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Law and Security

Mentor:

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Declarations

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“One looks back with appreciation to the brilliant teachers but with gratitude to those who touched our human feelings. The curriculum is so much necessary raw material but warmth is the vital element for the growing plant and for the soul of the child.”

Carl Jung
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Abstract

Once dominated by threats from nation-states, the current global scenario is dominated by a fast shift of powers that present us an intricate interaction between multiple actors, where faceless, unknown enemies, once well known to us, is currently dominated by well-organised, well-prepared terrorist groups.

Hezbollah is recognised as one of the most capable terrorist groups with an extensive network outside Lebanon dedicated to drug, weapons and human trafficking, as well as money laundering to finance terrorism, posing as a vast source of security instability.

As a State instrument, the Intelligence services hold the ability to be on the frontline of preventing and combating terrorism. Nonetheless, to comprehend this phenomenon it is necessary to analyse the actors of this menace.

In light of this conjuncture, this dissertation is divided in three main chapters aiming to answer the following key issues: What is terrorism? How does a transnational terrorist group function? Do the Portuguese intelligence services have the necessary tools to prevent and combat transnational these threats?

Key words

Terrorism; Hezbollah; Financing; Intelligence
Resumo

Outrora dominado por ameaças provenientes de Estados-nação, o cenário global actual, dominado por uma rápida mudança de poderes que nos apresenta uma interacção complexa entre múltiplos actores, onde inimigos desconhecidos, anteriormente bem identificados, é actualmente controlado por grupos terroristas bem preparados e bem organizados.

Hezbollah é reconhecido como um dos grupos terroristas mais capazes, com uma extensa rede fora do Líbano dedicada a tráfico de droga, armas e seres humanos, tal como o branqueamento de capitais para financiar o terrorismo, representando um grande foco de instabilidade à segurança.

Como instrumento de Estado, os serviços de informações detêm a capacidade de estar na linha da frente na prevenção e combate ao terrorismo. Todavia, para compreender este fenómeno é necessário analisar os actores desta ameaça.

À luz desta conjuntura, esta dissertação está dividida em três capítulos principais que visam responder às seguintes questões fundamentais: O que é o terrorismo? Como opera um grupo terrorista transnacional? Será que os serviços de informações têm as ferramentas necessárias para prevenir e combater estas ameaças?

Palavras-chave

Terrorismo; Hezbollah; Financiamento; Informações
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Glossary

**Amal Movement:** *Afwaj al Muqawamah al Lubnaniyyah*, Shia Muslim militia formed c. 1975.

**Ayatollah:** Highest hierarchal title for the Twelver Shia, used as a title of respect especially for one who is not an imam title in the religious hierarchy achieved by scholars who have demonstrated highly advanced knowledge of Islamic law and religion.

**Jihad:** holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty; also a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline

**Sheik:** Arab chief/a leader of a Muslim group

**Shia:** the Muslims of the branch of Islam comprising sects believing in Ali and the Imams as the only rightful successors of Muhammad and disregards the three caliphs who succeeded him.

**SIED:** Defence and Strategic Intelligence Service

**SIRP:** Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic

**SIS:** Intelligence Security Service

**Sunni:** the Muslims of the branch of Islam that adheres to the orthodox tradition and acknowledges the first four caliphs as rightful successors of Muhammad

**Ulama:** From the ‘ulamā’, who are versed theoretically and practically in the Muslim sciences, come the religious teachers of the Islamic community—theologians (mutakallimun), canon lawyers (muftis), judges (qadis), professors—and high state religious officials like the shaikh al-Islām. In a narrower sense, ‘ulamā’ may refer to a council of learned men holding government appointments in a Muslim state.
Methodology

Following a phase of numerous ideas, debates and considerations, the approach of this topic was born envisioning several factors. Therefore, to carry on this dissertation, the subsequent methodology was applied:

This research includes data collected from a diverse, national and international expert literature, as well as open sources.

In terms of literature, we focused on a vast collection with predominance on Security, Intelligence, Law, International Relations and Political Science subjects. On the open sources, the selection of legal documents available at the official government websites, such as the Ministry of Internal Administration, Intelligence and Security Service, some articles from prestigious Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Media was preferred.

Subsequently we synthesized, organised, in a coherent form, and analysed it in a light of the questions that we will attempt to answer during this exercise.

In terms of referencing, by norm, it is preferable to use the Portuguese NP 405 bibliography system in this faculty. Nonetheless, since the selected language is English, the Harvard System seemed more appropriate.
Introduction

With the end of the Cold War and the ‘Iron Curtain’, we watched an end of an era, the era of a bipolar world. A divided world was crumbling under the pressure between two superpowers, the United States of America and the USSR.

The shift of powers, because of the end of the Cold War, introduced us to a conjuncture of nationalist, ethnical matters, plus organised crime and terrorism. Ideology of that period was an essential pillar to define a certain type of terrorism, terrorist groups whiling to survive initiated a hazardous association with organised crime, converting international terrorism to transnational terrorism.

A new set of threats began, as well as a new configuration of power, where interdependence and cooperation are key elements, sovereignty along with security cannot be analysed as before. We cannot simply analyse a country, in this case in terms of security, excluding it from an international community, particularly with the conjuncture of blurred borders and a faceless, unknown enemy.

These enemies, once well known to us, currently do not have a flag (or the opposite - use of a ‘false flag’), a uniform, nonetheless are well-organised, well-prepared groups. The world is undoubtedly a more volatile place now than in the past.
Security is a vital piece of a structured society. Hence, by law, the State have the duty to protect all individuals, their physical integrity, fundamental freedoms, and the most precious right of them all, the right to life.

As a State instrument, the Intelligence services hold the ability to be on the frontline of preventing and combating terrorism, since its purpose is to analyse, anticipate and forecast risk and threats. The distinctive methods of these services, provides them a unique position of being the utmost effective on defensive and offensive forefront of the rule of law.

The aim of this dissertation is to answer to some of the issues raised above.

Key issues:

- What is terrorism?
- How does a transnational terrorist group function?
- Do the Portuguese intelligence services have the necessary tools to prevent and combat transnational terrorist groups?

In the light of these key issues, this dissertation is divided in three main chapters.

The first chapter serves as the basis to develop the dissertation. Predominantly focused on answering what is terrorism, what its evolution, origin and definitions.

On the second chapter, considering terrorism as one of the major threats to
world stability, we decided to use the tactical analysis method (organisational charts, connections, modus operandi - in particular logistic support, money laundering and fundraising schemes), i.e. the dynamics and capabilities of a terrorist group. For this purpose, we selected Hezbollah, not only because it is acknowledged as one of the most capable terrorist groups, but also because of its power of action and mobilisation through its extensive network present across the five continents. There is vast literature analysing Hezbollah origins and their regional impact however, there a lack of research focused on profiling Hezbollah network and activities outside Lebanon. However, apart from Matthew Levitt’s work, there is a lack of research focused on profiling Hezbollah’s network outside Lebanon and for this reason and the reasons mentioned above, our choice was to focus on its action at an international level, particularly in Europe – geographical proximity to the Middle East (especially Southern Europe). In addition, apart from being a place where attacks are perpetuated, it can be used as launch pad of terrorists or as a logistics platform or even as a safe haven – and the Hezbollah activities in the Portuguese-speaking countries.

In light of Hezbollah’s analysis and considering Portugal as a responsible actor of the international community, the third chapter will explore if Portugal intelligence services have the necessary tools to prevent and combat groups with these characteristics by introducing the intelligence concept, origins and cycle. Moreover, this research selected to analyse the country
profile, followed by an analysis of the Portuguese intelligence services structure, purpose and cooperation mechanisms. Finally, we will present some of the major challenges and dilemmas that the intelligence community is presented with.

To complete, the last part of this dissertation is dedicated to present the conclusions.
CHAPTER 1:
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: TERRORISM

“For me the best way to fight against terrorism and extremism is just a simple thing: educate the next generation.”

Malala Yousafzai

1.1. The evolution of terrorism:

The use of terrorism is nothing new, there is literature utterly dedicated to describe its evolution or its definition. It is a term approached by a variety of disciplines such as political science, international relations, security/intelligence studies, military studies, etc.

Constantly confronted with the media broadcasting news related to terrorism on a daily basis we are however, most of the times, unacquainted with its ancient and complex roots.

To understand the causes and circumstances of its evolutionary progress it is necessary to find its origin, its etymology.

Terrorism, as a word, it is believed to have its origin in the Latin word Terror\(^1\), from the verb terrere to frighten, put in fear, terrify, scare, alarm and

from the Greek *trein* to be afraid, *tremein* to tremble.

The political connotation similar to the one used nowadays (besides its ancient roots), started merely during the French Revolution\(^2\).

The suffix –ism, from the Latin –ismus and the Greek – ismos\(^3\) is used in a political, theoretical level or to refer to an attitude, a form of acting. As noted by Schmid (2011) the historic use of the suffix –ism was added to ‘terror’ after the reign of terror of 1793 – 1794 (France), however it is not clear that it is related with the examples above-mentioned.

### 1.1.1. Reign of Terror

‘Terror’ was declared as a legal instrument of state violence after the 5\(^{th}\) of September 1793. Subsequently, in June 1794, since Maximilen François Marie Isidore de Robespierre\(^4\) had publicly declared a new list of traitors, the

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\(^2\) This word was introduced in the French language in the XIV Century.


\(^4\) (Born on 6\(^{th}\) of May 1758, Arras, France – Died on the 28\(^{th}\) of July 1794, Paris, France) Jurist and one of the key elements in the French Revolution, he was a radical Jacobin leader. He fought for universal suffrage and the abolishment of slavery. Robespierre controlled the Committee of Public Safety, the principal organ of the Revolutionary government during the Reign of Terror. Adapted from: Maximilien de Robespierre. 2015. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, n.d., Available online at: [http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/505619/Maximilien-de-Robespierre](http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/505619/Maximilien-de-Robespierre). [Last Viewed: 13\(^{th}\) of January 2015]
fear increased among the delegates of the French National Conservative Convention who have once supported him.

Overthrown from the Committee of Public Safety on the 27th of June 1794, Robespierrre and his collaborators, as Schmid (2011) argues, could not indict Robespierrre of ‘terror’ without incriminating themselves, they had to find a way to exonerate them. The solution was to prosecute Robespierrre of terrorism\(^5\) and after his imprisonment, without any trial, he and his companions were beheaded by the guillotine.

It is estimated that 40.000 people, including the King Louis XVI of France, the Queen Marie Antoinette of France and Dr. Guilhotin (creator of the guillotine), were beheaded between 1783 until 1795.

1.1.2. Ancient phenomenon

As previously mentioned, terrorism it is nothing new. The existence of ‘holly warriors’ dates back to the Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, their mission was to kill in the name of freedom. Nevertheless, it was during the XI to the XII centuries, in the Middle East, that a group of Shia Nizari Ismaili\(^6\) (1090 - 1256) emerged known within the Crusades culture as the

\(^5\) At that time the word terrorism was associated with a criminal abuse of power through a dictatorial, indiscriminate and disproportionate violence.

\(^6\) The Nizari has its origin with Nizar (Mustanir’s firstborn). The highest point of this group was reached with the Alamât Reform in 1164. Thenceforth, there was a gradual unification between the Ismaili and the esoteric Sufism.
Assassins⁷.

Led by the Persian al-Hassan ibn-al-Sabbah, this group had a political and religious agenda. According to Lewis (2003)⁸ the group modus operandi was almost ceremonial as they could invoke an ancient Islamic tradition: the religious obligation to free the world of tyrants. The target was carefully selected, usually important predominant political, military or religious leaders. Their weapon was a dagger and the assassin should not return to the Alamut Castle, it was his duty to wait on the crime scene for popular justice, since returning would be interpreted as an insult, an outrage.

Silva (2010) underlines that Hassan ibn-al-Sabbah used this behaviour as a political weapon, to terrorise. This movement is set to be the initiators of the present suicide-bombers (the binomial die-kill).

Although some scholars highlight the 9/11 as a shifting point, terrorism through time is present with different agendas, from left to right, acting local or global.

⁷ From the Arabic Hashishyyin meaning ‘hashish user’. There are conflicting facts/sources about its origin. One is that the origin was distorted from aschishin meaning ‘follower of Hasan’.
1.1.3. Categorisation

David Rapoport was a pioneer outlining a system of four waves categorising terrorism - different phases albeit with the same characteristics.

The waves are defined as “cycle of activity in a given time period… characterised by expansion and contraction phases” (Rapoport, 2004, p.47). He argues that the legitimacy of these uprisings is diverse through the waves, and most of the groups with particular characteristics that contribute for the construction of the waves generally perish before the wave is predominant. As a final point Rapoport claims that the ideologies can cross countries, regions and continents therefore the waves are transnational in character.

**Figure 1: Rapoport’s Four Waves**

The First Wave began after the Napoleon wars and the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The revolutionary ideas started to spread particularly in the South European countries. Portugal, was not immune and anarchist terrorism...
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fomented the fall of the Portuguese monarchy, starting with the regicide of the King Carlos I and the heir to the crown prince Luís Filipe (1\textsuperscript{st} of February 1908). Subsequently a coup d’état occurred, organised by the Portuguese Republican Party, with the aim of taking the power from the constitutional monarchy and afterwards establishing the Portuguese Republic (5\textsuperscript{th} of October 1910). Nonetheless, it started with the assassination of Tsar Alexander II (13\textsuperscript{th} of March 1881), the group who perpetrated the crime was \textit{Narodnaya Volya} (The People’s Will). This wave includes, among others, the Civil War in the United States, the Ku Klux Klan\textsuperscript{9}.

The Anti-Colonial Wave is the Second Wave. It began after the end of the World War I with the aim of self-determination, to liberate themselves from the French, British, Portuguese (and others) colonial rule by breaking up these empires. All in all groups such as the Algerian \textit{Front de Libération Nationale} (FLN), Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Irgun\textsuperscript{10} (Zionist group in Israel) fought as guerrillas through ‘\textit{hit and run}’ tactics.

With the start of the Vietnam War plus the Cold War framework, the Third Wave known as ‘New Left Wave’ emerged. The internationalisation of terrorism started under the influence of the Marxist revolution with actions

\textsuperscript{9} A secret right-wing extremist organisation founded, after the Civil War, in 1865 in Tennessee, United States. Their main purpose was to maintain the white supremacy, the purification of the United States through violent actions.

\textsuperscript{10} They introduced the term “freedom fighters” to describe their struggle against government, dissociating themselves from the First Wave type of groups.
Chapter 1: Transnational Threats: Terrorism

guided by the strong urge of the West World groups to help the Third World. Some notorious actions/tactics were high jacking and hostage takings, such as the ‘Black September’ (1972) performed by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), frequently broadcasted by the media spreading fear to a vast number of people. The Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red Brigades, the German Baader-Meinhof, West German Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) were also amid this type of terrorist groups.

Finally, the Fourth Wave, identified as ‘Religious Wave’, began with the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union (1979) and the occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The religious political agenda was more appealing and congregating compared to Nationalist groups. Furthermore, the Soviet Union withdraw from Afghanistan, displayed a powerful message of religion eliminating a superpower from their land and after that, the United States became the next enemy to annihilate.

Aum Shinrikyo from Japan, Tamil Tigers from Sri Lanka, Hamas from Palestine, the well-known Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah from Lebanon are groups that belong in this categorisation.

Observing Rapoport’s Fourth Wave, we are inclined to think that a fifth wave it is starting soon. Nevertheless, it seems that this one in particular it is not fading and apart from his terrorism categorisation, several authors and
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organisations attempt to organise or/and define it.

1.2. Terrorism concept: Attempt of a definition

The use of the term terrorism varies in different cultures and languages. Still a controversial topic, through time the same actions were on occasion, not considered an act of terrorism.

We will briefly enumerate some of the most prominent and accepted definitions in a chronological manner (adapted from Schmid, 2011, p.99 FF).

- **Robespierre (1794):**
  “Terror is nothing else than immediate justice, sever, inflexible; it is therefore an outflow of virtue, it is not so much a specific principle than a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to the most pressing needs of the motherland.”

- **League of Nations Convention for the prevention and Repression of Terrorism (1937)**
  “In the present Convention, the expression 'acts of terrorism' means criminal acts directed against a State an intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public.”

- **Wilkinson (1974):**
  “Our main concern is with political terror: that is to say with the use of coercive intimidation by revolutionary movements, regimes or individuals. … We have thus identified some of the key characteristics common to all forms of political terror: indiscriminateness, unpredictability, arbitrariness, ruthless destructiveness and the implicitly amoral antinomian nature of a terrorist’s challenge. … Political terrorism, properly speaking, is a sustained policy involving
the waging of organized terror either on the part of the state, a movement or faction, or by a small group of individuals. Systematic terrorism invariably entails some organizational structure, however rudimentary, and some kind of theory or ideology of terror.”

- **Laqueur (1977):**
  “Terrorism, interpreted here as the use of covert violence by a group for political ends, is usually directed against a government, less frequently against another group, class or party. The ends may vary from the redress of specific ‘grievances’ to the overthrow of a government and the taking of power, or to the liberation of a country from foreign rule. Terrorists seek to cause political, social and economic disruption, and for this purpose frequently engage in planned or indiscriminate murder… .Note: Any definition of political terrorism venturing beyond noting the systematic use of murder, injury and destruction or the threats of such acts toward achieving political ends is bound to lead to endless controversies.”

Apart from the previous definitions, Alex Schimdt and Albert Jongman (1988), in pursuit of a clearer definition proposed themselves to find an academic consensus by asking their colleagues to define terrorism through the ‘Research Guide’. After analysing those solutions from 109 definitions, the conclusion was that twenty-two elements were matching. Consequently, Schmid and Jongman attempted to define terrorism:

- "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets."
The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought" (Scmid, 1988, p. 28)

The 9/11 event prompted the need to an effective and capable answer to prevent another similar act, a definition was urgent and necessary consequently most of the definitions were reconsidered, adjusted.

- **EU Definition of Terrorism (2001):**
  “Offences intentionally committed by an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or people, with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic, or social structures of a country.”

- **UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism (draft -2001):**
  “UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism: Informal Texts of Art. 2 of the draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, prepared by the Coordinator:
  1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
     • Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
• Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or Government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or
• Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.”

• European Union (2002):
  “An intentional act which may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, seriously destabilizing or destroying fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures by means of attacks upon a person’s life, attacks upon the physical integrity of a person, kidnapping, hostage-taking, seizure of an aircraft or ships, or the manufacture, possession or transport of weapons or explosives.”

• Chomsky (2003):
  “Terrorism is the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature... through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear.”

• NATO (2003):
  “The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.”

• Lei n.º 52/2003 de 22 de Agosto - Portuguese Law to Combat Terrorism (2003)
  “Artigo 2.º Organizações terroristas
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1 - Considera-se grupo, organização ou associação terrorista todo o agrupamento de duas ou mais pessoas que, actuando concertadamente, visem prejudicar a integridade e a independência nacionais, impedir, alterar ou subverter o funcionamento das instituições do Estado previstas na Constituição, forçar a autoridade pública a praticar um acto, a abster-se de o praticar ou a tolerar que se pratique, ou ainda intimidar certas pessoas, grupos de pessoas ou a população em geral, mediante:

a) Crime contra a vida, a integridade física ou a liberdade das pessoas;
b) Crime contra a segurança dos transportes e das comunicações, incluindo as informáticas, telegráficas, telefónicas, de rádio ou de televisão;
c) Crime de produção dolosa de perigo comum, através de incêndio, explosão, libertação de substâncias radioactivas ou de gases tóxicos ou asfixiantes, de inundação ou avalanche, desmoronamento de construção, contaminação de alimentos e águas destinadas a consumo humano ou difusão de doença, praga, planta ou animal nocivos;
d) Actos que destruam ou que impossibilitem o funcionamento ou desviem dos seus fins normais, definitiva ou temporariamente, total ou parcialmente, meios ou vias de comunicação, instalações de serviços públicos ou destinadas ao abastecimento e satisfação de necessidades vitais da população;
e) Investigação e desenvolvimento de armas biológicas ou químicas;

«f) Crimes que impliquem o emprego de energia nuclear, armas de fogo, biológicas ou químicas, substâncias ou engenhos explosivos, meios incendiários de qualquer natureza, encomendas ou cartas armadilhadas;
sempre que, pela sua natureza ou pelo contexto em que são cometidos, estes crimes sejam susceptíveis de afectar gravemente o Estado ou a população que se visa intimidar.”
• **Stepanova (2006)** “…the intentional use or threat of violence against civilians and non-combatants by a non-state (sub-national or transnational) actor in an asymmetrical confrontation, in order to achieve political goals.”

• **Richardson (2006)** “Terrorism simply means deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes. It has seven crucial characteristics... [F]irst, a terrorist act is politically inspired... Second, if an act does not involve violence or the threat of violence, it is not terrorism. ...Third, the point of terrorism is not to defeat the enemy but to send a message... Fourth, the act and the victim usually have symbolic significance... Fifth – and this is a controversial point – terrorism is the act of sub-state groups, not states... A sixth characteristic of terrorism is that the victim of the violence and the audiences the terrorists are trying to reach are not the same. ...The final and most important defining characteristic of terrorism is the deliberated targeting of civilians.”

• **Rapoport (2008):**
  “‘Terror’ is violence with distinctive properties used for political purposes both by private parties and states. That violence is unregulated by publicly accepted norms to contain violence, the rules of war, and the rules of punishment. Private groups using terror generally disregard rules of punishment, i.e. those enabling us to distinguish guilt from innocence. But both states and non-state groups can ignore either set of rules.

• **Schmid (2011):**
  “‘Terror’ is a state of mind characterized by intense fear of a threatening danger on an individual level and by a climate of fear on the collective level. ‘Terrorism’, on the other hand, is an activity, method or tactic which, as a psychological outcome, aims to produce ‘terror’.”
In general, most of the definitions abovementioned fail to include the State as an actor capable of terrorism actions or the aim/purpose of those actions. From our perspective the combination of Wilkinson’s, Shmid’s, Chomsky’s, Richardson’s first three characteristics and particularly Rapoport’s have the elements of a proper definition:

- Act perpetuated by and individual, group, organisation, State + Intentional acts that disrupt/destroy (political, social and economic) structured society + Direct victims (random or representative /symbolic) with the intention of provoking intense fear through their actions + With predominantly political, (religious, ideology) aim.

Nonetheless, yet again the term terrorism varies in different cultures and languages plus there are vast regional differences. Most prominent and universal accepted definitions continue to be predominantly from male, western authors.

Even without a clear definition, every State has the responsibility within their rule of law to safeguard their people. We cannot allow our society, our security to be threatened by terrorist groups or other destabilising agents.

Although making an immense effort, scholars and the international community still have not reach a universal definition and may perhaps never find it. Most of the definitions are vague or to strict and that can offer a place for wrong interpretation.
Terrorism is continuously evolving. What were the main factors that led terrorism to achieve its transnational character?

1.3. Terrorism pathway: From national to transnational

The Rapoport’s categorisation of terrorism highlights that, terrorism actions were predominantly characterised with a nationalistic ideology. Nonetheless, although still present, that was about to change.

With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire between 1800 until 1923 new States emerged. In addition, according to Costa (2000, p. 195), the British and Russian expansionist tendencies, particularly in the Middle East, and the fall of the Qadjar\textsuperscript{11} dynasty left Iran fragmented. The combination of those factors placed the Middle East into a delicate position.

After World War I Palestine once administrate by the Ottoman Empire, was now administrated by the British. With a post-World War II scenario, considering the cost of their participation and the previous commitment with the Jew community through ‘The Balfour Declaration’ (1917), Britain was placed in an economic and political fragile situation. Consequently, they had no choice but to deliver the administration to the United Nations in 1948.

A turbulent period ended, nonetheless a clash of ideologies and agendas between the United States and USSR, would submerge the world into a new crisis acknowledge as the Cold War. Therefore, this new bipolar

\textsuperscript{11} After 138 years of ruling.
environment would set the Middle East and some African countries into a battlefield, though there was never a direct physical confrontation between the two superpowers. The conflicts increase then again they were also ‘controlled’ by the US/USSR.

Afterward with the end of the Cold and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the USSR ‘imploded’ and all the internal problems emerged. With the change of circumstances, terrorist groups willing to survive made the choice to ally with organised crime groups.

The association of terrorism with organised crime is undoubtedly one of the key elements of the metamorphosis of international terrorism into transnational.

Although, the majority of academics accept that there is a difference between terrorist and organised crime activities:

**Figure 2: Difference between terrorist and organised crime activities**
To summarise the shifting points were:

**Figure 3: Key events of the evolution of terrorism**

- Fall of the Ottoman Empire
- USSR Implosion
- Terrorism and Organised Crime Alliance
- New countries
- Berlin Wall Collapse
- Great threat/instability that may exacerbate tragic events, such as 9/11
- Two World Wars
- Cold War

To understand better the dynamics of a terrorist group capability, the next chapter is an analysis of Hezbollah, known as one of the most capable terrorist groups to thrive.
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not to fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

Sun Tzu

Since its formation in Lebanon\textsuperscript{12}, Hezbollah has carried out several terrorist attacks, nonetheless their actions are not exclusive of a national or regional scenario they are global.

As noted by some authors Al-Qaeda and recently groups like self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ Group (\textit{Daesh}) aka ISIL aka ISIS, Boko Haram, Al-Shabab and so on, take hold of all the headlines as Hezbollah, considered by Richard Armitage as the “\textit{A-team of terrorism}”, grows dangerously ‘quiet’ in the shadows.

Acknowledged as a resistance group Hezbollah is also a social movement and a political party. However, in this chapter we will focus on comprehending how a transnational terrorism group works. Hence, we propose a modest analysis with emphasis on Hezbollah’s activities outside

\textsuperscript{12} Please consult Lebanon map, p.108
Lebanon, as Levitt (2013) highlights “there is a gap between the organization’s activities in Lebanon and its global infrastructure”. We will focus particularly their ‘self-financing network’, as traditionally understood as separate phenomenon, organised crime and terrorism are not often linked by security and law enforcement agencies.

“Understanding Hizbullah requires a multifaceted conceptual framework that combines theories of crisis, revolution, leadership, personality, social class, and political parties.” (Hamzeh, 2004, p.2)

2.1. Hezbollah’s inception

The Ayatollah Mahmoud Ghaffari originally created the Party of God, Hezbollah, in Iran in 1973. Silva (2010), notes that Hadi, Ghaffari’s son, became the leader of the party although with no relevance. On the other hand, the militants of the Party of God became the armed proxy for the Islamic Republican Party, the Party of the Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Beheshti, Ayatollah Khameni and Ali Rafsanjani. Also in 1982, twenty-five radical Islamic organisations, ordered by the Iranian regime, were included in a restructure of the Party of God.

June 1982, with the Israel incursion of southern Lebanon, Iran finds a pretext to deploy, according to Hamzeh (1993), around 1,500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Bekaa (Biqua) region and the opportunity to export

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its revolution. The Lebanese Hezbollah\textsuperscript{14} is born.

Sayyd Husayn al-Musawi, former Amal member, became its official leader until his assassination in 1992. According to Avon and Khatchadourian (2012), Hassan Nasrallah, follower of Musa al-Sadr and identified as a “member of the Baseq Force of the Resistance”, leader of the Baalbek region, left Amal in June 1982. Nasrallah became Musawi’s recognised successor and it was elected as Secretary General since then.

\textbf{Figure 4: Hezbollah’s relations}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Islamic Revolutionary Guards/Qods Force:}
  - Recruitment, Training, Indoctrination.
\item \textbf{State Sponsorship:}
  - IRAN/SYRIA
\item \textbf{Mussawi’s Islamic AMAL}
  - (Merge with Hezbollah)
\item \textbf{Al-Jihad al-Islami}
  - (Islamic Resistance ‘twin sister’)
  - Claims responsibility of suicide bombings in several occasions
\item \textbf{Creation of Islamic Resistance (al-Mujawarah al-Islamiyyah)}
  - Purpose: military activities against Israel
\item \textbf{Allied Organisations:}
  - Jund Allah, Hussein Suicide Squad, al-Dawa, Holy Warriors for Freedom, The Organization of the Oppressed of the Earth and Revolutionary Justice
\item \textbf{Enemies:}
  - ISRAEL
  - UNITED STATES
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{14} Please consult Hezbollah’s profile and Who’s Who, pp. 113-115
October 1983, the US embassy and Marine Corps in Beirut were brutally destroyed by a suicide attack that claimed the life of hundreds. This attack consolidated the group’s image as leader of the Shia.

2.1.1. Lebanon Political Background

Lebanon political division is deep-rooted dating back to civil war (1860), particularly after the downfall of the Ottoman Empire plus the French League of Nations Mandate.

The National Pact (1943), an agreement between Lebanese leaders, introduced a ‘fair’ political system of a 6:5 formula that would distribute representatives according to their sect.

Norton (2007) highlights that Christian Maronite’s were in charge of the presidency, the Sunnis premiership and the Shia speakership, a position with minor influence on the political system. As a result, Christians and Sunni were privileged with access to strategic economic sectors, on the other hand the Shia, the fastest growing community at the time, remained dedicated to agriculture. The development of this situation had a damaging impact on the Shia people subsequently the Lebanese Diaspora started once again, with Africa, South America and the Gulf on the top of the list.

With the decay of the Shia community conditions, Harakat Amal (The Movement of Hope) in the early 1970’s, an organised Shia party led by the Imam Musa al-Sadr, was born.
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The Palestine war (1948/49), as Norton (2007) underlines, pushed thousands of Palestinians to South Lebanon, were most of the Shia live(d), stressing the existing precarious work conditions. Adding to that the Jordanian civil war of 1970/71 presented Lebanon with a new challenge, not only with the increasing numbers of Palestinians on Lebanese soil, but also with Palestinian guerrillas, such as Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), that would threat the government authority.

In the 1960’s, concerning the Shia community, the four dominant political trends were:

Figure 5: Shia dominant political trends

“Amal challenged the stifling and often brutal domination of the Palestinian guerrillas whose public support plummeted in the late 1970s and early 1980s for bringing southern Lebanon into crossfire with Israel. Israel's invasion of the 1978, the “Litani Operation”, (...) displaced hundreds of thousands of Lebanese from the southern region.” (Norton, 2007, p.22)
During the “Litani Operation” the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established the Resolutions 425 and 426\textsuperscript{15} - specifying Israel withdraw from Lebanon as well as a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to intercede as a peace keeping force. Yet before the Israeli invasion the panorama in Lebanon was critical with the outbreak of the civil war (1975/89).

A restructure of the parliament recognised as ‘The Ta’if Agreement’ (1989), signed in the Saudi city of Tai’f, ended the civil war. One of Ta’if cornerstones was to call all militias to disarm, Hezbollah was now on the spotlight and it was confronted with a challenging situation that was solved astutely. Hezbollah’s choice was to participate in the Lebanese system via politics and at the same time, preserve the right of resistance.

Rafiq Hariri, a former Lebanese Prime Minister, died in a terrorist attack (14/02/2005) in the Beirut, along with several others. His death had deep implications in the country, opening the way for the Cedar Revolution and the withdrawal, after twenty-nine years of permanence, of the Syrian troops. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (UN) was set to investigate Hariri’s death and it has allegedly found enough evidence to link the attack back to Hezbollah.

\textsuperscript{15} To read the full Resolutions please consult: The Official Document System of the United Nations. Available online at: \url{http://documents.un.org/default.asp}
2.2. Ideology

Resistance in the Shia context is a deeply rooted concept. Hezbollah is pointed by many as the introductory of suicide\textsuperscript{16} bombing as a cost/effective weapon. Nasrallah speeches are full of the Battle of Karbala\textsuperscript{17} and the martyrdom of Husain, the son of Fatima (Prophet Mohammed’s daughter) and Ali ibn Abu Talib (cousin and son-in law of the Prophet Mohammed), references to instigate the Shia to fulfil their duty through jihad. Husain’s action was vital to transmit that the Shia community must resist against the oppressors and abusive power, it is a fundamental pillar of the Shia narrative as well as the link to the present-day Shia activism and collective identity.

Pointed as a founding text by most scholars, the group ideology can be better understood by analysing the ‘Open Letter’\textsuperscript{18} (16\textsuperscript{th} of February 1985).

The ‘Open Letter’ states, amid other matters, that:

"Our primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the Zionist entity is aggressive from its inception, and built on lands wrested from their

\textsuperscript{16} Istishhad: Sacrifice of one’s own life for the sanctification of Allah’s name, in the context of an Islamic military campaign against the enemy.

\textsuperscript{17} 680 A.D. as the Shia refused the authority of a Caliph that was non-descendent of Prophet Mohammed, Husain and his followers marched into Damascus to destitute Yazidi’s illegitimate power. The result of this incursion was the brutal massacre of Husain’s faction and himself.

owners, at the expense of the rights of the Muslim people. Therefore our struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease-fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated." (Avon and Khatchadourian, 2012, pp.103-120)

The main ideas are:

Figure 6: Key pillars of Hezbollah ideology

The first pillar and the third are vital since the group use of violence and terror are central to its ideology. During 1984/85, as highlighted by Norton (2007), dozens/hundreds members of the Communist Party were assassinated simply because Hezbollah decided to free the world from the oppressors, like US and the Soviet Union.
During 2009, Hezbollah published the ‘Political Charter’\(^\text{19}\), the second letter since the ‘Open Letter’ of 1985. The purpose of this release was to highlight their current political vision/position, ambitions, so on and so forth, to ‘complement’ the first document that was neglecting Hezbollah’s political strategy.

Hamzeh (1993) adds that the ideology is:

- Formulated by the political writings of Ayatollahs Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Ruhollah Khomeini + Experience of the Iranian revolution;

- Obeys to the Governance of the Religious Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih) in the absenteeism of the Twelfth Imam;

Silva (2010) points out that, apart from being simplistic in their ideology, they highlight some dichotomies, for instance Good/Bad, Justice/Injustice, Truth/Untruthful…

2.3. Hezbollah’s (In) Visible Structure and Modus Operandi

During the decades of 1960s until 1980s, the organisational structures of terrorist groups were predominantly ‘star shaped’. It was easier to identify it with the capture of its leaders.

Presently, with the evolution of the structures, we no longer can make the assumption of a network dependable on an exclusive leader (although the group may have a ‘public’ leader like Hassan Nasrallah in Hezbollah). Groups are now decentralised, organised in independent cells with the power of acting alone and sometimes without the knowledge of other ‘twin’ cells. Therefore, if discovered and dismantled the other cell(s) can still pursue their mission/act. Eventually it makes it harder for the intelligence services to penetrate this kind of structure.

Hezbollah acts in different arenas:

- **National** (politics – sometimes employing violence against opposition; social movement; militia/resistance);
- **Regional** (particularly in Israel/Palestine arena + Syria, Yemen; Bahrain);
- **Global** (five continents – intricate network: intelligence gathering; sleeper cells; attacks; logistical support; fundraising; money laundering; money and documents counterfeite; trafficking)
2.3.1. (In) Visible Structure

As Hezbollah evolves into a more legitimate group, in part because of its involvement in politics and welfare, the demand for a more transparent structure grows. Nonetheless, there is ‘still place’ for a secretive structure within the group.

According to Hamzeh (1993), a consultative council (Supreme Shura Council), plus several committees composes the Hezbollah structure. After the National Pact the group started a political life, hence a public structure was necessary to legitimise it. In terms of leadership, Hezbollah presents a collective leadership instead of the usual one charismatic leader. In addition, the Ulama is vital on its structure.

Following Hamzeh’s (1993) opinion, seven members, majority clerics, constitute Hezbollah’s Shura Council. With executive, political, legislative, judicial and military power, this Council is the highest authority inside the structure. All decisions must pass through the Shura Council and require a majority vote, in circumstance of impasse the Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah in Iran will decide, as he is the supreme Juris consult.

Additionally, the summarized explanation of Hezbollah’s organisation

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20 Please consult Hezbollah’s structure charts, pp. 109-112

21 Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Shaykh Naim Kassim, Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli and Shaykh Abu Salem Yaghi (Musawi’s place was not filled).
structure described by Hamzeh consists in:

- **Secretary General**: Ex-officio chairman of the Executive Council

  Composed by several heads of districts + 5 members
  (named/appointed by the Shura Council)

- **Politburo**: Constituted by 15 members; Coordinates the work of the committees + directs the activity of three organs:

  1) **Enforcement Recruitment and Propaganda**: Supervises three sections: Network of preachers + Al-Hawzat (circles of learning) – important as the preachers + research and propaganda section: manages the media.

  2) **Holy Reconstruction Organ**: Divided in eight committees; Supervised by a committee of the Holy Reconstruction Organ; Provides support to Hezbollah members, new recruits and followers via medical care, financial aid, housing, public utilities; Reliefs underprivileged regions of Lebanon.

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- **Combat Organ**: Controlled directly by the Shura Council; Organised in two groups: the Islamic Resistance, responsible for suicide attacks against Israeli/Western targets and Islamic Holy War, accountable for conventional attacks against Israeli troops.

Levitt (2013) with an updated version also explains that the Secretary General, presently Hassan Nasrallah, presides the Shura Council, which is the entity that deliberates all elements of the group’s activities. In addition, explains that there are five administrative bodies:

- **Executive Council role**: Management of daily operations + supervises all education, cultural, political, social affairs;

- **Political Council role**: Management of Hezbollah’s external relations + Group’s political relations inside Lebanon + organisation of public information/propaganda through several subcommittees;

- **Parliamentary Council role**: Organisation of the party’s parliamentarians activities + studies proposed legislation brought before the government;

- **Judicial Council role**: Management of disputes in regulatory matters (between members or between the organisation and non-members)

- **Jihad (military) Council role**: (Headed by Mustapha Badreddine) Accountable for official militia (Islamic Resistance) activities + Covert
actions through the Islamic Jihad Organisation (IJO)\textsuperscript{22}, headed by Talal Hamiyeh; Divided into smaller units to protect the structure; Three subgroups: central, preventive and overseas security – Terrorist/Militia wing plus security organ report to it.

The nature of the last council above mentioned, apart from the others, it is maintained ‘private’ as most of the parliamentarians and officials are not acquainted with their activities. Nonetheless, as it happens with all the other matters, the senior leaders of the Shura Council supervise them.

On the other hand Abboud and Muller (2012) highlight that the decision-making within the structure might not be as we know. Also adds that Nasrallah took the Secretary General position for life abolishing the three-year mandate rule. Nonetheless, the election of other member occurs in the General Conference through an Electoral College system.

Abboud and Muller (2012) clarify as well, that no one inside the Party intentionally knows about the location, weaponry or military activities of the Resistance Council (Levitt’s Jihad Council) allowing strategic ambiguity. Apart from that, Hezbollah’s structure description is quite similar to Levitt’s.

\textsuperscript{22} Also known as Special Security Apparatus (SSA) or External Security Organisation (ESO)
2.3.2. Recruitment

Since its inception, Hezbollah managed to establish a powerful transnational network particularly backed by the Lebanese Shia emigrant communities.

Providing a network of social services that includes financial aid, medical care, housing, education, cultural activities and religious services Hezbollah exploits this as excellent tactic on the battle of “winning hearts and minds”. The population, as a form of expressing gratitude, may effortlessly get into the process of enlistment.

Although efficient there are other methods of recruitment, particularly in the Mosques, where Hezbollah can reinforce their doctrine and “Al-Hawzat al-'ilmiyyah (circles of learning) (...) they represent the basic element in Hizbullah's recruitment process and its slow infiltration policy among the people. The most important of these Hawzat are: the Religious Hawzat of Siddikin in South Lebanon, the Centre for Youth Education in Jibsheet (South Lebanon), the Educational Hawzat in Brital (Biqa'), the Iranian Religious Centre in Tyre, and the Centre for Islamic Martial Arts in Kabrikha (South Lebanon).” (Hamzeh, 1993)

Based on Rudner (2010) explanation, each element of recruit is trained in numerous skills, after assessment the new recruits are assigned to different contingents according to their performance.
There are four operational contingents in the combat division:

**Figure 7: Hezbollah operational contingents**

- **Martyrs:** For individuals willing to lead suicide operations.
- **Commando:** Elite fighters - distinguished in guerrilla warfare.
- **Rocket launching:** Operate heavy weapons - surface to surface/surface-to-air rockets + mortars.
- **Regular fighting:** Militant combatants; surveillance, logistics + medical support units.

### 2.3.2.1. The Vital role of Communication

It is argued that Hezbollah's has sophisticated and complex communications system. “That system included radio networks, copper wire phone systems, cellular and fiber optic networks, and VoIP networks which now extend into the global cyber domain. The individual elements of Hezbollah’s communications system were neither novel nor exotic. Hezbollah communication was set apart by the scaled, disciplined, and systematic deployment of a layered communications architecture, from copper land lines to encrypted VoIPs” (Wege, 2014, p.248).
In fact, the communication apparatus that *Hezbollah* owns\(^{23}\) it is, not only lucrative, but also basilar for heavy propaganda and recruitment campaigns. *Al-Manār* television, radio stations such as *al-Nour, Baqīyyat allāh or the press as the al-‘Ahd* which became *al-Intiqād* (based on Avon’s Organisational Chart of 2012) are used as a tool, also “The research and propaganda section runs two radio stations, Sawt al-İman (Voice of Faith) and Sawt al Nidal (Voice of Struggle), and one television station called al-Manar (the Beacon). In addition, there are two publications: al-Ahed (the party’s main mouthpiece), which appears weekly, and the al-Bilad, which appears monthly.” (Hamzeh, 1993). There is a general acceptance that Hezbollah is the first group to use a camera as a weapon and clearly, they take advantage of their widespread communications network to promote their ideology and strategic goals.

The internet is also a powerful propaganda/recruitment tool for Hezbollah, the use of official websites such as [www.hizbollah.tv](http://www.hizbollah.tv) and the personal page of Hassan Nasrallah [www.nasrollah.org](http://www.nasrollah.org) are proof of that. Nevertheless, the use of social media by other groups, for instance ‘Islamic State’ (Daesh), is heavily used as method of recruitment however, there is no public evidence of its utilisation by Hezbollah.

Rudner (2010) points out that this media outlet is used as a mechanism of

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\(^{23}\) Majority shareholder, with a 55% share, since 1997 of the Lebanese Communication Group
animosity stimulation against Israel and the US. In addition to that, it works as a psychological warfare tool as well as an instrument to validate jihad against the infidels.

2.3.3. Targets

Although targets for terrorist attacks may vary from critical infrastructures (symbolic value), to events or the selection of prominent personalities, Hezbollah current targets are predominantly Israeli diplomatic missions, Israelis on holidays plus, US/Western targets on a minor scale.

2.3.4. Weaponry

It is difficult to predict Hezbollah’s weaponry stock because of its secrecy. Nonetheless, there is a report from 2003 which argues that Hezbollah’s capability for an offensive was increasing. The group had an estimated arsenal composed with: “upgraded anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, missile launchers, land-to-land missiles of various types, including long-range (43 km) Fajr-3 missiles and Fajr-5 missiles (with a 75 km range)”. Moreover, a “high level of technological skills and sophistication all far exceed the known standards of terrorist organizations worldwide (…) highly sophisticated tactical as well as operational capabilities.” (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2003, pp.9-16).
In 2012, the update of the report above-mentioned underlines that, Hezbollah weaponry is estimated in:

**60,000 rockets and missiles with short, medium and long ranges**

- C-802 shore-to-ship missiles + Ababil UAVs
- Iranian-manufactured 122mm rockets ——> range of between 20/40 kilometres
- Iranian Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets ——> range of between 43/75 kilometres

- 240mm flak rockets ——> range of 10 kilometres
- Iranian-manufactured Fatah 110 rockets ——> range of 250 kilometres
- Iranian-manufactured Zelzal rockets ——> range of 250 kilometres
- Syrian-manufactured 302mm rockets ——> range of between 110/115 kilometres.

**2.4. Hezbollah Transnational Network: ‘Routes’ of Self-funding**

Hezbollah in 2014 was considered, by most intelligence services, as a serious threat, as well as a source of terrorism. Currently, perhaps due to Iranian nuclear power negotiation and combat against ‘Islamic State’ (Daesh), Western powers avoid mentioning it. Nevertheless, most of us have a vague idea what is Hezbollah but no idea of the extent and impact of
their activities.

With the dissemination of a transnational world, any place may serve as a recruitment or logistical support for terrorists, amidst other things. These groups are continuously searching new acting arenas as well as taking advantage on country weaknesses, for instance to gather intelligence, to use a country as a safe haven, to have easy access to forged documents, where money laundering policies are laid back.

As Syria faces its fourth year of civil War and Iran a strong economic pressure, Hezbollah, once heavily subsidised by its patrons, ensured a complementary funding (legal and illegal) sources through its transnational network.

Rudner (2010) emphasise that analysts estimate that Hezbollah’s international network may have cells with 15,000 operatives in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Belgium, Britain, France, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, Paraguay, several African countries and Asia, the US, Canada, and so on and so forth.

Levitt (2013) conducts an extensive research on Hezbollah’s activities outside Lebanon comprising all five continents. Based on his work, we decided to emphasise the group’s activities predominantly in Portuguese speaking countries and Europe.
2.4.1. South America

With the fall of the Ottoman Empire the first waves of migration started. The influx of people from Syria and Lebanon to Argentina and Brazil was considerable during the 1880s (around 80,000) and again during the Lebanese civil war (1975/1990) in the 1980s. Authorities estimate that Hezbollah formal cells were established during that period, comprising several hundred operatives at the tri-border of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, particularly at Ciudad Del Este, known as a safe haven for terrorist, among other negative things.

The Israeli embassy (1992) and the Jewish community centre Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) attacks in Argentina (1994) pushed the Argentinian, Paraguayan and Brazilian authorities into a deep investigation.

The result of those investigations had the following worthwhile discoveries:

- The Buenos Aires/Tri-border cells, led by Samuel el-Reza, a Hezbollah contact person, planned to blast the Israeli embassy. The selected method to accomplish this task was a car bomb, more precisely the use of a Ford F-100 van purchased by a man with Portuguese accent. Claimed by the Islamic Jihad, according to them, the attack was perpetuated to honour Hussein (Mussawi’s son). However, according to Alberto Nizman, has Levitt (2013) points out, the attack may be perhaps a response, a retaliatory act to the suspension of the shipment of nuclear material made by the Argentinian government.

- As for the AMIA attack in 1994, Levitt (2013) argues that Mohsen Rabbani, a radical cleric and the head of the Fundación Cultural Oriente, was a key element. The funding of this attack, allegedly, passed through Rabbani’s accounts at Deutsch Bank, Banco Sudameris and Banco Tornequist from the Iranian Bank Melli (purportedly linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard) through Unión de Bancos Suizos.

- Rabbani and el-Reza are key figures in the well-known Barakt’s network. This network is the perfect example of Hezbollah capabilities abroad. According to Levitt (2013, p.82/84), the “Barakat network” headed by Assad Barakat24, carried money to Lebanon and from

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24 A prominent Lebanese businessperson that lived in Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil side).
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Lebanon to South America. Besides collecting sensitive information, one of the key activities of the network is raising money through the trafficking of narcotics to the Middle East and Europe. The major sources of the network’s profits, apart from trafficking drugs (or other items), are often related to extortion of Lebanese local storekeepers, fraud schemes and the use of front shops, for instance the use of electronics “Casa Apollo”, “Barakat Import Export Ltd” or “Piloto Turismo” a travel agency headed by Farouk Abdul Omairi and Mohammah Abdallah.

**Figure 8: Barakt’s network**
Tax evasion indictment against Barakat led the Brazilian authorities to search “Casa Apollo” in 2001. Attempting to escape to Angola, the Paraguayan authorities detained Barakat in 2002.

According to Paniago (2007) there are more Lebanese people in Brazil than in Lebanon itself, besides, they have a strong impact in the community. It is difficult for Brazil to preclude elected Hezbollah members of parliament of the Lebanese government to visit, as well as to ‘draw a line’ to distinguish between zakat\textsuperscript{25} contribution to their home country and donations to finance terrorism. Furthermore, according to an article pointed by Levitt (2013) is “Without anybody noticing, a generation of Islamic extremists is appearing in Brazil.”

Rabbani’s group is presently on the shipping business, with containers arriving into the port of São Paulo and disappearing on their way to the tri-border. Moreover, it is believe that in general, Hezbollah is still overactive in this continent.

2.4.2. Africa

West Africa, particularly Sierra Leone, was one of the preferred places for the Lebanese diaspora.

Hezbollah, allegedly, has the advantage to establish powerful networks inside the ‘diaspora’ community and the African country is no exception. The networks present in this continent are essential to provide training to the op-\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{25} Legal donation, it is a religious duty and one of the five Islam pillars (al-arkan al-khamsa)}
eratives, to recruit, gather intelligence as well as, a springboard for attacks in other countries but above all to finance their global network.

Levitt (2013) highlights that the Paraguayan authorities estimate that after the 1992 and 1994 attacks in Argentina, Angola was a place where Hezbollah affiliates would go to reorganise, perhaps in view of a great deal of front companies.

Moreover, Angola and Sierra Leone, among other African countries, are part of the countries where diamond trading/smuggling occurs and where a considerable number of groups, including Hezbollah, use diamonds to finance their networks.

Levitt (2013) argues that a report from the Belgian military intelligence (2000) found some convincing facts that diamonds smuggled from Angola to Antwerp were linked to Lebanese groups. Furthermore, the trade of a considerable amount of diamonds occurred in the course of the Angola civil War (1975/2002), before and during the UN embargo. During this period, Lebanese buyers connected to Hezbollah, acquired diamonds from National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The profits provenient from the diamond trade were transferred to Iran, Lebanon and Syria.

In addition to diamond smuggling/trading in Africa, drug trafficking is acknowledged as one of the major sources of Hezbollah’s income, especial-
ly with the declaration of Hezbollah’s spiritual leader emphasising that this action is morally acceptable when the consumers are the ‘Western heretics’. According to Levitt (2013) the symbiosis of weak or non-existent laws with high levels of corruption made Guinea-Bissau a desirable place for drug trafficking groups, particularly provenient from South America. With formal and informal networks in both sides of the Atlantic, Hezbollah uses Guinea-Bissau and West African countries as a launch pad to reach Europe, particularly Southern Europe.

2.4.3. Europe

The Middle East (in) stability has strong impact in international security, in Europe\(^{26}\), particularly in Southern European countries mainly because of its geographic proximity and Portugal is not immune to this.

In fact, several factors make Europe desirable:

- Most of the countries have an open society;
- Before 9/11, Madrid 11/03 and London 7/7 attacks, European countries were considered ‘relaxed’ in terms of security + small number of travel restrictions (including countries with special agreements with their former colonies or/facilitating guest workers);
- Considerable Middle Eastern communities (predominantly in Western European countries) that could offer shelter, cover, and so on;

\(^{26}\) Please consult Hezbollah impact in Europe map, p.116
The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating transnational terrorism: The rising of the Party of God, Hezbollah

- Terrorist groups aspire to release operatives arrested in European countries.

Hezbollah has been involved in many terrorist attacks against Europeans. Nevertheless, it is also acknowledged by the intelligence services as capable of using European countries as a logistic platform, to gather intelligence, to raise funds via legal and illegal businesses/methods, overall a launch pad for terrorist attacks.

Figure 9: Hezbollah’s use of European countries

Through the Islamic Jihad group, Hezbollah first operation in European soil can be traced to 13th of November 1983 when an attack took place at a train station plus the train Paris/Marseille. Levitt (2013) hints that approximately one year later, at Zurich airport, the Lebanese Hussein Hanih Atat ready to board an aircraft to Rome, was arrested by the Swiss authorities after the
detection of numerous pounds of explosives in his belongings. Approximately two weeks later of Hanih Atat capture, Italian authorities detained seven Lebanese students that were planning an attack against the US embassy in Rome.

Levitt (2013) highlights that in a short period of time Hezbollah action was felt in several European countries, for instance:

- Kuwait (1983) the French and US embassies suffered an orchestrated bomb attack;

- Torrejon, Spain (12th of April 1985), a blast destroyed the restaurant named ‘El Descanso’, injuring and killing several people (claimed by Islamic Jihad and other groups);

- A TWA flight 847, from Athens to Rome was high jacked by the Islamic Jihad to smuggle guns and hand grenades (Imad Mughniyeh was one of the operatives and the mastermind of this action);

- Copenhagen, Denmark (July 1985) was the place selected to blast an office of the US-based Northwest Orient Airlines and the oldest synagogue in Scandinavia;

- Paris, France (December 1985/September 1986), 15 places were bombed, including a shopping gallery on the Champ Elysées (claimed by the Committee of Solidarity with the Arab and the Middle East Political Prisoners (CSPPA), later linked to Iran and Hezbollah);
The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating transnational terrorism: The rising of the Party of God, Hezbollah

- Air Afrique flight to Congo was high jacked over Milan, landed in Geneva to refuel (Swiss authorities arrested the Hezbollah hijacker Hossein Ali Mohammed Hariri).

Hamadi’s group in Germany, led by Mohammad Ali Hamadi (operative in the TWA flight 847), was supposedly in charge of providing drugs and arms to the European Hezbollah cells. The Hamadi family, apart from their strong relation since the group’s inception, was linked with the kidnappings of European citizens in Lebanon.

- Kidnap of two West German businesspersons to pressure the West German government to free Mohammad Hamadi (Lebanon);
- Kidnap of two Swiss mistaken for German and two Swedish journalists (Lebanon, 1987).

Levitt (2013) argues that following these actions, in 1992 one of Hezbollah’s missions was the assassination of Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi (Secretary General of Iranian Kurdish party PDKI). The operatives Rhayel and Farajollah Haider, allegedly organised by Fallahian (Iran Minister of Intelligence at the time) and headed by Abdolraham Banihashemi aka Abu Sharif, shot Sharafkandi in a Greek restaurant named “Mikonos” in Berlin, Germany.

A Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center report stresses that in 1989 a Hezbollah network in Valencia, Spain was uncovered. This

cell was linked to a considerable stockpile of weapons in a vessel provenient from Lebanon via Cyprus.

In addition, according to Levitt (2013) Aziz Nassour, after being accused of helping UNITA by the Angolan authorities, flew to Marbella in Spain. The authorities in Spain estimate that Nassour worked alongside Mohammed Derbah (possible Amal member). In 2001, Derbah and seventeen people, linked to Amal and Hezbollah, were detained due to their alleged involvement in weapons trafficking beside the crimes of fraud, money laundering, extortion, counterfeit and a time-share scheme in the Canary Islands. This group/cell, according to the Spanish Baltasar Garzon, had a profit estimated on $10 million a year.

Accused of money laundering Derbah was detained once again in 2003. Hezbollah, according to the same report abovementioned, attempted to strike through several attacks during the period of 2008/2012.

- A bomb blasted an Israeli tourist bus in Burgas (2012) Bulgaria. The result of this attack was the death of the Bulgarian bus driver and five Israelis plus thirty-five injured.

Overall, after analysing Hezbollah presence and activities in Europe it is safe to say that Portugal is not immune to a possible Hezbollah presence in its territory. Particularly if we consider the following reasons:

- Hezbollah’s activities and/or substantial presence in Portuguese speaking countries;
- Use of European countries as a launch pad for terrorist attacks (collection of intelligence, logistic support, raising funds and so on);

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• Portugal is an entry point to Europe, for instance Lebanon is the fifth country with more conceded golden visas;

• Levels of high corruption;

• Its geographic location places Portugal as a potential strategic place to interconnect these countries\(^{29}\).

2.5. Success

The success of Hezbollah’s organisation can be summarised into some key factors:

• The constant political vacuum present in Lebanon, the role of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) viewed by some as pro-Hezbollah, plus, the Lebanese defence policy ‘motto’: “people, army and resistance”, offers legitimacy to Hezbollah’s vital role in national defence;

• Strong financial support from Iran and Syria plus, from their legal and illegal ‘businesses’;

• Effective operational capabilities (national and transnational), as well as, a strong leadership and hierarchical organisation authority;

• Solid discipline and valuable intelligence provided from their extensive network;

• Religion validation for strategic changes, involvement on the Lebanese political system plus provision of a welfare system and the

\(^{29}\) Please consult Hezbollah presence in Portuguese speaking countries, p. 117
The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating transnational terrorism: The rising of the Party of God, Hezbollah

struggle against Israel invasions gives the group legitimacy.

2.6. Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities

After the confirmation of Hezbollah’s presence in Syria (currently in a civil war for the fourth year) by a Hassan Nasrallah’s speech, a major setback followed in Lebanon. The movement started to lose followers/supporters, furthermore with the rising of various terrorist groups, particularly al-Nusra and the ‘Islamic State’ (Daesh), the movement began to appear decrepit. As a result, it is observable the recent efforts of Hezbollah’s Media Relations office to show that they are winning the war on terror by defending Lebanon’s borders from extremist groups, that their presence in Syria is fundamental.

Levitt (2013) argues that Hezbollah sought to retaliate as a reaction of Mughniyeh’s homicide, nonetheless its capability of carry on international operations decreased with Mughniyeh’s death, recognised as a mastermind of terrorist attacks.

However according to The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (2003) one of the major weaknesses of Hezbollah is to manage a delicate balance between the core of the Lebanese arena where they act, and several constrictions imposed/influenced by Iran and Syria in key areas such as their policies and decision-making process.
CHAPTER 3: INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: PREVENTING AND COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM – PORTUGAL INTERNAL SECURITY

“Security is like oxygen: You do not tend to notice it until you begin to lose it.”
Joseph S. Nye Jr.

“Plans are nothing… Planning is everything.”
Dwight D. Eisenhower

3.1. Intelligence: Origin and cycle

Throughout history, there are periodic references that mention the use of intelligence. Allegedly, soldiers during Ramses II rule in Egypt, were captured and subjected to torture with the intention of obtaining ‘valuable information’; Moses sent ‘spies’ before entering Canaan; the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu when he wrote the ‘Art of War’; Queen Elisabeth I sending Sir Francis Drake to collect ‘intelligence’ amid other references.

But then again what is Intelligence? There are some definitions nevertheless, as terrorism there is no universal accepted definition. In a simple manner, intelligence can be a special form of knowledge necessary to accomplish a mission or the strategic knowledge that reveal opportunities/threats that can endanger the mission success.
For instance, David Khan argues:

“The roots of intelligence are biological. Every animal, even a protozoan, must have a mechanism to perceive stimuli, such as noxious chemicals, and to judge whether they are good or bad for it. At that level intelligence is like breathing: essential to survival, but not to dominance. To this primitive capacity for getting information from physical objects, humans have joined the ability to obtain it from words. This verbal ability has led to a form of intelligence far more powerful than the kind used by animals or men to hunt prey or flee predators. It has driven the rise of intelligence to its present significance.”

Nonetheless, Khan currently considers intelligence divided into two major segments: Physical and Verbal - “physical intelligence steadies command and verbal intelligence magnifies strength” (Gill, Marrin and Phytian, 2009, pp.4-8)

For Michael Warner “Intelligence is secret state activity to understand or influence foreign entities.” (Warner, 2002, pp. 15–22)

Moreover, Lowenthal’s definition of intelligence is:

“Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and
provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities” (Lowenthal, 2002, p.8)

Regarding multiple definitions, the one accepted more often is the definition provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):

“Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us - the prelude to decision and action by U.S. policymakers” (Waltz, 2003 pp.1-2).

To talk about intelligence it is mandatory to mention Sherman Kent, known as the ‘father of intelligence analysis’, has he after the Second World War, defined intelligence in three different levels:

1. **Knowledge** – Intelligence means knowledge, nonetheless it does not include all kinds of knowledge, it specifies that decision makers at a high rank will beneficiate from it to safeguard national stability when faced with pretences of a foe state;

2. **Institutional** – Functional structures with the mission of gathering data with the aim of producing a certain type of knowledge;

3. **Procedural** – As a process, intelligence is the means and techniques employed to convert ‘raw data’ into intelligence.
Kent sustains that intelligence is:

“In the circumstances, it is surprising that there is not more general agreement and less confusion about the meaning of the basic terms. The main difficulty seems to lie in the word ‘intelligence’ itself, which has come to mean both what people in the trade do and what they come up with. To get this matter strait is crucial: intelligence is both a process and an end-product” (Kent, 1946, p.117)

Moreover, Kent in order to provide a distinctive definition to the intelligence used as an operational concept when applied to analysis to support decision-making introduced the specific term ‘strategic intelligence’.

To comprehend the work of the intelligence services it is crucial to know how the intelligence production, to take into account its cycle management, its phases:

**Figure 10: Intelligence production cycle**
The first phase of the cycle is where priorities, deadlines, means to be used and coordination are defined, considering the needs of the policymaker.

Furthermore, the next phase, in order to obtain intelligence identified as necessary, is where the analyst obtains ‘raw data’ from several sources, for instance:

- **Open Source Intelligence** (OSINT) - Collected from publicly available sources
- **Signals Intelligence** (SIGINT) - Collected from the interception of signals - **Communications intelligence** (COMINT) or **electronic signals intelligence** not directly used in communication (ELINT)
- **Imagery Intelligence** (IMINT) - Collected from satellite/aerial photography
- **Human Intelligence** (HUMINT) - Collected from interpersonal contact

The third and the fourth phases of the cycle are designed to transform ‘raw data’/information into valuable intelligence, through registering, compilation, study and interpretation/analysis process along with its organisation by type generating conclusions and recommendations.

The last phase of the conventional intelligence cycle is dissemination, based on a prompt submission of the intelligence product, to the decision/policymakers.
Although, there are some main critics on the intelligence cycle, for instance Johnston (2005) argues that the ‘conventional’ cycle omits elements, thereof it fails to capture the process correctly. In addition, it is more complex and difficult to spot when errors happen. Johnston (2005) also highlights that this cycle fails to explain how elements can affect the movement of the cycle, it transmits the idea of being continuously flowing and ‘fed’ by inputs. Hence, Greg Treverton’s model is suggested as a more detailed and complete cycle since it considers the interactivity of the cycle phases.

**Figure 11: Treverton’s “Real” Cycle**

![Treverton's “Real” Cycle](source)


In addition, Johnston (2005) highlights Mark Lowenthal intelligence cycle, although simpler than Treverton’s, it also provides an insight on the revisions and reconsideration occur.
Nonetheless, both models of the intelligence cycle fail to demonstrate efficiently who is accountable for what for instance.

Moreover, Johnston (2005) considers that the traditional cycle:

- Does not accurately represent the impact of resource availability on analysts;

- Does not represent the interactive nature of the process required for meeting objectives;

- Assumes the process works the same way for all objectives, regardless of complexity and cognitive demand;
• Does not identify responsibilities for completing steps and allows for misconceptions in this regard.

Hulnick (2006) also criticizes the conventional intelligence cycle, particularly because it fails to comprise two major integral components of intelligence work - counterintelligence and covert action. Moreover, on the first phase/stage, the intelligence consumers occasionally express their needs still they repeatedly rely that the intelligence system will provide what is necessary. It seems that policymakers need intelligence to support policy instead of being informed. Most of the times, guidance comes from within the system and the practitioners know its gaps and filling the gaps is what stimulates the intelligence gathering process. Therefore, the process that propels the collection phase of the cycle it is not guidance provided by the policymakers, it is the process of filling the gaps.

The second phase should rely on filling the gaps during the process itself since, with all the sources available currently, particularly OSINT, the analysts should not wait for guidance from the policymakers. As a result, intelligence managers are the genuine drivers of the collection process.

Hulnick (2006) also highlights that a major concern of the cycle functioning is that occasionally intelligence collection and intelligence analysis are quite independent of each other and work as parallel, particularly because in practice there are constraints of information sharing (amidst other elements)
between intelligence collection and intelligence analysis.

In the dissemination phase theoretically, the multiple products of the analysis are delivered to policymakers and as a result, policymakers based on these ought to make decisions or request additional intelligence inducing the cycle to restart. Nonetheless, Hulnick (2006) points out that this is a misrepresentation of what occurs in reality since it depends on the sort of intelligence product that is being supplied, considering that this product includes warning intelligence, the policymakers consider that it is implicit that the intelligence services know all so they should foresee every possible crisis that may take place.

Considering the intelligence cycle process it is also important to clarify the difference between security intelligence and strategic intelligence purposes.

3.1.1. Security Intelligence and Strategic Intelligence

Informações de Segurança or Security intelligence is essential to prevent threats. Romana (2005) defines it as the study and evaluation of risks and the prevention of threats - internal or external source, as well as, State security, with asymmetrical characteristics (organised crime, terrorism, destabilisation of the pillars of the ‘Democratic State’).

This type of intelligence serves the purpose of safeguarding internal security (homeland security) and the prevention of sabotage, terrorism, organised
crime, spying and other forms of destabilisation or destruction of the State.

Security planning and national defence are based upon perceived threats and risks:

Figure 13: Threat and Risk

Strachan-Morris (2012) argues that the capability of a group can be ‘measured’ by analysing their success rate of previous attacks, modus operandi, training, command logistical support and what is trying to obtain.

In a practical sense, this can be measured following a threat assessment chart:
Table 1: Threat Assessment Chart in Terrorism context example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CAPABILITY</strong></th>
<th><strong>INTENT</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sophisticated</strong></td>
<td><strong>Extreme</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable of multiple coordinated complex attacks</td>
<td>Specific intent + Freedom to attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable of deliberate coordinated attacks</td>
<td>Demonstrates consistent intent + create opportunity to attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable of deliberate action</td>
<td>Display of intimidation and threats + Very limited opportunity to attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable of low level intimidation and extortion</td>
<td>Display some aggression + no opportunity to attack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Strachan-Morris (2012, p.176 - Based upon a table compiled by Richard Siebert at Aegis Defence Services for use in Iraq. The definitions were a compilation of US and Australian military doctrine but the inclusion of ‘opportunity’ was Siebert’s own innovation)*

Informações Estratégicas políticas or political Strategic Intelligence is according to Romana (2005) divided in two main components:

- **DEFENSIVE** - Produces intelligence with the purpose of: Identifying vulnerabilities; Prevent and neutralise threats against external interests of a State;

- **OFFENSIVE** - Produces intelligence with the purpose of: Creation of
strategies to maximize the projection of national interests in key areas (geopolitical, geo-cultural, geo-economics)

*Counter-intelligence and active/passive measures are the key elements that support the defensive component.

Furthermore, defensive strategic intelligence is essentially supported by the production of intelligence directed to identify vulnerabilities, to prevent or neutralise threats conducted by agents or entities against external interests either permanent or cyclical of a particular State. On the other hand, the offensive component of strategic intelligence relies on the production of intelligence to support strategies aimed to influence, determine and condition the geopolitical, geo-economic, geo-cultural framework of places, territories regarded as vital.

Considering Strachan-Morris point abovementioned, plus Hezbollah capability as an organisation with a wide network, has a high level of opportunity since it can attack anywhere, like it did in previous attacks. Hence, bearing in mind this and the possibility of the group presence in Portugal we propose, as an exercise, a threat/vulnerability assessment considering a risk rating scale from five levels:

1) Low – no threat indications/no forecast of threats to occur in the short term
2) Moderate – very limited indication of threats, unlikely to occur in the short term
3) Substantial – limited indication of threats to occur in the short term
4) Severe – clear indications of threats likely to occur in the short term
5) Critical – clear indications of imminent threats very likely to occur within a specific period of time

Table 2: ‘Hezbollah in Portugal’
Example of an overall Risk Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VULNERABILITY</th>
<th>Awareness of civil society</th>
<th>Preparation of Intelligence Service + Law Enforcement</th>
<th>Border Control + ‘Golden Visas’</th>
<th>Corruption</th>
<th>Risk Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence of cell/members in Portugal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack on the critical infrastructures</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic support; Money laundering/ fundraising schemes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based upon a risk assessment table by Professor Heitor Barras Romana in a lecture of the Post-graduation in Intelligence and Security (ISCSP) 2011/12

In light of this exercise, it is very likely that Portugal is used as a launch pad for terrorist networks activities, particularly as a logistic support, money laundering/ fundraising schemes place. Hence, considering the possible presence of a terrorist group in the Portuguese territory we will proceed to the next topic.
3.2. Portugal’s place in the world

Portugal was one of the propellers of globalisation during the Discoveries. Its rich history combined with the Portuguese diaspora placed Portugal in a unique position to project its national interests. For instance, our sphere of influence with the Portuguese speaking countries, who are strategically important partners, followed by Portugal’s membership in the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation\textsuperscript{30}, among other prestigious organisations.

With prominent personalities in the international arena, such as António Guterres as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or Jorge Sampaio, until recently, as High Representative at the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) also José Barroso as President of the European Commission. Moreover, Portugal assumed the co-presidency of the 5+5 Dialogue\textsuperscript{31} in 2013 and was non-permanent member of the Security Council (UNSC) during the biennium of 2011/2012. The sum of these factors, combined with others, may position the country to some risk.

Though the Treaty of Westphalia still dominates the international relations panorama, the concept of sovereignty is changing, particularly if we observe how third parties influence the States. The positive factors of globalisation

\textsuperscript{30} Portugal was one of its founders.

\textsuperscript{31} Portugal, Spain, Italy, France and Malta + Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia
also expose Portugal to some dangers, and as observed on Chapter 2, the nature of threat has become transnational.

As a cooperative democracy, we rely on security cooperation mechanisms and although some security budgets are increasing, the tendency is to be less armed.

More than ever, our intelligence services must be ready to answer successfully to these challenges.

3.2.1. Country Profile

Overview: One of the major concerns of the European Union security agenda is terrorism, particularly with the cases of European Jihadists/foreign fighters. According to the Portuguese Internal Security Annual Report (RASI) 2014, the Portuguese Law Enforcement authorities are closely monitoring this phenomenon, as well as the identification of possible agents and modus operandi. For instance, Portuguese nationals/descendants moving to ‘problematic’ countries or joining transnational terrorist groups as fighters, recruiters and other positions – the authorities confirmed the involvement of Portuguese nationals/descendants with the self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ (Daesh) Group. The authorities are also monitoring transnational organised crime and its expressions, for instance transatlantic drug trafficking, particularly the African Portuguese speaking countries. The Portuguese authorities verified that a there was a systematic abuse of the Dakar, Lisbon,
Brazil route by Sierra Leone nationals who later presented themselves as refugees in Portugal.

RASI (2014) highlights that Portugal joined an international joint anti-terrorism exercise, within the ATLAS Network frame, which carries out the most complex preparation and crises response through simultaneous terrorist attacks in Europe.

The Portuguese Intelligence Services, according to the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, implemented close relation with the Islamic community along with the adoption of anti-radicalisation measures.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement and Border Security:** The Portuguese government continued to use of counterterrorism key legislation:

- Law n.º 52/2003, 22\(^{nd}\) of August – Law to Combat Terrorism\(^ {32}\)


Portugal adopted the European Joint Declaration on Combating Terrorism in


the beginning of 2015 (Riga, Latvia)\textsuperscript{34}. The declaration aims to increase the exchange and sharing of intelligence through the improvement of the Schengen Intelligence System or for instance, specific consideration should be given to fight against financing of terrorism among other issues.

Portugal implemented as well the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism\textsuperscript{35} (2015) with the aim of adjusting existing legislation. The key pillars are of this Strategy are:

- **Detect** – Early detection of potential terrorist threats, through the acquisition of essential knowledge for an efficient combat;

- **Prevent** – Know and identify of the causes of radicalisation, recruitment and terrorist acts;

- **Protect** – Reinforcement of security of key targets, reducing their vulnerability and the impact of possible terrorist threats;

- **Pursue** – Dismantle or neutralise terrorist initiatives, as well as their logistic networks, hinder the movement of agents, communications, access to financing and material capable of being used in terrorist actions. Submit the agents involved in terrorist groups

\textsuperscript{34} Available online at: \url{https://eu2015.lv/images/Kalendars/leM/2015_01_29_jointstatement_JHA.pdf}

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- Response – Management of all operational means that will be used to in a possible terrorist action.

The Strategy contemplates the promotion of a straight cooperation with multiple organisations/partners, for instance Eurojust, Europol and Frontex. In addition introduces eight draft laws:

- Update of the definition of terrorism in Criminal Procedure Code;
- Nationality Law – Hinder the requirements for granting Portuguese nationality via naturalisation;
- The law that establishes the legal regime of covert actions for prevention and criminal investigation;
- The law that establishes measures to combat organised crime including economic/financial crime, able to cover all criminal offenses related to terrorism;
- The Law to Combat Terrorism criminalising public incitement for the crime of terrorism and affiliation with terrorist groups;
- The legal regime of entry, remain and leave plus the removal of foreigners from national territory;
- The organisation of the Law of Criminal Investigation to include all the criminal offences related to terrorism;
Chapter 3: Intelligence Services: Preventing and Combating Transnational Terrorism - Portugal Internal Security

- The Law of Internal Security - Adding competencies to the Conselho Superior de Segurança Interna/Higher Council of Internal Security, besides reinforcing the organisation of the Anti-terrorism Coordination Unit (UCAT), which will be coordinated by the Secretary General of the Portuguese Republic Intelligence System (SIRP).

**Countering the Financial Terrorism:** Portugal is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since 1991 as well as the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) and observer of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD) and Inter Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), all of which are FATF-style regional bodies. Portugal is also member of the Egmont Group through the Unidade de Informação Financeira (UIF) established by the Portuguese Law to Combat Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism n.º 25/2008, of 5th of June.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Portugal is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and takes part in several

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36 Global association of Financial Intelligence Units
missions such “Operation Active Endeavour” (Mediterranean), “Operation Inherent Resolve” (Iraq) besides continuing to participate in several multilateral initiatives to counterterrorism. Portuguese cooperation with regional and international organisations on counterterrorism includes the European Union, OECD, OSCE, 5+5 Dialogue, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Europol, Interpol, United Nations.

Portugal, according to a report from OSCE (2015), signed fourteenth of the nineteenth Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols, as well as eleventh of the sixteenth international and regional legal instruments related to terrorism or co-operation in criminal matters.

3.3. Historic evolution of Intelligence in Portugal

According to the Portuguese Intelligence Security Service (SIS) the production of intelligence was, for centuries, developed by informal relations between monarchs and their most reliable officers. In addition, during the inception of the Portuguese Nation, it was linked to key areas of the government, such as the territorial conquer process and the kingdom’s political unification.

Its evolution is marked by some key events before the Carnation Revolution on the 25th of April 1974, which ended the established dictatorial political

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38 Available online at: [http://www.osce.org/atu/17138?download=true](http://www.osce.org/atu/17138?download=true)

39 Serviço de Informações de Segurança (SIS) official website: [http://www.sis.pt](http://www.sis.pt)
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regime *Estado Novo*:

**Figure 14: Evolution of intelligence in Portugal until 1974**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>“Guarda Nacional Republicana” was founded. Regulation of “Conselho Superior da Defesa Nacional” and “Estado-Maior do Exército” (creation of a Division specialised in military intelligence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>“Polícia Preventiva” is now designated “Polícia de Segurança do Estado”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Restoration of “Direcção Geral de Segurança Pública”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>“Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado” (Surveillance and Defence State Police) as the result of “Polícia Internacional Portuguesa” and “Polícia de Defesa Política e Social” fusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>With the creation of PIDE (International Police and State Defence) the political repression reached a turning point – application of severe measures against political misbehaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>“Conselho da Segurança Pública” was created to coordinate the different public security organs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>PIDE was reorganized and became the only entity responsible for the intelligence exchange with foreign intelligence services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>“Serviço de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações” was created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>PIDE was extinct and replaced by “Direcção Geral de Segurança”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **1147**: Sending of undercover Emisseries and informers to influence territorial conquering and the political unification of the Kingdom.
- **1385**: Undercover agents sent to Castelo de Castelo to lead Portugal to victory in Aljubarrota.
- **1481**: The strategic importance of the “secret” and intelligence was recognized through the reinforcement of the diplomatic relations.
- **1494**: Signature of the Tordesilhas Treaty, one of the most significant events in the history of International Relations (assuring the sea route to India and Brazil).
- **1760**: Marquês de Pombal created “Intendência da Polícia de Corte e do Reino” – composed by a network of spies/informers responsible to collect political, fiscal and criminal intelligence.
- **1822**: Approved by the Constitution, the executive power, was able to create a permanent national military force with the purpose of guarantying the Kingdom’s internal and external security.
- **1899**: Army reorganisation. Creation of the “Estado-Maior General” and “Serviço de Estado Maior” (where military intelligence was collected).
- **1902**: 19th September law declared special measures (preventive and repressive) to crimes against the State security, social order and fake currency.
- **1910**: 8th October creates the “Ministerio do Interior” and extinguishes the “Juízo de Instrução Criminal.”
Subsequently with the overthrown of the regime, the national intelligence system was dismissed. During 1974, the creation of the Executive law 400/74 of 29th of August was in part an answer/solution to fill the intelligence void, establishing that the coordination of these matters would pass through the 2nd Division of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (EMGFA).

During this troubled times there were multiple attempts to establish intelligence services or at least to manage intelligence. Some of these attempts were:

- Intelligence Management and Coordination Department (SDCI) - Established by the Executive law 250/75 of 23rd of May;
- SDCI was dismissed - Task of producing intelligence given to the Intelligence Division of the Armed Forces (DINFO);
- DINFO was in charge of producing intelligence until 1984 - Legal competence to exclusively produce military intelligence;
- In 1977 General (at time Brigadier) Pedro Cardoso proposed the creation of the Intelligence System of the Republic (SIR) – It was not developed;
- With the purpose of organising a national intelligence system, the Law n.º 30/84 of 5th of September established the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic (SIRP).
The Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic (SIRP) established in 1984, although passing through several adjustments, is currently in force with the aim of intelligence production necessary to safeguard national independence and national interests, the unity and integrity of the State along with internal and external security regarding the tasks and powers of the services mentioned according to the law.

3.4. Portuguese Intelligence Services

Presently, the Portuguese intelligence panorama is constituted by the Portuguese Republic Intelligence System (SIRP), which integrates two autonomous intelligence services with independent capabilities both coordinated by the key figure of the Secretary General.

According to SIRP\textsuperscript{40}, the Sistema de Informações da República Portuguesa or the Portuguese Republic Intelligence System (SIRP) it was established in 1984 as above mentioned, envisioning three intelligence services: Defence and Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED), Military Intelligence Services (SIM) and Security Intelligence Service (SIS). The regulations of these three services were established by the Decree Laws n.º 224/85 for SIED, n.º 225/85 for SIS and n.º 226/85 for SIM nevertheless, SIS was the only service to operate during the 1980s.

It is essential to highlight that the article 31º, from Law n.º 30/84 of 5th of

\textsuperscript{40} Available online at: \url{www.sirp.pt}
The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating transnational terrorism: The rising of the Party of God, Hezbollah

September, precluded former agents of the PIDE-DGS services as well as the Portuguese Legion members or informants of both institutions.

After multiple adjustments the introduction of the Law n.º 4/95 of 21st of February brought considerable changes to the Portuguese intelligence services. The SIM was extinct nonetheless, the military component was integrated into SIED became Military, Defence and Strategic Intelligence Service (SIEDM). The SIEDM was legislated by the regulatory decree n.º 254/95.

In 2004, SIEDM capabilities were adjusted along with as SIRP's Organic by the Law n.º 4/2004 of 6th of November. The major adjustment on SIEDM was the loss of its military component and as a consequence the military intelligence was attributed to the Armed Forces. With these adjustment processes SIRP is now headed and coordinated by its Secretary General reporting directly to the Prime Minister.

The Law n.º 9/2007 of 19th of February, established the structure of the Secretary General of the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic, the Strategic Defence Intelligence Service (SIED) and the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) revoking Laws n.º 225/85 of 4th of July and n.º 254/95 of 30th of September. Moreover, the article 17º introduced joint structures for the intelligence services within SIRP:

- Human Resources Department;
• General support and Finances Department;

• Information Technologies Department;

• Security Department

In 2014, the establishment of the organic law n.º 4/2014 of 13th of August\textsuperscript{41} amends, for the fifth time, and republished the organic law n.º 30/84 of 5th of September, along with the Law n.º 9/2007 of 19th of February and revokes the decree-laws n.º 225/85 of 4th of July and n.º 254/95 of 30th of September.

\textbf{Figure 15: SIRP Organisational Chart}

\textsuperscript{41} Available online at: https://dre.pt/application/dir/pdf1sdip/2014/08/15500/0419404206.pdf
As established by the laws aforementioned, SIRP structure can be a complex system where all bodies, represented in the above chart, perform diverse nonetheless complementary tasks:

- Election of the members of the Conselho de Fiscalização dos Serviços de Informações/Supervisory Council of the Intelligence Services by the Assembleia da República/Parliament of the Portuguese Republic;

- The Parliament of the Portuguese Republic is also responsible to hear, in a parliamentary committee, the nominee for the Secretary General position;

- The Prime Minister: coordinates the activity of the services, chairs the Conselho Superior de Informações/ Intelligence Supreme Council as well as inform the President (the PM actions are assisted by the Intelligence Supreme Council ). Has the power to appoint/exonerate the Secretary General of SIRP, as well as the both directors of the intelligence services;

- The Secretary General reports directly to the Prime Minister and it has a status similar to Secretary of State. The duties are established in the article 19.º of the republished law n.º30/84 of 5\textsuperscript{th} of September, it has a support office with the same legal regime as ministerial offices;

- The Intelligence Supreme Council is supported by a technical committee;
- The technical committee is directed by the SIRP Secretary General as well as the General Secretaries of both services;
- The members of the Comissão de Fiscalização dos Centros de Dados/Data Monitoring or Supervision Committee are selected by the Procurador Geral da República Portuguesa/Attorney General of the Portuguese Republic;

SIS is within SIRP’s scope by law (paragraph 2, article 25º, Law n.º 53/2008) the only service that is responsible, along with the law enforcement authorities, to exercise internal security functions. Its mission is, above all through a preventative approach, anticipate multiple threats and inform the policymakers on time. This requires essentially the use of the intelligence cycle, to gather information and to product intelligence to:

- Safeguard internal security;
- Prevent acts of espionage, sabotage and terrorism;
- Prevent acts that may, because of their nature, alter or destroy the rule of law.

SIS work in accordance with:
The role of the intelligence service in preventing and combating transnational terrorism: The rising of the Party of God, Hezbollah

**Figure 16: SIS work sources**

- **OSINT** (Open Source Intelligence) Data collected from open sources and unclassified documents available to the public in general;
- **HUMINT** (Human Intelligence) Gathering intelligence through human sources;
- **Access to data and information** contained in files through established protocols with the public authorities

It has the duty of:

**Figure 17: SIS duties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREVENT</th>
<th>PURSUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>phenomena that are the root of terrorist activity</td>
<td>the activities of terrorist networks, its logistic support networks, funding and training structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROTECT</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>people, infrastructures, critical national infrastructures security, as well as vital electronic systems from a terrorist attack</td>
<td>to the consequences of an attack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For those duties to be accomplished SIS relies on:

- **Production**: of intelligence on the development of terrorist threats aimed to identify, in advance, threats that maybe hanging over the safety of the citizens; Threat assessment that contribute to reduce vulnerabilities, consequently reducing risks in the event of a terrorist
attack, particularly against critical infrastructures as well as less protected targets; procedures of terrorist groups on gathering intelligence, selection of targets and on technical equipment, in order to adopt measures to decrease vulnerabilities; Reviews of threat assessments to prevent further attacks in the period after the attack.

- **Identification**: on time, of the causes and sources that may foster violent radicalisation, recruitment for terrorist groups/actions; Agents and *modus operandi* used in violent radicalisation/recruitment activities; Exploitation of the internet with the purpose of incitement to violence, recruitment and terrorist training.

- **Detection**: of signs of planning/preparing terrorist attacks against national or international targets in national territory; Evidence, promptly, of the formation of local terrorist cells and/or presence of elements belonging to terrorist groups in national territory; Individuals and organisations that provide logistical support and/or financing terrorism; Activities that comprise the use of national territory as a place of acquisition of materials to produce weapons of mass destruction;

- **Cooperation**: with other countries intelligence services, in order to identify possible connections of terrorist networks in Portugal.

Overall, ensure the coordination of response in the event of an attack.
It has also the duty of cooperating with SIED according to SIRP’s Secretary General indications, along with communicating with the law enforcement authorities for criminal investigations or/and with the purpose of prosecution, regarding state secret.

Concerning international relations/cooperation SIS is, according to n. º2 and 3º, article 11. º of Law n.º 9/2007 of 19th of February, allowed to cooperate with other intelligence services in all areas of their activities, in line with the priorities of foreign policy beside the guidelines established by SIRP’s General Secretary.

Cooperation is a vital structure for SIS in the fight against threats particularly in the prevention and combat of international terrorism.

For an effective cooperation SIS policy relies into two objectives:

**Figure 18: SIS cooperation policy**

- **Complementary intelligence**
  *via* exchange of intelligence on the phenomena that may affect the security of the countries that maintain relations with Portugal

- **Obtaining reliable intelligence**
  on phenomena capable of turning into threats to the internal and national security
Apart from preventing and combating terrorism, in the light of this dissertation, it is important to mention the role of SIS regarding organised crime. One of SIS key purposes is to make Portugal a hostile territory to the presence and action of organised crime, particularly because of its nature and capability to undermine the financial and economic system (public or private). Considering that, plus the ability to infiltrate and undermine or disrupt state structures, these networks must be tackled in advance by the intelligence services.

Thereof, the intelligence services establish patterns through the analysis of these groups’ origins, evolution and adaptation capabilities, are capable to outline stronger and effective strategies to tackle it. Moreover, SIS is committed to the production of intelligence to identify trends/patterns in the activities of criminal structures, diverse typologies, working mechanisms, including the level of hierarchies, as well as behavioural actions of its members, geographic areas of operation plus routes for their strategic activities (drug, arms, human trafficking, money laundering, facilitation of illegal immigration, amidst other activities)

Predominantly SIS’s core work is to product intelligence. Therefore, it is the law enforcement authorities, within the spectre of criminal investigation, who as the role of repressing organised crime structures/networks.
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Regarding Law framework, apart from Law n.º 9/2007 of 19th of February, SIS security bidding general rules are:

- SEGNAC\(^{42}\) – 1) Addresses the rules of classified material; 2) Industrial security; 3) Communications Security; 4) Computer security [SIS follows the doctrine expressed in these rules. The National Security Office (ANS) role related with SIS is to provide training in this area, as well as to monitor if these rules are followed].


A myriad of laws to **does not** allow this SIS to:

**Figure 19: SIS legal restrictions**

- **Intercept** communications (Constitution article 34º, n.º4);
- **Detain** people (Law n.º 5/95 + article 250º Code of Criminal Procedure);
- **Restrict** rights, freedoms and guarantees;
- **Launch** investigations or criminal proceedings;
- Law enforcement authorities or court **competencies**

The Defence and Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED), according to the law n.º 4/2004 of 6th of November, it is the responsible entity to product intelligence to safeguard national independence and national interests, along with the external security of the Portuguese State.

\(^{42}\) Available online at: [http://www.cfsirp.pt/Geral/segnac.html](http://www.cfsirp.pt/Geral/segnac.html)
This service contributes to the policy making process through the production of intelligence, particularly focused on:

- Assessment of terrorist threats + identification of organised crime networks, particularly those involved in drug trafficking, facilitation of illegal immigration, nuclear/biological/chemical proliferation;

- Early alert to situations where there is a potential compromise of national interests;

- Political, energy, economic and defence matters that are a priority to Portuguese foreign policy.

To achieve results SIED follows the intelligence cycle – planning, research/collection, processing, analysis/interpretation and dissemination, regarding the rights and freedoms established in the Portuguese Constitution, along with guidelines issued by the Prime Minister (via SIRP Secretary General).

It is with a complex evolutionary matrix, the symbiosis between terrorism and organised crime groups, both asymmetrical threats and diffuse scenario, that the intelligence services within SIRP have to deal, thereof it is susceptible to constant reframing’s.
3.4.1. Portuguese Intelligence Services and Integrated Internal Security System

The establishment of the Law of Internal Security (LSI) n.º 53/2008 of 29th of August, regarding its third chapter article n.º 12 by including SIRP Secretary General into the Integrated Internal Security System (SISI) Council, reveals the effort to establish a solid cooperation between both systems.

According to the articles 15.º to 19.º, SISI Secretary General is central in the LSI, although with similar competencies to SIRP Secretary General the SISI Secretary General has a broader spectre of duties. Nonetheless, it should be highlighted that the SISI Secretary General competencies are performed according with the coordination, control and operational plan of the law enforcement authorities, which is approved by the Council of Ministers on a basis of a proposal from the Prime Minister.

Overall, as an effort to improve coordination of the law enforcement authorities, the bases to create the Integrated Internal Security System were established. Regarding this, complementarity is one of the key points of cooperation between these two systems, particularly on the exchange of intelligence.
3.5. Future of Intelligence: Challenges and dilemmas

An intricate interaction between many actors dominates and contributes the present fast shifting global environment. Those shifts present the intelligence community with a potential for surprise and surprises are the first thing that the intelligence services want to avoid, the paradigm of intelligence and intelligence analysis changed, driven first and foremost by the shift in targets from the predominance of nation-states to transnational groups. Thereof the intelligence community must be agile, anticipatory, preventive, and above all learn to adapt to this fast shifting world.

According to Waltz (2003) there are two main sources of future threats to national and international security. The first one is the complex and diverse range of actor's interaction and the second is “the threat-generating mechanism because of rational nation-state behaviors to discontinuities in complex world affairs.” (Waltz, 2003, p. 49)

According to an U.S. intelligence officer since 9/11 there are three critical areas that need to adapt:

1. **Global intelligence cooperation.** National intelligence organizations must collaborate and include academic- and business-sector contributors to provide true in-depth global background intelligence.

2. **Open-source intelligence.** Organizations must “move beyond” the primary focus on secret sources and methods and develop means to embrace and integrate open sources into analysis.
3. **New analysis.** Analytic communities must create new cultures of collaboration and “reflection” that will enable them to understand nonstate threats. (Waltz, 2003, p.49)

Waltz (2003) also points to the fact that the conventional characteristics of intelligence were centralised, for instance:

- focus on collection and secret sources; known and continuous, predictable targets; hierarchical analysis organisation and control; intelligence management on tactical, operational, measurable objectives; focus on intelligence as a product

Need to be reviewed and maybe substituted by a distributive approach with the following characteristics:

- Focus on analysis, collaboration with others, open and closed sources; targets are unknown, discontinuous, and unpredictable; networked analysis organisation and collaboration; intelligence management on strategic, anticipatory, adaptive objectives; focus on intelligence as a service.

Schreier (2005) argues that the key challenges and problems for intelligence are present within the:

- Human and signals intelligence collection, analysis, cooperation with law enforcement agencies, plus sharing of intelligence;
- Real-time intelligence needs to reach promptly those who can most
effectively counter terrorism or other threats.

Alternatively, Agrell (2012) suggests that the major concerns that the intelligence community is presented with are:

- The decreasing hegemony of national intelligence;
- The rise of new fields of knowledge with intelligence relevance;
- The diminishing relative importance of exclusive sources and methods;
- The rise of new actors producing and providing intelligence;
- The loss of an intellectual monopoly in a competitive knowledge environment;
- Increasing demand for reliable assessments and verification in a fragmented world of information.

Moore (2003) highlights that the intelligence errors and failures are:

- Intelligence professionals cannot afford to consider only information that conforms to their own pre-existing worldview or agreed upon, collective perspective;
- Understand the differences between “intelligence error” and “intelligence failure”;
- “Failure of imagination” - members of an intelligence fail to imagine in advance the essential outlines of an incident that subsequently occurs;
- Policy Failures - failure to act on intelligence received;
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- To make sure policy “understands it” - the message is not effectively transmitted and acted upon.

For an effective approach above all, the intelligence community should take into account the facts aforementioned and the lessons learned to combat terrorism according to Schmid (2011):

**Figure 20: Schmid’s lessons to combat terrorism**

- Build international cooperation/coalitions/regimes/norms for counter-terrorism;
- Intelligence, above all, is what it takes to defeat terrorism;
- Improve communication between law enforcement and intelligence;
- Terrorism is real, not just a scare tactic;
- Dialogue with immigrants it’s necessary.
- There have been failures of intelligence;
- Arrogance in foreign policy decision making can breed terrorism;
- Re-examine barriers between law enforcement and intelligence;
- Do not give terrorist free publicity;
- The current Islamic threat is transnational, involving myriad groups, and there is no specific grievance that can be addressed, nor any specific leadership with whom one can seek a compromise.
CONCLUSIONS

- Categorising terrorism by groups with similar characteristics in phases, waves, periods allow us to place and understand their ideology/tactics, to establish patterns. Hence, in one hand the groups become more predictable and easy to deter, on the other hand this approach may contain some gaps, particularly allowing smaller or low key groups that don’t ‘fit the profile’ to rise without being noticed. It is crucial to interpret the society behaviour with special attention when a shift of power happens.

- The analysis of prevention and combat of transnational terrorism presented us with several dilemmas and challenges. The first one, apart from plenty of attempts, is no general accepted definition of terrorism, which may have some impact on international cooperation, on the application of judicial measures and even on research. Though challenging this should not be an impediment to tackle it. Secondly, terrorism nature is intricate and not static, it is constantly shifting plus its secrecy ‘divert’ researchers of doing their research efficiently – access to files, interviewing terrorists (danger of being too empathetic or unjust), dubious sources…

- We need to improve the matrix of intelligence analysis. Our services have to be sharp, focused and one-step ahead to forecast real threats better and on time by refining the intelligence cycle. If we observe the
contribution of Sherman Kent and other prestigious academics, it is utterly required the creation of a new genuine bridge between practitioners and scholars. Such as academics dedicated to international relations, intelligence, law and security studies [although happening in Portugal, for example with the work of the Observatory of Security, Organised Crime and Terrorism (OSCOT) and the Portuguese National Defence Institute (IDN), it is still a scarce number]. It would be a win-win symbiosis, since the academia could do orientated research by identifying the demands of the intelligence analysis practitioners, creating a strong methodology with appropriate theoretical foundations. Consequently, the scholars would beneficiate from the practitioner’s knowledge and experience, mostly from situations of failure (what to do next time; what to improve; creation of new methods…). Part of this cooperation would pass naturally through a rigorous background assessment of the people involved.

- Adding the Autoridade Tributária to the Anti-terrorism Coordination Unit (UCAT) may perhaps beneficiate the system, specifically to tackle the alliance between organised crime and terrorism, focusing for example on logistic support and money laundering schemes.

Portugal, like other countries it is not immune to suffer from a terrorist attack and from our point of view, at the moment, it is more likely to be used as a ‘platform’ of logistic support/launching pad for terrorist
attacks, money laundering, safe haven or even fundraising (this one in particular perhaps not directly). The analyses of the second chapter displayed the group capability to manage elaborate schemes. Hence, it is imperative to dismantle their logistic and financial support, as it is a way of neutralising or at least weaken the group position. This could be a vital ‘piece of the puzzle’ on preventing and combating terrorism on Portuguese soil.

- Analysing the intricate working mechanisms of Intelligence Services it is not an easy task in part because of its nature as aforementioned. The Portuguese Intelligence Services, in particular, still suffer from the heavy shadow left by the PIDE from the Estado Novo dictatorship. In addition, the recent scandals associated with people previously connected to the services do not help. Yet we can observe the growing interest of the academia and the effort of the IDN to promote this subject, to clear the wrong image left by the past. Nonetheless, there is a lot of work to do.

- Apart from the efforts, it is still a taboo to talk and study this topic in the Portuguese society, although understandable. A ‘makeover’ of the services as to be done, with the aim of making it more transparent (respecting its nature evidently) and clarify some persistent myths. For instance, people commonly have the misconception that the Portuguese Intelligence Services have all the power to tape wire,
detain and so on. However, by law the Autoridade Tributária currently as far more power to investigate and detain a suspect than the Intelligence Services. An agent from the Intelligence Services cannot detain a suspect it is required to call law enforcement authorities. Although, confronted with an imminent threat, the agent as the same ‘power’ as a civilian if he/she observes a situation of looming danger, it has the power to detain the suspect and hand him/her to the law enforcement authorities afterwards.

- In the United Kingdom, generally speaking, most of the society have a clear perception of the Intelligence Services work, by that we do not mean their mechanisms but the purpose of their existence. In Portugal now, the society is distant and alienated because, a part from other things, the lack of knowledge leads to distrust and suspicion. The best way to earn that trust and respect it is to show the purpose of their existence, to inform, to display that their work is fundamental, the first line of defence to keep the population safe in an opaque perilous world where threats can come from anywhere. To be more effective and accountable we must engage civil society into this subject by improving public perception, public resilience and self-awareness of identifying possible dangerous situations, stress that civil society has a role to play.

- The engagement of the civil society should not be mistaken on
directly preventing terrorism, since there is a risk of creating a
‘paranoid’ society unintentionally. This should pass by engaging the
community on wider safety and security matters. For instance the law
enforcement authorities should establish a relation of trust with
reliable social organisations/authorities, who are directly involved with
its citizens, to create a pattern if there are changes to normal
situations. Henceforth, planning and preparation that guarantee an
effective co-ordination between all the services involved is
strategically crucial.

• By developing a strong and effective working relation between the
intelligence services and the security authorities internally, we are
more able to do it externally, particularly using Portugal’s geostrategic
position and sphere of influence. To tackle threats on time we must do
the effort of, not only share, but also be efficient on complementing
our intelligence with valuable research and analyses from our
international counterparts. Information can be ambiguous and now,
the volume of information that the intelligence services need to
process is enormous. As a result, the prioritisation of tactical analysis
(organisational charts, connections, modus operandi - in particular
logistic support, money laundering and fundraising schemes) is
essential to inform well the politicians so they can take better-
informed decisions. Nevertheless, intelligence is not perfect and
depends upon political will and tenacity to drive an operation forward.

- It is essential to have high quality, focused personnel that are able to produce high quality reports/analysis for an on time intervention and capable of establishing patterns. However, it is important to, once again, ‘read’ the society, to spot the origin of the problem by analysing demography, marginalisation, lack of opportunities, captivating ideological outbursts. At this level a possible structure to prevent and combat terrorism should comprise first tactical analysis complemented by an operative team, both ‘teams’ should have an open communication and be backed with a strong symbiotic, well-defined strategy.

- Through the analyses of the second chapter, we observed the group resilience, creativity, capacity of reinventing themselves especially facing lack of funds. Indeed, the intelligence services cannot use their methods. Nonetheless, it should acquire their spirit of reinventing themselves with a new approach by investing in a diverse group of intelligence analysts/officers in terms of age, social background and gender-balance. It is difficult to predict these kinds of group’s actions, principally if we fail to think differently, fail to exclude all the possibilities, as terrorism is a dynamic, changing phenomenon the intelligence services also should be.

- To conclude, it seems that the Portuguese intelligence services have
the necessary tools to prevent and combat terrorist groups in theory. Although, the fact that they do not have the ability to intercept communications or to detain suspects (two controversial matters), plus possible high budget cuts, may affect their actions, to fulfil its intended purpose.
ABBREVIATIONS

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Annexes
Lebanon Map
Hezbollah Structure by Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh (1993)
Hezbollah Organisational Chart (Adapted from Avon, 2012, p.67)
The Organizational structure of Hezbollah
(The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information, 2003,p.36)
The Chain of Command for External Terrorist Attacks
(Source: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (2012) Portrait of a Terrorist Organization, p.14)

- Hassan Nasrallah
  - Hezbollah leader
- Mustafa Badr al-Din
  - Head of External Operations Networks
- Talal Hamiya
  - Head of Overseas Operations Unit
- Terrorist Operatives in Lebanon and Target Countries Abroad
Hezbollah Profile

- **Name:** Hezbollah (Party of God) also spelled Hizbollah or Hezbullah. Hezbollah has also used the names Revolutionary Justice Organisation and Organisation for the Oppressed Earth, Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Resistance for some operations.

- **Founded:** Early 1980s

- **Home base:** Lebanon. The group also has cells in the North/South America, Asia, Africa and Europe.

- **Backing:** Iran and Syria provide generous organisational, training and financial support.

- **Objectives:** Defined in the “Open Letter” (16/02/1985). Primarily Jihad against the oppressors (particularly US and Israel), instauration of a Shia Islamic Government in the image of the Islamic Republic of Iran (this objective was perhaps abandoned).

- **Organisation:** Please consult the organisational charts aforementioned.

- **Political activity:** Joined the Lebanese political scene in 1992. It is an integral and accepted Lebanese political element, although unlike other groups, they have not renounced violence as a political instrument. The group also provide social welfare services in South Lebanon.
‘Who’s Who’ - Hezbollah Top Figures
(According to Norton, Hamzeh and other sources)

- **Name:** Ruhollah Moosavi Khomeini
  - **Born:** 24 September 1902, Khomeyn, Persia – **Died:** 3 June 1989, Tehran, Iran
  - **Role:** ‘Father’ of the Islamic Revolution; Iranian Supreme Leader

- **Name:** Hassan Nasrallah
  - **Born:** 31 August 1960, Bourj hammoud, Lebanon.
  - **Role:** Secretary General

- **Name:** Imad Mugniyah
  - **Born:** 7 December 1962, Tayr Dibba, Lebanon – **Died:** 12 February 2008, Damascus, Syria.
  - **Role:** Head of Jihad Council

- **Name:** Sheik Mohammad Hussein Fadl-Allah
  - **Born:** 16 November 1935, Najaf, Iraq – **Died:** 4 July 2010
  - **Role:** Hezbollah’s Spiritual Leader

- **Name:** Sheik Naim Qassem
  - **Born:** 1953, Kfar Fila, Lebanon
  - **Role:** Deputy Secretary-General

- **Name:** Hajj Husein Halil
  - **Born:** ?
  - **Role:** Head of Political Advisor

- **Name:** Hashem Safi al-Din
  - **Born:** ?
  - **Role:** Head of Executive Council
• Name: Sheik Muhammad Yazbek
  • Born: ?
  • Role: Head of Judiciary Council

• Name: Abbas al-Mussawi
  • Born: 1952, Al-Nabi Shayth (bekaa valley), Lebanon – Died: 16 February 1992, Nabatieh, Lebanon
  • Role: Co-founder and the first Secretary General of Hezbollah

• Name: Subhi al-Tufayli
  • Born: ?
  • Role: Former Secretary General

• Name: Mustapha Badreddine/Badr al-Din aka “Saab”
  • Born: 6 April 1961
  • Role: Head of Hezbollah´s operational networks (Mughniyeg cousin/brother-in-law)

• Name: Muhammad Baquir al-Sadr
  • Role: Prestigious Ayatollah

• Name: Ibrahim Amin al-Sid
  • Born: ?
  • Role: Head of Political Council

• Name: Musa al-Sadr
  • Born: 4 June 1928, Kom, Iran – Disappeared: 31 August 1979, Lybia
  • Role: Founder of Harakat Amal party (Philosopher and Shia religious leader)
Hezbollah activities in Europe
(Source: Courrier International, September 2013, N.° 211, p.27)
Hezbollah presence in Portuguese speaking countries

(source: Cabrita, Vânia A.)

Hezbollah presence in Portuguese speaking countries with a close relation to Portugal

Portugal Lebanon relation