endowed with interests and skills, becomes a generator, helping to reproduce but also to transform social structures. The habitus, more than a repeated behaviour, is a matrix that generates behaviours. Socialisation produces a habitus that can reproduce discrimination and the inequalities that go with it, but that can also generate capacities for resistance and transformation.

10h 05m Brisa Paim Duarte (Faculty of Law, University of Coimbra, University of Coimbra Institute for Legal Research), Reinventing the praxis, inventing the law? Some thoughts on Aristotle's contribution to practical reasoning and rhetoric and its possible connections to contemporary aesthetic legal discourse

On the background of a basic question (it is possible to establish justice and validity in the realm a praxis already confronted with difference and imponderability?), tempting the frontiers of *inventio*, rhetoric evolves from a mechanism able to expose the fractures and imperfections that were believed to be grounding sociopolitical institutions to a philosophical device to establish a plausible truth, insofar as justice was already conceived as a borderline value. Aristotle's voice enables a complex understanding of the relationship between rhetoric, practical reason, and the practice of justice, one that can be linked to contemporary enterprises in juridical thinking, especially those looking to establish closer connections between legal culture and certain experiences of practical rationality typically associated to the artistic realm. This paper intends to discuss such possibilities, mainly focusing on *phrónēsis-potēsis* axis and its projection in forensic field and legal discourse.

10h 30-10h 50 - Discussion

10h 50m Coffee break

11h 30-12h 30 – Plenary Lecture IV

Room 1.01

António de Castro Caeiro (NOVA FCSH e Ifilnova), Selflove (pleonexia) and the love of one's own for the sake of others (dikaiosynē) (EN: V, X; EE: VII)

Chair: Nuno Santos Coelho

The result of *pleonexia* (ambition that can degenerate into greed) is the asymmetry between the self (*autos*) and the other (*heteros*) - inequality, inequality, injustice. The desire to have more (*pleon echein*) is the motive for injustice (*adikia*), behavior that is out of control, both as an active result (the perpetration of an injustice [*adikein*]) and as a passive result (the suffering of an injustice: *adikeisthai*). The asymmetry factor in relating to others results from the same asymmetry in relating to oneself. The desire to have more for oneself is irrevocable, it distorts the relationship with oneself and thus also with the other. This is the way in which we relate to ourselves in the project (*orexis*) of what we love (*to eromenon*). But ambition can be distorted. It can turn into greed. Wanting to have more (quantity, intensity, frequency) than one has consequences: wanting more than others, wanting everything for oneself and nothing for others. The other, however, exists with ambition, desire to have more for himself.

Justice as excellence perfected in relation to others (*Nicomachean Ethics*) seeks to control and regulate our relation to others, which would otherwise be destroyed if everyone made greed their guiding principle. When the other becomes a "friend" (*philos*) and, at that point, a different self (*autos*), the other comes out of the alienation in which he finds himself, as long as he exists there without *philia*. The asymmetry created by greed, in which everyone becomes a *solus ipse*, can be nullified by an excellent openness to the other, accompanied by an excellent relationship with oneself, based on the philia of the self (*philautia*). The discovery of the possibility of justice is not independent of the discovery of the affective a priori, in which each person discovers himself or herself to want the good of the other. The other is understood in the possibility of wanting one's own good. Justice, as a complete excellence based on the constitutive relationship between the self and the other, can be radicalised and take being with the other to the extreme, in which the level of excellence is raised because to be just is to discover the excellent and complete relationship that perfects both self and other.

LUNCH

15h-16h – Plenary Lecture V

Room 1.01

Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer (Amsterdam, Nederland), *De-universalizing Aristotelian ethics*

Chair: JM Aroso Linhares

After the second world war a conception of democracy took hold in which the belief in continuous global technical progress and economic growth were thought to replace the need for authoritarian decisions, because all people would be better off anyway through these processes.

Authority-based decisions have to be made when the issue is not how much more growth of welfare the one has in comparison with somebody else, but that the one will be worse off to realize that others are better off. Such an issue cannot be solved in global universal terms, but asks for local legitimation and enforcement in specific power constellations. It seems in this respect inevitable to rethink the concept of authority in relation to democracy.

The paper explains Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as an ethics of primarily magistrates i.e. those who exert authority over others. The ethics pertains only to those acts which belong to the magistrate's responsibility in the sense of actual accountability in the specific political community of Athens.

16h - Closing Session

Room 1.01

This session is dedicated to discussing and preparing the volume in which the papers will be published.