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THE CONSEQUENCES OF MISOLOGY. SOCRATES' APOLOGY OF DISCOURSE IN THE *PHAEDO*

Abstract: In this article we examine the *Phaedo* section on misology. Socrates tries to identify the nature and origin of μισολογία, as well as its ruinous consequences for the philosophical life. Μισολογία has a disastrous effect on philosophical life, because it consists in hatred of argument and therefore bears the power to undermine the confidence in λόγοι which is the very basis of life devoted to philosophy. Since philosophy is based upon confidence in λόγοι and could consequently be termed a kind of φιλολογία, hatred of argument or μισολογία can be equated with hatred of philosophy. Socrates endeavours to protect philosophy against the dangers of μισολογία. He does this by showing that confidence in λόγοι is the only way to conduct a meaningful life: the philosophical life. He performs an apology for λόγοι, which is an apology for philosophy and a fortiori for his own life: the life of a true φιλόλογος.

Keywords: Arguments; Misology; *Phaedo*; Philology; Plato.

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As consequências da misologia. A apologia socrática do discurso no *Fédon*
Resumo: Neste artigo, consideramos a secção do *Fédon* sobre a misologia. Sócrates procura identificar a natureza e a origem da μισολογία, bem como as suas consequências ruinosas para a vida filosófica. A μισολογία exerce um efeito devastador sobre a vida filosófica, porque consiste no ódio aos argumentos; tem, portanto, o poder de abalar a confiança nos λόγοι, a qual é a própria base da vida filosófica. Na medida em que a filosofia se baseia na confiança nos λόγοι e, por conseguinte, pode ser designada como uma espécie de φιλολογία, o ódio aos argumentos ou μισολογία pode ser identificado com o ódio à filosofia. Socrates esforça-se por proteger a filosofia contra os perigos da μισολογία. Fá-lo mostrando que a confiança nos λόγοι é o único caminho para viver uma vida com sentido: a vida filosófica. Sócrates leva a cabo uma apologia dos λόγοι, a qual é uma apologia da filosofia e *a fortiori* da sua própria vida: a vida de um verdadeiro φιλόλογος.
Palavras-chave: Argumentos; *Fédon*; Filologia; Misologia; Platão.

1. Introduction. Socrates' First Three Arguments and Simmias' and Cebes' Objections to Them. The Effect of Simmias' and Cebes' Objections upon the Audience. Immortality of the Soul and Meaningfulness of Life

At the very moment when he is about to die, Socrates and his friends decide they will try to find out whether or not the human soul is immortal. There could hardly be a stronger connection between the main theme and the existential circumstances of the *Phaedo*[1]. However, the connection is still stronger than this. Because Socrates has been devoting his life to philosophy and understands philosophy as a way of learning to die in the present life (in the sense of preparing oneself for contemplating eternal truth in an immortal

[1] See D. Jacquette, «Socrates on the Moral Mischief of Misology», *Argumentation*, 28 (2014) 5: «It is likely part of the unspoken subtext of Plato's many-layered dialogue that Socrates chooses to address the threat of misology shortly before his death, since it would be not unreasonable to imagine his followers easily becoming misologues through resentment of the kind of argument that seems to have brought Socrates to his final tragic lethal punishment.» Although Jacquette seems to recognise that there is a connection between the main theme and the existential situation of the *Phaedo* (namely, through the topic of misology) we think he misunderstands what the grounds of such connection are. As we shall see more clearly, the main theme and the existential situation of the *Phaedo* are strongly connected not so much because Socrates' imminent death could cause his companions to become μισόλογοι, as because the fact that Socrates is about to die leads him and his followers to the question of whether their lives have been making any sense. Contrary to what Jacquette states in the passage quoted, misology does not arise out of resentment at the condemnation of Socrates, but rather out of the fact that the validity of Socrates' first three arguments in favour of the immortality of the human soul is threatened by Simmias' and Cebes' objections.

afterlife), the question whether or not the human soul is immortal amounts to whether or not Socrates' life (a philosopher's life) has any meaning and ultimate justification. In this sense, arguing for the immortality of the soul (which is what Socrates spends the entire *Phaedo* doing) corresponds to an apology for the philosophical life (for Socrates' own life – cfr. 69e3-4)[2]. In other words, it corresponds to an account of the ultimate reason why dedicating one's life to philosophy is not absurd and might constitute a worthy enterprise (in fact, the only worthy enterprise in human life).

In the following paper we will be examining the *Phaedo* section on misology (89d1-91c6). In this section Socrates tries to identify the nature and origin of μισολογία, as well as its ruinous consequences for the philosophical life. According to Socrates in the *Phaedo*, μισολογία has a disastrous effect on philosophical life, because it consists in hatred of argument and therefore bears the power to undermine the confidence in λόγοι which is the very basis of life devoted to philosophy. In other words, since philosophy is based upon confidence in λόγοι and could consequently be termed a kind of φιλολογία, hatred of argument or μισολογία can be equated with hatred of philosophy[3]. In the *Phaedo* Socrates endeavours to protect philosophy against the dangers of μισολογία. He does this by showing that confidence in λόγοι is the only way to conduct a meaningful life (the philosophical life). In other words, in the *Phaedo* Socrates performs an apology for λόγοι, which is an apology for philosophy and a fortiori for his own life (the life of a true φιλόλογος)[4].

[2] For a similar view, see J. Dalfen, «Philologia und Vertrauen (Über Platons eigenartigen Dialog Phaidon)», *Grazer Beiträge*, 20 (1994) 41, 50; S. Špinka, «*Katharsis katharseôs*: Philosophie als "Flucht in die *logoi*" und als "Reinigung"», in A. Havlíček (ed.), *Plato's Phaedo*, Oikoymenh, Prague 2001, p. 287.

[3] See Jacquette, «The Moral Mischief of Misology», art. cit., p. 2: «Misology, as Socrates explains, by analogy with misanthropy as the hatred of humanity, is the hatred of *logos*, of words, in one sense, but more relevantly of discussion, logical reasoning, and argument.» Jacquette is right in his account of the meaning of λόγος in the composition of the term μισολογία. However, a full account of the term μισολογία requires attention to be given to the fact that μισολογία is the opposite of φιλοσοφία. For philosophy is tantamount to a form of life devoted to λόγοι. Hatred of argument should, therefore, be equated with hatred of a form of life devoted to arguments.

[4] On the importance of the section on misology for the *Phaedo* as a whole, see Dalfen, «Philologia und Vertrauen», art. cit., pp. 35, 37: «In der Verunsicherung und der Enttäuschung, in welche die Zuhörer durch die Einwände des Simmias und Kebes geraten sind, sieht Sokrates die große Gefahr, daß sie das Vertrauen in die Tragfähigkeit der *logoi* verlieren und sich in ihrem künftigen Leben nicht mehr an ihnen orientieren. Der ganze Dialog Phaidon ist eine Demonstration, wie Sokrates diese Gefahr aus dem Weg räumen will: im Intermezzo läßt Platon die Personen seines Textes explizit darüber sprechen, was er implizit den ganzen Dialog hindurch darstellt.» On the singularity of this *intermezzo* of the *Phaedo* in comparison with those of other Platonic dialogues, see D. Frede, *Platons «Phaidon»: Der Traum von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1999, p. 85.

Up until the section on μισολογία Socrates presents a few arguments for the immortality of the human soul:

1) The cyclical argument (70c4-72d10), according to which the dead come from the living and vice versa;
2) The recollection argument (72e1-77a5), according to which the human soul, because it possesses a kind of innate knowledge, must have existed elsewhere before coming to this life;
3) The affinity argument (78b2-80b8), according to which the human soul, due to a greater affinity between it and the realm of intelligible forms, shares the latter's indestructibility.

However, both Simmias and Cebes have doubts about these arguments or, rather, about the survival of the human soul after death, which Socrates' first three arguments were supposed to be able to prove. Each of them, therefore, raises an objection to Socrates' arguments:

a) Simmias presents the soul-harmony theory (85b10-86e5), according to which the human soul consists in the harmony of the bodily parts the soul's existence depends upon[5].
b) Cebes objects to Socrates' arguments by presenting a theory of the body as the human soul's garment (86e6-88b8); according to Cebes, the fact that the human soul outlives a great number of garments does not necessarily entail that the soul will outlast all of its garments[6].

The details of both Simmias' and Cebes' objections should not concern us here. However, to be aware of the exchange of arguments between Socrates and his two companions is absolutely decisive for understanding why Socrates' reflections on the consequences of μισολογία and his apology for λόγοι take place. For Simmias' and Cebes' objections to Socrates' arguments have a tremendous impact upon the validity of the latter from the audience's perspective and could give rise to hatred of argument in the souls of the listeners of the conversation[7]. Indeed, up to this point Socrates arguments are

[5] R. Burger, *The Phaedo: A Platonic Labyrinth*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1984, p. 247 n. 2, points out that Simmias' soul-harmony theory originally derived from the Pythagorean Philolaus.

[6] K. Dorter, *Plato's Phaedo: An Interpretation*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1982, p. 87, points to the fact that Simmias' and Cebes' arguments are, more often than not, treated by Socrates as one single argument. Cfr. 89a4, a8, c3-4, 91b7-8 (where both arguments are referred to in the singular).

[7] For a more detailed summary of Socrates' first three arguments and Simmias' and Cebes' objections to them, see D. Sedley and A. Long (eds.), *Plato: Meno and Phaedo*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, pp. xxiv-xxv, xxvi-xxxi.

convincing for at least the majority of those who are with him during his last moments. Socrates' friends (with the exception of Simmias and Cebes) are persuaded by Socrates' arguments that the human soul is immortal and will survive bodily death. However, Simmias' and Cebes' objections come to shake their confidence in Socrates' arguments, that is, in the human soul's survival after death. Socrates' companions (as well as Echechrates) now become persuaded or convinced of the strength and validity of both Simmias' and Cebes' objections. In other terms, all listeners and readers of the exchange of arguments between Socrates and his two friends are thrown back and forth between opposite arguments about the immortality of the soul. At one moment they are persuaded that the soul is immortal. At another moment they are persuaded that the soul might not be immortal. The back-and-forth movement between opposite arguments (or between the opposite theses such arguments speak in favour of) is confusing for those who are listening to the conversation between Socrates and his two dialogue partners[8]. What is more, this back-and-forth movement causes deep uncertainty in the minds of the listeners of the conversation – not only about which series of arguments is true (whether Socrates' or Simmias' and Cebes' arguments), but also and more fundamentally about the validity of arguments as such and the very intelligibility of reality.

The extension of the suspicion about the validity of arguments and the intelligibility of reality from the immediate audience of the conversation to its narrators and the whole universe of readers of the *Phaedo* becomes plain in 88c1-7, where Phaedo suddenly and unexpectedly interrupts the narration to tell of the feeling of discomfort, trouble and unbelief generated by Simmias' and Cebes' objections to Socrates[9]:

> «Now when we all heard them say this our mood took an unpleasant turn, as we later told each other, because we had been firmly persuaded by the earlier argument, but then they seemed to have disturbed us all over again and sent us plummeting into doubt, not just about the arguments given before,

[8] Špinka, «*Katharsis katharseôs*», art. cit., pp. 297-300, maintains that a relationship exists between this experience of instability in the realm of λόγοι and the instability one experiences in the realm of the body.

[9] The fact that the suspicion about the validity of Socrates' arguments extends from the immediate audience to the narrators of the *Phaedo*, is widely accepted by Plato scholars – see e.g. Dalfen, «Philologia und Vertrauen», art. cit., p. 44; Dorter, *Plato's Phaedo*, op. cit., p. 87; T. Ebert (trans.), *Platon: Phaidon*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2004, p. 301; Frede, *Platons «Phaidon»*, op. cit., pp. 85-86.

> but also about what would be said later. We were worried that we might be worthless as judges, or even that the very facts of the matter might merit doubt»[10].

The sense of loss and oscillation between arguments in favour of and against the immortality of the soul is also experienced by Echechrates in 88c8-d3 (right after Phaedo's words quoted above):

> «Heavens, Phaedo, I quite sympathize with you. Now that I too have heard you, it makes me too say something like this to myself: "What argument will we still trust now? How utterly persuasive the argument was that Socrates was giving, yet now it has been plunged into doubt"»[11]!

The passages quoted above are saturated with terms from the semantic field of πίστις and πειθώ[12]. What is more, the passages in question point to the unpleasant, troubled situation in which the listeners of the conversation are left after becoming aware that Socrates' arguments might not be true. In other words, the passages in 88c1-7 and 88c8-d3 show that a close connection exists between, on the one hand, absence of belief and conviction and, on the other hand, agony or distress felt towards the very situation absence of belief and conviction has brought one into. The reason why this connection exists is that it has to do with the destiny of the human soul after death. Indeed, one of the core constituents of our untroubled relationship to ourselves and

[10] Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ᾖ. The Greek text is quoted from E. A. Duke (ed.), *Platonis opera*, 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995. We use the English translation in Sedley and Long, *Meno and Phaedo*, op. cit.

[11] Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται· «Τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὤν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν.»

[12] On the important role played in the *Phaedo* by the notions of πίστις, πειθώ and δόξα, see Dalfen, «Philologia und Vertrauen», art. cit., pp. 38, 46; Dorter, *Plato's Phaedo*, op. cit., p. 94. However, we do not think – as Dalfen and Dorter do – that the use of the vocabulary of belief, persuasion and conviction is responsible for the introduction of a subjective-emotional and non-disinterested (non-philosophical) dimension into Socrates' argumentation strategy. For given the limitations of human knowledge – given that human knowledge is not capable of achieving a full grasp of truth (at least in the present life) – any objective-rational and disinterested (philosophical) enquiry must necessarily involve persuasion of (oneself and) others and result in a state of belief and conviction about the thesis one has been persuaded of.

to the world we live in consists in the fact that we possess certainty about the destiny of the human soul after bodily death. In the *Phaedo* we can find references to Greek religious beliefs about the soul's destiny in the afterlife, cultural disbelief in the immortality of the soul and Socrates' philosophical attitude, which consists in trying to rationally prove that the soul is immortal. In none of these references is there an indication that some sort of agony or anxiety is likely to arise due to any one of the aforementioned kinds of certainty about the soul's survival after death. The possession of any kind of certainty in this connection (regardless of what the particular content of the certainty is and the specific way in which the certainty was achieved) is, therefore, apparently enough for us to establish and to maintain a peaceful, untroubled relationship to ourselves and to the world. The question whether the content of the aforementioned certainty is important in establishing an unworried, safe relationship to our existential situation should not concern us in detail here. Nevertheless, as the *Phaedo* progresses – as we progressively become aware that upon the immortality of the human soul depends not only the meaningfulness of philosophical life but also the meaningfulness of human life as such (insofar as every form of human life possesses a philosophical nature or an inherent relationship to truth) – it turns out that the content of the certainty about the human soul's survival after death is not at all unimportant. If the meaningfulness of philosophical life depends upon the truth that the human soul is immortal, and if every form of human life has a philosophical nature, then the meaningfulness of every form of human life must stand or fall with the truth that the human soul is immortal[13]. To put it another way, the fact or even the possibility that the human soul is not immortal is likely to cause worry and anxiety in the minds of the listeners of Socrates' discussion with his two interlocutors[14]. Indeed, such a fact or such a

[13] We should like to argue against the view maintained by R. Woolf, «Misology and Truth», *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 23 (2007) 7: «(…) the dialogue presents what it takes to be a highly attractive picture of immortal souls in communion with everlasting Forms; and that this picture is so vigorously defended, at least in part, because it is such an attractive one.» The immortality of the human soul is not merely an attractive possibility, but rather that upon which the whole meaningfulness of human life is grounded. J. Wood too, in his reply to Woolf, seems to totally miss the point at stake in the *Phaedo*: «(…) Socrates (or Plato) is not advocating an otherworldly escapism in this dialogue, but a certain way of living in the light of exalting and ennobling possibility (…).» (Ibid., pp. 22-23) In fact, the question of the human soul's immortality is fundamentally not that of which form of life is more exalting and ennobling – but that of the truth of the only single fact that can give meaning to human life.

[14] Woolf, «Misology and Truth», art. cit., p. 12, recognises that despair might arise should the demonstration(s) of the human soul's immortality be refuted: «It is psychologically plausible that despair about the possibility of having good grounds to believe at all should arise from the

possibility can profoundly disturb our peaceful (unreflective) relationship to ourselves and to the world. Once we become aware of even the possibility that our soul may not be immortal, our relationship to ourselves and to the world will remain disturbed until it has been proved that the soul is immortal. The confusion and uneasiness felt by the entire audience to Socrates' conversation with Simmias and Cebes is caused by the fact that uncertainty about the immortality of the soul amounts to the possibility that the soul is not immortal – and such a possibility is enough to cause one's relationship to oneself and to the world to fall into uneasiness. To put it a bit differently, the confusion and uneasiness felt by the audience of the conversation is produced by the fact that the course of the dialogue changes from a situation in which the immortality of the soul is considered proved into a situation in which uncertainty as to the immortality of the soul prevails. In the *Phaedo* the power of λόγοι to reach truth is assessed in terms of its capacity to prove that the human soul is immortal (and not merely in terms of its ability to determine whether or not the soul is immortal)[15]. If the λόγοι of the *Phaedo* were able to demonstrate that the soul is not immortal, one's trouble and anxiety about one's existential situation would not go away. In the *Phaedo* μισολογία is hatred of argument insofar as hatred of argument is caused by the (at least momentary) inability of λόγοι to indisputably demonstrate that the soul is immortal.

The central role played in human life by one's conviction that one's soul is immortal can be seen through Echechrates' curiosity about how Socrates handled his two companions' arguments and whether he did this in an adequate fashion:

> «So for heaven's sake tell me how Socrates pursued the argument. Was he too at all noticeably upset, as you say the rest of you were, or did he instead come calmly to the argument's rescue? And was his help sufficient, or inadequate? Please go through everything for us as accurately as you can»[16].

undermining not of anything about which we happen to have been persuaded argumentatively, but of the category of conclusions we have found especially attractive or uplifting.» In our view, however, the despair (worry or anxiety) does not arise out of the fact that what is refuted is an attractive or uplifting thesis, but out of the circumstance in which the only single thesis that can make human life meaningful is refuted.

[15] We agree with Woolf («Misology and Truth», art. cit., pp. 5-6, 9) that Socrates' position is ideological – however, in the sense that in the *Phaedo* Socrates does not intend to rescue all arguments from the dangers of misology, but only those in favour of human soul's immortality.

[16] 88d8-e4: λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διὸς πῇ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κἀκεῖνος, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς φῄς, ἔνδηλός τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πρᾴως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῖν δίελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

Echechrates' curiosity is not a disinterested one. Echechrates is seeking to find out how Socrates dealt with a couple of objections which shook the conviction that the soul is immortal – that is, a conviction upon which Echechrates' untroubled relationship to his own existential situation depends. The passage quoted makes clear that the question at issue is so decisive for how one is existentially situated that Echechrates is not at all interested in a demonstration of the human soul's immortality regardless of the truth of such a demonstration. Echechrates is interested in knowing not only whether or not a demonstration of the human soul's immortality has been achieved, but also whether or not it has been achieved by means of an adequate procedure. We can extend Echechrates' interest in Socrates' response to his friends' objections in exactly the same terms to all listeners of their exchange of arguments.

2. The Peculiarity of Socrates' Stance. On What Should Be Mourned. The Transindividuality of λόγοι. The Perfectibility of λόγοι

Of course, Socrates too is interested in the outcome of the whole discussion on the immortality of the human soul. This issue is as fundamental for Socrates as it is for all the listeners of the debate in course. However, Socrates is in a peculiar situation. Socrates' untroubled relationship to his existential situation depends upon the outcome of a «journey» in which he acts as the main guide. To put it in other words, to the extent that in the *Phaedo* (as in the majority of the Platonic dialogues) it is Socrates who leads the discussion, Socrates is responsible for the untroubledness not only of his relationship to his existential situation but also of that of the listeners of the conversation. Therefore, Socrates should be at least as confused and troubled as the rest of the audience. Nevertheless, Socrates is depicted as calmly reacting to the uneasiness of the situation. Socrates' state of mind before the difficulties his first arguments in favour of the immortality of the human soul fall into, is beautifully expressed in Phaedo's answer to Echechrates' question:

> «Well, Echecrates, I'd often admired Socrates, but I never respected him more than when I was with him then. Now perhaps there is nothing surprising in his having something to say. But I particularly admired in him first how pleasantly, genially and respectfully he took in the young men's argument,

> then how discerningly he noticed the effect the arguments had had on us, and next how well he cured us and rallied us when we'd taken to our heels in defeat, so to speak, and spurred us on to follow at his side and consider the argument with him»[17].

Phaedo is completely amazed at Socrates' attitude towards such a worrying situation. Phaedo is more amazed with Socrates than he has ever been amazed with him before. In the passage quoted Phaedo lets us know exactly what the causes of his perplexity towards Socrates are. Phaedo is astonished by

i) Socrates' serenity in such a stressful situation;
ii) Socrates' perspicacity in understanding how confused and troubled his companions are after his first three arguments are put in jeopardy;
iii) Socrates' respectful attitude towards his friends' state of mind;
iv) Socrates' ability to adequately respond to the challenge of curing his friends from a dangerous disease later called μισολογία.

Phaedo's astonishment towards Socrates' reaction is not difficult to understand. How can Socrates be so calm and lucid in the face of such a tremendous possibility: that the immortality of the human soul is not rationally verifiable and consequently every form of human life might be simply meaningless? However, Socrates' calmness and lucidity are not due to the fact that he is already in possession of a rationally valid demonstration of the human soul's immortality which he has not yet presented. In fact, Socrates is in a similar situation to that of his listeners. The possibility that the human soul is mortal and human life is meaningless has had an enormous impact on Socrates' relationship to his existential situation, too. In truth, Socrates' situation is even more stressful than that of his companions. Socrates will not live much longer, and the meaningfulness of his whole life depends on finding a rationally valid demonstration of the human soul's immortality. In spite of the fact that his first three arguments are put into question, Socrates remains calm and lucid, because he maintains his confidence in the capacity of rational argumentation to reach the truth about the human soul's immortality, that is, to demonstrate that the human soul is immortal. Phaedo's depiction of

[17] 88e5-89a8: Καὶ μήν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ᾔσθετο ὃ ᾽πεπόνθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

Socrates' attitude towards the present uncertainty about what the destiny of the human soul after death is intends to present Socrates as the φιλόλογος κατ' ἐξοχήν – as one who above all others remains confident in the power of λόγοι as the single means by which every form of human life might not have been conducted in vain. Phaedo's words quoted above draw a picture of what the right stance towards the danger of μισολογία is, even before we have become acquainted with Socrates' explanation of the nature and causes of this perilous disease.

After having drawn this sort of romantic picture of Socrates, Phaedo refers to Socrates' affectionate gesture towards him (89a10-b4). At the time when Socrates' conversation with his friends took place, Phaedo had grown long hair. After giving Phaedo's head a stroke and squeezing the hair on Phaedo's neck (89b2-3), Socrates addressed him with a few, significant words. Through Socrates' address to Phaedo, we understand that Phaedo has decided to cut his hair the following day as a sign of mourning for Socrates' imminent death[18]. Socrates says to Phaedo that he should not wait for the next day to cut his hair. Should he and Phaedo not be able to bring the λόγοι in favour of the immortality of the human soul back to life, they should rather both cut their hair today:

> «So tomorrow, Phaedo, I expect you'll cut off these beautiful locks.» «I suppose so, Socrates», I said. «You won't, if you follow my advice.» «What then?» «I'll cut off my locks», he said, «and you'll cut off these ones today – if our argument dies and we can't revive it»[19].

According to this passage, Phaedo's mourning should be directed not towards Socrates' imminent death but rather towards the λόγοι in favour of human soul's immortality being dead. In the passage quoted Socrates suggests that the λόγοι in question are much more important than himself in terms of rationally proving that the human soul is immortal and human life is therefore meaningful. The lack of power to rationally prove the immortality of the human soul and the meaningfulness of human life as such is what really deserves to be mourned (not Socrates as an individual person). What

[18] On this topic, see Frede, *Platons «Phaidon»*, op. cit., p. 86.

[19] 89b4-c1: (…) Αὔριον δή, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερῇ. Ἔοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὔκ, ἄν γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ. Ἀλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι.

is more, mourning for the death of the λόγοι at issue is much more urgent than mourning for Socrates' imminent death, for these λόγοι (or rather, the confidence Socrates' companions have in them) are already dying. What really matters now is to bring these λόγοι (or rather, the confidence Socrates' companions have in them) to life again.

However, the power of arguments to attain a rational demonstration of the immortality of the human soul should not be considered a value in itself. Such arguments (in fact, all arguments) should not be deemed worthy of being searched for, if they are to remain detached from a desirable impact on the course of human life[20]. Socrates' address to Phaedo in 89b4-c1 implies that saving the power of arguments to rationally prove the immortality of the human soul is more fundamental to human life as such than love for (and the reputation of) each individual person – even if that person is Socrates. Nevertheless, this does not mean that rational arguments for the immortality of the human soul should be saved for their own sake. Instead, it means that such rational arguments are more important than any given individual person, because they should serve the lives of all currently existing human beings as well as the lives of all human beings who might exist in the near or distant future. To state it very briefly, the value of such arguments transcends the

[20] In this light, Dalfen's («Philologia und Vertrauen», art. cit., p. 39) distinction between the pragmatic and the dramatic level of the *Phaedo* is too sharp: «Der Dialog hat eine pragmatische und eine dramatische Ebene. Auf der pragmatischen liegt die Sache, die von den Personen gesprochen wird, auf der dramatischen das Verhalten der Personen der Sache und den Gesprächspartnern gegenüber, ihre Aktionen und Interaktionen.» From our point of view, there would not have been any discussion on the immortality of the human soul in the *Phaedo*, if there had not in the first place been a personal relationship of the interlocutors in the dialogue to the subject of human soul's immortality. Woolf («Misology and Truth», art. cit., p. 10) rightly points out that enquiry into truth must have a motivational basis in order to take place: «Truth as a merely formal end seems too thin (from a psychological point of view) to get enquiry going. Aristotle tells us that we all desire to know. But he would be happy to admit that most of us have no desire to know (for example) the exact number of hairs on one's head. Such cases suffice to indicate that "truth for its own sake" is, in itself, a dubious motivation and may not be all there is to Socrates' conception of being philosophical. To care simply that one reaches truth, whatever it may be, is to be disinterested as to outcome. But what motivates is something about the putative object of enquiry – some aspect (or perceived aspect) that strikes us as fascinating, mysterious or noble. After all, in other parts of the *Phaedo,* not to mention the *Republic* and elsewhere, being a philosopher is intimately connected with having and pursuing a certain definite and purportedly inspiring, vision of reality.» However, Woolf's conception of the kind of truth one is motivated to search for is weak. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates and his companions are not in search of a fascinating, mysterious or noble truth. Instead, they are looking for a meaning-giving truth (and therefore a reassuring one). A few sentences later, Woolf (ibid., pp. 10-11) maintains that «The truths one is motivated to seek for their own sake need not be ones whose discovery one expects to welcome, but they must at minimum be ones whose content or subject-matter one has some concern with.» However, he leaves the nature of that concern indeterminate. The problem is that the identification of the nature of such concern is crucial to understanding what is fundamentally at stake in the *Phaedo*.

value of the life of every individual person; it is, so to speak, transindividual. What is more, such arguments should be true; that is to say, they should be developed according to the rules of rational argumentation[21]. Therefore, the transindividuality of the arguments at issue also has to do with the fact that they should be true arguments. In other words, one should not adopt the thesis about the question of the human soul's immortality which best suits one's individual selfish interest, regardless of the truth value of that thesis and of whether that thesis is the outcome of a rigorous rational procedure[22].

Near the end of the section on μισολογία (91b7-c6), Socrates insists on this same idea of transindividuality, but in much more precise terms:

> This then, Simmias and Cebes, is the baggage I bring with me when approaching the argument. But as for you, if you take my advice, you'll give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth: if you think I say something true, agree with me, and if not, use every argument to resist me, making sure that my eagerness doesn't make me deceive myself and you simultaneously, and that I don't leave my sting in you, like a bee, before I depart[23].

In this passage Socrates explicitly says that ἀλήθεια is what one should really give thought to. Furthermore, Socrates refers to the procedure that should be followed in order for one not to deceive oneself and others as to the truth of the arguments for the human soul's immortality. According to Socrates, the right procedure to be applied to the discussion of the arguments for the immortality of the human soul, assuring the rationality of this discussion, consists in

i) the exposition of arguments for the immortality of the human soul,
ii) agreement with these arguments on the part of the interlocutors, if they find the arguments at issue true,
or iii) resistance to these arguments on the part of the interlocutors, if they find the arguments in question false.

[21] For a summary of the rules rational argumentation should follow see Jacquette, «The Moral Mischief of Misology», art. cit., p. 2.

[22] On falseness and illusion as possible consequences of enquiries into truth which are motivated by one's individual selfish interest, see Dalfen, «Philologia und Vertrauen», art. cit., p. 38; Frede, *Platons «Phaidon»*, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

[23] παρεσκευασμένος δή, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὑτωσὶ ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.

The dialogical preconditions for rationality and truth now expounded, which should be complied with in order for the immortality of the human soul to be adequately proved, constitute the preconditions for the rationality and truth of Socrates' arguments against μισολογία, too.

As we have seen above, Socrates is in a peculiar situation. By arguing in favour of the immortality of the human soul, Socrates is trying to make sense of philosophy (his lifelong activity). However, to the extent that Socrates is a sort of mentor for his companions, he feels himself responsible for them. Socrates wishes his friends' confidence in rational argumentation for the human soul's immortality does not die in their hearts. To understand in more precise terms how Socrates conceives of his responsibility towards his friends is decisive for our purpose here. For the way in which Socrates sees himself as responsible for the meaningfulness of his friends' lives will reveal what the status of Socrates' statements against μισολογία towards the λόγοι for the immortality of the human soul is and how Socrates' friends should hear these statements. The relevant passage in this respect is 91a3-b3:

> For when they [sc. those who are fond of victory] are at odds about something, they also do not care about the facts of the matter they are arguing about, but strive to make what they themselves have proposed seem true to those who are present. And I think that now I will differ from them only to this extent: I won't strive to make what I say seem true to those who are present, except as a by product, but instead to make it seem so as much as possible to myself. For I reckon, my dear friend – see how ambitious I'm being – that if what I'm saying is actually true, then it's quite right to be convinced (…)[24].

Socrates' words in this passage are quite odd. For Socrates' position here seems to contradict what we said above about Socrates' responsibility for the meaningfulness of his companions' lives. Socrates says, namely, that he is worried only about convincing himself of the truth of his own statements. Of course, it may happen that in the process of convincing himself Socrates also convinces his friends that what he is saying is true – but, as Socrates himself

[24] καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι [sc. οἱ φιλόνικοι] ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε – θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς – εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι (…).

indicates, this would be merely a by-product of his convincing himself about the truth of his own statements. However, we should not take Socrates' position at face value. First, as readers of Plato's dialogues, we should be well aware that Socrates is most conscious of the limitations of direct communication. Therefore, we should not expect Socrates to assume the responsibility for the meaningfulness of his companions' lives by directly communicating to them perfect demonstrations of the immortality of the human soul and objective rules of conduct against μισολογία. Secondly, we should bear in mind that Socrates is responsible for the meaningfulness of his own life too – that is to say, for demonstrating to himself that the human soul is immortal and μισολογία is dangerous when it comes to conducting a meaningful human life. In this connection, Socrates does not experience a problem of communication – but rather of internal clarification of his own λόγοι for the immortality of the human soul. If, on the one hand, direct communication to others with respect to the immortality of the human soul and the dangers of μισολογία is not possible, on the other hand, internal clarification of one's own λόγοι for the immortality of the human soul and against μισολογία is difficult and complex – but in principle possible. Therefore, there seems to be only one way for Socrates to assume responsibility for both the meaningfulness of his own life and the meaningfulness of his companions' lives – namely, to devote himself to the task of achieving internal clarification of his own λόγοι for the immortality of the soul and against μισολογία, and to share the outcome of this internal clarification with his companions by discussing the truth value of its outcome with them. Socrates' friends should in turn open themselves up to Socrates' argumentation and try to find out for themselves whether or not Socrates' argumentation is true. For the only way for one to achieve rational clarity in one's own life and in one's own existential situation is through either an individual search for such clarity or the clarifying effect of a joint discussion about one's own personal life. In sum, Socrates assumes responsibility for the meaningfulness of the lives of his companions by sharing and discussing with them his arguments for the immortality of the human soul and against μισολογία. Socrates' friends will in turn have the possibility of making sense of their lives and protecting themselves against μισολογία, should they open themselves critically to Socrates' discussion of his arguments with them. In the end, according to Socrates (or at least, according to Plato in the *Phaedo*) to prove the immortality of the human soul and to fight against μισολογία (in short, to make sense of one's life) is always an individual enterprise.

The passage in 91a3-b3 is important in yet another respect. Socrates uses

the notion of δοκεῖν or δόξα in it in two different senses:

i) δοκεῖν or δόξα in the sense of «illusion» («appearance of something being true, when in fact it is not»);

ii) δοκεῖν or δόξα in the sense of «truth insofar as it appears to one» («truth as a mode of being of what appears to one»)[25].

The two different uses of δοκεῖν or δόξα should not concern us here in detail. We should like to point to one single aspect of δοκεῖν or δόξα in the second sense referred to above – namely, the fact that δοκεῖν or δόξα defines the peculiarity of the human condition with respect to access to truth. The notion of δοκεῖν or δόξα in the second sense (and to the extent that it defines the human condition in terms of knowledge capacity) indicates that human access to truth is always limited and partial – and therefore always perfectible. As we shall see more clearly below, the notion of δοκεῖν or δόξα in the second sense plays a central role in terms of understanding the particular lack of τέχνη concerning the very status of λόγοι for the immortality of the human soul, which Socrates deems the real cause of μισολογία. Furthermore, the notion of δοκεῖν or δόξα in the second sense characterises the knowledge limitations (the knowledge partiality) both Socrates and his friends are suffering from when they are discussing the immortality of the human soul and the dangers of μισολογία. To state it very briefly, Socrates' and his friends' λόγοι about the question of the immortality of the human soul and the perils of μισολογία are not the final word on the matter. In sum, their λόγοι are perfectible – both in the sense that they are able to achieve greater clarity on the matters at issue, and in the sense that they are capable of better defending themselves against objections which may call them into question in the future.

3. The Analogy between μισολογία and μισανθρωπία. The Cause of μισανθρωπία. The Experience Involved in Both μισολογία and μισανθρωπία. The Difference between μισολογία and μισανθρωπία: The Cause of μισολογία

In 89c11-e3 Socrates draws an analogy between μισολογία and μισανθρωπία («hatred of argument» and «hatred of man»):

[25] On the positive sense of δοκεῖν or δόξα in the *Phaedo*, see Dalfen, «Philologia und Vertrauen», art. cit., p. 50.

> «But first let's make sure that a certain thing doesn't happen to us.» «What sort of thing?» I asked. «Becoming haters of arguments», he said, «like those who come to hate people. Because there's no greater evil that could happen to one than hating arguments. Hating arguments and hating people come about in the same way. For misanthropy sets in as a result of putting all one's trust in someone and doing so without expertise, and taking the person to be entirely truthful, sound and trustworthy, and then a little later finding him to be wicked and untrustworthy – and then again with someone else. When this happens to someone many times, particularly with those whom he would take to be his very closest friends, and he has been falling out with people again and again, he ends up hating everyone and thinking that there is nothing sound in anyone at all»[26].

According to Socrates, μισολογία and μισανθρωπία are born in the same way. Socrates establishes an analogy between μισολογία and μισανθρωπία in terms of their γένεσις («generation» or «coming-to-be»). First of all, Socrates tries to give an account of how μισανθρωπία arises. Μισανθρωπία – Socrates says – arises out of

i) an exaggerated, inexperienced belief in someone's truthfulness and trustworthiness;
ii) a subsequent revelation that it is in fact the exact opposite which is true – that the person whose truthfulness and trustworthiness one believed in is in fact a wicked and unworthy person;
iii) the frequency with which the belief in someone's truthfulness and trustworthiness changes into its exact opposite – into disbelief in such person's truthfulness and trustworthiness;
iv) the fact that this also happens with one's closest friends;
v) a sort of induction – the result of which is that one ends up hating everyone else for their supposedly false truthfulness and trustworthiness (for their supposedly unsound nature and character).

Next, Socrates focuses on what he takes to be the real cause of

[26] ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι· ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἄν τις μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἥ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν.

μισανθρωπία – the αἰτία that unleashes the whole process constituting misanthropy referred to above:

> «Now this is deplorable», he said, «and obviously someone like that was trying to deal with people without having expertise in human qualities, wasn't he? For surely if he had been doing so with expertise he'd have viewed matters as they really are: he would have recognized that both the very good and the very wicked are few in number, and that those in between are the most numerous»[27].

According to Socrates in this passage, the real cause of μισανθρωπία consists in a lack of τέχνη on the part of the μισάνθρωποι – namely, a τέχνη concerning τἀνθρώπεια («human qualities» or «human affairs»)[28]. What kind of skill concerning human qualities or affairs is at stake here? Socrates indicates that the lack of τέχνη at issue here corresponds to a lack of insight into the nature and character of human beings – into how human qualities are distributed among human beings. Men are liable to become μισάνθρωποι when they are unable to see the difference between the nature and character of the great majority of human beings, on the one hand, and the nature and character of a very little minority of human beings, on the other. According to Socrates, only very few men can be adequately labelled either very good or very wicked. The majority of men are – as Socrates states – situated in between the very good and the very bad. Socrates' words suggest that the majority of men are both good and bad – that they have a mixed nature or character. The misanthropist's lack of τέχνη («skill» or «insight») has to do with his mixing up what is a feature of only a very few men – namely, extreme goodness – with the nature and character of mankind as such. Men can become misanthropists because they attribute to all human beings what is a characteristic of only a few – because all human beings appear to them to be extremely good (when in fact they are not). To put it slightly differently, men can become misanthropists because their perspective or point of view is usually dominated by δοκεῖν or δόξα in the first sense (in the sense of

[27] 89e6-90a2: Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπεχείρει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρῆτο, ὥσπερ ἔχει οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.

[28] On the subject of lack of τέχνη in the misology section of the *Phaedo*, see Dorter, *Plato's Phaedo*, op. cit., p. 92; Ebert, *Platon: Phaidon*, op. cit., pp. 302-303; Woolf, «Misology and Truth», art. cit., p. 3.

«illusion» or «appearance of something being true when in fact it is not») as to what human nature or character as such is.

In 90b4-9, Socrates completes his analogy between μισολογία and μισανθρωπία:

> «All the same, arguments do not resemble people in that way (I was following your lead just now), but in the following way: when someone without expertise in arguments trusts an argument to be true, and then a little later thinks that it is false, sometimes when it is, sometimes when it isn't, and when he does the same again with one argument after another»[29].

In the passage quoted Socrates begins by pointing to the fact that a difference exists between misology and misanthropy. Only after this does Socrates finish his analogy between misology and misanthropy, which he begins in 89d1. However, for the sake of convenience, we will proceed in the reverse order. First of all, we will call attention to the similarities between the process constituting μισολογία and that constituting μισανθρωπία. Thereafter, we will focus on the difference between the two phenomena, which Socrates refers to at the beginning of 90b4-9.

Socrates' account of the process constituting μισολογία in the context of the aforementioned analogy is not difficult to pin down in the light of what we have already pointed out above with respect to the process constituting μισανθρωπία. According to Socrates in 90b4-9, μισολογία arises out of

i) a lack of τέχνη with respect to λόγοι;
ii) a switch from the belief that a given argument is true to the belief that it is in fact false – due to the aforementioned lack of τέχνη;
iii) the fact that such a switch is sometimes justified and sometimes not;
iv) the frequency with which such a switch occurs – and on the basis of which μισόλογοι form the conviction that no argument is trustful.

The several stages in the process constituting misology, which Socrates points out in 90b4-9, are very similar to those which he already indicated in 89c11-e3 with respect to misanthropy. The only significant difference between the two accounts is that in the case of the process constituting misology the disbelief in the truth of the argument under scrutiny is only

[29] ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνδὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ, ᾗ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κἄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὤν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὤν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος (…).

sometimes justified. However, the existence of this difference between the two accounts does not mean that they are essentially different insofar as they are accounts of the similarity between the experience of misanthropy and that of misology. In both cases a transition occurs from a positive experience, which is that of the truthfulness of a given person or the truth of a given argument, to a negative experience, which is that of the untruthfulness of that same person or the untruth of that same argument. In other words, both in the case of misanthropy and in the case of misology, disbelief and disappointment arise in one's mind.

Now let us see what the difference between the two constituting processes is. In the beginning of 90b4-9, Socrates stated that arguments are not like people in a certain respect. According to Socrates, arguments do not have a mixed nature or character. In other terms, they are not true and false at the same time. Instead, they are either true or false[30]. Socrates' statement implies that the transition referred to above (that is, the transition from the positive experience of belief in the truth of an argument to the negative experience of disbelief in the truth of that same argument) is caused not by the argument itself – for the argument is either always true or always false (not true and false at the same time) – but by the very person who examines the truth or falseness of the argument.

In 90b4-9 Socrates merely states that arguments differ from people – although already suggesting that arguments are different from people because they do not possess a mixed nature or character. Nevertheless, we have to wait for the passage in 90c8-d7 in order to have access to Socrates' full account of the αἰτία of μισολογία:

> «Now, Phaedo», he said, «it would be a lamentable fate if there really were some true and firm argument that could be understood, and yet from associating with arguments of another sort – the very same ones seeming true at some times but not at others – someone were to blame not himself or his own lack of expertise, but instead because of his agitation were to end up gratefully transferring the blame from himself to the arguments, and from that point to spend the rest of his life hating and belittling arguments, deprived of both truth and knowledge about things»[31].

[30] The difference has already been pointed out by *Phaedo* scholars – see Ebert, *Platon: Phaidon*, op. cit., p. 301; Frede, *Platons «Phaidon»*, op. cit., pp. 85-86.

[31] Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις

In this passage Socrates describes the experience of transition illustrated above, in quite the same terms as Phaedo and Echechrates in 88c1-7 and 88c8-d3 – namely, as an experience of hesitation, oscillation, confusion or loss as to what the truth value of a given argument is. According to 90c8-d7, the experience due to which one might become a misologist is the experience both of a transition from the belief in the truth of a given argument to the disbelief in the truth of that same argument and of a transition from the disbelief in the truth of a given argument to the belief in the truth of that same argument. In short, it is the experience of a back-and-forth movement of perspective as to what the truth value of a given argument is. Therefore, the experience because of which one might become a misologist is not the experience of the universal falseness of arguments. Instead, it is the experience of the instability of the way in which the truth value of arguments appears to one. As we can see, the experience out of which μισολογία might arise has to do with the fact that a human perspective is usually dominated by δοκεῖν or δόξα – that is to say, by the fact that a human assessment of the truth value of arguments is

i) always dependent upon how the truth value of arguments appears to the human subject and
ii) always determined by the limitations or partiality of that appearance in terms of adequate and full knowledge of the truth value of the arguments which appear to a human subject.

Socrates' account of the experience of the instability of the truth value of arguments by means of the notion of δοκεῖν or δόξα makes clear that the two different senses of δοκεῖν or δόξα can be combined in a unified and coherent explanation of the terms. For the experience of truth as appearance (that is, as a limited and partial access to truth) may turn out to be the experience of an illusion (that is, of the appearance of a given argument as true, when in fact it is false – or vice versa).

According to Socrates in 90c8-d7, the real cause of μισολογία has to do with the fact that a μισόλογος blames arguments – not himself – for the instability of the way in which the truth value of arguments appears to him. However, Socrates says that at the very heart of the coming-to-be of μισολογία lies an error on the part of the μισόλογος. A μισόλογος should

τισὶ λόγοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιᾶτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἅσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶντε καὶ λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη.

blame himself – not arguments – for the instability of how the truth value of arguments appears to him. Socrates adds that a μισόλογος makes this mistake because he lacks τέχνη with respect to the nature and character of arguments. A μισόλογος would know that arguments do not suffer from instability as regards their real truth value, if he were a τεχνίτης with respect to the nature and character of arguments. In 90c8-d7 Socrates suggests that a μισόλογος also lacks τέχνη with respect to the nature and character of human knowledge. Socrates' words in 90c8-d7 imply that if a μισόλογος were a τεχνίτης with respect to the nature and character of human knowledge, he would be aware of the fact that it is human knowledge (to the extent that it is usually impregnated with δοκεῖν or δόξα) which is in fact unstable. Socrates' advice is that human beings should strive to know not only the nature and character of arguments, but also the nature and character of their own knowledge capacity, in order to not become μισόλογοι. Given the intrinsic correlation between the truth value of arguments and the human subject to which the truth value of arguments appears, human beings cannot become real τεχνίται as regards the nature and character of arguments, without at the same time becoming τεχνίται as regards the nature and character of human knowledge, and vice versa.

4. The Nature of Socrates' Advice. The Meaning of ἀνδρεία in the Context of Socrates' Advice. Λόγοι As the οὗ ἕνεκα of Life. Conclusion: The Possibility of ἄνοια

Now that we have illustrated Socrates' account of what the real cause of μισολογία is, we should take a closer look into the nature of Socrates' advice to his friends against μισολογία. In 90d9-91a1 Socrates gives his companions the following instructions:

> «So first let's make sure we avoid this», he said, «and let's not allow into our soul the notion that there's probably nothing sound in arguments. It will be much better to assume that we are not sound yet, but must make a manly effort to be sound. You and the others should do this for the sake of your whole life to come, but I for the sake of my death considered in its own right (…)»[32].

[32] Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὔπω ὑγιῶς

Socrates' advice to his friends in this passage contains both a reference to the content of the advice and a reference to the way in which Socrates' friends should open themselves to his advice and follow it. As to the content of Socrates' advice, the passage quoted reminds us of

i) the need to avoid giving way to μισολογία (that is, to the conviction that there is nothing sound in arguments);
ii) the need to recognise that we (not the arguments) are the ones to blame for the very arising of μισολογία – in other terms, that we and our knowledge capacity (not the arguments themselves) are unsound;
iii) the fact that the meaning and purpose of one's life and death depend upon the recognition of the two previous points.

As to how Socrates' companions should open themselves to his advice and follow it, the passage in 90d10-91a1 calls our attention to two significant points, which we have not dealt with here yet. First, it raises the question of the right attitude to adopt against μισολογία in terms of soundness of mind. Secondly, it equates such an attitude with a courageous or manly effort to achieve soundness of mind with respect to arguments. The fact that Socrates is now presenting the question in this way means that he conceives of the need to acquire τέχνη with respect to the nature and character of arguments and human knowledge in terms of the preservation of one's safeness in life (and death). For the notion of ὑγίεια or ὑγιής involves both the idea of soundness (in the sense that something is functioning well) and that of safeness (in the sense of the state or condition in which one is free from the danger of becoming at a loss or falling into despair). A close connection exists between the two ideas involved in the notion of ὑγίεια or ὑγιής – at least as far as the *Phaedo* (in particular, the section on μισολογία) is concerned. To state it briefly, the soundness of a man's soul is that which is capable of preserving that man's safeness in life (and death). To state it in more precise terms, in 90d10-91a1 Socrates is pointing to the fact that to be aware of the nature of arguments and human knowledge, and to strive to overcome the limitations of human knowledge as regards the truth value of arguments – that is, to become a τεχνίτης (one who possesses a sound mind) in this respect – is what is really capable of preserving life (and the soul's afterlife) from despair. According to Socrates in 90d10-91a1, such soundness of mind and safeness in life is what one should strive for in a courageous or manly fashion.

How should we understand Socrates' reference to the notion of ἀνδρεία

ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου (…).

(cfr. 90e3: ἀνδριστέον)? What does ἀνδρεία mean in 90d10-91a1? If one's belief in arguments – especially, in Socrates' arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul and against μισολογία – depends upon ἀνδρεία («courage» or «manliness»), then it seems that one's belief in these arguments can only be restored by means of a sort of emotional response against μισολογία (not by means of rational argumentation). In this case, the acceptance of Socrates' entire argumentation in the *Phaedo* (and a fortiori in the section on μισολογία) is dependent upon his companions' emotional response to his emotional incentive[33]. In short, it is all fundamentally a matter of non-rational persuasion (on Socrates' part) and non-rational choice (on the part of Socrates' companions)[34].

Of course, this is one way of trying to answer the question about what makes Socrates' persuasion of his companions possible. However, a problem arises out of this conception, which in the final analysis depends upon a sort of impossible communication between an emotional and a rational dimension of man's being. How can man's emotional dimension communicate with his rational dimension, if these two different dimensions are entirely independent from one another in terms of their nature? There must be an essential link between ἀνδρεία and λόγος for Socrates' persuasion to be possible. To put it a bit differently, the very constitution of ἀνδρεία must involve a λόγος-component – so that by means of an emotional incentive Socrates is able to reach the very core of his companions' rationality. By means of an emotional incentive – of an appeal to his friends' courage or manliness – Socrates touches the logical dimension of the purposefulness of life (of both his life and the lives of his friends). Because human life has a logically constituted purposefulness and ἀνδρεία involves a λόγος-component, Socrates' appeal to courage or manliness might succeed in persuading his friends of the need for an internal clarification of the logically constituted purposefulness of human life, and of the need for a rational examination of the grounds of such purposefulness. In sum, in spite of the fact that Socrates appeals to ἀνδρεία, his persuasion depends on an internal transformation of λόγος («reason») – on an entirely logical περιαγωγή (an entirely rational «revolution» of the mind)[35].

[33] For the thesis that in the *Phaedo* Socrates behaves in a subjective-emotional manner, see Dalfen, «Philologia und Vertrauen», art. cit., p. 37.

[34] Dalfen, ibid., pp. 51-53, makes a fairly comprehensive survey of the vocabulary of emotional persuasion in the *Phaedo*.

[35] Jacquette, «The Moral Mischief of Misology», art. cit., p. 7, raises the question inaccurately: «If we have already dissociated argument from truth, however, why should we care whether or not it would be consistent to consider an argument to show that arguments generally are irrelevant

The explanation given above of the possibility of Socrates' persuasion of his companions implies that the human perspective must be conceived of as a pervasively rational totality, which possesses a life of its own and is capable of carrying out a complex process of internal self-clarification[36]. Indeed, the entire *Phaedo* (in particular, the whole section on μισολογία) – α) Socrates' first three arguments for the immortality of the human soul, β) Simmias' and Cebes' objections to Socrates' first arguments, γ) Socrates' account of the nature and cause of μισολογία, δ) Socrates' advice to his friends against the dangers of μισολογία, ε) Socrates' appeal to ἀνδρεία, ζ) the very idea of the perfectibility of all the previous points (to the extent that they correspond to λόγοι) – consists in a series of steps which reflect a particular putting into practice of the above-mentioned process of self-clarification. In a word, it consists in a particular staging of a drama, which is the internal life of reason.

At the end of 90d10-91a1 Socrates says that one should make an effort – a manly effort – not to give in to μισολογία, and to keep oneself confident in the power of λόγοι. Furthermore, Socrates says that this effort should be made for the sake of one's life and of one's death. The difference between making such an effort for the sake of one's life and making it for the sake of one's death is not significant for our purpose here. In fact, it merely reflects the difference between Socrates' situation and that of his friends. However, in the *Phaedo* death is conceived of as a continuation of life, as the moment when life reaches perfection. What matters in Socrates' words at the end of 90d10-91a1 is his indication of the reason why confidence in λόγοι should be preserved for the sake of life and death. Confidence in λόγοι should be preserved because the οὗ ἕνεκα of life and death has a rational nature. Therefore, according to Socrates, loss of confidence in λόγοι amounts to loss of confidence in the οὗ ἕνεκα itself of life and death. The most dangerous consequence of μισολογία (the fundamental motivation of Socrates' apology for discourse in the *Phaedo*) is the fact that hatred of λόγοι is identical with hatred of the very notion of a purposefulness of life and death.

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to the discovery of truth? Socrates might regard any argument against the knowledge amplifying power of inference as self-defeating, if it is supposed to result in a truth about the nature and limits of argument. Such a stance would at once make misology entirely a matter of emotion or the passions, rather than reason.» We think there is no real dissociation between argument and truth in the experience of μισολογία. For μισολογία involves a thesis about λόγοι which is taken to be true – namely, that λόγοι cannot be demonstrated to be true or false. Μισολογία is, therefore, totally a matter of reason. Indeed, it can be overcome only by means of a περιαγωγή within the realm of λόγοι.

[36] On the internal self-clarification of λόγοι, see Dorter, *Plato's Phaedo*, op. cit., p. 97; Špinka, «*Katharsis katharseôs*», art. cit., p. 299; Woolf, «Misology and Truth», art. cit., p. 20.

However, Socrates seems to be well aware of the fact that, although the human perspective consists in a pervasively rational totality, it may well be suffering from a peculiar kind of madness, insofar as its οὗ ἕνεκα – the purposefulness of the entire domain human perspective amounts to – may not be real. In 91b3-7, Socrates explicitly refers to the possibility that the human perspective as a whole may suffer from ἄνοια («madness» or «folly»):

> «(…) if, on the other hand, there is nothing in store for one who has died, at least in this period before I die I will be less of a mournful burden to those who are with me, and this folly won't stay with me – that would have been an evil – but will perish shortly»[37].

According to this passage, the human perspective as a whole seems liable to suffer from a sense of its own madness or folly, for it may become aware of the possibility of its own absurdity – of the possibility of its internal incoherence[38] or a divergence between its perception of itself and its actual being. In the passage quoted, Socrates' persuasion strategy is to emphasise the search for a valid argument in favour of the soul's immortality in terms of its immediate effects on his life and the lives of his companions. Socrates maintains that the search for a rational demonstration of the immortality of the soul keeps the soul safe from falling into despair – from the burden of the conviction that life is absurd. In 91b3-7 Socrates clearly suggests that the absurdity of life cannot be confirmed and must remain a possibility. For life after death is what makes such a confirmation possible. If the soul has no afterlife, then no confirmation of the absurdity of life is possible, since no one will be there to confirm such an absurdity. Life after death is the confirmation that the purposefulness of life is founded on solid ground, for the confirmation of the existence of an afterlife is the confirmation of the existence of the very οὗ ἕνεκα of life, of the fact that the moment in which life achieves its perfection is real. In 91b3-7 Socrates tries to make sense of the search for a demonstration of the immortality of the soul by maintaining that such a search keeps the human perspective in contact with the possibility of the existence of a solid foundation for the purposefulness of life. According to

[37] (…) εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἧττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ συνδιατελεῖ – κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν – ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολεῖται.

[38] On the question of incoherence, see Dalfen, «Philologia und Vertrauen», art. cit., p. 51; Špinka, «*Katharsis katharseôs*», art. cit., p. 301.

Socrates, such a contact is in itself productive of soundness of mind and keeps the human perspective safe from giving in to the illusory conviction that life is actually meaningless. However, it is also true that life may be meaningless or absurd (though this cannot be confirmed or verified). The problem is, therefore, that the simple possibility of the absurdity or meaninglessness of life affects life in such a way that life is always on the verge of being thrown into a maddening territory – into the very territory of madness.

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