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**BORDERS AND THE BURDENED: COLONIAL PARTITIONING AND LEVELS OF  
TRUST, IDENTITY, AND DISCRIMINATION IN AFRICA**

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## Abstract

This thesis exploits the long-run effects of ethnic partitioning on trust, national identity, and feelings of discrimination within ethnic groups across 29 Sub-Saharan countries. Combining individual data from Afrobarometer (2005-2023) with the pre-colonial location of ethnic homelands, I find a significant effect of exogenously defined borders on current attitudes. Difference-in-differences estimates show that individuals from majority segments within partitioned groups exhibit lower trust, weaker national identification, and perceptions of discriminatory political systems. Overall, the findings highlight how colonial borders persistently deteriorate social cohesion.

Keywords: Afrobarometer, Colonial Partitioning, Ethnicity, Trust, Identity, Political Discrimination

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## **I. Introduction**

Africa's poor development is often blamed on the clashing social heterogeneity that developed since colonialism and the partitioning of ethnic communities between states. The very existence of these "borderlands" tends to inhibit nation building and destabilize social cohesion (Miles 2014; Horowitz 2000). Yet, this relation appears to change with the relevance of each land segment across the borders. For instance, consider the Tonga's group, whose territory is mostly located in Zambia, with a small segment extended into Zimbabwe (Figure 1). While the Zambian Tonga developed as a majority political group with a strong affiliation to its ethnic identity (Muluable 2009), often fuelling ethnic divisions, their underrepresented neighbours in Zimbabwe have embraced a looser group identity, while advocating for the formation of a broad and inclusive national society (Makoni, Makoni, and Nyika 2008; Saidi and Matanzima 2021). Instead of self-isolating, the Zimbabwean group has increasingly engaged with other ethnicities in an attempt to better integrate the national framework, whereas the larger Zambian counterpart has often engaged in ethnicity-based politics, which is more likely to exacerbate, rather than block, existent social cleavages.

The contrasting experiences of inter-group relationships suggests that the link between partitioned ethnicities and cohesion goes beyond the mere presence of a splitting border. To provide some answers, this thesis proposes to explore the effects of belonging to the largest ethnic segments on different dimensions of trust, attachment to the nationality, and perceptions of discrimination along ethnic lines. I argue that, if not in power, individuals from major segments of partitioned groups perceive other nationals as opponents to their well-being, and national institutions as discriminatory, making them less trustful of others and less nationally attached. Groups that are too small relative to the respective state should behave the opposite direction as more frequent interactions with other groups and the embracement of a common identity ensures them a better access to state resources (Bazzi *et al* 2019). As is, these groups

are likely to be less ethnocentric, to trust others, and to perceive national institutions as impartial along ethnic lines.



Figure 1. *Tonga's Homeland*

In understanding the mechanisms behind the weak African performance, recent economics literature has increasingly focused on the role of colonialism (Easterly and Levine 1997; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson 2014; Heldring and Robinson 2012), yet only a few studies have specifically addressed the effect of quasi-random national borders on current development (Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski, 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016). While Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2011) find empirical evidence that “artificial states” built by non-natives are negatively correlated with economic performance compared to organic ones, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) address the specific contribution of the partitioning experience by relating it to greater local conflict and discrimination. However, in what type of territorial partitioning these effects persist is still uncertain. By investigating the effect of asymmetrical ethnic territories on individual attitudes, this research attempts to make a step in that direction.

The results rely on a difference-in-differences empirical strategy as the effect of belonging to the largest segment is observed by comparing the variation of attitudes between individuals

from the largest segments and individuals from the smaller segments within the same ethnic group. The combination of the Murdock's (1959) map portraying pre-colonial ethnic homelands, with contemporary national borders and Afrobarometer's data allows me to observe exogenous within-group variations since African borders were defined almost randomly (Englebert, Tarango and Carter 2002; Paine, Qiu and Ricart-Huguet 2024). I find that individuals belonging to a split ethnic group with the largest territorial segment located in their country exhibit lower levels of trust, both to other ethnicities and to national entities. An explaining mechanism is that the asymmetrical partitioning prolonged intra-group development and political disparities that fuel inter-ethnic antagonisms (Weiner 1971; Horowitz 1981, 2000) and lead to self-isolation. In this context, a generalized sense of ambiguous loyalties and mistrust might have persistently developed over time, especially if ethnic affinity remained above the national one. The results depicting lower levels of national identity among individuals from the largest segments are consistent with this hypothesis. Because African politics tend to be mediated by ethnic favouritism, the leaders' ethnicity matter to individual attachment to the nation and, thus, to relationships with non-co-ethnics, specifically for somewhat large minorities that can benefit the most from receiving patronage state resources (Green 2020). While some groups are sufficiently large to hold power, others remain large minorities whose lack of political representation can possibly lead to the disappointment with the state and detachment from the nation. By proxying ethnic political representation with the ethnicity of the head of state, I find a robust negative relationship between large split ethnicities that do not hold power and overall trust. Likewise, I find that these groups correlate with lower national identification. These results not only show that colonial state formation continuously impacts social and political integration but also that the groups' political representation is one powerful mechanism behind the variation of behaviours across borders.

## II. Background

In explaining contemporary Africa, it is necessary to recognize its particular historical context regarding the formation of ethnic communities and identities, especially since the colonial border design and the subsequent independence movements. The increasing European presence in Africa since the mid 1800's marks the beginning of what is commonly considered in the literature as the "Colonial period" in which, following the Conference of Berlin in 1885, some of the greatest European powers were given the right to colonize Africa and to formally impose new political boundaries. However, Europeans significantly disrupted the political and social organization of the indigenous communities by defining frontiers inconsistently with the local context (Englebert, Tarango and Carter 2002). Although the pre-existence of water bodies and large historical states influenced 63% and 62% of bilateral borders, respectively (Paine *et al* 2024), many still followed a gridded pattern. Approximately 80% of all contemporary African boundaries follow latitudinal and longitudinal lines (Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski 2011), which suggests that these were demarked somewhat arbitrarily.

Such pattern affected particularly those ethnic groups without sufficient political power to contest the European demarcation as they were forced to integrate highly heterogenous states and to separate from their kin (Englebert, Tarango and Carter 2002). In the end, around one third of ethnic homelands mapped in Murdock (1959) were divided across states<sup>1</sup> (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016) and each materialized in different shapes. While minority groups experienced relatively small territorial changes, larger ones underwent more substantial transformations, depending on the combination of ethnic polarization and the sizes of colonies, later independent states. Somewhat sizeable ethnicities, such as the Busansi, Ewe,

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<sup>1</sup> Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) identify 229 partitioned homelands with at least 10% of their homeland occupying more than one country. Using a 5% threshold, they identify 266 split groups.

Fon, Hausa and the Tonga<sup>2</sup>, transformed into subgroups of varying importance (minority, large minority and majority subgroups) across neighbouring states.

Because the majority of the colonial borders were kept fixed even after independency took place (Ajala 1983; Herbst 1989), most contemporaneous African states lack an homogenous cultural and historical basis for the formation of a national identity and a stable society. This does not mean that precolonial societies functioned in well-delimited states with fixed organizational structures. In fact, they were anything but static and territorial boundaries were full of competition. But, despite the boundaries fluidity, the *Scramble for Africa* had a perpetual impact on the continent's dynamics. It quivered notions of identity, especially regarding the levels of national and ethnic consciousness (Ali *et al* 2019; Miles 1991), intensified development disparities (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001), stirred unification sentiments (Horowitz 1981, 2000) and increased political discrimination and local ethnic conflict (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016).

The intensity of these effects can vary considering that the colonial grid divided homelands into unequal parts. Upon colonial rule, the restriction on free movement and the imposition of new political administrations posed contrasting economic and institutional opportunities to split ethnicities, leading them to develop unequally across the borders. Besides encountering distinct national frames, these ethnicities also found themselves in uneven segments of their historical homelands, which enhanced within-group disparities that pulled them further apart.

Although it is true that power in precolonial Africa was mostly based on control over people than over land (Reid 2020), territories, especially the ones demarcating historical homelands, were and are relevant. Past evidence is found since borders were frequently challenged by the indigenous populations, whether colonizers sought for state hegemony or for power

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<sup>2</sup> The groups are currently split by the following bilateral borders: Burkina Faso-Ghana-Togo, , Ghana-Togo, Benin-Togo, Niger-Nigeria and Zambia-Zimbabwe.

decentralization. Despite the heterogeneity in colonial experiences, historical homelands remained immaterial subjects to the extent that they continued to imply emotional attachments that hardly dissipated whenever physical boundaries changed. The tendency of people's movements to follow precolonial settlement patterns (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016), the maintenance of strong relationships within partitioned groups (Asiwaju 1985) and the ongoing disputes over historical territories<sup>3</sup> corroborate that. By exploring how different homelands' segments and their shares in the respective countries coordinate with the variation in attitudes, I attempt to show their long-term relevance.

Segments' sizes relative to the states are crucial to determine how greatly spatial asymmetry impacts social cohesion. When contemporary countries contain a few large ethnicities, that is, when the degree of ethnic polarization is sufficiently high, the large partitioned homelands occupy significant, and potentially majority, shares of the respective countries. However, in the neighbouring countries these usually portray minor groups since their territory is mostly concentrated in a single state<sup>4</sup>. On the other hand, in states containing several ethnicities, major segments represent large but minority groups within the national frame, even when these keep the largest part of their homeland within those countries<sup>5</sup>. Such irregular scale of partitioning led to different experiences of groups integration in each nation. Extremely small groups tend to integrate the national society to avoid a systematic deprivation of resources (Asiwaju, 1985). Conversely, somewhat large, but still minority groups tend to

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<sup>3</sup> One example is the three-decade civil war in Somalia concerning the independence of Somaliland, a former British protectorate. Today, Somalia still faces a high risk of conflict over colonial borders. See Elmi, Afyare A. and Yusuf Hassan. "The Coming War Nobody is Talking About", *New York Times*, August 26, 2024.

<sup>4</sup> Examples include the Chokwe, the Baya and the Chewa, which are, respectively, majorities in Angola, Central African Republic and Mali, but minorities in Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon and Zambia.

<sup>5</sup> Examples include the Busa in Nigeria and the Duma in Gabon.

maintain an independent identity to build a tight community capable of functioning when overlooked by the government. Finally, sufficiently large ones tend to blend with the nation as they are more likely to become powerful agents in the political arena, influencing redistributive national policies in their favour. These segments hold political competitiveness if they occupy a sufficient territorial share of the state, since it encourages group concentration and weakens the relevance of other political opponents. When, due to the location of borders, split groups are insufficiently large in respect to the state they occupy, group grievances intensify (Horowitz 1981, 2000; Saideman and Ayres 2000; Gokcek 2011; Weiner 1971). As such, their presence destabilizes social cohesion as its individuals perceive other citizens as obstacles to their well-being, while others perceive those ethnic members as a threat to nationhood and social stability. As result, a generalized atmosphere of mistrust and discrimination may develop.

How partitioned groups relate to others and to the nation goes beyond feelings of unfairness or exclusion that arise from the different sizes across the borders. It also reflects their loyalty to the ethnicity and nationality (Druckman 1994), which, in the African context, relates to the colonial experience. Ethnicity refers to somewhat culturally distinctive groups where the shared notion of a common ancestry is usually inseparable of kinship and attachment (Horowitz 2000). It emerged upon colonial rule when Europeans started to categorize communities and influenced Africans to “think ethnically” (Berman 1998, 323). While having to accommodate to the imposed categories, individuals had to maintain strong communal ties to access wealth and power. As states evolved towards independence, ethnic identity gained relevance as it was often campaigned to defend claims for territory and state resources. Naturally, this process was also accompanied by nationalistic sentiments aimed at shaping unified, trans-ethnic identities.

I anticipate that the territorial grid affects the salience of national identities on different scales, contingent upon the groups' relative importance across the borders. For smaller segments the benefits of integrating the national society are far greater than the benefits of self-isolation (Bazzi *et al* 2019), specifically regarding the access to public goods. As such, minorities tend to interact with other groups more frequently, which, eventually, leads them to fully integrate the national community and prioritize their citizenship above the ethnicity. On the other hand, larger ethnicities have less need to cultivate intergroup relationships compared to minorities since they generally own sufficient political relevance to assure an adequate provision of resources. In fact, frequent intragroup contact and strong internal ties are particularly important for somewhat large partitioned groups as it empowers them with enough unity to compete in the political arena. As such, groups retaining a larger portion of their historical homeland in the same country tend to self-segregate and, thus, to identify less with their nationality relatively to their ethnicity.

Finally, I expect that ethnic political representation, proxied by the president's ethnicity, contributes to explain why the areas of split groups influence social stability. Because African governments and institutions tend to follow ethnic lines (François, Rainer and Trebbi 2015), ethnic power should interfere with levels of identity, satisfaction with domestic politics and trust, since it affects claims over state resources, as well as the opportunity costs linked to self-isolation. A highly heterogenous country with several small groups evolves almost the same way as an homogenous country with a few large groups, since the smaller groups are likely to join political coalitions to gain political influence (Horowitz, 1985; Fearon and Laitin 2003) and to accommodate their identities and behaviours to the nation. However, the presence of a larger segment will challenge the domestic arena as the group will intend to affirm the superiority of its own culture. If the group is not in power, it may perceive the political system as discriminatory or unfair as it will be controlled by other large ethnicity that will most likely

favour one's own group and discard the others. Hence, those powerless but large groups who sense discrimination from the political elite are more likely to expressively show inter-ethnic antagonism and mistrust in national entities, and to prioritize their ethnic identity above the national one.

### **III. Literature review**

This thesis relates to the economics literature linking Africa's contemporary development to its historical context. Recent works have uncovered the persistent influence of institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 2002) and power configurations (Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson 2014; Heldring and Robinson 2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013). Although not confined to Africa, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) demonstrate that the type and quality of current institutions derive from the institutions established during colonialism. Looking within the African context, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) corroborate the institutional effect by revealing how pre-colonial levels of political centralization explain current regional development, while Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson (2014), and Heldring and Robinson (2012) observe the colonial legacy on the power structures and levels of development of current communities. This thesis contributes to this by showing that social tensions retarding the development of modern Africa also relate to historical features that have endured through time, namely ethnocentrism and territoriality.

Other works have stressed the impacts of ethnicity on social cohesion, particularly how it can exacerbate inter-group divisions that undermine growth (Easterly and Levine 1997; Nunn 2008) and incite conflict (Esteban and Ray 2011). Mistrust and low propensity for collective action are also connected to ethnicity. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) depict that high ethnic heterogeneity inhibits participation in social activities and trust. Hodler *et al* (2020) go further in analysing that, in Africa, ethnic diversity reduces generalized trust if it is associated with

economic distances. Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2013) focus on recent conflict events in Uganda to add that generalized trust also decreases with conflict intensity, whereas ethnic identity increases. The dichotomy of lower trust and salient ethnic identities is consistent with this thesis, although I focus on trust specifically regarding individuals from other ethnicities, and national entities, and on identification with the nationality. This thesis builds, however, mostly on the work of Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) as it also stresses how mistrust in other ethnicities and governmental entities is potentiated by historical shocks. Their work shows that individuals from ethnicities that had been exposed to enslavement prior to colonialism are less trusting of others. I follow the same logic of using survey data from the Afrobarometer and the historical map of George Murdock (1959), but instead of focusing on slave trade experiences, I focus on the colonial partitioning of communities. I also observe other outcomes that destabilize social peace, such as salience of identities and senses of political discrimination and of an unequal legal system.

Consistent with the hypothesis that African states are undetachable from diverse identities, Ali et al (2019) associate the strength of ethnic *versus* national identities with the type of colonial rule adopted by Europeans. Although Bazzi et al (2019) focus on Indonesia, their research on how inter-ethnic interactions changes identities is highly informative as they find that ethnic polarization raises ethnic attachments and antagonistic attitudes. Recent literature on political science has additionally found that the salience of national identities is positively related with the groups population sizes when these dominate political power (Green, 2020). This thesis contributes by adding that identities are also shaped by the territorial configurations of ethnic groups as it disaggregates them by areas to find the existence of a negative relationship between larger ethnic segments and the salience of national identities.

Similarly, this thesis echoes the literature on ethnic politics. Horowitz (1981, 2000) argues that the relative political positions of African ethnic groups can exacerbate disputes than

inhibit nationhood, especially when groups are divided between states. Further literature shows that government coalitions are proportional to ethnic elites (Francois, Rainer and Trebbi 2015) and the awareness of favouritism along ethnicity affects individual behaviours (Vanden Eynde, Kuhn and Moradi 2018). Dicker (2018) provide evidence that ethnic favouritism is widespread across Africa. Finally, Berman, Couttenier and Girard (2023) use Afrobarometer data to suggest that the individuals from mineral rich ethnic homelands identify less with their nationality, especially when the respective groups are excluded from power. Other works in political science have also emphasized ethnic favouritism and discrimination of minor groups as key elements for conflict and social cleavages (Berman, 1998; Green, 2020; Englebert, 2000; Posner, 2005). This thesis contributes by suggesting that ethnic favouritism destabilizes peace when states contain large but somewhat peripheral ethnic segments since its members tend to feel more politically excluded and to detach from the national society when the national leader is a non-co-ethnic.

Finally, this thesis situates itself within the theoretical work linking the colonial border design with contemporary development, state weakness and social tensions (Asiwaju 1985; Englebert 2000; Englebert *et al* 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Herbst, as discussed in Robinson 2002), an issue often neglected by the economics. As such, this thesis aligns most closely with the scarce empirical work on externally defined borders and groups partitioning. While Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2011) show that states whose borders do not reflect people's desires perform economically worse, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) specifically address the effect of ethnic partitioning on development by exploiting within-country regional variations in conflict activity, ethnic power and public goods provision. They find that conflict events occur more often in the homelands of split ethnicities and that these groups are often subject to political discrimination and exclusion from resources. I contribute by exploring the

effect of ethnic partitioning on within-group individual attitudes through the lens of territoriality.

#### **IV. Data and Methodology**

To explore how the degree of ethnic partitioning affects attitudes across groups I combine survey data from Afrobarometer with the location of ethnic homelands depicted in Murdock's map (1959).

##### **Afrobarometer**

To observe individuals' ethnicities, levels of trust, national identification, and perceptions of political discrimination I explore cross-sectional data from the Afrobarometer, an African survey project that intends to map attitudes towards the civil society based on periodic survey rounds across sub-Saharan countries, specifically avoiding conflict areas. Each survey is conducted on a random sample of 1,200 or 2,400 voting age individuals to generate representative results at the national level. It reports the respondents' ethnicities as well as a variety of other individual characteristics such as age, gender, education levels, living conditions and employment status.

I explore data from Afrobarometer's round 3, 8 and 9, conducted between 2005 and 2023, since each consistently asks questions<sup>6</sup> that help to understand the underlying mechanism of ethnic partitioning on current social cohesion. Specifically, I take answers from questions regarding levels of trust in individuals from other ethnicities and levels of identification with the nationality relative to ethnicity. I also consider the answers on trust in national entities, namely the parliament/national assembly and the president. Finally, I explore

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<sup>6</sup> Except for round 8, which did not include the question on inter-ethnic trust, and for Zimbabwe in round 3, where questions on ethnicities, inter-ethnic trust, national identity, and political discrimination were not asked, all other questions were consistently covered.

proxies for political discrimination along ethnic lines and general inequality of the legal system. Particularly, I observe if individuals feel that their ethnic group receives an unfair treatment by the government and if they feel people are often treated unequally under the national law. From these dimensions I construct the dependent variables used to exploit the variation of behaviours within partitioned ethnicities. The specific questions used to construct the dependent variables are the following<sup>7</sup>:

- Trust Ethnic: *“How much do you trust each of the following types of people: From other ethnic groups?”*. The variable takes the value of one if the answer is either *“Somewhat”* or *“A lot”*, and zero otherwise.
- National Identity: *“Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [Respondent’s Nationality] and being a [Respondent’s Ethnic Group]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?”*. It equals one if the answer includes *“I feel only [National]”* or *“I feel more [National] than [Ethnic]”*, and zero otherwise<sup>8</sup>.
- Trust Parliament: *“How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Parliament/National Assembly?”* The variable equals one if the answer is either *“Somewhat”* or *“A lot”*, and zero otherwise.
- Trust President: *“How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The president?”*. The variable equals one if the answer is either *“Somewhat”* or *“A lot”*, and zero otherwise.
- Political Discrimination: *“How often is [Respondent’s Ethnic Group] treated unfairly by the government?”*. It equals one when the answers are *“Sometimes”*, *“Often”* or *“Always”*, and zero otherwise.

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<sup>7</sup> More details about the construction of the variables are found in the Appendix.

<sup>8</sup> The ethnic group is chosen by each respondent in the beginning of the survey.

- Unequal Law Treatment: “*In this country, how often: [Are people treated unequally under the law]?*”. The variable is one if the answers are “*Often*” or “*Always*”, and zero otherwise.

From all the 39 surveyed countries, I did not consider islands since, by definition, these locations do not share a border with other countries, hence, do not have partitioned ethnic regions. I also dropped the countries where the questions of interest were not asked and the countries where the majority of answers on ethnicity refers to a nationality.<sup>9</sup> The remaining 29 countries are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

### **Ethnic Homelands**

The identification of ethnic homelands follows a methodology similar to previous studies (e.g. Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Berman, Couttenier and Girard 2023), in which self-selected ethnicities<sup>10</sup> from Afrobarometer’s respondents are matched with those displayed in the historical map of George P. Murdock (1959). The map depicts the historical locations of 835 ethnicities in Africa between 1860 and 1940, based on ethnographic information collected by Murdock himself. Since most observations were collected prior to the final formation of colonial states, using Murdock’s map attenuates concerns regarding the location

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<sup>9</sup> The countries dropped were Cape Verde, Madagascar, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe and Seychelles; Sudan and Tunisia; Eswatini.

<sup>10</sup> This was observed from the answers to “*What is your ethnic community or cultural group?*”, where individuals chose their ethnicity based on a predetermined list. Of all the observations, 0.1% “Refused to answer”, 0.4% said “Don’t know” and 1% chose only their nationality.

of communities being endogenous to current feelings of trust, identity and discrimination across ethnicities.

Respondents' ethnicities were manually matched to historical homelands using the digitized version of Murdock's Map from Nunn (2008)<sup>11</sup>. Across the full sample, I was able to match 486 self-identified ethnicities with 296 homelands from the map. For most ethnicities it is not possible to find a direct match due to differences in spellings across borders (Asiwaju 1985) and due to differences between the Afrobarometer's answers and the names in the map<sup>12</sup>. For the ethnicities without an exact correspondence, I rely primarily on the data compiled by Nunn and Watchekon (2011) reporting matched ethnicities from the 3rd round of Afrobarometer<sup>13</sup>. This simplifies the connection process for the ethnic groups common to the three rounds, but, because a significant volume of new ethnicities was introduced in round 8 and 9, I am still left with a high volume of unmatched ethnicities. Therefore, I complement my identification strategy with information from Joshua's Project – an online database of ethnic groups from all around the world – from which I can explore the different spellings for a specific ethnicity. When I detect one ethnicity being spelled in an equivalent or, at least, in a very similar way to an ethnic homeland portrayed in the map I assume the match between the two. If a particular group cannot be confidently matched using Joshua's Project information, I complement the analysis using a range of other sources<sup>14</sup>. In the end, I match

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<sup>11</sup> The data from Murdock (1959) was coded to ArcGIS by Nunn (2008) and is available at:

<https://nathannunn.arts.ubc.ca/data/>.

<sup>12</sup> For instance, in Botswana, the questionnaires refer to most ethnicities using the prefix "Mo" which in Setswana language represents the class of nouns dedicated to a person. In Murdock (1959) these homelands, although similar, do not include such prefix. Some examples are: Moherero - Herero; Morolong - Rolong.

<sup>13</sup> Available at: <https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/112479/version/V1/view>.

<sup>14</sup> I used a combination of existing literature validating different names for the unmatched ethnicities with information from *Britannica* Online Encyclopedia, eHRAF World Cultures and *Wikipedia*.

486 self-reported ethnicities to 296 ethnicities from the map. However, for 9,671 individuals I cannot determine a clear match. Finally, of all the individuals who answered “*Other*”, I am unable to confidently match most of the answers as some indicated a national language or an ethnicity that was not linkable to any name in portrayed in the historical map. Therefore, I omit their information from the analysis. The final sample consists of 85,197 cross-sectional observations.

### **Identification of the degree of partitioning**

Following the hypothesis that social cleavages are influenced by the degree of ethnic partitioning across countries, the explanatory variable *Largest Segment* derives from the asymmetry of territorial shares occupied by each matched ethnicity in the respondents’ countries. It is constructed by overlapping contemporary national borders with the polygons of historical homeland represented in the Murdock’s map. Since colonial borders remained almost intact, this intersection allows the observation of the partitioning asymmetry with sufficient accuracy. Using the software QGIS, I intersect the shapefiles of the surveyed countries<sup>15</sup> with the shapefile of the historical map<sup>16</sup>. The outcome is 296 ethnicities in 43 countries<sup>17</sup>. Once the overlap is completed, I calculate the share of territory it occupies in a specific country, which represent the areas of ethnic segments. If an ethnic homeland is partitioned, I calculate the shares of occupied territory in all the countries where it is located. As such, I identify 134 partitioned groups. Since the purpose is to observe whether belonging to a larger segment within a partitioned ethnicity exacerbates social cleavages, the explanatory variable *Largest Segment* is defined as a *dummy* representing individuals from an ethnicity

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<sup>15</sup> Available at <https://data.humdata.org/>.

<sup>16</sup> Available at <https://nathannunn.arts.ubc.ca/data/>.

<sup>17</sup> The number of countries is higher because several partitioned homelands are found in countries not covered by Afrobarometer.

with the largest share of occupied national territory relative to the other co-ethnic segments. In other words, it represents cases where a significant share of a country's territory is occupied by the ethnic group of those individuals. Whenever an individual belongs to an ethnicity whose largest segment is in that respondent's country the variable equals 1. As such, for ethnic regions entirely contained within a single country and, thus, with no other cross-border segments to compare to, the variable will also equal 1. If, on the other hand, the individual belongs to an ethnicity whose largest segment is in the neighbouring country, the variable equals 0. This allows to identify the variation of attitudes arising from the within-group territorial heterogeneity.

### **Political Representation**

Following the argument that African politics usually evolve along ethnic lines (Berman 1998), I observe the mechanism linking political representation of each ethnicity and individual attitudes. I use the ethnicity of the national leaders<sup>18</sup> at the time each individual interview<sup>19</sup> as a *proxy* for political representation. After identifying the ethnicity of the country's leaders<sup>20</sup>, I build the additional explanatory variable *Political Representation*. It is defined as a *dummy* representing whether individuals share the ethnicity with the national leader. The sample includes 21,143 of individuals whose ethnicity matches that of the leader and 64,054 whose ethnicity does not match.

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<sup>18</sup> The leaders can be either the president, the prime-minister, or the king, depending on each political system.

<sup>19</sup> In the event of elections and, sometimes military coups, these leaders changed in the interval of years in which each Afrobarometer round was conducted. As such, I identify the leaders considering the exact date of each Afrobarometer's interview.

<sup>20</sup> This information was found in articles from the media linking the leaders to an ethnicity.

### III. Empirical strategy

To estimate the effect of membership in largest ethnic segments on feelings of trust, national identity, and perceptions of political and legal discrimination, as reported by respondents from a specific ethnic group, I run variations of the following specification:

$$(1) Y_{i,e,c} = a_0 + \beta_1 \text{Largest Segment}_{i,e,c} + \gamma_e + \gamma_{c,y} + X_{i,e,c} + \varepsilon_{i,e,c}$$

The dependent variable  $Y$  denotes one of the six measures of social cohesion specific to individual  $i$ , from ethnic group  $e$  and country  $c$ . Specifically, it indicates levels of inter-ethnic trust, identification with the nation, trust in the parliament/national assembly, trust in the president, and views of political discrimination and of an unequal legal system. The independent variable  $\text{Largest Segment}_{i,e,c}$  is a *dummy* representing individuals that belong to an ethnicity with the largest territorial segment in their country. It assigns each ethnicity  $e$  to the respective country  $c$  where its homeland is located. It is constructed based on how much of a country's area is occupied by each ethnicity identified in the Afrobarometer, using contemporaneous country borders and the past ethnic regions displayed in Murdock's map (1959). It equals 1 when individuals identify with an ethnicity whose majority segment is in their respective country and it equals 0 if otherwise. This variation identifies split regions since it indicates there is a cross-border segment that occupies the largest shares of a national area. The coefficient of interest  $\beta_1$  represents the estimated relationship between the degree of partitioning of a specific ethnic group and current levels of trust in other ethnicities, identification with the nation, trust in national entities, perceptions of political discrimination along ethnicity and, finally, of an unequal legal system. Relying on a difference-in-differences identification strategy, while controlling for ethnicity fixed effects, the coefficient allows to exploit the variation of attitudes between individuals from major and minor segments within the same partitioned ethnicity. Including ethnic fixed effects, represented by  $\gamma_e$ , captures the variation of attitudes within ethnic groups that arises whenever groups are partitioned. It

accounts for time-invariant features of each ethnic group that may affect the outcome, such as differences in the type of colonial rule and historical institutions. For example, individuals of former British colonies tend to be less attached to the nation (Ali *et al* 2018; Robinson 2014). On the other hand, including country-year fixed effect, represented by  $\gamma_{c,t}$ , accounts for possible shocks in a country in a specific year that may correlate with how individuals attach themselves to the nation and how they perceive others. For example, the election of a co-ethnic president in a year covered by the Afrobarometer survey might increase individuals' attachment to the nation as it makes them feel well nationally represented. The specification including ethnic and country-year fixed effects ensures that the correlation between belonging to a majority segment and measures of social cohesion is not driven by unobservable factors specific to each ethnicity and pair of country-year. The regression specification also includes a  $X_{i,e,c}$ , a vector of individual controls (age, gender, education, living conditions and employment) to account for possible correlation between individual characteristics and the dependent variables. Because  $Y_{i,e,c}$  varies around the respondent's answers on ethnicity the standard errors are clustered by ethnicity.

To observe if political representation changes individuals' responses regarding their national contexts, I test for a pattern in the data by estimating the following equation:

$$(2) Y_{i,e,c} = a_0 + \beta_1 \text{Largest Segment}_{i,e,c} + \beta_2 \text{Political Representation}_{i,e,c} + \beta_3 \text{Largest Segment}_{i,e,c} * \text{Political Representation}_{i,e,c} + \gamma_e + \gamma_{c,y} + X_{i,e,c} + \varepsilon_{i,e,c}$$

In this specification all variables are defined as in (1). An interaction term *Largest Segment*<sub>*i, e, c*</sub> \* *Political Representation*<sub>*i, e, c*</sub> is introduced to account for the largest segments that are politically represented at the national level. *Political Representation*<sub>*i, e, c*</sub> is a *dummy* denoting whether individuals *i*, self-identified with ethnicity *e*, in country *c*, are represented in the national politics. I use the ethnicity of the national leader as a *proxy* for political representation. Whenever respondents identify with the same ethnicity as the national leader,

the variable equals 1. It is 0 if otherwise. As such, individuals from the largest ethnic segments are represented in national politics when sharing the ethnicity with the national leader and unrepresented when not sharing the ethnicity. This allows to explore the heterogeneity in outcomes for each type of large segment. As in (1), the specification includes ethnic and country-year fixed effects, as well as a set of individual controls. The standard errors are also clustered at the level of the ethnicity.

#### **IV. Results**

Table 1 reports estimates of the equation (1) exploring the variation of attitudes within ethnic groups. The results show the effect of the explanatory variable *Largest Segment*  $i, e, c$  in each one of the dependent variables, namely, Trust Ethnic, National Identity, Trust Parliament, Trust President, Political Discrimination and Unequal Law Treatment. Because ethnic fixed effects are included, the results inform whether individuals belonging to a partitioned majority exhibit feelings of trust, identification with the nationality, and discrimination that are disproportionate relative to the feelings of their cross-border minority kin. This allows to compare reactions of individuals from the same ethnic background but exposed to different treatment positions because of their specific territorial possessions. All specifications include ethnic and country-year fixed effects, as well as individual controls.

Overall, the results suggest that the existence of partitioned ethnic majorities weaken social cohesion. For the first four measures of social cohesion,  $\beta_1$  is negative and statistically significant. The estimated coefficient regarding inter-ethnic trust (1) and identification with the nationality (2) are the most robust as both are significant at 1% level, although the latter is lower in magnitude. Columns (1) and (2) show that, on average, individuals from the largest segments are less likely to trust non-co-ethnics and tend to identify less with their nationality relative to their ethnicity. The estimates can be explained by the fact that, because several of

these segments belong to partitioned ethnic groups, their members tend to self-isolate to reinforce a common identity that upholds the group's political and social relevance. This is consistent with Posner (2004) who finds that partitioned groups that are sufficiently large relative to the state are more likely to identify with the ethnicity than smaller ones and with Esteban and Ray (1994) who establish that identification with the group increases with the size of that same group.

In in the second pair of columns, (3) and (4), the negative correlations imply that being from the largest segment decreases trust in the parliament/national assembly and in the president, at 10% and 5% significance levels, respectively. One reason is that mistrust in national political entities arises from the consciousness among partitioned ethnicities about the fact that they usually face higher political discrimination compared to non-partitioned groups (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016). Although not statistically significant, the estimate in column (5) aligns with this reasoning. The positive coefficient indicates that the individuals from the largest segments tend to feel that their ethnic group is often treated unfairly by the government. These results align with the argument that larger segments are less committed to a cohesive national society as they prioritize intra-ethnic relationships to affirm their group's relevance, specifically if they are partitioned between states and there is a cross-border minority kin with whom they aspire to reunite ((Miles 1971; Horowitz 2000).

Finally, column (6) portrays a surprising result. Although statistically insignificant, the negative correlation concerning views on the inequality of the legal system suggests that individuals do not feel people are often neglected by the law, which contradicts the previous findings. However, once the political representation of each ethnicity is considered in Table 2, the underlying mechanism for such findings becomes clear.

Table 1: Largest Segments and Measures of Social Cohesion: Difference-in-Differences Estimates

	Dependent Variables					
	Trust Ethnic (1)	National Identity (2)	Trust Parliament (3)	Trust President (4)	Political Discrimination (5)	Unequal Law Treatment (6)
Largest Segment	-0.0520*** (0.0105)	-0.0295*** (0.0095)	-0.0161* (0.0078)	-0.0323** (0.0138)	0.0213 (0.0152)	-0.0112 (0.0081)
R-squared	0.140	0.126	0.162	0.200	0.190	0.095
Observations	51,065	83,633	79,049	82,361	81,351	81,110
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The unity of observation is an individual. The table reports OLS estimates relating majority segments with measures of trust, national identity and political discrimination. All specifications include ethnicity and country-year fixed effects. Individual controls include age, gender, education, employment status and living conditions. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of ethnicity answers and of country-year pairs. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 2 displays the estimated coefficients from equation (2) linking territorial ethnic composition and political representation. By interacting the territorial variable with a *dummy* capturing the national political representation of each ethnicity, I explore the heterogeneity of results between two types of groups: unrepresented and represented largest segments. The general statistical significance of the interaction coefficient  $\beta_3$  indicates that individuals' attitudes differ depending on their ethnicity matching with the ethnicity of the country's leader. Overall, the results suggest that the individuals who are less inclined in fostering a cohesive society are mostly those from politically unrepresented majorities within partitioned groups.

I find that the previous results of lower trust in other ethnicities (1), the parliament/national assembly (3), and the president (4) are driven by the individuals from unrepresented large segments, since, for each outcome variable, the correlation coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 1% only for individuals from unrepresented groups, while for represented groups the coefficient is positive and insignificant. Column (2), on the other hand, shows that identification with the nationality relative to ethnicity is consistently lower for both represented and unrepresented large segments. This may be because members

from larger ethnicities are generally more attached to their own community rather to the nation, irrespectively of whether they are represented in politics or not (Masella, 2013).

The coefficients in column (5) are interesting as their change in sign reveals a clear inverse relationship between political representation and discontent with the government. When individuals from majority segments are not politically represented,  $\beta_3$  is positive, indicating they are likely to feel that the government often treats their group unfairly. On the other hand, if individuals belong to represented large groups, the negative  $\beta_3$  indicates that, on average, they don't feel their ethnicity is neglected. Both results are significant at 5%. This is consistent with the findings of Berman, Couttenier and Girard (2023) that show that greater political influence of an ethnic group improves perceptions on how fairly the government treats that group.

Finally, column (6) shows a significant negative correlation between represented majority groups and views on people being treated unequally by the legal system. This means that individuals, on average, do not perceive the law as unequal only when they share the ethnicity of the national leader, which explains the intriguing results in Table 1.

Table 2: Largest Segments and Political Representation: Difference-in-Differences Estimates

	Dependent Variables					
	Trust Ethnic (1)	National Identity (2)	Trust Parliament (3)	Trust President (4)	Political Discrimination (5)	Unequal Law Treatment (6)
Unrepresented Largest Segment	-0.0597*** (0.0112)	-0.0231** (0.0117)	-0.0273*** (0.0098)	-0.0519*** (0.0160)	0.0396** (0.0162)	0.0047 (0.0094)
Represented Largest Segment	0.0115 (0.0291)	-0.0652* (0.0333)	0.0199 (0.0265)	0.0480 (0.0302)	-0.0869** (0.0411)	-0.0788*** (0.0241)
R-squared	0.140	0.126	0.162	0.200	0.191	0.095
Observations	51065	83633	79049	82361	81351	81110
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The unity of observation is an individual. The table reports OLS estimates relating political representation of majority ethnic segments with measures of trust, national identity and discrimination. Political representation is proxied by the ethnicity of the national leader. All specifications include ethnicity and country-year fixed effects. Individual controls include age, gender, education, employment status and living conditions. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of ethnicity answers and of country-year pairs. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

## **V. Conclusion**

The colonial border design crystalized African communities into states lacking a common identity. This thesis focuses on how such historical shock shapes current attitudes through the lens of territoriality. It studies the effects of the asymmetrical ethnic partitioning on contemporary measures of social cohesion, focusing on 29 Sub-Saharan countries. Using individual data, as well as the distribution of ethnic homelands prior to the colonialism, the results suggest that individuals from larger segments within partitioned groups challenge the building of cohesive societies, which is consistent with the literature on colonial partitioning and underdevelopment (e.g., Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016).

To investigate this issue, I explore within-group variations of trust, national identity, and perceptions of political and legal discrimination, using data from Afrobarometer. I match self-reported ethnicities with the Murdock's map to construct the main explanatory variable portraying the largest territorial segments of a specific ethnic group relative to the state where it is located. I find that individuals from the largest segments report lower trust in other ethnicities and in national identities, weaker identification with the nationality and views of a partial political system. These effects are driven by individuals belonging to politically unrepresented ethnicities. Inversely, political representation influences views of an equal legal system.

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## Appendix

### 1. Data and Variables

#### 1.1. Afrobarometer – round 3, 8 and 9

##### Dependent variables

Each dependent variable was constructed based on the following six questions included in Afrobarometer:

- Trust Ethnic: *“How much do you trust each of the following types of people: From other ethnic groups?”* where the potential responses include “Not at all”, “Just a little”, “Somewhat” and “A lot”.

Trust Ethnic = 1 when answers are “Somewhat” and “A lot”

Trust Ethnic = 0 if otherwise

- National Identity: *“Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [Respondent’s Nationality] and being a [Respondent’s Ethnic Group]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?”*, where the potential responses include “I feel only [ethnic]”, “I feel more [ethnic] than [national]”, “I feel equally [national] and [ethnic]”, “I feel more [national] than [ethnic group]”, “I feel only [national]”.

National Identity = 1 if the answer includes “I feel only [national]” or “I feel more [national] than [ethnic]”

National identity = 0 if otherwise

- Trust Parliament: *“How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Parliament/National Assembly?”* where the potential responses include “Not at all”, “Just a little”, “Somewhat” and “A lot”.

Trust Parliament = 1 if the answer is either “Somewhat” or “A lot”

Trust Parliament = 0 if otherwise

- Trust President: “*How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The president?*”, where the potential responses include “Not at all”, “Just a little”, “Somewhat” and “A lot”.

Trust President = 1 if the answer is either “*Somewhat*” or “*A lot*”

Trust President = 0 if otherwise

- Political Discrimination: “*How often is [Respondent’s Ethnic Group] treated unfairly by the government?*”, where the potential responses include “Never”, “Sometimes”, “Often” and “Always”.

Political Discrimination = 1 when the answers are “*Sometimes*”, “*Often*” or “*Always*”,

Political Discrimination = 0 if otherwise

- Unequal Law Treatment: “*In this country, how often: [Are people treated unequally under the law]?*”, where the potential responses include “Never”, “Rarely”, “Often”, “Always”

Unequal Law Treatment = 1 if the answers are “*Often*” or “*Always*”

Unequal Law Treatment = 0 if otherwise

- Political Representation: Dummy variable that is 1 whenever the respondents’ self-reported ethnicity matches the ethnicity of the respective national leader.

Sources: <https://www.afrobarometer.org/> and information found in the media linking the leaders to a specific ethnicity, such as <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24017899> .

## Control Variables

- Age: Continuous variable that changes at the individual level based on the answers to *“How old are you?”*.
- Gender: Categorical variable where 0 = Female and 1 = Male.
- Education: Categorical variable based on the question *“What is your highest level of education?”*. The categories include: “No formal schooling” = 0, “Informal schooling only” = 1, “Some primary schooling” = 2, “Primary school completed” = 3, “Intermediate school or some secondary school/high school” = 4, “Secondary school/high school completed” = 5, “Post-secondary qualifications, other than university” = 6, “Some university” = 7, “University completed” = 8, and “Post-graduate” = 9.
- Living conditions: Categorical variable based on the question *“In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions?”* The categories include “Very bad” = 1, “Fairly bad” = 2, “Neither good nor bad” = 3, “Fairly good” = 4, or “Very good” = 5.
- Employment: Categorical variable based on the question *“Do you have a job that pays a cash income?; Is it full time or part time? ;Are you currently looking for a job?”*. The categories include “No (not looking)” = 0, “No (looking)” = 1, “Yes, part time” = 2, and “Yes, full time” = 3.

Source: <https://www.afrobarometer.org/>

## Fixed effects

- Ethnicity fixed effects: From the match between the respondents’ self-identified ethnicity to the question *“What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group.”* and the ethnicities displayed in Murdock’s map (1959).

- Country-year fixed effects: From the combination of each surveyed country and the corresponding survey years.

Sources: <https://www.afrobarometer.org/> and <https://nathannunn.arts.ubc.ca/data/>.

## 1.2. Murdock's Map (1959)

### **Ethnic matching**

To pair each self-reported ethnicity from Afrobarometer to a region described in Murdock's map (1959) I first rely on the match made by Nunn (2001) regarding round 3. Exceptionally, the question on ethnicity was not asked in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the ethnicities of Zimbabwean respondents are identified using linguistic information based on the answers to the question "*What is the primary language you speak in your home?*". I am able to find a clear match for 212 out of 1048 respondents. Because round 8 and 9 included more countries, the volume of new ethnicities was high. Therefore, I complete the process by using Joshua's Project information and other sources such as existing literature, *Britannica* Online Encyclopedia, eHRAF World Cultures and *Wikipedia*. However, for 9,671 individuals I cannot determine a clear match since several reported their ethnicity as either a nationality, an European term used during colonialism or an aggregate group constituted by several sub-groups. Finally, of all the 2,906 individuals who answered "*Other*", I am unable to confidently match most of the answers as some indicated a national language (e.g., Swahili), which makes it impossible to connect them to a specific ethnic group. Others indicated an ethnicity that was linkable to one of the alternatives already listed in the answer options, which means that these respondents most likely did not identify themselves with that ethnicity. Beyond that, for most answers I cannot find reliable information that connects their names to those displayed in Murdock's map. Therefore, I omit their information from the analysis.

Source: <https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/112479/version/V1/view>

## **Explanatory variable**

To build my main explanatory variable, I calculate the areas of each ethnic segment. Specifically, I calculate the shares of national surface areas occupied by each ethnicity identified in Afrobarometer. To do that, I use QGIS *software* to intersect contemporary national borders of each surveyed country with the historical location of ethnic homelands from Murdock (1959). Before calculating each share, I take an intermediate step by identifying the partitioned ethnic groups. For the few homelands that cannot be clearly identified as partitioned I calculate the overlap areas between the respective layer and the layer of the countries where they appear to be located. I defined partitioned groups as the ones with at least 5% of their surface area falling into more than one county. From here, I compute the mean of the raster files associated with each ethnic homeland within the polygons defined by the shapefiles of each country. This provides the territorial shares that an ethnic segment occupies within each country where it is located. Each share is transformed into a percentage. From these calculations, I define the variables:

- **Split:** Dummy variable that is 1 when an ethnic region where at least 5% of its surface fits into more than one country. It is 0 otherwise. It builds from the intersection between contemporary national borders and historical ethnic borders.
- **Ethnicity Area:** Corresponds to the percentage of territorial share that each ethnic region occupies in the respective countries where it is found. It varies on the ethnic segment level.
- **Largest Segment:** Dummy variable that is 1 when one ethnic segment occupies the largest percentage share of the country's territory where it is located relative to other segments from the same homeland. It is 0 otherwise.

Sources: <https://data.humdata.org/> and <https://nathannunn.arts.ubc.ca/data/>.

## 2. Tables and Figures

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Individual level variables						
Trust Ethnic	51,606	0.522	0.500	0	1	1
National Identity	84,398	0.379	0.485	0	1	0
Trust Parliament	79,720	0.459	0.498	0	1	0
Trust President	83,077	0.547	0.498	0	1	1
Political Discrimination	82,061	0.399	0.4898	0	1	0
Unequal Law Treatment	81,753	0.584	0.493	0	1	1
Ethnicity level variables						
Split	85,197	0.542	0.498	0	1	1
Ethnicity Area	85,197	12.813	19.262	0	90.927	6.666
Largest Segment	85,197	0.845	0.362	0	1	1
Political Representation	85,197	0.248	0.432	0	1	0
Control variables						
Age	84,935	36.978	14.799	18	102	34
Gender	85,197	0.500	0.500	1	0	0
Education	84,973	3.283	2.199	0	9	3
Living conditions	84,989	2.568	1.278	1	5	2
Employment	85,040	1.154	1.135	0	3	1

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. It reports statistics across the full sample of Afrobarometer's respondents whose ethnicity matches with an ethnic region depicted in Murdock's map (1959). Individual level variables derive from round 3, 8 and 9. Ethnicity level variables derive from the intersection between contemporary national borders and the historical ethnic regions in Murdock's map (1959).

Table A2. Afrobarometer Sample – Observations per country and round

Country	Round 3	Round 8	Round 9	Total
Angola	-	2,003	904	2,907
Benin	1,198	1,161	1,175	3,534
Botswana	1,157	1,007	1,071	3,235
Burkina Faso	-	1,139	1,097	2,236
Cameroon	-	781	763	1,544
Côte d'Ivoire	-	905	864	1,769
Gabon	-	781	763	1,478
Gambia	-	1,173	1,173	2,346
Ghana	1,119	2,150	2,250	5,519
Guinea	-	1,155	1,187	2,342
Kenya	1,231	2,260	2,205	5,696
Lesotho	1,160	1,176	1,183	3,519
Liberia	-	1,016	1,115	2,131
Malawi	1,061	1,051	813	2,925
Mali	1,136	1,166	1,100	3,402
Mauritania	-	-	102	102
Morocco	-	317	331	648
Mozambique	1,167	930	969	3,066
Namibia	990	1,072	1,066	3,128
Niger	-	1,105	1,087	2,192
Nigeria	2,155	1,344	1,319	4,818
Senegal	1,193	1,176	1,174	3,543
Sierra Leone	-	1,140	1,130	2,270
South Africa	1,509	1,076	1,138	3,723
Tanzania	655	1,760	1,669	4,084
Togo	-	1,087	1,066	2,153
Uganda	2,345	1,172	2,328	5,845
Zambia	1,158	1,127	1,075	3,360
Zimbabwe	212	727	743	1,682
Total	19,446	32,904	32,847	85,197

Table A3: List of All Ethnic Groups

Abe	Chewa	Gurensi	Kgalagadi	Lunda	Ngindo	Sinza	Yao
Acholi	Chiga	Gurma	Kgatla	Lungu	Ngonyelu	Soga	Yergum
Adangme	Chokwe	Guro	Kikuyu	Luo	Nguru	Somba	Yoruba
Ajukuru	Chopi	Gusii	Kumbundu	Luvale	Ngwaketse	Songhai	Zaramo
Akposso	Chuabo	Gyriama	Kinga	Mada	Ngwato	Soninke	Zerma
Alur	Dafi	Ha	Kipsigi	Madi	Nkole	Sonjo	Zezuru
Ambo	Dagari	Hausa	Kisii	Maka	Nkoya	Sotho	Zigula
Ana	Dagomba	Hawiya	Koba	Makonde	Nsaw	Subia	Zulu
Angas	Dan	Haya	Kongo	Makua	Nsenga	Suka	
Anyang	Dendi	Hehe	Konjo	Malinke	Nupe	Sukuma	
Ashanti	Digo	Herero	Konkomba	Mamprusi	Nusan	Susu	
Aulliminden	Diola	Hlengwe	Kono	Mandara	Nyakyusa	Swazi	
Aushi	Diula	Hurutshe	Konso	Manyika	Nyamwezi	Tabwa	
Bajun	Dogon	Ibibio	Koranko	Masa	Nyanja	Tawana	
Bakwe	Duala	Ibo	Korekore	Masai	Nyoro	Teda	
Bambara	Duruma	Idoma	Kota	Mashi	Pare	Teita	
Bamileke	Ebrie	Igala	Kotoko	Masina	Pedi	Tekna	
Banyun	Edo	Igbira	Kpe	Matengo	Pemba	Tem	
Bararetta	Egba	Ijaw	Kpelle	Matumbi	Pepel	Temne	
Bargu	Ekoi	Ila	Kran	Mbere	Pogoro	Teso	
Basa	Ewe	Iramba	Kru	Mbugwe	Popo	Thonga	
Basari	Fajulu	Iraqw	Kulango	Mbukushu	Puku	Tikar	
Bassa	Fali	Isoko	Kunda	Mbum	Rangi	Tiv	
Bauchi	Fang	Itsekiri	Kundu	Mbunda	Rendile	Tlhaping	
Baya	Fia	Iwa	Kwangare	Mbundu	Rolong	Tlharo	
Bede	Fipa	Jibu	Kwena	Mende	Ronga	Tlokwa	
Bemba	Fon	Jukun	Kwere	Meru	Ruanda	Toma	
Bena	Foutadjalon	Kabre	Laka(Ndebele)	Minianka	Sabei	Tonga	
Beraber	Fut	Kagoro	Lala	Moba	Safwa	Toro	
Bergdama	Ga	Kaka	Lamba	Mossi	Samburu	Tuburi	
Birifon	Ganda	Kamba	Lambya	Mpongwe	Samo	Tukulor	
Birum	Gbande	Kanuri	Lango	Mum	Sandawe	Tumbuka	
Bisa	Gbari	Kaonde	Lenje	Mundang	Sena	Turkana	
Bobo	Gisiga	Kapsiki	Limba	Murle	Senga	Turu	
Boran	Gisu	Karamojong	Liptako	Musgu	Senufo	Vai	
Bozo	Gogo	Karanga	Lobi	Mwera	Serer	Venda	
Bura	Gola	Karekare	Loko	Nama	Shambala	Waba	
Busansi	Grebo	Kasonke	Lomwe	Nandi	Shebelle	Wanga	
Buye	Grunshi	Kebu	Lozi	Ndau	Sherbro	Wolof	
Chaga	Guang	Kerewe	Luchazi	Ndebele	Shogo	Xosa	
Chakossi	Guin	Keyu	Lugbara	Ndob	Shuwa	Yalunka	

Table A4: List of Partitioned Ethnicities per Country


Ethnicity	Country	Ethnicity	Country	Ethnicity	Country	Ethnicity	Country	Ethnicity	Country
Acholi	SSD	Dendi	BEN	Iwa	TZA	Lobi	BFA	Ndau	MOZ
Acholi	UGA	Dendi	NER	Iwa	ZMB	Lobi	CIV	Ndau	ZWE
Alur	COD	Digo	KEN	Kabre	BEN	Lugbara	SDN	Ndebele	BWA
Alur	UGA	Digo	TZA	Kabre	TGO	Lugbara	ZAR	Ndebele	ZWE
Ambo	AGO	Diola	GMB	Kaka	CAF	Lunda	AGO	Ngwaketse	BWA
Ambo	NAM	Diola	GNB	Kaka	CMR	Lunda	COD	Ngwaketse	ZAF
Ana	BEN	Diola	SEN	Kaonde	ZAR	Lungu	TZA	Ngwato	BWA
Ana	TGO	Dogon	BFA	Kaonde	ZMB	Lungu	ZMB	Ngwato	ZAF
Aulliminden	DZA	Dogon	MLI	Kapsiki	CMR	Luo	KEN	Nkole	TZA
Aulliminden	MLI	Egba	BEN	Kapsiki	NGA	Luo	TZA	Nkole	UGA
Aulliminden	NER	Egba	NGA	Karamojong	KEN	Luvale	AGO	Nsenga	MOZ
Aushi	ZAR	Egba	TGO	Karamojong	UGA	Luvale	ZAR	Nsenga	ZMB
Aushi	ZMB	Ekoi	CMR	Kgalagadi	BWA	Luvale	ZMB	Nsenga	ZWE
Bajun	KEN	Ekoi	NGA	Kgalagadi	ZAF	Madi	SDN	Nusan	BWA
Bajun	SOM	Ewe	GHA	Kgatla	BWA	Madi	UGA	Nusan	NAM
Banyun	GNB	Ewe	TGO	Kgatla	ZAF	Makonde	MOZ	Nusan	ZAF
Banyun	SEN	Fang	CAM	Kissi	GIN	Makonde	TZA	Nyakyusa	MWI
Bararetta	ETH	Fang	GAB	Kissi	LBR	Malinke	CIV	Nyakyusa	TZA
Bararetta	KEN	Fang	GNQ	Kissi	SLE	Malinke	GIN	Nyanja	MOZ
Bararetta	SOM	Fang	COG	Koba	BWA	Malinke	GMB	Nyanja	MWI
Bargu	BEN	Fon	BEN	Koba	NAM	Malinke	GNB	Pare	KEN
Bargu	BFA	Fon	TGO	Kongo	AGO	Malinke	Mali	Pare	TZA
Bargu	NER	Foutadjalon	GIN	Kongo	ZAR	Malinke	SEN	Popo	BEN
Bargu	NGA	Foutadjalon	GNB	Konjo	UGA	Mandara	CMR	Popo	TGO
Baya	CAF	Foutadjalon	MLI	Konjo	UGA	Mandara	NGA	Puku	CMR
Baya	CAM	Foutadjalon	SEN	Konkomba	GHA	Manyika	MOZ	Puku	GAB
Birifon	GHA	Grebo	CIV	Konkomba	TGO	Manyika	ZWE	Puku	GNQ
Birifon	BFA	Grebo	LBR	Kono	GIN	Masa	CAF	Ronga	MOZ
Bobo	BFA	Grunshi	BFA	Kono	SLE	Masa	CMR	Ronga	SWZ
Bobo	MLI	Grunshi	GHA	Koranko	GIN	Masai	KEN	Ronga	ZAF
Boran	ETH	Guin	BFA	Koranko	SLE	Masai	TZA	Ruanda	BDI
Boran	KEN	Guin	CIV	Kota	COG	Mashi	AGO	Ruanda	RWA
Busansi	BFA	Gurensi	BFA	Kota	GAB	Mashi	ZMB	Ruanda	TZA
Busansi	GHA	Gurensi	GHA	Kotoko	CMR	Masina	BFA	Ruanda	UGA
Busansi	TGO	Gurensi	TGO	Kotoko	TCD	Masina	MLI	Ruanda	ZAR
Chaga	KEN	Gurma	BEN	Kpelle	GIN	Masina	MRT	Sabei	KEN
Chaga	TZA	Gurma	BFA	Kpelle	LBR	Mbere	CAF	Sabei	UGA
Chakossi	GHA	Gurma	NER	Kran	CIV	Mbere	CMR	Samo	BFA
Chakossi	TGO	Gurma	TGO	Kran	LBR	Mbere	TCD	Samo	MLI
Chewa	MOZ	Gusii	Ken	Kunda	MOZ	Mbunda	AGO	Serer	GMB
Chewa	MWI	Gusii	TZA	Kunda	ZMB	Mbunda	ZMB	Serer	SEN
Chewa	ZMB	Hausa	NER	Kwangare	AGO	Minianka	BFA	Shambala	KEN
Chiga	RWA	Hausa	NGA	Kwangare	NAM	Minianka	CIV	Shambala	TZA
Chiga	UGA	Herero	AGO	Lala	COD	Minianka	MLI	Shebelle	ETH
Chokwe	AGO	Herero	NAM	Lala	ZMB	Mundang	CMR	Shebelle	SOM
Chokwe	ZAR	Hlengwe	MOZ	Lamba	ZAR	Mundang	TCD	Shuwa	CMR
Dagari	BFA	Hlengwe	ZAF	Lamba	ZMB	Musgu	CMR	Shuwa	NGA
Dagari	GHA	Hlengwe	ZWE	Lambya	MWI	Musgu	TCD	Shuwa	TCD
Dagomba	GHA	Ibibio	CMR	Lambya	TZA	Nama	NAM	Songhai	BFA
Dagomba	TGO	Ibibio	NGA	Lambya	ZMB	Nama	ZAF	Songhai	MLI

Table A4: List of Partitioned Ethnicities per Country (Continued)

Ethnicity	Country	Ethnicity	Country	Ethnicity	Country	Ethnicity	Country	Ethnicity	Country
Songhai	NER	Subia	ZWE	Tekna	MAR	Toma	LBR	Vai	LBR
Soninke	MLI	Susu	GIN	Tem	BEN	Tonga	ZMB	Vai	SLE
Soninke	MRT	Susu	SLE	Tem	TGO	Tonga	ZWE	Venda	ZAF
Soninke	SEN	Swazi	SWZ	Thonga	MOZ	Toro	COD	Venda	ZWE
Sonjo	KEN	Swazi	ZAF	Thonga	ZAF	Toro	UGA	Wanga	KEN
Sonjo	TZA	Tabwa	ZAR	Tlharo	BWA	Tuburi	CMR	Wanga	UGA
Sotho	LSO	Tabwa	ZMB	Tlharo	ZAF	Tuburi	TCD	Yalunka	GIN
Sotho	ZAF	Teda	LBY	Tlokwa	BWA	Tukulor	MRT	Yalunka	SLE
Subia	BWA	Teda	NER	Tlokwa	ZAF	Tukulor	SEN	Yao	MOZ
Subia	NAM	Teda	TCD	Tlokwa	ZWE	Tumbuka	MWI	Yao	MWI
Subia	ZMB	Tekna	ESH	Toma	GIN	Tumbuka	ZMB	Yao	TZA

Notes: This table reports all the partitioned ethnic groups within the full sample of ethnicities. There are 134 partitioned groups with at least 5% of their surface area fitting into more than one country.

Figure A1. Map displaying all partitioned ethnic groups identified in Afrobarometer



Legend:

- Surveyed countries
- Not surveyed countries
- Region of partitioned ethnic groups