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  <title>DSpace Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2309" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2309</id>
  <updated>2013-05-18T17:28:04Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2013-05-18T17:28:04Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>The impact of pharmaceutical policy measures: a structural-break approach</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2495" />
    <author>
      <name>Barros, PP</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Nunes, LC</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2495</id>
    <updated>2011-06-30T23:00:52Z</updated>
    <published>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The impact of pharmaceutical policy measures: a structural-break approach
Authors: Barros, PP; Nunes, LC
Abstract: Pharmaceutical spending in many other countries has had a steep increase in the
last decade. The Portuguese Government has adopted several measures to reduce
pharmaceutical expenditure growth, ranging from increased co-payments to price
decreases determined administratively. Promotion of generic consumption has also
ranked high in political priorities. We assess the overall impact of the several
policy measures on total pharmaceutical spending, using monthly data over the
period January 1995 – August 2008. Endogenous structural breaks (time-series)
methods were employed. Our findings suggest that policy measures aimed at
controlling pharmaceutical expenditure have been, in general, unsuccessful. Two
breaks were identified. Both coincide with administratively determined price
decreases. Measures aimed at increasing competition in the market had no visible
effect on the dynamics of Government spending in pharmaceutical products. In
particular, the introduction of reference pricing had only a transitory effect
of less than one year, with historical growth resuming quickly. The consequence
of it is a transfer of financial burden from the Government to the patients,
with no apparent effect on the dynamics of pharmaceutical spending. This
strongly suggests that pharmaceutical companies have been able to adjust to
policy measures, in order to sustain their sales. It remains a challenge for the
future to identify firms’ strategies that supported continued growth of sales,
despite the several policy measures adop</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Does a Tougher Competition Policy Reduce or Promote Investment?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2557" />
    <author>
      <name>Costa, AA</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Barros, PP</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2557</id>
    <updated>2011-06-30T23:00:29Z</updated>
    <published>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Does a Tougher Competition Policy Reduce or Promote Investment?
Authors: Costa, AA; Barros, PP
Abstract: The question of how interventions from the Competition Authority (CA) affect
investment is not a straightforward one: a tougher competition policy might, by
reducing the ability to exert market power, either stimulate firms to invest
more to counter the restrictions on their actions, or make firms invest less
because of the reduced ability to have a return on investment. This tension is
illustrated using two models. In one model investment is own-cost-reducing
whereas in the other investment is anti-competitive. Anti-competitive
investments are defined as investments that increase competitors’ costs. In both
models the optimal level of investment is reduced with a tougher competition
policy. Furthermore, while in the case of an anti-competitive investment a
tougher authority necessarily leads to lower prices, in the case of a cost-
reducing investment the opposite may happen when the impact of the investment on
cost is sufficiently high. Results for total welfare are ambiguous in the cost-
reducing investment model, whereas in the anti-competitive investment model
welfare unambiguously increases due to a tougher competition polic</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Double coverage and demand for health care: Evidence from quantile regression</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2552" />
    <author>
      <name>Moreira, S</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Barros, PP</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2552</id>
    <updated>2011-08-06T00:01:06Z</updated>
    <published>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Double coverage and demand for health care: Evidence from quantile regression
Authors: Moreira, S; Barros, PP
Abstract: An individual experiences double coverage when he bene ts from more than one
health insurance plan at the same time. This paper examines the impact of such
supplementary insurance on the demand for health care services. Its novelty is
that within the context of count data modelling and without imposing restrictive
parametric assumptions, the analysis is carried out for di¤erent points of the
conditional distribution, not only for its mean location. Results indicate that
moral hazard is present across the whole outcome distribution for both public
and private second layers of health insurance coverage but with greater
magnitude in the latter group. By looking at di¤erent points we unveil that
stronger double coverage e¤ects are smaller for high levels of usage. We use
data for Portugal, taking advantage of particular features of the public and
private protection schemes on top of the statutory National Health Service. By
exploring the last Portuguese Health Survey, we were able to evaluate their
impacts on the consumption of doctor visi</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Health care costs of domestic violence against women – evidence from Portugal</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2553" />
    <author>
      <name>Barros, Pedro</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lisboa, Manuel</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Barrenho, Eliana</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Cerejo, Dalila</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10362/2553</id>
    <updated>2010-01-27T07:30:44Z</updated>
    <published>2010-01-27T07:19:06Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Health care costs of domestic violence against women – evidence from Portugal
Authors: Barros, Pedro; Lisboa, Manuel; Barrenho, Eliana; Cerejo, Dalila
Abstract: Our main objective is to estimate the additional health care costs to the Portuguese National Health Service&#xD;
(NHS) due to domestic violence against women. We collected information through a survey addressed to&#xD;
health care centres’ female users. Both victims and non-victims of violence were inquired. We estimate&#xD;
costs according to five different groups – consultation costs, health care treatment and therapeutic costs,&#xD;
costs of complementary and diagnostic exams, drugs costs and transport costs. The estimations have been&#xD;
split into two perspectives – the NHS perspective (public perspective) and private perspective of inquired&#xD;
women (out of pocket payments).&#xD;
The timeframe of our calculations is one year, referring to all costs generated by domestic violence&#xD;
situations in the last twelve months. Essentially costs were estimated through the product of total number of&#xD;
episodes by the average estimated price per episode. Additionally, for the private costs, we also considered&#xD;
the costs originated by income losses, the opportunity cost of time spent on health care treatments and the&#xD;
work inability caused by sickness.&#xD;
The results suggest that the victims of domestic violence’s additional demand for health care is&#xD;
valued €140 per annum, that is about 22% higher than health care costs of non-victims. These results match&#xD;
those of similar studies for the United States, taking account of per capita differences in health care&#xD;
spending. A large proportion (90%) of the additional costs associated with domestic violence is supported&#xD;
by the NHS, where consultations and drugs are the most important contributors of such costs. Health&#xD;
consequences of domestic violence result from losses in quality of life and worst health status of victims&#xD;
and correspond to additional permanent economic costs of domestic violence episodes.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-01-27T07:19:06Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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