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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2655

Título: How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?
Autor: Barros, Pedro
Clougherty, Joseph
Seldeslachts, Jo
Orientador: Pita Barros, Pedro
Palavras-chave: antitrust, deterrence, merger policy
Issue Date: 21-Feb-2010
Resumo: We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2655
Appears in Collections:NSBE: EG - Artigos em revista internacional com arbitragem científica

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