by creating links between the population and politicians, putting aside the parties of El Turno, through a programme of social welfare (e.g. Silvela’s project of work accidents). In 1903, Prime Minister Antonio Maura declared that public opinion was his guide in politics. And in 1909 the government called the draft on the population for military expansion in Morocco. This programme continued with the governments of Dato in 1913, and during the years of World War I (1914-1918), although Spain remained neutral, the debates between anglophiles and germanophiles were so intense that the governments of Dato and Romanones (1915-1916) imposed rule by decree, suspending parliamentarism, and taking the control of financial expenses of the state out of the parliament’s control. Also in Portugal, the monarchy assumed a project of authoritarian modernization that was deeply inspired by the German

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1014 Maura, 1971, p. 69.
1016 Maura, 1971, p. 70.
example. 1021 After ten years of unstable although repressive governments (1895-1905), the king nominates João Franco as a dictator in 1905 to rule without consulting the parliament and party politicians, and the legislative power of the government was empowered. 1022

In the 1890s, Iberian governments had a clearly repressive stance towards associational life, and they relied on the police and the army to deal with pressures from below. In Spain, Anarchists were highly repressed by the governments until the early 1900s, and they were able to come to surface only occasionally and to promote small uprisings especially in the provinces of Cádiz and Seville. 1023 In 1896, a law against anarchism was approved and brutally enforced. Executions of Anarchists were frequent and the government usually called the army or the Guardia Civil to crush Anarchist demonstrations. 1024 The period between 1898 and 1910 was one of brutal repression. Anarchists were deported and sent to prison, and many associations were closed. 1025 The most brutal case was in 1909, when the government imposed the draft in Catalonia for military service in Morocco. This provoked an Anarchist revolt, which was brutally repressed, in the events known as the tragic week. Paradoxically, Francisco Ferrer, an Anarchist leader and pedagogue but a representative of the more moderate factions in the movement, was executed by government troops in October 1909. 1026

Also in Portugal, Anarchists were repressed by the government. For instance, on February 13, 1893 Prime Minister Hintze Ribeiro published even a law for the repression of anarchism. Strikers could be deported to Timor and defenders of Anarchist ideals could be sent to prison for up to six months. 1027 It was common for prefects to suspend republican individual freedoms, to make difficult and not allow demonstrations and meetings in public places, and remarks about state institutions in public demonstrations were forbidden. 1028 Workers’ associations (associações de classe), although legal since 1891, were not allowed to promote strikes, had to have their status approved by the prefects, and had to ask permission to rent facilities. Finally, the formation of federations was forbidden. 1029 The decree of March 29, 1890 introduced

1021 Ramos, 1994, pp. 218-220.
1023 Malefakis, 2001, p. 207.
1029 Mónica, 1986, p. 15.
stronger restrictions, and according to Trindade Coelho, it meant the «end of the right of reunion». The 1891 law on associations subjected the formation of associations to government approval and put many restrictions on their activities and the ability to form regional or national unions. Moreover, it was not possible to form political associations.

In Spain, this led to the lethargy of the movement in Andalucia until 1910. After 1903, the movement was weakly organized in the south. In Córdoba there was only one Anarchist association listed in this period, and until 1910 only 19 strikes are registered in the whole country. In general, the Anarchists could only organize episodic strikes, which evolved many times into sudden bursts of violence as in 1903 in the city of Córdoba. In 1910, the Confederación Nacional de Trabajo or CNT, an Anarchist confederation, was formed. The CNT received much of its inspiration from French revolutionary syndicalism. Direct action, factory indiscipline, refusal to participate in mediation institutions of labor issues, general strike, and sabotage became the main adopted tactics. Moreover, because of the growing expansion to the south, land division and armed insurrection were also part of the new ideology. In 1911, the CNT was declared illegal by the government. Its first years of life were not that very promising. It gained only about thirty thousand members in the first years, and after a failed general strike in Barcelona in 1912, its decline began. Its rural wing, the Federación Nacional de Agricultores de España founded in 1913, was also very unstable, and in 1916 only had three thousand members. Strikes were also few: 23 strikes in the rural countryside in 1915, 35 in 1916, and 46 in 1917. In 1915, the CNT had only 15,000 members in all of Spain. In fact, the growth of the Anarchist movement was never rapid or continuous: diverse federations proliferated but they were soon extinguished; it suffered periods of sudden growth and affiliation and then periods of persecution and clandestine activity when the movement became again only a small

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1030 Almeida, 1991, p. 73.
1032 Pinto, Almeida, 2000, pp. 5, 19 n.7.
1035 Maura, 1971, p. 72.
group of militants. The organization could not institutionalize as a provider of services to its members because of almost constant repression from the authorities.\textsuperscript{1039}

In Portugal, although a republic since 1910 and the right of association had been established in the 1911 constitution, the new regime would evolve into a hostile inimical position towards voluntary associations.\textsuperscript{1040} In fact, the new regime had been the result of an organized minority of radical republicans in the Carbonaria and in the military, which were successful less because they were able to sustain and organize a broad popular movement, but because they took advantage of state weakness to bring down the regime by a coup. The proclamation of the republic on October 5, 1910 was the result of the joint action of the Comité Militar Republicano and the Carbonária, who had infiltrated most military units of Lisbon and of the navy, and together with some civilian groups arrested the king. At most it mobilized 2,000 armed men.\textsuperscript{1041}

In this sense, the republicans who got power in 1910 were not civic leaders and coming from a rooted associational movement. They were also not very civic-minded in the sense that they would tolerate any association. They were republicans first, democrats after. In fact, the new regime attacked all associations that could have a different ideology from radical republicanism and promoted its own policial type of civic associations. Repression from above, would again promote the expansion, if in an irregular pattern, of anarchism in Portugal, as it had happened in the Spanish monarchy.

The new republican regime used the Carbonaria to organize “popular battalions” that were strongly connected to the Republican Party in order to “republicanize” the recalcitrant groups, in particular the peasantry and the industrial workers. After 1911 the republicans of the Partido Democrático (the continuator of the old Partido Republicano of the monarchy) used the battalions to organize incursions in the countryside to attack both peasants who wanted a return to the monarchy (in the centre-north) and Anarchist rural workers. In 1911 in Lisbon, there were twenty six battalions with seven thousand members.\textsuperscript{1042}

Already by 1911, the Anarchist movement declared war against the new regime in its first congress. In 1912, there was a strike of rural workers of the south (with a solidarity strike in Lisbon), where the prefect of the city of Moita was killed, the

\textsuperscript{1039} Carr, 2005, pp. 421-423.
\textsuperscript{1040} Pinto, Almeida, 2000, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{1041} Pinto, 1998, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{1042} Valente, 1975, pp. 234-236.
federation was closed, and hundreds of syndicalists were arrested. After 1910 there was a growth of rural syndicalism, especially in the south (Alentejo) from 4 unions in 1910 to 168 in 1915 (37 in 1920). In 1912, they were able to organize the first congress of the Federação dos Trabalhadores Rurais in Évora, encompassing 39 unions and representing 12,525 workers. According to Bermeo, in 1914 there were 110 unions for farm workers south of Tejo river (Tagus). Although weakly structured at the national level (despite the ephemeral attempt in the União dos Sindicatos Agrícolas Portugueses and another by the Associação Central da Agricultura Portuguesa), agrarian unions were represented in many counties of the south (70% of the counties in Beja and 75% in Portalegre), and they were able to organize protest activity: the Évora district had seventy strikes for higher wages between 1910 and 1925. Strikes rose from 91 in 1900-1909 to 391 in the period 1910-1919. With Portugal’s entry into World War I in 1917, the workers’ movement was mostly against the participation in the war effort contrary to many of the workers’ movements in Europe, and consequently it tended towards even more radical actions. In 1914, the União Operária Nacional replaced the Comissão Executiva do Congresso Sindicalista, thus creating a clearly federalist structure with a permanent administrative commission under the direction of a new organ, the conselho central, composed of one delegate from each union. The general organization was a pyramidal structure of unions and federations. There was an organ for the current management of the confederation: a council with representatives of the base militants that met every one to three months and that possessed decision capacity between congresses. Still, the confederation had very weak powers over its members. Combat tactics were to be chosen by each association, and each unit was autonomous. As it was declared in the Anarchist congress, «in the union movement, the influx comes from the bottom and not from the top».

In sum, low parliamentarism, weak state capacity, and a tradition of extreme individualism promoted in this period in the two Iberian countries a loose, local, and weakly dense but radical associational life, mainly in the hands of Anarchist and radical republican movements. There was also the expansion of this radicalism to the

1043 Freire, 2000, pp. 80-81.
1047 Maxwell, 1986, pp. 122-124
1048 Freire, 2000, p. 82.
1050 Mónica, 1985, p. 118.
countryside. Mass organized ideologies like socialism were very weak when compared to radical republicanism and anarchism.\textsuperscript{1051} This differentiates Iberia from the rest of Western European countries that were analyzed in the previous chapters.

But in spite of these commonalities, there were significant differences between Portugal and Spain. Spain had a stronger associational life that was more of mass type. In Spain, when compared to Portugal, there was the development of denser and more coordinated networks of socialist, Catholic, and nationalistic-regionalist voluntary associations. Again, as my model predicted, this was explained by the fact that in Spain 1) corporate representation legacies continued in this period in some regions, thus promoting a denser and coordinated associational life, especially in the Basque country and Catalonia, 2) Spain’s degree of parliamentarization and democratization were higher, and 3) state capacity was also stronger.

11.3. Variations in Iberia: Regionalist, Socialist, and Catholic Civil Societies

In Iberia, as elsewhere in Europe, the period between the 1880s and the 1930 saw the biggest expansion and growth of modern associational life. For instance in Spain, seventy eight percent of all workers’ associations were founded in the years between 1899 and 1904 according to Riley.\textsuperscript{1052}

According to Zorrila, there were 3,108 associations in Spain in 1887. Of these, 53% were recreational, 21.3% were mutualities and self-help associations (664 associations), 254 were literary, artistic, and educational associations (8.7%), 3% were political associations (freethinking, republican, conservative, liberal, and leftist); 3% were pressure groups of specific interests, 2.7% were economic associations of agriculture, industry, and mining, 2.5% were cooperatives, 2.5% were Catholic associations, 1.38% were associations of resistance, 1.38% beneficial-charity, and 0.12% associations to provide the building of houses.\textsuperscript{1053}

In 1904, there were 5,609 associations in Spain, and in 1916 there were 18,986 associations. Of these, 14,214 were professional associations (workers, mixed, and employers' associations) while 4,772 were no-professional associations (526 were savings associations, 696 cooperatives, and 3,550 welfare associations). Although the

\textsuperscript{1051} Malefakis, 2001, p. 233.
\textsuperscript{1052} Riley, 2005, p. 291.
\textsuperscript{1053} Zorrila, 1997, p. 92.
data on levels of membership is scarce, there are indications of a rise. In 1916, 348,265 workers were members of class associations, and the 2,020 savings, cooperative, and welfare associations had 437,347 members (of a diverse social background). There was also a growth of political associations of workers. In 1904 there were 1,147 societies of resistance, and in 1916 4,764 unions existed.¹⁰⁵⁴ Mutualities grew from 1,691 in 1904 to 4,517 in 1916.¹⁰⁵⁵

In Portugal, the years between 1891 and 1932 witnessed also the highest rate of formation of associations of several types (welfare, civic, employers’ and workers’, mutualities, recreational, youth, and religious). Brotherhoods and mutualities grew rapidly after the 1870s. In 1851-1853, there was an annual average of three, in 1886-1890 the annual average was 21, reaching in 1889 the number of four hundred.¹⁰⁵⁶ In Lisbon in 1893, 90 associations were registered: professions’ – shoemakers etc. – neighborhood, recreational, and beneficence, all devoted to organizing conferences, schools, meetings, and publishing public bulletins. Afterwards, they became more politically oriented.¹⁰⁵⁷

According to Costa Goodolfim, at the end of the nineteenth century there were three hundred associations in Portugal with about seventy thousand members. Most of them were Socorros Mútuos associations, or mutualities, brotherhoods or self-help societies. They were mainly concentrated in Lisbon, with forty thousand members in this city.¹⁰⁵⁸ According to Ramos, there 295 Mutualidades or Sociedades de Socorros Mutuos in 1882, out of which 65 were based in Lisbon, 61 in Oporto, the remaining throughout the country, and all comprising about 94,000 members. In 1898 there were about 480 associations, with 170,000 members in total; and in 1903, there were 559 associations, of which 301 were based in Lisbon. Since each member could represent a family, Ramos argues that about 14% of Portuguese families were represented by these organizations.¹⁰⁵⁹

Also Pereira puts the number of associations at around three hundred in the 1880s. In 1883 there were 295 mutualities and in 1889 392 (with a membership growth of 47%). In 1909 there were 628 associations in Portugal (with a membership growth of 174%); in 1921 almost 700 associations (and a growth of members at 62%). Between

¹⁰⁵⁴ Zorrila, 1997, p. 95.
¹⁰⁵⁵ Zorrila, 1997, p. 98.
¹⁰⁵⁷ Almeida, 1991, p. 73.
¹⁰⁵⁹ Ramos, 1994, pp. 80-81.
1921 and 1931, there was a reduction of the number of members (4% less), and associations: in 1929 there were only around 550 associations.\textsuperscript{1060}

The evolution of the number of association members was the following: in 1889 a bit more than 100,000, in 1905 300,000, in 1919 370,000, in 1921 490,000, and approximately 600,000 in 1930. The distribution of the associations’ members by types of associations, there was much more people in the mutualities than in the purely class associations: in 1921 class associations had 96,328 members and associações de socorros mútuos (health insurance, pensions, and funerary) had 615,000 members.\textsuperscript{1061}

Finally, the geographical distribution of mutualities was very uneven. They were mainly concentrated in Lisbon and Porto. In 1883, 81% of the mutualist population was concentrated in Lisbon. Also, at the end of the nineteenth century about one third of the population of Lisbon held membership in a mutuality.\textsuperscript{1062}

Pinto and Almeida note a rise in the number of associations between 1876 and 1909. In 1874 they count 84 friendly societies in Portugal, in 1889 there were 303, in 1903 there were about 473 and in 1909 number increases to 502 associations. These numbers are very similar to the ones presented by the previous authors.

Table 29: Friendly Societies in Portugal, 1876-1909

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lisbon and Oporto Number</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Rest of the Country Number</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>153</td>
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<td>1889</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>118,650</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>20,220</td>
<td>392</td>
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<td>1903</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>141,900</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>33,600</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>175500</td>
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<td>1909</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>324,000</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>42,309</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>366309</td>
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(Source: Pinto, Almeida, 2000, p. 9)

As in the previous decades, in this period we also find a higher density of associational life. In Portugal, there were 392 associations in 1887. Dividing the population (4,660,095 in 1890) by the number of associations, there was one association

\textsuperscript{1060} Pereira, 2000, pp. 52-53.  
\textsuperscript{1061} Pereira, 2000, pp. 52-55.  
\textsuperscript{1062} Pereira, 2000, p. 56.
for every 11,887 individuals. In Spain, the comparable figure is one association for each 5,646 Spaniards (by using the total of the Spanish population in 1887 – 17,550,000 people – and the existing 3,108 associations). The same pattern continues in the early 1900s. In 1909 there were 628 associations in Portugal. Calculating that the population was of 5,900,000 (in 1910), there is one association for every 9,394 Portuguese. In Spain in 1904, there were 5,609 associations. Dividing the population of the country (18,594,000 in 1900), there was one association for every 3,315 individuals.

The first reason for a higher associational life in Spain than in Portugal in this period was the continuation of higher associational life traditions at regional level that continued and modernized the legacy of guilds and corporations, especially in Catalonia and the Basque country. As Riley has shown, in 1904 Catalonia and the Basque country had the highest number of workers’ associations relative to population (23 and 20 respectively, per one hundred thousand people). The Castilla region had 11 and Valencia 13, with the rest of the regions of the country with a number of associations per capita between 4 and 8. In 1913, this number had grown even more and the top regions are the same. The number of per capita workers’ associations was 82 in the Basque Country, 49 in Catalonia, and 44 in Valencia. Asturias had risen to 41 associations per capita. The importance of these regions for associability remains also when non-professional associations are counted (excluding unions, mixed employers-employees associations, and employers associations). The per capita figures are 96 for Catalonia and 33 for the Basque country with the rest of the country’s regions with figures between 3 and 21.

In Catalonia during this period, according to Castillo, it was where federations of mutualities were strongest in Spain, continuing the tradition of strong associational life of the previous sixty years. In the city of Barcelona an exceptional case was La Union y Defensa de los Montepios de Barcelona y sus Afuera, a federation formed in 1896 that included most of the savings banks (montepios), mutualities, and welfare and mutual-help associations. There were 554 associations in the federation, and it had 124,916 members in 1911. In 1915 it included 747 associations and 167,623 members. In 1918 it

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changed its name to Federación de Sociedades de Socorros Mutuos de la Provincia de Barcelona and included 827 associations and 289,773 members.\textsuperscript{1066}

Many of these associations were recruited or formed by republicans. In Catalonia, besides the Anarchists, the radical republicans were also very strong. Their main party was Alejandro Lerroux’s Partido Radical (the successor of Unió Republicana), a lower-middle class radical party which combined an ideology of revolution, anticlericalism, and anti-catalanism, since they were centralist republicans as opposed to federalist republicans. They were able to penetrate with success especially in the non-manual workers’ milieu (commerce and industry): in 1900 they had the support of around 32,255 of the 128,000 Catalan workers,\textsuperscript{1067} and they had overthrew caciques and controlled much of the local government in Barcelona, and also had a presence in neighborhood associations.\textsuperscript{1068}

In Catalonia, a higher tradition of associational life both of anarcho-syndicalists and radical republicans, and of both federalists and anti-federalists (Lerroux) included also the emergence of a nationalist movement after the 1880s. The sources of the nationalist movement in Catalonia are to a large extent conservative and rooted in the countryside traditions of Catholicism and carlismo that were locally strong. In fact, the Catholic Church should be seen here as a kind of corporate body, since it was always a significant part of the institutional structure of Catalonia and in partnership with it, contrary to most of the Spanish state where state-church conflicts were endemic. In Catalonia the church and the local politicians, defenders of regional institutions and autonomy, were allies, both fought a centralizing and rapacious state.

Since the late 1870s, the Catalan episcopate Josep Torras I Bages, like the bishop of Vic, defended the notion that Catalan culture was more Catholic than the rest of Spain. Bages argued that «there was no other nation as completely and solidly Christian as was Catalonia».\textsuperscript{1069} The first nationalist groups were inspired by this, like the Renaixença that was an association for cultural defence, and that promoted popular theatre and workers’ circles. The Centre Catalá, founded in 1881, allied with the Renaixença, with carlist groups and with Lliga de Defensa Industrial I Comercial de Barcelona (that included 146 corporations - corporaciones - of commerce and industry) and formed a new organization, the Lliga de Catalunya, for the protection of Catalan

\textsuperscript{1066} Castillo, 2003, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{1067} Medrano, 1999, pp. 120-122.
\textsuperscript{1068} Ortega, 1997, p. 182; Payne, 1984, p. 132.
\textsuperscript{1069} Payne, 1984, p. 111.
language and culture. These groups were able to include critical bourgeois/liberal elites who demanded from Madrid the openness for cereal imports and freedom of commerce for textiles. In 1901, they all gathered to form a party in order to participate in the elections, the Lliga Regionalista, and to compete with the dynastic parties and the republicans of Lerroux, their main rivals. In 1901 they elected four candidates in the Cortes. The Lliga Regionalista was led by Prat de la Riba and Cambó and constituted a well-organized, well-funded, and highly mobilizing mass organization with a conservative ideology. Moreover, it was able to institute regional autonomy through the creation of the regional government, the Mancomunidad, and use these institutions for social policies for workers and of the cultural defense of catalanism, thus continuing pre-modern and early liberal policies of partnership between local governments and associations.

Also in the Basque country, the continuing strength of pre-modern forms of organization, of church autonomy and alliance with local institutions of governance and the late elimination of corporate institutions of self-rule led to the higher density and coordination of associational life in the modern period, in particular through the creation of a strong Catholic movement and sometimes overlapping also with a mass nationalist movement. The Basque country and Navarra did not suffer the process of state centralization set in motion since the early 1700s by the absolute monarchy that had led to the abolition of the power of corporate groups and representative parliaments (Cortes). In Portugal and in the rest of Spain, these bodies were almost powerless after the mid-1700s, but the Basque Provinces and Navarra maintained their own assemblies and rights (both legislative and executive bodies), Fueros, until 1875. This allowed these regions to have real governing autonomy from Castille, with the capacity to raise taxes and to organize its self-defence. Moreover, the church also kept a high degree of autonomy, not found in other regions of Spain with the exception of Catalonia, thus keeping its property, privileges, and remaining embedded in the local laws and institutions of governance.

This allowed for a very strong mobilization of the peasantry against the centralizing national state during the whole nineteenth century. In both Catalonia and

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1071 Carr, 2005, p. 519.
1074 Lynch, 2004, pp. 6, 98.
1075 Payne, 1984, p. 80.
the Basque country, *Carlismo* was stronger because these were areas where the church and the peasants formed a tight alliance.\(^{1076}\) In the Basque country and in Navarra, Carlist movements had been very strong until the 1870s, the time of the second Carlist war. In Portugal, on the contrary, *Miguelismo* was extinct by the early 1850s. As Herminio Martins argues, the *Miguelistas* lacked a regional base like the *Carlistas*, and as a consequence their movement was weaker in organizational density.\(^{1077}\) The Basque *Fueros* were finally abolished in July 1876, when the Spanish central government imposed mandatory military service, the payment of taxes, and their replacement with provincial bodies imposed by the central government. Still, since these institutions were so present at the moment, it was easier to be transformed into a more modern movement for regional defense, which became the basis for a nationalist associational life.\(^{1078}\)

Nationalist movements in the Basque country would thus be more based on a neo-traditionalist position and be very religious.\(^{1079}\) After the elimination of the *fueros*, many cultural and political organizations emerged for the recreation of traditional Basque institutions and culture. They were very able to attract popular classes in strongly Carlist regions.\(^{1080}\) Sabino Arana, the ideologue of Basque nationalism, was arrested in 1895 and afterwards created clandestinely the *Bizkai-Batzara*, a political association which became later the basis of the Basque Nationalist Party. The party was strong in the lower middle classes, some sectors of the working classes, artisans, and small shop-keepers.\(^{1081}\) It became very successful electorally, and in 1917 it conquered the majority in the region of Vizcaya. In 1918 it elected six deputies to the *Cortes* and strengthened its position in the rural areas.\(^{1082}\) It was linked to the *Solidariedad de Trabajadores Vascos* (STV), a nationalist union founded in 1911 and composed almost exclusively of Catholic miners, that rivalled the Socialist unions.\(^{1083}\)

For these reasons, civic associations of Catholicism were also stronger in Spain than in Portugal, because of the impact of the Basque and Catalan regions. Although there are other reasons for the development of a stronger Catholic movement in Spain, as I explain later in this chapter (higher levels of parliamentarization and state capacity in Spain), it was undeniable that these regions had very high density of Catholic

\(^{1076}\) Medrano, 1999, pp. 72-74.
\(^{1078}\) Medrano, 1999, p. 86.
\(^{1079}\) Payne, 1984, p. 112.
\(^{1080}\) Medrano, 1999, p. 87.
\(^{1082}\) Medrano, 1999, pp. 36-37.
\(^{1083}\) Carr, 2005, pp. 437-438.
associational life because of previous traditions of corporate associational life and a stronger corporate institutionalization the Catholic Church.

Catholic associational life appeared for the first time in Spain in 1868 with the formation of the first laymen’s association, the Association of Catholics, for the defense of Catholicism through political activity. It spread to twenty-nine provinces, declining during Alfonso XII’s restoration, with the exception of Catalonia. In the 1890s, when the first Catholic trade unions were formed, they were very strong in the Basque city of Bilbao, as well as in the agrarian areas of north-central Spain, a region of small property holders. After 1905, Catholic mass associational life developed in Spain. In Bilbao emerged small Catholic Uniones Profesionales, mixed worker-employer associations. In Barcelona, a network called the Accion Social Popular was founded in 1907 by the Jesuit priest Gabrile Palau. In 1915 it had 15,000 members in Catalonia, distributed insurance and charity, and also organized the only white collar union in Barcelona, the UPDEC. Another successful Catholic group in Barcelona was the Old Age and Pensions and Savings Bank (Barcelona Caixa de Pensions per a Vellesa I d’Estalvis) founded in 1902 by a lay militant, Francesc Moragas, that provided assistance to many workers, even irrespective of their religion.

Between the 1880s and 1918, Spain developed mass voluntary associations at a much higher level than Portugal. Associations were stronger, denser, more able to recruit members, and more capable to form confederations. This led to the formation of socialist and Catholic mass political movements that were more developed than in Portugal. Besides the fact that Spain had already inherited a stronger associational life at regional level, two other factors explain this: first, higher levels of parliamentarization and second, a stronger state capacity to distribute and implement measures of welfare that empowered voluntary associations.

In Spain, the constitution that was valid between 1876 and 1923 foresaw that legislative power was shared between the Cortes and the king. The king designated the ministers but these were responsible to the parliament, and although the king had a right of veto over legislation, only together with the Cortes could a constitutional change be achieved. Although this was a not fully parliamentarized regime, as in Belgium or in England, the parliament was more powerful than in Portugal. Moreover, this fact was

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related to a higher level of democratization. This had been the legacy of the reforms taken in 1868, which introduced universal male suffrage, which was re-established by the Liberal Party in 1890. The number of voters increased from 847,000 in 1878 to 4.8 million in 1890.¹⁰⁸⁸

Portugal’s parliament, as we saw in the introduction to this chapter was much less powerful and had lower levels of democratization. Laws on the rights of participation, suffrage, debate, assembly, and discussion were more restricted in Portugal than in Spain, and elections were less competitive. Thus, not only was the parliament weaker, but the whole legal framework regulating associational life was more repressive and as such, the levels of democratization of the regime were lower. In fact in 1878, the right of the liberal parties, the Partido Regenerador, published a electoral law that was very open, allowed all adult males to vote (even if illiterate). After the 1890 crisis, the vote in the Republican Party grew, and there was a decline of monarchist parties. In 1895, a new electoral law by PM Hintze Ribeiro took the vote from the illiterates; voters should be men able to read and write, and who paid a fixed amount of direct taxes. Most workers and popular classes stayed outside the political system. The electorate in 1895 was only 9.4% of the population and 40% of the adult males.¹⁰⁸⁹ Although until 1890 the franchise was wider in Portugal than in the neighbouring country, except for the short period between 1868-1874. (In the mid-1860s, the electorate as percentage of all population was about 3% in Spain and about 9%-10% in Portugal; and in the 1880s it was about 6% and 19%, respectively)¹⁰⁹⁰, after 1910 in the First Portuguese Republic, the era of mass politics never arrived. Republicans did not implement universal suffrage. The 1913 law was even more restrictive of the electorate, which became 6.4% of the population, the lowest percentage since 1859. In 1910 the electorate was 47.3% of the adult male population, whereas in 1911 it had been 57.4%, and in 1913 26.5%.¹⁰⁹¹

The deeper parliamentarization and democratization of the Spanish political system had several effects on the development of a higher associational life. First, liberal parties became more competitive both between themselves and with external

¹⁰⁸⁸ Although even after 1890 a law inhibited many individuals to vote since it stipulated that in the electoral circles where the number of candidates did not exceed the number of seats available, there was no need to proceed with the election. This affected mainly the rural districts and benefited the dynastic parties exclusively. Blakeley, 2001, p. 81; see also Collier, 1999, pp. 51-54; and Payne, 1984, p. 126.
¹⁰⁹⁰ I owe this information to Pedro Tavares de Almeida.
adversaries (the Socialists and the Catholics). As Malefakis has noted, in Spain the parties of the *el turno* system, both the liberals and the conservatives of Maura, became more competitive, mass based, and more mobilized than in Portugal, where parties were more dependent of the king.\footnote{Malefakis, 1995, pp. 56-58.} Parties developed more organic links to associations, and they allowed for more tolerant legislation on freedom of association and for inclusive social policies.

Spanish laws on associational life after the 1880s were more tolerant. In 1876 the constitution recognized the right of association, and in 1881 workers’ associations were legalized.\footnote{Caracuel, 1975, pp. 12-13.} The law June 15, 1880 regulated public meetings more freely.\footnote{Morena, 1988, p. 19.} In 1887, the first *Ley de Asociaciones* was approved which allowed all types of associations to exist, including unions. Political authorities could not limit that right, only the courts could declare an association illegal (although there was a lot of harassment and bureaucratic impediments of associational life, such as very detailed procedures for registration, approval of statutes, and the need to inform authorities about the associational leaders and members).\footnote{Castillo, 2003, p. 68; Linz, 1971, pp. 307-311} According to Morena, these laws had a beneficial impact on the growth of associational life.\footnote{Morena, 1988, p. 19.} In Portugal, the laws were more restrictive. Even during the Republic, the decree of December 1910, a law on strikes, put many restrictions on the right to strike. It became known as the *decreto-burla*.\footnote{Pinto, Almeida, 2000, p. 14.}

Through a variety of social policies implemented by both liberal and conservative governments, associational life was empowered in Spain. In 1876, the *Institucion Libre de Enseñanza* was founded by Segismundo Moret, which was the liberal association of social reformism and linked to the *Partido Liberal*. Social welfare measures on security and hygiene at the workplace, regulation of women and children’s work, approval of Sunday rest, and construction of workers’ neighbourhoods were presented to the Cortes in July 1878. In 1880 was presented legislation to encourage workers’ self-help societies, the *Montes de Piedad y Cajas de Ahorro*. The so-called Social Question became an issue in the worries of reformers and politicians in Spain to a degree that never happened in Portugal. Also conservatives, like Antonio Maura, declared the need to «efectuar la revolución desde arriba, para evitar que otros (el
proletariado) la hagan desde abajo». The CRS-Comision de Reformas Sociales was created on December 5, 1883 by a group of moderate liberals (Sagasta) and radical liberals, the Izquierda Dinastica, who had emerged in 1883.

The Commission had the mission to implement measures to improve the economic and social life conditions of the agrarian and industrial working classes. Provincial commissions were created in all the main cities of the country in order to gather information on the popular classes in each district and to supervise social welfare reforms in each locality, and also to mediate labor conflicts. In the early 1900s, it changed its name to Instituto de Reforma Social and implemented a system of local commissions of labour arbitration (to resolve issues like strikes or salaries). It was composed of twelve elected members, six of which were elected by the workers’ unions. Initially, the Socialists were more represented in these bodies, but after 1908 they shared it with the Catholic unions. In 1906, the Labor Inspectorate was also created like the National Institute of Social Security (Instituto Nacional de Previsión) in 1908.

Portugal never developed anything similar to these institutions of social affairs. Work accidents in industry were regulated by the civil code. A first proposal in 1906 by a group of monarchist and progressive dissidents (the Left-Liberals) for mandatory insurance was only restricted to work accidents, and its funding would only come from the employers, not the state. Moreover, it excluded rural workers and fishermen. In the Republican regime after 1910, there were plans for welfare initiatives by the state, but they were never really installed. Initially, the republican regime supported the mutualist movement; in fact, many of its leaders had been active in the mutualities during the monarchy, like Manuel José da Silva, the leader of the Conselho Central da Federação das Mutualidades, and Estevão de Vasconcelos, who became deputy and minister of Fomento (Development). A work accidents law was approved in 1912 to include industrial and rural workers (and fishermen), although it was only restricted to work accidents caused by machines. It also created the Ministério do Trabalho e da Previdência Social (Ministry of Work and Social Welfare) with a department to deal with class associations and mutualities. Finally, the government allowed the creation of

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1098 Morena, 1988, p. 19.
1100 Calle, 1989, p. 15; Morena, 1988, pp. 4-6.
1102 Pereira, 2000, p. 65.
the *Federação Nacional das Associações de Socorros Mútuos* in 1911, a structure that the existing law actually did not foresee.\textsuperscript{1104}

Still, this all became mere legal formalities, and they were never really implemented through the cooption of associations in policy and welfare policy networks. Workers’ mutualities complained at the time that they needed a stronger state intervention, that patrons’ contributions were very low, and that welfare based just on work accidents was very limited (leaving aside old age pensions for instance); finally, there was no clear statistical data on mortality and disease from which policies could be based. The first time the state channeled monetary funds to associations was a contribution of 50,000 escudos to fight the effects of the pneumonic flu epidemic in 1918.\textsuperscript{1105}

In contrast, Spanish associations had greater opportunities to expand, since they faced a more tolerant legislation, a more competitive party system that allowed popular classes greater incentives to build mass parties, and higher chances of participation in administrative welfare and policy-making bodies.\textsuperscript{1106} In 1893-1895, Republicans were able to win seats in the Cortes, with over 30 deputies elected.\textsuperscript{1107} The Socialists had a higher mass membership, a more ideological party, and a union confederation with some penetration in the workers movement, especially in the Basque industrial areas and in Asturias. In comparison, Portuguese socialism remained mainly a small group of middle class intellectuals and without any links to the workers’ movement and associations in general.

The *Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol* (PSOE) was founded in 1879. In 1888, the Socialist union, Union General de Trabajadores (UGT), initially with 3,333 members, was created.\textsuperscript{1108} The UGT proposed the establishment of unions in each *oficio* or *especialidade* who would then federate at local, regional, and national levels. For a long time PSOE’s and UGT’s strength was mainly based on Madrid’s printers. According to Amsden, there was a gradual evolution from 29 sections and 3,550 individuals affiliated in 1888 to 351 sections and 57,000 members in 1905.\textsuperscript{1109} According to Malefakis, the UGT had 6,276 members in 1895 (mostly in Madrid, Asturias and Bilbao), and 50,000 in 1904, 100,000 in 1912, although declining to

\textsuperscript{1104} Pereira, 2000, pp. 58-59.
\textsuperscript{1105} Pereira, 2000, pp. 59-62.
\textsuperscript{1106} Arbat, 1997, p. 220.
\textsuperscript{1107} Carr, 2005, pp. 452-455.
\textsuperscript{1108} Collier, 1999, pp. 51-52.
\textsuperscript{1109} Amsden, 1974, pp. 17-20.
89,601 in 1918. In 1919 it had 200,000 members and in 1921 240,113. Although the socialist workers’ movement was smaller than the Anarchists (the CNT had 699,369 members in 1919), and never expanded in Barcelona and Catalonia, it was much stronger than the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{1110} UGT’s leader, Largo Cabalero, was elected to the Cortes and acquired a post in the Instituto de Reformas Sociales,\textsuperscript{1111} and the Socialists’ strategy at this time was to be part of the political system at both the local and national levels through a penetration of its institutions.\textsuperscript{1112}

The Portuguese Socialist party, \textit{Partido Socialista Operário Português} (PSOP) was founded by José Fontana and Antero de Quental in 1875.\textsuperscript{1113} But Socialists never had any important share of the vote, and they were never included in welfare and policy-making institutions. In the 1878 national elections, they received 44 votes in the city of Porto, in a total of 100,000 voters. The parties of the system of Rotativismo were able to get through clientelism networks the workers’ vote, and mainly the republicans attracted the ideological-protest vote. In 1887, Republicans elected three deputies to the parliament. It was only in the Republic in 1911 that the first Socialist deputy was elected, Manuel José Silva.\textsuperscript{1114}

The Socialist Party’s first congress was in 1877, and the main ideas were put forward. Its aim was to defend the interests of workers in the polity, to advance democratization by universal suffrage, and to institute a federal state with the creation of legislative powers with elected representatives from each \textit{concelho} (Proudhon’s federalism).\textsuperscript{1115} When it was founded, it had established links of cooperation with some workers’ organizations like the \textit{Associação do Protectorado do Trabalho Nacional} (João Bonança), a mutualist-philanthropic organization, or the 1872 \textit{Fraternidade Operária} (José Fontana, Nobre França, and Brito Monterito). In the first congress, twenty seven workers’ organizations were present, among them craft organizations and producers’ cooperatives from Lisbon and Porto.\textsuperscript{1116} In 1876, the party had 5,800 members, 3,600 in Lisbon and 2,200 in Porto.\textsuperscript{1117}

Also the Socialists tried to organize workers’ associations, mainly under the form of mutualities until the late 1880s. In a letter by the Socialist leader Azedo Gneco

\textsuperscript{1110} Malefakis, 2001, pp. 231-232; see also Amsden, 1974, pp. 17-20.
\textsuperscript{1111} Amsden, 1974, pp. 15-16
\textsuperscript{1112} Maravall, 1997, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{1113} Homem, 1993, pp. 132.
\textsuperscript{1114} Mónica, 1985, pp. 86, 96.
\textsuperscript{1115} Mónica, 1985, pp. 51-53.
\textsuperscript{1116} Mónica, 1985, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{1117} Mónica, 1985, p. 58.
to the painters of the southern city of Beja, he suggested to create an association of that city’s socialists, which could be called Federação dos Operários Bejenses. It would be divided in sections of crafts, which would form district associations. In a letter to a Socialist of the city of Faro, he advised them to create an association that would organize leisure activities as well. It should have a library and be able to organize festivities every three months, as well as in specific periods like religious holidays, the Easter, and new year’s eve, including dancing parties, in order to «let the women jump».\(^{1118}\)

By the end of the 1880s, 20,000 workers were organized, in 1909 there were 27,000 workers in unions, and in 1917 55,000. In the 1880s, union density was 22.2% (the industrial population was 90,000). But in 1910, it had declined to 4% (there were 666,250 industrial workers in 1910). In 1909 the stronger unions were the freemasons of Porto (1,156 members), the metalworkers of Porto (731), the Porto carpenters (720), the soldadores of Setúbal, tailors of Lisboa, and the corticeiros of Almada, each with more than 400 members.\(^{1119}\)

Still, since its foundation the Socialist party never managed to build a strong organizational structure, and it remained a decentralized organization in the early twentieth century. It was composed of sections (each with an executive commission), municipal centers, and regional centers (with a directive junta). The party was led by a central council (conselho central), and the class associations, cooperatives, recreational societies and political clubs were admitted as party sections. All these gathered in three regional federations, one in the north, and other in the south and another in the center. Most accounts say that the center federation never really had an existence, and that the two other had a very independent life from each other and from the national direction with their own political line and newspapers. Finally, party funds were very scarce.\(^{1120}\)

Moreover and contrary to the Spanish socialists, it did not have a federative union like the Spanish UGT, and its links to the labor movement were weaker. Whatever links there existed, they were not through federative national structures of workers but through links to specific and single class associations.\(^{1121}\) Records of the period indicate that unions had a line of no direct involvement in the party debates of the day. The Associação Promotora do Trabalho Nacional, which was connected to

\(^{1118}\) Mônica, 1985, p. 69.
\(^{1119}\) Mônica, 1986, p. 16.
\(^{1120}\) Mônica, 1985, pp. 69-70.
\(^{1121}\) Mônica, 1985, pp. 72-73.
the Socialist leader João Bonança, was mainly worried about economic issues and demands on the workplace, and it expressed low interest in the contemporary political issues. Its official newspaper, *O Trabalho*, was very suspicious of bourgeois elites.\footnote{Mónica, 1985, pp. 47-48.}

In the 1870s, Socialist leader efforts to recruit workers’ associations faced the resistance of these associations, which put as a condition that the party abstains from electoral participation. Unions always tried to maintain a clear autonomy in relation to the party. In 1882, the *Confederação de Associações de Classe* proclaimed the principle of union autonomy. In 1885, the association of the wood workers (*torneiros*) revolted against the party and organized its own congress in order to defend a line of adaptation of workers to improve the workers’ material conditions and not to be directed under extremists and vague party ideologies.\footnote{Mónica, 1985, p. 58.} Socialist leaders, on the other hand, complained that workers were not interested in politics, were undisciplined, going on wild strikes, and that they wasted the movements’ energy and political stance.\footnote{Mónica, 1985, pp. 47-48.}

For similar reasons, Catholic associational life was be stronger in Spain than in Portugal. After the 1880s, Catholic associational life grew intensely. It was mainly spurred by the liberal governments’ anticlerical policies and also by the aim of blocking growing Socialist penetration of working classes. Apart from the Basque country and Catalonia, Catholic/agrarian associations spread intensely in the regions of Castilla, Navarra, and León, and they were able to mobilize and organize small and medium size rural proprietors. In 1881, the Catholic Union, a Catholic lay organization, was formed by Alejandro Pidal y Mon. In 1894, the Marques de Comillas (a Catholic millionaire from Barcelona) founded the *Junta Central de Acción Católica*, a lay association.\footnote{Payne, 1984, pp. 116-117.} Campaigns for the defense of Catholicism were organized by the Ligas or Juntas Católicas; Catholic Action expanded, *Centros de Defesa Social* appeared in many cities, and also the ACNP (*Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas*) emerged in 1908 thanks to the Jesuit priest José Ayala.\footnote{Payne, 1984, pp. 136-137.}

In the 1890s by the action of Jesuit priest Antonio Vicente, a follower of French and Austrian Catholic corporatism, the first Catholic trade union was founded. Built in the remnants of old traditional crafts, it was organized as fraternities based on profession or neighborhood. Vincent and the Marques de Comillas promoted later the...
Consejos Nacional de las Corporations Católicas-Obreras in Madrid in 1896 to serve as an umbrella organization to coordinate this ensemble of Catholic charity, mutual assistance, and recreational associations. In 1900, they had 485,000 members in workers’ circles and 275,000 in other associations. In 1916, the Federación Nacional de Syndicates Católicos-Libres was created by two Dominican priests, Pedro Gerard (leader of a Catholic union of vineyard workers in Jerez de la Frontera) and José Gafo (leader of a Catholic union of railway men in Madrid) from the old circulos católicos with the support of the cardinals Aguirre and Guisaola. Another priest, the Asturian Maximiliano Arboleya, organized the miners and farm workers in Asturias, rival of the Confederacion Nacional de Sindicatos Obreros Catolicos, of Comillas, who was much dominated by employers.

In 1905, there were less than 70 rural cooperatives in Spain (in France there were 648 in 1898 and 2,060 in 1900; in Italy there were 1,092 rural Catholic societies in 1904; in Germany there were 17,162 agrarian cooperatives of all types in 1905). But in 1910 there were already 1,559 and 1,530 in 1915, and they became very strong after 1912, when the confederation, the Confederacion Nacional Catolica Agraria (CONCA), was formed. As can be seen from the next table, the areas of Castilla-León, the province of Palencia, Burgos, Valladolid, Navarra, and Valencia became very dense in Catholic-agrarian associational life.

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1127 Payne, 1984, pp. 120-121.
Table 30: Agrarian *Sindicatos*, 1915

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque country</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragón</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cataluña</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baleares</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilla and Leon</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilla la Mancha</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalucia</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canarias</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Herrero, 1995, p. 135)

The CONCA was formed in 1912 in old Castile. It was a Catholic farmers’ association, and although its leaders were mainly recruited from the class of landowners of large estates, it became a strong organization in the regions of Castile, Leon, Navarra, northern Aragon, and eastern provinces of Valencia and Murcia. It was strong especially in Bilbao and in the agrarian areas of north-central Spain, a region of small property holders. It organized rural cooperatives of producers and consumers, instituted insurance programs, and savings and credit organizations. In 1922 it had more than half a million families, about three million people. It was as large as the CNT, but it had no presence in the southern latifundia. In 1922, the movement had about half million

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1131 In the with second republic regime it declined to 200000 members. Payne, 1984, pp. 140-146.
families, although it was limited to the regions of Castilla and Navarra where there was a very Catholic peasantry and where some landowners fomented the movement. Its regional distribution was: La Rioja: 148, Palencia 106, Valladolid 125, Astorga 84, Navarra 99, Murcia 25, Cuenca 15, and no data for Andalucia.\textsuperscript{1132}

In the nineteenth century Portugal, there were also attempts to organize a Catholic mass movement, but it was much less successful than in Spain. The first Catholic association was the \textit{Sociedade Católica Promotora da Moral Evangélica}, which was formed in 1843 to resist the secularization measures of liberalism although it accepted the liberal regime.\textsuperscript{1133} In the 1870s, several other Catholic associations were founded to fight the emerging ideologies of Republicanism and Socialism in the cities of Porto, Braga, Guimarães, and Lisboa. The first charity associations were founded in 1873 by the Count of Samodães, while the Catholic newspaper \textit{A Palavra} had been established in 1872.\textsuperscript{1134} In the congresses of Catholic writers in Porto in 1871, in Braga in 1872 and in the First Catholic meeting in Lisbon in July 1881, appeals were made for the creation of a permanent Catholic organization capable of mobilizing the working classes. In the aftermath of these debates, the leader of the Catholic association of Porto, D. António Tomás de Almeida, and the \textit{União Católica Portuguesa} was created in 1882. This was an organization that clearly opposed socialist ideas and tried to establish a wider federation of Catholic organizations with the creation of the \textit{Associação Protectora dos Operários} by another Catholic activist, Mendes Lajes, and with the aim to run in the elections.\textsuperscript{1135}

In 1882, the \textit{União Católica Portuguesa} failed miserably in the 1884 elections and disappeared after internal divisions. In 1895, a Catholic social movement, which included youth associations in Lisbon and Oporto, was formed by several Catholic centers in cities of the north with the aim to elect «genuine Catholics», but it was unable to elect a single deputy. In 1903 the Centro Nacional transformed itself into the \textit{Partido Nacionalista} (Nationalist Party) in the nationalist congress in the city of Porto 1903 organized by the Catholic association of that city. Five hundred delegates representing eleven districts (Viana do Castelo, Braga, Vila Real, Bragança, Porto, Aveiro, Viseu, Guarda, Castelo Branco, Lisboa, and Funchal) were inspired by the German \textit{Zentrum} party created the first attempt for mass Catholic associational life.

\textsuperscript{1132} Carr, 2005, p. 439.
\textsuperscript{1133} Neto, 1998, pp. 401-403.
\textsuperscript{1134} Neto, 1998, p. 409.
\textsuperscript{1135} Neto, 1998, pp. 413-414.
Their leaders were mainly big impresarios of center and northern agriculture who also sought protective measures for wine and agriculture in general, like lines of agricultural credit. They declared themselves leaders of a genuine Catholic party whose aims were the defense of the religious norms in education, in the mobilization of workers, and that aimed to replace the corrupt liberal parties.\textsuperscript{1136}

It was never a successful organization. In 1905 when the regime moved clearly in the direction of an executive dictatorship with PM Hintze Ribeiro, Catholics saw their electoral avenues closed.\textsuperscript{1137} It ran in the elections during all years. In 1905 it managed to get two deputies by the Funchal and Braga circles elected, and in 1906 four deputies were elected in the northern districts. In 1908 only one deputy was elected. In fact, soon the nationalist party became strongly anti-democratic, never accepting universal suffrage, and in the end supporting João Franco’s dictatorship, thus entering the so-called anti-liberal bloc in 1910.\textsuperscript{1138}

This inhibited any links with the workers’ Catholic movement. In 1905 the Catholic workers’ circles had only twelve thousand members, a small number when compared with the republican and socialist networks.\textsuperscript{1139} According to Neto, Catholic politicians and the Catholic workers’ circles and mutualities never «established any organic connection between themselves».\textsuperscript{1140} Social Catholicism had appeared in Portugal in the last years of the nineteenth century to fight the influence of socialism and republicanism in the popular and industrial classes. In 1872, the association \textit{Amigos de Santo António}, a charity for industrial workers, was founded in Porto, and after 1898 the first workers circles appeared in Porto 1898 under the promotion of Manuel Frutuoso da Fonseca and the city’s bishop. In 1910, there were only 25 circles in the whole country, mainly restricted to the northwest, although they organized about ten thousand workers, in a universe of half a million workers in the country (left associations, especially anarchists and socialists, included 20,000 workers)\textsuperscript{1141}.

Only in some rural associations in small areas of northern and central Portugal was the Catholic movement able to create roots.\textsuperscript{1142} Still, the \textit{sindicatos agrícolas} of small and medium farmers (sometimes land leasers) that were set up for credit and for

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1136} Neto, 1998, pp. 427-428, 431
\textsuperscript{1137} Neto, 1998, p. 420.
\textsuperscript{1139} Torgal, 1993, p. 239.
\textsuperscript{1140} Neto, 1998, p. 439.
\textsuperscript{1142} Torgal, 1993, p. 239.
\end{flushright}
the spread of techniques to improve production had much less success in Portugal, and they remained elitist bodies. The mutualist associations of small and medium sized independent farmers, contrary to Spanish agricultural associational life, tended to be atomized and apolitical despite the efforts of the Catholics to organize them. The first of the associations appeared in the village of Lagoa (in the island of S. Miguel in the Azores islands) in 1893 and in the village of Montemor-o-Velho in 1894. In 1910 there were 98 of these organizations with about 10,000 members, which was less than 1% of the agrarian active labor force. Half of these organizations were in the provinces of Ribatejo, Alentejo, Estremadura, and in some of the wine producing areas.

Finally, the producers’ class was divided. The southern landowners organized in the Real Associação da Agricultura Portuguesa (RACAP). The RACAP was created after two agricultural congresses in 1888 and in 1889 where producers asked the government special provisions to defend cereals agriculture and for protectionist measures, which in fact were enacted in 1889. Moreover, in 1906 RACAP became a member of a government commission for policies in agriculture, the Conselho Superior de Agricultura, which had technical, tariff, and product classification functions. The leaders of RACAP had also the plan to create a national network of sindicatos agrícolas as a base for the expansion of a Catholic ideology and the protection of Catholics but within a democratic system. The main figure was Luís de Castro, who defended in a conference in 1899 that RACAP should have an interclass organization, from the big landowners to the rural workers. As he argued, it was imperative to organize rural workers because they would bring «democratic spirit and strength».

Still, these efforts to create sindicatos that included big and small landowners, and workers were never fulfilled. There remained always strong particularism and heterogeneity in the agricultural arena of interests, especially because of the opposition of northern and southern wine producers. As a consequence, RACAP was unable to represent all the Portuguese farmers.

1143 Vaquinhas and Neto, 1993, pp. 334-337.
1145 Like the mandatory commercialization of bread in shops, the production of certain types of bread and the prohibition to commercialize foreign wheat before the Portuguese had been all sold. Pinto, Almeida, 2000, p. 11.
1149 Ramos, 1994, pp. 236-239.
Because of the low level of parliamentarization and democratization of the Portuguese regime, and the process of state development, Catholic associations never developed as much as they could have. Elites, both economic agrarian producers, intellectuals and the Catholic hierarchy, always refrained and/or failed to mobilize the citizenry through an ideology of mass Catholicism and to develop strong coordinated networks of associational life because of institutional barriers. For instance, low parliamentarism created divisions within would-be Catholic mobilizers, between those willing to operate within a competitive liberal-parliamentary system evolving in the direction of suffrage extension, and between those that preferred to ally with anti-liberal traditionalists in the army, the crown, and the turno parties. Those that expressed in the Catholic newspaper *A Palavra* in 1881 that it was «possible to be a liberal and a Catholic, without contradiction and confusion of ideas» were defeated.1150

These tensions became even more acute with the fall of the Republic in 1910 and with the declaration of a republican regime. As was discussed previously, the republican regime was even less parliamentarized, and many agrarian associations became even more divided between Catholics and supporters of the monarchist cause, which was composed by a band of dissident army officers in exile in Spain and that kept making military incursions through the country during the Republic. The republican coup in 1910 had been mainly a Lisbon phenomenon, and the republicans were never able to control the country and to unify the territory under a single regime and authority. As a result, there were many pockets of resistance to the regime, while the elites disagreed on rules for cooperation.1151 Until 1913, monarchists continued to make military incursions from Galicia, in Spain, in order to install a new monarchical regime.1152 Parliamentarization fell to a low, when the military began to intervene gradually, and for a period in 1915 the pro-monarchist general Pimenta de Castro ruled in dictatorship. Finally in 1917, pro-monarchist groups were also supporting the military coup that ended the first period of the Portuguese republic by General Sidônio Pais, who ruled for one year as a dictator.1153 Most of the *sindicatos agrarios* aligned with the monarchist cause and with the military, and as a consequence as soon as 1912 the Republican Minister of Interior declared them illegal.1154 Afonso Costa, the leader of

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1150 Neto, p. 409.
1151 Neto, p. 409.
1152 Cruz, 1999d, pp. 509-510.
1153 Cruz, 1999, p. 270.
the Republican Party, considered rural syndicalism a form of «reaccionarismo» (reactionarism).\(^{1155}\)

In terms of policy and welfare initiatives, the republican regime strengthened even more the legacy of statism and dirigisme, of state control over societal forces, thus not developing any partnerships or corporatist arrangements between the state and organized interests that would empower voluntary associations. For instance, the plans in 1912 for the creation of mandatory declaration of the agricultural production to be done through representative associations in the Directorate General of Agriculture were not pursued by the government. Instead, a system was instituted where each producer made his declaration individually and separately. Also the nomination of representatives of producers’ associations for consultative state organs like the Conselho Superior da Agricultura and the Conselho de Fomento Comercial da Produção were not pursued, and in 1913 they were replaced by the internal services of the ministries.\(^{1156}\)

The most successful Catholic associations in Portugal were the ones that remained elitist and that cultivated links to the conservative sectors in the administration and the military. Associative Catholicism would remain elitist and authoritarian. In the institutional and political conditions of this period, mass organizations could not develop well. In 1917, the Centro Católico Português was created by António Lino Neto, which was a last attempt for mass democratic Catholicism. Still, it could never participate in the elections during the republic, it never even claimed to be a party, but a civic association and its parish organizations were only active during electoral periods. It fell under internal divisions, between those that were democratic and suspicious of the Fascist and authoritarian thesis that started to be advocated by certain sectors of Catholicism, like António Salazar, the emerging leader of a reactionary-clerical wing.\(^{1157}\) António Salazar was one of the main figures of the CADC (Centro Académico da Democracia Cristã) together with the future head of Portuguese Catholic Church, Manuel Gonçalves Cerejeira. The CADC was created in 1912 by a group of university students and professors in Coimbra under the motto “Piety, Study, Action”. It was clearly an anti-democratic group that refused democracy and individualism. Between 1905 and 1909, it had only 100 members and it always remained an elite association.\(^{1158}\)

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\(^{1155}\) Ramos, 1994, pp. 482-483.
\(^{1156}\) Madureira, 2002, pp. 36-37.
But it was a far more successful association than the projects of mass Catholicism as becomes evident in the next chapter.

11.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I showed that most of the conditions that inhibited the development of associational ventures continued during the period 1870s-1918, the so-called golden age of associability, where everywhere in the western world associations were being founded for many purposes. Iberian countries did not escape this trend, but a tradition of weak state strength became predominant with a system of façade parliamentarism that sustained itself mainly through corruption. When external conditions led to a confrontation with other states that had military overtones, this led to a crisis of legitimacy of these regimes that definitely put away popular classes from elites.

Still, it was also in this period that conditions in Spain lead to a denser civil society especially in some regions. At the regional level, in Catalonia and in the Basque country, there was a tradition of partnerships between the state, and corporate and church interests. Moreover, at the national level, the Spanish state showed a higher capacity both in the development of corporatist and welfare functions through partnerships with unions, like the UGT, and it showed higher levels of electoral competition and freedom of association than Portugal. Accordingly, civil society organizations were stronger in Spain.
Chapter 12: The Mass Age, 1918-1940s

In this chapter I analyze the development of Portuguese and Spanish associational life between 1918 and the early 1940s. It was in this period that the full potential for a mass associational life could have been achieved in Western European countries, but the outcome that was consolidated in the Iberian countries was a very small, particularistic, clandestine, low density, and uncoordinated associational life that stabilized under the establishment of authoritarian state-corporatist regimes in the 1930s and the 1940s. This provided the framework through which civil societies in the post-1970s democratic period developed, and it explains the reason why both Portugal and Spain have the weakest associational life among western European democracies. Although there are differences worth exploring between civil societies between Spain and Portugal in the period 1974-2000 (this will be the topic of the next chapter), it was the inability of these countries to consolidate a democratic and participatory associational life in the interwar period that caused the contemporary weakness of the Iberian civil societies.

12.1. Mass Politics in Iberia: Variations

When the First World War ended in 1918, a period began where there are higher pressures for the development of voluntary associations. Associations for a variety of reasons tended to form or plan to form peak associations representative at the national level. The mobilization of members and their engagement in activities was also very high, and the expansion of associational life was positively related to social protest. The so-called trienio revolucionário, the years between 1920 and 1923, were the high point of this process. It was in this period and in the subsequent interwar years in Western Europe that socialist, Anarchist, and religious networks of associational life competed for members and influence in the national polity. But the end result in the Iberian countries was to frustrate all these historical alternatives and to stabilize instead by a state-corporatist controlled associational life, highly non-coordinated, and with low density.

In Portugal a military dictatorship gave the first steps in this direction in 1926, and they were later deepened by Salazar’s authoritarian Estado Novo in 1933. In Spain, the triénio revolucionário gave way to an authoritarian transition in 1923 with a military
dictatorship, which was briefly defeated in 1929 by a democratic experiment, the Spanish Republic, which would only last until 1936, when a right-wing military coup by General Franco started the civil war and the authoritarian regime.

In Portugal after 1918, one can notice the expansion of all types of associations as well as the emergence of nationwide confederations. In 1910 there were 223 unions, in 1921 there were 425 associations of workers in industry (46,277 members), 219 for commerce, services and transports (39,127 members), and 86 for agriculture and fishing workers (11,018 members). Mutual aid societies numbered 668 and rural unions 276. The total number of associations in Portugal in 1921 was thus 1,674. Trade unionism expanded to new social strata like the rural laborers, civil servants, and tertiary sector workers. There was a growing competition in the Left for the mobilization of workers. In 1925 there were 507 unions, with 263,000 members, out of which 67,000 were members of the main confederation (the Anarchist CGT). This was accompanied by an explosion of protests and strikes, especially in the two years after the war. The Soviet revolution in 1917 encouraged workers’ associations in Lisbon to go on strike and demand the nationalization of production. Associations tended to form nation-wide confederations. Only in 1924 is granted the right to form federations or national organizations. Moreover, the level of strikes rose. In 1900-1909 there were 91 strikes, in 1910-1919 391, and in 1920-25 127.

In Spain, workers associations’ capacity to mobilize constituencies grew immensely. In 1920 the combined CNT and UGT membership was at least 8 times its 1910-1914 average, and in 1933 it was 10 times what it was in 1930. In absolute terms in the 1930s, the membership of the CNT and the UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) was around two million, and the total union membership was 2.5 million if we add the smaller trade unions. In the trienio bolchevique, the Anarchist CNT had 700,000 members and in 1932 862,000.

When comparing the Spanish and Portuguese civil societies of this period, one can see that only for the period of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship Spanish associational

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1159 Pinto, Almeida, 2000, p. 16.
life was less dense. There were 1,647 associations in 1921 in Portugal,\(^{1166}\) which gives one association for each 4,205 people if calculating from the overall national population.\(^{1167}\) In Spain in 1928, which was the last year of Rivera’s dictatorship, there were 3,804 associations, an association thus for each 5,600 people.\(^{1168}\) In 1933, during the Spanish Second Republic, there were 10,479 workers’ associations and 4,662 employers’ associations, meaning 15,141 associations in total, and one association for each 1,556 Spaniards. In Portugal in 1934, just when the authoritarian regime was about to establish itself, there were 1,076 associations (754 of workers’, 285 of employers’, and 37 mixed), which gives one association for each 6,436 Portuguese.\(^{1169}\)

For the first three years of the interwar period, between 1918 and 1923, the Spanish Socialists seemed to become even more successful. The PSOE in the 1918 elections managed to elect seven MPs.\(^{1170}\) But the defeat inflicted by the Moroccan Kabile armies in July 1921 on the Spanish army sent to Morocco created the conditions for the 1923 Primo de Rivera’s coup.\(^{1171}\) Rivera inaugurated a new regime, a modernizing dictatorship when compared to Portugal. This project replaced the Cortes with a corporatist assembly, in which sat a single party, the Unión Patriótica, and economic development programs became central for the new regime. Initially it was ruled by a group of generals that governed by decree and took ad hoc measures to “correct” the 1876 constitution. It established permanent military administration in the provinces (ruled by generals) and in the municipalities/ayuntamientos (ruled by captains). But this form of administration was not enough for the regime to persist, and so attempts to co-opt a more civilian elite started soon. In 1925, the military directorio was replaced by civilians, mainly technocrats that attempted to institutionalize a state-planned and directed economy. Several measures were enacted: plans for taxing capital, a uniform income taxation system, an equilibrated budget, public works (roads, railways, and irrigation projects), and social welfare initiatives. In 1926, the single party was created, the Unión Patriótica.\(^{1172}\)

An important trait of the new regime was its cooptation of the leadership of the UGT and the strengthening trends inherited from the previous decades. The State

\(^{1167}\) The Portuguese population in 1930 was 6925883. Martins, 1998, p. 94.
\(^{1168}\) Riley, 2002, pp. 150-151.
\(^{1169}\) Martins, 1998, p. 94; Schmitter, 1999a, p. 115.
\(^{1171}\) Linz, 2006, p. 159.
Council had a place for Largo Caballero and the institutionalization of labor management boards (Comités Paritários) in 1926-1928, thus continuing the work of the Instituto de Reformas Sociales was done through a partnership with UGT. These and other regulatory boards and commissions of the regime fostered the development of voluntary associations, since it recruited representatives from all the interested parties and also had obligatory membership. Rivera’s labour policy was a «mix of repression and favouritism» of certain segments of the unions. Repression, censorship of the press, and the use of the Somaten (a kind of armed police in reserve) was directed mainly against the Anarchist CNT, not the UGT.

To a large degree, Spain had a successful modernizing dictatorship between 1923 and 1930, which allowed for the development of corporatist structures. First, it inherited a civil service that had many progressive and pro-labour technocrats and civil servants (progressive bureaucrats, like jurists, sociologists, academics, and humanists that served as consultants, arbiters, and committee officers for mixed consultation commissions) that went back to the Institución Libre de Enseñanza and that had worked in the Instituto de Reformas Sociales, the Instituto de Trabajo, and in the 1904 Instituto de Reformas Sociales. Many of these individuals were Socialists and even members of the PSOE and its organizations and staffed the labour agencies, the Treasury, and the Ministry of Development, where they designed legislation over social issues. In Rivera’s government they were known as the “arbitristas” (Aunós, Calvo Sotelo, and Benjumea) that competed with the hardliners’ militaristic faction of Martinez Anido, the Interior Minister, and head of the State Security Agency. In 1924 the Ministry of Labour absorbed the Instituto de Reformas Sociales in order to improve the collection of social data and to link it with policy-making and the implementation of social legislation and of the new labour code. The local juntas of the Institute became delegations of the ministry.

In fact, more weight was given to social policies by the government. The health care program budget went from 4 million to 12 million pesetas. There were subsidies for public charities from 2.4 to 4.7 million pesetas. Provincial Institutes of Hygiene were created under the direction of the National Health Institute, and the National Insurance Institute (INP), the agency for the administration of social security, had

1176 McIvor, 1982, pp. 49, 62-64.
grown from being supported mainly by companies and cooperatives to a real bureaucratic agent, thus becoming the main provider of social insurance (from 20 million in 1922 to 192 million pesetas in the budget of 1929). More importantly, the main vehicles through which support and placement of the unemployed were channelled were the workers’ unions that received state funding for this purpose. In 1923, an annual renewable credit line of 500,000 pesetas was created in the Labour ministry to be given to workers’ associations with unemployment programs.\textsuperscript{1177}

This allowed the UGT to grow and to become stronger as an organization. With the help of the state, it established \textit{Casas Del Pueblo} in many parts of Spain and in those cities where no tradition of organized associational life existed. By 1924 there were 1,000 active cooperatives with 25,000 members in Spain. The UGT had established cooperatives in the Casas Del Pueblo all over Spain. This allowed the UGT to augment its national membership: 41,000 in 1910, 148,000 in 1913, 100,000 in 1916-18, 211,000 in 1920, and 223,000 in 1927.\textsuperscript{1178} In Madrid, the Socialists became especially strong. The trade union officials developed more cooperative services, such as delivering savings, housing, medicine and consumer goods. In 1932, the \textit{Cooperativa Socialista Madrileña} served 12,000 families of workers, had an annual budget of 7.5 million pesetas, and enrolled by that year 14,000 members.\textsuperscript{1179} The number of workers covered by contracts negotiated in the comités reached one million in 1930, which was 25\% of all industry and service employees.\textsuperscript{1180} Because of these policies, the cooperative movement grew immensely also in Catalonia. In 1924 the cooperative movement was organized under a regional federation with a permanent basis. It included 147 associations and provided services to 22,000 families. In the northern provinces of Burgos, Santander, and Logrono, cooperatives expanded also. The Cooperative Union of Northern Spain, founded in 1914 in Bilbao, consolidated as a regional federation in 1924 and served 18,000 families.\textsuperscript{1181}

In July 1929, the military deposed Primo de Rivera from government. Since 1928, Rivera had began to loose the support of the Socialists and envisaged plans to legitimize the regime with a new constitution in July of 1929, where the royal power would be limited. A new figure would be head of government, nominated by Rivera, but

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1177} McIvor, 1982, pp. 7-10.
  \item \textsuperscript{1178} Amsden, 1974, p. 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{1179} McIvor, 1982, pp. 116, 120-121.
  \item \textsuperscript{1180} McIvor, 1982, p. 197.
  \item \textsuperscript{1181} McIvor, 1982, pp. 31-35.
\end{itemize}
with greater powers. The king opposed such plans and forced Rivera to resign in an alliance with both military conservative and republican sectors and politicians.\textsuperscript{1182} The Constitution of 1876 was reinstated, but now the king was also a weak figure, since he had previously supported Rivera and the old parties of the liberal system no longer existed. As a consequence, and with the Right discredited and the army paralysed with the expulsion of Rivera, the political space was occupied by the left-wing forces. Republicans, leftist Catalan nationalists, and Socialists agreed common action in the pact of San Sebastián in August 1930, and they won the municipal elections of April 12, 1931. The king and the government were discredited and unable to use the army. After an ultimatum of the victorious left-coalition, they left the country.\textsuperscript{1183}

A provisional government was enacted on April 14, 1931 to prepare the general elections that would mark a transition to democracy. The provisional government was constituted by several groups. There were the old Liberals of the \textit{El Turno} system, the \textit{progressistas} (Miguel Maura, and Niceto Alcalá Zamora), which were now the Right of the coalition; the republicans of the \textit{Partido Radical} of Alejandro Lerroux (the center of the coalition); the parties \textit{Acción Republicana}, led by Manuel Azaña, the radical-socialistas of Marcelino Domingo and Álvaro de Albornoz, the Catalans of the \textit{Esquerra}, the ORGA, a Galician party, and the PSOE together with its union, the UGT. Alcalá Zamora, the leader of the progressistas became the head of government, Maura Minister of Interior, Lerroux Foreign Affairs Minister, Azaña War Minister, and the Socialists occupied the Ministry of Justice (Fernando de los Rios), Work (Francisco Largo Caballero), and Finance (Indalecio Prieto).\textsuperscript{1184}

In the first general elections in June 1931, the provisional government coalition had an impressive victory. The Right was even unable to present candidates, and the extreme Left, the Anarchists, stayed outside of the electoral process. The coalition won 75\% of the parliamentary posts. Within the governing coalition there were also changes in the distribution of power, with the Socialists and the radicals becoming the more important parties.\textsuperscript{1185} The Second Republic achieved full democratization, and as a consequence a higher degree of party competition and concomitant associational competition and development. In Spain, Socialists competed with the Right and the Left, the Anarchists, to degrees much higher than in Portugal. The degree of regime

\textsuperscript{1182} Carr, 2005, pp. 564-567.
\textsuperscript{1183} Jover and Gómez-Ferrer, 2001a, pp. 568-573.
\textsuperscript{1184} Malefakis, 2001, pp. 243-244.
\textsuperscript{1185} Malefakis, 2001, p. 255; Payne, 1984, p. 152.
democratization was much higher in the Spanish republic of 1931-1926 than in the Portuguese republic during the period 1918-1926. As a consequence, it had much higher levels of mobilization and membership levels in unions and parties of the Right and the Left.1186

In the republic, the PSOE became the major left-wing party and a real mass organization, with 60,000 to 80,000 members and with a large and radical youth movement.1187 It continued to expand its unions under the UGT. In 1932 the UGT had one million members, organized Casas Del Pueblo across the country, and promoted local social, educational, and mutual benefit societies. Moreover, UGT attempted to mobilize southern agricultural workers, thus entering the Anarchists’ bastion. The UGT created a peasant union, the Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra (FNTT), in April 1930. By 1932 the FNTT had 392,953 members and 2,541 local committees, seven MPs representing it in the Cortes, sold a weakly newspaper of 80,000 copies, and its membership was about 40% members of the whole UGT.

The socialists’ position was also strengthened because of state policies, which enabled a rise in the unions’ and party membership. In the first two years of the republic, Republican and Socialist leaders continued and deepened the institutions of labor cooptation inherited from the liberal past and Rivera’s period. New labor conciliation committees, the Jurados Mixtos, in a decree of May 7, 1931 replaced the Comités Paritarios, gained more powers, extended to agricultural areas, and spread in the areas of Socialist influence, thus increasing Socialist membership.1188 The Jurados Mixtos became a central institution of the regime, bargaining collectively bargaining and negotiating between capital and labor, with the state having an arbitrative and conciliatory role, a common procedure. Jurados Mixtos were established in several localities with the old aim of mixed representation for conciliation of work conflicts. They could intervene in cases of firing and negotiate collective bargaining agreements.

The Ministry of Work became an engine of social policy. The ministry had two sections, one technical and the other corporative where workers and employers were represented in sub-committees and technical boards.1189 Programmes of social welfare were also expanded. Minimum wages, health insurance, paid vacations, and eight hour

day work were measures enacted by Largo Caballero as the Minister of Work. Lastly, the socialists’ plans for agrarian reform were also destined to conquer CNT’s traditional membership in the south. In 1931, the Socialists enacted a series of emergency decrees that forbade the expulsion of small tenants from their rented land: the prohibition of the employment of migrant workers by landowners (the *Ley de Terminos Municipales*). Furthermore, they forbade owners from withdrawing their land from cultivation, decreed wage increases, the eight hour work day, and a kind of closed shop in the rural labor market through arbitration boards in the Casas de Pueblo controlled by the FNTT. The *ley agraria* of September 1932 aimed at property redistribution. The expropriated land was to be redistributed either in collective form or in individual parcels by the Instituto de Reforma Agraria. Although about 10,000 poor peasants received new land, in general the reform was weak and not very profound. Still, this strengthened the Socialist unions and associational life in general. According to Payne, Socialists became a real mass movement after 1931: 40% of the union membership of the Socialists was coming from rural districts.

Table 31: UGT and FNTT Membership and Number of Local Committees, 1922-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UGT Membership</th>
<th>Local Committees</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1922</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>208170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1929</td>
<td>1511</td>
<td>228501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1931</td>
<td>4041</td>
<td>958451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1932</td>
<td>5107</td>
<td>1041539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FNTT membership</th>
<th>Local Committees</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1930</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>27340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1930</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>36639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1932</td>
<td>2233</td>
<td>308579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1932</td>
<td>2541</td>
<td>392953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1933</td>
<td>3319</td>
<td>451337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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By contrast, the Portuguese political system had very weak levels of parliamentarization and democratization. Portugal had only very brief experience with universal suffrage in 1918 during the military rule of Sidónio Pais. In 1919 with the death of Sidónio Pais the electoral law of 1913 was reinstated. Of the 6 million Portuguese in 1923, only 680,000 could vote. Moreover, only about 100,000 actually voted, since the system was highly controlled by the machine of the *Partido Democrático*. The republic continued the pattern of caciquism and clientelism in the party system that was common from the monarchy but now through a dominant party, the *Partido Democrático*. It only lost one election between 1910 and 1926 (in 1921). The remaining parties were parliamentary personalistic networks or ad hoc coalitions during electoral periods.

In Portugal, the Socialists were much weaker between 1918 and 1926. There were no links between the party and the unions, and any incorporation of associations through public policies failed. In the labor movement Anarchists were dominant, and they had at this stage a clearly anti-state and revolutionary posture. The Socialists had a weak presence in the *Federação das Associações Operárias*, especially in the *Federação Operária de Lisboa*, that was run by printers. In 1917, after the right-wing military coup of Sidónio Pais, who brought down the first phase of the republic and tried to install a military-presidentialist regime, there was a form of truce with the workers’ movement, in particular with the Socialists, since they had been persecuted during the republic.

The military insurrection of December 1917 by Sidónio Pais that brought down the republic and installed for a year a military regime was a consequence of Portuguese participation in World War I on allied side in 1917. Its’ aim was to keep possession of Portuguese colonies in Africa that faced a risk of being divided in the post-war agreements. It had the opposition of almost everybody (the monarchists, the Anarchists, and conservative-republicans). The officers of the rebellion were both monarchists and right-wing republicans, with some Catholics and early authoritarians who wanted a corporatist state, the *Integralistas*. Their aim was to end the domination of the PRP and its leader, Afonso Costa. In fact, the regime instituted universal suffrage for the first

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1194 Mónica, 1985, pp. 148-149.
1196 Oliveira, 2000, p. 432.
time in Portugal. Some leaders of the workers’ movement, like Martins Ruivo and Sebastião Martins, received places in the state administration, and the UON accepted places in the Conselho Superior do Trabalho. Political positions were given also to associational leaders. The leader of ACAP became minister of Agriculture in 1918, and the leader of the Associação Industrial do Porto became minister of commerce and finance (Xavier Esteves). Finally, Sidónio created a senate with corporative representation for interest organizations, like the ACAP, and for other business interests. All these measures failed almost immediately since Sidónio was killed on December 18 by a left-wing sergeant. Between July and November 1920, António Granjo’s government began some consultations between interest associations and the state in policies like wheat supplying, but they lasted only a few months.1198

Those welfare state and corporatist measures that were introduced after 1919 also failed. In May 1919, a mandatory system of social security was created by the Socialist minister Augusto Dias da Silva. It incorporated a mandatory insurance in disease, work accidents, and old age. The Instituto de Seguros Sociais Obrigatorios was created under the tutelage of the Ministry of Work and Welfare (Trabalho and Previdência Social), and with the function to regulate the insurance distribution. State expenses with health, welfare and education grew until 1926: they were 4-5% of the public expenses until 1920, 11% in 1920-22, and 13% in 1926-27. Only unemployment insurance was excluded, but an institution to regulate employment policies was created, the Bolsas de Trabalho.1199

This new system gave associations (like the mutualities) the possibility to become mandatory membership associations in their respective concelhos. In places where there already existed many associations, like in Lisbon and Porto, the plans were to promote federations of associations. In the concelhos where no associations existed, the state stimulated the creation of a single mandatory association. Still, according to historians of Portuguese welfare state, this system was never really put into practice. First, it suffered from a chronic lack of funds. The state provided very low funds to pensions and subsidies because the system relied mainly on contributions from workers and employers, with the state having competence only for the organization of commissions of mutualities, for funding the work accidents courts and for supervising

1198 Freire, 2000, p. 84; Madureira, 2002, pp. 36-37.
the self-help associations.\textsuperscript{1200} State spending with social policies was negligible and always dependent on the debate of the issue of public deficit.\textsuperscript{1201} There was also only some relative success at the level of work insurance but the rest of the policies, in disease, old age, and the organizational structures were never implemented in the field. The \textit{tribunais de árbitros} for the conflicts between labor and capital failed also. Finally, the associations were given the option of affiliating in the mandatory system. Most of the associations did not enter the system voluntarily. In fact, the state did not have the support of the mutualities.\textsuperscript{1202} Mutualities remained opposed to the state because of predominance of syndicalists. The minister resigned just after the approval of these laws on May 4, 1919 when the government and the workers’ movement, mainly Anarchist, clashed in Lisbon, with the government accusing the workers of terrorist acts.\textsuperscript{1203} At the end of 1924, a last attempt for corporate and welfare state promotion was led by the government of José Domingos dos Santos, of the \textit{Esquerda Democrática}, allowing also for the first time for the legal existence of federations of unions and for the right to collective bargaining. It failed again, since the military started to move and impose their rule.\textsuperscript{1204}

Catholic associational life was also much stronger in Spain than in Portugal. The Spanish Catholic associational life grew to achieve around half a million people in a network of associations like the \textit{Acción Católica}, the congregations for the worship of the Virgin Mary, Catholic cooperatives, trade unions, and savings banks.\textsuperscript{1205} The \textit{trienio bolchevique} gave also a great impulse to rural unions, most of them rural Catholic associations. There were 2,005 sindicatos agrarios in 1918 and 4,892 in 1922, which were very strong in the areas of small property like Castilla-Leon, Galicia, Aragon, Catalonia, and Pais Valenciano.\textsuperscript{1206} In 1920 there were about 12,000 benevolent Catholic societies, of which 1,000 in Madrid, 800 in Seville, and 200 in Barcelona. Of these, 300 were educational associations, 3,000 charity, 2,500 medical care, and 1,800 of denominational activities.

Workers’ Catholic organizations continued growing, especially in the Basque Country and Catalonia. The \textit{Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos} (STV) expanded

\textsuperscript{1200} Madureira, 2002, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{1201} Madureira, 2002, p. 87; Pereira, 2000, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{1202} Madureira, 2002, pp. 87-88.
\textsuperscript{1203} Pereira, 2000, pp. 70, 73.
\textsuperscript{1204} Freire, 2000, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{1205} Pérez-Díaz, 2000, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{1206} Herrero, 1995, pp. 128, 130.
greatly during the Second Republic in 1931. The *Sindicatos Libres de Barcelona* were created in 1919 by Carlist radicals that organized blue and white collar workers to rival the CNT, with whom they engaged in street fights. It was a grass roots organization that differed from the more upper class and paternalistic social Catholicism. It originated in the rural carlism of Catalonia, and had good relations with Gafo’s catolicos-libres. In 1921, it had about 175,000 members (half of CNT’s membership), and when the CNT was outlawed they became the main workers’ organization in Spain in the industrial regions. In 1923, the *Sindicatos Libres de Barcelona* and the *Federación Nacional de Sindicatos Católicos-Libres*, of José Gafo merged, thus forming the *Confederación Nacional de Sindicatos Libres de España* with more than 100,000 members. They grew under Rivera’s dictatorship, but in the republic, when CNT was legal again, they were marginalized.1207

In 1922 was created also the first Christian Democratic political party, the *Partido Social Popular* (PSP) that received its inspiration from the Italian *Partito Popolare*. Its membership was composed of Carlists, Social Catholics, and old Mauristas, who desired mass mobilization in a democratic system in name of Catholicism and in order to fight clientelism.1208

During Rivera’s dictatorship between 1923 and 1931, most Catholic associations supported the regime.1209 José Calvo Sotelo of the PSP became Director of Local Administration and Minister of Finance. Also during Rivera’s dictatorship the ACNdeP took the main role in the defense of church interests, and although it remained an elite association, under Rivera it sponsored the expansion of a mass movement of Catholic unions by using the network of agrarian unions of the CONCA, and it became very successful in mobilization at the local level.1210 Still, some of the northern countryside was also partly alienated from the regime. The collusion between the UGT and the regime made the Catholic Unions hostile, who rejected UGT’s almost monopoly of *comites mixtos* and wanted instead a system of proportional representation. In the regions where Catholic syndicalists were strong there were fights with the UGT, like in the Basque country with the *Solidariedad Vasca*.1211 Some social Catholics were also

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1207 Payne, 1984, pp. 140-146.
co-opted by the regime, but the tradition of rural associational life was less strong than with the UGT.

With full democratization it was through the direction of a real mass Catholic party that Catholic associational life expanded. After 1931 the Catholic party, the CEDA, dominated the political right and was able to represent the Catholic peasant mass. The CEDA (Confederacion Española de Derechas Autonomas), a Catholic-conservative mass party led by Gil Robles, which integrated some old caciques, had links to La Patronal and to the Confederación Nacional Catolica Agraria, a strong network of agrarian Catholic associations (cajas de ahorros, cooperatives, professional associations) of the medium and small peasantry of north-central Spain. Consumer co-operatives, and educational and medical benefit societies were very strong in many regions, like in Valladolid for instance. Catholic unions comprised from a tenth to a quarter of the total of farmers in Spain. Catholic peasant associations, mainly assisting small peasants through credit banks, cooperative machinery, and marketing schemes reached also landless laborers through the creation of special social programs. A youth movement, the Juventudes de Acción Popular, and a Catholic parents’ association were also created, organizing about 50,000 parents in efforts to provide Catholic schooling as an alternative to state schools. Finally, the traditionalist carlists were reorganized in the Comunión Tradicionalista, a modern right-wing association that enjoyed a 5% of the electorate in 1933.

In 1933, with the collapse of the original left-republican coalition of the republic and after the general elections in the fall of 1933, CEDA became the main party in the Spanish political system. After 1933, there was no natural majority in the parliament and the president Alcalá Zamora decided to call the Radical Republicans of Lerroux, who were the second largest party, to form government. The radicals soon called the CEDA for support in parliament in order to reach a full majority, and in October 1934 CEDA politicians entered the government. The new coalition reversed much of the anti-Catholic legislation that the republic had enacted. For example, it restored the church budget and ended the ban on Catholic education.

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1217 Payne, 1984, pp. 164-165.
Catholic associational building expanded even more in certain regions during the Second Republic, especially in Catalonia, Navarra, and the Basque country. The Basque nationalist STV grew as a mass organization, and Gafo reorganized his former Católicos-Libres in the Basque-Navarrese Confederation of Professional Worker Syndicates (CVNSOP) which had 25000 members in 1934. In the first phase of the republic, the Carlistas from Navarra and the Basque nationalists had allied in a bloc for the defense of regional autonomy and of the church, but gradually the Basque claim for autonomy led them to separate from the Carlists, who rejected the decentralization policies of the republic. Also the PNV achieved representation in the Cortes during the Second Republic, and because it was committed to regional autonomy it did not support the CEDA. Basque local clergy served as party organizers. In fact in 1920, the Basque and Navarra provinces alone provided 33.4% of the membership of all Marian congregations (the major devotional associations in Spain), although these regions had only 4.8% of the Spanish population.\footnote{1218}

In Catalonia, Catholicism was strongly organized. It formed the UDC, Unió Democràtica de Catalunya, in 1931 as a regionalist and Christian-democratic party, committed to social reform, trade unionism, and welfare redistribution. Its influence was small, and although it formed a Christian-democratic trade union, the UTCC (Unió de Treballadors Cristians de Catalunya), it only recruited 3,000 members.\footnote{1219} In Catalonia most Catholics supported the Lliga Regionalista, a conservative nationalist group whose deputies voted for the right on religious issues and on the left on regional issues. It also created the Federació de Joves Cristians (FJC) in Catalonia in 1931, with 7,000 members initially.\footnote{1220} But the main party was the Esquerra Republicana, a left-wing party.\footnote{1221}

After the insurrection of 1934, there was an attempt to unite all Spanish Catholic unions under a single confederation, with the exception of the Basque nationalists of the STV and the UTCC. The Confederación Española de Sindicatos Obreros (CESO) was created in 1935 with 273,000 members.\footnote{1222}

Portuguese Catholic associational life was less developed. A political organization resembling a party was launched by the Portuguese episcopate in August

1917, the *Centro Católico*, in which Salazar was the main figure. In the 1918 elections during *sidonismo*, it elected four deputies and afterwards won seats in all elections, especially in electoral districts of the areas of Minho and Beiras. But it did not promote any Catholic associational life. In fact, it was divided between monarchists, who used the Catholic organization to relate Catholicism with the defense of monarchism, and the purely Catholics for whom the regime issue was unimportant. This provoked ruptures in the *Centro Católico*, and in the 1921 elections only two deputies were elected. Moreover, in 1919 monarchists under the direction of Major Paiva Couceiro, coming from Spain, established the so-called *Monarquia do Norte* (Northern Monarchy) in the north of Portugal that dominated all the provinces of Minho, Trás-os-Montes, and Beiras for a month. This created major divisions in the Catholic camp, with many in it preferring to ally with the rebellious military and downplaying party and associational organization. Later, they would be defeated, when the city of Porto was conquered by southern troops and in Monsanto, close to Lisbon, the monarchists were finally crushed.

Catholic associational life did not have links with the *Centro Católico*. In fact, this organization was more a «Catholic pressure group» than a real party with a program and a solid structure like the CEDA in Spain. In 1921, there existed only 300 agrarian syndicates and 390 in 1926. They tended to be circles of caciquist influence, used by informal networks of local elites to sustain clientelistic relationships and not to mobilize in mass levels. Most of these sindicatos were at the concelho level and very few existed at the district level (only in the cities of Santarém, Évora, Aveiro, and Angra do Heroísmo). They did not attempt to include small producers, but they were mainly associations of big producers and farmers, only exceptionally including medium producers or rentiers. For instance, the first president of the *Sindicato de Coimbra* was Francisco Costa Lobo, director of the faculty of sciences of that city and civil governor of Coimbra. Another example of weak relationships between associations and political parties was the ACAP. In 1915 this association complained that there was no single deputy who understood agriculture. In 1924, the RACAP changed its name three times, first to the *Associação Central da Agricultura Portuguesa*, then to

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1223 Lopes, manuscript, N.D., p. 6
1227 Schwartzman, 1987, p. 156.
Sindicato Agrícola Central, and finally to União Central da Agricultura Portuguesa. These reorganizations were the result of internal conflicts between Catholics and Monarchists again, between the rivals’ monarchists in the Causa Monárquica (Conde de Azevedo) and the Centro Católico Português. Most of the monarchist associations left the ACAP.\textsuperscript{1228} A last example of the almost non-existing links between parties and associations was the case of employers’ association, União dos Interesses Económicos (UIE). This association was created in September 1924 by members of the Confederação Patronal. It defended a non-democratic ideological platform and ran in parliamentary elections, competing with the parties proposing the restoration of the senate of interests of the time of Sidonio’s dictatorship.\textsuperscript{1229} In the 1925 elections, it presented candidates in 104 electoral circles, electing four deputies, and amassing an important share of the vote in the circles of Viseu, Faro, Portalegre, Elvas, Évora, and Estremoz. At the same in the south, the landowners associations’, together with the police (the GNR) engaged in repressing the workers’ unions. But soon the association was in a conspiracy for the armed coup of April 18, 1925 by organizing civilian militias.\textsuperscript{1230}

In Portugal the conflicts between the state and the church led to divisions within the Catholic field as well as between Monarchists and Catholics. This inhibited the mobilization by Catholic elites through mass organizations, like the CEDA in Spain. The upper classes organized in the ACAP and became gradually supportive of authoritarian ideologies, namely the Integralismo Lusitano, the Portuguese version of the reactionary-conservative French Action Française. They also supported small groups of Catholic reactionaries, like Salazar’s Centro Académico da Democracia Cristã (CADC).\textsuperscript{1231}

Finally, the Anarchist movement in Spain was also much stronger in relative terms when compared to Portugal. In Spain between 1917 and 1923 revolutionary strikes organized by the CNT produced a state of almost civil war with the CNT wanting to show its opposition to the war.\textsuperscript{1232} In the period 1918-1920, there was an enormous strike and protest activity. In 1914-1917 there were 231 strikes of which 32 were rural; in 1918 463 strikes, 895 in 1919, and in 1920 there were 1,060. As for rural

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item \textsuperscript{1228} Graça, 1999, p. 435.
  \item \textsuperscript{1229} Madureira, 2002, p. 38; Pinto, 1998, pp. 13-15.
  \item \textsuperscript{1230} Madureira, 2002, p. 42.
  \item \textsuperscript{1231} Ramos, 1994, pp. 559-560.
  \item \textsuperscript{1232} Joll, 1979, pp. 224-225.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
strikes, in 1918 they were 68, in 1919 188, and in 1920 they were 194. The number of days of work lost to strike activity rose from 1.8 million in 1917 to 7.3 million in 1920, and the number of strikers from 71,400 to 244,700.\textsuperscript{1233}

In the congress of June 1918 it decided to reorganize its structure. Craft unions disappeared and all workers involved in a given industrial activity were grouped into one single union (e.g. the single union of the building trades, of metallurgy etc). After this, there was a territorial organization: all single unions in a given town were grouped into local federations. At the end of 1918 the CNT had 700,000 members and in 1920 more than one million.\textsuperscript{1234}

CNT also expanded in the countryside. In the 1918 Anarchist congress also the FNAE (\textit{Federación Nacional de Agricultores de España}) was set up as a rural association, although independent from the CNT. After 1918-20 Anarchists spread in Aragon, the \textit{Levante} area (eastern seaside), and in Andalucia. In the city of Cordoba, for instance, of 130,000 rural workers 55,383 were members of CNT. At the same time although more rural workers were entering the organization, it was still a very local associational life. It was in the associations in the localities that political initiative was coming from frequently. To cope with this, the FNAE in 1918 decided its fusion with the CNT in order to achieve a better organization. At the same time there was always a clear separation between rural and industrial sectors within the CNT and the organization was unable to synchronize the local spontaneous strikes with national guidelines of action. In sum, although there was a central authority, there was a high degree of internal factionalism.\textsuperscript{1235}

With Rivera’s dictatorship in 1923, the CNT called for a general protest strike, which was not supported by the socialist UGT, and was forced into clandestinity. Two hundred Anarchist trade unionists were arrested. The contradictions within the movement, between radicals and reformists heightened in this period, with the radicals gaining a definitive ascendancy in the movement. A new organization, the \textit{Federación Anarquista Ibérica} (FAI), was founded in secrecy in July 1927 that was a «true bakuninist secret society of young, fanatical revolutionaries», who preferred the promotion of insurrection by small clandestine groups to the traditional tactics of massive protest. Within the CNT the moderate line of Pestana was rejected, and the

\textsuperscript{1233} Malefakis, 2001, p. 219.
\textsuperscript{1234} Maura, 1971, pp. 73-74.
\textsuperscript{1235} Malefakis, 2001, p. 222.
Anarchists started to now favour more direct methods. Moreover, Rivera’s welfare programme only applied to urban, not rural workers. The corporate organization of agriculture only started in May 1928, and in those regions that were already endowed with pre-existing organizations. The government was very prudent in expanding its programmes to the countryside because it did not want to alienate the landowners who feared that collective negotiation institutions would empower the rural proletariat. This made the gulf between urban and rural worlds deepen and created an even more antagonistic labour movement in the countryside. The Southern countryside and Catalonia had no political representation since they were dominated by the CNT, which had been put outside the law. The UGT had also a weak penetration in these sections of rural society, and instead it protected its’ urban base (this would be different in the Republic). This radicalized even more the CNT and enabled it to spread through the rural areas. Still, the CNT had half a million of members in 1930.

In the Second Republic, the divisions on how to act became clearer within the new regime. The line of Juan Peiró opposed any links with regime parties and institutional cooperation, whereas Angel Pestaña’s group was more moderate and favored short-term goals. At the same time both these leaders were now united against the leaders of the FAI, who managed to expel Pestana and Peiró from the CNT. Rivera’s dictatorship had radicalized the Anarchist movement. Now the organization was dominated by leaders «committed to uncompromising direct action more than ever before», such as Buenaventura Durruti. During the Second Republic, the CNT never participated in labor conciliation boards, land reform projects, or elections, but because of full democratization and competition of Socialist unions backed by government policies, Anarchists pushed for the mobilization of workers.

In 1931, the CNT had half a million members, in 1932 more than one million, and in 1936 one million and six hundred thousand. In the mid-1930s it organized about 13% of the labor force, about the same as the socialist UGT (with Catholic and Communist unions 2% each). Catalonia provided 30% of its members, Andalucia and Valencia 15%. Its support centered on the rural laborers of Andalucia, Catalan and

1237 McIvor, 1982, pp. 227-228.
1239 McIvor, 1982, fn. 30, p. 54.
1240 Joll, 1979, p. 228.
1242 Maura, 1971, p. 74.
Valencian textiles, and construction workers and peasant small holders in Zaragoza. Heavy industry was underrepresented, and only 5% were white collar workers. Still, the CNT was a highly decentralized federation, able to intensely mobilize many local communities but without a strong national presence.  

In Portugal between 1905 and 1925, there were at least 777 unions, 15 industrial federations, and 23 local unions federations, which unionized more than 200,000 workers. Although many unions were not included in the successive national union structures (successively CECS, UON, and CGT), there were strong attempts at syndical unity in this period. In 1914, the UON (União Operária Nacional) was created, which was the first union confederation. In 1919 the CGT (Confederação Geral do Trabalho) was formed, the major confederation of labor, in a National Workers Congress (Congresso Operário Nacional) in Coimbra, where there were present 160 associations representing 90,000 members. CGT was organized in local unions, which were then grouped into industry federations. These industry federations sent delegates to a top confederal council, and daily issues were run by a confederal committee elected by the congress. The CGT came to include between 40,000 and 150,000 members, and it was able to mobilize about 60% of existing workers associations. As can be seen from the next table, there was a growth of Anarchist unions in the 1920-1925 period, which were particularly strong in the southern regions of latifundia (Alentejo) and Lisbon.

Table 32: Number of Total Unions (Anarchist)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nº</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>223</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>420</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>+173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Freire, 1992, p. 122)

1244 Freire, 2000, pp. 558-559.
1245 Freire, 1999c, pp. 396-397; Ramos, 1994, pp. 602-605.
Collective action in the countryside was also stimulated in the 1920-1925 period. Although never reaching their 1915 levels, after 1920 the number of rural unions grew from 37 to 67.

Table 34: Rural Unions, 1905-1925

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1925</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Pinto, Almeida, 2000, p. 11)

Although after 1920 the syndicalists were the dominant organization in the left, they were also in decline as well, being highly restricted to Lisbon and Barreiro, and declining in the north and the south (Alentejo). Between 1919 and 1922, CGT had 80,000 to 100,000 members, in 1923 their membership had fallen to 55,000, and in 1925 only partially recovered to 70,000 members. Associations remained weakly funded, small and local with a high proximity between leaders and members. The proportion of leader/member varied from 1/3 to 1/20.

Again, this was related to the movement’s position of non-cooperation with the state. Since the start the syndicalist movement aimed at the creation of self-help services...
to its members (in unemployment, disease, and accidents), building from the previous century tradition of mutualism, even creating services beyond the class association level, like the creation of funds at the federative level (e.g. the bolsas de trabalho/work funds in the construction, shoe making, graphics industry, who also had a role on providing information on job opportunities). The creation of welfare funds for all workers was defended by many in the movement. At the same time within the Anarchists, the group that opposed any of these welfare measures, and were contrary to the bolsas de trabalho and welfare subsidies, became dominant. These measures could be «the cause of death of the revolutionary spirit in the class», as Anarchist João Caldeira, a leader of the construction workers, argued in 1924 in the Anarchist congress in the city of Tomar. Moreover, Anarchists did not trust the cooperative movement, both of producers and of consumers, which was seen as cooperating with the capitalist system and being too dominated by the socialists. To this movement of cooperatives-socialists they called the «grocery shop socialism», a barrier to the revolutionary spirit of workers.1250

12.2. Deep-rooted and Violent Conflicts in Associational Life

With the pressures for full democratization, expansion of density of associations and creation of confederative structures after the trienio revolucionário, Iberian countries saw also the intensification of conflict within associational life. The Anarchist movements became more mass mobilizing and also at the same time more anti-system and revolutionary. In Portugal the most important event in this respect was the insurrection in October 1921 of the Anarchists who allied with the extreme left republicans with penetration of the police forces, who controlled Lisbon for almost a month.1251 Socialists and Catholics competed more in the electoral and political arenas in general, but they were unable to structure that competition in peaceful ways. Center parties (e.g. the radicals in Spain) lost their capacity to mobilize the citizenry and decayed as organizations, plagued by corruption and personalized.

With the growing radicalism both of the Right and of the Left, the military began to intervene in politics again by promoting military coups against the unstable

1249 Freire, 1992, p. 159.
democratic experiences of both countries: 1926 in Portugal and 1936 in Spain. The periods of 1926-1933 in Portugal and 1936-1939 in Spain saw the violent war of associational life associations against each other, which would be the prelude to the authoritarian regimes that between the late-1930s and the mid-1970s eliminated most traces of autonomous associational life.

Still, there are differences worth exploring between Portugal and Spain. Because Spain in the interwar period experienced a higher level of parliamentarization, democratization, and state policies directed at empowering associational life together with inherited regional patterns of stronger associational life, the civil war that followed the fall of the republican experience was bloodier and of greater magnitude because it was based on much higher levels of popular mobilization, both on the Left and the Right. Moreover, it also explains the varying structures of the authoritarian regimes that followed: a more ideological and mobilizational authoritarianism in Spain, and a more traditionalist and demobilizational regime in Portugal.

In Portugal the CGT refused to participate in politics, to support the participation in World War I, to ally with any of the existing parties, and it always espoused direct action through strikes, boycott, and sabotage while at the same it promoted social revolution.1252 In 1918, an attempted general strike failed, but another in 1919 was able to mobilize workers from construction, metal industry, water companies, printers, drivers, mail employees, shoemakers, street-cleaning workers, and many others. The government reacted by closing down unions and newspapers, and by extreme police repression against strikers. As a consequence, after 1920 Anarchists become more adept of using terror tactics, in particular the young syndicalists, like the targeted assassination at individuals or bomb attacks in public avenues. In January 1921 in the first congress of the syndicalist youths, a secret Comité de Defesa Social was created with the aim to push for the emergence of a revolutionary situation through the use of every possible means available. It was composed of three individuals, each of them in contact with groups of other five individuals, who by their turn contacted groups of other five and so on, in a pyramidal structure. They engaged in killings of judges, supposed traitors, policemen, and employers all throughout the 1920s. Bombings were at their height in the years 1923-1924, numbering about 200, thanks to a new radical organization, the Legião Vermelha (Red Legion).1253

In Spain the Anarchist confederation, the CNT, was controlled by the extremists of the FAI in 1932. Because of competition with the Socialists who were then in government, Anarchists attempted to set up insurrectional communes in the early years of the republic. For instance, the CNT would take over a town, burn the administrations’ archives, destroy money, and kill the policemen of the Guardia Civil. In January 1932 in the upper Llobregat valley in Catalonia, an insurrection of miners, textile workers, and peasants proclaimed libertarian communism in the area. The government repressed the movement and FAI leader Durruti was deported to Africa. Again, in Seville in the summer of 1932, a general revolutionary strike appeared, because of rumors that right-wing General Majuro was about to seize power by a military coup. Another insurrection arose in January 1933 in Barcelona and spread to Madrid, Valencia, Cadiz, Seville, and the whole south. Finally, the biggest of the insurrections, with a massive peasant support and the only one that was national in scope, began December 3, 1933 in Aragón and spread to Madrid, Valencia, La Coruña, Cádiz, and Seville.\textsuperscript{1254}

As has been described, after the fall of the left coalition that founded the republic, the Radical Party was called to government. In the 1933 elections, a government of Radicals sought to reverse many of the Left’s policies, by installing a new policy of order and property and by imposing a more repressive Ministry of Interior.\textsuperscript{1255} Moreover, Lerroux and especially the president Alcalá Zamora accepted the entry of the Christian-democratic CEDA in government in coalition with the radicals. When the government of Lerroux started to replace the members of the UGT in the Jurados Mixtos in the countryside and repealed the Socialist law of terminus municipals (which regulated the hiring of labor to be done first in the area of the land property, in order to provide employment for the workers of the area), the radical Largo Caballero gained ascendancy in the Socialist movement and excluded the moderate Juan Besteiro and his allies.\textsuperscript{1256}

The Socialists reacted fast. Azana declared that the Cortes should have been dismissed and elections held, and he called for a general revolutionary strike. The UGT and its agrarian union, the FNTT, radicalized speech and acts and Largo Caballero, leader of the Socialist youth, defended openly the social revolution. The Socialists reacted again by forming a revolutionary movement with the aim of creating a republic

\textsuperscript{1254} Malefakis, 2001, pp. 436-437; Joll, 1979, pp. 231.
\textsuperscript{1255} Mann, 2004, pp. 321-324.
of workers through the actions of a new organization, the *Alianza Obrera* (a revolutionary alliance of all workers parties) that included some left republicans, in Catalonia the *Esquerra* and in Asturias even included the CNT and the Communists. The FNTT and the Andalucian section of CNT celebrated an agreement.\textsuperscript{1257} In most of the country the strike failed, but in Madrid there were violent fights with the police, and in Catalonia Lluís Companys declared the independence of Catalonia within a federal republic in Spain. In Barcelona, revolutionary committees were created and militias organized, but the revolution failed because it was unable to coordinate actions between the city and the countryside (unable to mobilize rural workers, the Rabassaires), and so the army was able to crush it. It was especially in Asturias where a huge workers’ revolt erupted. The revolutionary attempt in Asturias was a strong and major uprising in the mining region by the *Alianza Obrera*, a common front of workers of all ideologies. For two weeks the mining zone of Asturias was controlled by local committees of the Socialist republic and by the militia of the red army, but it was strongly repressed by the army coming from Morocco. Noteworthy was the fact that in the rest of the country the CNT stayed away always from the revolutionary attempts, not wanting to make an alliance with the socialists.\textsuperscript{1258} The combat with the army lasted fifteen days, thousands of people were arrested, including Azáñ (for three months) and Caballero (one year) while Prieto was exiled. The government imposed one year of martial law after the defeat of the workers’ revolt by army units.\textsuperscript{1259} After this, the gulf between the left/socialists/workers and the center/republican/bourgeois camps was definitive. The UGT and Llargo Caballero returned to radicalism.

In reaction to these events, in early 1935 a law in the National Parliament was approved that forbade all citizens from belonging to secret associations with heavy penalties (prison and exile) to those who defied the law. Special legislation was also approved for the suppression of freedom of association, expression, and reunion. The constitution of any association required the government’s permission, which was also supposed to approve the statutes and the directive bodies of the association. Moreover, the government could dissolve at any moment any organization, suspend its meetings, make itself represented in the meetings by special appointees, or dismiss its leaders.

\textsuperscript{1257} Malefakis, 2001, pp. 493-497.
\textsuperscript{1258} Carr, 2005, pp. 605-608.
\textsuperscript{1259} Malefakis, 2001, pp. 500-501.
especially if they were considered to develop activities contrary to the established order (decree-law 22468 of April 11, 1933).\textsuperscript{1260}

But the center-right governments of CEDA and Lerroux fell because of scandals generated by the radicals’ corrupt practices. Lerroux resigned as PM in the autumn of 1935. Until 1936 there was a succession of CEDA-radicals governments, mainly preoccupied with problems of budgeting, finance equilibrium, and reduction of state expenses. After a brief period of unstable governments, President Alcalá Zamora dissolved the parliament and called for elections. The rightist parties united in a “national front” and the leftist parties in a “Popular front” (socialists, Anarchists, Communists, and again the republican left).\textsuperscript{1261}

After the February 1936 elections, led by Azaña the Left was again in power. It was a much more radical government. Socialists and Anarchists pushed for land occupations and formed militias to fight the \textit{Guardia Civil}.\textsuperscript{1262} On March 3, 1936 a wave of land occupation started by the peasantry, partially under the autonomous direction of the FNTT. In the province of Badajoz, 60,000 peasants occupied 3,000 properties, and the government was forced to legalize these occupations. Again the members of the \textit{jurados mixtos} were replaced with individuals more supportive of the socialists, and the mandatory recruitment of workers of the area of cultivation was reintroduced. In June there was a huge general peasant strike by the CNT, the FNTT and the recently created Communist unions, that soon became also an anticlerical wave with the persecution of priests and the burning of churches. Moreover, the government decided to dissolve all municipalities that were ruled by conservatives, and in these few months proceeded to a redistribution of land on a scale much higher than any year before.\textsuperscript{1263}

The radicalization of associational life organizations in both countries during the periods just analyzed served as a pretext for right-wing military interventions that put an end to the mass age. In Portugal in 1926, after a succession of unstable left and right republican governments, the military deposed the Republic. The period of military dictatorship lasted until 1933. Between 1927 and 1934, most workers’ associations lived in a situation of semi-clandestinity, since the new regime was frankly hostile to free associational life. A strong control was imposed on associations through the

\textsuperscript{1261} Malefakis, 2001, pp. 532-533.
\textsuperscript{1262} Malefakis, 2001, pp. 534-535.
\textsuperscript{1263} Malefakis, 2001, pp. 539-546, 554.
reintroduction of the 1891 law which also forbade union confederations, imposed previous police permission for the creation of associations, and the presence of representatives of the government in the union meetings.\textsuperscript{1264} Unions like the CGT were dissolved and the right to strike was abolished.\textsuperscript{1265} Gradually, a civilian current emerges within the military dictatorship around the figure of António Salazar, who became the main political minister when he was heading the Finance Ministry and was able to make a swift transition to a new form of authoritarian rule, more ideological and more civilianized, namely the \textit{Estado Novo}.

Initially there was a strong resistance to the imposition of the dictatorship by sectors of the union movement. On May 31, 1927 there was an appeal by the Anarchists for a general strike against the dictatorship, in February 1932 an attempt of general strike by the Communists, and a series of bombist actions in Coimbra, Barreiro, Setúbal, Lisboa, Almada, Silves, and Marinha Grande. On January 18, 1934 there was a large insurrection against the plans for state-corporatist legislation where the main left currents (Communists, Anarchists, and socialists) were able to achieve some coordination. Many associations, unions, and cooperatives were linked to the three left movements that participated in the insurrection (consumption cooperatives, mutualities, recreational, and cultural popular associations), much mobilized by the Socialists (the \textit{Voz do Operario} in Lisbon, the \textit{Casa do Povo} in Porto) as well as the \textit{Federação das Associações Operárias}; the Anarchist CGT; and the newly formed and small \textit{Comissão Intersindical}, connected to the recently formed \textit{Partido Comunista Português}-PCP. But the revolt failed, only achieving the blocking of railroads in the north, and occupying the city of Marinha Grande for several hours. After violent fights, it was repressed by the military.\textsuperscript{1266} In 1934, CGT was declared illegal, although a small group of Anarchists in 1937 made a failed assassination attempt against Salazar.\textsuperscript{1267}

The new corporatist legislation put unions in a state controlled structure that made them organize in \textit{sindicatos de profissão} (national craft unions). This contributed to the pulverization of unions, since they became regulated mainly at the district level, thus making it more difficult to cooperate between workers of different professions. In the same company, for instance, there could exist a diversity of unions, each with its different aims and legislative schemes. This is the contrary of what workers’

\textsuperscript{1264} Freire, 2000, pp. 558-559
\textsuperscript{1265} Estrada, 1988, fn. 7, p. 456.
\textsuperscript{1266} Beyerlein, 2000, pp. 394-396; Freire, 1999d, p. 558; Freire, 2000, pp. 558-559; Oliveira, 1999, p. 433.
organizations aimed during the republic, where unions after 1918 became *sindicatos de industria* and of a vertical nature. Moreover, new legislation prohibited federations and confederations of workers and stipulated that union directions needed to be authorized by the government.  

In Spain the events between February and June of 1936 were the pretext for the right-wing military to intervene. On July 18, 1936 a military coup by right-wing officers put an end to the republic. This was the start of the civil war and a situation of territorial dual sovereignty with one part of the country controlled by the republic fighting the other part controlled by the coalition of right-wing forces and the army. In order to defend itself, the republican government looked for support in the peasant organizations and in the unions. It legalized the land occupations and recruited individuals in these areas and in the unions for the creation of a militia to fight the rebellious military. In the republican zone the resistance of the government was based on the working class militia, a collection of ill-trained armed workers, recruited from the militant left and trade unions. The unions socialized production, controlled the factories, especially in Catalonia, where CNT was dominant, and established revolutionary committees that shared power with the remnants of the legitimate state. Moreover, a social revolution began and it was directed against the traditional enemies: the church and the landowners. Committees of armed milicianos destroyed churches and killed bourgeois and priests, in spite of the efforts of some of the CNT leaders to avoid this. Collectivization of property was also instituted by the CNT and in some areas by the UGT in order to create a federation of free municipalities (*municipios*) and workers’ collectivities.

In the nationalistic zone the military Right had the support of bourgeois, landowners, and the Catholic church. Organizationally it included also the Fascists (who until then had been a minority and who now began to organize for mass mobilization through a militia), the militant carlists and their armed militia, the *Requetes Navarros* (which had 6,000 individuals in 1934), the monarchists/traditionalists (the *Bloque Nacionalista* of Calvo Sotelo, an exile from France, who was influenced by Maurras, and who proposed a semi-Fascist monarchy), and the *Acción Católica Nacional de* 

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1268 Freire, 2000, pp. 558-559.  
1269 Malefakis, 2001, p. 564.  
Propagandistas also supported the rebellious military. There was also the consolidation of a series of extreme-right associations in this period. There were the Fascists in the Falange. They were inspired by Mussolini’s ideas and oriented for the mobilization of the working classes under a nationalist ideal, and they were strong in university student’s towns (Sevilla, Madrid, and Valladolid). They were the result of the fusion of the JONS (Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista, formed in 1931), a youth revolutionary Fascist movement created by Onesimo Redondo and Ramiro Ledesma Ramos who had plans for organizing a Catholic counter-revolutionary force composed of peasants and farmers in Valladolid, with the Falange of José António Primo de Rivera, the son of the ex-dictator. Before 1936 it had never more than 2% of the national vote and fewer than 10,000 members. With the outbreak of the civil war, it grew to 25,000 members and in October provided 43,000 of the 65,000 volunteers for the militias of the nationalist cause. The military Right was the more powerful group in the rightist coalition, and it was able to maintain control over it, especially because the Moroccan army of Franco was highly disciplined and cohesive. This enabled the Right to win over the republican side. First, it was not as divided as the republican side, with its intestine fights between left groups. Instead, it relied on a cohesive Catholic ideology somehow accepted by all parts of the coalition, at least provisionally, including the Fascists. Second, it was able to maintain a military unity and use a professional army, which the republican side lacked. In the end the nationalist bloc won.

12.3. Outcome: Disjointed Associational Life under Authoritarianism

In both societies, authoritarian regimes were established that ended almost any vestiges of autonomous associational life. Still, they were different regimes. The level of political and associational engagement in Spain was higher at least until the early 1950s. This was the result of a higher level of ideological differentiation between the several families that composed the authorization right wing founding coalition. Political families became clearer in the Spanish dictatorship (the Catholics, the

1276 Pérez-Díaz, 2000, p. 8.
1277 Tusell, 1996, p. 278.
Falangists, the military, the Tradicionalistas-traditionalists, the monarchists, the integristas, and later the technocrats) whereas in Portugal they were more of a personalistic-clientelistic nature.\textsuperscript{1278} The Portuguese dictatorship was the oldest right-wing authoritarian political regime of the twentieth-century. Between 1933 and 1974 a single-party regime, based on a strong repressive apparatus, repressed severely the development of voluntary associations.\textsuperscript{1279} The existing Republican, Socialist, Anarchist associations from the republic were dissolved and their property confiscated by the state. For instance, in 1926 the Masonry, the Grande Oriente Lusitano (Grand Lusitan Oriental) had 3,150 members organized in 94 groups. In 1933, the first year of the dictatorship, there were only 1,500 members. The organization was persecuted by the dictatorship, closed in 1930 by government decree, and its possessions were given to the Fascist semi-military organization Legião Portuguesa (Portuguese Legion).\textsuperscript{1280} Most CGT leaders were deported or sent to prison.\textsuperscript{1281}

In Portugal, authoritarian rule was reinforced by the abolition of all party pluralism and the creation of a single party representing the supporters of the new regime, the União Nacional. Contrary to the Spanish Falange, it was built from above and from the state to society, more as a device for the cooptation of local and regional elites and with the explicit aim to demobilize the citizenry.\textsuperscript{1282} It never achieved the levels of mobilization and links to associational life that its Spanish counterpart had. The party developed ancillary organizations, which were also weaker than their Spanish counterparts: the Legião Portuguesa (Portuguese Legion), monopolist student associations Mocidade Portuguesa (Portuguese Youth), and the Mocidade Portuguesa Feminina (Portuguese Feminin Youth).\textsuperscript{1283}

The major innovation of the regime was the creation of a monopolistic system of interest representation in industry and agriculture known as Estado Corporativo. The Portuguese state was considered a corporative republic, where the diverse interest groups from the past were replaced by monopolies of professional representation in so-called corporatist organizations of employers and workers in several productive sectors. It was supposed to be an alternative to liberalism and socialism with their recognition of

\textsuperscript{1278} Tusell, 1996, p. 193.
\textsuperscript{1279} Raby, 2000a, p. 394.
\textsuperscript{1280} Sousa, 2000, pp. 409-410.
\textsuperscript{1282} Rosas, 1994, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{1283} Kuin, 2000, pp. 499-501.
class warfare and divisive competition between interest groups. The corporatist system was very complex and had class organizations and sectoral organizations, organizations where just one or more than one class was represented, mandatory and non-mandatory organizations. Contrary to Spain, where single organizations for workers and business were implemented in a more coherent fashion, the authoritarian vertical unions represented only workers, and business created their own Grémios Nacionais (national guilds).

Workers were reunited in single national unions authorized and licensed by the state and controlled by the government. The state retained the possibility of determining union leaderships, dismissing its directions at will, and through the Instituto Nacional do Trabalho e Previdência it regulated collective hiring. Business was organized in Grémios based on products (wheat, cotton, olive oil, and so on) including all productive agents of the process (production, transformation, and commercialization). Legally, each Grémio regulated the economic activity of its field, and companies were not be allowed to develop outside the Grémios.

In agriculture, the corporative order included grémios of farmers, landowners, and animal breeders, who were organized at the concelho level (an intermediate administrative unit between the district and the single village or city) level. Subsequently, they would be aggregated in regional (e.g. the Federation of Wine Producers of the Center-South Region) grémios and finally in national confederations. They were about two hundred and thirty of these associations, almost all created between 1939 and 1943. They were managed at the concelho level by a general committee (conselho geral), run by twenty individuals chosen among the farmers of the region, and as only the founding members of the Grémio could be elected to its direction, this system tended to give almost absolute power to the more powerful farmers in the concelho. The rural workers and the fishermen were organized in the Casas do Povo (People’s Houses) and Casas dos Pescadores (Fishermen’s Houses). In these organizations there was a distinction between effective members (the rural workers, who paid dues and benefited from the services of the association) and protective members (sócios protectores) who had mandatory membership and at the same time access to the ruling positions in the organization (usually the big

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1285 Rosas, 1994, pp. 249-258.
1286 Estrada, 1988, p. 475.
landowners). The sócios protectores were present in the assembly that elected a directive junta and its president, again usually a big landowner. Contrary to corporate representation in industry, there was no separate representation for unions of workers in the countryside, since the big landowners controlled the Casas do Povo.1287 This system was established in all rural parishes of Portugal, and it was highly paternalistic, being more a vehicle for control from above and paternalistic distribution of sickness benefits, old age pensions, and unemployment subsidies.1288

In April 1939, after the victory of General Franco and the right in the civil war, there was the creation of a new authoritarian order. After the defeat of the left, repression ensued in a very large scale. Authority by the military was provisionally institutionalized, and political and associational activities were forbidden. A declaration of the war was maintained and authority given to local military commanders.1289

The Spanish Franquist dictatorship (1936-1977) was also one the most long lived right-wing authoritarian regimes of the twentieth-century. It was based on a strong repressive apparatus, on the monopoly power by a single-party, and on laws that severely limited dissenting groups and the development of voluntary associations. It deliberately promoted widespread demobilization of the population, although in some contexts there were waves of mobilization and association building.

First, it simply attempted the total physical elimination of any opposition. More than 30,000 “reds” were killed between the end of the war and 1946.1290 There were no firm procedural guarantees, at least not until 1941. The government supervised traveling between provinces and kept the country in a state close to a state of war until 1947. 270,000 people were held in prison in the 1936, 84,000 in 1940, and 35,000 in 1945.1291

This strong repression was in the hands of the army, and military courts had competence over civilian matters.1292

Second, a set of laws prohibited any form of free associational life. A decree on September 13, 1936 by the National Defense Committee (Junta de Defesa Nacional) declared illegal all parties and associations that had integrated the republican Popular Front (Frente Popular) or that were in the opposition to the Fascist Movimiento Nacional (National Movement). Another decree, on September 25, 1936 prohibited the

1289 Linz, 1981, p. 387
1290 Casanova, 1999, pp. 21, 23.
1292 Tusell, 2005, p. 31.
political activity by unions or employers associations. All political associations were dissolved and their property given to the single party (the *Ley de Responsabilidades Políticas* of February 1939). Strikes became illegal. In March 1940, a law was approved specifically for the repression of masonry.

On January 25, 1941 a decree regulated the right of association. Associations could not be constituted without the approval of the regime’s political coordination ministry, the *Ministerio de la Gobernación*. The exceptions were associations with the sole objective of profit that were ruled by the dispositions of civil or mercantile law, Catholic associations that promoted exclusively religious ends, institutions or corporations that existed because of special laws, cooperatives registered in the Ministry of Work, and associations subject to the syndical legislation or to the single party of the regime, the FET de la JONS. The state recognized the right of Spaniards «to associate freely for licit purpose», but the limits of the law were so narrow that the creation of any association was very difficult. In 1941 a decree declared that projects of associations should be sent to the *Gobernadores Civiles*, civil governors or prefects, of their district which in turn sent them to the *Ministry of Gobernación*. Before deciding the minister would listen to the several state departments that had direct relations with the interests of the association. For instance, the Ministry of Education would be consulted about associations related to education, or the public health state department, the *Dirección General de Salud*, if it was an association of doctors, for instance. But many times these state organizations were rival and conflicting with these merging associational interests, and consequently they would veto their legalization. Although in some contexts associations collaborated with state agencies, this was an exceptional situation. The regime elites were very careful in selecting the type of associational life they wanted to foster.

In Spain between 1945 and the mid-1950s, associational life was constituted mainly by three arenas. First, there was the associational life connected to the single party. The FET de la JONS, the single political organization in Spain, was created in 1937 and had the task of intermediation between the society and the state. The regime had banned political parties and instituted single-party rule. Its principles of unity, totality, and hierarchy (*unidad, totalidad y hierarquía*) were extended to existing

1293 Linz, 1971, p. 311.
1294 Tusell, 2005, p. 31.
1296 Tusell, 2005, p. 65.
associations like unions, employers’, sports, or youth associations. In the war years, its membership grew from 650,000 members in 1939 to one million in 1945. At this time, it had about 2,000 full-time functionaries (and 10,000 in the syndical organization).\textsuperscript{1297} Some associations were organizationally dependent of the single party, like the Youth Front (\textit{Frente de Juventudes}).\textsuperscript{1298} Until 1965, for instance, all university students were required to belong to the \textit{Sindicato Español Universitario}, a Falangist union founded in the 1930s.

There was also the a women's organization, the \textit{Sección Femenina} (SF) of the Falange, which had been created during the war as a network of social welfare centers for the health and hunger relief of wounded combatants, women, and children in the Nationalist zone. From 1937 to 1939, it grew from 60,000 to 580,000 members.\textsuperscript{1299}

Second, there was an attempt to corporatize society from above by direct state initiatives. The regime fostered the creation of new institutions and organizations. The work laws, called \textit{Fuero Del Trabajo}, compelled workers to join vertical unions dominated by the Falange and controlled by the government.\textsuperscript{1300} The \textit{Ley de Unidad Sindical} of 1940 instituted 28 multifunctional, vertical, and sectoral syndicates that were supposed to include all workers, technicians, and employers of each product cycle. The sectors were insurance, herding, entertainment, banking and stock exchange, chemicals, hostlaries and tourist activities, water gas and electricity, glass and ceramics, transportation and communications, merchant marine, teaching, hides, olives, metals, sugar, cereals, combustibles, foodstuffs, wood and cork, alcoholic beverages, paper and graphic arts, fruits and horticulture, press radio television and publicity, and health.\textsuperscript{1301} These unions served as communication channels between workers, employers, and the state, and they had several welfare functions (collected and distributed retirement, sickness and other social insurance benefits, operated sports clubs, vacation resorts, and entertainment facilities), trained labour, resolved plant-level grievances, set wages, and work conditions.\textsuperscript{1302}

These authoritarian corporatist institutions were designed as a part of the broader project to control associational life in general and the labor class in particular. Unions and interest organizations were integrated into the regime through monopolistic forms.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1297} Tusell, 2005, pp. 46-47.
\textsuperscript{1298} Pérez-Díaz, 2000, pp. 14-15.
\textsuperscript{1299} Riley and Fernandez, 2005, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{1300} Gunther, 1980, p. 28
\textsuperscript{1301} Gunther, 1980, fn. 89, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{1302} Gunther, 1980, p. 29
\end{footnotesize}
of representation. Membership was compulsory for employers and employees, while a vertical command structure controlled associations. Officials at national, provincial and local levels were nominated by the government, and they were to maintain discipline in the work force, and subordinated to the authoritarian single party, the *Falange*.  

Agricultural organizations were also included in the corporatist system. The *Hermandades Agrícolas* were created in 1940 by the fusion of pre-existing laborers’ unions with employers’ organizations known as *Camaras Agrarias* (rural lodges), and they assumed the power that in a syndicate was exercised by the syndical centrals. These *Hermandades* had a history since the early twentieth century of fighting rural workers’ mobilization, and now they were given ultimate control over the rural proletariat’s life and work conditions by being integrated in the Falange and given monopolistic representation powers. According to Sevilla-Guzman, these *Hermandades* (1906) were created to neutralize workers’ and peasant movements of left orientation in the first half of the century, an early attempt of the big landowners to mobilize small peasants.

Nevertheless, the *Hermandades* were subordinate to the centrals at the provincial level and their workers’ and employers’ sections had the same appointed president, which made them in a way less representative than the syndicates at the provincial level and below. The main organizations were the *Hermandades Sindicales* and the *Sindicatos de Rama*, both organized within a given territory and connected vertically with the *Organizacion Sindical*; The *Hermandades Sindicales Locales de Labradores y Ganaderos*, with mandatory membership of several categories of the agrarian production (farmers, technicians and workers), and an internal structure very much controlled by the Movimiento; then would be aggregated at the provincial level with the COSAS (*Cámaras Oficiales Sindicales Agrarias*), federations with consultation functions; and then at national level there was the *Hermandad Sindical Nacional de Labradores y Ganaderos* with exclusive character for the representation of the interests of the countryside.

The corporatist structure managed to achieve some penetration of society. In the late 1950s, ten million workers were organized in twelve thousand and five hundred local syndicates and associations. By 1964, nine million workers and three million

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1304 Sevilla-Guzmán, 1979, p. 175; and fn. 46, p. 308.
1305 Foweraker, 1989, pp. 85-86.
employers were organized by the syndicate. Out of a labor force of thirteen million, ninety percent belonged to the syndicate. The corporatist structure provided also vacations, training centers, parks and sports facilities, medical centers, and social insurance schemes. In the 1960s, these activities absorbed forty percent of the syndicate budget and five percent of the state budget. The sindicatos had a mandatory quota, a tax on all wages and salaries, which gave it a solid financial basis. Finally, they managed to regulate with some stability employment hiring and conditions, imposing in many situations hard rules on employers, which made it difficult to dismiss workers.

12.4. Conclusion

The common patterns of Spain and Portugal, of a political stabilization by the elimination of almost all autonomous voluntary associations can be traced to the factors I identified in the previous chapters: a weak pre-modern associational life tradition, low parliamentarization and democratization, and low state capacity. Still, there were differences between Portugal and Spain explained by variations in these three aspects. In fact, Spain in the interwar period, both during the Rivera’s dictatorship, the second Republic and the civil war, continued its history of a much denser associational life than Portugal. This is explained by the fact that associational life organizations in Spain maintained their partnerships with the state and strengthened their links with political parties. This also explains why the authoritarian regimes were different at this level: there was a much more mobilizing dictatorship through Fascist organizations in Spain, whereas in Portugal a more traditionalist and static regime fostered instead passivity and demobilization.

Chapter 13: Associational life in Iberia, 1940s-2000s

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, I explain how the patterns of state-voluntary associations relationships established in the 1930s-1940s to the 1970s constitute a legacy that still shapes associational life in contemporary Iberian democracies (after the 1980s). These patterns left an imprint that still determines the scope, density, and coordination levels of associational life in democratic Iberia, and that explains to a large extent why among Western European democracies, it is here that we find the weakest voluntary associations. Second, I also explain variations between the Iberian democracies. Spain and Portugal have significant differences in the density and composition of their associational structures that allow for a reflection that not all is determined by the weight of an authoritarian legacy. There are varying possibilities for change and for building an active citizenry and participatory democracy in post-authoritarian democracies.

13.1. Associational life during and after authoritarianism: problems and issues

As was discussed in previous chapters, the preceding regime’s levels of associability (the corporateness of polity), the nature of the state, and the level of democratization of the regime were the main factors shaping associational life in the twentieth century Western Europe. In the case of Iberian countries, a stable configuration of associational life developed between the late 1930s and the 1970s that was to become the weakest of Western Europe. This was the result of very early opposition to and elimination of corporate identities, low levels of state capacity, and low levels of democratization and parliamentarization of the polity. This very weakly dense and coordinated pattern of voluntary associations stabilized in the lifetime of the Iberian authoritarian regimes, between the 1930s and the 1970s, and it was still highly present when these societies faced pressures to end these regimes in the mid-1970s. In this sense, and according to my theoretical model, it is to be expected that when Iberian societies faced the process of transition from authoritarianism in the 1970s and the consolidation of democratic regimes in the early 1980s, their associational lifes would be heavily influenced and shaped by the characteristics and traits of voluntary associations that developed during authoritarianism as well as by the state and
institutional configurations inherited from this regime. In this section I examine this claim.

One factor recently stressed in the literature on voluntary associations in the third wave of democratization in shaping associational life is the nature of the antecedent regime. As Marc Howard has shown, the levels of associational membership for a series of countries in western and southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe are well explained by the nature of the antecedent political regime. As Howard has shown for the 1990s, established western European democracies, with a strong democratic tradition, have the highest average of associational membership with a mean of 2.39. Then, they are followed by democracies whose previous regime was authoritarian (e.g. Brazil, Spain, Portugal, and Argentina) with a mean of 1.82 associations per adult. Finally, in the last place come the post-totalitarian Eastern European democracies with a mean of 0.91.

Howard’s argument is similar to mine: the fact that new democracies of southern Europe consolidated after a period prolonged authoritarianism, in contrast to the rest of established western European democracies where authoritarianism never existed (e.g. Britain and Norway) or lasted only a few years (e.g. Germany and Italy), explains its weak dimension. In which way and through which mechanisms do the legacies of authoritarian dictatorships have an impact in associational life during the democratic consolidation period in Iberia (1980s-present)? Which characteristics of authoritarianism, both at the level of associational development and institutional traits, are important?

First, authoritarianism left a legacy of weak organizational development that after the more euphoric and mobilizing period of the transition from authoritarianism, still impacted associations by making them have a low capacity for resource extraction, mobilization, and influence over authorities. The fact that most associational ventures, in particular lower class/popular sector, were prohibited from forming confederations and they were coerced into state sponsored vertical corporatism, disorganized these groups and left them with a low capacity for self-organization at the moment of democratic consolidation. This was the result of high repression and direct exclusion of popular masses from policy-making networks. As Fishman argued for the Spanish working class during Francoism, there was a disconnection between «oppositional

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1309 Linz and Stepan, 1996.
1310 Howard, 2002, p. 158.
activity and organization», meaning that opposition to the dictatorship could not take the form of organization-building.\textsuperscript{1311}

Moreover, the state sponsored corporatist institutions were built less for mobilization and indoctrination of the population and more for control and promotion of apathy.\textsuperscript{1312} Although working classes had no alternative but to affiliate with the official sindicatos, in the end even this was not possible, since corporatist organizations took a long time to be built and left popular classes’ relationships with the state mainly through direct clientelistic contacts with the administration and/or direct repression by the police. For instance, in Portugal many parishes did not have the corporatist institutions for the inclusion of rural workers, the \textit{Casas do Povo}. Still in 1967, 70\% of the nation’s parishes did not have these institutions.\textsuperscript{1313} In 1969, a government report showed that the primary sector was «almost untouched by collective bargaining» and that 90\% of the \textit{Casas do Povo} functioned only as charitable institutions.\textsuperscript{1314} A 1969 survey of Portuguese industrial workers of OPorto and Lisbon found that only 39\% were members of the official unions, and of the ones who were members only 50\% knew the name of the union they belonged to. Even more, 76\% had the opinion that the union «nunca serviu para nada». Finally, only 6\% had the idea that unions were able to determine their level of salaries.\textsuperscript{1315} Another survey taken in 1973 showed that only 1\% of the population thought that organizing a formal group was a worthwhile form to influence the government. Finally, in 1973 only 19.7\% disapproved the government policy towards freedom of association, 25.8\% approved, and 54.5\% did not answer.\textsuperscript{1316}

In fact, this meant that opposition to the regimes by popular sectors had to take the form of informal networks. For instance when the regimes implemented processes of labor cooptation and the liberalization of workplace relationships, this provided an opportunity not for association building but for the spread of informal networks of resistance and protest. In Spain in 1958, collective bargaining was introduced between the formal representatives of capital and labor within the vertical system in order to overcome the rigid central wage formation. The Ley de Convenios Colectivos of April 24, 1958 gave more power to the \textit{jurados de empresa} and the \textit{enlaces sindicales}

\textsuperscript{1311} Fishman, 1990, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{1313} Bermeo, 1986, pp. 18-20.
\textsuperscript{1314} Bermeo, 1986, p. 45
\textsuperscript{1315} Martins, 1969, p. 385.
\textsuperscript{1316} IPOPE, 1973, p. 94.
(elections were allowed for the social sections of the different syndicates at plant level, for the post of shop steward - *enlace sindical*-, which would represent 25 workers, and the *jurados de empresa*, or factory committees, which meant to represent workers equally to the management, the state, and the syndicate), and determined that salaries and work conditions to be regulated by direct negotiation between representatives of workers and employers. In Portugal, Salazar’s successor, Marcelo Caetano also introduced changes in the corporatist system in order to make it more representative and to achieve real negotiation and bargaining between workers and employers. In 1969, the government published laws (decree-law 49058 June 14, 1969) which ended the need for government permission of the union leaders and on August 28, 1969 the decree-law 49212 instituted mandatory negotiation and mechanisms of conflict resolution called *conciliação arbitral* in companies, namely in industry and services, as well as mandatory quotas and free union elections.1317

This led to the infiltration of official unions by opposition forces that could consequently reach workers.1318 In Spain, official unions were penetrated by communists, left-Catholics (and to a much less extent by the socialists or anarchists). This promoted the development of clandestine trade unions, such as the communist-led Workers' Committees (*Comisiones Obreras* CC.OO, in 1964) and the progressive Catholic Workers' Union (*Unión Sindical Obrera* USO) to take part in the official syndical organizations. USO was created by members of the apostolic youth workers' organization *Juventud Obrero Cristiana* (JOC) in Guipuzcoa in 1959. *Comisiones Obreras* emerged more spontaneously as an ad hoc organization of an unofficial strike movement in Asturias (1958), which insisted to negotiate on employment conditions.1319 The labor movement gained capacity for collective action since the mid-1950s strikes started to be organized by informal coordination committees of workers, but never through organization building.1320

Also, in Portugal these changes allowed the opposition to penetrate more easily the unions, especially in the sectors of insurance, banking, metal industry, electricity, chemical industry, and commerce. Still, the unions controlled by the opposition were only one tenth of the total. After a national encounter of union directions, out of this liberalization of the corporatist system came out in October 1970 an informal

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coordinative structure, of confederal nature and national in scope, called *Intersindical Nacional*. Its aim was to envisage a common union strategy towards the regime.\textsuperscript{1321} It grew from the «reuniões intersindicais», meetings of representatives of several unions (banking, commerce employees, and metalworkers), and it became institutionalized on September 1970. It spread quickly and in two months had 41 unions. Most of its founders were linked to the Partido Comunista Português (PCP or Portuguese Communist Party), but there were also many Catholics from the the JOC, JOCF and LOC, and LOCF.\textsuperscript{1322} In 1971, it included about 190,000 workers.\textsuperscript{1323} In 1973 in Lisbon and in Setúbal areas, there were 105 different labor unions with over 350,000 members and additional 350,000 associates. Moreover, this gave the unions the ability to organize strikes more effectively: they were able to mobilize more than 100,000 workers in 1973 alone.\textsuperscript{1324}

Second, the experience of authoritarianism created deep divisions in the workers’ movement that led especially to communist empowerment. The communists had been a weak and insignificant political organization in Iberia in the interwar years, where the Left was much more represented by mass movements of socialists and especially anarchists. The extreme harsh conditions that the dictatorships imposed on the popular sectors led to the disintegration of the anarchist and socialist movements, and instead it provided a more fertile ground for the survival of sect-like radical organizations, thus favouring the communist parties. Communists, Catholics, and to much less extent, socialists competed for the allegiance of the workers within the corporatist unions during the dictatorships, but these divisions became clearer in the last years of the dictatorships, and they were especially promoted by government action. In Portugal, the PCP was more cautious and pursued a strategy of recognition by the authorities, whereas the Catholic unionists had more the aim of creating a real confederation.\textsuperscript{1325} In Spain after Franco’s death in November 1975, there was a debate whether there should exist a single labour organization or a variety of unions. The policies of the authoritarian governments towards the unions made a single movement less possible. The UGT had been permitted to have a public meeting in April 1976 (Arias Navarro was the PM), while the CCOO, which was the strongest movement in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1321} Oliveira, 2000, p. 434.
\item \textsuperscript{1322} Bermeo, 1986, p. 57.
\item \textsuperscript{1323} Lucena and Gaspar, 1991, n. 30, p. 865.
\item \textsuperscript{1324} Bermeo, 1986, p. 32.
\item \textsuperscript{1325} Lucena and Gaspar, 1991, p. 865.
\end{itemize}
Spain since the late 1960s, had to remain clandestine. As a result, an extreme competition between the two confederations emerged, especially in the first years of the transition, when CCOO was hegemonic and the UGT was fighting for its place.\textsuperscript{1326}

This inhibited the creation of confederative structures during democracy, and in both countries it favoured the organizational fragmentation of the working class during the transition from authoritarianism and during democratic consolidation. In Portugal the main union confederation, the communist dominated CGTP, opposed integration in the corporatist tripartite body, the Conselho Permanente da Concertação Social in 1984, and it was willing to enter only the unions affiliated with the socialist dominated UGT. CGTP entered the council in 1987 but never signed any agreement with the employers and the state, contrary to the UGT.\textsuperscript{1327} In Spain in the 1980s, the CC.OO had to compete with UGT (socialist), a small anarchist federation (CNT), basque (ELA/STV), and galician (INTG) labour organizations.\textsuperscript{1328}

It was not only the legacies of associability during authoritarianism that shaped democratic associability in Iberia but also the continuation of state and regime institutional configurations of the dictatorship. First, political parties both on the Right and the Left had weak links with voluntary associations. This was the result of the fact that in the dictatorships parties were not important institutions in the regime, thus inhibiting the creation of links between the elites of the opposition and popular classes.\textsuperscript{1329} As Juan Linz has argued, political parties in authoritarian regimes are much less important than other institutions like the bureaucracy, the church, or the army. This makes the political elites of the regime to be recruited in institutions that are insulated from contacts with associational life, and for the small number of professional politicians.\textsuperscript{1330} But it also affects elites in the opposition. Iberian dictatorships had created a high ambiguity between the government and the oppositions, with many individuals maintaining ambiguous positions towards the regime. It was possibly one way how to survive in an authoritarian environment, but a price to be paid was also the depoliticization of many opposition groups and the strengthening of a technocratic mode of thinking.\textsuperscript{1331} As Fishman has shown, a big part of anti-Franco union plant leaders in the vertical unions during Francoism that organized strikes and illegal

\textsuperscript{1326} Martínez-Alier, Jusmet, 1988, p. 40; Martinez-Alier, Roca, pp. 15-16
\textsuperscript{1327} Lucena and Gaspar, 1991, pp. 876-878.
\textsuperscript{1328} Schmitter, 1999, p. 426.
\textsuperscript{1329} Oxhorn, 1995, pp. 32-33.
\textsuperscript{1330} Linz, 1975, pp. 264-266.
\textsuperscript{1331} Linz, 1975, pp. 269-273.
activities did not have any connections to the opposition during the authoritarian period.1332

Moreover, due to the difficulty of creating mechanisms to legitimize political pluralism, authoritarian regimes are prone to experience factionalism. The various groups which support and oppose the regime tend to occupy simultaneously institutions and organizations such as the single party, the state bureaucracy, the press, public companies, or the armed forces. Thus, their competition for power tends to cut across several of the régime’s institutions. One example was the competition between the *Opus Dei* technocrats, placed in technocratic ministries dedicated to economic and social development reforms, and the single party, the *Falange*, during *Franquismo*. As a result, autocracies often do not have clearly demarcated borders between the government and the opposition, and this tends to engender political groupings which are simultaneously inside and outside the regime, and which occupy its institutions but display an attitude of semi-loyalty towards the current political order. Juan Linz labelled these sectors the ‘semi-opposition’. In its extreme form, the semi-opposition is made up of those groups which control or are present in some of the régime’s institutions, and which initially were supportive of the regime but with the purpose of attaining goals «not shared by their coalition partners».1333 In Portugal, during the *Estado Novo*, the democratic semi-opposition was embodied during the period from 1968 to 1974 by a group of representatives in the X legislature of the National Assembly (*Assembleia Nacional*) (1969-1973) who became known as the *Ala Liberal* (Liberal Wing), and who defended the project of a gradual and peaceable transformation of the *Estado Novo* regime into a democracy.1334

During democracy and after the euphoria of the transition, these old patterns were re-established. As Gunther argues for Spain «the weakness of contemporary Spanish parties as interest-representation organizations would appear to parallel the irrelevance of the *Movimiento Nacional* in the former régime's policy processes».1335 Iberian political parties were formed without strong links to associations of popular sectors, and thus more easily tensions and different aims arised between the party leadership and the union leadership.1336 From the point of view of elites, there was not a

1333 Linz, 1975, p. 272.
1334 This paragraph draws from Fernandes, 2007, pp. 687-688.
presentation of clear ideologies and a direct mobilization strategy. Many sectors of the new elite, both on the Right and the Left, were state technocrats. For instance, in Portugal in the Socialist Party the technocrats became ascendant in the mid-1980s and emphasized mainly economic development plans and economic liberalism that clashed with many unions’ claims for a higher state intervention in sponsoring welfare and consumption. In Spain, the even more aggressive economic liberalization policy of the PSOE antagonized labor and failed to create a comprehensive welfare state. This distanced socialists from the workers’ movement. In Portugal, unions were mainly connected to the communists produced extreme conflicts with the socialist party, and in Spain PSOE’s rule led to a clash with both communist and socialist unions.

On the Right, the same pattern occurred. In both countries there was an inability to build the classical mass mobilization strategy of Western European right-wing Christian-democracy. During the authoritarian regimes and the transition there were weak links between the elites and the Catholic masses. In Spain, the francoist moderate elites that directed the transition to democracy could not even form a mass party (the failed UCD), and they had very low connections with workers and peasants. In Portugal, in the transition the Catholic Church did not mobilize its constituency through the building of new organizations and direct links to parties. After the coup in April 1974, the Church was very cautious, refraining from any mobilization and defending instead the idea that Catholics should be mobilized by the existing political forces: the newly created center parties. Catholics, moreover, were present in a diversity of political associations, from the most right-wing to the extreme left-wing groups. The groups that emerged claiming an explicit politico-Catholic identity were very small and soon disappeared (the PCSD or Partido Cristão Social Democrata, with some militants of the Catholic Action; Partido Democrático Popular Cristão or PDPC). The most nefarious was the rightist PDC (Partido da Democracia Cristã) that was illegalized on March 17, 1975 under the accusation of preparing a coup a few days earlier. The Portuguese constitutions of 1976 and 1982 in fact prohibited parties from using religious affiliations.

1337 Gunther, 1996, p. 15.
1339 Bermeo, García-Duran, 1994, p. 121-123.
1342 Santos, 2005, pp. 112, 114.
1343 Stepan, 2001, p. 221.
This is a very interesting finding, since organized Catholicism was allowed and even promoted during both dictatorships, as was explained in the previous chapters. The Catholic Church was part of the social pluralism that Linz argued was a main trait of authoritarian regimes.\textsuperscript{1344} In this sense, the Catholic field could have served as a base for conservative mobilization. But divisions within the Church after the second Vatican council in 1961-1963 inhibited Catholic alignment with a single political position.\textsuperscript{1345} In the 1960s, many Catholics began to oppose the regime while others support it. This division affected both laymen and members of the hierarchy. In Spain, there emerged gradually a situation of stronger workers’ mobilization by other organizations, some of them new, in cooperation or in competition with the CCOO. The USO was formed by Catholic activists and independent socialists.\textsuperscript{1346} In the Catholic workers’ movement, the HOAC or Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica, a legal organization, participated in the workers’ struggles and utilized churches and monasteries as shelters for meetings even to non-Catholic organizations like the CCOO.\textsuperscript{1347} This contributed to the emergence of a cleavage within the Catholic associations between those discontent with the regime, which tended to come close to left-wing and even Marxist positions, and those still supporting it. For instance, many Catholic leaders of the dictatorship started to participate and lead secular and extreme left organizations.\textsuperscript{1348}

In Portugal, the first sign of clash between the church and the regime was when the bishop of Porto declared to favor strikes in 1958 and he argued that the «Portuguese corporatism was in reality a means to deprive workers from the natural right of association».\textsuperscript{1349} In the aftermath, many reformist Catholic groups were created to fight for freedom of expression and democracy. They were founded in particular by people coming from the ranks of the \textit{Acção Católica} and other lay movements: the \textit{Comissão Justiça e Paz} (Porto, 1969), the \textit{Comissão Nacional de Socorro aos Presos Políticos} (1969), the cooperatives \textit{PRAGMA} (Lisbon 1964) and \textit{Confronho} (Porto 1964). Moreover, some of these Catholics participated in the opposition’s electoral lists in the elections of 1961, 1965, and 1969, and in the military coup attempts of 1959 and

\textsuperscript{1344} Linz, 1975, p. 266.
\textsuperscript{1345} On the political effects of the II Vatican Council in Portugal see Fernandes, 2006; on Spain see Pérez-Díaz, 1998, pp. 108-183.
\textsuperscript{1346} Fishman, 2004, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{1347} Martinez-Alier, Jusmet, 1988, pp. 30-32.
\textsuperscript{1348} Linz, 1981.
\textsuperscript{1349} Robinson, 2000, pp. 230-231.
These internal contradictions of Portuguese Catholicism were reflected in the conflicts between laymen and the church hierarchy, and within the church hierarchy itself between progressive and conservative bishops and priests. More importantly, it led to an internal decomposition of the unity and identity of Acção Católica. The organization identified greatly with the existing political order, and gradually after the 1960s it was unable to recruit members, its local implantation declined, and it was affected by a lack of financial resources. At the same time, there was growth in the opposition organizations, like the students, and some of its organizations like the JEC, JUC, JOC and LOC closely adopt a left wing posture and become controlled by leftist priests. Between 1963 and 1969, the members of LOC decreased from 2,000 to 400, and in 1975 Acção Católica had only 7,891 members.

Second, in the democratic period one can see the creation of powerful executives, and the state administrations somehow continued the strong executives of the dictatorship. There was a tendency for weak parliamentary bodies and institutions of societal corporatist policy-making. Direct imposition from above (statism) was a form of policy-making and/or selective relationships between the state and chosen associations. There was a continuation of the technocratic policy-making and decision-making style of the dictatorship. In Portugal during the authoritarian Estado Novo, for instance every economic sector was under the tutelage of an institution of sectorial economic coordination, nominated by the government and with almost absolute powers on the sectors, from fixating prices and the quality of products to imports of raw materials, work contracts and the supervision of exports.

Moreover, although free popular class associability was not allowed, elites did have more open channels of influence and access to rulers. Business and professional interests were tolerated and even escaped the state corporatist structures. In Portugal, capitalist associations like the Associação Industrial Portuguesa and the Associação Industrial Portuense negotiated directly with the government. Also in Spain, the

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old liberal trade associations like the camaras de comercio, industria, and navegacion remained outside the official sindicatos. Moreover, both in Portugal and in Spain, a few corporate groups dominated the economy under the protection of the state while relying mainly on direct and informal contacts with the political elite for the advancement of their interests.

In the democratic period, this pattern of statism and preferential relationships continued between the state and particular voluntary associations. In Spain, for instance policy-making during UCD and PSOE governments was similar to the patterns of the dictatorship. As Richard Gunther has observed, the Council of Ministers did not establish policy priorities to be resolved by consensus between the ministers as a collegial body, but it was the prime minister's intervention that resolved issues and made the decisions. As a consequence, corporatist institutions played a minor role in economic and welfare policies. In Portugal, the Conselho Permanente da Concertação Social, created in 1984, was presided by the Prime Minister, and was composed of six members of the government, six representatives of employers designated by their confederations (Industry-CIP, Commerce-CCP and agriculture-CAP) and three representatives of workers from the socialist/social-democrat UGT and three from the mainly communist CGTP. But this body had very weak powers and most decision-making was done by direct government regulation. The government attempted to directly impose decisions, like limits on salaries (tectos salariais) and many issues could not be debated in the council, like social security, duration of work, termination of work contracts, duration of work conventions. establishment in 1991 of the Conselho Económico Social (CES), the main body for corporatist negotiation ever since. Did CES play in the 1990s a more relevant role than the Conselho Permanente da Concertação Social in the 1980s

In Spain there has been also a weak institutional integration of unions in corporatist structures. The main body for corporatist negotiation, the Economic and Social Council (Consejo Económico y Social or CES) was created in 1992 for the cooperation between unions, business, and the government. But as scholars have observed, the CES cannot take binding decisions and its discussions are fundamentally

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different from the negotiation of the global pacts up to 1986». Moreover, although Spain has become known for its transición pactada (the Pactos de la Moncloa, in October 1977), these pacts were mainly the work of political parties and of the UCD governments and were not institutionalized. For the most part, they were pacts between the UCD and the opposition parties to achieve democratic stabilization, not designed for deliberation and decision on economic policy issues. Although an income policy agreement was achieved, unions and employers’ organizations did not participate directly in the negotiations. The national leaders of the unions voted it in the parliament, as deputies (Nicolás Redondo, as head of the UGT, and Marcelino Camacho, head of CCOO).1364

This has affected associational life. For instance in Spain, agrarian interest organizations do not have institutionalized relationships with the parliament (where the agriculture commission has a diffuse role), and they depend more on personal relationships with MPs and individual politicians.1365 There is also in this field a style of policy making characterized by a high degree of direct state intervention.1366 The francoist Instituto de Estudios Agrosociales became the Instituto de Relaciones Agrarias (IRA), which continued to have powerful functions and financial control over agrarian associability, and to use its power for political purposes.1367 Employers act also less through business associations and more «by maintaining a ‘family relationship’ with the public sector» or by direct links with ministers.1368 Although in the field of third sector associations 85% report to have public funding, only 1% receives it through partnership contracts, and most receive it by direct funding or by subventions. Moreover, only 31% of these associations report a constant collaboration with the state, and two thirds think that the state and public authorities provide very weak support.1369

Legislation inherited from Francoism reinforced this tendency. In fact in Spain, the 1964 law of associations was terminated only in 2002.1370 The 1978 Constitución eliminated the clauses prohibiting freedom of association and the requisite of administrative permission in the 1964 law, but it maintained the figure of declaracion de utilidade publica (public utility), which is granted through very discretionary

1365 Estrada, 1984, pp. 286 ff. and 322, 324.
1366 Estrada, 1984, p. 124.
1367 Estrada, 1984, p. 142.
1369 Perez-Díaz, Novo, p. 179.
mechanisms. Its attribution depends on the council of ministers, and it is reserved only for associations with aims of welfare, education, culture, and sports. As a consequence, very few associations have had this statute in democratic Spain.\textsuperscript{1371} In 1987, there were 20 associations, in 1988 23, and between 1993 and 1997 157 associations that received it.\textsuperscript{1372}

Unions are usually not consulted and have no impact on policy decisions.\textsuperscript{1373} This argument could be extended to most of the associational landscape of popular classes in the Iberian democracies. The data shows that the Portuguese and Spanish democracies’ levels associational life remained stable and at very low levels when compared other Western European democracies, stagnating around the 30% of the adult population affiliated in voluntary associations (Table 33). The periods of transition from authoritarianism involved high mobilization and organization building, but when democracy was consolidated, older patterns of state-society relationships surfaced again, thus contributing to weaker associational lives during democracy.\textsuperscript{1374}

Table 35: Membership in Voluntary Associations (% adult population affiliated)

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As one can see, the Iberian democracies show very low levels of associational membership, both in political and social associations (Table 35). But of interest is also the level of membership in social associations. It is much higher than in political associations, with about 16% more for both countries. This is explained by the legacy of authoritarianism that depoliticized associability and channelled whatever associational ventures existed to social forms. In Portugal, a survey taken in 1969 found that 51% of the workers did not belong to any association, but that the preferred and allowed forms of associations were exclusively social: 15% were members of sports associations, 11% of recreational, 14% of social welfare associations (usually fire fighters), and 2% of

\textsuperscript{1371} Perez-Diaz, Novo, 2003, pp. 110-112.
\textsuperscript{1372} Mota, 1999, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{1373} Gunther, 1996, pp. 68-69; Pérez-Díaz, 1999, p. 35.

361
cultural associations. In Spain, it is mainly associations of social type that have public status. In 1997 only 0.54% of all associations had this status, and most of these were associations for the protection of the disabled and incapacitated (32% in 1989), followed by sports and recreational organizations (19%), philanthropy (17%, usually related to helping drug addicts and alcoholics), educational (9.5%), cultural and ideological (9%), old age and familial (9%), and finally economic and professional (5.5%).

Table 36: Membership in Type of Association: Political and Social

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>political</td>
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<td>Port:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(sources: Eurobarometer: 1990-nº34.0, 1998-nº50.1; social associations: groups that provide social welfare, personal health, education, art, music and culture, youth, sports, recreation and entertainment; political associations: unions, professional associations, local community groups, political parties, movements for human rights, peace, Third World development, resource conservation, environmental protection, gender equality)

National surveys during the democratic period show a continuation of this pattern. The national Portuguese surveys are constant in showing very low levels of civic engagement. In 1978, a survey conducted by Thomas Bruneau and Mário Bacalhau asked the Portuguese population if it had cooperated in any socio-cultural organizations: only 11.1% responded in the affirmative. The same question was replicated in 1984, and the result was that only 14.9% had. IA 2000 survey asking what the Portuguese did in their free time found that activities in associations and collectivities (4.9%) and in political parties and unions (3.6%) were the lowest and least preferred in a list that included spending time with friends and family (79.3%), listening to music (63.7%), watching TV (59.9%), internet surfing (59.5%), or reading (52.5%).

Finally, there are very high social and economic inequalities in civic engagement. In Portugal there is a very strong social inequality in the levels of

1376 Mota, 1999, p. 58.
1377 Cardoso, Nascimento, Morgado and Espanha, 2005, p. 150.
membership. Studies have consistently found a strong class bias in levels of associational membership. In 1991, 34% of the upper and upper-middle classes were affiliated in associations, 22% of the middle class, 12.7% of the lower class, and 6.1% of the lowest classes.1378 In Spain in 2001, of the people who belonged to associations, 28.3% belonged to the upper middle class, 24.2% to the middle and lower middle class, and 28.3% were workers. In terms of age, 26.1% were between 30-45 years old, 26.2% between 46-60 years men 24.4%. People who did not belong to associations were mainly women (80.4%), younger than 30 years (84.5%), with just the primary school or no schooling at all (81.5%), unemployed (84.3%), working class (83.4%), and abstentionists (88.9%).1379

Looking at the universe of associations themselves is also revealing. In Spain, 69% of third sector associations declare that there is a low coordination between associations; only 31% associations say they have regular collaboration with other associations. This field is mainly occupied by a few very large and powerful entities (the 3 biggest associations have 50% of the paid and 64% of the volunteers of third sector associations), but half of these associations are very small and local.1380

In Spain, the associations of local character dominate.1381 Two out of three associations are local and one out of four is provincial. Regional organizations account for only some 9% of the total, while only 8% operate at the national level. Since 1983, more than half of the associations registered declared to work in the local sphere, with percentages of more than 70% in the period 1977-1979. Next are the associations of the provincial sphere, with 16% and 30% of all registered associations and a development with no variations since 1987. National associations, finally, account for 16% of all associations in 1967, 3% in 1978, and 12% in 1996. Regional associations have evolved from 3% in the 1970s to 20% in 1985, and to 26% in 1996.1382

13.2. Variations of Associational Life in Portugal and Spain, 1940s-2000

There are interesting variations of associational life between Portugal and Spain. Although Spain shows slightly higher levels of membership in associations, there are

1378 Schmitter, 1991, pp. 101-103
1380 Mota, 1999, p. 58.
1381 Mota, 1996, pp. 48-49.
1382 Mota, 1999, p. 53.
studies that put Portugal ahead of Spain. In 2000, Manuel Villaverde Cabral found in a national survey that 32.1% of the adult Portuguese population was affiliated in voluntary associations.\textsuperscript{1383} Morales and Mota have found that Portugal had higher levels than Spain in 1999-2002: 43% and 42% respectively.\textsuperscript{1384}

Where we see stronger differences is in membership by type of association (Table 36). In the period of democratic consolidation (in Portugal after 1982 and in Spain after 1981), Portugal shows higher levels of membership in unions and professional associations. It also shows higher levels of membership in sport and religious associations (8% in Portugal during the period 1984-1999 vs 5.6% in Spain during the period 1989-2002) although with much smaller differences. Inversely, Spain has much higher levels than Portugal in New Social Movements type of associations and of neighbourhood and cultural local organizations.

Also union density has been higher in Portugal. In 1989, Portugal had a union density of 28.6% of the workforce.\textsuperscript{1385} Between 1988 and 1990, about one million people were union affiliates. In 2000 union density was 25.6%.\textsuperscript{1386} In Spain, union density was 8% in 1980, 12% in 1990, and 17% in 1997. According to Perez-Diaz, union density declined sharply from 27.4% in 1977.\textsuperscript{1387} In 1978, both labor unions listed over 2 million members, over 70% labor force, although this data might be an exaggeration because Perez Diaz found in a survey of 1978 that only 56.3% of the workforce was enrolled in unions. Most accounts refer to a sharp decline in union membership after the extreme mobilization of the transition years, putting it around 13% or lower.\textsuperscript{1388} There has been also a scarcity of union plant level leaders, and surveys found that the attitudes of the mass membership reveal apathy.\textsuperscript{1389} Finally, according to Schmitter, in 1989 Portugal showed a 28.6% union density and Spain a 9.3% rate.\textsuperscript{1390}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{1383} Cabral, 2000, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{1384} Morales, Mota, 2006, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{1385} Schmitter, 1999, p. 418
\textsuperscript{1386} Royo, 2002, pp. 152-153.
\textsuperscript{1387} Pérez-Díaz, 2000, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{1388} Fishman, 1990, pp. 187-188.
\textsuperscript{1389} Fishman, 1990, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{1390} Schmitter, 1999, p. 418
\end{footnotes}
Table 37: Types of associational membership in Spain (%), 1980-2002

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(Sources: Morales, Mota, 2006, p. 85; for parties Morales, 2003, p. 11)
Table 38: Types of associational membership in Portugal (%), 1978-1999

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What could explain these varying patterns of associational life, a stronger density of traditonal socioeconomic associations in Portugal (unions, professional associations) and a more localistic and neighborhood type of associational life in Spain?
I argue that this is explained by different modes of transformation of the authoritarian regimes into democracies, in particular the institutional and state transformations during the periods of authoritarian liberalization, transition, and democratic consolidation.\textsuperscript{1391} In this section I analyze these historical phases and their impact on associational life.

By liberalization of an authoritarian regime I mean those political processes of enlargement of the sphere of political and social rights that are available to the citizens as well as measures directed towards a greater acceptance of the opposition and stimulus towards organizational pluralism. This does not mean that the authoritarian leader wants to democratize the regime, but only that it allows for wider spaces of freedom within the dictatorship.\textsuperscript{1392} In the words of Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, the regime evolves in the direction of a softer form of rule, a Dictablanda.\textsuperscript{1393} For instance, in Spain Carlos Arias Navarro ruled from December 1973 to July 1976 and attempted to institutionalize a softer Franquism, a more liberal order, but pressures towards liberalization started in 1964 with a new wave of associations.\textsuperscript{1394}

A context that tends to spurt liberalization is leadership succession. The succession of an authoritarian leader is one of the major problems that an authoritarian regime faces, and ”the absence of mechanisms for self-renewal contributes significantly to the erosion of the legitimacy of those regimes”. A crisis of succession, which usually occurs after the death of a founding and charismatic leader, threatens seriously regime stability and tends to produce a dispersion of power and to accentuate the struggles amongst the regime’s factions. The issue here is to find out whether the stability of the regime itself is affected. As Sigmund Neumann has argued, autocracies tend to accentuate the personal aspects of leadership, and this seems to have been very strong in the Portuguese dictatorship. For instance, Neumann considered Salazar to be the dictator who most identified his persona with the regime.\textsuperscript{1395}

I argue that the processes of liberalization were different in both countries, and that in Portugal they tended to give more power to political and professional organizations, whereas in Spain they tended to promote more localistic organizations. In

\textsuperscript{1391} Ekiert, Kubik, 1998, p. 571.
\textsuperscript{1392} Lucena, 1976, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{1393} O’Donnell, Schmitter, 1986, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{1394} Gunther, 1980, fn. 105, p. 309.
\textsuperscript{1395} Neumann, 1941, pp. 138-142; this section draws from Fernandes, 2007, p. 692.
Spain in 1964 the regime proceeded to changes in the law of associations. The new 1964 Law of Associations was more tolerant of new social associations and broke the
monopoly enjoyed by the single party and the Church. It stimulated, for instance, the
growth of some third sector associations. A decree of May, 20 1965 declared that
associations could apply for public status. If an association was considered to be
dedicated to «welfare, educational, sportive or any other ends that tend to promote the
common good» it could be exempted from the general legislation on associations,
receive public subventions and technical help from the state, and to be consulted in
affairs related with their activity. Still, associations could not question the public order,
they were to maintain the regime informed of their activities and budget, and ask
permission for their meetings. Moreover, at the same time the Movimiento pushed
further its own new internal associational project for the Associaciones de Cabezas de
Familias (ACF), the first of which appeared in late 1963, in order to survive in a much
more competitive world. In fact, any new association could register either through the
Ley de Asociaciones of 1964 or through the Movimiento.

These changes enabled the regime to channel the development of voluntary
associations but of a social, not political, nature. Still, in 1968 only 5,650
associations were listed, and the number of organizations per 100,000 inhabitants was
18.4. The evolution of associations between 1968 and 1975 was slow and more
stable, although many of them might not have been registered because they worked at
the neighborhood level. But in the early 1970s, although repression in fact grew, it
was the time when associational ventures started to spread. Between 1973 and 1976,
there were debates in order to legalize some form of “political associations”, but these
were very ill-defined as a legal category, something between interest group and party.
For political associability the legalization was very restricted and needed the approval of
the National Movement. On the other hand, a very strong neighborhood
associational movement emerged. In 1975 it coordinated several campaigns with wide
popular support. The neighborhood movement became publicly politicized when the

1396 Tusell, 2005, p. 169.
1398 Radcliff, 2005b, p. 8.
Provincial Federation demanded a democratic system and made an alliance with the trade unions.  

In Portugal, the liberalization phase started with the rule of Salazar’s successor, Marcelo Caetano. In the years of the so-called Marcelismo, there was more tolerance of associability. First, the 1969 elections were used by Caetano as plebiscites to his rule, which introduced a stronger mobilization by the single party. Together with softer rules for the opposition to participate in elections, this fostered the emergence of new civic-electoral organizations by the opposition. Caetano used the National Assembly to gain political legitimacy, both internally and externally. As Schmitter argues, the 1969 and 1973 elections were above all exercises in political mobilisation in support of the new authoritarian project and leadership, which is a novelty when compared to the Salazarismo period. In fact, Caetano had no choice but to use this institution as a source of power and legitimacy for his political projects, since he had not been chosen by Salazar as his successor. Hence, Caetano also appealed to electoral legitimacy. In the words of Manuel de Lucena, after Salazar any new leader «has much greater need for the regime’s legal and institutional crutches». In 1969, after the Second Republican Congress, the opposition forces created together the Comissões Democráticas Eleitorais (Electoral Democratic Commissions, CDE). These were expanded to each district of the country, and in July 1969 approved a common political platform and a coordination commission in a national meeting. In the 1973 elections, though, the CDE suffered an internal cession, and the socialists opted to form the Comissão Eleitoral de Unidade Democrática, or CEUD (Electoral Democratic Union Commission). Moreover, these groups had links to both Catholic and communist unions and social movements.

Caetano fostered deliberately more organizational political pluralism. There was the creation of the Sociedade para o Desenvolvimento Económico e Social (SEDES, Society for Economic and Social Development), an organization of Catholic technocrats and liberal-minded new generations of the regime’s elites that functioned as a kind of democratic semiopposition and that on occasions supported Caetano against the hardliners in the single party, but that also started becoming autonomous from Caetano and developed links to the socialist opposition and even to the communist trade

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1405 Schmitter, 1999c, pp. 81-82.
1407 Raby, 2000d, p. 552.
unions. In fact, SEDES was the organizational prelude and basis from which the center-right political party of Portuguese democracy, the *Partido Social Democrata* (PSD), was created in 1974.  

Also in Portugal there was a stronger tradition of freedom of association during the dictatorship that could be used to foster reforms when the right moment arrived. Freedom of association was always in the 1933 constitution, although it never had been implemented. Scholars have classified the 1933 constitution as a dual text incorporating both liberal and state-corporatist principles. A 1971 law allowed for more freedom of religion and permitted diverse religious groups to organize and create associations without administrative permission.  

Also in Portugal, the legislation on cooperatives was more benign to freedom of association. This had in fact stimulated the development of a cooperative movement with political tonalities. The “commercial” cooperatives had been used by the opposition (socialists, communists, and Catholics) as a form to create free associability, since the law regulating cooperatives was not restrictive. Moreover, this cooperative-political movement had always the support of the more liberal MPs of the dictatorship. For instance in December 1970, a group of these MPs reacted against the proposals of the government to curb the cooperative movement by a more repressive law. One of these MPs, Pinto Machado, referred in the parliament even that he represented UNICOPOPE, a federation of 85 cooperatives.

In Portugal there was a strong survival and continuity of institutions inherited from the pre-authoritarian past. Portugal had an experience of competitive politics after WWII. Its legislature continued to function, although without many powers (could not remove the government), but nonetheless it contributed to some form of political pluralism: republican/socialist, and sometimes even communist, electoral fronts were tolerated and some progressive MPs were elected to the parliament. Also for much of the time, the president was elected by popular suffrage. In fact, in 1969 18% of the adult population was enfranchised, and 40% voted in the general elections. In 1973 34.4% were enfranchised. The National Assembly was a window of opportunity for

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1411 Santos, 2005, p. 95.  
1412 Rosas, 1994, p. 554.  
1415 Reed, 1995, p. 673.  
certain sectors of the regime’s elites who sought to transform the regime in order to assert their position. During the Marcelismo, the National Assembly acquired higher public visibility and political autonomy.1417

A comparison with the assembly under Franco reinforces this point. In authoritarian regimes, parliaments were distinguished by the degree of freedom and autonomy given to minority and semi-opposition groups. In its origin and function, the Spanish assembly (the Cortes) was markedly different from the Portuguese National Assembly. When it was created in 1942, it was merely a consulting organism, which assisted Franco in the legislative tasks. It did not approve laws, and elections were not held before 1967. The head of state, Francisco Franco, had full legislative power and nominated every member of the assembly. As an institution, the Spanish assembly was thus tightly bound to the authoritarian order. Initially, its members were appointed ex-officio, that is, they were persons who already held posts within the regime (union leaders and mayors, for instance).

Consequently, the Spanish assembly was an institution with less autonomy and it was more dependent on the authoritarian leader than the Portuguese assembly. From 1966, when the new Spanish constitution created 108 seats, two for each province, to be elected by the heads of family, the Spanish assembly became an institution where there was some pluralism. The government, however, only required its support for great constitutional changes, and it almost always controlled all the nominations. In Portugal, the government’s control over the chambers was much weaker. An example which is similar to the Portuguese is Pinochet’s Chile, where the continuation of the parliamentary assembly of the previous democratic regime contributed to making political positions more extreme, and, consequently, caused the opposition to play the decisive role in the transition. By contrast in Spain, the transition tended to be carried out by the democratic semi-opposition.1418

The Spanish form of liberalization of the regime was different and tended to promote the spread of more local and social organizations. This is also related to the institutional configuration of the regime. As Linz has argued, in Spain there was a higher organizational competition between two factions of the coalition supporting the

1417 Fernandes, 2007, p. 690.
regime, the single party (the Falange) and the Church.\textsuperscript{1419} In the 1960s, this competition became very intense, with elements of the Falangists deciding to make use of their control of parts of the welfare state apparatus to compete with other political families (modernizers, Catholics, etc.) and young Falangists who initiated dissident social movements. Hence the disposition within the Falange to tolerate some dissidence in the union domain and in spaces that emerged as a consequence of the extension of the welfare state: in public hospitals and, above all, in the higher education system. This led to the creation within the orbit movimineteto of a new Delegación Nacional de Asociaciones (National Delegation of Associations) to mobilize wider sectors of the Spanish population, and for this a specific type of associations was created: local associations of cabezas de familia (family heads) and amas de casa (housewifes). In 1976, there were more than 4,000 of these local family associations sponsored by the Movimiento.\textsuperscript{1420}

At the same time the Church supported associational building in response to this move from the Falange. The Acción Católica expanded its organizations (442,000 members in 1946, 600,000 in 1955, 53,300 in 1956, and in 1973 only 100,000 though): the Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica, the Juventud Obrera Católica, and the Juventud de Estudiantes Católicos.\textsuperscript{1421} In rural areas like Castilla Vieja and Navarre Church organizations tried also to mobilize the conservative peasantry through associations like the Hijas de María or by giving stronger socialization functions to the parishes.\textsuperscript{1422} Finally, a stronger role was given to family associations like the Confederación Católica de Padres de Familia who in 1958 was composed of 74 associations of provincial and diocese character, and 247 associations of colegios (private catholic schools) with a total of 143,000 heads of family in it. The Asociacion de Padres de Familia had been founded in 1913 to mobilize against the liberal government’s anticlerical education legislation, and during the Republic they expanded from 34 to 154 local branches, and from 9,000 to 85,000 members. These associations continued to exist during the early Franco regime and competed with Movimiento organizations since the early 1960s.

Localism was an outcome of these social movements because both the family associations and the neighborhood associations of the Movimiento and of the Church

\textsuperscript{1419} Linz, 1975, pp. 292, 320.
\textsuperscript{1420} Radcliff, 2005b, pp. 11-12, 14-15.
\textsuperscript{1421} Tussell, 2005, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{1422} Sevilla-Sevilla-Guzmán, 1979, p. 135.
relied on parish centers to be built. Church buildings and local infrastructures were essential resources to spread these organizations, and in both local priests were the key actors. Many local Spanish priests of the 1960s and 1970s were promoters of both family and neighborhood associations. Many of these associations evolved gradually towards a left political position, becoming comunidades cristianas which discussed everything from labor issues, human rights, and even the election of bishops.

These differences were strengthened when the two regimes began their transition from authoritarian rule. The period of transition from authoritarianism refers to the phase when there is no return to the previous authoritarian order but it is not yet known and certain which type of regime will replace it. Accordingly, this is a phase of extreme institutional innovation and political uncertainty. Moreover, different forms of transition have different effects in the quality and type of possible subsequent democratic regimes. Specifically, democracies will vary in their different associational landscapes according to the types of transition they emerged from.

Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter have defined four types of transition from authoritarian rule. They look at transitions according to two dimensions of variation. One dimension is the main actors that push for change of the authoritarian regime. These can be the elites or the popular sectors, the masses. The other dimension is the strategies of the main actors of the transition. These range from the use of force to a willingness to compromise and negotiate. Democracies can emerge from any of these modes of transition but the quality and type of democracy will vary nonetheless. Cross-tabulating these dimensions, Karl and Schmitter arrive at four modes of transition. Imposition: when elites are predominant and use force to bring regime change (e.g. the foreign led transition to democracy of Germany in 1945-1947); Revolution: when the masses are the main actor and rise up in arms and defeat the authoritarian elites; Pact: elites are also the main actor behind the transition but negotiate the terms and rules of the new regime (e.g. Spain in 1977 or Venezuela in 1958); Reform: when the popular sectors or masses mobilize from below and impose a regime transformation but without resorting to widespread violence (e.g. Poland in 1989).

According to Karl and Schmitter, revolution is the path of regime transformation less conducive to democracy, since usually revolutions result in extreme widespread use

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1424 Radcliff, 2005, pp. 18, 25.
of violence that only end by state centralizations fostered by single party hegemony. The other paths can lead to democracy, although to different types of democracy.\textsuperscript{1426} Pact-led transitions and imposition paths are conducive to more restricted types of democracy. In the former, the outcome usually leads to an institutional design where competitiveness and accountability are restricted, and as a consequence they demobilize and even exclude popular classes. This is the case of Spain. In the later a big part of the former regime’s elite will not accept the new regime.\textsuperscript{1427} Reform seems to be the better option for the development of a wider and denser associational landscape, since from the beginning popular sector voluntary associations had a major role in bringing regime transformation and as a consequence, all other things being equal, the new regime institutional design will be more open to the demands of popular sectors. I argue this to be the case of Portugal.\textsuperscript{1428}

Portugal’s transition, between April 1974 until the end of 1975, was an extreme case of high participation and popular mobilization through a variety of forms. It was stimulated by the termination of the regime by a coup of left-wing, dissatisfied military officers, the MFA (\textit{Movimento das Forças Armadas}-Armed Forces Movement). The \textit{Estado Novo} regime was brought down by a military coup on April 25, 1974. The coup unleashed a wave of popular mobilization and associational building unprecedented in Portuguese history. The denominated revolutionary period, between April 1974 and April 1976 when the new democratic constitution was approved, saw an explosion of associative movements concerned with every aspect of social life, such as the improvement of housing conditions through resident associations (\textit{associações de moradores}), the preservation of employment, improvement of working conditions, parent associations, and services to help children.\textsuperscript{1429} The women’s movement, Movimento Pró-Divórcio, was created in 1974. In a rally in Lisbon, it brought together 10,000 people and gathered 100,000 signatures all over country asking for the end a law that forbade people to divorce.\textsuperscript{1430} In May 1974, the Portuguese environmental organization, the Movimento Ecológico Português, was created by the journalist Afonso Cautela.\textsuperscript{1431}

\textsuperscript{1428} Oxhorn, 1995, pp. 24-26
\textsuperscript{1429} Campos Franco, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{1430} Sousa, 1994, pp. 504-505.
\textsuperscript{1431} Eloy, 1994, pp. 334, 343-344.
After the coup there was such an institutional opening in Portugal whereby popular associations were created and many of them also developed strong links with elites, institutions and the state apparatus. The MFA, but also civilian elites of new political parties, tried to sponsor and mobilize much of this popular sector.\textsuperscript{1432} In particular, the Portuguese transition involved high competition and mobilization by political parties. Unions established closer links to parties, much more than in Spain. The CGTP allied with the Communist party, and the PS (Partido Socialista) and the PSD (Partido Social Democrata) counter-reacted by mobilizing other sectors of the union movement that were later used to build a rival confederation, the UGT, in 1978.\textsuperscript{1433}

The PCP just after the transition had a strategy of wait-and–see, and between April and the summer of 1974 it even condemned some wild strikes not organized by the CGTP. But as the national state decomposed and the military radicals and the extreme left mobilized, the PCP radicalized its action for a revolutionary takeover of power. The main controversy in this period was between the control of the labor movement and union federations in Portugal. The Intersindical had an unofficial link with the PCP, which proposed a unitary labor movement, and the center-left (PS) and the center-right (PSD) wanted instead multiple union federations as a way of fighting the PCP monopoly over the labor movement. The provisional government ruled in favor of a single union federation on January 22, 1975. It was seen as proof of the ascendancy of the Communist party in the provisional governments.\textsuperscript{1434} The labor movement (the CGTP mainly) reached its highest membership in 1975, about one million and a half unionized workers, and according to the CGTP two million (the active population was three million). The CGTP had been successful after 1974 in penetrating the corporatist unions, and the fact that it was the single confederation and organized by a party with a mobilization strategy made it grow.

Moreover, it could rely on state induced resources for that. The mandatory quota in Portuguese corporative legislation was instituted, which foresaw that all workers had to pay their unions quotas (unless they declared the contrary).\textsuperscript{1435} Socialists and Social Democrats reacted by counter-mobilizing. The first constitutional government in 1976 established the preponderance of the PS which together with the PSD established limits.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1432} O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 54.
  \item \textsuperscript{1433} Morlino, 1995, pp. 357-358.
  \item \textsuperscript{1434} Bermeo, 1986, p. 60.
  \item \textsuperscript{1435} Matos, 1979, pp. 71-73.
\end{itemize}
to a single confederate labor movement. It did this first by establishing links with some unions in service sector\textsuperscript{1436} (whereas the CGTP had its strongholds in industry, public employees, and farm workers) and second, by creating another union confederation in 1978, the UGT, which emerged out of a pact between PS and PSD and with a stronger constituency in the service sector (banques, insurance, and office employees).\textsuperscript{1437}

Also rural associational life became linked to elites and the new political parties during the cycle of mobilization during the transition. In the north the farmers’ organizations were called the MOLA or \textit{Movimento de Lavradores} (Farmer’s Movement). It was composed mainly of small farmers, and it was more heterogeneous ideologically, having in its first commission socialists, Catholics, liberals, and conservatives. Moreover, the MOLA wanted to mobilize small farmers, namely tenants, a group that did not exist in the more socially polarized south (where the opposition was mainly between big landowners and landless laborers).\textsuperscript{1438} In the summer of 1974, agricultural workers’ unions were founded. Their potential constituency was the 510,000 individuals who classified themselves as wage and salary earning agricultural workers, composing one sixth of the active population of the country, but these associations became strong mainly in some parts of the southern latifundia region. Union penetration was stronger in the districts of Beja and Évora. In 1975, 62\% of Beja’s workforce was unionized in comparison to 53\% in Évora. In Portalegre it was less than 20\% of all workers, in Santarém and Setúbal only 15\%, in Faro and Lisboa even less, and in Castelo Branco the union came into existence only in 1976.\textsuperscript{1439}

In the first months of 1975, a group of workers in the south started to occupy lands and establish collective farms. In the following twelve months, 23\% of Portuguese farmland had changed hands and was now managed collectively. These changes occurred mainly in the south.\textsuperscript{1440} These new institutions were called \textit{Unidades Colectivas de Produção} or UCPs. They paid fixed salaries and they were run on an egalitarian and democratic basis. Each was a cooperative run by elected boards of directors, a fiscal council, and with a general assembly of all workers as the supreme decision-making body.\textsuperscript{1441} When the revolutionary process came to a halt in the summer of 1975, with the defeat of the coalition of PCP and left revolutionaries by the coalition

\textsuperscript{1436} Menezes Ferreira, 1994, pp. 166-167.
\textsuperscript{1437} Lucena, 1989, p. 516.
\textsuperscript{1438} Lucena and Gaspar, 1992, pp. 139-141.
\textsuperscript{1439} Bermeo, 1986, pp. 44-46.
\textsuperscript{1440} Bermeo, 1986, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{1441} Bermeo, 1986, p. 111.
of the moderate parties and the less ideological military, the occupation of land ended also in the south. But this process had sparked a transformation in the farmer’s organizations in the south. Landowners created a confederation called CAP (Confederação da Agricultura Portuguesa or Confederation of the Portuguese Agriculture). It had a major mass organization, it was capable of public disruption, and it opposed any attempts of agrarian reform declaring a war «against the Marxists» and against the «Lisbon commune». It became strongly linked with the right-wing groups and supported on occasions the center-right of PSD and CDS, asking for the retribution of the lost, expropriated land. Reacting against this, some farmers in connection with the PCP and the PS formed the CAN (Confederação Nacional da Agricultura or National Confederation of Agriculture) in 1978. It was an umbrella organization for 253 different associations and cooperatives, of small and middle property farmers that supported the revolution. It pretended to represent small and medium farmers from the regions outside agrarian reform area and rivaled with CAP. Existing accounts attribute it a weak dimension: in the late 1980s it had only 6,000 members. In the north the MARN (Movimento de Agricultores e Rendeiros) was animated by the PCP and took the place of the MOLA. In the south, there were the Ligas, which became under PCP control in 1975, although they shared some socialist influence and creation of Sindicatos de Trabalhadores Agrícolas.

Spain’s transition from authoritarianism was very different. It was mainly a negotiation between the moderates within the francoist elite (represented by Adolfo Suárez) and the elites of the opposition, the socialists and the communists. With the support of the new head of state, King Juan Carlos, who had replaced Franco, a series of negotiations in 1977 that terminated the dictatorship. But this highly secretive and elitist mode of transition left the elites of the new Spanish democracy with much weaker links to the masses.

This was possible due to institutional origins and configuration of the Spanish regime, and how it resolved the problem of Franco’s succession. In Spain there was a simultaneous identification of the head of state and the head of government, both roles being played by Franco, which resulted in the Spanish authoritarian leader’s far greater power over the regime’s factions than what the Portuguese leader possessed. Franco

1444 Lucena, 1989, pp. 529-530.
1445 Barreto, 1987, pp. 304-305.
held weekly cabinet meetings, and his government was the true center of power. This allowed him, in 1947, to overcome the regime’s factions and to push through the approval of a law regulating the succession of the head of state in which Spain is defined as a monarchy and in which the successor is chosen by Franco.

In Portugal, on the contrary, the council of ministers was very much centred on the figure of Salazar and not very well developed as an organ of power. From a legal and constitutional perspective, in the Estado Novo regime, the government was only made up of the president of the council and of the individual ministers, but the council of ministers was not regulated as an organ of power. It was only with Caetano in 1968 that the council of ministers was finally institutionalized. This inhibited the development of other centers of power in Spain and allowed more easily for the head of government to be an agent of political change and reform. This was precisely what happened when Juan Carlos was crowned. After a brief rule by Franco’s last prime minister, Carlos Arias Navarro, Juan Carlos nominated Adolfo Suarez as head of the government in July 1976, thus putting the democratic semi-opposition in power. Together with Suarez, he dismantled Franco’s single party, issued amnesties to political prisoners, and presided over the first free elections. Moreover, the fact that Juan Carlos had greater control over the assembly than any leader had in Portugal over the National Assembly allowed him to persuade them to approve the law of political reform in October 1976, in which the assembly dissolved itself, thus clearing the way for democracy.1446

The party behind this transition was the UCD (Unión del Centro Democrático), created in 1977 under the leadership of Suarez, that included the reformist wings within Francoism and that was adept of a transition to democracy, as well as other groups like the Tacito group (advocates of a regime change since the early 1970s), liberals, Christian-democrats, and social democrats.1447 The UCD won the general elections in 1977 and in 1979, but it was unable to develop a modern party with a unitary organization throughout the territory, and it disintegrated after factional struggles. The UCD was just a collection of personalities, and it was unable to develop links to societal

organizations and interests, like the church and business interests. In 1982, the party splits with many joining the socialists and the more conservatives going to AP.  

Also the Spanish socialists, the PSOE, were unable to create links with the workers’ movement. This is even more paradoxical because historically the Spanish socialists had close links to the workers’ movement, in the UGT, as I explain in the previous chapters. Even in the first years of the transition, the party statutes required that PSOE members join the UGT. Still the party as an organization became weak. It did not have more than 200,000 members and within the party internal power struggles, party functionaries, and elected officials are predominant over union leaders. Members of the union’s national executive attended party congresses as guests and had no voting rights.  

Also the Communists had weaker links to unions than their Portuguese counterparts. The CC.OO maintained its autonomy from the PCE. «Thus, the union has not been “dominated” by the party».  

These weak linkages are quite evident in the agricultural associability. After 1982, with the transition to democracy, the agrarian sector stabilized around four national agricultural associations: CNAG (National Confederation of Farmers and Breeders), COAG (Coordination of Farmers and Breeders Organizations), CNJA (National Central of Young Farmers), and UFADE (Union of Agrarian Federations of Spain). They had almost no connection to parties or other organizations, and their relations with governments were mainly consultative and informative meetings. In the transition period, the COAG (Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Estado Espanol) was mainly implanted in Catalonia, Pais Valenciano, Navarra, Rioja, Alava, Cuenca del Duero, and Valle del Ebro, although in Catalonia, Rioja, Navarra, and Leon it had many conflicts with regional organizations. In the south it was weak and dispersed. The COAG originated from the peasant protest movements of the 1970s, the UAGAs (Uniones de Agricultores y Ganaderos). After 1977, it achieved some institutionalization as a valid interlocutor with the Ministry of Agriculture. Still, it tended to have internal divisions and it strongly depended on its members for funding. The FTT-UGT, Federación de Trabajadores de la Tierra and the SOAs (Sindicatos de Obreros Agricolas), the rural workers’ federation of the 1930s,
were revitalized by the PSOE in 1977. This led to some competition with the UAGAs, and the FTT had some success in the elections of 1978 for the camaras agrarias, especially in Andalusia, Extremadura, Pais Valenciano, and Castilla la Mancha, where there was a strong UGT tradition. But in spite of continuous support from PSOE’s organizational network and the obligatory membership for all socialist militant workers to be affiliated in the FTT (which itself is part UGT), it did not consolidate and expand as an organization. After 1982 the PSOE allowed for its militants to be affiliated with the UAGAS.1453

Instead, it was local associability that developed during the Spanish transition. During the transition, the neighborhood and housewife associational movements became even more politically oriented. There were an approximate of fourtiy neighborhood associations at the end of 1975.1454 They appeared in every major city, calling for improvements in public services in working-class neighborhoods (cultural activities, health, education, and housing). In the early 1970s, they stood against the Greater Barcelona and the Comarcal (district) plans and several groups, within a strong cycle of protest, even presented a Memorandum of Citizen’s to the Mayor of the city. In one Madrid neighborhood, the local association grew from six families in 1970 to 1,400 in 1977. In the mid-1977, there were 110 neighborhood associations in Madrid with 60,000 members and 5,000 militants. In Alcala-de-Henares, a city close to Madrid, in 1974 there were only 50 individuals in associations, whereas in 1977 there were four associations that coordinated over 600 individuals. In one neighborhood of Madrid, the local association grew sixfold from 1970 to 1977. On May 1976, sixty thousand individuals demonstrated against the high cost of living in Madrid; on June 22, fifty thousand against the high cost of living and called for the legalization of their associations; and through 1976 the demonstrations organized by these associations mobilized up to one hundred thousand people.1455 Interestingly and contrary to Portugal, the neighborhood movement seemed to have maintained roots after 1982, when the transition to democracy was completed in Spain. Although there was a decline of the movement after 1979, in the 1980s the Asociaciones de Vecinos were still

1453 Estrada, 1984, p. 216.
articulating intense demands for participation and democratization at the municipal level in the big cities.\footnote{Radcliff, 2005b, p. 31.}

In Portugal, a major social movement that rapidly expanded was the neighborhood commissions’ movement. During the final years of the authoritarian regime there had been community organizing of poor neighborhoods by church organizations and left-wing forces, and when the regime fell these organizations rapidly took over the control of authority in their residential areas. On May 8, 1974 in the poor Lisbon neighborhood of Chelas began the occupation of empty houses: in the next two weeks about 2,000 houses were occupied all over the country and on May 11 the first \textit{comissão de moradores} is elected in Lisbon with the participation of 230 families. Gradually these \textit{comissões} were taken over or mobilized by the military revolutionary left, the extreme left, like the MDP-CDE or the PCP. These groups competed strongly with each other, making the process of mobilization from below of poor neighborhoods very radicalized. At the beginning, the PCP opposed the wild occupations of houses which were fomented by the radical faction in the MFA that was structured on a Cuban socialist model (the faction around Major Otelo de Carvalho). These military between November 1974 and March 1975 organized “Poder Popular” campaigns all throughout the country, with the result that neighborhood commissions were established in many cities, like in Porto and Setúbal. In April 1975 in Lisbon, there were committees of occupation, 21 neighborhood commissions, and 54 freguesias were run by these committees. Moreover, the radicals in the army attempted an alliance between these commissions and the workers’ movement, and hence plans developed in November 1974 document \textit{Aliança Povo-MFA} (Alliance People-Armed Forces Movement). In the southern city of Setúbal this movement became very strong, and at the end of 1974 almost two thirds of the population was covered by neighborhood commissions. The speed of house occupations became stronger between March 11 and November 25, 1975, namely in Porto, Setúbal and Lisboa, involving now the occupation of private houses. National politics had radicalized to such an extent that a newly constituted and heavily armed revolutionary military unit, the COPCON, was organizing it and even clashing with the police.\footnote{Ferreira, 1994, pp. 45, 106-108; Franco, 1994, p. 185.}

Also, some the poor neighborhoods’ associations of some Portuguese cities by lay people and priests, coming partially from the structures of the Catholic Action (the
JOC, JUC, LOC), founded associations like the Assembleias Livres de Cristãos (in Moscavide, Lisboa, and Porto), the meetings of Christians (Évora, Setúbal, Almada, Barreiro, Braga, and Algarve e Bragança), but they were never sponsored by the hierarchy.\textsuperscript{1458} The Catholic hierarchy rejected and criticized these organizations, also because some of them evolved to extreme left positions and connected with the radical factions in the military and extreme left groups like the LUAR, PRP, UDP, FUR, especially in the so-called \textit{hot summer} of 1975 (the Acção Católica’s junta central was deactivated in December 1984).\textsuperscript{1459} The only mobilization strategy the church promoted was more defensive, against the campaigns of ideological mobilization in the northern countryside by leftist military and the PCP in 1975 and the attacks done by leftist forces on the Catholic Rádio Renascença in February 1975.\textsuperscript{1460}

Contrary to Spain, the neighborhood commissions that emerged in Portugal were unable to survive into the democratic consolidation period, and by the end of the 1970s they were already extinct. A survey in 1978 revealed that only 11.1\% of the population had collaborated with these organizations during that year. Moreover, they were considered the least relevant institutions to make the country democratic (1.6\%), when compared to other institutions like the presidency of the republic (27\%), the political parties (7\%) or even the armed forces (4\%).\textsuperscript{1461} Braga da Cruz revealed in a study in 1995 that the levels of identification with a city or a village were much higher in Spain than in Portugal (40\% and 21.8\% respectively).\textsuperscript{1462}

In the democratic period these differences were sustained by different patterns of state-voluntary associations relationships.\textsuperscript{1463} In Portugal, state transformations during the transition allowed for a higher control of the state apparatus by the CGTP. There was a strong presence of the CGTP unions in state employees and in banking, the sectors that were nationalized during the transition. There was also a high inequality in distribution of union density by sectors. It was very high in the primary sector and in the public services (where CGTP dominated), but in private industries and services it was below average. Union membership levels were strong in sectors like railways, banking, insurance, transport, and public companies, and weak in construction, commerce,
Moreover, union membership was close to 100% because in many of these sectors unions had a monopoly of health care provisions (e.g. banking, insurance, and telecommunications). For instance, banking unionism was around 90%, and its membership doubled since the revolution. Finally, the CGTP included 71% of all union members and the UGT less than 23%. Union density was about 47.7% in companies with more than 160 workers (smaller union density in smaller companies, about 27.4%).

In Spain, membership in unions was low in comparative terms although it rose since the mid-1980s until 1992, when major conflicts with the socialist governments led to cooperation between the two major unions for protest and membership mobilization. But most unions were unable to give their members such services like housing, pension, and strike funds in the democracy later on. Also labor laws in Spain made it easier to dismiss workers, whereas in Portugal employment could only be terminated by mutual consent, when a contract ended or when there was a just reason (an existing legal precedent). Moreover, collective dismissals required the approval of the ministry of labor and consultations with the workers’ union. Finally, in Spain there was a much wider variety of welfare funds (private, public, agricultural, self-employed, and other workers), whereas Portugal was less fragmented with some sectors like public employees, white collar workers and private wage earners in public and private companies received generous protection schemes.

Regime institutions were also different. In Portugal there was a higher parliamentarism. In Spain, the stability of governments was somehow an illusion, because it rested on the existence of a constitutional provision that to dismiss a government it required a constructive vote of no-confidence in the parliament, a censure act that could replace the Prime Minister with a new one. This required a large majority of the votes in the chamber involving much more than one single party usually, and these conditions are not always possible. Governments were usually single party and

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1466 Cruz, 1995, pp. 303-305.
needed only very few additional votes to legislate.\footnote{Pasquino, 1995, pp. 268-269.} In Portugal, many reforms have reinforced the parliament’s role since 1985.\footnote{Leston-Bandeira, 2002.}

This allowed for a higher pattern of coalitional politics. Although these have been rare, this has mainly led to the creation of stronger and more mobilizing parties that have thus had an interest in reaching out to voluntary associations in Portugal. Levels of party membership as well as party identification\footnote{Gunther and Montero, 2001, p. 92; Morlino, 1995, p. 337.} and the links of interest groups towards parties have been higher in Portugal than in Spain. In Portugal negotiations with interest groups about laws and legislative measures and proposals are usually done with party leaderships.\footnote{Cruz, 1988, pp. 109-119.}

Table 38: party membership rates, 1970-1996

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1975</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1993</th>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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(Gunther and Montero, 2001, p. 94)

Finally, because parties and unions are less important, socioeconomic cleavages are also less relevant for determining the type of Spanish civil society, which makes room for an easier formation of New Social Movement organizations. In Portugal, on the contrary, stronger organizations and competition between traditional socialist and communist parties occupies the political space, and it is more successful in mobilizing possible constituencies and groups that would support NSM organizations, like the youth. For instance, party youth movements are very important in Portugal. There is a tendency in Portugal for this type of organizations to prevail to other youth political movements. The existing organizations are the Juventude Comunista Portuguesa (JCP, Portuguese Communist Youth), Juventude Socialista (JS, Socialist Youth), the Juventude Social-Democrata (JSD, Social-Democratic Youth), related to the PSD and a center-right party, and the Juventude Centrista/Juventudes Populares (Centrist Youth/Popular Youth), related to the Centro Democrático e Social (CDS, Democratic and Social Center), a right wing party of Christian-democratic inspiration that in 1992 changed its name to Partido Popular (PP, Popular Party).

\footnote{Pasquino, 1995, pp. 268-269.} \footnote{Leston-Bandeira, 2002.} \footnote{Gunther and Montero, 2001, p. 92; Morlino, 1995, p. 337.} \footnote{Cruz, 1988, pp. 109-119.}
All these organizations, with the exception of the JCP, were created after 1974 by the leaderships of the respective political parties and closely depend on them in terms of financing, organization, and ideology. Their organizational structure tends to reproduce the party structure. Also, the youth organizations have representatives in the leadership organs of the party, and their functions are mainly of supplying workpeople for electoral campaigns, propaganda, militancy substitution for regions where the party is weakly implanted, and so on. At the same time they also work as one of the many pressure groups or factions within the parties.\textsuperscript{1474} In the early 1990s, the JS and JSD had both 30,000 members between sixteen and thirty years of age. The JSD existed in the majority of Portuguese districts with the exception of some areas of the south. The JCP is radicated mainly in Lisbon, Porto, and Setúbal. Fifty percent of their members are in secondary school. The JC had six thousand members in 1980 and in 1990 fifteen thousand, 70\% of them students. The JS had 8,000 members in February 1975, 15,000 in 1976, 16,600 in 1978, but in 1981 they had declined to 2,000 and in 1984 they were 5,000. Forty percent of its youth is in secondary school.\textsuperscript{1475} Since the mid-1980s, with the exception of the JC, the membership of these organizations has declined. The leaders of these organizations have themselves a high level of membership in voluntary associations (85\%), specially in the left-wing youth organizations’ elites (JCP, 93.5\%, JS 86.5\%, JC 84.8\%, and JSD 81\%). The types of associations preferred by these elites are sports association (22\%), students’ association (13\%), cultural (10\%), and political non-party organizations (8\%).\textsuperscript{1476}

In Spain, the non-socialist left, the communists, and ex-communists are less powerful and more adept of post-materialist values. In fact in Portugal, pre-materialist values are more widespread in the population than post-materialist values.\textsuperscript{1477} In Spain, the PCE is more fragmented than the PCP. It is still organized around the principles of democratic centralism and extreme loyalty to leaders, and not even allowing for organized factions. Since the transition, the PCE has been supportive of the milder version of Marxism and Eurocommunism, whereas the PCP has maintained its Stalinist ideology and practices. After some years, the PCE gave way to an electoral coalition

\textsuperscript{1474} Cruz, 1995b, pp. 370-373.
\textsuperscript{1475} Cruz, pp. 378-384.
\textsuperscript{1476} Cruz, 1995b, p. 394
\textsuperscript{1477} Cruz, 1995, pp. 303-305.
called Izquierda Unida, forging new links with social movements like feminists, pacifists, and ecologists, the so-called policy of “social and political convergence”\(^\text{1478}\).

As a consequence, NSM organizations grew more in Spain. The feminist movement has been growing strongly also, and in fact it has been able to achieve even national coordination with the Coordinadora de Organizaciones Feministas del Estado Español to intervene in reproductive rights by presenting project-laws to the governments (divorce and abortion projects were presented in 1980 in order to change the penal code in the issue of abortion).\(^\text{1479}\) Environmental groups have also grown, having about 170,000 members in Spain (Greenpeace, CODA, AEDENAT, and Federacion de Amigos de la Tierra); about 348,000 people affiliate in associations for peace, international solidarity, human rights (Movimiento por la Paz, Desarmer y la Libertad, Paz Ahora, and Coordenadora Gesto por la Paz de Euskal Herria), and in ONGs (architects without borders, doctors without borders etc.).\(^\text{1480}\) In fact the conscience of ecological problems by Spanish citizens is high, and much higher than the actual participation in ecological associations and ecological activities. Some researchers conclude that many of these associations, although their number has been growing, have a low participation of citizens. In fact, the surveys that have been analyzed do not seem to confirm this interpretation; the membership in voluntary associations has in fact grown. An important sub-sector of these associations is the Catalan environmental associations, which are able to mobilize the citizenry to a large extent. Some of these are associations for fire protection or the interesting Fundacio Territori I Paisatje which buys land in order to protect it, others specialize in recycling residues like the grupo CEPA in Barcelona or publish information about solid residues like the ecologist platform ERREKA in the Basque country.\(^\text{1481}\)

\(^{1478}\) Bosco, 2001, pp. 346-349.
\(^{1479}\) Peñasco, Fissure, 1983, pp. 431-437.
\(^{1480}\) Mota, 1996, p. 53.
\(^{1481}\) Casademunt, 1999, p. 265.
Conclusion and Implications

This dissertation addressed the problem of the sources of associational life and civic engagement. What makes people form, affiliate, and engage in activities in voluntary associations? I developed a new theory of the origins of associational life by a comparative historical study of popular sector/lower class associations of urban and rural populations in a set of Western European countries during the period of the 1800s-2000s. The countries under study were Sweden, Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Britain, Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal.

Existing theories have not yet provided a full explanation of the causes of associational life and its variations in a diversity of settings. First, most studies, including the classics, have restricted the analysis to a small set of countries. Tocqueville wrote mainly on France and the United States, and Otto von Gierke on the German states. Putnam and Skocpol write especially about the United States. There are edited books on civil society in a diversity of Western European countries, but they restrict themselves to narrower time periods, namely the late-nineteenth century or the recent transformations since the 1980s. As a consequence, the theoretical scope of these studies was very restricted and their hypotheses applied only to a few cases. Second, students of associational life have been more interested in the effects of associations (e.g. to economic development or to democratic accountability) than with its origins and causes. Also, theories so far have mainly focused on single factors, taken in isolation, like the role of the state in shaping associational life (first recognized by the neo-corporatist school in the 1970s), or on specific institutions, like federalism, levels of regime decentralization, or proportional electoral systems.

In order to go beyond these shortcomings, I proposed the following: 1) to maximize variation in the dependent variable by analyzing a bigger number of cases than previous theories. This meant looking at a larger number of countries than most studies. I also covered a broader time period. This time period is usually called the age of mass politics, and with respect to mass based voluntary associations it corresponds to the phases of their emergence (1800-1870s), struggle for inclusion (1870s-1920s), varying attempts of incorporation (1920s-1930s) and consolidation (from the 1930s-1940s until the 1970s). The dependent variable was the associational life that developed in the period between the 1930s-1940s and the 1970s, when all countries in Europe experienced the stabilization of associational networks around patterns of strong
(Norway, Sweden), medium-strong (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands), medium (Great Britain), medium-weak (Italy, France), and weak (Spain, Portugal) civil societies.

The bulk of the material of this thesis came from a variety of secondary sources, namely historical monographs that gathered data on voluntary associations for the period and countries considered. Such a comparative work usually rests on the re-interpretation and analytical use of secondary sources. The explanatory strategy pursued was historical, as opposed to a more presentist approach. Many interesting political processes take long time periods to unfold, and many historical processes have consequences in the future that were not possible to predict.

Within the field of associational life studies, this dissertation aimed to present a unified and multicausal theory of Western European civil societies. I also gave the due importance to rural associations and religious associability, like many studies have done for other themes. There has been an urban/industrial and secular bias in the analysis of the processes of political modernization. In fact, I argue that historically religious and agrarian associations have had a decisive role in the creation of conditions propitious to the development of strong civil societies in the twentieth century. It was only when rural lower class associations decided to ally with industrial workers that a hegemonic associational network emerged leading to the denser and more coordinated associational lives of Western European democracies, as in the cases of Norway and Sweden. This was the product of the non-existence of state-church conflicts.

I also showed a series of counter-intuitive mechanisms that sustain associational life. Civic participation will grow if associations have an encompassing and national scope (not small and local), usually through their insertion into confederative structures; it is also enhanced by strong states, especially when associations are embedded in state structures and used for the provision of services in the economy and in the welfare state system; and finally, civic engagement and associational life will grow when associations have opportunities to be connected to national level and parliamentary politics and to create links with parties and political elites. Arguments and theories that explain civic engagement by looking at socioeconomic structures and changes, social and political attitudes (e.g. trust and social capital theories), and religious values are insufficient in explaining long term patterns of associational development, as well as in their timing and shape, in the Western European context.
Three political and institutional factors have shaped civil society: 1) Timing of state building and/or international status in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. The later the process of state building and/or the lower international status in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the stronger will be voluntary associations in the twentieth century. In states that consolidated fully during the mid and late nineteenth century and/or had been secondary states in the international system in the eighteenth century (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Italy, Sweden, Norway), as opposed to states that consolidated before the nineteenth century and/or had been major international players by the eighteenth century (Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal), the pre-modern corporatist structures (e.g. guilds, religious corporate bodies, rural fellowships) survived up to the early twentieth century, because the pressures for resource extraction from state-builders were weaker. This in turn promoted a stronger popular sector associational life in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries both in the form of voluntary associations and political parties. Early state builders abolished these structures much earlier (already by the early eighteenth century) in order to use their resources to finance war with other states.

There were two mechanisms at work here. First, from the point of view of the communities and members of these groups, the stronger the tradition of corporatism inherited from feudal Europe, the higher was to be group consciousness and easier the collective action of urban workers and farmers in the late nineteenth century. Second, political elites and state-builders recognized corporate status groups as legitimate and integrated them, in the context of heightened international military and economic competition of the 1870s-1930s, in policy making networks for the dispensation of military, welfare and economic policies. This promoted the recognition of the self-administration of voluntary associations.

2) State-capacity: the stronger the state capacity, the stronger were be voluntary associations. States with high capacity were able to implement policies and establish goals autonomously decided by rulers (e.g. Germany, Austria, Sweden and Great Britain, as opposed to the low capacity states of Italy, Spain, and Portugal; Belgium, the Netherlands and France are intermediate cases). In the late nineteenth-century, one of the main functions of the state became the promotion of economic development and nationalist mobilization. For this purpose states established partnerships with associations. This has empowered associations, through two mechanisms. First, associations have received resources, legitimacy and public status from the state, thus
being able to recruit more members through the distribution of selective benefits (welfare, pensions, health, education, and policy advise). Second, since high capacity states are more able to impose a uniform jurisdiction and control over a territory, this will make it easier for associations to expand through the whole national territory, to connect different geographical areas, and to develop more easily encompassing peak associations. Instead, low capacity states will produce small, weak, and local associations.

In the process of development of Western Europe two main factors have shaped state capacity. The first was international and geopolitical competition with other states. Processes of international competition which have led to war and made the state suffer collapse, defeat in invasion, politicization of the military, or military foreign occupation have promoted a weak state unable to control its territory.

The second factor refers to state-church relations during the process of modernization. The more the church has put a territorial barrier to state expansion, the less likely it has been that the state will develop a strong capacity. If state and church elites are allies in the process of nation building, the easier it will be to achieve national territorial unification, because the state uses the church resources, personnel, and apparatus for the implementation of state policies, especially in welfare provision (pensions, old age care insurance, widower funds, credits for investment, and compulsory relief funds) and educational policies.

3) Democratization: the stronger the degree of democratization of the regime between the 1880s and the 1930s, the stronger the associational life. Democratization is measured by two dimensions: 3.1) the extension of rights of participation, debate, and assembly; 3.2) the degree of parliamentarization of the regime. This refers to the control by representative bodies of the formation, decisions, personnel, and policies of the executive (cases of high parliamentarism are Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands; of low are Portugal, Spain and Italy; of medium are France, Germany and Austria). The stronger the parliament, the more associational leaders will seek to influence and establish links with MPs and political parties and to build their own agenda according to parliamentary cycles. Since strong parliaments represent the whole nation, associations will tend to become national in scope, and as such more coordinated through the territory, with associational leaders creating links and alliances that run through several regions and localities in the country. Moreover, in a strongly
parliamentarized system parties will be also more interested in creating permanent and not episodic links with associations in order to have a higher reach to the electorate.

The Scandinavian countries had the best conditions for the development of a fully developed and encompassing associational life. In Norway, Sweden, and Denmark traditions of estate and corporate organization survived until the late nineteenth century especially in the countryside, and a very efficient state that relied on partnerships with the Lutheran church for policy implementation. Also, the state was highly unified and had a high control of the territory. These two conditions promoted a strong capacity for collective action and organization building during the first two thirds of the nineteenth century, especially in the form of religious and agrarian reform movements. In the context of growing workers’ mobilization from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s, these movements were able to become receptive to workers’ demands and to build broad coalitions crossing class boundaries: farmers, workers, and sectors of the liberal elite (representing more progressive and open economic sectors). This was possible because strong parliaments and an open legal system created incentives for popular classes to address their claims to the parliament, and elites became more open to pressures from below since rival claims could be accommodated within the national parliament without the need to resort to repression and violence. Finally, this broad alliance conquered national government in the 1930s as the coalition promoting the transition to democracy. Because it was so hegemonic, it could use the traditions of state-church partnership to build an extremely broad welfare state and corporatist partnerships in industrial policy that to this day sustains a highly participating citizenry.

The pattern of dominant associational life rested on a particular combination of variables. As in the pattern of hegemonic civil society, there was also the continuation of corporate forms of interest intermediation inherited from the pre-modern period that were modernized since the late nineteenth century to build modern societal corporatist states, but these were more denser in Germany (and Austria) than in Belgium and in the Netherlands. On the other hand, these two countries had a higher level of democratization, which allowed for popular classes to be represented in the polity and to form organizational links with elites, especially with the liberals. In Germany, however, parliaments were weaker, a point which made liberal elites immune to pressures from below. Additionally, in all these countries there were deep traditions of state-church partnership, but not as deep as in Scandinavia. In all of these cases, there were religious conflicts with state builders in some periods. Especially Catholics were antagonized by
rulers for long periods, which led to weaker patterns of incorporation of the church and
as a consequence divided the popular classes, especially after the appearance of the
workers’ movement at the end of the nineteenth century. Workers were mobilized either
by religion, or by socialism, but it was never possible to form a broad coalition of
religious reformists and dissenters with the workers and sections of the liberal elite as it
happened in Scandinavia. After the transition to democracy in the 1930s and the 1940s,
these societies built less comprehensive welfare systems and corporatist institutions for
policy-making, thus not promoting civic engagement as the levels found in the pattern
of hegemonic associational life.

Like the previous patterns of associational life in Europe, also England had some
propitious conditions for the development of mass voluntary associations. England
possessed an efficient and coherent state, which had been fostered by the incorporation
of the Anglican Church and by several anti-corruption acts, and since early on it was a
highly parliamentarized polity. These traits fostered national level mass movements,
especially of religious reform, but also of craft workers, because national integration
made easier the connection and communication of associational leaders within the same
social movement. Moreover, the centralisation of parliament allowed claims to be debated,
and it made viable the entry of the popular classes into organized politics by the creation
of links between parties (both the liberals and the conservatives) and associations. At
the same time, two other features inhibited the development of associational life in the
levels found in the hegemonic and dominant patterns, and instead they pushed for a
dualistic society. First, there was the religious issue over Ireland, which gave a fatal
blow to an alliance of farmers (mainly Catholic and Irish) and workers (mainly English
and Protestant/dissident). Second, the form of the British polity since the seventeenth
century was essentially individualistic and corporate, as in the cases so far analysed.
This made it impossible to create national level policy-making corporatist institutions as
well as a developed welfare state in the 1930s and the 1940s that could have integrated
voluntary associations in their social schemes. Instead, welfare and corporatist benefits
were weak, dispensed from above by elites and not through organizations, thus
promoting a dual and not coordinated associational life where social inequalities
strongly determine the civic engagement of the citizenry.

In disjointed associational life, the conditions for development of associational
life were weak. The traditions of corporate representation were extinguished early,
parliaments historically had very low powers, and the state had a very low capacity
because of protracted territorial state-church conflicts, civil war leading to state collapse, and clientelism. Associational life became local and with weak links to political parties, thus facing high administrative barriers imposed by a distant and all-powerful state. Partnerships with the state for the dispensation of welfare benefits and corporatist coordination never became the norm of policy-making. The combination of these three variables inhibited the development of a dense and coordinated associational life.

Still, there are differences between these societies that are worth exploring. Generally speaking, Italy (especially in the center and the northern regions) has had historically a denser associational life than France. Again, the same set of factors I have pointed out earlier explain the variations between the types of associational life and also distinguish these two cases. When compared to France, Italy has had higher levels of parliamentarism, thus allowing for politics to become more competitive and for parties to create interlocking links with associations. Italy inherited a higher legacy of pre-modern associational life than France. Although corporate organizations were abolished earlier in many parts of Italy, in some regions, because of the fact they were peripheral regions which were not subject to extreme and harsh rule from state builders, it was easier to transform premodern guild associational life in modern voluntary associations. Also, part of the conditions for the promotion of a stronger civic life in Italy can be attributed to the Vatican state. In contrast to the French (or Spanish and Portuguese) churches, when it was incorporated in the new Italian nation in the late nineteenth century, there was a vast body of resources that could be used for collective action and for sponsoring Christian democracy.

Iberian societies faced the hardest conditions for the development of a dense associational field. First, since the eighteenth century there was a direct attack on any corporate autonomous body by state rulers, first by the absolute monarchy and later by both liberals and reactionaries that much took away resources for collective action and self-organization of communities both in cities and the countryside. Second, there was a pattern of an almost failure of state building that left many areas of the territory out of the control of the center and national rulers, thus promoting local and clientelistic associational ventures. Finally, a very weak parliament, where party competition was largely a sham, left power in the hands of the king and the military. In these conditions, repression over associations was much easier but at the same time promoted associational initiatives directed against the existence of the state itself.
These conditions inhibited the development of associational ventures during the period 1870s-1918, the so-called golden age of associability, where everywhere in the western world associations were being founded for many purposes. Iberian countries did not escape this trend, but a tradition of weak state strength became predominant with a system of façade parliamentarism that sustained itself mainly through corruption. When external conditions led to a confrontation with other states that had military overtones, this led to a crisis of legitimacy of these regimes that definitely put away popular classes from elites.

Still, it was also in this period that conditions in Spain lead to a denser civil society especially in some regions. At the regional level, in Catalonia and in the Basque country, there was a tradition of partnerships between the state, and corporate and church interests. Moreover, at the national level, the Spanish state showed a higher capacity both in the development of corporatist and welfare functions through partnerships with unions, like the UGT, and it showed higher levels of electoral competition and freedom of association than Portugal. Accordingly, civil society organizations were stronger in Spain.

The common patterns of Spain and Portugal, of a political stabilization by the elimination of almost all autonomous voluntary associations can be traced to the factors I identified in the previous chapters: a weak pre-modern associational life tradition, low parliamentarization and democratization, and low state capacity. Still, there were differences between Portugal and Spain explained by variations in these three aspects. In fact, Spain in the interwar period, both during the Rivera’s dictatorship, the second Republic and the civil war, continued its history of a much denser associational life than Portugal. This is explained by the fact that associational life organizations in Spain maintained their partnerships with the state and strengthened their links with political parties. This also explains why the authoritarian regimes were different at this level: there was a much more mobilizing dictatorship through Fascist organizations in Spain, whereas in Portugal a more traditionalist and static regime fostered instead passivity and demobilization.

In the end I discussed the implications of my findings for to the recent processes of democratization, namely in Portugal and Spain? How do patterns of state transformation, institutional configurations in these new democracies (e.g. the varying role of representative institutions like parliaments and presidencies), and varied legacies
of state-corporatism inherited from the previous non-democratic regimes influence third wave democratic associational structures?

In this vein I analysed post-authoritarian associational landscapes in Portugal and Spain (1980s-2000s) and found that my previous theory predicts associational dynamics in the contemporary new democracies. In spite of lower levels of socioeconomic development, institutional legacies and patterns of transformation from the dictatorships to democracies since the late 1960s led to a stronger civil society in Portugal because 1) associational life was stronger and political during the phase of authoritarian liberalization, 2) because of a mobilizational transition in Portugal, associations could develop links to parties and to a more open parliament than in Spain, 3) links between the state and associations for the dispensation of welfare benefits were more solid in Portugal.

Since civic engagement and a participatory public are the result of strong and centralized states and powerful representative institutions (the parliaments), to what extent are changes in public policies and the international context since the 1970s strengthening or undermining these bases for citizen participation in old democracies? Second, highly civic and participatory polities are sustained by state-voluntary associations’ partnerships in the arenas of welfare and economic policy-making. This finding calls for a broader theorization of the political economy of citizen participation and for linking the literatures of welfare state (e.g. Esping-Anderson) and production regimes (e.g. Peter Hall, David Soskice) with democratic theory. These tasks remain to be done.

Although the thesis included only I only studied (Western) European cases, I would argue that the hypotheses are also valid to explain the character of (as pointed out by many scholars) the exceptional high associational life in the USA between the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. First, democratization and parliamentarization, like in the European cases of strong civil society (e.g. Sweden), were also traits of the USA since early on in its history. This was very much an aspect singled out by Tocqueville already in the 1830s and confirmed by recent scholarship. Theda Skocpol for instance, argued against cultural interpretations that early and long lived democracy and competitive elections made parties compete for support in a national level and spurred the formation of waves of associations1482.

1482 Skocpol, 1999a, pp. 42-44.
Second, corporate forms of pre-industrial civil society were also present in the USA and served as a background to modern association building. Recent research has showed that early American associations were not separated from the state and regime institutions and had a corporate form. Since before the independence American states already possessed legislation regulating «the public constitution of corporate and associative bodies» 1483 . These had various forms—partnership, corporation, unincorporated association, charitable trust, mutual benefit society, labor union, and municipal corporations. Moreover, many voluntary associations «received the formal benefits of incorporation through an official charter» (e.g. associations for the «the advancement of religion, of learning, and of commerce») which gave them «privileges, immunities and the coercive power» to enforce their own laws and obligations 1484.

Moreover, the state was not weak in the USA during the nineteenth century. In terms of infrastructural power the American state was sometimes even stronger than many European cases. See for instance, the importance of the much stronger railway and postal system of the USA when compared to European countries. This, as well as a spreading federal State, served as an impetus and an «organizational model» for the rules, organization and expansion of associations 1485.

In this sense there was a strong state in the USA (as in the European cases where civil society was highly developed). However it was strong not so much in coercive power (although that is important too), but in the sense of being embedded in societal networks. States are strong insofar as they are able to coerce and impose policies and legislation. In particular, when they develop «ties that connect citizens and public officials across the public private divide», they promote individual initiative in the civic arena (associational formation), political participation and cooperation for joint ventures 1486.

Finally, the mechanisms that sustained civic engagement and associational development in the USA were similar to the ones I discovered for the Western European cases. Also, in the USA federative associational structures organized civil society and many of its most vibrant voluntary associations were local chapters of national federations 1487.

1485 Skocpol, 1999a, p. 47.
1486 Evans, pp. 179-189.
1487 Crowley, Skocpol, 1999.
What is the connection between economic enterprises and voluntary associations? The question here is to understand the degree to which voluntary associations influence the functioning of markets and the economy, and specifically the emergence of a prosperous country, an insurmountable condition for civil society in the broad sense defined above.

Markets are «processes of coordination among individual agents who are engaged in a variety of activities including investing in, producing, distributing, exchanging and consuming a large array of goods and services they produce for each other». A market that fosters trust, progress and prosperity to all groups and classes within a society, does not automatically arise. Economic actors may ally with state rulers to exploit the public, and fraud and violence have long been traits of many capitalist ventures. As Culpepper argues, «the principal problem facing policymakers is not how to make actors improve economic performance, to cooperate with the government, but one of inducing economic actors to cooperate with each other». One solution, proposed by Tocqueville, was that the size of the companies had to be small, in order to avoid extreme concentration of resources in new elites. Still, as realms of inter-organizational/company coordination, for the functioning of the market to lead to civil society it needs a particular legal and institutional framework in which to function. Regulation of work and contractual practices, of consumers’ rights and of work dynamics that lead to higher productivity can be achieved by improving the degree to which companies and the state establish joint ventures for policy-making.

And this is best achieved when employers and capital associations are empowered by the state. Research has shown that this happens when the state grants public functions and selective benefits (e.g. the channeling of state subsidies to companies) to these associations. This empowers the associations, which are then able to attract more members (companies), which makes them have access to daily and contextual information that is passed on to state policy-makers. With this they have a much more accurate description of the economic actors’ aims, dilemmas, and resources. In this sense, public policy becomes more effective, since it has a more realistic and contextual knowledge of society. Moreover, associations’ with high membership

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1489 Pérez-Díaz, 2006, pp. 8, 18.
1490 Hall, Soskice, 2001, pp. 45-46.
1492 Hall, Soskice, 2001, p. 11-12.
1493 Hall, Soskice, 2001, p. 11-12.
density and strong public incorporation are able to persuade (and sometimes force) more easily companies to engage in cooperation, exchange of information, have similar technical procedures, share technical expertise and manpower, thus setting in motion long term processes of trust between economic actors\textsuperscript{1494}.

Another question is the degree to which «associational life is not just unions and business associations; the whole being bigger and more complex than, and different from, each of its components» (Víctor Pérez-Díaz). The point in debate here is the relationship between associational life (its density, quality, types of associations) and civil society in the broad sense, as a «liberal polity defined by the rule of law, limited, accountable government», a «public sphere» and a political culture of «justice, benevolence, and civic virtue»\textsuperscript{1495}. Or, put in different way, the relationship between civil society and democracy.

In my thesis we argued that this outcome is best achieved when subordinate/popular classes/groups (and these are varied historically) have a strong associational organization that gives them access to policy making and/or capacity to influence, veto and determine policy outcomes\textsuperscript{1496}. When the poor, the excluded, the uneducated and the large anonymous majorities are somehow considered in the polity and their interests have a policy expression, the feeling of shared community and collective purpose is augmented as well as the overall feeling of political efficacy, interpersonal trust and regime legitimacy\textsuperscript{1497}. This is the broader meaning of civil society.

Still, this is not achieved simply by multiplying the sheer number of voluntary associations in a society, by considering that some classes are better suited to this task than others (the working class/unions, or the middle class/professional associations etc) or by favoring particular categories of associations (political or social). Density of associations per se does not necessarily promote democracy, since there have been periods where a high density of civil society, even popular class organizations, has paved the way for authoritarianism (e.g. Weimar Germany). As Tocqueville argued, «liberty of association is only a source of advantage and prosperity to some nations, it

\textsuperscript{1494} Culpepper, 2003, pp. 54-56.
\textsuperscript{1495} Pérez-Díaz, 2006, pp. 2, 5.
\textsuperscript{1496} Huber, 1995, p. 179.
\textsuperscript{1497} Rueschemeyer, 1998, pp. 9-10.
may be perverted or carried to excess by others, and from an element of life may be changed into a cause of destruction»1498.

I argue then that we must look not at the quantity but at the quality of civil society, namely of the ties between social groups and between groups and the government. What is important is the degree to which links are built between people across localities, social classes, workplaces, religions etc1499. Again, it was Tocqueville, thinking about political parties and mass political associations, who said that «it is solely in great associations that the general value of the principle of association is displayed (...) When the members of a community are allowed and accustomed to combine for all purposes, they will combine as readily for the lesser as for the more important ones; but if they are allowed to combine only for small affairs, they will be neither inclined nor able to effect it»1500. If the scale of civil society is very limited and not connected to national politics and centers of decision making, it will have a limited effect.

In the future I propose to analyse more deeply the impact of associational life on democratization and on the quality of democracy. We argue that two analytical dimensions should structure this project: (1) whether the association defends the interests of elites (e.g. professional, business groups) or the less advantaged (e.g. urban and rural unions, immigrants’ associations), with intermediate categories of associations of elites with public minded service (e.g. charities) and associations that are places of cross-class/group cooperation and/or public interest organizations (e.g. women’s, religious, advocacy groups); (2) whether the role of membership in the associations is high or low - meaning the degree of members’ participation and consultation in the activities and decisions of associations1501. In a second phase we deepen our analysis by studying a sample of associations that will be chosen according to their theoretical relevance to the process of democratization. In this respect, popular sector mass membership voluntary associations are particularly relevant. Core associations of our research could be public interest, cross-class and of the disadvantaged. In particular, these arenas of interest are important: parents associations, religious, immigrants, cooperatives, welfare and mutual aid (sickness, health, educational), political debating societies, women, veterans, farmers, consumers, neighbourhood, public service groups,

1499 Skocpol, 2003, p. 287.
1501 Skocpol, 2003; Wilson, 1973
and community services. We propose to build an in-depth qualitative and quantitative data set of their organizational characteristics: profile of founders, leaders and members, trends in membership, mobilization capacity, sources of funding, services provided to members and public in general, professionalisation of the activities, mechanisms of internal debate and selection of policy and leadership, members attitudes, leisure activities, networks with other associations and the degree to which they are inserted in federations\textsuperscript{1502}.

Finally, associational landscapes should be inserted within a general theory of socio-political coalitions in regime transitions and within democracy. Drawing on the idea of «sets of subpolitical families»\textsuperscript{1503} and in the work of Martin Shefter\textsuperscript{1504}, I define a socio-political coalition as a relatively unified composite of social and political actors, namely organizational leaders and their followings, that engage in a certain moment under a common quest for power. Coalitions are not purely socio-economic, but involve institutional actors, like state bureaucrats or church officials. Rarely are also composed of only two groups.

In the modern world we can identify three main types of political coalitions: a coalition for reform (oriented to gradual but sustained change of existing institutions in the direction of more democracy), a coalition for reaction (oriented to maintenance of existing status-quo, whatever it may be), a coalition for revolution (oriented to rapid and radical social and political change). Several actors may compose these coalitions: middle classes, intellectuals, bureaucrats, military, peasantry, landowners, etc. The important fact here is that the same actors may participate in different socio-political in different countries or periods. Also, the specific weight and political strength of these coalitions varies a lot between periods, between countries and within countries (this means that in a specific country a reformist coalition is dominant, but may also exist and operate a revolutionary coalition, with its specific clientele, institutional sites and so on). Note also that the same groups may have different political positions in different periods and countries. For instances, middle classes associational leaders may be pro-democratic, but also against democracy. We should as well consider the probability of working classes within a reactionary coalition. Another element is that there exist several institutional sites for these coalitions. The first and most obvious of these sites in

\textsuperscript{1502} Collier, 2006; Wilson, 1973.
\textsuperscript{1503} Schmitter, 1992, pp. 162-5.
\textsuperscript{1504} Shefter, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c.
the modern age is the political party and the party system should be considered together and in articulation with the realm of associability, of voluntary associations, religious denominations, social movements, the media, courts etc. I would claim that to observe the causes of a positive relation between civil society and democracy we should look for the causes of the ascent to power of a socio-political coalition that structures political struggle by reform. Since a socio-political coalition is composed of elites based in diverse organizational and associational sites, the associations that favor democracy would be the ones that compose that coalition (they may, or may not be, be unions; they may, or may not be, be capital associations; they may, or may not be, professional associations; they may, or may not be, religious, and so on).
APPENDIX: Research Design and Methods

In order to test the theory developed in the previous chapters, I propose an approach that I call historically oriented comparative structural analysis. Let’s see what each these terms means and why I consider this to be the best approach to the study of associational life.

1. A Historical-Structuralist Approach

An historical approach, from the point of view of the dependent variable, or the outcomes to be explained, explicitly locates the phenomena to explain in time and space, in stretches of identifiable periods and concrete locations. The construction of the cases is the result of an attention to historical similarities and differences, which are considered empirical wholes. This means that the researcher first proceeds by induction, trying to observe similarities and differences between the societies he’s researching. From a disparate set of sources, both primary and secondary, there is an effort to arrive at descriptive generalizations or properties according to which the phenomena under interest can be classified. This process relies much in induction: looking for instances of a phenomena of interest and theorize about their properties. At the same time, there is also a deductive side since the diverse existing theories are put in contrast with the historical variation and serve as guidelines to better interpret and classify the data. In the process, the descriptive theory is also reformulated and a new definition of the phenomena is presented.

This is a more fruitful approach to either purely interpretative historical analysis or pure deductive research\(^{1505}\). Historical analysis frequently arrives at conclusions about a case which, although frequently of interest and rich of intelligent suggestions, cannot really prove that the causes imputed to a phenomenon are not present in other settings. In this sense, historical analysis frequently assumes the uniqueness and incomparability of societies and is more interested in establishing the particularism of phenomena. But either in terms of the definition of the case and its imputed causes, there is no way to know their validity since there is no comparison with other cases. That would violate the axioms of many historians, because by assuming the need to

\(^{1505}\) In the field of studies of associational life, an example of the former is Hoffmann, 2006, and of the latter Putnam, 1993.
compare, one has to start thinking more about similarities between societies differently located in time and space, and hence going beyond simple description and thinking more on general criteria on what and how compare. Purely deductive approaches use frequently the historical cases to illustrate a theory, to prove that a theory is applicable to instances of reality, hence right, or to find deviations from the theory only. In this sense, is less attentive to the varying uniqueness of the cases and frequently looks more for instances of cases where the theory is “proven right”. A more inductive analysis is more case-oriented, looking for puzzles in the real world, theorizing about those puzzles, finding variation about them, and then start asking questions about their varying causes. On the other hand, deductive theories are indispensable, because one cannot think about the world without guidelines and principles of classification, causal interpretation and of facilitating conditions. But theories when used in a too deductive way can also block the advancement of new ideas, which only comes from noting empirical patterns not foreseen and explained by the existing theories. Moreover, historically oriented social science, while avoiding the errors of particularism and uniqueness of some historiographic schools, pay more attention to case definition than purely deductive approaches, especially theory driven macro-quantitative studies, where the cases are just points or indicators in a scale. Deductive statistical reasoning since relies mainly in canned quantitative data gives does not problematizes the comparability of cases.

In this sense, a mixed inductive-deductive approach is the best antidote for these drawbacks. In particular, it is a privileged way to establish variation that allows for the testing of different hypothesis. As Ragin argues, once a phenomenon of interest is identified, it is necessary to identify sub-types of the phenomena/concept, that is, to historicize it1506. Having a scale of variation that is sensitive to both differences and similarities, allows the researcher more easily to go from the particular to the general, to identify specific and particular instances of a phenomenon. Moreover, this approach allows for the testing of the particular weight of each existing theory. Since we’re looking for multicausal processes, different cases should show variations the combinations and weight of the theorized causes. Each of this combination produces a distinct path to associational life, our theme under investigation. Finally, this is

1506 Ragin, 1989, p. 44.
approach is similar to what Charles Ragin has identified as QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis).

Second, from the point of view of the explanatory strategy pursued, it has been given a primacy to a historical explanation, as opposed to a more presentist approach. Many processes take long time periods to unfold and many historical processes have consequences in the future that were not possible to have been predicted. Only perspectives attentive to historical processes over long periods of time capture this. Otherwise we’ll fall in the fallacy of presentism, where everything that happens in a certain moment is shaped by its immediate context.

In the historical-comparative literature the terms now fashionable to define these historical processes are critical juncture and path dependency. Path dependency means that in certain historical contexts, self reinforcing processes are set in motion that have outcomes unfolding over time long after the historical-specific causes for it have disappeared\textsuperscript{1507}. This is very important in the study of associational life because many have argued that voluntary associations usually survive for long their founding moment, much after the contextual conditions of their emergence have long disappeared. The second term is critical juncture, meaning that are historical contexts where organizational and institutional innovation and fluidity is very high, when several and alternative possibilities of evolution can develop\textsuperscript{1508}. Other periods are more stable and predictable. This is also important when studying associational life, since many have also observed that associations tend to appear in waves, there are periods of immense foundation of associations, and others of much slower growth (e.g. the waves of fraternities founding in the USA)\textsuperscript{1509}.

Also, a short term temporal approach is less attentive to multiple and combinatorial causation, because when one tries to find long term processes unfolding over time, it is frequent to find not one but several independent processes that sometimes interact and as a consequence produce outcomes of interest. In this sense there are several processes unfolding over time, frequently intersecting, or not, and whose combinations will have different impacts. Many real world contemporary phenomena are unintended consequences of cross-cutting and convergent processes. As Katzenelson argues, society is the «structured concatenation of processes» (e.g. state

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\textsuperscript{1507} Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{1508} Mahoney, 2001, pp. 113-114.
\textsuperscript{1509} Stinchcombe, 1986, p. 197; see also Wilson, 1973, p. 198.
building, market expansion etc) and while these do not determine behavior in a rigid way, they are conditioning strongly individuals’ actions and thinking. In this sense causality is combinatorial. Deductive-statistical method, on the contrary, is in a way more simplistic because each supposed cause in only seen in isolation. In this sense there is less attention to causal complexity, leaving many important questions without an answer. For instance, as we have argued, a very dense and coordinated associational life, what we’ve called the hegemonic pattern (of the Scandinavian countries, especially) is the result of three variables operating together, none of which alone would produce this outcome, but which are the result of autonomous historical processes (high state capacity, high parliamentarization and an unbroken continuity of premodern corporate forms of associational life).

In fact, statistical investigations are good at presenting tests to see the degree to which certain phenomena are associated (positively, negatively or in null way), but less good at presenting causal factors. Correlation is not causation; it is just the measure of certain phenomena being associated with each other. Historical approaches are better suited to look for causes because since causes must temporally occur prior to effect, one tries to trace the genesis of the phenomena under investigation and the immediate and previous context of it, and then, looking for variation always, hypothesizes about its causes.

Timing and sequence of historical processes are also important. Not only when things happen but the order of which they happen relative to other processes determines the outcomes being studied. If things happen before or after a certain event, their impact can vary. In Tilly’s words, «when things happen within a sequence affects how they happen»1512. In this line of reasoning, we have argued that countries that were early state builders were led to impose for much longer periods of time the extraction of resources on society (through taxes, confiscations etc) in order to wage war and as a consequence, eliminate the guilds much earlier, which proved to condition future associational life in the late nineteenth century.

Thirdly, historical approach understood in these lines, leads one to a more structuralist line of explanation. If one is looking at the converging impact of different processes over longer periods of time, one more easily apprehends dynamics which

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1510 Katznelson, 1997, p. 83.
1511 Ragin, 1989, pp. 34-35; Katzenstein, 1985, p. 21,
were not foreseen, especially unintended consequences of the sequence, timing and intersection of these processes. This is what we mean by structuralism, the idea that phenomena in society are not wholly determined by the intentions of actors but instead are consequences of the actions of many actors acting at the same time with different aims and objectives. In our opinion, these are very interesting phenomena. It is not that everything is fully determined and that action and possibilism are totally impossible. But in order to assess degrees of freedom, one first has to determine the unchosen and fixed contexts under which action takes place. This is what we mean by structuralism.

To operationalize this structural approach, we’ve used John Stuart Mill’s methods of agreement and difference. Mill’s method is better for arriving at deterministic causations and parsimonious explanations, even considering that sometimes they may be too deterministic and rapid at eliminating factors that could be of interest. The method of agreement hypothesizes about the causes of a similar outcome by eliminating the different traits of the similar cases and considering only their common background traits. We have used this method mainly within each theorized case of pattern of associational life. We ask, for instance, what do cases of Hegemonic associational life have in common? All factors that are not common to all cases are not considered as potential explanation. Then we check these supposed factors to all the other cases outside the theorized type of associational life, that is, all other types of associational life. This is the method of difference. The identified factors, or combination of factors, within each type of associational life to be considered valid must be absent in other types. It compares cases differing in the dependent variable and eliminates the previous common traits arrived at by the method of agreement if they happen to exist in the negative cases. In the end of this process of a series of paired comparisons, the researcher should be able to discern patterns of multiple causation.

Finally, the comparative logic is to western Europe tough and valid only to the period between the late nineteenth and the end of the twentieth century. We look for multiple causal paths within Europe, as della Porta says, we aim at «rich descriptions of a few instances of a certain phenomenon». Moreover, our approach is a kind of soft QCA, not operationalized technically as Ragin defends, but using it suggestions as rationales for case description and evaluation. We have a medium

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1515 On this notion see della Porta, 2008, pp. 213-214.
number of cases, which allows for the growth of a multiplicity of causal conditions and combinations. Ragin’s insights were particularly useful in building up the truth tables where we tabulated the theorized outcomes with their possible causal conditions. Finally, our aim is to arrive at a middle level theory, true for a certain set of cases/societies in a certain time and period. As della Porta argues this is a weberian approach, that looks for causal to explain a certain variation and where generalization is limited and bounded spatially and temporally 1517. But we also argue that it might be possible to extend the causal factors identified as relevant and apply them to other areas and time periods. In this sense it is possible to go beyond the set of western European cases in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and see to which degree do conclusions that explain its variations can be reconceptualized and applied to other settings. To what extent does our theory travel to other times and places? It can serve as a model. If we say that the strongest associational life is the result of high a parliamentarization of the regime, a strong state and strong corporatist pre-modern tradition, this may be applicable to other areas world, like Eastern Europe in the same time period, including Russia, or Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and especially the USA.

2. An Institutional and Organizational Focus

Finally, we propose an Institutional-Organizational focus. We have argued in the previous chapters that the causes of associational life lie in the interaction of associational legacies with patterns of institutional and state development. Our aim is to discern how legacies associational life from past periods (e.g. old regime guilds and corporations) are shaped and themselves shape the institutional and state processes that led to the emergence of patterns of associational life in the 1930s. How shall we go on to observe this in terms of an analysis? On the side of the dependent variable, we should focus in chosen sets of associations and see their organizational development and history in relation to the state, institutions and target groups through long stretches of time 1518. We have argued that it necessary to go beyond survey and attitudinal data and to put associations themselves in the center of analysis, as actors of their own right 1519.

1517 della Porta, 2008, pp. 200, 203; see also Tilly, 1984, pp. 142-143.
1518 Skocpol, 1999a, pp. 34-35.
1519 For the notion of organizations as actors see Schmitter, 1983 and 1992.
On the side of the independent variable we have argued that associational life will reflect the process of nation building and that the institutional constraints and opportunities of the polity shape associations. In this sense, our research tries to operationalize what Katznelson calls a polity-centered approach. Institutions are «middle level mediations between large scale processes and the micro dynamics of agency and action». They mediate between interest formation and aggregation and historical developments. This means that on the side of the independent variable we must look at processes of state building, legacies of institutions from previous eras (e.g. timing of state building) and the functioning of regime institutions, namely parliaments, governments, the bureaucracy, the army and the police. Their interaction with efforts of association building has produced the different patterns of associational life we hypothesized.

How do we put together these two aspects? By a causally informed historical narrative. We’ll tell a story that links the outcomes to be explained to the combinations of causal conditions. We’ll proceed through an analytical narrative. In the words of Philippe Schmitter, a narrative is «a plausible story that places the associations (the researchers) calculate and the inferences they draw in some chronological order. Narration can also serve to fill in the gaps between cause and effect by providing a verbal description of the mechanisms involved».

Still, it is necessary to specify the components of that story. Since we’re interested in explaining variations in a certain phenomenon, we first must be sure that the cases are comparable. In this sense the cases are comparable when it should be expected that all these cases could have fell in any of the outcome categories. Cases must have had similar starting conditions, a similar starting point after which their differences accentuated through time. The push for the development of modern associational life was similar but ended having different evolutionary paths. This is what is made in the first chapter of the second part where we theorize on the issue of associational life in nineteenth-century Europe. We identify a common background to all the cases. Then, the following chapters of Part II and the whole of Part III make a causal narrative of each distinctive pattern of associational life.

3. Data and Sources

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1520 Katznelson, 1997, pp. 84, 91.
In terms of data selection data, we first used standardized data on membership on voluntary associations and on federative structures of unions in western Europe, in order to have a reliable starting point to compare national level associational structures. This type of data is quite relevant for this task for two reasons. Theoretically we have argued that participation in voluntary associations is still today mainly through membership, that loose and non-organizational forms of participation, tough important, are rarer. So membership is still a very valid concept, as Ulzurrum, for instance, recently argued. Second, surveys provided reliable and standardized data since the questions to all countries analysed are very similar. In this sense surveys are still a very good starting point for ranking and classifying cases. Also the other data on confederative structures of unions, mainly systematized by Colin Crouch, has the advantage of being standardized. But this was only the starting point, then it was necessary to focus the analyses in specific forms of association and on patterns of state-association relationships.

We also try to go beyond surveys and data public opinion data and proceed to an in-depth analysis of specific organizations, in particular mutual aid societies, religious, agriculture, and industry (unions). These associations are the main actors of our story. We were interested in collecting data on their number, memberships, time duration, the degree to which they became federated and non-federated groups, territorial scope, organizational structure, sources and quantities of funding, services provided to members, the meaning of participation for members, and data on their leaders (party affiliation etc).

For the independent variables we looked for laws on freedom of association, on the right of demonstration, reunion, and strike; information on the effective practices of bureaucrats and state officials on the daily life of associations; legislative framework on the forms organizations are allowed to take; definitions of public-private status, fiscal treatment, responsibilities of policy implementation and their rules and practices.

1523 Ulzurrum, 2002.
incorporation in decision making bodies, labor codes. It was also important to know the associational affiliations of elites (deputies, ministers)\textsuperscript{1526}.

Such a vast study relies mainly on secondary sources, complemented here and there by primary sources like associational reports. But the bulk of the material of this dissertation comes mainly from a vast number of monographs on the history of associational life for a period of a bit more of two hundred years. Through comparison and juxtaposition of these varied sources of information, it tries to achieve a unique and hopefully original interpretation of the whole process of associational life in Europe since the late 1700s.

\textsuperscript{1526} Schmitter, 1971, pp. 150-154; Schmitter, 1997, p. 249; see also on some of these aspects Bartolini, 2000, pp. 320-335; Huber, 1995, p. 187; Pharr, 2003b, p. 335.
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