Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea:
Issues and Solutions for the 21st Century

Master’s Dissertation

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This Dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the awarding of Master of Political Science and International Relations (specialised in Globalisation and the Environment) by Universidade Nova de Lisboa, completed under the guidance of Professor Catarina Mendes Leal.
Abstract

A producer of 5.4 M bbl/d, totalling almost half of the consumption of the entire European Union, the Gulf of Guinea is a fundamental lifeline and maritime link between Europe, the Americas and Africa. Geographically positioned as a staging post for transit originating in Latin America and coupled with its relatively porous borders, the region is also the perfect stepping stone for contraband heading to European shores. While blessed with an enviable wealth of marine and mineral resources, the region is also plagued by an ever-increasing spectre of maritime piracy; accounting for around 30% of incidents in African waters from 2003 to 2011. It is for these reasons that this research centres around the issues of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, with a particular focus on the first two decades of the 21st century. This research looks to examine the overall picture of the present state of play in the area, before going on to provide an analysis of potential regional developments in maritime security.

This research begins with the analysis of concepts/phenomena that have played a notable role in the shaping of the field of maritime security, namely Globalisation and security issues in the post-Cold War era. The ensuing chapter then focuses in on the Gulf of Guinea and the issues dominating the field of maritime security in the region.

The penultimate chapter presents a SWOT analysis, undertaken as part of this research with the aim of correlating opinions from a variety of sectors/professions regarding maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

The final chapter builds upon the results obtained from the abovementioned SWOT analysis, presenting a series of potential proposals/strategies that can contribute to the field of maritime security in the region over the coming years.

This research draws to a close with the presentation of conclusions taken from this particular investigation, as well as a final overview of the earlier presented proposals applicable to the field of maritime security during the second decade of the 21st century.

Person dedication

Although the motivation for actually writing this paper is essentially my Master’s dissertation, the Gulf of Guinea and how the world should approach what is an inexplicably complex and intriguing region is something that has fascinated me both in my professional and personal live. The Gulf of Guinea is an exciting cocktail of diversity that is sometimes overlooked more than it should be by a world that heavily relies on the region's stability.

My first thanks go to my Master’s coordinator, Professor Catarina Mendes Leal, who I had the first pleasure of meeting while reading for my Post-Grad in Strategic and Defence Studies. Her positive and light-hearted approach to study and ability to motivate me has played a fundamental part in the formulation of this research paper from the very start.

I would also like to express my gratitude to all of the people who were involved in the development of this paper’s SWOT analysis. If anything can give this paper credibility, then it is your experience and knowledge. Thank you.

Finally, to my dear friend Conor Shields: thank you. Your professional and personal guidance has played a huge part in life so far.
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List of Abbreviations

AMLEP     African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership
COSMAR    Counternarcotics and Maritime Security Interagency Operations Center
CRIMGO    Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme
CSI       Container Security Initiative
ECCAS     Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS    Economic Community of West African States
EEZ       Exclusive Economic Zone
EU        European Union
GGC       Gulf of Guinea Commission
IMB       International Maritime Bureau
IMO       International Maritime Organisation
INEGMA    Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis
ISPS      International Ship and Port Facility Security
ISS       International Security Studies
LEDET     Law Enforcement Detachment
MAOC-N    Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre - Narcotics
MEND      Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
PSI       Proliferation Security Initiative
RSC       Regional Security Complex
SEACOP    Seaport Cooperation Programme
UNODC     United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WCO       World Customs Organisation
WFP       World Food Programme
Introduction

In a world in which more than 90% of total trade is transported by sea,¹ the field of maritime security will inevitably grab headlines and attract the attention of policy makers as the XXI century progresses. With the maritime sector acting as the beating heart of global trade, transporting everything from the world’s energy and food supplies to consumer products, the stability and security of states in strategically significant maritime zones is capable of having a knock-on effect for individuals as well as the entire international community as a whole.

To such an extent is the global market now interlinked and far-reaching between consumer markets, mass producers of raw materials and the world’s industrial basins, the field of maritime security now relies upon the cooperation of what are often seen as unstable states.² While the very materials that are crucial for the feeding of developed nations that have benefited from the process of Globalisation traverse the world’s oceans, the safe and successful transportation of those materials is heavily dependent on the cooperation of actors to whom the same values and standards cannot be applied.

One of the most pressing and perhaps vulnerable areas in terms of maritime security is the Gulf of Guinea.³ Indeed, with the region producing more than five million barrels of oil per day which must be transported by sea, totalling 40% of the total consumption of the 27 European Union Countries in 2011,⁴ any destabilisation that poses a threat to maritime security is sure to be of concern, while existing maritime security issues such as drug trafficking (with West Africa acting as a hub for between 8% to 13% of cocaine

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¹ International Maritime Organisation, 2011: 2
² Of the 15 ECOWAS Member States, five feature in the top 20 of the Failed States Index 2013, produced by the non-profit research organization the Fund for Peace, while another five enter into the top 50. (Fund for Peace, 2013)
³ For the purposes of this research paper, the Gulf of Guinea will be based on a wider definition that includes the region from Senegal to southern border of Angola (15°0’0”N to 15°0’0”S) – See Figure i.
⁴ Chatham House, 2013: V
shipments heading for Europe), human trafficking, arms trafficking, poaching and piracy also draw the focus of the international community’s spotlight. On a more local level, the same issues are just as hard hitting, with estimates of revenue losses caused by poaching alone exceeding the cost of servicing multilateral loans to the region.

As Globalisation continues to press forward at a seemingly unrelenting pace, the increasing importance of the maritime routes that pass through the Gulf of Guinea also brings a whole new approach to security in Africa, with the analysis of the field of maritime security gaining evermore momentum in comparison to the more traditional approaches of state/regime and land-based security.

It is in this context that this research paper will examine the importance of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, thereby touching on the region’s newly found importance as a maritime route, bolstered by recently discovered rich offshore hydrocarbon deposits as a potential fracture point capable of having an effect which extends well beyond the sub-region and into the advanced, as well as advancing, world. This paper will approach the topic mindful of the role that the international community can and will in all probability come to play in the future of maritime security in what has essentially become one of the most dangerous maritime areas in the world over the last decade.

The foundations of this research paper’s methodology will be focused around the applicability of existing international relations theory to maritime security in the region, as well as the role that Globalisation has played in shaping not only the Gulf of Guinea, but maritime security as a whole. An empirical (SWOT) analysis of ideas and opinions will follow, with data provided via a questionnaire completed by actors who are directly linked to the topic and who have their own vested interests in maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea then building on this research paper’s initial theoretical basis.

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5 UNODC, 2013: 17
6 Gilpin, 2007: 1
7 International Crisis Group, 2012: i
The paper will finish with the presentation of the results of that same analysis, thereby using the data/information provided to elaborate on proposals that could be of use to the field of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea in the near future.

**Figure i: States in the Gulf of Guinea**

![Map of the Gulf of Guinea](image)

Source: adapted from Plutonius 3D, 2014

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8 For the purposes of this paper, the Gulf of Guinea will be defined as the area of the Eastern Atlantic Ocean from 15°0’0”N to 15°0’0”S, thereby including the 17 states in the region that have a maritime border, namely: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Togo.
1. Maritime Security – A Changing Field

1.1 The Post-Cold War Era

This chapter will approach the field of maritime security as one that is in a constant state of flux, with the influence of countless actors and developments shifting it into sometimes, but not invariably, unchartered territory. As an opening note, it is worth affirming that the field of maritime security is nothing new, but rather the culmination of issues which have remained ever-present during centuries of seafaring exploration, trade and expansion.

The very concept of security is, without doubt, one that has altered in shape and approach with the beginning of the post-Cold War era, particularly when applied to the field of maritime security. While tensions between the USA and the USSR where at their height, it was fundamentally superpower politics, technology and the nuclear stalemate that underpinned the debates and policy that defined the security agenda of the day.9

“Traditionally, maritime strategists have been concerned with the threat of interstate confrontation, i.e. with naval power as a pillar of national defence and capability. For instance, during the Cold War, the US Navy’s main task, as defined in the Maritime Strategy adopted in the mid-1980s, was to deter attacks, and, in the event that deterrence failed, be prepared to engage in and win a war against the Soviet Union’s Navy.” (Jopling, 2010)

Essentially, the thawing of the Cold War drew a line under what had been the meta-narrative which had driven security policy for the best part of five consecutive decades. The loss of the Soviet Union meta-event forced a recalculation of approaches to security, but the relatively peaceful manner in which a world superpower had crumbled and the apparent newly-found importance of non-state actors under narratives such as the War on Terror and organised crime etc. marked a notable shift in approach towards the tackling of

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9 Buzan and Hansen, 2010: 155
non-traditional security issues. Essentially, with the threat of outright war diminished, the very concept of security and those who study it have been given the green light to reach out into other fields.

“The absence of threats is sufficiently far reaching for Security Studies to encompass dangers that range from pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, and environmental degradation, through to the more readily associated security concerns of direct violence, such as terrorism and inter-state armed conflict.” (Collins, 2010, p. 1)

Not only are issues of security now more diverse, but the actors involved now include the public as well as the private; in an interdependent power-play in which events far afield can have unexpected effects in our own backyard. Spurred on by an evermore interconnected global economy, i.e. the result of Globalisation, the field of maritime security has also seen its own rise: emerging as a policy and study area that has moved the field away from something viewed as transport security to something that is now a crucial foundation of international and geopolitical relations.10 In a reflection of that same interconnectivity, the issues grabbing the present-day headlines in the field of maritime security are now often a cause for security concerns which are to such an extent interlinked that they cannot be feasibly separated or tackled independently.11

“...the global political and economic system is more complicated and complex than ever before. More sectors, more states more issues and more private actors are involved in interdependent relationships. It is increasingly unrealistic to analyse world politics as occurring solely among a group of large states, solid as billiard balls, bouncing off each other in a balance of power.” (Nye and Welch, 2013: 273)

10 Amirell, 2013: 1
11 Buzan et al., 1998: 201
While this paper focuses more specifically on the state of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, it should also be noted that the conditions which define the discipline in the region are far from being unique to that particular part of the globe. Indeed, similar developments can also be seen in other parts of the world and are essentially the result of global maritime conditions born out of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, as the thawing of the Cold War saw global actors diminish their naval footprint around the world.\textsuperscript{12} For example, maritime piracy is often just as much of an issue in East Asia as it is in West and indeed East Africa. Such incidents have seen the international community come together in an unparalleled example of multinational maritime security cooperation far beyond the territorial waters of the states providing military assets.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, international organisations with roles not readily associated with the field, for example the World Food Programme (WFP), are now also involved in such missions, making for a clear indication of just how important the field of maritime security is going to be as the 21\textsuperscript{st} century progresses.

In tracing the roots of present-day non-traditional maritime security issues, we can certainly look to the dissipation of the need to project military prowess far afield with the culmination of the Cold War and the end of colonial rule. What resulted was a shift towards the upkeep of territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that saw countries focus their resources more locally. That proliferation of actors and diffusion of maritime power, including in areas where resources are often already stretched before the sustainable management of national maritime domains is even addressed, has essentially seen the emergence of other maritime actors to fill the void created by security threats that have not been matched by an ability to tackle them.\textsuperscript{14} In essence, access to what have long been considered as global maritime commons is no longer something guaranteed by the application of a global hegemonic power or multilateral regimes.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Amirell, 2013: 6
\textsuperscript{13} One such example of this cooperation is Operation Atalanta, also known as European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU-NAVFOR-ATALANTA).
\textsuperscript{14} Behr et al., 2013: 8
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid: 2
Perhaps such a situation was to be somewhat expected, as the dismantling of the Soviet fleet saw the world assume that a return to some form of the *Mare Liberum* concept would pave the way for actors from a range of fields to fall into a somewhat false sense of security. What had been forgotten is that the safety of strategic maritime zones and sea lanes is not necessarily an inherent situation to be found across the world’s oceans, but rather something which had traditionally depended on the ability of global actors to project naval power far beyond their own territorial waters.\(^\text{16}\) This concept is nothing new and can actually be traced back the era of expansive European colonial power, when trading companies were in a relative decline and imperial navies took on the burden of ensuring secure passage for trade to such an extent that the dominant Mahanist theory of the day drew clear lines between navies, the control of shipping lanes and the prosperity of any particular state.\(^\text{17}\) However, the modern global market context presents very different challenges. The nature of the modern economy is increasingly focused on transnational trade and capitalism via open competition and instant communication based on technology, thereby pulling apart the traditional linkage between the fielding of blue-water navies (the mere presence of which was often enough to deter what are today considered as non-traditional security threats\(^\text{18}\)) and economic interests.\(^\text{19}\)

### 1.2 International Security Studies and Maritime Security

Looking strictly at maritime security as an academic field, it becomes clear that it is one that has inevitably been linked with the overarching field of International Security Studies (ISS) and its offshoots. Of course, the wide scope of the idea of ‘security’ is one that encompasses a huge array of ideas and what may be viewed as issues specifically related to the field of maritime security are often inextricably linked with areas such as territorial

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\(^{16}\) Amirell, 2013: 5-6  
\(^{17}\) See Mahan, 1890 for a comprehensive overview of the relationship between national wealth and naval power.  
\(^{18}\) Amirell, 2013: 6  
\(^{19}\) Grove, 1990: 4
security; with what happens at sea often having a knock-on effect, or being a result of, issues which occur on *terra firma*. While the field of ISS took upon greater importance with the development of academic interest stemming from issues such as the Cold War and decolonisation, the long-standing notion of the influence of Sea Power and the study of naval strategy dominated the study of those issues which are now beginning to be considered as the field of maritime security. Despite this, certain security concerns which began to draw the attention of policy makers in the maritime domain during the later stages of the 20th century, such as economic, environmental and food security, have to a large extent been engulfed by the field of human security, despite the potential impact that maritime issues can have on those topics.

The non-traditional security issues thrown up since the end of the Cold War, particularly within the sphere of maritime security, shift focus away from a strictly military-based doctrine (which had traditionally captured the focus of ISS and International Relations as a whole) and the need to be ready to respond to aggression from an opposing state, towards a general acceptance that the deep and complex societal, economic, political and technological linkages between states creates a mutual vulnerability that can no longer be addressed by any one single nation or particular field alone. It is that very sense of mutual vulnerability that triggers some of the more in depth academic debates when applying already existing concepts of security. Such mutual concern will inevitably result in an increased interest in the field of maritime security by not only individual states, but also collections of states and non-state actors alike. Such an interest poses a tasking academic debate, particularly in the field of International Security Studies, should it be noted that the referent object of many ISS perspectives, as well as the sectors which they address, are often focused on the role/predominance of the state (see table 1.1) as a singular actor, rather than as part of a larger grouping.

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20 Klein, 2011: 4
21 For an extensive analysis of the influence of Sea Power upon history, particularly its importance in the development of commerce and colonialism, see Mahan, 1890.
22 Amirell, 2013: 8
23 Ullman, 1983: 129
Table 1.1 ISS Perspectives

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<th>ISS Perspective</th>
<th>Referent object</th>
<th>Securitising Sectors</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Studies</td>
<td>The state</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poststructuralist Security Studies</td>
<td>the State Collective-individual</td>
<td>Military-Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-colonial Security Studies</td>
<td>States and Collectives</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>State, societies, individuals</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Security Studies</td>
<td>individual, women</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Security Studies</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Copenhagen School</td>
<td>Collectivities and the environment</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Constructivism</td>
<td>The state</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Constructivism</td>
<td>Collectivities</td>
<td>Military</td>
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Source: adapted from Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 38

While other ISS perspectives are also suitable for application in a deeper analysis of the field of maritime security, the importance of non-state actors (i.e. collectivities) and non-traditional security issues as referent objects acts as the centre pin around which the Copenhagen School’s perspective revolves; therefore positioning this particular perspective well for application in the analysis of the field of maritime security in the post-Cold War era. Developing as a result of increasing academic interest in the role played by securitising actors (not necessarily military, as is the case with various other ISS perspectives), the Copenhagen School is particularly useful in the analysis of what have traditionally been largely neglected security topics that nowadays play a crucial role in the broader issues that contribute to greater levels of maritime ‘insecurity’.

Should the focus remain on use of military force by the securitising actor which wields it, namely the state, then the absence of protection from powerful navies that can be observed (see figure 1.2) does pose an interesting conceptual challenge to the field of Security Studies. However, the Copenhagen School’s approach, which broadens the definition of securitising actors to include the role of all actors, i.e. political leaders,

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24 McDonald, 2013: 72
bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups, who securitise an issue (defined as a ‘referent object’) is particularly useful when approaching the broad range of topics encompassed by the field of maritime security.

**Figure 1.2 U.S. Navy Active Ships**

Source: adapted from Naval History and Heritage Command, 2011

The Copenhagen School provides an approach which tackles the exclusivity of the use of military power when addressing the concept of security. This is of particular relevance when considering that the traditional role of military tools in International Relations is to protect referent objects that revolve around the upkeep of the state.

“A Narrow interpretation of security concentrates on the state and its defence from external military attacks. In response to this narrow definition of security, other approaches to security studies have called for a widening and deepening of security to include non-military issues.” (Emmers, 2010: 137)

One such example of the increased importance of non-military means as relative to this research paper’s focus can be found in what appears to be the start of an era marked

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25 Buzan et al. 1998: 36
by less state and more private responsibility for maritime security.\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, the shipping industry is increasingly turning to the use of private mercenary forces and security companies to bolster security. Largely involved in efforts to tackle piracy, particularly off the coast of Somalia at the turn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, these companies are now increasingly relied upon as a method for protecting cargos and crews transiting through some of the world’s more problematic maritime zones.\textsuperscript{27} Indeed, to such an extent has private security now taken on a role in protection at sea, the IMO has actually taken steps to regulate the industry.\textsuperscript{28}

Also essential to the Copenhagen School’s approach is the notion of securitising actors. Centring precisely on this paper’s geographical area of study, namely the Gulf of Guinea, the field of maritime security clearly has two very different groups of securitising actors; namely those who have a vested interest in the area by virtue of their geographical position (for the purposes of this research paper, designated as native actors); and those who are not native to the area but who have a vested interest in an area by virtue of its strategic, geopolitical and economic worth (for the purposes of this research paper, designated as non-native actors).

While more traditional International Relations theories which focus on the state can be used to identify the power centres behind the security process(es) of native actors, the leeway provided by the Copenhagen School allows for the identification of other vectors when addressing non-native actors.

In 21\textsuperscript{st} century maritime security, non-state actors such as international shipping agencies or oil companies, as well as international organisations and other non-military actors, are often the focal point of attempts to raise awareness regarding particular

\textsuperscript{26} Amirell, 2013: 6
\textsuperscript{27} Liss, 2009: 1
\textsuperscript{28} For example, see International Maritime Organisation, 2012a
threats. Moreover, it is often those same entities taking steps to address those threats, rather than any form of state apparatus.²⁹

Working from the basis that a securitising actor is an actor who securitises an issue, namely a referent object, by declaring it as existentially threatened,³⁰ both native and non-native groupings of actors will inevitably focus on differing security issues and therefore differing referent objects, depending on the geographical proximity of a particular threat. For example, for native actors the issues affecting present-day maritime security may pose an existential threat to the referent objects of national sovereignty³¹ or ideology (both referent objects being issues of political security), as maritime-fuelled issues such as large-scale organised crime, piracy and illicit trafficking have a significant detrimental effect on those actors, whereas the existential threat posed to non-native actors is more pressing to the referent object of economies (economic security).

It is generally more likely that a great number of referent objects will be of concern to native actors due to their geographical proximity, when compared to non-native actors; especially should the Copenhagen School’s method of highlighting survival as being the driving force behind security be kept in mind. Should different forms of threats originating in the maritime sphere also be considered, it is arguable that each threat is likely to have a varying effect on the same security vector for native and non-native actors (see figure 1.3 for a preliminary comparison of the potential impact of a maritime security issue in the Gulf of Guinea on native and non-native actors).

²⁹ An Example outside of the military and political security sector defined as part of the Copenhagen School can be found in the economic security sector, namely in the form of the International Chamber of Commerce’s specialised maritime department known as the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). The IMB is a non-governmental and non-profit organisation funded by voluntary donations, designed to raise awareness within the shipping industry (see International Maritime Bureau, 2014).
³⁰ Buzan et al., 1998: 36
³¹ Williams, 2013: 4 uses Buzan’s work in providing a breakdown of the idea of referent objects and the security sectors under which they can be categorised, dividing between the security sectors of: military security, political security, economic security, societal security and environmental security. In summary, military security is concerned with the interplay between the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of the state; political security is focused on the organisational stability of states/systems and ideologies that give legitimacy; economic security revolves around access to resources, finance and markets; societal security is concerned with the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere.
What is clear from both figures is that the threat types included, which are issues of maritime security in their application (the core motivations behind such threats and their implications are, of course, more extensive), are all more existentially threatening issues for native actors in comparison to non-native actors. Moreover, none of the threats utilised are likely to cause direct damage to the military security of non-native actors. Rather the focus of non-native actors will likely centre on economic security, due to the vulnerability of maritime transport routes. The splitting of actors into native and non-native groupings and the extent to which each is likely to be damaged by the noted threats also touches upon another core themes approached in literature on the Copenhagen School, namely the idea of societal security. Initially developed as an analysis for the causes of conflicts in Eastern Europe, the concept is applicable to the identification of the motivation behind the intervention of non-native actors. Should a society, in being the mass which makes up the

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32 Wæver et al., 1993 first presented the concept of ‘societal security’.
nation state, be able to maintain its position and character in the face of a threat,\textsuperscript{33} it can be concluded that a society would consider such a threat as being less than existential in terms of severity and would therefore and refrain from intervening.

Specifically noteworthy relative to the organised crime threat is how such a threat could affect the two groupings of actors in varying ways. While organised crime may have an effect on the political and economic security of both groups, it is for very different reasons. For native actors, organised crime arguably encourages corruption\textsuperscript{34} that, if left unchecked, can have a disastrous effect on a state’s economy and international credibility. As an example of this we need to look no further than Guinea Bissau, which is often branded with the undesirable label of the world’s first “Narco-State”.

“The pervasive power of the corruption of criminal organisations, coupled with a general crisis by state actors in the administration of justice and enforcement of the rule of law, contribute towards the progressive diminishing of the credibility of the state as the institution entrusted with the prerogatives of guaranteeing security (of people and investments) and dispensing justice. In this context, the case of Guinea Bissau is probably the clearest example of what West African states may face in the near future if the issues of justice and security are not properly and promptly addressed.” (Mazzitelli, 2007: 1071)

While, non-native actors are also affected by organised crime in terms of political security, it is not for reasons of the organisability of states or systems of government, but rather due to the ideology that gives such actors legitimacy.\textsuperscript{35} Should the concept of the Responsibility to Protect be taken into consideration in conjunction with the organised crime phenomena of drug trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea as a stepping stone to Europe,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} Wæver \textit{et al.}, 1993: 23 notes societal security as being “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible actual threats.”
\item \textsuperscript{34} Chêne, 2008: 7 discusses this matter, but does affirm that additional research is need in this area.
\item \textsuperscript{35} This definition of different referent objects within the political security sector is provided by Williams, 2013: 4, as based on Buzan, 1991.
\end{itemize}
then the moral repercussions for the political security of non-native actors become obvious. In short, the tons of illegal narcotics being transited through Western Africa (see figure 1.4) on their way to foreign markets is an issue that non-native actors must, out of ideological necessity, address.

**Figure 1.4 Cocaine transiting West Africa en route to Europe**

![Cocaine transiting West Africa](source: adapted from data provided in UNODC, 2013)

### 1.3 Maritime Security, Securitisation and the Speech Act

Another key step in following the Copenhagen School’s methodology is the act of securitisation, as well as the process leading up to and following on from that act. Indeed, it is during this step that the earlier noted ideas of an existential threat and referent objects come into their own. As a perceived existential threat to a particular referent object is identified by a security actor in one of the sectors elaborated on earlier, an attempt to move that threat onto the security agenda is made, namely through the effort to convince a relevant audience of the need for a response through extraordinary means.\(^{36}\) It is in the act of moving an issue onto the political agenda (at this stage considered as ‘politicised’ issues) and then convincing a relevant audience of an existential threat and a need to take

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\(^{36}\) McDonald, 2013
extraordinary measure that the Copenhagen School moves into the realm of securitisation (see figure 1.5). Specifically relative to the challenges faced in the maritime security domain, the Copenhagen approach is of course tried and tested, with distinguished authors having already analysed issues such as transnational crime as a security threat.\textsuperscript{37}

**Figure 1.5 The Copenhagen School’s approach**


A key step developed by the Copenhagen School effectively bridges the gap between what is essentially a ‘politicised’ issue and what is a ‘securitised’ one. That step is taken in the form of the speech act, which is, in a nutshell, the discourse made by an actor to a relevant audience in a way that attempts to securitise an issue by giving it a priority that sees it recognised as an existential threat and that pushes for the utilisation of extraordinary means for the resolution of that issue.\textsuperscript{38}

While the specifics of what exactly the process to securitise an issue is have been exhaustively examined,\textsuperscript{39} the Copenhagen approach of including the speech act\textsuperscript{40} as the centre-pin which moves an issue from being politicised to being securitised is particularly useful when studying the field of maritime security. Indeed, the usefulness and applicability of the speech act should not be overlooked, especially in such a fast-paced environment where the need to make timely decisions and allocate resources in times of emergency can

\textsuperscript{37} For example, see Emmers, 2003 on transnational organised crime in South East Asia.
\textsuperscript{38} Buzan \textit{et al.}, 1998: 26
\textsuperscript{39} For example, see Wæver, 1995: 48-86.
\textsuperscript{40} See Buzan \textit{et al.}, 1998 for further reading on the ‘Speech act’.
be crucial. Moving an issue out of the realm of everyday politics and into the realm of ‘emergency politics’ allows that issue to be dealt with swiftly and without the baggage of policy cycles and regulations. In short, the nature of security threats in the maritime realm and the way that they are addressed goes a long way to validating the theoretical basis of the speech act.

A specifically relevant example of the speech act and securitisation in the maritime domain comes in the form of the attention given to the defence of international sea lanes following the September 11th 2001 attacks on the United States. As part of a broad kneejerk reaction to secure vital transport routes in the face of such persuasive discourse by world leaders, states (via the United Nations) quickly went about empowering the IMO to move ahead with the International Ship and Port Security Code to increase the security of ships and harbour facilities in what is a reflection of securitisation and the role of the speech act in reaction to a perceived existential threat posed by potential terrorist attacks in the maritime domain.

There are of course many other examples of the applicability of the concept of securitisation to the maritime security realm, but one of the most diverse is without doubt the issue of drug trafficking. Indeed, this specific issue acts as a prime case study of how particular issues can become securitised for very different reasons, depending on the content of the speech acts which encourage their acceptance as existential threats at particular times throughout history. Examples of speech acts by non-native actors in this area stretch back as far as the early 1960’s, originating in the UN’s Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. In stark contrast to 21st century policy, this early mention of the ‘drug problem’ focused almost exclusively on societal security.

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41 Taureck, 2006: 55
42 For a full overview of the ISPS Code, see International Maritime Organisation, 2014.
43 Schneider, 2013: 9
44 International Maritime Organisation, 2014
“...Parties to the Convention are concerned with the health and welfare of mankind and are conscious of their duty to prevent and combat the evil of drug addiction....Considering that, while drug addiction leads to personal degradation and social disruption, it happens very often that the deplorable social and economic conditions in which certain individuals and certain groups are living predispose them to drug addiction...Recognizing that social factors have a certain and sometimes preponderant influence on the behaviour of individuals and groups.” (UNODC, 1961: 12)

Discourse on this same issue has been developed by the same actor on several occasions as the 20th century progressed, however references to both economic and political security later begin to appear as drug trafficking picked up the pace, in what is a notable reorientation of existential threat discourses by non-native actors towards a focus on the state itself, rather than society.45

“...Deeply concerned by the magnitude of and rising trend in the illicit production of, demand for and traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which pose a serious threat to the health and welfare of human beings and adversely affect the economic, cultural and political foundations of society.” (UNODC, 1988: 10)

This change in discourse acts as a solid indication of how what is essentially the same issue, vis-à-vis the same existential threat, can be used in application to very different referent objects. Perhaps this comes as little surprise, should the nature any particular existential threat be considered as a phenomena governed by the specific political and social contexts which created them,46 rather than being some sort of universally objective condition.

45 Crick, 2012: 1
46 Grayson, 2003: 338
In following the line of dividing actors between native and non-native mentioned earlier, the question of who actually makes speech acts is inevitably relevant. On the more local level, the result of a speech act is naturally easier identify, as the engine behind discursive representations of an issue as being an existential threat, that is the successful securitisation of an issue, can be expected to be governments or politically enabled entities which by definition have an advantage in pushing for the utilisation of means outside of that which would be considered as run-of-the-mill situations.\textsuperscript{47} That advantage and the added success in lobbying by native actors for a response to an identified existential threat means that more examples will be readily available and, to that end, identifiable.

“The more power a securitising actor has the more likely this actor will succeed in attempted securitisation and gain the consent of audience.” (Coskun, 2007: 11)

Indeed, much of the original work around the speech act focused more specifically on the role of state actors, rather than the increasing role of other actors in the economic, social or environmental spheres.

“By uttering ‘security’, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it.” (Wæver, 1995: 55)

Although the innate advantage of native actors is theoretically present, the discursive nature of the speech act and the resources/influence needed to effectively address an existential threat poses a curious challenge to some native actors. Assuming that the successful securitisation of an issue involves a metaphorical representation of an existential threat to a referent object by securitising actor,\textsuperscript{48} it follows that the securitising actor will require access to some form of means, or require some form of resource,

\textsuperscript{47} Collins, 2005: 565
\textsuperscript{48} Buzan et al., 1998: 27 provides an overview of the idea ‘security of silence’ and the authors who have examined the issue.
through which that actor can articulate a securitising discourse. Should native actors not have access to such means, then it will prove to be exceptionally difficult for native actors to effectively address any form of existential threat. This idea of ‘security of silence’ is certainly applicable to the native actors which are the focus of this particular study, namely those located in the Gulf of Guinea. Such extreme poverty levels and lack of governance which are present in some regions of the Gulf of Guinea will result in a situation in which many security issues will fall by the wayside, as certain groups do not have the tools through which to articulate their concerns. Moreover, the political and societal conditions and norms needed for a given security actor to successfully make a security speech may not always be present across the entire region.

“At the micro end of the spectrum, individuals or small groups can seldom establish a wider security legitimacy in their own right. They may speak about security to and of themselves, but few will listen.” (Buzan et al., 1998: 23)

Internationally, or rather externally, the situation inevitably becomes more complex. There are of course states powerful enough to project their power well beyond their national borders, but the vastness of the maritime domain, coupled with the nature of the modern nation-state system in which national sovereignty is enshrined as the most precious tenant of the international political arena, sees most categorised as part of what is identified as ‘international society’. While it may be the case that many supranational organisations which make up international society are delegated roles and powers which can influence decisions and policies normally monopolised by sovereign states, there is

49 Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 216-217
50 McGuire, 2010: 6 notes that many states “in the region are empirically weak: they lack the capacity to deliver public goods and services to their citizens, do not claim effective control over their territories and are marked by high levels of official corruption.”
51 This issue stems from what has been critiqued as being the Western/Euro-centric foundation of the Copenhagen School by authors such as Anthony et al. 2006 and Wilkinson, 2007, with the areas of economic and societal security being particularly based upon a Western perspective.
52 See Bull and Watson, 1984 for an overview of the idea of international society.
53 Nye and Welch 2013: 196 affirm that although the sovereignty of nation states is a crucial pillar of many international organisations, “international law and organization are an important part of political reality because they affect the way states behave.”
still the question of the increasing role of non-state actors who have the ability to effectively articulate a speech act in a way that sees an issue become accepted as an existential threat through a successful securitisation process. However, the wider context supported by the Copenhagen School allows for the identification of security actors other than those who specifically compose the state apparatus. NGOs, international companies and even think tanks evidently have a part to play in the security discourse. Such entities are evermore transnational in their presence and influence, playing an increasing role in pressing the policies of governments and policy makers. Although without the hard power monopolised by states, such entities find their footing socially and economically as a way to influence decisions; bolstered of course by the modern interconnectivity of the globalised world. More recent academic works have also affirmed the theoretical basis for the involvement of non-state actors in such discourse.

“The initial move of securitization can be initiated by states but also by non-state actors such as trade unions or popular movements. Non-state actors are thus regarded as important players in the securitization model.” (Emmers, 2010: 139)

Curiously, while securitising actors may vary between native and non-native groupings, the nature of the maritime domain does mean that the target audience of those actors is often essentially the same; namely the capabilities and policies of nation states. When direct action is needed, the specialised resources needed to police the high seas at the actual flash point of an issue and, in some cases, to enter into live conflict, are all but monopolised by nation states in the form of expensive naval assets, meaning that states will inevitably be the focal point for attempted speech acts. This explanation does however only centre on the tacking of issues directly and, should the underlying causality of a security issue be the focus of a securitising actor rather than that the actual point of

54 For example, see UNODC, 2012, in which corporate chiefs from 35 top German companies urged their government to ratify a UN Convention against corruption.
55 Nye and Welch, 2013: 302
56 Ibid
57 Such a monopolisation is not only borne out of the sheer cost of fielding naval assets, but also as a result of the exclusivity of use of military force by nation states.
friction, it follows that target audiences will also begin to vary. For example, native groupings would be more effective in tackling corruption brought about in part by maritime security issues\textsuperscript{58} should they appeal to a political audience or elements of civil society capable of bringing officials found to be involved to accountability, while non-native groups would be best served by focusing on relevant audiences within the business community.\textsuperscript{59}

Essentially, what are being addressed by non-native actors interested in maritime security are threats which are, in general, low Intensity. It is precisely this low level of intensity that such threats pose that leaves policy makers and other security actors uneasy when it comes to any form of intervention. Giving legitimacy to a threat as a national security issue will inevitably be complicated should it be difficult to identify direct and immediate damage resulting from that threat, even though such threats often embody a whole host of causes and consequences which are difficult to predict in foresight.\textsuperscript{60} Why those threats are of a low intensity is without doubt linked to their geographical proximity. On the contrary, native groupings are much more likely to see such threats as being of a high intensity, due to their geographical proximity and immediately identifiable damage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low intensity non-native</th>
<th>High intensity native</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distant (space)</td>
<td>Close (space)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distant (time)</td>
<td>Close (time)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low probability</td>
<td>High probability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low consequences</td>
<td>High consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically neutral</td>
<td>Historically amplified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Buzan, 2007: 123

\textsuperscript{58} A linkage between large-scale drug trafficking and the resulting exposure to money laundering and corruption is outlined in UN Economic and Security Council, 2009: 8.

\textsuperscript{59} Gumede, 2012: 6-7

\textsuperscript{60} Buzan, 2007: 123
Having established which parties are involved in the discourse/speech act process relative to maritime security threats, an analysis of the success of attempts to securitise issues naturally follows. Rather, the prerequisite of the need for a security issue to be accepted as such by a relevant audience. Arguably, it is not simply enough for a particular security actor to undertake a discourse pushing for the securitisation of an issue for that issue to be accepted as such. There must be an acknowledgement by that audience which produces substance; a measurable effect.\(^{61}\) That measurable effect is essentially the green light being given to the taking of extraordinary measures against what is deemed to be an existential threat.

“If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization.” (Buzan et al., 1998: 25)

The division comes when an issue, in having been the subject of an identifiable security discourse aimed to insight extraordinary measures to be taken, must actually be addressed via those measures, or where an issue can still be considered as securitised without such measures being taken. Certain maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea are of relevance here. For example, although the seriousness and need for urgency in tackling the issue of piracy, which is fuelled in large part by the disorder of a mushrooming regional oil industry,\(^{62}\) has been highlighted in what are clear examples of the speech act,\(^{63}\) the actual implementation of extraordinary measures have been largely limited to attempts by international organisations to encourage legislative processes at the local level. Despite a reported one in every five piracy attacks in 2013 (with estimations that only

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\(^{61}\) Emmers, 2010: 139

\(^{62}\) UNODC, 2013: 45 affirms the importance of that industry, stating: “There is a booming black market for fuel in West Africa. Without this ready market, there would be little point in attacking these vessels. There are indications that oil may also be smuggled outside the region.”

\(^{63}\) For example, the International Crisis Group, 2012: ii, in referring to the issue states: “A range of urgent measures is needed to reverse this trend: reforms to improve governance of the economy and security sector, comprehensive and effective maritime public policies and practical regional cooperation beyond declarations of intent.”
about one third of incidents in the region are actually reported) taking place in the Gulf of Guinea, many of which are remarkably more violent than previous incidents in other parts of the globe,\textsuperscript{64} no large-scale multinational task force, such as that deployed to tackle piracy off Somalia, has been tasked to the region. That is not to say, however, that the issue has not been securitised, especially with speech acts on the topic being so readily available. The Copenhagen School has actually touched on the theoretical need for action, affirming that the taking of extraordinary measures is not specifically a necessity. Rather the acceptance of an issue as an existential threat is what should be considered as the inescapable prerequisite for an issue to be considered as securitised.\textsuperscript{65}

There appears to be an innate curiosity to the world’s approach to maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea is that actors involved in the region, particularly non-native actors, have seen that it can be more effective to move what are issues securitised by discourse back into the realm politicised issues. What may once have been considered as extraordinary measures to tackle certain existential threats, such as the creation of international entities such as SEACOP, MAOC (N), US Africa Station, Cape Verde’s COSMAR etc. to deal with maritime security issues, are now part of the everyday political processes of the actors involved. That is not to say that the issues being addressed are no longer existential threats, but rather that a much needed and more desirable long term footprint is better established through the politicisation of issues, rather than any sort of \textit{ad hoc} and temporary securitisation; Extreme politicisation it may be, but politicisation nonetheless. Arguably, a long term approach to such existential threats, namely through the continuation of securitisation discourses over longer (non-temporary) periods, is more likely to encourage the provision of assets and resources of a more permanent nature compared to extraordinary measures focused on an extraordinary and immediate solution to a particular existential threat.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{64} Foreign Policy, 2014
\textsuperscript{65} Buzan \textit{et al.} 1998: 25
\textsuperscript{66} Abrahamsen, 2005: 71
1.4 Globalisation and Maritime Security

“Today, international trade has evolved to the point where almost no nation can be fully self-sufficient. Every country is involved, at one level or another, in the process of selling what it produces and acquiring what it lacks: none can be dependent only on its domestic resources.” (International Maritime Organisation, 2012b: 7)

There can be little doubt that Globalisation is the most defining aspect of the current international system.\(^\text{67}\) It is the effects, both direct and indirect, of Globalisation that have governed the economic, social, political and environmental development, whether seen as a positive or negative, of the planet which we live on today. If there is any one particular phenomenon which can be given credit for the rise of the field of maritime security, then it is without doubt Globalisation. A rise largely as a consequence of the radically different nature of the global economy, rather than being something that has itself acted as a spearhead for change, the field of maritime security is drastically different now compared to how it was 100, or even as recent as 20, years ago. In more recent times, maritime security is something that has been inextricably linked to the Globalisation of transport security, namely as relative to shipping.\(^\text{68}\)

While Globalisation can of course be argued as being the main engine behind such shifts, the role that the development of the maritime trade industry has had as a facilitator for that process cannot be understated. Maritime transport is essentially the only economically viable method for large-scale long distance trade, without which the effects of Globalisation would arguably have struggled to take hold. It is the maritime industry that has provided the tools for scaling seemingly insurmountable obstacles to trade and without it other products provided by other creations of Globalisation, such as the internet and global financial networks, would be pointless in the absence of the cost-effective transport

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\(^{67}\) Tangredi, 2002: XXV

\(^{68}\) Amirell: 2012: 1
provided across the world’s oceans.  

While credit for the birth of globalisation often goes largely to industrialisation and technical development, it is the maritime domain that has acted as the constant facilitator.

Speaking at the 2010 Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the UK House of Lords representative, Lord Michael Jopling, summed up in a nutshell the extent to which the globalised world now relies on the sea.

“Seventy percent of the surface of the Earth is covered by water, 90% of global trade and about half of the world’s oil are transported by sea. Maritime areas also provide a vital dimension of Europe’s economy. It is estimated that 90% of the European Union (EU)’s external trade and 40% of internal trade is transported by sea.” (Jopling, 2010)

The influence of Globalisation on the modern maritime industry is undisputable, but that is not to say that the Globalisation of the oceans only occurred in recent times. Looking back through history, it becomes apparent that maritime security is something which has featured on the agenda since the very beginning of European expansion. With booming trade with outposts overseas fuelling the rise of the seafaring nation, attention inevitably turned to the detail of who was actually in control of vast and apparently unclaimed regions of ocean, as well as how to protect maritime activity far from home. Off from this early ‘Globalisation’ of the maritime domain spun initial studies and definitions of maritime security (see figure 1.7), such as Papal Bulls in the mid-15th century recognising the roles of Spain and Portugal as the dominant maritime powers (a period largely defined by a philosophy of *Mare Clausum*). The increasing importance of trading companies as the centuries progressed, most notably in the case of the Dutch and British empires, saw this monopoly reversed (a period largely defined by a philosophy of *Mare Liberum*), as a more

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69 Tangredi, 2002: XXVI
70 Tangredi, 2002b: 1
71 Heine and Thakur, 2011: 2
pragmatic approach took root when it came to protecting maritime trade. In line with the immense importance of trading companies to state interests came technological developments in the maritime field, which effectively provided the tools through which navies could police vast swathes of ocean. The build-up to the major conflicts of the 20th century saw naval power reach a peak in terms of the sheer quantity of vessels deployed, before the end of the Cold War and an increasingly unlikeliness of open naval warfare hailed the start of a notable decline in the number of vessels maintained. Mirroring this decline is an increase in the role played by private security companies, in what is arguably a return to the *Mare Liberum* model in which trading companies were largely responsible for their own security while traversing far off oceans.

*Figure 1.7 Approaches to maritime security throughout history*

![Diagram showing different approaches to maritime security throughout history](source: Risley, 2014)

Curiously, the current state of Globalisation may actually see us witness the regress of the principle of *Mare Clausum*. As the world presses ahead with the imposition of ever-growing claims and regulations regarding extended continental shelves, what we may be about to witness is the creation of some form of EEZ which extends out to 200 nautical miles and beyond.\(^72\) Although the current international approach to the issue does not affect the legal status of the water or airspace above a claimed continental shelf,\(^73\) such a

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\(^{73}\) United Nations Environment Programme, 2009: 8
situation may result in an unintended policing or strangulation of areas once thought to be governed by the principle of *Mare Liberum*.  

Regardless of how links to economic issues and age-old principles shape the future of maritime security, the development of interlinked global trade and communication shows no signs of letting up and is only likely to increase as more and more nations begin to build infrastructures and societies which rely on resources imported via sea routes (see figure 1.8).

To such an extent does the modern world rely on the shipping industry, an average of 1.2 tons of cargo are shipped annually per person. The vast amounts of commodities involved saw a world fleet of 104,304 sea-going merchant ships (weight of >100 gross tons) traversed the high seas in 2011.

**Figure 1.8: Global maritime trade**

![Graph showing global maritime trade](source: adapted from UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2011: 7)

74 For example, heightened levels of tension in the South China Sea are fuelled by ongoing disputes over the sovereignty of islands claimed by several states in the region.

75 Stopford, 2010: 2

76 International Maritime Organisation, 2012b: 8
While the benefits are obvious, Globalisation-fuelled technological development in the maritime field has further compounded on security risks, with modern tankers and container ships now bigger than ever\textsuperscript{77} and, as a result, presenting a more attractive/lucrative target non-traditional actors.\textsuperscript{78} Curiously, the marked increase in the size and quantity of merchant vessels has not been matched by the world’s navies. On the contrary, resources have been shifted away from traditional maritime assets to such an extent that the US Navy, which itself has been going through a very measurable downsizing, is currently the only force worthy of consideration as a global navy\textsuperscript{79} at a time when the world is almost desperately reliant on the stability of the maritime domain. Should Mahan’s traditional argument that sea power, vis-à-vis the ability to enforce policy in the field of maritime security, is solely about the ability to wage naval warfare remain as navies’ raison d’etat, then a decrease in the number of vessels deployed would indicate a shift in approach to maritime security. However, this is perhaps to be expected as a result of the effects of Globalisation on trade and technology. Although a tool capable of dictating the location, timing and procedure of maritime activity, on top of their ability to control access to regions,\textsuperscript{80} no longer are navies required for the manipulation of world trade. While they are still effective tools for deterrence, diplomacy and political influence, trade rather than the cannon is fast becoming the weapon of choice for the world’s major players. To this end, the shipping industry and the ability to exploit maritime resources are now what should be looked at as a scale for measuring modern sea power.\textsuperscript{81}

However, that is not to say that traditional naval forces have lost their application and we may indeed be on the cusp of a return to the fielding of large naval fleets as economic and diplomatic tools. Of particular relevance here is the rise of China and the importance that has been attached to an American military presence in maintaining trade

\textsuperscript{77} The world’s largest ore carriers, used largely to transport iron ore from Brazil to Europe and Asia, have an estimated deadweight of 400,000 tons.
\textsuperscript{78} Lal et al., 2006 notes that the attack on the oil tanker Limburg in October 2002 was seen as the cause of a short-term collapse in shipping in the area, with notable economic consequences for the region’s states.
\textsuperscript{79} Tangredi, 2002b: 2
\textsuperscript{80} Tangredi, 2002b: 6
\textsuperscript{81} ibid: 4
in the Far East.\textsuperscript{82} While the potential flash point of Taiwan appears to have moved to the back burner in recent times, on-going issues in the Pacific theatre and huge levels of US and Chinese investment in naval tools in the region\textsuperscript{83} are perhaps a sign that the traditional maritime security issues and strategies are yet to see their heyday.

Considering the dependence that many of the world’s nations now have on the Globalised economy, it necessarily follows that the process of Globalisation will itself feature heavily as a potential existential threat in its own right in the field of economic security. A prime example can be seen present-day in the form of the ongoing debt crisis, which has undoubtedly shook the very foundations of the globally intertwined financial system.\textsuperscript{84}

However, that is not to say that Globalisation is limited exclusively to the economic security vector. The bread and butter of the phenomenon may be traced to efforts to produce an explanation for greater levels of transnational economic activity, finance and investment, but that same phenomenon also lends itself to the description of ever-increasing technological integration, the propagation of ideas, the movement of people and cultural exchanges.\textsuperscript{85} To this end, Globalisation will necessarily begin to taken on a more prominent manifestation in the fields of military, environmental, political and societal security as the 21\textsuperscript{st} century progresses. After all, Globalisation is an ongoing exponential process, rather than a process fixed in time and space.\textsuperscript{86}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{82} U.S. Department of Defense, 2012: 2 affirms: “Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region...The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence.”
\item \textsuperscript{83} BBC, 2012 highlights that around 60% of the US fleet will be deployed to the Pacific region by 2020, in what is a clear indication of the continued relevance of traditional naval forces.
\item \textsuperscript{84} The applicability of the Copenhagen School’s approach is evident here, with examples of speech acts and the resulting process of securitisation readily available in the form of extraordinary austerity measures taken by national governments and encouraged by supranational entities.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Heine and Thakur, 2011: 2
\item \textsuperscript{86} Robertson, 1992: 59
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Although the influence that Globalisation has had on the global economy and the benefits reaped the world over are incontrovertible, what has essentially been painted over is the more sinister side of the phenomenon. The security perils of an inextricably interlinked world were largely ignored as geo-economics seemed to claim the day with the promise of endless growth. The events of the 11th of September 2001 were what drew back the curtain in one swoop, transforming Globalisation into a theme that would now feature on the security agenda. A small and apparently irrelevant security concern from far afield had managed to use the transport and technology provided by the process of Globalisation in what could be argued as an anti-Globalisation attack.

While the maritime domain may seem like a far cry away from Ground Zero, the attack at the heart of a global commerce centre saw the US government almost completely, at least in the short term, alter the focus of its maritime assets. Wholesale policy changes to maritime security approaches have also been made around the world as a result of the 9/11 attacks, with various supranational organisations (for example, the WCO’s Framework of Standards, the International Cargo Security Council, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Container Security Initiative and the IMO’s International Ship and Facility Security programme) and nation states scrambling to bolster port security in light of what was now viewed as a security vulnerability.

Despite these developments, the 9/11 attacks did arguably have a reinforcing effect on one of the more traditional roles of maritime forces; namely to support land-based activity. Facing wholesale changes in light of spending reductions being implemented by the Bush administration at the turn of the century, the need for an immediate presence in

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87 Tangredi, 2002: XXVII
88 Streusand, 2002: 29 affirms: “Arguably, Osama bin Laden’s war is against the effects of globalization rather than any deliberate Western policy.”
89 For example, see Boyd, 2002: “The week before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks... the Coast Guard cutter Tahoma was cruising the peaceful waters off New England, protecting codfish and scallops from illegal fishermen. A week later, the 270-foot vessel was patrolling New York harbor, machine guns ready, warily shepherding foreign ships into port.”
90 Khalid, 2005
the Middle East was addressed by the US Navy; particularly through its ability to deploy carrier groups to the region in a ground support role.91

What the 9/11 attacks essentially brought home was a realisation that security was no longer a field limited to traditional threats, but was now becoming increasingly concerned with addressing asymmetric threats.92 Not only has the translucent state of 21st century borders opened up opportunities for financial gain and the further development of ‘civil’ society, it has equally done the same for ‘uncivil’/non-traditional transnational actors.93

“In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, the free flow of information, people, goods and services has accelerated at an unprecedented rate. This interconnection has empowered individuals for good and ill, and challenged state based international institutions that were largely designed in the wake of World War II by policymakers who had different challenges in mind. Non-state actors can have a dramatic influence on the world around them.” (US National Security Strategy, 2010: 7)

Not only does Globalisation make actors more vulnerable to security threats beyond their own borders through failures of the complex systems which they depend on, but it also provides additional access and means which can be exploited to disrupt globalised networks.94 This is no more apparent than in the constantly shifting field of maritime security.

Of all the effects which Globalisation has had on the current maritime security portrait, it is perhaps the development of non-traditional security threats that has

91 Gaffney, 2009: 540
92 National Security Strategy, 2010: 15 outlines the strengthening of the US military in order to prepare a wide range of contingencies against non-state actors. Seen as somewhat of a break from traditional US strategy, the document has been largely touted as the definitive guide for US foreign policy in the coming years.
93 Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 231
94 Navari, 2013: 39
triggered the largest shift. These threats have of course existed throughout history, but it is Globalisation that has massively contributed to their reach and extent.95 Clear examples can see seen in maritime security issues specifically present in this research paper’s geographical area of study.

The effects of Globalisation on the world’s maritime routes has, without a doubt, been the main facilitator of transnational drug trafficking. While the illegal trade in narcotics is estimated to be the world’s second largest industry,96 drug producing regions are often far afield from destination markets, giving maritime routes a fundamental role. While cocaine production is dominated by three counties in Latin America, the world’s two most profitable cocaine markets (the US and Europe) are overseas. A total of 106 tons of cocaine were seized in the United States, while a total of 71 tons were seized in Europe97 in 2011; most of which will had been transported by sea in what is clearly an issue of maritime security. The maritime trafficking of hashish originating from North Africa is also becoming an increasingly predominant issue in the Mediterranean in the fallout of the Arab Spring phenomenon, with regional instability transforming the region into a coordinator for illicit smuggling.

**Figure 1.9: Global maritime drug trafficking routes**

Source: adapted (base map) from Screen Avenue, 2013

95 Thachuk and Tangredi, 2009: 58
96 Ibid: 57
97 UNODC, 2014: 35-36
Recently a series of multi-ton maritime seizures have highlighted the extend of the issue and its potential connection with arms trafficking and terrorist activity in the region, in what is a clear example of a national security threat resulting from a non-traditional maritime threat.\textsuperscript{98}

Unstable conditions on land have also led to a considerable jump in the number of reported incidents of maritime piracy during the first two decades of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. With attackers taking advantage of nearby busy sea lanes, piracy is particularly prominent in the Gulf of Guinea, A total of 297 incidents of piracy were reported in 2012: 75 of which were off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden; 58 in the Gulf of Guinea; and 81 incidents in the Indonesian archipelago.\textsuperscript{99} All three of these areas are fundamentally important maritime choke points and act as transit regions for vast amounts of energy supplies and goods.

\textbf{Figure 1.10: Global maritime piracy hotspots}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{map}
\caption{Global maritime piracy hotspots}
\end{figure}

Source: adapted (base map) from Screen Avenue, 2013

Likewise, large-scale human maritime trafficking is becoming more of an issue as the 21\textsuperscript{st} century progresses. Incidents of mass clandestine immigration are becoming an increasing problem for Australia and the United States, while the European Union is currently investing vast amounts of maritime resources into policing its southern maritime border. In 2012, a total of 37,214 illegal border crossings were detected in the Eastern

\textsuperscript{98} Reuters, 2013
\textsuperscript{99} ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2014: 5
Mediterranean, 10,379 in the Central Mediterranean and 6,379 in the Western Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{100}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure11.jpg}
\caption{Global maritime clandestine immigration routes}
\end{figure}

To better tackle these new asymmetric threats, states are increasingly adapting not only their legislative tools, but also the capabilities of their actual naval assets. Examples include the Royal Netherlands Navy’s recent launch of the Holland Class off-shore patrol vessel. Developed as the new highlight of the Royal Netherlands Navy, the vessels are designed specifically for anti-piracy, anti-drug trafficking and quick response missions and are not actually capable of performing a role as a traditional naval combat platform.\textsuperscript{101} The French Navy has also followed suit with the Gowind Class, designed specifically for maritime safety and security missions,\textsuperscript{102} while the US Coast Guard continues to develop the Sentinel Class of vessels while will be used in anti-narcotics missions.\textsuperscript{103}

On the political level there are also signs of a shift in maritime security approaches in reaction to non-traditional threats, most notably relative what can generally be referred to as the principle of posse comitatus.\textsuperscript{104} Traditionally, many states have proven keen to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100} FRONTEX, 2013: 20
\item \textsuperscript{101} Naval Technology, 2014
\item \textsuperscript{102} MSHIPCO, 2012
\item \textsuperscript{103} United States Coast Guard, 2013
\item \textsuperscript{104} The principle is enshrined in the United States federal law 18 U.S.C. § 1385, more commonly known as the Posse Comitatus Act and is essentially the limiting of military forces in law enforcement activities.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
maintain a clear separation between military tools and law enforcement activities, however several states have adopted legislation to better equip their forces for the tackling of non-traditional maritime threats. Maritime assets operating far afield are often presented with the conundrum of what to actually do when confronted with what are more situations of a legal nature, rather than of a defence nature. Naval assets deployed far afield are well-positioned to address maritime drug trafficking in sensitive regions, but lack the legal basis to act as law enforcement entities. To address this issue, many governments have passed legislation authorising the use of Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET), in what is useful tool for actually addressing the globalised threat of maritime drug trafficking without encroaching on the limited of the Posse Comitatus principle.

In summary, the effects of Globalisation on maritime security are still open to debate. Many of the maritime challenges now emerging onto the security scene are relative new and, therefore, are still likely to develop. Just how far issues such as drug and weapon smuggling, human trafficking and piracy are likely to spread is of course hugely dependent on the situation in the regions in which such phenomena can be found. However, what is clear is that non-traditional threats have already began to shape approaches to maritime security. The design and deployment of maritime assets is being adapted to fit these new challenges, while the shipping industry is also taking steps to protect itself.

Globalisation has had an undisputable influence on the field of maritime security, however it has not made the field irrelevant. On the contrary, maritime security will inevitably be more of an issue in a globalising world that relies more and more on maritime transport. What Globalisation has done to maritime security is force it to adapt to a world that now presents very different challenges in both nature and extent.

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105 This is not the case for all navies. While it remains the case, for example, for the US Navy (it is the US Coast Guard which has a law enforcement role), the UK Royal Navy and the Armada Española, the Commanders of French Navy vessels are empowered to act as law enforcement officials. The Netherlands have also recently adopted their national legislation to grant such powers to the Royal Netherlands Navy.

106 Shelton, 2014
2. The Gulf of Guinea and the Maritime Domain

2.1 Regional Maritime Issues

“Maritime security is essential to maintaining the flow of revenues from oil and gas, which have the potential to contribute significantly to development in the region. At the same time maritime resources such as fish, aquaculture and intact ecosystems directly contribute to the livelihoods of many Africans.” (Chatham House, 2013: 1)

The Gulf of Guinea\textsuperscript{107} is a hugely diverse region. Home to more than an estimated 400 million people,\textsuperscript{108} it is a thriving example of cultural and linguistic diversity and history. However, the region also attracts its fair share of negative attention. While 6%\textsuperscript{109} of the world’s population lives in the region, it generates just 1.2% of global GDP.\textsuperscript{110} Of the 17 states included in this research paper’s definition of the Gulf of Guinea, 14 feature in the poorest 100 states out of a sample of 191.\textsuperscript{111} Further compounding on these unenviable levels of poverty is the fact that almost one third of states in the wider West African region have experienced a coup d’état in the last 5 years,\textsuperscript{112} in what is a sure indication of levels of political fragility right across the board.

Such instability and economic under-development has led to startlingly high perceptions of corruption within the region’s states: corruption and a fragility of the state apparatus which is arguably gripping not only the Gulf of Guinea, but the entire African continent.

\textsuperscript{107} For the purposes of this paper, the Gulf of Guinea is defined as the area of the Eastern Atlantic Ocean from 15°0’0”N to 15°0’0”S, thereby including the 17 states in the region that have a maritime border, namely: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Togo.

\textsuperscript{108} Calculated based on figures provided in CIA, 2014.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid

\textsuperscript{110} Calculated based on figured provided in World Bank, 2014a.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid

\textsuperscript{112} UNODC, 2013: 7
“Africa, on the other hand, home to 36 of the 50 least developed states, is in many ways a paradigm of how state weakness opens the door to transnational crime and terrorism.” (Heine and Thakur, 2011: 8)

Indeed, with the exception of Senegal, Liberia, Ghana and Benin, none of the states included in this research paper’s sample feature in the top 100 states in terms of perceptions of corruption out of a total of 177 (the state ranked in 1st being that which is perceived as least corrupt).113 Nigeria offers a shocking example of such levels of ingrained corruption, with somewhere in the region of 90% of international aid received by the country since its independence in 1960 having been channelled away by corruption.114

### Table 2.1: overview of research sample states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population115</th>
<th>GDP Rank (sample of 191)116</th>
<th>Corruption Rank (sample of 177)117</th>
<th>Failed State Index Rank (Sample of 178)118</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>19.088.106</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>10.160.556</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>23.130.708</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>4.662.446</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>77.433.744</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>722.254</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1.672.597</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia, The</td>
<td>1.925.527</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>25.758.108</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>11.474.383</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1.693.398</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>22.848.945</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>4.092.310</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>177.155.754</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>13.635.927</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>5.743.725</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>7.351.374</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

113 Transparency International, 2013
114 Deculdt, 2013
115 CIA, 2014
116 World Bank, 2014a
117 Transparency International, 2013
118 The Fund for Peace, 2013
The indicators for the region are troubling, but it is the consequences of such instability that attract the attention of the wider community. Issues on land have spilled out into the Gulf of Guinea itself, fuelling maritime concerns that are showing few signs of improvement half way through the second decade of the 21st century. Evidence of many major maritime security issues (human trafficking, arms trafficking, drug trafficking and piracy) can all be found in the region, but it is piracy and drug trafficking which are the most startlingly evident and, consequently, it is these issues which are the focus of this research paper.

While such a stifling level of corruption is in itself draining on the region’s political, economic and social outlooks, there are other issues which are becoming increasingly imbedded: issues which are of concern for the international community. One of the most pressing of those issues is piracy. Seen as phenomenon largely facilitated by widespread corruption and governance issues in the region, as well as the region’s states’ inability to maintain complete and full control of their territory, the Gulf of Guinea is now holder of the unenviable title as the world’s second most exposed region to piracy incidents.\textsuperscript{119} Pressure elsewhere, particularly imposed by Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, has reduced piracy in other areas and contributed to the Gulf of Guinea’s relative rise in the piracy league table, but trends do suggest that the problem is on the increase in the region. Just under 30\% of recorded incidents in African waters from 2003 to 2011 (427 out of 1,434)\textsuperscript{120} occurred in the Gulf of Guinea, while incidents in the area rose by 73\% from 2010 to 2011.\textsuperscript{121}

“The Gulf of Guinea is, in many ways, a perfect incubator for piracy, providing both resources and safe haven. Surrounded by some of Africa’s most proficient oil producers, including Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Ghana, and Equatorial Guinea, the

\textsuperscript{119} See IMO, 2013 for a full list of reported maritime piracy incidents occurring in 2012.
\textsuperscript{120} Chatham House, 2013: 1
\textsuperscript{121} From 39 incidents in 2010 to 53 incidents in 2011.
Gulf is a major transit route for oil tankers on their way to international markets. These tankers have proven valuable prey for pirates.” (Nelson, 2012)

While the dangers to shipping passing through the area are obvious, the consequences risk triggering a downward spiral. As levels of attacks, or at least documents attacks, increase, shipping companies are likely to be faced by increasing costs for shipping in the region. As a result, foreign investment could be dissuaded, compounding on an already alarming political and economic situation which fosters conditions for illicit maritime activities.122

Compounding on increasing incidents of piracy is an incapacity of the region’s states to effectively respond to the issue. The maritime domain is one that is not only difficult, but also expensive to police. The only real solution for the immediate prevention of piracy (save the long-term resolution of the economic and social issues that lead to and facilitate piracy) is heavily resource-dependent maritime patrols,123 which are well beyond the means of most of the region’s actors. Essentially, maritime security is a low priority issue for most Gulf of Guinea states. This may however change in the future, with the region spread of Nigerian-based piracy groups already having seen the Ivory Coast124 and Cameroon125 bolster their naval forces. Faced by a scarcity of resources, the region’s naval forces have also concentrated their efforts with the intention of creating safe areas in the piracy-plagued anchorages off Cotonou, Lomé and Lagos.126 However, it continues to be the case that only Nigeria and, to a degree, Angola can muster a naval response capable of acting as an effective deterrence or response to piracy activity in the area.127

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122 Decludt, 2013
123 Thachuk and Tangredi, 2002: 68
124 Reuters, 2014. Ivory Coast has added around 40 new vessels to its fleet. “They will fight piracy, infiltration and illicit trafficking and will be managed by the navy”, the country’s Defence Minister was quoted as saying regarding the acquisition of the vessels.
125 Defence Web, 2013. The Cameroon Navy acquired two Spanish-built patrol vessels, as well as a landing craft.
126 United States Naval Institute News, 2014
127 Ukeje and Movomo Lea, 2013: 10
Another unique and highly worrying phenomenon of Gulf of Guinea piracy is its violent aspect. While piracy in other regions tends to focus on capturing crew members to be used as leverage, that is not usually the case in the Gulf of Guinea. With the aim of attacks being steal goods, incidents have increasingly seen the use of firearms and violence against crews, which is less often the case in regions.\\footnote{128 Neptune Maritime Security, 2012 notes that at least 20 of the 32 incidents reported in 2012 involved the use of a firearm.}

**Table 2.2: Violence and use of firearms in Gulf of Guinea piracy incidents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threat of violence against crew</td>
<td>Actual violence against crew</td>
<td>Firearm used by attacker(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabian Sea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Sea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malacca Strait</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Sea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Ocean</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America (Atlantic)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America (Central)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America (Panama)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South China Sea</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMO, 2011; IMO, 2012; IMO, 2013

The Gulf of Guinea is of course not the only piracy hot spot threatening important shipping routes, however the motivation fuelling the occurrence of such incidents is unique. Piracy attacks on the East African seaboard tend to focus on the hijacking of ships.
and the taking of crews as hostages in order to press for the payments of ransoms, however the Gulf of Guinea presents a very different problem set. Many of the incidents recorded indicate that piracy in the region is more focused on stealing goods; more specifically the fuels being produced and shipped by the booming oil industry. This form of piracy has become such a serious issue that regional actors are becoming more concerned by hikes in trade-related costs and insurance rather than the occasional loss of cargo, as such increases risk having a hugely detrimental effect on the region’s entire economy.\textsuperscript{129}

While two thirds of Gulf of Guinea piracy incidents have occurred off the coast of Nigeria, it is largely believed that most of the perpetrators involved in such incidents are indeed based out of Nigeria.\textsuperscript{130} This is a reflection of the extent and impunity in which these ‘pirates’ operate. While incidents are focused around the densely populated Niger Delta region, there have been reports as far afield as Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Togo.\textsuperscript{131} Another indicator this impunity is the \textit{modi operanti} used. Despite appearances, there is evidence to suggest that the perpetrators of such incidents have the liberty to be selective in their targeting of vessels; often making extensive voyages and working based on prior knowledge of cargo and shipping routes, before selecting the most lucrative target.\textsuperscript{132}

\textbf{Figure 2.3: Gulf of Guinea Piracy hotspots 2006-2012}

![Gulf of Guinea Piracy hotspots 2006-2012](image)

Source: adapted from figures presented in Think Africa Press, 2013

\textsuperscript{129} Bem-Ari, 2013: 12
\textsuperscript{130} Think Africa Press, 2013
\textsuperscript{131} Ben-Ari, 2013: 12
\textsuperscript{132} United States Naval Institute News, 2014
As Globalisation brings the world closer together than ever before and technological advancement sees flows of information and commerce circulate the globe at ever increasing speeds, parts of the world in which particular global risks may have seemed completely alien are now facing the new realities of threats that are finding it ever easier to cross international boundaries. One such challenge posed to the Gulf of Guinea is what the 2013 Global Risks Report defines as Widespread Illicit Trade; more specifically the challenge posed by the trafficking of illicit drugs into/through the area.

With the turn of the millennia seeing the lucrative European market up the policing of its waters against illicit trafficking, the Gulf of Guinea quickly developed into a hub through which the international trade in illicit narcotics, particularly cocaine, operates. Although essentially produced exclusively in three Latin American countries, increasingly notable seizure figures indicate that the area has fallen prey to international organised crime using the region as a transit point between South America and Europe. This use is further encouraged by the notoriously high prices of cocaine on the European market, with the drug selling at all-time high prices that are 60% higher than in the US market.

Curiously, while trafficking through the Gulf of Guinea is believed to be an increasingly more commonplace activity, the region is little more than a transit point for illicit material destined for other markets, as noted above. Indeed, transits points between Latin America and Europe such as Cape Verde are not generally considered as being areas with their own drug usage problems. However, recent studies have suggested that addition rates are on the rise as a consequence trafficking through the region.

Much of the focus of cocaine transportation from Latin America into West Africa is around the latitude of 10 degrees north (directly across the Atlantic Ocean into the Gulf of

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133 World Economic Forum, 2013
134 The African Executive, 2009 notes that an estimated 27% of the cocaine consumed annually in Europe is believed to pass through the Gulf of Guinea.
135 Mutume, 2007: 3
136 AFRICOM, 2010
137 Deutche Welle, 2013
Guinea), which is the shortest distance between the two continents. In light of the notable use of that latitude, European law enforcement agencies have come to know the route as ‘highway 10’.138

The issue and severity of highway 10 really came to light between 2004 and 2007, when a series of major maritime cocaine seizures were made in the Gulf of Guinea region.139 Shockingly, the sheer quantity of narcotics being moved through the region was estimated to be worth more than the annual GDP of some of the states being used as transit zones.140 While such large scale narcotics trafficking is of course facilitated by issues of governance, there is also a major concern that foreign trafficking groups abusing and already fragile Gulf of Guinea will trigger even higher levels of corruption and even political violence.141

“The fragile States of West Africa are not in a position to take on Latin American organised crime gangs, which are much stronger in terms of resources. The establishment of the illegal drug market in those weak States goes hand in hand with a rise in instability, growing levels of corruption, possible financing of non-governmental armed groups and high incidence of cocaine use.” (Brombacher and Maihold, 2009: 1)

Such fears appear to have been proven as founded, with a series of incidents across the region indicating dangerous levels of corruption at some of the highest levels of government: Guinean officials have been accused of using diplomatic channels to move cocaine across borders;142 in 2010 the Gambian president dismissed the national head of the police, the head of the navy, the deputy head of the army and even the head of the

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138 UNODC, 2007b: 6
139 The amount of cocaine trafficked via West Africa is believed to have increased from just 3 tons in 2004 to around 47 tons in 2007 (UNODC, 2011: 26)
140 UNODC, 2013: 9
141 McGuire, 2010: 1
142 African Executive, 2009
National Drug Enforcement Agency for involvement in narcotics trafficking; and in 2008 Sierra Leone’s Minister of Transportation was forced to resign after his cousin was associated with an aircraft used to transport a notable quantity of cocaine. All of this without mentioning the dire state of Guinea (Conakry) and Guinea-Bissau.

It should however be stressed that drug trafficking, while worryingly prevalent in the Gulf of Guinea, is not the sole, or even initial, cause of the governance issues being experienced in the region today. While it unarguably contributes to a worsening of the situation, it is essentially a consequence of wider patterns of drug consumption (i.e. trafficking as the result of demand on the European market) and the perceived ease of operating in the area. Many of the region’s states are struggling under the weight of huge deficits, while global indexes and rankings only contribute to the perception of an area considered as lacking in terms of rule of law and open and transparent governance.

“The sudden rise in cocaine trafficking through West Africa indisputably has negative implications for governance, security, and development in the region. It is, however, crucial to recognize that cocaine trafficking is not a cause of state fragility and political corruption but is rather a symptom of the pre-existence of these conditions in West Africa.” (Mcguire, 2009: 3)

Widespread corruption, high levels of poverty and an absence of an effective state apparatus to control such activity sees the Gulf of Guinea occupy a position of preference for drug trafficking organisations. Notoriously low levels of development arguably make certain West African states attractive areas for use as transit points for illicit materials and with 14 of the 15 ECOWAS states all falling within the bottom 50 (with the exception of Cape Verde, in 132nd) ranked in the 2012 Human Development Index, many of the

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143 Independent Online, 2010
144 The Guardian, 2010
145 Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, 2013: 10
146 United Nations Development Programme, 2013: 146
region’s actors would find it difficult to muster the resources needed to effectively prevent usage of the region as a transit route by drug trafficking groups.

Figure 2.4: West Africa maritime cocaine seizures 2005-2011

2.2 Maritime insecurity and the failed state phenomenon

Unenviably high levels of corruption, some of the world’s highest illiteracy rates, porous international borders and systematic failures in overall governance plague the Gulf

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147 Transparency International, 2013. With the exception of Ghana, all of the countries comprising this research paper’s definition of the Gulf of Guinea are in the top 100 of the Corruption Ranking.
148 Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2009. A reported 40% of West Africa’s adult population cannot read or write.
of Guinea and contribute to what is perhaps a justified label of failed state\textsuperscript{149} to some the region’s nations. Essentially, what the idea of a failed state embodies is the notion of a weak state taken to the extreme. However, the assessment of the weakness of a state is a particularly problematic academic exercise, principally due to the varied methods for assessing the relative stability/weakness of states. Maintaining this research paper’s focus on the Copenhagen School approach, the concept of the ‘idea of the state’ is what is fundamental to the analysis of a state’s bill of health. To this end, a weak state (i.e. a failed state) is one in which the domestic consensus does not have the strength to eliminate the threats faced within that state.\textsuperscript{150} Deeply engrained corruption and proven involvement in illicit activities on the part of important state actors would certainly lend to indications of state weakness in the Gulf of Guinea region.

Highly unstable economic outlooks and some of the world’s lowest GDP figures means that investment in security is often overlooked in the Gulf of Guinea and the field of maritime security is no exception. However, an absence of maritime security can bring with it catastrophic consequences, opening the door to illicit activities that can plunge already vulnerable states into a perpetual cycle: state weakness acts as a facilitator for issues which are essentially maritime in terms of method and application (i.e. large-scale drug trafficking and piracy), while the prevalence of these issues contributes to a further weakening of the state. While it is arguable that the absence of one step of this cycle could potentially bring it to a halt, what is certain is that instability facilitates trafficking, as trafficking facilitates instability.

“Policy planners point out that organized crime can derail development programmes. In turn, unbalanced or inadequately planned development contributes to criminality, resulting in a vicious cycle of poverty-crime-poverty.” (Mutume, 2007: 3)

\textsuperscript{149} Global Policy Forum, 2014 notes a failed state as being a state which “can no longer perform basic functions such as education, security, or governance, usually due to fractious violence or extreme poverty.”

\textsuperscript{150} Buzan, 1991: 67
On a side note, it is worth stating that the western-centred study of security (maritime security included) perhaps adds more of an emphasis to the extent of the failed state issue than it actually deserves. After all, a permanent state of stable security right across the board is something that is only really enjoyed by a small core of developed states. In short, around the world insecurity is by far more of a normal circumstance that security.\textsuperscript{151}

One of the most infamous examples of a perpetual cycle of insecurity, highly influenced by illicit maritime activity, is Guinea-Bissau. What Guinea-Bissau is experiencing is essentially a weak state insecurity dilemma, whereby the state has failed to convince its internal actors that armed rebellions and coups d’état are counter-productive,\textsuperscript{152} even reaching a point in which the actual security mechanisms of the state itself look to seize power to further their own interests.\textsuperscript{153} In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the furthering of interests on the part of certain groups can be largely be seen in the complacency with which the issue of maritime drug trafficking is addressed. One of the main complications here is that many, particularly the poorest, now rely on such activity for survival, making discouraging such complacency an extremely complicated task.

Assuming then that Guinea-Bissau is experiencing an insecurity dilemma, it is curious to note that the country actually has one of the highest ratios of military personnel in the region, with only Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon having a higher ratio.\textsuperscript{154} Such a ratio would arguably be well equipped to deal with security challenges. However, such extensive coups d’état suggest that it is in fact this powerful domestic actor which is largely contributing to a lack of overall regime security (i.e. a situation in which governing actors are isolated from violent overthrow). Essentially then, the internal security challenges

\textsuperscript{151} Jackson, 2010: 186
\textsuperscript{152} See BBC, 2014 for a comprehensive timeline of incidents which have affected Guinea-Bissau. Worryingly, Guinea-Bissau has changed government more times as a result of coups than as a result of elections.
\textsuperscript{153} UNODC, 2011: 28: “Some observers have linked the murder of the President João Vieira in March 2009 and the coup d’etat of the military in April 2010 to such conflicts that were, at least partly, financed out of drug trafficking.”
\textsuperscript{154} Data compiled from Hackett, 2012.
inherited by Guinea-Bissau as a weak state contribute to a condition which makes it incapable of dealing with external threats such as maritime drug trafficking.

“Guinea-Bissau is considered one of the poorest countries in the world, and is a primary transshipment point for drugs moving between South America and Europe. Military and law enforcement officials are purportedly deeply involved in the drug trade, so traffickers move with impunity throughout the country. This is the type of failed state that breeds regional instability.” (Grassley, 2012: 1)

Branded as a ‘narco-state’, Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest states in what is already a generally poor region. This of course goes someway to explaining the appeal of the international drug smuggling industry for the country: with cocaine trafficking estimated to be worth somewhere in the region of 2 billion USD to the country, which is almost double Guinea-Bissau’s actual GDP, there are clear economic implications to be taken into consideration. To put those implications into context: the national budget of Guinea-Bissau is worth roughly the same as two and a half tons of cocaine sold at wholesale on the European market.

While the finger is largely pointed at Guinea-Bissau as one of the world’s most infamous examples of the damage which can be caused by large-scale maritime drug trafficking, it is of course not the only state believed to act as a cocaine safe-haven. Indeed, Ghana, Guinea, Benin, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and even the relatively stable countries of Senegal and Cape Verde have been associated as transits points for cocaine heading into the lucrative European market.

There would also appear then to be other reasons which make Guinea-Bissau such an attractive location for drugs trafficking. Inevitably the weakness of the state outlined

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155 In a region that claims just 1.20% of the world’s GDP, Guinea-Bissau is particularly worse off; with a GDP of just 859 million USD (World Bank, 2014a).
156 Africa Economic Development Institute, 2014
157 UNODC, 2007a: 12

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above plays a part, but there are also other historical and cultural reasons to be taken into consideration. As a former Portuguese colony, Guinea-Bissau shares a common language and cultural ties with other Lusophone countries that form an important triangle for the importation of cocaine into Europe, namely Portugal on Europe’s Atlantic seaboard, Cape Verde on the Eastern side of the Atlantic and Brazil to the West. Moreover, Guinea-Bissau is highly accessible to maritime activity in being comprised of 87 islands (21 of which are largely uninhabited).158

The influence of the well-documented chronic lack of resources in Guinea-Bissau also undoubtedly plays its part. One case in April 2007 was an ideal example of how an inability on the part of state actors to intervene in maritime security issues such as large-scale drug trafficking often sees such crimes go unpunished. While an estimated 635kg of high-grade cocaine were seized by the authorities in Guinea-Bissau, an estimated 2500kg slipped away unhindered, due to the fact that the poorly-equipped law enforcement forces in the area did not have the resources to give chase.159

2.3 Globalisation and the Gulf of Guinea: the importance of Maritime security

Despite its noted deficiencies, the Gulf of Guinea is certainly a basket of economic potential; most notably in terms of its vast and largely untapped hydrocarbon reserves. Despite the emergence of the region an energy provider in its own right, it is curious to note that levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Gulf of Guinea have actually seen a slight decline in recent years.

158 UNODC 2011: 28
159 Mutume, 2007: 3
Table 2.5: Levels of foreign direct investment in the Gulf of Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2,205,298,180</td>
<td>-3,227,211,182</td>
<td>-3,023,770,966</td>
<td>-6,897,954,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>-18,732,014</td>
<td>53,454,933</td>
<td>161,091,309</td>
<td>158,589,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>740,307,389</td>
<td>537,779,845</td>
<td>652,411,756</td>
<td>525,754,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1,861,554,557</td>
<td>2,210,884,010</td>
<td>3,055,952,325</td>
<td>2,757,934,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>-278,000,000</td>
<td>2,728,800,000</td>
<td>1,596,024,304</td>
<td>2,891,607,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>1,636,219,625</td>
<td>2,734,000,000</td>
<td>1,975,000,000</td>
<td>2,115,073,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>573,000,000</td>
<td>499,000,000</td>
<td>696,000,000</td>
<td>702,406,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia, The</td>
<td>39,447,344</td>
<td>37,366,208</td>
<td>36,178,721</td>
<td>33,524,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2,372,540,000</td>
<td>2,527,350,000</td>
<td>3,222,240,000</td>
<td>3,294,520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>140,850,000</td>
<td>101,350,000</td>
<td>956,040,000</td>
<td>605,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>-1,346,926</td>
<td>1,469,884</td>
<td>25,024,053</td>
<td>16,226,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>396,030,774</td>
<td>358,118,909</td>
<td>286,110,464</td>
<td>478,400,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>127,803,425</td>
<td>452,342,328</td>
<td>1,312,748,380</td>
<td>1,354,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>8,554,840,769</td>
<td>6,048,560,266</td>
<td>8,841,952,775</td>
<td>7,101,031,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>330,145,121</td>
<td>266,107,641</td>
<td>338,218,819</td>
<td>337,669,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>110,430,203</td>
<td>238,404,158</td>
<td>950,477,689</td>
<td>548,073,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>46,118,874</td>
<td>124,942,199</td>
<td>171,038,614</td>
<td>166,324,169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With “foreign direct investment seen as the primary motor of globalization”,\textsuperscript{160} it perhaps comes as a surprise that an area which is increasingly becoming a global energy supplier would see a decrease in FDI from 2011 to 2012 (11 of the 17 states comprising this research paper’s sample saw a decrease).\textsuperscript{161} This is a particularly curious shift, should it be highlighted that Gulf of Guinea states, particularly those sitting in the Niger Delta of rich oil reserves, are vital in the energy security outlook of some of the world’s major economies and FDI providers, including China, France, India, Russia, the UK and the USA.\textsuperscript{162} Despite this shift, some of the region’s states are still showing notable levels of sustained

\textsuperscript{160} World Trade Organisation, 1996
\textsuperscript{161} The noted reduction in FDI in Angola may be due to increased levels of Angolan investment abroad, rather than an actual decrease in incoming FDI.
\textsuperscript{162} Courson, 2009: 5
development (namely levels currently being experienced in Angola and Nigeria) and are transforming the Gulf of Guinea into a region that is beginning to make a name for itself as one of the world’s principal energy producing regions; fuelled further by the post 9/11 policies of American and certain European actors geared around the diversification of energy resources and efforts to break dependence on the unstable and potentially hostile Middle East region.163

“...some countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have been gaining increased importance in the global energy sector (the cases of Angola and Nigeria). In the West African energy basin, various countries have been gaining importance in the petroleum geopolitical arena thanks to discoveries of new reserves and the expansion of production. Standing out amongst those countries are Nigeria, Angola, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.” (Mendes Leal, 2011: 27)

This phenomenon may in the long run bring further development to the entire area should one of its major actors assume a position as a regional power, however it is currently Angola and Nigeria who are experiencing and getting the most out of biggest oil booms; producing 34% and 47% of the region’s total oil supply respectively.164 Despite this boom, even these two regional powerhouses still have some way to go before they are considered amongst the world’s top ranking economies, with Nigeria still having only the 23rd best GDP,165 despite being the world’s 8th most populous nation166 and despite having derived oil revenues somewhere in the region of 52 billion USD in 2011.167

While the oil industry has brought in much needed investment to one of the world’s poorest regions, it is precisely that same industry which has also produced one of the Gulf

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163 Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, 2013: 13. This policy of diversification has seen the Gulf of Guinea become a vital area for American national security interests, resulting the establishment of a dedicated and autonomous Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008.
164 Chatham House, 2013: 1
165 Calculated based on figured provided in World Bank, 2014a.
166 CIA Factbook, 2014
167 UNODC, 2013: 45
of Guinea’s increasingly problematic maritime security issues; more precisely piracy. The dark side of Globalisation provides for a black market in fuel both locally as well as regionally, which acts as a further incentive for piracy activity.

“Much of the piracy that affects West Africa is a product of the disorder that surrounds the regional oil industry. A large share of the recent piracy attacks targeted vessels carrying petroleum products. These vessels are attacked because there is a booming black market for fuel in West Africa. Without this ready market, there would be little point in attacking these vessels. There are indications that oil may also be smuggled outside the region.” (UNODC, 2013: 45)

The issue of piracy has become so damaging to the oil producing sector in the region that a staggering 7% of Nigeria’s oil wealth is believed to be lost due to the phenomenon.168 While not all oil revenue losses can be attributed to this medium, it does play a fundamental role in the wider issues that result in an estimated loss of 400,000 barrels of oil per day in Nigeria, representing a cost of 1 billion USD per month169 in what is an ideal example of how one single threat can span across a range of security fields. Not only is the theft of oil damaging the economy, it is also a risk-ridden activity in terms of environmental security due to the potential for large-scale oil spills170 and has ramifications for political and societal security, with the OCGs involved in this illicit activity believed to even have replaced the state in some locations in the building of infrastructure as a method of swaying the loyalty of local populations.171

168 Nelson, 2012
169 Chatham House, 2013: 12
170 Mwalimu, 2009: 29: “Siphoning of fuel illegally due to thriving black markets for fuel products also contributes to oil pipeline explosions. In July 2000, a pipeline explosion immediately outside the city of Warri, Nigeria was responsible for the death of two hundred and fifty people. In December 2000, another explosion in the city of Lagos led to the death of sixty people. On May 16, 2008, BBC estimated that at least one hundred and up to two hundred people died in an oil pipeline explosion.”
171 Chatham House, 2013: 12
Aside from the obvious issue of piracy, the field of maritime security also plays another fundamental role in region’s infrastructure for Globalisation; more precisely oil extraction and refinery facilities themselves. Again, the oil producing powerhouse of Nigeria is a solid example worthy of study, with approximately one third of production capacity located offshore.\footnote{Mendes Leal, 2011: 31}

**Figure 2.6: Location of Gulf of Guinea energy reserves**

![Location of Gulf of Guinea energy reserves](image)

Source: Offshore Energy Today, 2013

These facilities are of course part of the wider security spectrum of the Gulf of Guinea, meaning that they are vulnerable to the issues affecting the region. The two main threats to these installations in the Gulf of Guinea in particular which are either a direct maritime security issue or which could be prevented through the improvement of the maritime security setting are politically-motivated insurgency and, again, piracy. Of the estimated six piracy attacks against off shore facilities which have been reported globally
since 2007, four actually took place in the Gulf of Guinea.\textsuperscript{173} Relative to insurgency, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) attracts the biggest headlines. Initially associated with insurgency along rivers and the states located around the Niger Delta, offshore facilities were once thought to be largely out of range. However, the attack on the 20\textsuperscript{th} of June 2008 on the largest single platform in the entire Niger Delta, the Bonga Oil Platform, located 120km off shore, demonstrated that this was no longer the case.\textsuperscript{174} In total, MEND was associated with at least 13 attacks on offshore oil and gas facilities in the region between 2006 and 2010 alone.\textsuperscript{175}

Another maritime security vulnerability in the Gulf of Guinea which is inextricably linked to Globalisation is the area’s geographical significance as a shipping route. Placed in a strategically and commercially important area on the East Atlantic seaboard, the region is the shortest distance for Atlantic crossings from South America and is a transit route for maritime traffic heading around the Southern Cape of Africa both to and from Europe, the Middle East and Asia. At the same time, conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East which are affecting the shorter Arab Gulf maritime route also encourage the increased usage of the Gulf of Guinea.\textsuperscript{176} Moreover, many of the region’s states rely on commerce generated from exporting materials via maritime routes, while vessels transiting through the region are an important source of tax revenue. With an estimated 30,000 ships transiting the Gulf of Guinea every year,\textsuperscript{177} any detrimental influence on shipping in the region is sure to have far-reaching consequences.

Piracy can have a hugely damaging effect on trade flows and countries such as Benin have particularly suffered due to the resulting reluctance on the part of some

\textsuperscript{173} Journal of Energy Security, 2013 lists: 01/04/07 attack on Bulford Dolphin mobile offshore drilling rig; 03/05/07 attack on FPSO (floating production, storage, and offloading vessel) Mystras; 05/05/07 attack on Trident VIII offshore rig; 05/01/10 attack on FSO Westaf.
\textsuperscript{174} Courson, 2009: 23
\textsuperscript{175} Journal of Energy Security, 2013
\textsuperscript{176} Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, 2013: 9
\textsuperscript{177} Nautilus International, 2014
shipping companies to make stops in the region. An estimated 70% drop in shipping activity due to the prevalence of piracy is hitting the country heavily, resulting in decreased revenue usually generated from taxing vessels using the port of Cotonou.\textsuperscript{178} As a country heavily dependent on trade taxes (an estimated 50% of state revenue is sourced from this medium), this decrease in activity has led to an estimated loss of 28% of tax revenue and threatens to have a wider knock-on effect on other sectors in the country. In fact, Benin has been so heavily affected by piracy that the country’s president has appealed to the United Nations to consider forming an anti-piracy initiative similar to that in place off Somalia.\textsuperscript{179}

2.4 Regional security complexes

“Ensuring the security of the Gulf of Guinea is beyond the capacity of any existing regional body acting alone. A number of regional organizations share an interest in maritime security...Geographical and mandate overlap argues for greater integration and coordination of maritime initiatives.” (Chatham House, 2013: 5)

To try and nail down the specific causes of maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea is not a simple task. While issues such as piracy and illicit trafficking are increasingly well documented, the actual root causes of those issues are complex. There are many factors, both historical and contemporary, which contribute to the shape-shifting security environment in the region. There is of course the consideration of the Gulf of Guinea becoming an increasingly used, and as a result abused, route as a consequence of Globalisation and conflict elsewhere, but issues such as an increasing overreliance on oil revenue, the weakness of post-colonial state structures in West Africa, endemic governance and transparency problems, a lack of resources and investment in the

\textsuperscript{178} Ben-Ari, 2013  
\textsuperscript{179} UN Security Council, 2012a
maritime sector and even the unclear definition of national maritime borders frame the Gulf of Guinea\textsuperscript{180} as a unique challenge for analysis.

With the international community’s approach to the Gulf of Guinea essentially being different to that which can be found \textit{in loco} and considering that many, if not all, of the maritime security topics in the region are transnational issues which can seldom be dealt with by individual states acting independently, there is space for another layer of analysis.

“The system and the state levels of analysis tell us important thing about the national security problem...But there is also an important set of security dynamics at the regional level, and this often tends to get lost of discounted...Unless that level is properly comprehended, neither the position of the local states in relation to each other, nor the character of relations between the great powers and local states can be understood properly.” (Buzan, 2009: 158)

Accepting that the influence of both national and international security agendas cannot be overlooked, the importance of a regional sub-system (‘sub’ in the sense that it is part of a greater/broader system i.e. the international system) of security also clearly has implications for how maritime security issues originate and are addressed in the Gulf of Guinea. International Security Studies is one academic vector which has particularly focused on the rising eminence of regional factors in defining the general security setting, with Africa and the ‘failed state’ phenomenon being included in the discussion as an example of the ‘if and when’ to intervene in local conflicts.\textsuperscript{181} While of course taking into consideration the fundamental role of the international community in this discourse, what must be highlighted here is that many of the maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea are regional in cause as well as effect. Essentially, security issues in the Gulf of Guinea must be examined from a regional perspective.

\textsuperscript{180} Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 17-18
\textsuperscript{181} Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 179
Thompson’s 1973 research into the nature of regional subsystems has become one of the topic’s corner stones of academic study.\textsuperscript{182} The framework provided certainly supports the argument in favour of consideration of the Gulf of Guinea in its own right, with the region satisfying most, if not all, of the attributes provided as a checklist for the consideration as a particular region as a regional subsystem.\textsuperscript{183}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Layers_of_security_systems}
\caption{Layers of security systems}
\end{figure}

Source: adapted from the framework provided in Buzan, 2009: 158-188

\textsuperscript{182} See Thompson, 1973: 89-117
\textsuperscript{183} See Thompson, 1973: 93 for the full list of attributes. These attributes include the geographical proximity of a region, the regularity of interactions, internal and external recognition as a distinctive area (i.e. “the Gulf of Guinea”), degrees of historical bonds, evidence of polices for further integration, explicit institutional subsystem organisation (i.e. the GGC) and a common developmental status.
By applying Buzan’s definition of a security complex,184 some of the nuances of Gulf of Guinea maritime security become more apparent. Although focusing more precisely on the security relationship between states themselves, the concept is clearly applicable to how groups of states address security issues. While Buzan does clearly make reference to 5 security complexes in the third world,185 the porous nature of the region’s borders,186 the ethnic ties between its people, the transnational nature of the regions maritime security issues and the geographical proximity of states in the region187 make it an ideal candidate to be considered as its own regional security complex, particularly when dealing with issues of maritime security.

Figure 2.8: Proposed Gulf of Guinea security complex

Source: adapted from Buzan, 2009: 174

184 Buzan, 2009: 160: a security complex is defined as: “...a defined group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”
185 Ibid: 174 Latin (South) America, Middle East, Southern Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia.
186 The 2014 Ebola outbreak of the Ebola virus is a clear indication of the porous nature of the region’s borders, with the virus being transmitted on an unprecedented scale across national boundaries.
187 Lake, 1997: 50 highlights the fundamental role of geography in defining regional subsystems, affirming that almost all of the attributes proposed by Thompson, 1973 are based upon geography.
“Regional Security Complex is an analytical concept defined and applied by us, but these regions (RSCs) are socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on the security practice of the actors. Dependent on what and whom they securitise, the region might reproduce or change.” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 48)

Lake’s research provides another analytical step in support of the consideration of the Gulf of Guinea as a regional security complex, namely in the verification of the importance of security externalities in defining RSCs. Maritime security is particularly relevant here, in that it is essentially the principal trans-border local security externality affecting a set of states in the region. Although seen largely as a Nigerian generated problem, piracy does, as discussed in earlier sections, have a knock-on effect on the entire region, thereby lending to the creation of a regional security complex by virtue of the existence of a trans-border externality.

“Transborder externalities affect, by definition, more than one state and are, therefore, inherently political and strategic...It is this interdependence that creates the system; it is the localized nature of many externalities that creates regional systems; and it is local security externalities that define regional security complexes.” (Lake, 1997: 51-52)

The above reasoning lends itself to the consideration of the Gulf of Guinea as an RSC, but it can also be argued that the region had already taken on such a characteristic prior to the emergence of the major maritime security challenges of piracy and large-scale drug trafficking. While the global extend of the Cold War worked to paint over regional complexes and variations, the diminishing of superpower rivalry gives an extra emphasis

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188 See Lake, 1997: 45-67
189 “Externalities are costs (negative externalities) and benefits (positive externalities) that do not accrue only to the actors that create them” (Ibid: 49)
190 Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 23
191 Buzan, 1991: 208
to the security management role of RSCs\textsuperscript{192}; thereby satisfying Thompson’s attributes of *Explicit institutional relations or subsystem organisation* and *Intrarelatedness*.\textsuperscript{193}

**2.5 Existing efforts to ensure maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea**

The increasing importance of the Gulf of Guinea as a maritime route and producer of raw materials and energy resources, coupled with the use of the region as backdoor into Europe, has seen the international community, regional actors and individual nation states launch a long list of initiatives. One of the main drives behind the recognition of the importance of maritime security in the region has been two recent UN Resolutions focusing specifically on the issue. In October 2011, UN Resolution 2018 brought the issue into the limelight by condemning all acts of piracy at sea committed off the coast of the states of the Gulf of Guinea, further calling on ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC to cooperate in prosecuting facilitators and financiers involved in such activity.\textsuperscript{194} In February 2012, UN Resolution 2012 further added to the earlier Resolution, urging states in the region to counter the problem of piracy. This resolution however took an additional step, in encouraging actors from outside of the Gulf of Guinea to provide support for regional patrols, coordination and strategy.\textsuperscript{195} However, while the UN may be the focal point of efforts to coordinate global politics, it is not a global government.\textsuperscript{196} Thus such Resolutions are still largely little more than encouragement for action by regional bodies and member states who have the jurisdiction to intervene in domestic issues. Moreover, there is a concern that international initiatives applicable to the region are generally too narrow in their focus, in what is a reflection of international community’s overall approach to Gulf of Guinea maritime security.\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{192} Bah, 2005: 79 gives the example ECOWAS’s intervention in the Liberian conflict as a reflection of the newfound importance of regional security concerns.
\textsuperscript{193} Thompson, 1973: 93
\textsuperscript{194} UN Security Council, 2011
\textsuperscript{195} UN Security Council, 2012b
\textsuperscript{196} Nye and Welch, 2013: 196
\textsuperscript{197} Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 25
While the international community looks to deal with maritime security issues directly in the field as noted above, partly by encouraging the fielding assets focused on at-sea exercises\(^{198}\) or by creating task-specific agencies/institutions,\(^{199}\) the current state of the (local) fight against maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea is mainly geared around updating national legislation in order to better fall into line with international legal frameworks also applicable in the region.\(^{200}\)

This legislative push is of course not completely lost on the international community, although many of the legislative pieces used to tackle maritime security issues in the region, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention against illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, were originally drafted to deal with very different realities. Ukeje and Movomo Ela correlate existing international legal tools applicable to the region into legislation of a repressive nature and legislation of a preventative nature.\(^{201}\) Examples of a repressive nature include the UN Montego Bay Convention (Law of the Sea)\(^{202}\) and the Convention of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.\(^{203}\) An Example of a preventative nature is the International Ship and Port Facility Code.\(^{204}\)

The same categories are also useful for the division of operational tools applicable to the region, some of which are designed to directly intervene as a repressive tool and

\(^{198}\) Examples of such exercises specifically in the Gulf of Guinea region are those spearheaded by the United States Africa Command, including AMлеп, Exercise Obangame Express, Exercise Africa Endeavor and Exercise Saharan Express. See AFRICOM, 2014 for further reading on these Exercises.

\(^{199}\) Examples of such agencies include MAOC-N and SEACOP. The former specifically recognises “the significance of West Africa as a nexus for the trafficking routes and coordinates (our) activity to engage other regional initiatives” (MAOC-N, 2014), while the latter has worked to establish Maritime Intelligence Units in countries such as Cape Verde, Senegal and Ghana (SEACOP, 2009)

\(^{200}\) Mutume, 2007: 3

\(^{201}\) Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 25

\(^{202}\) UNCLOS provides the overall framework for territorial limits and passage. See UN, 1982 for the complete Convention.

\(^{203}\) The SUA Convention is a multilateral agreement which criminalises activity which may endanger the safety of a ship’s navigation. See SUA, 1988 for the complete Convention.

\(^{204}\) International Maritime Organisation, 2014
some of which are designed to focus on the core issues underlying maritime security issues; thereby taking on the form of preventative tools. Repressive operational tools compiled by the international community include entities such as MAOC-N, which coordinates international counter-narcotics operations by its members states\textsuperscript{205} and SEACOP, which coordinates the training of competent authorities in the Gulf of Guinea.

On the supranational administrative level, the Gulf of Guinea straddles two different regional supra-governmental organisations,\textsuperscript{206} both of which have their own approaches to maritime security which have developed at different speeds and along different vectors, but both of which are crucial for the coordination of maritime security policy and the fight against uncivil society\textsuperscript{207} in the region. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) really began to develop an extensive maritime agenda in 2009, notably with participation in the creation of the inter-regional Coordination Centre for the Maritime Security of Central Africa (CRESMAC) as an agent for the harnessing of member state capacities in the maritime domain, as well as the implementation of a new Code of Conduct on various maritime security issues\textsuperscript{208} in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding as part of efforts to harmonise maritime security cooperation across the Central and West Africa regions.\textsuperscript{209} Operationally, ECCAS has addressed the daunting scale of its maritime jurisdiction by dividing the region into three operational areas, expanded on by an additional ECOWAS operational area encompassing Nigeria, Benin and Togo in 2012. Complementarily, as of May 2014 further discussions were on-going regarding the eventual application of two additional operational areas.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{205} These member states are France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK.
\textsuperscript{206} ECCAS and ECOWAS.
\textsuperscript{207} van Langenhove, L and Scaramangli, 2011: 204
\textsuperscript{208} “On June 25, 2013, in an effort to help prevent piracy and other illegal maritime actions in West and Central Africa, participants in the Summit of the Gulf of Guinea Heads of State and Government...adopted the Yaoundé Declaration on the Gulf of Guinea Security. Two key resolutions contained in the Declaration are on the creation of an inter-regional Coordination Centre on Maritime Safety and Security for Central and West Africa...and the implementation of a new Code of Conduct...” (Library of Congress, 2013)
\textsuperscript{209} See ECOWAS, 2013 for a complete copy of the Yaoundé Memorandum of Understanding.
\textsuperscript{210} Zone F, covering Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone; Zone G, covering Gambia, Cape Verde, Senegal and Guinea Bissau (Vanguard, 2014).
While ECCAS has arguably spearheaded maritime cooperation in the region, ECOWAS, despite being a relatively more developed economic organisation in comparison to its other African counter-parts, first began inquiries into some form of combined maritime agendas in 2010. This delay is perhaps not surprising, considering that ECOWAS had traditionally focused on a narrower definition of security,\textsuperscript{211} while maritime insecurity for much of the ECOWAS region was (and to some extent still is) seen as a Nigerian problem resulting from drawn-out insurgencies in the Niger basin, best addressed on the national level.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{211} Bah 2005: 82 highlights the need for ECOWAS to strengthen the socio-economic aspects of security, including unemployment, disease control, mortality rates and poverty.

\textsuperscript{212} Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 23
“The Gulf of Guinea has a problem: Nigerian-driven maritime crime. Nigeria’s problem in turn is a thoroughly criminalised political and commercial elite and a largely disenfranchised electorate. The fallout of that state of affairs has an impact on the region’s security and stability.” (Centre for International Maritime Security, 2014)

However, more recently ECOWAS has lent from the ECCAS model by pushing towards greater integration, coordination and information. In fact, the two supra-governmental bodies are now beginning to overlap to such an extent that ECCAS is expected to provide funding to ECOWAS, generated through maritime taxes levied in the region. To alleviate fears of a Nigerian dominance over ECOWAS activity, a three-tier training programme has also been developed to include a wider range of states in the region, with Ivory Coast developing tactical training, Ghana developing operational training and Nigeria heading strategic training. That being considered, Nigeria is still expected to take the reins of the regional maritime security effort, with the UN also pushing for international assistance in supporting the continuation of joint patrols already being undertaken by Nigeria and Benin. While we can perhaps expect to see ever-increasing roles for regional bodies such as ECOWAS and ECCAS in an attempt to better deal with cross-border illegal activity, Nigeria’s apparent rise does pose an interesting topic for debate. Considering the importance given to an equilibrium of power between states in regional subsystems, the relative power of Nigeria compared to other states in the region could call into doubt the definition of the Gulf of Guinea as an RSC and place in jeopardy the role of its trans-regional supra-national organisations, thereby leading to an

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213 Sekomo, 2013: 9 referencing Commodre K.B. Ati-John
214 Bah, 2005: 80-81
215 UN Security Council, 2011
216 “Transferring a number of government prerogatives to the supranational level allows states to share expertise, institutions, tools polices, personnel and funds, in order to better deal with cross-border illegal activities.” (van Langenhove and Scaramaglì, 2011: 191-192)
217 Nigeria’s projected population by 2050 is expected to reach 440 million (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013), with 10% of all global births occurring in the country by 2050. Moreover, recent studies of the country’s GDP, which had not been recalculated since 1990, indicate that Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy by far (Provost, 2014).
218 For example see Buzan, 2007: 178; Thompson, 1973: 93; Lake, 1997: 47
internal transformation that moves the region away from an RSC towards a monopolar, or hegemonic, complex.\textsuperscript{219}

While compiling a complete list of all domestic approaches to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea would be an impossible exercise, there are a number of initiatives which can be cited as prime examples which could arguably be applied by other states in the region. Cape Verde makes for an interesting study of national maritime security initiatives applicable to research paper’s target geographic area. The archipelago off the African west coast is home to the Counternarcotics and Maritime Security Interagency Operations Center (COSMAR): With initial support from the United States, the Centre acts as the articulation of Cape Verdean maritime law enforcement agencies.\textsuperscript{220} Cape Verde has also acted as a trailblazer in the field of Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET). In working around the region’s chronic lack of deep-water maritime assets, the Cape Verdean authorities have signed Memorandums of Understanding which allow the country’s competent agencies to travel onboard foreign assets for the purposes of tackling illicit maritime activity.\textsuperscript{221}

Other states from outside of the region have also contributed to the maritime security domain on a unilateral basis, albeit often as part of broader policies or interests. France for example is a regular provider of navy assets to the region as part of the nation’s ongoing presence in several Gulf of Guinea states, while the USA makes a notable contribution through programmes harnessed as part of the Africa Partnership Station (APS). The United Kingdom regularly routes warships through the region as part of its standard patrol around the Atlantic basin, while Belgium recently included a programme with the Cape Verdean authorities in its itinerary as part of its deployment in the APS Exercise Obangame Express.\textsuperscript{222} The Netherlands have also lent backing to maritime security

\textsuperscript{219} Buzan, 2007: 179
\textsuperscript{220} Radiotelevisão Caboverdiana, 2011
\textsuperscript{221} See Royal Navy, 2013 for an example of recent LEDET training operations conducted between the Cape Verdean authorities and the UK Royal Navy.
\textsuperscript{222} Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 30
initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea, with the deployment of one of the country’s most modern vessels to the West African region on a specific tasking against drug trafficking.\footnote{Koninkijke Marine, 2014}

Considering that it is largely impractical to compile an exhaustive list of all domestic, regional and international maritime security programmes/initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea, the earlier touched upon framework can be further expanded as a method for categorisation. Generally, such programmes/initiatives can be divided along 3 axis: (1) Preventative vs. Repressive measures; (2) Legislative vs. Operational measures; (3) International vs. Domestic measures.

\textbf{Figure 2.10: Method for categorising maritime security initiatives}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{category_chart.png}
\caption{Method for categorising maritime security initiatives}
\end{figure}

\scriptsize{Source: Risley, 2014}
3. The Gulf of Guinea - Searching for Potential Solutions

3.1 SWOT Analysis Elaboration

There can be little doubt that the Gulf of Guinea is becoming increasingly more significant in the field of international maritime security. The discovery and development of rich hydrocarbon deposits, geopolitical developments in other regions encouraging increased volumes of maritime traffic through the area, the Gulf of Guinea’s accessible geographical position to the south of the European continent, issues of corruption and the region’s porous borders have all contributed to a cocktail of drug trafficking and piracy that has seen a rapid rise to the unenviable status of one of the world’s most dangerous maritime areas.\(^\text{224}\) The seemingly unrelenting pace of Globalisation in the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century is sure to further focus the spotlight of both the regional and international community, as the world grapples with what is quickly becoming a hugely significant geographical and geopolitical hotspot.

In short, what is arguably at stake is the very stability of the global maritime common as it exists today. To better understand the importance of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and how the field could potentially develop in the future, the paper will make use of the well-established Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) model; with the aim of generating qualitative proposals for 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

Used widely as method for structured planning in both the academic and business world, the acronym SWOT can more extensively be defined as the role of strengths and weaknesses as they relate to our opportunities and threats in the marketplace.\(^\text{225}\) To this end, this research paper’s SWOT analysis is geared around the identification of the strengths and weaknesses of the current Gulf of Guinea maritime security picture and how

\(^\text{224}\) International Crisis Group, 2012: i
\(^\text{225}\) Westwood, 2002: 22
those indicators shape opportunities for proposals and threats in the future of the region. Essentially, the aforementioned analysis is broken down as follows (with the first two steps acting as sources of opinions and ideas which can contribute to the latter):

- Strengths of the current maritime security situation;
- Weaknesses of the current maritime security situation;
- Opportunities resulting from the current maritime security situation;
- Threats to the improvement of the future maritime security situation.

Figure 3.1: SWOT Analysis method

To better form a more accurate reflection of the maritime security issues currently in play in the Gulf of Guinea and to draft more applicable and better suited proposals as to the future of the topic, a variety of individuals from several distinct fields and backgrounds were asked to respond to a questionnaire. These individuals were also selected and grouped using the native and non-native criteria outlined earlier in this paper,226 in order to more effectively take into consideration potential variations in opinion.

226 See page 13
### Table 3.2: SWOT analysis participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nº</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Native or Non-Native</th>
<th>Institutional Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Admiral José Saldanha Lopes</td>
<td>Non-Native</td>
<td>Portuguese Navy Admiral Former Head of Portuguese Navy Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Capt. Lt. José Mário Lopes Tavares</td>
<td>Native</td>
<td>Cape Verdean Coast Guard Commander and Director of COSMAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dr. Ana Cristina Andrade</td>
<td>Native</td>
<td>UNODC representative in Cape Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dr. Ewa Tomaszewska</td>
<td>Native</td>
<td>Political Matters Representative with the Delegation of the EU in Cape Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mr. Pierre Lapaque</td>
<td>Native</td>
<td>Regional Representative of the UNODC Regional Office for West and Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Commander João Fonseca Ribeiro</td>
<td>Non-Native</td>
<td>Director General of the Portuguese General Directorate for Maritime Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dr. Nuno Pinheiro Torres</td>
<td>Non-Native</td>
<td>Director General of the Portuguese Defence Policy Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mr. John B. Richardson</td>
<td>Non-Native</td>
<td>German Marshall Fund of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mr. Martin Lavahun</td>
<td>Native</td>
<td>Central Intelligence and Security Unit in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mr. Edmun Landey Tei</td>
<td>Native</td>
<td>Narcotics Control Board in Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mr. Frank Francis</td>
<td>Non-Native</td>
<td>MAOC (N) Executive Director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted to this research paper’s sample from Mendes Leal, 2011: 74

### 3.2 SWOT Analysis on Potential Developments: Results

To gauge the opinion of the experts asked to take part in this study, with the aim of identifying the issues influencing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and the presentation of proposals for those issues, a series of four questionnaires were prepared; compiled in the form of a SWOT analysis.

- Questionnaire 1: Strengths
- Questionnaire 2: Weaknesses
- Questionnaire 3: Opportunities
- Questionnaire 4: Threats
Participants were given a choice of 4 options for each question: 1) not important; 2) reasonably important; 3) very important; 4) abstain. The final tallied results of these questionnaires are presented in the following tables.

**Table 3.3: Results of SWOT analysis on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea**

| STRENGTHS of the current maritime security outlook in the Gulf of Guinea | IMPORTANCE* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Support of the international community in providing tools and expertise (i.e. European Union, AFRICOM, IMO, UNODC, SEACOP) | 0% | 0% | 17% | 40% | 83% | 60% | 0% | 0% |
| 2 | Regional initiatives supporting maritime security (i.e. The African Union, MOWCA, ECOWAS) | 17% | 0% | 17% | 20% | 67% | 80% | 0% | 0% |
| 3 | The discovery and development of energy resources in the region, giving added importance to the need for security in the maritime domain | 0% | 0% | 17% | 80% | 83% | 20% | 0% | 0% |
| 4 | Increasing availability of local military and law enforcement resources in the region | 0% | 0% | 33% | 40% | 67% | 60% | 0% | 0% |
| 5 | Increasing levels of maritime trade passing through the region to other markets, giving added importance to the need for security in the maritime domain | 0% | 0% | 33% | 100% | 67% | 0% | 0% | 0% |

*1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain
**Questionnaire II**

**WEAKNESSES** of the current maritime security outlook in the Gulf of Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPACTANCE*</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Differences in economic development between states in the region leading to different levels of investment in the maritime domain</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of the Gulf of Guinea as a transit area for illicit trafficking into other regions (i.e. drug trafficking to Europe)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lack of state resources allocated to the maritime security domain</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived corruption as a facilitator for illicit maritime activity in the region</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The transnational effects and reach of maritime security issues in the region (i.e. cross-border piracy)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in national approaches to maritime security policy in the region</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate surveillance systems resulting in a lack of maritime domain awareness</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain
## Questionnaire III

### OPPORTUNITIES for the future maritime security outlook in the Gulf of Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Increasing international recognition of the need for a stable maritime environment in the region</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Further international investment in developing maritime expertise and resources in the region</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The harmonisation of national approaches to maritime security in the region</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>States with additional resources in the region taking on a leadership role</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Developments in technology allowing for a more efficient and cost-effective monitoring of the maritime domain</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The implementation of an integrated maritime policy as tool for bringing together policies and capabilities in the maritime domain</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The implementation of policies and development programmes to address the root causes of maritime security issues in the region</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain
## Questionnaire IV

**THREATS** for the future maritime security outlook in the Gulf of Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IMPORTANCE*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Increasing levels of maritime piracy in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>On-going political instability in the region (i.e. insurgency, unstable governments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Differences in levels of economic development in the region potentially leading to conflicts and mass migration movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Unbalanced levels of investment in the maritime security domain by states in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Increasingly sophisticated technology available to organised criminal groups, piracy groups etc. in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The corrupting effect of endemic organised crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain

Source: questions elaborated by Risley, 2014. Format adapted from Mendes Leal, 2011: 76-78
With regards to an analysis of the aforementioned SWOT Analysis results, one of the most notable overall characteristics is the similarity in answers chosen by both native and non-native actors. Indeed with the exception of **Strengths** questions 3 and 5, **Weaknesses** question 3 and **Opportunities** questions, 1, 2, 5 and 7, both groups chose to give priority to the same answer overall (meaning that both groups gave the same importance to 72% of the questions asked).\(^{227}\) However, 4 of the 7 questions on which native and non-native tallied opinions differ are to be found in the results of the **Opportunities** questionnaire, showing a remarkable difference in approach to potential maritime security solutions/areas for development in the future. This difference could prove to be problematic when drafting proposals and must be taken into account if any eventual presented proposals are to be considered as palatable to both sets of actors.

Also noteworthy is the frequency of which the option of **Very Important** or **Reasonably Important** was chosen by both sets of actors. Whereas **Reasonably Important** scored as the most selected option for non-native actors in just under half of the questions asked, native actors overwhelmingly chose in favour of the option of **Very Important**.

![Figure 3.4: SWOT Analysis most Chosen option](image)

**Source:** Risley, 2014

\(^{227}\) Any overall tallied results should take into account the response of one additional native actor in comparison to non-native actors (6 native actors responding, compared to 5 non-native actors).
The association of high levels of importance to a whole range of issues right across the maritime security board by native actors and a considerably lower association on the part of non-native actors is supportive of the argument developed in page 13 of this research paper, namely that a greater number of referent objects will be of concern in this case to native actors by virtue of their geographical proximity. Should the Copenhagen School’s method of highlighting survival as being the driving force behind security be kept in mind and should it be affirmed that security issues in-region are more likely to threaten that survival, then such an association on the part of native actors is of course understandable.228

Further notable levels of variation can also be found within each questionnaire. Regarding **Strengths**, 100% of non-native actors considered increasing levels of maritime trade passing through the region to other markets raising the need for security as **Reasonably Important**, while one third (67%) of native responses considered the same issue as **very important**.229

**Figure 3.5: SWOT Analysis results: Strengths**

![SWOT Analysis results: Strengths](image)

Source: Risley, 2014

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228 Examples of this phenomenon can be found for example in Singapore’s security discourse relative to terrorism: “When analysed collectively, the ‘alien’ nature and proximity of the threat to ‘home’ not only create an acute sense of vulnerability among readers, but also highlights an ambiguity about the boundaries and demarcation between danger and security.” (Ying, 2013).

229 **SWOT Questionnaire I: Strengths**, question 5
Such a variation in responses is perhaps unsurprising, considering that the economic benefits of increased levels of maritime trade in the region are much more likely to directly benefit native actors in comparison to non-native groups.

Another curiosity resulting from the Strengths questionnaire can also be seen in responses to the role of the international community in providing tools and expertise to the region,\textsuperscript{230} with a majority in the cases of both groups seeing such support viewed as Very Important. This result is particularly relevant for the drafting of proposals for maritime security in the region, considering that such support would essentially be provided by non-native groups, but used by native actors. Also standing out in the Strengths questionnaire is one selection of Not Important regarding the role of regional initiatives supporting maritime security,\textsuperscript{231} particularly when considering that this selection was made by a responder from the native actors group. While making up 17\% of the overall choice of that same group with regarding to this issue, this is arguably an extremely relevant indicator of in-region approaches towards maritime security.

With regards to responses to the Weaknesses questionnaire, greater levels of variation can be found, particularly within the replies of the non-native actors group. Notably, at least one responder chose Not Important in five questions of the seven questions (of which two responders chose that same option on two of the seven questions). The only two questions to which Not Important was not chosen addressed the use of the Gulf of Guinea as a transit area\textsuperscript{232} and the transnational effects and reach of regional security issues.\textsuperscript{233} Also of relevance was the majority of both native and non-native responders selecting Very Important with regards to the use of the Gulf of Guinea as a transit area.\textsuperscript{234}

\textsuperscript{230} SWOT Questionnaire I: Strengths, question 1
\textsuperscript{231} SWOT Questionnaire I: Strengths, question 2
\textsuperscript{232} SWOT Questionnaire II: Weaknesses, question 2
\textsuperscript{233} SWOT Questionnaire II: Weaknesses, question 5
\textsuperscript{234} SWOT Questionnaire II: Weaknesses, question 2
While non-native actors appear divided regarding the standard of surveillance systems available in the region resulting in a lack of maritime domain awareness, an overwhelming majority of native actors saw the issues as Very Important. This is a particularly pressing issue, should it be affirmed that this research paper’s definition of native actors are those more likely to be familiar with the extent of their maritime domain awareness by virtue of their position in situ, while non-native actors are likely those who are more capable of provide additional resources for the bolstering of surveillance systems and who have the tools capable of deep sea deployment and the resulting development of a wider maritime picture.

A further interesting result which can be found in the Weaknesses questionnaire is the selection of one responder from each group of actors regarding the issue of state resources allocated to the maritime domain, namely the choice to Abstain. This result may be viewed as stemming from the sensitive/political nature of such allocation, with two responders choosing the Abstain option as a consequence.

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235 SWOT Questionnaire II: Weaknesses, question 7
236 SWOT Questionnaire: Weaknesses, question 3
The overall results of the Opportunities questionnaire also pose some particularly interesting variations in options chosen, again particularly between the two groups of actors used in this research paper. While 100% of native actors saw the development of technology allowing for a more efficient and cost-effective monitoring of the maritime domain \(^{237}\) as Very Important, opinion amongst non-native actors was largely divided (40% seeing the issue as Not Important, 40% seeing it as Reasonably Important and 20% seeing it as Very Important). Curiously, this issue is arguably made all the more pressing should it be addressed in correlation with the standard of surveillance systems available in the region resulting in a lack of maritime domain awareness mentioned above in the analysis of the Weaknesses questionnaire, where a majority of native actors also saw the issue as important while non-native actors were divided. Again, this is an issue which must be taken into consideration when formulating maritime security proposals on this topic.

**Figure 3.7: SWOT Analysis results: Opportunities**

![Graph showing SWOT Analysis results for Opportunities]

Source: Risley, 2014

Also noteworthy regarding responses to the Opportunities questionnaire is the choice by one responder to Abstain regarding further international investment in developing regional maritime expertise and resources\(^ {238}\), as well as the harmonisation of

\(^{237}\) SWOT Questionnaire III: Opportunities, question 5  
\(^{238}\) SWOT Questionnaire III: Opportunities, question 2
national approaches to regional maritime security.\textsuperscript{239} Again, a correlation can be seen between similar issues raised as part of the \textbf{Weaknesses} opportunities questionnaire,\textsuperscript{240} where one responder from the native actors group also chose to \textit{Abstain}, along with one from the non-native grouping. This result may be viewed as stemming from the sensitive/political nature of such allocation, with two responders choosing the \textit{Abstain} option as a consequence. In this light, any proposal regarding the allocation of funding and/or resources to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea must bear in mind the potential sensitivities of opinion on the issue. Also of interest resulting from non-native responses to the \textbf{Opportunities} questionnaire was a 40\% selection of \textit{Not Important} regarding states with additional resources taking on a leadership role.\textsuperscript{241} While such a result cannot be taken as definitive indication of potential international support for a state located in-region that would be willing to assume a leadership role, it should certainly be taken in consideration, as such a leadership role would likely require the backing/support of a non-native actor(s) through the provision of additional resources.

Regarding responses to the \textbf{Threats} questionnaire, responses from both groups of actors were notably uniform. This is somewhat surprising, giving this paper’s focus on the Copenhagen School of thought and its emphasis on survival, as well as the increasing significance of a threat based upon its geographical proximity. Moreover, the option of \textit{Reasonably Important} features heavily in the \textbf{Threats} questionnaire results, although \textit{Very Important} would perhaps be expected particularly from native actors. Evidentially there is more of a tendency to select \textit{Reasonably Important} within the non-native group (with 100\% of responders seeing unbalanced levels of investment in the maritime domain by states in the region\textsuperscript{242} as being \textit{Reasonably Important}), however a more one-sided result across the entire questionnaire would perhaps have been expected.

\textsuperscript{239} SWOT Questionnaire III: Opportunities, question 3
\textsuperscript{240} SWOT Questionnaire II: Weaknesses, question 3
\textsuperscript{241} SWOT Questionnaire III: Opportunities, question 4
\textsuperscript{242} SWOT Questionnaire IV: Threats, question 4
One responder from both the native and non-native groupings of actors saw differences in levels of regional economic development leading to mass migration movement and conflicts\textsuperscript{243} as \textit{Not Important}, while one actors from the native grouping also saw on-going political instability in the region (i.e. insurgency, unstable governments)\textsuperscript{244} as \textit{Not Important}. This is indeed a surprising response, considering the focus often being given to the regional as a hub of instability by the international press.

\textsuperscript{243} SWOT Questionnaire IV: Threats: question 3
\textsuperscript{244} SWOT Questionnaire IV: Threats: question 2
4. Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea

4.1 Proposals for Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea

In establishing levels of need and applicability of any proposal for maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a projection must inevitably be made as to what significance the area and any associated security issues are likely to have in the future. Essentially a calculation of risk must be made, based upon identified threats: risk = threat x probability. The most pressing phenomenon in this sense is without doubt Globalisation. There are countless indicators suggesting that this phenomenon is showing no sign of slowing down, with the African continent being no exception to the rule. One such indicator of the influence of Globalisation in the region is increasing levels of FDI (see table 2.5). Moreover, a number of powerful foreign states are already beginning to heavily invest in the Gulf of Guinea, acting as yet another indicator of anticipated continued Globalisation of the region; with China alone pouring billions of dollars into the area, particularly in oil-rich areas.

Figure 4.1: Chinese investment in the Gulf of Guinea

Source: adapted from Badkar, 2012.

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245 Mendes Leal, 201: 80
It being established that the Globalisation phenomenon is not likely to slow in the region in the short term and, as a result, is likely to increase levels of trade, commerce and overall maritime traffic, other indicators for potential maritime security developments in the Gulf of Guinea must also be considered, namely the two major issues which are the focus of this research paper: drug trafficking and piracy. Specifically relative to drug trafficking, reported tendencies suggest that consumption has remained relatively stable, despite law enforcement efforts to eradicate plantations; with the overall number of consumers increasing proportionally.

“Although coca cultivation has been reduced, it does not appear that cocaine use has similarly declined. Based on the data available, the share of the global population that uses cocaine seems to have stabilised, but the global population has grown, resulting in a larger number of consumers.” (UNODC, 2011: 8)

Specifically relative to cocaine consumption in the European market, which is of great significance to this research paper due to the Gulf of Guinea’s position as a route into Europe, available data would suggest that overall trends remain largely unaltered, showing a very slight decline over time. However, 2013 estimates for the prevalence of cocaine amongst all adults from 15-64 years of age in Europe saw the major markets of the United Kingdom and Spain maintain rates of over 2%, while prevalence rates rise to over 3% of young adults (15-34 years of age) in these same two countries. These figures are of course of significance when considering that the Gulf of Guinea region is considered as an entry point for cocaine destined for the European market.

“Although seizures in the sub region of West and Central Africa remained below 3 tons in 2012 (including 2.2 seized in Cape Verde alone), cocaine trafficking via West Africa to Europe is believed to be continuing.” (UNODC, 2014: 38)

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246 UNODC, 2014: 37-38
247 EMCDDA; 2014
Likewise, incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea also show worrying trends. While just under 30% of recorded incidents in African waters from 2003 to 2011 (427 out of 1,434)\textsuperscript{248} occurred in the Gulf of Guinea, incidents in the area did rise by 73% from 2010 to 2011\textsuperscript{249} and are showing few signs of abating.

With it then being affirmed that the maritime security outlook for the Gulf of Guinea is likely to become of greater interest due to the Globalisation phenomenon and considering that two of the major maritime security issues appear extremely likely to remain present in at least the short to medium term, the need for applicable proposals becomes all the more evident. These proposals can be broken down into various vectors:

1. Societal and Economic | addressing the wider issues which contribute to the prevalence of maritime security issues in the region:
   a. Programmes to address issues of corruption;
   b. Regional economic development programmes;
2. Political | The formulation of a maritime security strategy, considering:
   a. The analysis of the adaptability of existing regional maritime security initiatives;
   b. The analysis of the adaptability of existing extra-regional maritime security initiatives;
3. Operational | The formulation of operational strategies which consider:
   a. Regional capacities;
   b. Extra-regional capacities available to the region.

The above are of course little more than a theoretical starting point which must, for the purposes of this research paper, consider the results of its SWOT analysis in order to better give feasibility and credibility to any suggested proposals. Furthermore, should any such proposals be viewed as applicable and hope to gain any sort of momentum, then they would also need to be limited in scope and drafted in consideration of the tools and likely

\textsuperscript{248} Chatham House, 2013: 1
\textsuperscript{249} From 39 incidents in 2010 to 53 incidents in 2011.
limited additional resources available. In short, while sweeping proposals and statements may have a theoretical application in an ideal scenario, a more limited and calculated approach which makes use of existing tools is more likely to suffice in attracting interest. Essentially, any proposal must be a) realistic; b) cost-effective; c) applicable on a specifiable timescale and d) politically neutral. To this end, the following proposals can be seen as feasible:

1. Cost-effective and undisruptive initiatives to tackle corruption and other societal issues leading to insecurity in the maritime domain:
   a. Utilise already existing tools, expertise and cooperation to enhance training of regional personnel in the financial services sector;
   b. Make use of existing regional and extra-regional financial regulatory bodies to monitor suspicious transactions;
   c. Encourage and facilitate greater cooperation between financial regulatory bodies and competent authorities for the investigation and prosecution of identified perpetrators.

2. The pooling of already existing intelligence and expertise of private industry and competent authorities to address maritime security issues:
   a. Establishment of a regional centre, acting a point of contact for competent authorities to cross-reference intelligence on suspicious maritime activities;
   b. Make already existing off-the-shelf software available to the region, to better organise and disseminate intelligence on suspicious maritime activities;
   c. Develop relationships with private industry operating in the region to report suspicious maritime activities to the competent authorities.
   d. Further expansion of already existing internationally funded programmes to neighbouring states.

3. Ensure correct *asset sequencing* of both regional and extra-regional personnel, tools and assets operating in the area:
   a. Make greater use of the spare capacity of extra-regional personnel, tools and assets transiting the region;
b. Improve coordination of extra-regional personnel, tools and assets deployed in the region so as to avoid duplication;
c. Further regional coordination of asset deployment, avoiding periods/areas of reduced activity and encouraging pooling and sharing to make asset deployment more cost-effective.

4. Make already existing tools available to increase maritime domain awareness:
   a. Increased coordination with advanced extra-regional assets transiting and located in the region to report suspicious activity beyond territorial waters;
   b. Make available already existing internationally funded software for the tracking of regional maritime activity, making better use of and standardising already existing systems (AIS, VMS) and the extra capacity of assets deployed in the region (i.e. radar satellite);
   c. The development of a regional early warning system, based upon already existing tools and relationships.

4.2 Complementarity of Existing Efforts and New Proposals

For any maritime security proposal to be accepted and perhaps even put into practice, it must inevitably take advantage of the lessons learned and resources available through already established methods and tools. To this end, the aforementioned proposals are drafted with the intention of taking advantage of existing spare capacities or potential, while remaining cost-effective and applicable without the need to undertake a long political process.

Relative to the implementation of undisruptive initiatives to tackle corruption and other societal issues leading to insecurity in the maritime domain, similar examples can already be found in force around the world. In the European Union, the Third Money Laundering Directive is used a legal tool for tackling criminal activity which makes use of

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250 Point 1, page 88
251 See Europa, 2013
the financial system for money laundering and is applicable to all banks operating in the European Union, as well as all lawyers, notaries, accountants, real estate agents, casinos and service providers, as well as all goods sellers when cash payments exceeding €15,000 are verified.

“Money laundering is the conversion of the proceeds of criminal activity into apparently clean funds, usually via the financial system. This is done by disguising the sources of the money, changing its form, or moving the funds to a place where they are less likely to attract attention...“Criminal activity" includes fraud, corruption, drug dealing and other serious crimes.” (Europa, 2013)

Although a specific reference is actually made to drug dealing, the incentive of much of the piracy activity in the Gulf of Guinea region stems from a booming black market for oil.\textsuperscript{252} Should tighter controls be made to control this market, piracy incidents may be reduced as a direct consequence. Essentially, denying perpetrators of readily available methods of laundering and reinvesting ill-gotten funds, no matter what the crime, could dissuade such illicit activity in the region. However, it should be noted that the already established European legislative system does facilitate the introduction and application of such initiatives. To this end, any similar development in the Gulf of Guinea could either a) be tailored on a national level by individual states or b) could be encouraged by well-established and respected supranational entities and focal points such as ECOWAS and ECCAS. Although no doubt difficult to institute, such an initiative would make use of already existing financial transaction data to highlight suspicious activity, rather than push for the creation of a new and potentially costly process. Moreover, many of the financial institutions and services operating in the region are global brands which, either directly or through sister companies, already have experience and exposure in working with anti-corruption legislation elsewhere. There are of course already existing bodies designed to tackle corruption, such as Liberia’s General Auditing Commission and the Liberia Anti-

\textsuperscript{252} UNODC, 2013: 45
Corruption Commission,\textsuperscript{253} however the launching of a legislative tool specifically focusing on private industry would potentially deter any direct state involvement.

Regarding the pooling of already existing intelligence and expertise of private industry and competent authorities,\textsuperscript{254} there are likely cost and operational efficiencies to be had for both parties; thereby encouraging such activity. In a region in which approximately one third of oil production capacity is located offshore,\textsuperscript{255} private industry is potentially act as a source of reporting on suspicious maritime activity in the region which can be put to good use by the competent authorities. Already located in the region, there are few costs impeding the pooling of such intelligence. Moreover, regional initiatives which currently act as focal points for law enforcement and military information coordination, such as the Africa Partnership Station and Cape Verde’s COSMAR, already have a solid foundation in place which can potentially be complemented by the expansive maritime picture developed by constant commercial maritime traffic and oil exploration.

The European Union’s Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme (CRIMGO), which is a wide-ranging initiative supported by the EU Instrument for Stability, as well as France, Portugal, Spain, the UK, Finland, Italy and Poland, is a notable example of international efforts to better the coordination of Gulf of Guinea maritime authorities, but it is essentially an initiative which focuses on ensuring maritime governance, rather than a tool which looks to get to the very heart of the causes of maritime security issues.\textsuperscript{256}

The transnational nature of maritime security raised in this research paper must also be considered. With maritime crimes often stretching over several national jurisdictions, there is a likelihood that various states will be able to contribute to a broader picture, capable of tackling a particular threat with greater efficiency. For example,

\textsuperscript{253} The Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission “was established in August 2008 to directly investigate, recommend for prosecution all acts of corruption in all sectors of government including the private sector and to institute measures aimed at eradicating the practice and its impact.” (Kaydor, 2014)
\textsuperscript{254} Point 2, page 88
\textsuperscript{255} Mendes Leal, 2011: 31
\textsuperscript{256} Europa, 2013b
maritime piracy is often viewed as a largely Nigerian-based phenomenon, although it is an issue which leaves traces right across the entire region.\textsuperscript{257} Moreover, the investigative and information gathering tools which could be provided by the international community through initiatives such as SEACOP, the IMO, AFRICOM and which were highlighted as an important strength to both native and non-native actors\textsuperscript{258} can be further bolstered by readily available information from private industry that is often exercising activity in locations far from territorial waters, where many of the Gulf of Guinea's states have a limited operating capacity. Plans are already in place to expand existing maritime zones, such as the implementation of an ECOWAS Zone F and G,\textsuperscript{259} however such an expansion may run the risk of being over-reliant on already stretched national resources in areas where private industry may have a regular presence.

Relative to the correct asset sequencing of both regional and extra-regional personnel, tools and assets operating in the area,\textsuperscript{260} there are a number of extra-regional initiatives and assets which operate or transit through the area which could be better coordinated in order to ensure that a duplication of efforts is better dispersed in a way that avoids extensive periods of inactivity. Such examples include the United Kingdom Royal Navy’s regular passage through the area, which has already been used to good effect as an opportunity to provide training to regional actors,\textsuperscript{261} and the Belgium Navy’s recent exercise in the area which utilised spare capacity while on route to an APS exercise in the Gulf of Guinea.\textsuperscript{262} However, such initiatives often see assets from various states deployed to the region during the same period, leading to a duplication of efforts, a duplication of training and avoidable periods of inactivity. Considering that many of the nations which deploy to the region, i.e. Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom

\textsuperscript{257} Centre for International Maritime Security, 2014
\textsuperscript{258} SWOT Questionnaire I: Strengths, question 1 – 83% of native actors saw the issue as Very Important and 17% as reasonably important, while 60% of non-native actors saw the issue as Very Important and 40% as Reasonably Important.
\textsuperscript{259} Zone F, covering Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone; Zone G, covering Gambia, Cape Verde, Senegal and Guinea Bissau (Vanguard, 2014).
\textsuperscript{260} Point 3, page 88-89
\textsuperscript{261} Royal Navy, 2013
\textsuperscript{262} Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 30
and the United States, can potentially be coordinated by already existing entities such as Europe’s MAOC-N, there is a clear opportunity to ensure more cost-effective and operationally efficient asset sequencing that would benefit both regional and extra-regional bodies; thereby providing a solution to one of the weaknesses which attracted curiously diverse levels of opinion in this paper’s SWOT analysis.263

Regarding the use of already existing tools to increase maritime domain awareness,264 which was highlighted as an issue by the native actors group in this research paper’s SWOT analysis,265 there are a number of tools which can be better exploited in order to develop a more complete maritime picture in the region. Information could be sourced from private industry already present in the area to complement existing tools, while advanced military assets navigating the Gulf of Guinea or orbiting the region could provide data which could be used in the construction of an image that reveals what is actually happening in what is still one of the world’s most unknown maritime areas. Moreover, already existing and commercially available tracking tools such as AIS and to a lesser extent VMS have proven successful in enhancing this maritime picture, as was the case with the SeaVision project which worked with 20 African nations to maintain AIS receiving stations.266 Database tools provided by programmes such as SEACOP267 can also make an important contribution and should be rolled out to additional states in the region, while simultaneously encouraging the use and dissemination of information sourced through such assets. Essentially, there is little need for additional investment in this proposal, but rather a better, wider and more standardised use of tools which have already been developed and which, in many cases, are available at virtually no cost though already existing international programmes.

263 SWOT Analysis: Weaknesses, question 3. Non-native actors responded 20% Not Important, 40% Reasonably Important, 20% Very Important and 20% Abstain. Native actors responded 17% Reasonably Important, 67% Very Important and 17% Abstain
264 Point 4: page 89
265 SWOT Analysis: questionnaire II: Weaknesses, question 7. A total of 83% of native actors saw the issue as Very Important.
266 Volpe, 2013
267 SEACOP, 2009
Concluding Remarks

Maritime security is without doubt poised to become one of the major topics of discussion for the international community as the 21st century progresses. While the world’s oceans have played a fundamental role in shaping society as we know it today, be it through early exploration, expressions of military might by imperial powers or even as the mode of transport used by the first mass migratory movements, Globalisation has once again morphed the maritime vector into the lifeline driving development and expansion. Even through times of economic crisis, international trade, fuelled by the maritime sector, has continued to boom. Indeed, from 2000 to 2008, total world trade grew at almost double the rate of global GDP growth. The emergence of potentially huge global economies and their ever-increasing demand for fuel, minerals and consumer goods has only worked to contribute to the expansion of the maritime sector, while a massive development in shipping registries has enabled the industry to take advantage of cheaper labour and subsequently reduce shipping costs and lower prices at the actual point of consumption. As staggering as it is, 90% of all trade is now moved by sea. Only 23% of global trade is between countries that actually share a land border and it is the shipping industry that overwhelmingly dominates the rest of the field.

The undeniable significance of maritime trade will inevitably see maritime security attract the spotlight and the Gulf of Guinea is no exception. Huge hydrocarbon reserves, increasing interest and investment by some of the world’s major economic powerhouses and the continuing growth of the global maritime industry overall has already seen maritime security become one of the major issues of the day in the region. To a certain

268 World Ocean Review, 2014
269 China alone almost quadrupled its exports after just 5 years of WTO membership.
270 International Maritime Organisation, 2011: 2
271 World Ocean Review, 2014
extent, the international community has already heeded the call, with everything from economic entities such as ECOWAS, military bodies such as AFRICOM and mission-specific agencies such as MAOC-N, to name just a few, focusing their activity on the region.

While maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is without doubt of vital importance to the international community, it is also a topic with an undeniable application in the region itself. The Niger Delta’s energy reserves are a huge source of revenue, particularly for the regional giant Nigeria,²⁷² and are dangerously reliant on safe maritime routes. States such as Benin are massively dependent on revenue generated from taxing ships moving through the region, while others source much of their food from the oceans. Regional actors such as Cameroon and Ivory Coast, to name just two examples, have taken steps to bolster their maritime security footprint, while supranational entities such as ECOWAS and ECCAS have made remarkable efforts to better police maritime zones.

However, while being a source of almost unimaginable potential wealth and development, the Gulf of Guinea maritime outlook is also the source the region’s most pressing security concerns. A quirk of geography means that this massively diverse region of West Africa is perfectly positioned as an entry point for illicit trafficking bound for lucrative markets further north and the collateral damage being caused to already fragile governments is alarmingly dangerous and destabilising. Corruption facilitates illicit activity, which in turn feeds more corruption in an aggressive spiral²⁷³ that is proving difficult to halt. Some West African nations have been battered by Latin American trafficking gangs at even the top echelons of governance and society. Guinean states officials having been associated with cross-border cocaine trafficking, the Gambian president dismissed the national head of the police, the head of the navy, the deputy head of the army and even the head of the National Drug Enforcement Agency for involvement in narcotics

²⁷² Nigeria is believed to have raised more than 400 billion USD from oil sales since the beginning of the 1970’s (Mendes Leal, 2011: 88)
²⁷³ Decludt, 2013
trafficking\textsuperscript{274} and Sierra Leone’s Minister of Transportation was forced to resign after his cousin was associated with an aircraft used to transport a notable quantity of cocaine.\textsuperscript{275}

Perversely, oil wealth is not only one of the Gulf of Guinea’s biggest source of wealth, but also the biggest source of its increasingly biggest headaches: piracy. The black market trade in stolen and bunked fuel, re-sold both in and out of the region,\textsuperscript{276} is the biggest motivation for such incidents. In what is a staggering example of the interplay between the region’s states, oil giants and military forces, allegations have also been made of payments by private companies for protection of their interests; contributing to funding for militant groups who in turn have links to piracy and drug trafficking themselves.\textsuperscript{277}

“Extortion: oil companies pay protection fees to communities and security companies to ensure pipelines are not sabotaged...Groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta admitted to stealing and smuggling oil. This theft was rationalized as re-appropriation of wealth and as a form of protest, but the line between political and criminal activity has always been blurry.” (UNODC, 2013: 45-46)

On many levels both drug trafficking and piracy can of course be traced back to the same root topics. A developing but still young sense of civil society in need of careful nurturing, compounded on by a difficult economic climate and often chronic lack of resources, opens up the Gulf of Guinea maritime vector to actors who would look to exploit it. It is for all of the above reasons that proposals for dealing with potential maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea must be made. The importance of global maritime trade and the sinister activities that can be conducted on the world’s oceans is of such a vital importance to 21\textsuperscript{st} century society that ground work must be done to ensure

\textsuperscript{274} Independent Online, 2010
\textsuperscript{275} The Guardian, 2010
\textsuperscript{276} UNODC, 2013: 45
\textsuperscript{277} International Crisis Group, 2006: 1
that the Gulf of Guinea is prepared with the best available tools for taking on such a crucial maritime security role.

Serving as a base for the SWOT analysis that followed, this research paper began with an academic approach to maritime security. The perspective offered by the Copenhagen School offers a useful insight into how securitising actors play a definitive role in bringing security issues to the forefront and worked as a foundation from which this research paper’s differentiation between native and non-native acts could be developed. Moreover, the speech act set out by the Copenhagen School is likely to be important in the future, as both regional and extra-regional actors look to draw attention to maritime security issues. On the flip side of the coin, approaches to the Gulf of Guinea by the international community also offer an interesting slant on the securitisation of a particular issue in a situation where that securitisation has either a) become more of a semi-permanent reality rather than an exceptional way of addressing a particularly pressing issue and b) become an issue that is better addressed by a re-politicisation and de-securitisation. Taking into account the results of this research paper’s SWOT analysis, maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea a safe bet to become a hugely pressing issue for the international community. A total of 88% of the questions asked to native actors were seen as Very Important, while 52% of non-native actors also had the same response.

In conclusion, there are no doubt many other initiatives which can add further to the proposals made in this research paper. However, any proposal hoping to be adopted without the backing of a notable regional or extra-regional actor would better succeed if it satisfies the 4 criteria earlier described, namely the ned to be a) realistic; b) cost-effective; c) applicable on a specifiable timescale and d) politically neutral. There are already countless maritime security initiatives championed by a hugely diverse range of actors in the Gulf of Guinea, perhaps the challenge is harnessing them rather than pushing for the creation of more.
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### Appendix I: SWOT Questionnaires

Master’s in Political Science and International Relations  
Specialisation in Globalisation and the Environment

Michael Geoffrey Risley  
SWOT Analysis  
Questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMPANY/INSTITUTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
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**Note:**  
The following questionnaire is divided into four sections, each with a series of statements which should be classified from 1 to 3 (1: not important; 2: reasonably important; 3: very important) relative to how important you consider each statement to be in relation to the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Should you wish to abstain from comment on any particular statement, please choose 4.

**ALL ANSWERS WILL BE ANALYSED AND RECORDED ANONYMously**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>IMPORTANCE*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support of the international community in providing tools and expertise (i.e. European Union, AFRICOM, IMO, UNODC, SEACOP)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional initiatives supporting maritime security (i.e. The African Union, MOWCA, ECOWAS)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The discovery and development of energy resources in the region, giving added importance to the need for security in the maritime domain</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing availability of local military and law enforcement resources in the region</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing levels of maritime trade passing through the region to other markets, giving added importance to the need for security in the maritime domain</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain
### Questionnaire II

**WEAKNESSES** of the current maritime security outlook in the Gulf of Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>IMPORTANCE*</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Differences in economic development between states in the region leading to different levels of investment in the maritime domain</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The use of the Gulf of Guinea as a transit area for illicit trafficking into other regions (i.e. drug trafficking to Europe)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A lack of state resources allocated to the maritime security domain</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Perceived corruption as a facilitator for illicit maritime activity in the region</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The transnational effects and reach of maritime security issues in the region (i.e. cross-border piracy)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Differences in national approaches to maritime security policy in the region</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Inadequate surveillance systems resulting in a lack of maritime domain awareness</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
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*1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain
### Questionnaire III

#### OPPORTUNITIES for the future maritime security outlook in the Gulf of Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>IMPORTANCE*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Increasing international recognition of the need for a stable maritime environment in the region</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Further international investment in developing maritime expertise and resources in the region</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The harmonisation of national approaches to maritime security in the region</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>States with additional resources in the region taking on a leadership role</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Developments in technology allowing for a more efficient and cost-effective monitoring of the maritime domain</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The implementation of an integrated maritime policy as tool for bringing together policies and capabilities in the maritime domain</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The implementation of policies and development programmes to address the root causes of maritime security issues in the region</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
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*1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain
### Questionnaire IV

**THREATS** for the future maritime security outlook in the Gulf of Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increasing levels of maritime piracy in the region</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-going political instability in the region (i.e. insurgency, unstable governments)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in levels of economic development in the region potentially leading to conflicts and mass migration movements</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbalanced levels of investment in the maritime security domain by states in the region</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasingly sophisticated technology available to organised criminal groups, piracy groups etc. in the region</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The corrupting effect of endemic organised crime</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain*